ADM 186/339

Attention is drawn to the penalties attached to any infraction of the Official Secrets
Acts.



C.B. 3001/1914-36

SUMMARY

OF

PROGRESS IN NAVAL
GUNNERY, 1914-1936

________________


TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
NAVAL STAFF,
ADMIRALTY, S.W.
December, 1936.

















This document is a modern transcription of Admiralty record ADM 186/339. It was
transcribed by David Chessum on behalf of the H.M.S. Hood Association for
inclusion in its website.

The original document is held at the Public Records Office (PRO) at Kew, London. It
is reproduced here by kind permission of the PRO. Crown Copyright reserved.
NOTE.

The following summary has been compiled from data extracted from the
various editions of Progress in Naval Gunnery published up to 1936 inclusive, and
represents a record of the experience accumulated since 1914.
3

Summary of Progress in Naval Gunnery,

1914-1936

CONTENTS

Page
CHAPTER I. Single Ship Fire Control War Experience and
Development .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6
Section 1. - Capital Ships .. .. .. .. .. 6
Section 2. Cruisers .. .. .. .. .. .. 8
Section 3. Destroyers .. .. .. .. .. 8

CHAPTER II. Review of Modifications affecting the Control of Fire
Of Single Ships when Aircraft Observation is not available 10
Section 1. Explanatory Remarks .. .. .. .. 10
Section 2. Affecting all Ships .. .. .. .. 10
Section 3. Affecting Capital Ships (Main Armament) an Cruisers 11
Section 4. Affecting those Ships to which the Destroyer and/or
Submarine Spotting Rules apply .. .. 13
Section 5. Affecting Capital Ships (Secondary Armament) only 21
Section 6. Affecting Cruisers only .. .. .. .. 23
Section 7. Affecting Aircraft Carriers only .. .. .. 26
Section 8. Affecting Submarines only .. .. .. 28

CHAPTER III. Compensation for Own and Enemy Alterations of
Course .. .. .. .. .. ... .. 30
Section 1. Compensation for Own Ships Movements .. 30
Section 2. Compensation for Enemy Alteration of .. 34

CHAPTER IV. Defence against D.C.Bs and C.M.Bs .. .. 38
Section 1. Repulse of a Daylight C.M.B. Attack by Destroyer
Screen .. .. .. .. .. .. 38
Section 2. Repulse of C.M.B. Attacks by Other Classes of Ships 38

CHAPTER V. Aircraft spotting .. .. .. .. .. 40
Section 1. General .. .. .. .. .. .. 40
Section 2. Position to be taken up by Spotting Aircraft .. 40
Section 3. Method of Reporting Fall of Shot .. .. 40
Section 4. Accuracy of Aircraft Reports of Fall of Shot .. 42
Section 5. Aircraft Spotting Rules .. .. .. .. 42
Section 6. Relative Importance of Fall of Shot and Course
Reports .. .. .. .. .. 43
Section 7. Range and Bearing Finding by Aircraft .. .. 43

CHAPTER VI. The Value of Long Range Fire .. .. .. 46

CHAPTER VII. Concentration of Fire in Capital Ships .. 48
Section 1. War Experience .. .. .. .. .. 48
Section 2. Master Ship Control and Individual Ship Control 49
Section 3. Position of Master Ship and Datum Ship .. 51
Section 4. Method of obtaining the best Rate of Hitting .. 52
Section 5. The Firing Signal .. .. .. .. 53
Section 6. Breakdowns in Communication in Master Ship
Control .. .. .. .. .. 55
Section 7. Concentration on Enemy Turning Point .. .. 57

CHAPTER VIII. Concentration of Fire in Cruisers .. .. 60
Section 1. War Experience and Post War Development .. 60
Section 2. Concentration in Close Formation when Normal
Procedure is not suitable .. .. .. 61
Section 3. Concentration by Cruisers widely separated .. 63
Section 4. Position of Master Ship and Datum Ship .. 67

(C23461) v 2
4

Page
CHAPTER VIII Concentration of Fire in Cruisers continued.
Section 5. Method of obtaining the best Rate of Hitting .. .. 68
Section 6. Firing Signal .. .. .. .. .. .. 69
Section 7. Concentration of Fire against Enemy Destroyer Flotillas 69

CHAPTER IX. Concentration of Fire in Destroyers .. .. .. 72
Section 1. War Experience .. .. .. .. .. .. 72
Section 2. Position of Master Ship and Datum Ship .. .. 72
Section 3. Method of obtaining the best Rate of Hitting .. .. 74
Section 4. Firing Signal .. .. .. .. .. .. 74

CHAPTER X. Night Action General .. .. .. .. .. 78
Section 1. General .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 78
Section 2. War Experience .. .. .. .. .. .. 78
Section 3. Nature of Fire .. .. .. .. .. .. 79
Section 4. Value of Tracers .. .. .. .. .. .. 79

CHAPTER XI. Night Action Illuminants .. .. .. .. 82
Section 1. Development and Use of Illuminants .. .. .. 82
Section 2. Silhouetting Effect of Illuminants on Ships using them .. 86
Section 3. Searching an Area with Star Shell .. .. .. 88

CHAPTER XII. Night Action Procedure when in Company .. .. 92
Section 1. General .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 92
Section 2. A Division of Capital Ships .. .. .. .. 92
Section 3. A Cruiser Squadron .. .. .. .. .. 96
Section 4. A Division of Destroyers .. .. .. .. 98

CHAPTER XIII. Trend Spotting .. .. .. .. .. .. 108

CHAPTER XIV. Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Long Range .. .. 114
Section 1. Rate of Fire .. .. .. .. .. .. 114
Section 2. Reduction of Rate of Fire and Increase of Dead Time when
Loading Difficulties Increase 4 in. Guns .. .. 115
Section 3. Concentration Identification of Own Bursts .. .. 119
Section 4. Use of Guessed Data for Opening Fire .. .. .. 120
Section 5. Possibility of Spotting for Fuze Length or Height .. 121
Section 6. Value of Flank Observation Reports .. .. .. 122

CHAPTER XV. Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Close Range .. .. .. 124
Value of Tracers in Observation of Fire and Proportion to be used .. 124

CHAPTER XVI. Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Use of Guns primarily
mounted for Anti-Ship purposes .. .. .. .. .. 128
Section 1. Long Range Fire .. .. .. .. .. .. 128
Section 2. Close Range Fire .. .. .. .. .. .. 130

CHAPTER XVII. Anti-Aircraft Gunnery At Night .. .. .. 132

CHAPTER XVIII. Bombardment .. .. .. .. .. 136
Section 1. Spotting Rules .. .. .. .. .. .. 136
Section 2. F.O.O. v. Ship Control .. .. .. .. .. 136
Section 3. Orientation of the Clock when used for Ground Observation 138
Section 4. Accuracy and Roll on which Salvos should be Fired .. 139






CHAPTER I


___________


Single Ship Fire Control War Experience and
Development

___________


Section 1. Capital Ships.

Section 2. Cruisers.

Section 3. Destroyers.





(C23461) B3
6 C.B.3001/1914-36 PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER I

__________

War Experience and the Development of Single Ship Fire Control

__________


SECTION 1. CAPITAL SHIPS

System 1914

1. In the year 1914 a high standard of efficiency in the control of fire was
attained; the system used was thoroughly understood and there was no lack of
confidence in the ability of the fire control system to compete successfully with the
accepted standards of range and general battle conditions.

2. Briefly, the rangefinder equipment was used to feed the fire control
gear, and the latter was relied upon to furnish the requisite information for successful
attack on a moving target. In conjunction with this, the bracket system of spotting
was universally used to correct the best mean range into the actual gun range after
opening fire.

The correction of the remaining factors, such as rate and deflection, was
primarily dependent upon observation of fire, although great importance was attached
to the use of the fire control gear as a guide.

Battle Experience

3. The earliest engagements of the war gave no cause to suspect that the
firing rules were inadequate to deal with battle conditions.

4. The Battle of Heligoland Bight in 1914, fought in very low visibility
was not of a character to produce any reliable evidence one way or another. It
showed, however -
The impossibility of taking ranges in low visibility conditions.

5. The action off the Falkland Islands in the same year demonstrated the
following :-
(i) The rangefinder equipment failed to provide much information. (This
was chiefly due to the range at which the action was fought, which
outclassed the 9-ft rangefinders.)
(ii) The use of defensive tactics (zigzagging) rendered the control of fire
extremely difficult, and placed a high premium on rapidity of fire as
soon as the gun range was found.

6. In J anuary, 1915, the Battle of the Dogger Bank afforded the first real
experience of battle under modern conditions, with capital ships of similar class
opposed to one another in line.
CHAP. I. SECT. 1.- CAPITAL SHIPS

While, as already stated, the system in use depended on observation of fire,
supported but not dependent on rangefinder ranges, this action confirmed the lessons
learnt from the Battle of Falkland Islands and demonstrated that
Spotting (observation of fire) was extremely difficult, hits and overs
could rarely be observed, and, therefore, shorts were the only guide to the
fall of shot relative to the target.

Other lessons learnt from this battle in connection with the control of fire
were:-
(i) Rapidity of fire is essential.
(ii) Owing to lack of range observations the rate of change of range could
not be plotted, and the gun was mainly used as its own rangefinder and
ratekeeper.

It is of interest to note that after this battle the suggestion was made that as
soon as the range is found, ships fitted with director* should fire a double salvo,
thus introducing the germ of an idea which was later to revolutionise the control of
fire.

7. On 31st May, 1916, the Battle of J utland was fought between the two
main fleets.
Again the great difficulty experienced by control officers was in
observing the fall of shot, while range-taking and rate-keeping were again
found immeasurably harder than at target practices.

The severe punishment to which the enemy were subjected under difficult
conditions clearly proved that efficiency in the use of the accepted system of control
was great, but it also clearly proved that

Under the conditions of modern battle, with vessels of great mobility
and manoeuvring power, the system of control must not be based on rate-
finding alone.

It was also shown that

At great ranges and with a long time of flight, the system of firing one
salvo, and awaiting its fall, was much too slow, although it had answered well
enough at pre-war ranges.

It was further demonstrated that a battle was liable, under certain conditions,
to devolve into a series of fleeting opportunities, frequently of short duration, and that
for this reason also

Any system of control depending on range finding would be wrong in
principle, and incapable of developing the maximum hitting power of the
armament.

8. One of the more far-reaching reforms was the introduction in
September, 1916, of a new system of control and the 1916 Spotting Rules.

9. These spotting rules have never undergone the test of battle, and such
modifications as have since been made are in consequence of circumstances arising
during practice firings of all natures, and the post-war development of material.
* At the date of this action, the director system was fitted to only a few capital
ships and to none of the smaller ships.

(C23461) B4


8 C.B.3001/1914-36.- PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

SECTION 2. CRUISERS

System

10. The system of control used in cruisers followed a somewhat similar
line of development to that outlined for the capital ship.

Battle experience

11. Cruisers participated in practically every sea battle, but no radical
improvements were effected in fire control as the result of lessons of early actions, it
generally being accepted that these ships were normally spread, and therefore unlikely
to be called upon to fight ore than a single-ship action.

After the Battle of J utland a series of spotting rules was drawn up for use in
cruisers.

12. A cruiser action was fought on 17th November, 1917. This action was
the real turning point of cruiser gunnery, as was J utland in the case of capital ships.
The enemy made considerable use of smoke screens.

(i) Owing to the smoke, overs were practically never seen, so that
straddles could be judged only by the number of short shots observed
out of a salvo of a known number of guns.
(ii) Splashes showed up badly against the smoke.
(iii) Hits with H.E. nose fuzed shell were distinguishable, and were not
confused with the flash of enemys guns.
(iv) Great difficulty was experienced in judging inclination of enemy due to
smoke and frequent zigzags.
(v) No inconvenience to spotting was caused by the splash of enemy
salvos.

13. It was generally reported that the Spotting Rules met requirements. It
was in this action that a blind ladder was employed, a form of control which has
since been embodied in the Spotting Rules. It is not known if this method was
effective.

SECTION 3. DESTROYERS

System

14. Pre-war policy was to employ local control without instruments of any
sort, on the assumption that destroyer actions would be fought at close range.

The commencement of the war showed an inclination on the part of destroyers
to open fire at long range and this consequently led to elementary methods of primary
control in all ships.

After the Battle of J utland improved fire control arrangements were fitted, and
a set of Spotting Rules introduced.

CHAPTER II

______________

Review of Modifications affecting the Control of Fire of Single Ships when
Aircraft Observation is not available


_______________

Section 1. Explanatory Remarks

Section 2. Affecting all Ships

Section 3. Affecting Capital Ships (Main Armament) and Cruisers.

Section 4. Affecting those Ships to which the Destroyer and/or
Submarine Spotting Rules are applicable.

Section 5. - Affecting Capital Ships (Secondary Armaments) only.

Section 6. Affecting Cruisers only.

Section 7. Affecting Aircraft Carriers only.

Section 8. Affecting Submarines only.

10 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36


CHAPTER II

________

Review of Modifications affecting the Control of
Fire of Single Ships when Aircraft Observation
is not available

__________


SECTION 1. EXPLANATORY REMARKS

1. In this chapter is contained a review of the various modifications to the
rules for the Control of Fire by day of single ships, when aircraft spotting is not
available.

2. The Spotting Rules in their present form were adopted :-

Capital Ships (Main armament) .. .. 1917
Capital Ships (Secondary armament) .. .. 1921
Cruisers .. .. .. .. .. 1917
Aircraft Carriers .. .. .. .. 1933
Leaders and Destroyers .. .. .. 1923
Submarines .. .. .. .. .. 1930
Sloops, etc. .. .. .. .. .. 1923

Since these dates various minor modifications have been proposed some of
which have been adopted and others decided against Each class of ship has worked
independently, with the result that proposals similar in principle to those made by
other classes of ship, have been reviewed on more than one occasion.

3. In summarising the proposed modifications they have been grouped
into sections. Sections 2-4 contain those proposals which, although perhaps only
proposed and investigated by one class of ship, contain principles which are
applicable to others. Sections 5-8 contain those proposals applicable only to the class
of ship concerned.

SECTION 2. AFFECTING ALL SHIPS

INITIAL DEFLECTION SPREAD

4. In 1930 it was realised that the rules for finding the deflection in
various classes of ships differed unnecessarily in minor ways, such as the amount and
direction of the spread.

5. As a step towards attaining consistency, it was decided to carry out
trials of spreading the first salvo towards the enemys bow and the second towards the
stern. This procedure was selected on the grounds that a salvo missing ahead may
give information

CHAP. II. SECT. 2. AFFECTING ALL SHIPS 11

As to elevation due to target travel during the time the splashes are visible. Against
this, there appeared to be a chance that the second salvo might be obscured by the
first.

6. Reports received during 1930 were generally in favour of this
proposal, though it was represented that the probability of information being gained
fr0m a miss ahead is not so great as to justify the complication to the rules. It was
suggested that greater simplicity would result, and the possibility of error be removed
by using a standard spread to the right for the first salvo, and to the left for the second.

7. This proposal was adopted in 1932. In addition, a standard magnitude
was ordered, the total spread to be at least two-thirds the width of the target with a
minimum of 4 knots (or equivalent in units) for capital ship main armaments, and 8
knots (or equivalent in units) for all other armaments.

USE OF 100-YARD CORRECTIONS

8. Reports were called for at the end of 1932 regarding the desirability of
limiting the occasions on which corrections of 100 yards for range are permissible, in
view of the frequent occasions on which range spotting corrections are insufficiently
bold.

9. As a result of these reports it was not considered that a case had been
made out for altering the existing rules, but it was stressed that control officers must
constantly bear in mind the necessity for the use of bold spotting corrections,
especially when aircraft are not available for spotting.

SECTION 3. AFFECTING CAPITAL SHIPS (MAIN ARMAMENT)
AND CRUISERS

SIZE OF STEPS OF A REGAINING LADDER

10. It was reported by cruisers in 1929 that, in a number of high speed
practices, mistakes in estimation of inclination and delay in observation of target
alterations of course had resulted in several failures of a 200-ard regaining ladder
(three steps of 200 yards) to refind the target, and proposals were put forward to
amend the Cruiser Spotting Rules to make the normal regaining ladder of 40-yard
steps, and an abnormal one of 200-yard steps. It was further proposed that with 8-
inch cruisers, owing to the larger spread of salvos, the steps should be one of 400
yards followed by two of 200 yards.

11. That the first step should be 400 yards was considered sound,
observing that it is usual to wait for a confirming salvo before ordering a regaining
ladder. The accumulated error in range is therefore likely to be more than 200 yards.
12 C.B.3001/1914-36 PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

12. It was considered, however, that further steps of 400 yards were wrong. In
the first place, although this would make certain of crossing the target, two large zones
would be left in which no hits on a ship would be obtained. In the second place, the
accumulated error between the last straddling salvo and the last step of the regaining
ladder should rarely be as much as 1,000 yards, and this area would be effectively
covered by a ladder of one 400 and two 200-yard steps.

13. The rules finally adopted are as laid down in the Firing Manual, namely:-

The normal regaining ladder is-
(a) First step 400 yards, second and third steps 200 yards each.
Abnormal regaining ladders are-
(b) Three steps of 200 yards each for use when firing at slow targets,
such as a damaged ship in action, a towed target in peace practices,
or in a chase.
(c) Three steps of 400 yards each when firing at a very fast target,
when alterations are difficult to observe or in bad visibility.

INDIRECT FIRE-SPOTTING RULES FOR LINE NECESSITY
FOR A LINE SPOTTING OFFICER

Spotting Rules for Line

14. In 1931 approval was given to spread deflection salvos for line if aircraft
reports indicated that salvos were 200 yards or more from the target.

15. As a result of practices carried out, the opinions were formed in 1933 that-
(i) The spotting rules for line should be based on the same principles as those
for range.
(ii) Spotting corrections for line should not be given when the firing ship is
altering course, if line has been correct previously.
(iii) Corrections for line should generally be based on the trend of a number of
salvos.
(iv) The opening double salvo should not be spread for range or line.
These opinions have been subsequently confirmed.

Line Spotting Officer

16. Concurrently with the foregoing, the necessity or otherwise of a line
spotting officer was investigated. The conclusion was reached that a separate line
spotting officer was neither necessary nor desirable; officers should have the same duties
in indirect fire as in direct fire.

CHAP. II. SECT. 4. AFFECTING SHIPS USING DESTROYER OR 13
SUBMARINE SPOTTING RULES

SECTION 4. AFFECTING THOSE SHIPS TO WHICH
DESTROYER AND/OR SUBMARINE SPOTTING
RULES ARE APPLICABLE

SPOTTING RULES LADDER v. SINGLE STEP SYSTEM OR
COMBINATION OF BOTH SYSTEMS

Destroyers

17. Spotting rules embodying double salvos were introduced subsequent to the
Battle of J utland, the target being found for range on the ladder principle, which is still in
force.

Ladder versus Single Step

18. This principle has been questioned in past years, however, and suggestions
were put forward that the secondary armament method, i.e., rapid salvos and single step
corrections, might be preferable. This point of view was first advance din 1921, mainly
with a view to increasing the rate of fire, which was reduced to a point below that of
which the guns (Q.F. 4-inch) were capable by control delays.

19. It was foreshadowed that a combination of the ladder method for finding
the target, and the single step for keeping the range or regaining the target, might prove
the most successful. This procedure was adopted as Standard early in 1923 after a series
of trials.

20. These rules stood the test of Agamemnon firings during 1924 and 1925,
but again the opinion was put forward that the single step system might be preferable, and
further investigations were carried out during 1926.

21. The arguments advanced in favour of the single step system (though sea
opinion was sharply divided on the merits of the two systems) were-

(a) Control officer has only to think of one step at a time.
(b) Should a critical salvo be unobserved, due to an error in laying, smoke, or
other interference, there are others in the air that can be spotted on with
very small delay.
(c) The rules for finding and regaining the target are similar.

22. Those who were in favour of the Standard Rules maintained that they were
the fruit of war experience, had not in practice proved difficult for the average officer to
apply, and would on the whole obtain earlier hitting.

23. Theoretical considerations tended to favour the Standard Rules, except
when the initial salvos were 700-900 yards from the target. The results of 54 firings in
1926, showed 19 favoured the Standard Rules as against 10 for the Single Step System,
25 showing no advantage either way.
14 C.B.301/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

In addition mistakes appeared in the application of the Single Step System,
which showed it to be not so simple to use as was supposed; these were principally
caused by loss of control due to continuous firing in rapid salvos.

24. At the end of 1927, a scrutiny of practices carried out gave the relative
advantage of each in obtaining early hitting as follows:-

Percentage in favour
of Standard Rules
Percentage in favour
of Single Step.
Percentage in favour
of neither
1925 (A.F.) 35 48 17
(Med.) 40 25 35
1926 (54 firings) 35 19 46
1927 (132 firings 49 23 47

A decision was made in favour of the Standard Rules.

Combination of two systems

25. Nevertheless, there were an appreciable number of practices which
favoured the Single Step System, and it was decided to carry out an investigation (by
the A.F. Flotillas) into the value of a combination of the two.

26. In its elementary form, the Control Officer, on observing a deflection
salvo over or short, fired two salvos, each preceded by a correction of 400 yards in the
direction of the target, immediately ordering Rapid Salvos after firing the second
salvo. If the target was not located by either of these two salvos, he reverted to salvos
and repeated the procedure.

27. Reports were strongly in favour of these modified rules, and a scrutiny
of all practices (107) carried out during 1928 suggested that there was little to choose
between the standard and modified rules. Further investigation was ordered in 1929.

At the end of that year, after a very careful scrutiny of all destroyer practices,
the following questions were considered to be answered as indicated:-

Question. Answer.
(i) Which rules result in the earliest
hitting?
(i) Neither one shows any advantage
(ii) Which rules are least expensive of
ammunition?
(ii) Standard.
(iii) Which rules are simplest of
application?
(iii) Indications were that the Standard
Rules were more simple.

28. It was therefore decided to adhere to the Standard Rules. These are
the ones now in force.


CHAP. II. SECT. 4. AFFECTING SHIPS USING DESTROYER OR 15
SUBMARINE SPOTTING RULES

POINT OF AIM AT VERY SHORT RANGES

Destroyers

29. It was suggested in 1930 that, at very close range, it would be very
difficult to obtain shorts if the standard point of aim were adhered to, and that, in
consequence, it would become necessary to aim at the waterline under the foremast.
It was further suggested that the waterline should be the standard point of aim, except
when in director or gyro firing.

30 It was considered undesirable to have a different point of aim for
different methods of firing, and that requirements would be med by giving the order
Water line if a very close range was reached.

Submarines

31. A similar proposal was received from submarines in 1934. Further
information was asked for but none has yet been received.

Sloops

32. A similar proposal was received from the A/S Training Flotilla, as a
result of some practices in which the Asdic was used for ranging on the B.P. target
before it was officially in sight (i.e., a submarine surfacing during a hunt).

There was an appreciable difference between the Asdic range and the hitting
gun range, and it was suggested that this was due to the top of the target being used as
the point of aim.

Attention was drawn to the proposal made by submarines.

SPREAD FOR DEFLECTION AT VERY SHORT RANGES

33. The desirability of spreading the initial deflection salvos at very short
ranges was questioned by submarines in 1933. It was pointed out that the minimum
spread of 8 knots (total) was about 20 feet, which was quite sufficient to miss either
side of a submarines conning tower.

It was suggested, on the score of simplicity, as well as to save delay, that
whenever a single step was used for range, it should also be used for finding the target
for deflection.

34. This proposal was adopted after trial during 1934.

USE OF AN INITIAL LARGE CORRECTION

Destroyers

35. The use of a 1,000 yard correction as the initial step of a range ladder
was first authorised in 1922. Its use was dependent on the accuracy of the
rangefinder, and instructions were given that it should not be used when reliabl
rangefinder ranges were available.

16 C.B.301/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

Two cautions were added:-

(i) When opening fire under conditions of poor visibility, if shots are
short, caution is necessary as regards the deployment of the initial
1,000-yard step since it may cause shots to be lost altogether. (Ships
were armed with 4-inch guns.)
(ii) If the 1,000-yard correction crosses the target, a reverse 400-yard
ladder with an initial 800-yard step was to be fired in the reverse
direction until the target was crossed, i.e., steps must not be diminished
when the limit covered by the large initial correction is approached,
owing to the possibility of an error in rate.

36. In 1927 it was suggested that the use of an initial 1,000-yard correction
should be made obligatory at ranges over 10,000 yards. It was considered undesirable
to lay down a hard and fast ruling, and that Control Officer should judge each case on
its merits, bearing in mind the following:-

(i) A 9-ft. rangefinder in a destroyer will give a range of the target within
the scope of a 400-yard ladder up to a maximum splash visibility,
provided the instrument is in adjustment, and the operator is accurate.
(ii) Accuracy increases as range decreases, due both to instrumental and
personal causes.
(iii) Accuracy decreases rapidly with poor visibility, motion on ship due to
sea, vibration due to speed, etc.

37. It will be appreciated that in the foregoing paragraphs the 1,000-yard
correction was the step of ladder. This was subsequently modified, the instructions
directing that if the deflection salvos are observed to be far out of range, a correction
of 1,000 yards is to be applied in the direction of the target, and a further double salvo
fired. These salvos may be spread for direction, if desired, and are to be treated
exactly as deflection salvos.

38. In 1931 these instructions were questioned and instructions for
deflection salvos over or short modified to read:-

The steps of the ladder are normally to be 400 yards, but if the
deflection salvos have been observed very far wrong for range, or if Control
Officer considers his range is probably largely in error, the first step is to be
1,000 yards.

39. This amendment was promulgated in Progress in Naval Gunnery,
1931, but not inserted in the current Destroyer Firing Manual, and subsequently
overlooked.

40. Further remarks on the use of this correction were promulgated in
1935, and it was pointed out that there appeared to be a reluctance among G.C.O.s to
use the initial large steps.

CHAP. II. SECT. 4. AFFECTING SHIPS USING DESTROYER OR 17
SUBMARINE SPOTTING RULES

The limitations of a rangefinder were again pointed out, and it was suggested that the
logical tendency should be towards the use of the large correction, except at short and
medium ranges.

41. A suggestion had also been received that a ladder with an initial step of
800 yards should be authorised.

42. No remarks on this proposal have been received from sea, but the
principle has been embodied in the new Destroyer Firing Manual.

Submarines

43. In 1933 a proposal was received that for submarines a 1,000-yard
correction should be made compulsory in all long range practices.

44. The range-finding facilities in submarines are dependent on knowledge
of the height of the target, which may give satisfactory results in peace practices when
this is accurately know, but such accuracy cannot be expected in war. Neither does
the low height of eye make it easy to judge if the error in range is large.

45. It was not considered desirable to amend the existing rules to make the
use of this correction compulsory, but the wording was altered to read-

if the deflection salvos have been observed to be very far wrong for range, or
if Control Officer considers his range may be largely in error, the first step is
to be 1,000 yards.

LIMITED RANGE FOR LADDER SYSTEM OF SPOTTING

Submarines

46. It was suggested in 1932 that the ladder system is unsuitable for
submarines because, at the ranges at which submarine actions are likely to be fought,
the time of flight will not permit of two salvos being in the air at once.

47. The Submarine Firing Manual, however, does order the rules to be
used under these circumstances, but at present there is no limit defined.

It was proposed for trial that the short range rules should be used below 4,000
yards.

48. Subsequent experience showed this range to be excessive. Although in
one firing, the ladder system was successfully employed down to 2,200 yards,
evidence tended to show, with well drilled personnel, the limiting range to be of the
order of 2,500 to 3,000 yards. Opinion tends towards a limit of 3,000 yards, unless
the standard of control and gun drill is above the average.

49. Further information is required.
18 C.B.301/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

THE MAGNITUDE OF VERIFYING CORRECTIONS

Submarines

50. It has been suggested that a verifying correction shall be 200 yards
instead of 100 yards.

Opinion appears to favour this proposal, but no definite evidence in its favour
has been put forward.

51. Further information is required.

SIZE OF STEPS OF A REVERSE LADDER WHEN A STEP OF A LADDER
FALLS OUT FOR LINE

Destroyers

52. In 1934 the instructions were that if a salvo of a ladder fell out for line,
but the next salvo crossed, the 800-yard gap was to be swept out be a reverse ladder of
200-yard steps.

53. The proposal was made that a reverse ladder of 400 yards should be
used, in order to find the target more simply, and to make the application simpler in
operation.

54. No great amount of experience was obtained on this proposal, but in
1936 it was decided that this was similar in principle to the action in cruisers when
firing a regaining ladder after the target had been lost, and it was decided that the
reverse ladder should normally be of 400-yard steps, except when engaging a slow-
moving target, or under other conditions when the rate of change of range could not
be large, in which case the steps could be 200 yards.

Submarines

55. The instructions direct that if a 400-yard step falls out for line, and the
next step crosses the target, the reverse corrections shall be 200 and then 400 yards.

This was questioned in 1931, and it was proposed to fire a reverse ladder using
continuous 200 yard steps.

56. It was decided not to alter the existing instructions, unless further
experience showed this to be necessary.

RULES FOR O.O.Q. CONTROL

Destroyers

57. This problem was investigated in 1923-4. Considerations of space and
personnel in destroyers render it impracticable for the O.O.Q. to make use of any
instrumental aids, with the exception of a time of flight watch, and the question arose
as to how the simultaneous fire of the foremost and after groups could most efficiently
be carried out when being controlled by their respective O.O.Q.s in local control.

CHAP. II. SECT. 4. AFFECTING SHIPS USING DESTROYER OR 19
SUBMARINE SPOTTING RULES

58. Considerable experience in 1923-24 gave rise to the following
instructions:-

The primary control communications between the guns of a group are
to be used so far as they remain efficient.
Range and deflection orders are to be given as spotting corrections
only.
One sight setter in each group is the master, and passes total range and
deflection to the other gun or tuns of his group as soon as his own sights are
set.
Destroyer spotting rules are to be adhered to in principle.
If no appreciable interval elapses between failure of the primary
control and the O.O.Q. taking over the range may be assumed to be nearly
correct, and, should his first salvo miss, a 400-yard ladders should be started.
In other cases the first step of the ladder is to be 1,000 yards.
An isolated gun should not fire, unless it can do so during the silent
interval, or unless another target is available.

59. The above rules did not deal with the question of mutual interference
to the control of two groups by the fall of shot. Confusion naturally arose from this
cause, and was also attributable to the O.O.Q.s firings being carried out at ranges of
4,000-6,000 yards.

60. These difficulties led to emphasis being laid on the necessity for not
abandoning primary control whilst the Transmitting Station and communications to
the guns, remained serviceable, and that casualties to the G.C.O. or to bridge
personnel should be met by summoning an officer from another station to carry on the
control of fire for the whole armament.

61. Consideration was given to the method whereby the firing of the after
group depended upon that of the foremost group, a salvo from the latter being
considered the executive order to the after group to fire. This method showed
promise, but the question was raised as to the minimum interval that cold be allowed
between the firing of the two groups if mutual interference was to be avoided. It was
suggested that, as the time of flight might differ by from 2-3 seconds between groups,
and as all guns would not fire exactly together, 5 seconds was a suitable interval. Tho
achieve this interval it was thought that 3 seconds should be aimed at.

62. It was also pointed out in Progress in Naval Gunnery, 1927 that the
rules in the Destroyer Firing Manual governing this form of practice allowed the
firing to be begun at 4,000 yards with a closing rate.

63. Further trials disclosed the fact that the arrangement, whereby the after
group depended on the foremost one, became a case of each group waiting for the
other, and the method to be used was reiterated in Progress in Naval Gunnery,
1930, as follows:-

The forward group is to develop its maximum rate of controlled fire,
the after group being regulated so as not to interfere, and endeavouring to fire
within three seconds of the
20 C.B.301/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

foremost group. At very close ranges, it may be possible for both groups to be
controlled with their maximum rates of fire without mutual interference, but it
will be apparent as soon as interference occurs, and then it is the duty of the
after group to reduce its rate of fire to the point where efficient control of both
groups again becomes possible.

64. At the same time, modified rules were in use in the Mediterranean
Fleet, and it was decided to adopt them. They are-

When casualties occur, the most experienced officer should take over
or retain control of as much of the armament as possible.
For instance, casualties in the Transmitting Station should not prevent
the foremost group from being controlled by the G.C.O. from the bridge, and
casualties on the bridge should be met by providing another officer in this
position as soon as possible, in order to continue in primary control.
In O.O.Q. control decisive results will only be obtained at close range.
It is impracticable for the O.O.Q. to make use of any special
instruments, with the exception of a time of flight watch.

The following rules are to be observed:-

(i) Both groups are to fire at their maximum rate, except that, when both
groups are firing at the same target and confusion arises in identifying
the fall of shot, the O.O.Q. of the after group is temporarily to reduce
the rate of fire of his group to such an extent as may be necessary to
allow the situation to be cleared up.
(ii) The O.O.Q. is to give the permissive order Shoot for each salvo to
the master sight-setter, who will pass the total range and deflection to
the other gun of the group, and will then order Fire.
(iii) The O.O.Q. is to correct the range and deflection by spotting
corrections, using single step rules as under.
(iv) Deflection salvos need not be fired at ranges below 4,000 yards.
(v) No bracket is to be continued below 200 yards.
(vi) Finding the range.- Use an 800-yard bracket, except when the interval
between the breakdown of the primary control and the O.O.Q. taking
over is very short, when a 400-yard bracket may be used. If, however,
the target has not been crossed during primary control, and 800-yard
bracket is to be used in every case, regardless of the interval in taking
over.
CHAP. II. SECT. 4. AFFECTING SHIPS USING DESTROYER OR 21
SUBMARINE SPOTTING RULES

(vii) Keeping the Range.- If a Down 200 correction causes the shot to fall
short, it should be reversed. Unless hits are observed, if three
consecutive salvos produce no short shots, the target is to be
considered lost.
(viii) Regaining the Target.- Use a 400-yard bracket.
(ix) Rate is to be allowed for by an estimated correction superimposed on
spotting corrections.
(x) An isolated gun is not to be allowed to interfere with the control of the
remainder. If there is no separate target available such a gun is to
check fire.

65. These rules proved generally successful. It was proposed, however,
that when finding the range, an initial 800-yard bracket should always be used, if in
primary control the target has not been crossed; and that in most cases it would be
better to use an 800-yard bracket, unless the target was actually straddled.

66. These views are concurred in, but further information is required
before amending the rules.


SECTION 5. AFFECTING CAPITAL SHIPS (SECONDARY
ARMAMENTS) ONLY

SPOTTING RULES

Nelson and Rodney only

67. After trials of triple 2-gun deflection salvos, and a continuous ladder
for finding the range, it was decided to use the standard secondary armament spotting
rules in Nelson and Rodney.

CORRECTION TO RANGEFINDER RANGES FOR LAG ON
OPENING FIRE

15-inch Ships

68. The original instructions were that a correction, equal to the rate in use,
was to be applied to the rangefinder range obtained prior to opening fire. This
allowed for a delay of one minute due to the accumulation of the following intervals:-

(i) Time taken by rangetaker, when he has obtained a cut, to read off and
call the range.
(ii) Time taken to transmit the range tot eh clock.
(iii) Time taken to set the sights and fire.
(iv) Time of flight.
22 C.B.301/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

69. Although the use of a correction equal to the rate in use was a
convenient amount, it seemed to be excessive, observing that (iv) is 25 secs. at 12,000
yards and (i) (ii) and (iii) should be completed in 20 seconds. It was therefore
proposed that the allowance should be reduced to an amount equal to three-quarters of
the rate in use.

70. It was then pointed out that (iii) was not truly applicable, since by the
time (i) and (ii) had occurred the rate should be on the clock, in which case (i) and (ii)
should not amount to more than 40 secs., and in consequence an allowance equivalent
to two-thirds the rate in use would suffice.

71. Experience in 1931 practices proved the suitability of this correction
but it was finally decided, on the score of simplicity and the small difference between
the two allowances, to adhere to a correction equal to the rate in use.

WORKING THE BRACKET

72. Prior to 1930 the standard method of working the 800-yard bracket
was successive halving of the corrections, e.g., Up 800, Down 400, Down 200.

73. It was pointed out that, with rapid salvos in use, a considerable interval
will elapse before salvos with the final correction commence to fall, particularly if is
has not been possible to spot one or more salvos. During this interval the almost
inevitable error in rate may well prevent the Down 200 finding the target and at
least a 400-yard regaining step will then be required.

74. It was proposed, and finally adopted, that a correction as small as 200
yards should only by used when it was ordered in the reverse direction to the
preceding one.

ENGAGEMENT OF A TURNING POINT OF DESTROYERS

75. Practices were carried out during 1932 to exercise the engagement of a
turning point of a division of destroyers when turning to fire torpedoes. The method
employed was to set the enemys speed to zero as the leading ship passed through 0
or 180 and fire at the extreme wing ship until the rear ship came under fire, when
normal enemy settings were used.

76. It was claimed that the firings were successful, and showed that a
turning point can be engaged with a reasonable prospect of success; tough this success
would diminish as the speed of the enemy increased, and also if the rear ships turned
inside or outside the leading ships track.

CHAP. II. SECT. 4. AFFECTING CAPITAL SHIPS ONLY 23

77. Further firings carried out in 1933 brought out the following points:-

(a) The difficulty of keeping line when firing at the turning point.
(b) That even if the turning point is successfully engaged the destroyers
will not necessarily be prevented from firing their torpedoes.

78. In opposition to this, it was suggested that it would be preferable to fire
at each destroyer in turn before she reaches the turning point and fires her torpedoes.
Each targe would then present a similar control problem, and shifting from one
destroyer to another would not involve any great changes in the settings of the
instruments.

79. This system has the definite advantage that the enemy is engaged
before torpedoes are fired, and in consequence the attack is more likely to become
disorganised and avoiding action more difficult.


SECTION 6. AFFECTING CRUISERS ONLY

TRIPLE SALVO FOR DEFLECTION

80. Concurrently with the proposals to amend the rules for spreading the
initial deflection salvo, remarks were called for during 1930, as to whether or not
cruisers should fire a trend third [transcribers note this was a pen amendment to the
original document] deflection salvo with the calculated deflection when the time of
flight is long enough to admit of more than two salvos being in the air.

81. As a result of experience the arguments for and against were
summarised as follows:-

For. (All classes of cruisers.)

(i) Reduces the chance of initial salvos falling either side of the target
when end on.
(ii) Utilisation of an additional opportunity to hit.
(iii) Productive of a more uniform rate of fire, and therefore regular loading
intervals.
(iv) Spotting is simplified when calculated deflection is reverted to after
completion of ladder.

Against. (Certain 8-inch Cruisers.)

(i) The time of flight does not permit of their use below effective gun
range (16,000 yards approximate).
(ii) If used between ranges of 16,000 yards and 20,000 yards, and
information for starting a ladder is obtained with the first salvo of the
triple, the firing of this ladder is delayed as the guns will not be ready.
(Assuming a rate of fire of four rounds per minute.)
24 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

(iii) Owing to the good deflection-finding qualities of the Admiralty fire
control table, a deflection double will almost always suffice.
(iv) The only time when triple deflection salvos may prove advantageous is
if the initial range is correct. This rarely occurs at the ranges when
triple deflection salvos can be used.
(v) Triple deflection salvos are liable to be wasteful of ammunition at a
stage in an action when the conservation of ammunition is of
importance, i.e., outside effective gun range.

82. The advantages were considered to be of a more concrete nature than
the disadvantages and it was decided to accept the latter, and issue instructions
authorising the use of a triple deflection salvo when the time of flight permits.

8-INCH CRUISERS THE USE OF AN ARTIFICIAL SPREAD
FOR LINE AT RANGES ABOVE 10,000 YARDS

83. During 1932 a Cruiser Squadron investigated, and favourably reported
upon, the use of an artificial line spread, an investigation which was carried out owing
to the small line spread experienced with 8-gun salvos, which made individual shots
difficult to observe.

This artificial spread was achieved by setting convergence in A turret to
20,000 yards, and in B to infinity.

84. It was pointed out that one objection to this proposal was the
possibility of the enemy altering course and presenting a narrow target.

85. Further experience was against this proposal, and the decision was
given that it was not to be used.

CRUISERS NUMBER OF GUNS IN A SALVO WHEN RANGING

Hawkins Class (6-7.5 inch on a broadside)

86. In 1925, after a long succession of trials, the use of half-broadside
salvos was definitely decided against. It had been thought that by firing faster, the
target would have been more quickly found. Experience showed, however, that a 3-
gun salvo was unreliable, and therefore liable to mislead, the critical salvo possibly
being incorrectly spotted.

The matter was kept in mind in the event of ships being give a larger number
of guns on a broadside.
CHAP. II. SECT. 6. AFFECTING CRUISERS ONLY 25

Kent and London Classes (8-8-in.. on a broadside)

87. When these classes came into service in 1928 the matter was again
raised. It appeared desirable that broadsides should be fired in order that the full use
could be made of the rate of fire obtainable with these guns.

88. On the other hand it seemed that there might be occasions when the
four-gun salvo would suffice, such as testing splash visibility, or finding the range
at very long ranges when effective fire is unlikely. Further, the long range and limited
outfit of ammunition necessitates economical use outside effective range.

89. Initial experience suggested the advantages and disadvantages to be-

Advantages:-

(i) Reduction in the time required for deflection and ladder salvos.
(ii) Greater output of salvos per minute, making dodging fall-of-shot more
difficult.

Disadvantages:-

(iii) Less chance of early straddles due to smaller spread of salvo.
(iv) Less chance of hitting with straddling salvos, due to less density of
rounds.
(v) Increased to rangefinders and control.
(vi) Effective of loss of output is much greater than in broadsides.
(vii) Does not develop full output of which the guns are capable.

90. The final conclusions were-

(i) Spotting four-gun salvos is practicable under average conditions up to
18,000 yards, but spotting half broadsides, at twice the rate of fire of
broadsides would be less certain due mainly to cordite smoke
interference.
(ii) With loading intervals varying between 11 seconds and 16 seconds,
and time on aim between 3 and 6 seconds, it was possible to fire
broadsides every 14 to 22 seconds. It was not considered possible to
fire half broadsides every 7 to 11 seconds, except under exceptional
conditions, and in consequence half broadsides resulted in reduced
output.
(iii) The fewer the guns fired in a salvo, the less the probability of hits in a
salvo.
(iv) The effect on the output of failures at guns increases if half broadsides
are fired.

91. In consequence of these conclusions it was decided that 8-inch cruisers
are normally to fire full broadsides.

26 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CRUISERS ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF A REGAINING LADDER
CROSSES THE TARGET WITHOUT STRADDLING

92. In 1931 the instructions laid down that if a regaining ladder (then of
200-yard steps) should cross the target without straddling, further salvos were to be
fired to confirm the fall of the salvos which fell on opposite sides of the target.

It was pointed out that this procedure delayed going into rapid salvos after the
target had been located, which was not acceptable in cruiser gunnery.

93. The instructions were therefore deleted.

8-INCH CRUISERS LOCAL CONTROL NATURE OF FIRE

94. The Firing Manual directed initially that turrets were to fire
broadsides in rapid salvos, but this was subsequently amended to direct 8-inch
turrets to fire salvos.

95. Before this amendment had been promulgated, proposals had been
received that 8-inch turrets should be allowed to use Cruiser Spotting Rules. It was
pointed out that considerations of the firing interval and time of flight show that range
ladders are impracticable at all ranges at which local control firings would be
justified, and that the same argument applies to rapid salvos.

CRUISERS SPOTTING RULES FOR INDIRECT FIRE

96. In 1929 the suggestion was made that rapid salvos and an 800-yard
bracket should be employed if the target had not been found on turning over to
indirect fire, and rapid salvos and single step corrections of 400 yards if it had been
found.

97. At this time it was laid down that, in the event of indirect fire being
resorted to when no aircraft was available, and the target was being held before its
disappearance, a short burst of rapid salvos could be fired.

The proposal was not agreed to, it being considered preferable to use normal
cruiser spotting rules based on reports of a consort or aircraft.

SECTION 7. AFFECTING AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ONLY

WHETHER DESTROYER OR SECONDARY ARMAMENT
SPOTTING RULES ARE PREFERABLE

98. Prior to 1926 the ships armed with 6-inch and 5.5-inch guns used the
Cruiser Spotting Rules and the Argus, with 4-inch guns, used the Destroyer Rules.
The proposal was made that all
CHAP. II. SECT. 6. AFFECTING CRUISERS ONLY 27

should employ a single step system, on the grounds that the gun armament is provided
for a defensive purpose and chiefly against destroyers. The conditions are therefore
similar to those for the secondary armament of a battleship.

99. Approval for these to be adopted by all carriers was given in 1927.
The desirability of opening fire in rapid salvos was questioned, however, after the
Glorious and Courageous came forward for service, it being pointed out that when
shooting up to the target at extreme range, it was possible to have six salvos in the air.
Against this however, it was pointed out that a deliberate reduction in the rate of fire
might result in an increase in the chances of the target being crossed without being
straddled, and that furthermore, in most conditions of weather, the splash visibility
would be less than the extreme range of the guns. This will influence the range at
which fire is opened and so the number of rounds in the air will be correspondingly
reduced.

100. It was not proposed, therefore, to make any change in the rules.

101. In 1929 it was represented that the Secondary Armament Rules were
not entirely suitable. The point of view was advanced that these rules were designed
to suit conditions of high closing rate during a limited period, consequent on the
limited range of the secondary armament of battleships, and the long range of modern
torpedoes. Such an argument was not really applicable to aircraft carriers, who would
normally turn from an adversary, thereby precluding a high rate.

102. One carrier was detailed to test the Destroyer Spotting Rules. In 1931
the indications were that these would be preferable, and they were adopted finally in
1933.

103. The decision was questioned in 1934 on the grounds that the
Secondary Armament Rules produced earlier hitting, though admittedly with greater
expenditure of ammunition. An important factor is the ability of the ammunition
supply arrangements to compete with the high rates of fire.

104. After further firing, when the actual results were compared with results
which would probably have been obtained with Secondary Armament Spotting Rules,
the conclusion was reached that the latter might, on an average, find the target earlier,
though the balance in their favour was very small. On the other hand, the increase in
ammunition expenditure might be considerable.

105. The possible and only slight balance in favour of the Secondary
Armament Rules was held to be overweighted by the inadequacy of the ammunition
supply under these conditions, and it was decided to adhere to the Destroyer Spotting
Rules.
28 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

SECTION 8. AFFECTING SUBMARINES ONLY

REVERSE CORRECTIONS

106. It is directed that when the target has been crossed by a step of the
range ladder if the reverse correction of 200 yards produces a short, it is to be taken
off and hitting may be assumed. If it produces an over, hitting may be assumed.

107. The proposal was put forward in 1932 that a correction of 200 yards
should always be given in the direction of the target as a result of the fall of the first
round affected by the reverse correction, on the grounds that, even if laddering had
been carried out correctly, it was not difficult for the range to be as much as 300 yards
in error. It was therefore considered desirable to confirm the accuracy of the range
selected at the earliest possible moment.

108. Reports have been called for and the evidence to date is inconclusive.
Further information is required.
CHAPTER III

__________

Compensation for Own and Enemy Alterations
of Course

___________


Section 1. Compensation for Own Ships Movements.

15-inch ships .. .. Dreyer Tables.
Cruisers .. .. General.
Turret Dreyer Tables.
Mark III* Table.
A.F.C. Tables.

Section 2. Compensation for Enemy Alteration of Course.

15-inch ships .. .. Dreyer Tables.
15-inch ships .. .. Secondary Armament.
30 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER III

___________

Compensation for Own and Enemy Alterations
Of Course

____________


SECTION 1. COMPENSATION FOR OWN SHIPS MOVEMENT

15-INCH SHIPS DREYER TABLES

1. This problem was set in 1928, with the following foreword:-

Action experience and the results of fleet exercises show that it may
be necessary to accept the torpedo menace in order to obtain decisive results.
This may entail a large turn towards the enemy, and subsequently individual
avoiding action when the torpedo zone is reached. It may be anticipated that
under these circumstances the enemy will maintain comparatively steady
course so as to develop maximum gunfire and take advantage of possible
confusion in our line.

2. The first opinions formed were -

Deflection.- Provided the calculating instruments are trusted, and care
is taken not to spot on occasional erratic salvos, there should be no difficulty
in keeping correct for line.

Range.- To maintain hitting, the Dreyer calculator requires constant
resetting, which can best be achieved by good drill rather than by additional
gear.

3. Further consideration gave rise to the following statements:-

With Dreyer tables the change of bearing due to alteration of own ship
is applied automatically. Provided, therefore, that due allowance is made for
loss of speed during the turn the change in rate and deflection will also be
allowed for accurately.

4. Other factors affecting hitting:-

Deflection.- Errors in training will not be enough to cause misses for
line unless drill is bad.

Canted trunnions.- Since no cross levelling gear is fitted the heel
resulting from alteration of course must be allowed for by a spotting
correction, which is not anticipated to be difficult to assess and order if the
hell is steady. If rolling, salvos must only be fired with the ship upright or in
same position on each roll.
CHAP. III. SECT. 1. COMPENSATION FOR OWN SHIPS 31
MOVEMENT

Range.- (i) Change in Dreyer correction due to change in component
of own ships speed along the line of fire.

(ii) Error in range produced by the lateral transfer of the ship, or
slip, i.e. the ship does not follow the theoretical track traced out on the Dreyer
table.

5. With regard to (i), for a turn towards, this correction is Down and is
not large. In a 15-inch ship, speed 20 knots and alteration of course of 90:-

At 20,000 yards, correction is Down 210 yards.
At 15,000 yards, correction is Down 170 yards.

With regard to (ii), for a turn towards, this correction is Up, the actual track being
outside the theoretical track. The exact amount is difficult to assess, but is of the
nature of 100-200 yards according to the speed and rudder used.

6. It will therefore be seen that (i) and (ii) tend to cancel each other, and
that the actual change in range due to an alteration of own ship is not likely to exceed
100 yards.

7. From an examination of a number of analysis charts, it appeared that
the change in Dreyer correction was frequently wrongly calculated and almost always
over-estimated. The reason for this was believed to be that change in rate is applied
to the calculator, but the alteration in wing you feel along the line of fire is not
applied at the same time. This would result in over-estimating the change in Dreyer
correction. It is obvious that the change in rate is much easier to apply, being read
directly off the auto-Dumaresq, whereas the change in wind you feel is less likely to
be obtained quickly and accurately.

8. It was therefore considered that, as the maximum change of Dreyer
correction likely to be required (100 yards) was well within the spread of a salvo and
also, that by leaving the correction unaltered, the risk of applying a wrong correction
due to neglecting the alteration of wind was eliminated, it would be better to make no
alteration to the Dreyer correction for an alteration of own course.

9. Opinion in both Fleets in 1930 was unanimous that no range correction
should be made when own ship alters course as the correction is small, and it was
decided that the Dreyer calculator was only to be used before opening fire and when
tuning to rangefinders.

CRUISERS

General

10. This problem was set for all cruisers in 1928, as follows:-

To investigate the effect on own ships fire when frequent and large
alterations of course have to be made, and to discover the best method of
compensating for own ships movements with Dreyer Fire Control Tables.
32 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

For Range

11. The factors to be considered are-

(i) Effect of lateral transfer or slip of the ship while turning.
(ii) Effect of errors in calculation and lag in application of rate.
(iii) Effect of change in component of own ships speed, resolved along the
line of fire, on ballistics

For Deflection

(iv) Effect of error in calculation and application of correct deflection
(v) Effect for firing with ship heeled.

12. It can be shown that the effects of (i) and (iii) are opposite and cancel
each other, leaving (ii) as the chief source of error. Provided that lag in resetting rate
and Dreyer correction is not excessive, for small alterations of course no spotting
correction is necessary to gun range. For alterations over 50 at high speed the
resultant effects may be appreciable and a correction may be required.

13. Item (iv) is dependent on accurate assessment of the loss in speed and
on the bearing. If the loss of speed is correctly assessed, the major error will be due to
lag in resetting the calculating instruments. The effect of this lag will be appreciable
if the bearing is on the bow.

14. To counteract item (v) the director layer should endeavour to fire when
the horizontal cross wire indicates the ship is approximately upright, informing the
Control Officer if a salve was fired with the ship listed. With a ship target, salvos
may still be in line; but in target firings, when the danger space is small, Control
Officers are liable to order corrections when they are not really necessary.

Cruisers with Turret Dreyer Tables

15. The T.S. and control positions were cramped, and it seemed that it
might be impracticable to use the Dreyer calculator except initially.

16. It was therefore proposed to investigate the use of the following scale
of corrections for speeds over 18 knots.

Up to 30 .. No correction.
30 to 60 .. 200 yards.
Over 60 .. A further 200 yards correction after 60 degrees.

The correction to be up or down according to whether the turn is away or
towards, and to be applied in the middle of the turn.

17. For further consideration see Cruisers equipped with Mark III*
Tables.
CHAP. III. SECT. 1. COMPENSATION FOR OWN SHIPS 33
MOVEMENT

Cruisers equipped with Mark III* Tables

18. It was considered that if the correct drill was carried out with the
existing fire control installations, no correction would be required to range. The ideal
to be aimed at was for the T.S. to apply all corrections necessary to allow for own-
ship alterations without reference to the control, and thus enable Control Officers to
concentrate on observation of fire and enemy movements.

19. As regards deflection, it was considered that quick and accurate
working of the calculator would give good results, except perhaps during large
alterations of course. Under these circumstances, which involve a large change in
deflection, spotting to anticipate the change was recommended, though it was pointed
out that care must be taken not to increase the total change in calculated deflection.

20. Experience during 1929 confirmed the suitability of relying on the
quick and accurate working of the deflection calculator, but reports were strongly
against reliance on the Dreyer calculator. Little information was received as to the
suitability of the scale of corrections laid down in para. 16.

21. No definite recommendations were received as the result of experience
during 1930, but it was suggested that the proposed corrections were unsound on
account of the complication involved in applying such corrections in ships which
should maintain a rate of fire of four to five salvos per minute. It appeared more
practical to absorb the correction either in a regaining ladder or in a spread either side
of the straddling range. This proposal was not concurred in, and attention was called
to the Battleship procedure (see paragraphs 8 and 9).

22. Opinion during 1931 hardened in favour of the use of the Dumaresq,
course being set ahead as the wheel was put over, and opinion was generally against
the use of the Dreyer calculator (except when opening fire or when tuning to
rangefinders), it being accepted that the effects on M.V. and of slip are approximately
opposite and equal.

23. The final decision reached was-

(a) Keep the Dumaresq set 20 ahead of the turn until the wheel is put
amidships.
(b) Alter own speed settings at the rate indicated by the Forbes log.

Cruisers fitted with A.F.C. Tables

24. No definite information was obtained during 1930, but opinion tended
towards the use of 10 of slip angle when using 25 of rudder.

(C23461) C
34 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

25. A difficulty was pointed out in connection with the speed settings.
Forbes logs were fitted which were not very accurate regards actual speed, but could
be relied upon to indicate correctly the change in speed. It was considered that the
change in speed [..] shown was the best means available.

(This difficulty does not apply with Pitometer logs, which accurately record
the speed through the water.)

26. Experience during 1931 favoured the use of the Forbes log as indicated
above. The allowance for slip had proved less easy, the moment of application and
removal was considered to be of importance, and mistakes were easy to make. What
evidence there was tended to indicate that slip error was small up to turns of about 40
and, in view of the possibility of making mistakes, it was questioned whether it was
really necessary to apply it.

Such information tended to show that a standard slip angle of from 5 to 8
appeared suitable.

27. Information from trials carried out later showed that the magnitude of
the slip angle is variable, being chiefly influenced by the tendency of the ships head
at the moment the rudder is put over.

28. It was directed that the following procedure was to be adopted:-

(a) Apply a slip angle of 3 when rudder is put over.
(b) Reduce own speed settings at the rate indicated by the Forbes log.

SECTION 2. COMPENSATION FOR ENEMY ALTERATIONS OF
COURSE

15-INCH SHIPS DREYER TABLES

29. In this case the wind you feel does not alter and the change in rate
can be applied easily and quickly to the Dreyer calculator.

30. It was suggested that change in range correction consequent on an
alteration of course by the enemy should also be ignored because-

(i) The change is partially offset by enemy slip, though to a less extent
than is the case with own ship.
(ii) The occasions on which the alterations of the enemy are seen in time to
apply the correction are not frequent, and the drill at the calculator is at
present complicated.

31. As a result of the above remarks it was proposed that the Dreyer
calculator should only be used before opening fire, or when tuning to rangefinders.
While this proposal was concurred in the trial, it was pointed out that the change in
range correction for an alteration of course on the part of the enemy is considerably
greater

CHAP. III. SECT. 2. ENEMY ALTERATIONS OF COURSE. 35

than that for a similar alteration on the part of own ship and, if no correction is applied
by the calculator, allowance should be made by means of a spotting correction, the
amount of which must depend on the speed of the enemy and the size of the
alteration, when this alteration is observed.

If the enemy is seen to alter course, an appropriate spotting correction should
at once be given The application of the correction by means of the Dreyer calculator
is far too slow.

32. It was therefore approved that the change in range correction when the
enemy is seen to alter course is to be applied in the form of a spotting correction, the
size of which must depend on the amount of the alteration and the speed of the
enemy.

CAPITAL SHIP SECONDARY ARMAMENT.- CORRECTION
WHEN ENEMY ALTERS COURSE

33. In some firings carried out during 1931it was found that although line
was held during a large alteration of course by the enemy range was lost. It was
therefore proposed that the Control Officer should make an arbitrary correction for
range to allow for change of range in time of flight during the turn.

34. Experience in 1932 was insufficient to justify a definite opinion being
given on this point, but one report was that the use of such a correction was liable to
confuse the Control Officer and that it was not, in consequence, recommended. It was
suggested that if the enemy is seen to be making a large alteration of course, the rate
should be forecast.

35. The matter was further investigated during 1933 but no consensus of
opinion was reached, although it was agreed that the degree of forecasting will be
difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, it was recommended that-

(a) An attempt should be made to forecast the inclination, even if it could
only be done approximately to counteract the lag in the effect of
change of rate.
(b) That for deflection, the deflection calculator should be ignored and the
line kept by estimated spotting corrections. tions. [sic]

36. Opinion in 1934 was generally in favour of the foregoing proposal.

(C23461) C2
CHAPTER IV


____________


Defence Against D.C.B.s and C.M.B.s


_____________


Section 1.- Repulse of Daylight C.M.B. Attack by Destroyer Screen.

Section 2.- Repulse of C.M.B. Attacks by other classes of Ships.


(c23461) C3
38 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER IV

___________


Defence against D.C.B.s and C.M.B.s

____________


SECTION 1. REPULSE OF A DAYLIGHT C.M.B. ATTACK BY
DESTROYER SCREEN

1. Trials were carried out in 1922 and 1923 to evolve suitable spotting
rules for use against these very high-speed targes. A series of practices was arranged
to compare the relative merits of rapid salvos and single step spotting against a
creeping barrage.

2. The results of the trials showed the former to be infinitely preferable.
The latter system involved an error of principle, because data which are known with
accuracy, sufficient to make the barrage creep at a proper speed, and in the right
direction, should be utilised to hit rather than to miss the target.

3. The general principles to be followed are laid down in the Destroyer
Firing Manual.

SECTION 2. REPULSE OF C.M.B. ATTACKYS BY OTHER
CLASSES OF SHIPS

4. Trials were carried out in the latter part of 1921 and 1922 to compare
the effectiveness of Pom-poms with a splash barrage from 6-inch guns.

5. The object of the splash barrage was to put down a zone of fire through
which the attacking craft would have to pass, and which did not rely for its
effectiveness entirely on direct hits. It was hoped to provide sensitively fuzed shell
which would burst on impact with the water, setting up a barrage of flying splinters.

6. The conclusions reached at this date were

(a) Single or Mark M pom-poms are expected to prove the most
effective weapons.
(b) The splash barrage cannot be relied upon to defeat the attack.

CHAPTER V


____________


Aircraft Spotting


_____________


Section 1.- General

Section 2.- Position to be taken up by Spotting Aircraft.

Section 3.- Method of Reporting Fall of Shot.

Section 4.- Accuracy of Aircraft Reports of Fall of Shot.

Section 5.- Aircraft Spotting Rules.

Section 6.- Relative Importance of Fall of Shot and Course Reports.

Section 7.- Range and Bearing Finding by Aircraft.


(c23461) C4
40 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER V

___________


Aircraft Spotting

____________


SECTION 1. GENERAL

1. The best method of employing aircraft for observing gunfire and
reporting enemy course and speed, has been under investigation since 1918. It was
initially a Capital Ship problem, since the number of aircraft available, and the W/T
equipment of cruisers, did not permit of their employment, other than experimentally,
by the latter type of vessel.

2. The experimental aspect as regards the employment of aircraft reports
by cruisers was annulled in 1934, when modified W/T and V/S arrangements for
gunnery purposes in cruisers had been decided upon.

SECTION 2.- POSITION TO BE TAKEN UP BY
SPOTTING AIRCRAFT

3. Up till 1925 little or no control was exercised over the position taken
up by spotting aircraft. It was then found that it had become the habit to fly over the
target while spotting fall of shot. As a results the first instructions were laid down,
limiting the aircraft to a position approximately over the firing ships, and not nearer
than half-way to the target.

4. In 1926 these instructions were elaborated, both as regards position
and height as follows:-

(a) Aircraft should fly as high as possible.
(b) As a general rule the height in feet should be not less than half the
range in yards.
(c) Consistent with (b) above, the spotting aircraft should take up a
position about one mile on the lee side of the battle line.
(d) If due to clouds it is not possible to attain the height as in (b), aircraft
should close the target line well to a flank.
CHAP. V. SECT. 2. POSITION TO BE TAKEN UP BY 41
SPOTTING AIRCRAFT

5. These instructions have been subsequently modified on broader lines,
which give greater freedom of choice to the aircraft.

(a) The normal position for spotting is on the line of fire, and nearer the
firing line than the enemy.
(b) If due to smoke or other reasons the fall of shot cannot be seen by the
observer from the normal position, the aircraft is to proceed to a
position from which spotting can be carried out.

Experience shows that the nearer the observer is to the target, the greater is his
accuracy in reporting fall of shot for range. It is considered that the spotting aircraft
should take up the best position attainable at the time for the type of firing being
carried out, and it is undesirable to lay down anything more definite.

6. The advantages of the normal position are that a particular target can
be more easily identified, and that the upper works of enemy ships may provide a
scale on which to base fall of shot reports.

The disadvantage is that it militates against accuracy and, to some extent,
speed in course reporting.

SECTION 3. METHOD OF REPORTING FALL OF SHOT

7. The difficulty of producing an instrument for measuring fall of shot led
to consideration as to the possibility of employing clock code for fleet spotting, partly
with a view to assisting the observer in course reporting, in opposition to the method
then in use which was direct spotting.

8. These trials were carried out in 1925, and it was decided that direct
spotting was to be used on all occasions except-

(i) Bombardment.
(ii) When aircraft cannot see both firing ships and target ships at the same
time.

9. Subsequent experience showed that although the aircraft had on
occasions lost sight of the firing ships, it had never been necessary to revert to clock
spotting, no difficulty having been experienced in determining the approximate line of
fire.

10. In view of the great advantages of direct spotting in saving of time, the
foregoing decision was amended and now stands as follows:-

(i) Against a ship target direct spotting should always be employed, if this
is practicable.
(ii) If clock code is to be used, ru north is to be taken as the datum point
for 12 oclock.
42 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

SECTION 4. ACCURACY OF AIRCRAFT REPORTS OF FALL
OF SHOT

11. As experience has been gained, the accuracy of reports has steadily
improved. In the early stages of the investigation, attention was directed towards the
design of an instrument for measuring the distance between the splash and the target,
but this project was not successful. Estimation of the distance is now made by
judgement based on the height of the mast or upper works as a scale. The [] of the
probable spread of salvos as a scale is to be avoided, since these are very variable.

12. It was remarked in 1926 and 1928 that the reports of the initial salvos
were considerably less accurate than those of subsequent salvos, and that the error
was primarily in the direction of underestimating the distance. This fault seems
largely to have been overcome, and the magnitude of errors in estimation now seems
to be only dependent on the distance of the fall of shot from the target.

13. Nevertheless, the tendency to underestimate on all occasions which has
been frequently remarked upon in the past, still persists.

SECTION 4. AIRCRAFT SPOTTING RULES

14. The spotting rules to be employed when aircraft observation is
available must be largely dependent, of course, on the anticipated accuracy of aircraft
reports.

15. Spotting rules to be used when aircraft reports were available have
been continuously under revision from quite early in the investigation, and various
codes have from time to time been issued. So far, complete agreement has not been
reached as to the corrections to be used under various circumstances.

16. As the accuracy of aircraft reports increased, control officers came to
place more and more reliance on them, almost to the extent of neglecting the evidence
f direct observation. In 1929 it was necessary to issue a caution pointing out that
control frequently delayed giving spotting corrections which could have been made
on the results of direct observation.

17. The policy regarding control with air observation is that-

(i) If the fall of shot cannot be seen, rely entirely upon the reports from
aircraft.
(ii) If the fall of shot is visible, accept the guidance of air reports but do
not neglect the evidence of your own eyes.

Furthermore, in all cases the method of control should be such that no change
of procedure is entailed if air reports are not available or suddenly cease.
CHAP. V. SECT. 6. FALL OF SHOT AND COURSE REPORTS 41

SECTION 6. RELATIVE IMPORTANE OF FALL OF SHOT
AND COURSE REPORTS

18. The relative importance of these two reports has always been a matter
of great importance, and the requirements in this respect have been coloured to a large
extent by the ability of the ship to estimate these two factors. When aircraft spotting
was first considered, ships had no accurate instrumental means of estimating an
enemys course, and in consequence for some years course reporting was given a very
high order of priority.

19. Experience in 1926 with the inclinometers then afloat was that the
expected of these instruments to detect alterations of course was not confirmed.

Since that date, however, considerable improvements have been made in these
instruments, and statistics indicate that they are capable of measuring the course more
accurately than an aircraft can estimate it.

20. In 1934, Home Fleet experience during Centurion practices indicated
that fall of shot reports should normally take precedence over course reports, but that
it was necessary continually to impress on observers that ships need an early and
accurate course report to assist them in judging the side of 90, and derive great help
from good and rapid course reports, especially when the enemy alters course.

21. Further experience during 1935 in the Home Fleet led to the
conclusion that-

While fall of shots reports are normally of greater value than enemy
course reports, occasions arise when the latter assume greater importance.
Missing an alteration of course takes salvos progressively further from the
target, while missing one or two spotting reports merely leave the fall of shot
where it was, subject, of course, to errors in rate.

22. The consensus of opinion in the Home Fleet was that, in direct fire, it
is easier in reasonable visibility to observe inclination from a ship than fall of shot,
and that the aircrafts piror task should be to assist the spotter rather than the
inclination officer.

23. Mediterranean Fleet opinion generally confirmed the foregoing, and
both fleets pointed out the necessity of the ship being able to reverse the order of
priority.

SECTION 7. RANGE AND BEARING FINDING BY AIRCRAFT

24. The necessity for aircraft to be able to provide ranges and bearings of a
target invisible to the firing ship has been recognised for many years, the first
investigations into suitable instruments being made in 1920-21. Much, of course,
depended on the accuracy and reliability of the compass.

44 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

25. At the time, a system of measuring the angles of depression from the
aircraft, of the firing ship and target, and the angle between them was in use. The
instruments were rude, and the lag was considerable, because these data had to be
transmitted to the firing ship for computation of the range. No reliance could be
placed on the accuracy of the result. It also called for a high degree of co-operation
between pilot and observer, since simultaneous observations were necessary.

26. It was promising, however, and development proceeded slowly to
1926, when the same system with improved instruments was still in use, but
computation could be made in the aircraft. Development was taking place along the
lines of making the system more automatic, and it was also under consideration to
investigate the possibilities of evolving a single observer instrument.

27. Opinion in the Fleet gradually hardened against the gear employed
for various reasons such as weight and complication and attempts were made to
evolve a simpler and lighter instrument. A combined horizon and bubble rangefinder
came into supply in 1931. A further type, Plan Rangefinder, Mark II, was issued to
certain units in 1932.

28. It is now normal for aircraft to estimate both range and bearing from a
position immediately over the firing ships.
CHAPTER VI


____________


The Value of Long Range Fire


_____________



46 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36


CHAPTER VI

___________

The Value of Long Range Fire

___________


1. In order to collect date with regard to the effectiveness of fire at long
ranges, Nelson, Rodney, Hood, and 8inch cruisers commenced in 1934, carrying out a
certain number of practices at ranges of 23,000 yards and upwards. The problem is
primarily a capital ship one, but the 8-inch cruisers were associated with the
investigation in order to provide more data.

2. To date, these practices have necessarily been confined to target and
throw-off firings, from both types of which there is a danger of drawing false
conclusions. In throw-of firings the spotting is unrealistic; in target firings, enemy
movement is not comparable with that of an enemy ship.

3. The problem is still under investigation. Opinion appears to be
trending towards-

(i) That aircraft spotting will be a requirement whether or not the target is
visible to the firing ship(s).
(ii) That the difficulty will be to keep salvos on the target, both for range
and line, in view of the greater effectiveness of avoiding action at long
range.
(iii) Nevertheless, the expenditure of a limited amount of ammunition may
be justified in view of the serious damage which may be inflicted by
one or two hits from plunging fire.




_______________
CHAPTER VII


____________


Concentration of Fire in Capital Ships


_____________


Section 1.- War Experience.

Section 2.- Master Ship Control v. Individual Ship Control.

Section 3.- Position of Master Ship and Datum Ship.

Section 4.- Method of obtaining the best Rate of Hitting.

Section 5.- The Firing Signal.

Section 6.- Breakdowns in Communication in Master Ship Control.

Section 7.- Concentration on Enemy Turning Point.


48 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER VII

___________


Concentration of Fire in Capital Ships

____________


SECTION 1. WAR EXPERIENCE

1. In the earlier days of the War, 1914-1918, little was known about fire
concentration, although ships had on occasions fired in company.

2. The primary object in view in target practices in 1915 was to develop
single ship efficiency to the highest attainable point, based partly on the factor that the
British Fleet was numerically not greatly superior to the German High Seas Fleet.
Because of the results of the Dogger Bank action, renewed attention was given to
pair-ship concentration, and the, up till then, accepted maxim that no enemy ship
must remain unfired at was thrown open to doubt.

3. Later, as the relative numerical strength of the British to the German
battle fleet increased, still more attention was given to the question, and the problem
became one of reliable intercommunication.

The Battle of J utland then intervened and showed that-

(i) Apart from numerical superiority, the conditions of battle may offer
good opportunities for fire concentration.
(ii) That to be effective, a strictly disciplined system of fire distribution is
essential to success.

4. The new system of control regulated by standardised rules was a big
step towards simplifying concentration. This was further facilitated by the provision
of W/T sets for gunnery purposes during 1917.

5. After a period during which each division investigated the problem
according to its own ideas, rules for concentration were drawn up in the autumn of
1917, based on what is now known as Individual Ship Control.

6. Considerable attention has since been paid to this problem and the
various major items are summarised under their separate headings.
CHAP. VII. SECT. 2. G.M.S. AND G.I.C. 49

SECTION 6. MASTER SHIP CONTROL (GMS) AND INDIVIDUAL
SHIP CONTROL (GIC)

7. When concentration was introduced for Capital Ships, a reliable and
rapid line of intercommunication was not available, since W/T for this purpose had
not been sufficiently developed. Doubt existed as to whether intercommunication
could be depended upon in battle, and the funnel smoke in coal burning ships was too
dense to allow of visual methods being employed with any certainty.

GMS was tried, but, partly owing to the dislike of placing the control of the
fire of a number of ships in the hands of one man, and also to the above defects, it was
held to be impracticable.

Individual control, firing double salvos, was therefore developed. Mutual
interference to spotting by each others fall of shot led tot eh adoption of time sectors,
which were allocated to individual ships, and during each one of which only one shp
might fire. Intercommunication of results was arranged for. It was decided that the
cycle of sectors should be completed every minute and in a four-ship concentration
the individual sectors were of 15 seconds duration, in a three-ship 20 seconds and in
pair-ship concentration 30 seconds.

8. Confusion of fall of shot still occurred with sectors in use, as a ship
which fired towards the end other sector was apt to clash with the ext ship to fire.
Improvement in fall of shot devices, though helping the identification of each ships
salvos, did not render spotting, either from the air or direct, any easier if two salvos
fell nearly simultaneously.

None of the foregoing sectors allowed a 15-inch gun ship to develop her full
output 3 salvos per ship per minute and efforts were directed towards
improvement in this respect. The two methods tried were neglect of sectors and
shortening the sectors. In both cases confusion of fall of shot occurred sooner or later,
and, under action conditions this confusion would almost certainly be more frequent
and have more severe effects. Moreover, although shortened sectors allow of the full
potential output being obtained they limited the maximum range at which this form of
firing could effectively be used. For instance, in a pair-ship concentration using 30-
second sectors, and allowing 10-15 seconds for observation of fall of shot of both
salvos of a double, application of corrections and firing of a double salvo in the next
sector some 35-40 seconds remained available for time of flight. This fixed the
maximum 15-inch range at about 22,000 yards. Any longer time of flight encroached
on the next sector, and soon led to a sector being missed, or to only one salvo of a
double being fired in it. With the same conditions, but with 20-second sectors, pair-
ship concentration could not effectively be used much above 14,000 yards.

50 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

10. It was then suggested that broadsides would solve the difficulty, but,
after trial, this was abandoned, owing to the heavy strain thrown on the hydraulic
machinery, and to the fact that a broadside could bot be spread on either side of a snap
R.F. reading, or of an aircraft report, and that salvos indicated more quickly an error
in rate, or served better to confirm a doubtful fall of shot.

11. Trials of master ship control having been dropped in 1917, were re-
opened in 1918, and improvements in W/T communication permitted their
continuance. It was stated in 1921 that this was the most successful system so far
evolved for the concentration of three or more ships on one target.

12. The master ship signalled the range for each salvo, and gave the order
to fire whilst consorts corrected the signalled range for P.I.L. and applied and
corrected their own deflection.

At first P.I.L. difficulties caused large spreads to be obtained, but the supply of
modern and accurate gear for calculating this correction brought spreads down to a
reasonable figure.

13. It was found that confusion of fall of shot caused deflection mistakes,
and, after considerable experimenting with the firing signal, it was proved to be
practicable for the master ship to control both the range and deflection, and still
achieve a divisional output of one salvo every 20 seconds. This is superior to any
result that can be obtained by GIC and, so long as the divisional spread can be kept
small, GMS gives the better chance of hitting since the density of shots in a
straddling salvo is greater than that obtained in GIC.

14. The principle drawbacks to GMS are the difficulty of direct spotting
on a salvo which may contain as many as sixteen 15-inch splashes, and the delays that
may occur owing to any failure of communications in master ship or consorts.

With regard to the latter, a satisfactory procedure has been evolved which
minimises the delay to be expected.

As regards the former, the difficulty is largely overcome if air spotting is
available, and, since heavy concentrations will normally be employed at the
commencement of an action, it is reasonable to suppose that this will be the case.

15. When H.M. ships Nelson and Rodney began concentration practices, it
was found that the difficulties of direct spotting in GMS on nine 16-inch splashes
were so great that control of fire was badly handicapped, and was impracticable
without aircraft spotting. Moreover, the design of the 16-inch mounting rendered it
necessary to fire a double salvo before re-loading could be commenced, and the use of
divisional double salvos, with the consequent delay between successive salvos
reduced the rate of fire to an extent that

CHAP. VII. SECT. 3. POSITION OF MASTER AND DATUM SHIPS. 51

was unacceptable. These ships therefore have developed GIC as their normal
method. This has the further advantage that in the event of a 15-inch ship being
ordered to join in their concentration, the difficulties inherent in using two different
natures of gun are minimised.

Conclusion

16. GMS is the only method of concentration under which the full
output of a number of ships can efficiently be used. It suffers from the difficulty of
applying such a large number of shots effectively, but this can be overcome by
aircraft spotting. It also has the disadvantage that a mistake by one officer or rating in
the master ship may have a disastrous effect. Mistakes in any type of firing will have
bad effects, and the chances of mistakes should not be allowed to outweigh the
enhanced efficiency obtained by GMS if mistakes do not occur.

17. Should errors during GMS be such as to cause the Admiral or Master
Control Officer to doubt the effectiveness of the concentration its degree can be
reduced of GIC reverted to.

SECTION 3. POSITION OF MASTER AND DATUM SHIPS

18. In 1920, when GMS was being developed, it was considered that one
of the middle ships of the concentration should act as datum ship, the master ship
being the Senior Officer who would usually be leading.

19. This was elaborated in 1921 as under:-

Master Ship.- The Senior Officer, but a ship other than the former
would be detailed if necessary.
Datum Ship in GMS was to be the centre ship of the concentration,
or that ship of the senior subdivision nearest to the junior subdivision.

At this time when in GIC there was no datum ship, and all signals were
corrected for P.I.L. by the recipient, according to the relative position from her of
their originator.

20. In 1928 the position had become-

Master Ship.- Divisional or Subdivisional leaders depended upon the
degree of concentration. In event of breakdowns the net ship in the line was to
take over. All ships were to be equally capable of carrying out Master Ship
duties.
Datum Ship to be the Master Ship, or, in GIC the leading ship of the
division, irrespective of the degree of concentration.

21. In 1930 it was pointed out that it was our policy to concentrate fire on
the leading ships of enemy division, and that there was little reason to doubt that an
enemy would adopt the same

52 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

policy. It would probably occur, therefore, that the leading ship of a division would
be unfavourably situated for controlling and observing the fire of her division, owing
to the enemy fire directed at her, whereas the second ship might be unfired at. There
were many advantages in a flagship leading her division, but no real necessity for her
to be Master Ship.

22. It therefore appeared sounder for the second ship to be Master Ship,
and this would have the additional advantage of reducing the datum distance from the
rear ship thus conducing to more accurate P.I.L. correction.

It was appreciated that the necessity for being able to obtain P.I.L. correction
abaft the beam would entail alterations and possibly an increase in complement.

At the same time it was pointed out that, in the event of a division engaging
two targets by pair-ship concentrations in GMS the datum ship of the rear
subdivision must be changed to the leading ship of the division if this subdivision has
to revert to GIC. It was therefore decided that datum ship in GIC was to be the
leading ship of the concentration.

23. Trials with the second ship acting as Master Ship showed that no
difficulties arose, and that under normal condition the concentration was very nearly
as efficient as when the leading ship was Master Ship. It was held, however, that
experience pointed to the desirability of the leading ship in action being Master Ship,
but that the second ship take over this duty if the leading ship was more heavily
engaged than the remainder.

24. Differences in construction between battleships and battle cruisers led
to the following decisions as to the position of the datum ship.

Battleships.- The leading ship of the concentration.

Battle cruisers.- The Master Ship.

SECTION 4.- METHOD OF OBTAINING BEST RATE OF
HITTING

25. Neglecting the question of spotting rules, which are considered
separately, various methods of achieving the best rate of hitting in Master Ship
concentration have been put forward.

26. At the end of the war it was thought that, when the target had been
found, all ships should fire salvos at their maximum rate, regardless of attaining
simultaneous divisional salvos. This method of firing was termed Master Ship
Independent, AFR, and it led

CHAP. VII. SECT. 4. BEST RATE OF HITTING. 53

to a more or less continuous fall of salvos. This, although it might produce the
highest possible output from the firing ships, suffered from the following
disadvantages:-

(i) Direct and Indirect spotting was rendered difficult owing to the
continuous fall of salvos with no definite intervals.
(ii) It was difficult to control the fire effectively since there was no silent
period.
(iii) The possibility existed of confusion to the control, owing to the
uncertainty as to whether a given salvo carried a spotting correction or
not.

The Divisional spread would also be thereby increase and false straddles
resulted.

27. Trials confirmed that the total output in Divisional Rapid Salvos was
equal to that obtained in AFT and that the former had the additional merit of
obviating the disadvantages given in (i) to (iii) above.

In Divisional Rapid Salvos with 15-inch mountings, it was found that a salve
fired every 20 seconds gave the maximum output possible from the guns, and the
advantages of this regular 20-second salve interval were:-

(a) It allowed of regular and disciplined firing.
(b) As all salvos from the concentration unit fell at nearly the same time,
the tasks of the Master Ship spotting officer and of the aircraft observer
were much simpler.
(c) The regular fall of divisional salvos at short intervals made it difficult
for the enemy to take avoiding action by snaking the line.


SECTION 5. THE FIRING SIGNAL

28. When GMS first came into use the maximum rate of fire (AFR)
was obtained without regard to the speed of signalling, and the length of the firing
signal was not of vital importance, although it increased the normal interval between
the salvos of Deflection and Range doubles.

29. In 1924 the position was that the Master Ship could order either of two
methods of firing which depended on an executive signal from her:-

Divisional Salvos.- Signal OSF, 3-figure range group.
M.S. Independent.- Signal AFT, 3-figure range group every 15
seconds.
54 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

30. Following the Monarch firing in J anuary, 1925, the introduction of
Divisional Rapid Salvos, and of Master Ship control of deflection as well as range, led
to the length of the firing signal assuming great importance. The firing signal in tis
present form emerged:-

Deflection and range are made, followed by the OSF signal; a pause
is then made to allow consorts to apply these data, and an exceutive [sic] dash
is made. On the receipt of the latter, all ships rig their fire gongs. This
method gives latitude to the Master Ship to fire slightly early if it is required to
test the fall of the Master Ship salvos alone.

31. In 1927 the following methods for shortening the firing signal were
tried:-

(a) Either Range of Deflection could be made first at the discretion of the
Master T.S. officer.
(b) Deflection could be omitted if it had not altered since the last signal.
Range was always to be included, even if it had not changed, as
otherwise confusion might result owing to the receiving ship being
doubtful whether or not a complete signal had been taken in.
(c) The Master T.S. officer was to work the firing intervals from the
Transmitting Station, ordering the firing signal to be made at regular
intervals when firing Divisional Rapid Salvos. The Control officer
could order both steps of a ladder at the same time.

32. In the Firing Manual issued in December, 1928, the firing signal was
definitely laid down. It consisted of four components:-

(i) Range. 3 figures, e.g.: 090, 138, 210.
(ii) Deflection. e.g.: L03L, R27R, L00L.
(iii) Master Ship identification letter.
(iv) Executive sign.

(i) and (ii) were employed as laid down in (a) and (b) above.

(iii) was a single letter designating the ship originating the signal, and (iv) was
a long dash of four seconds duration. The length f this dash was designed to allow
for sigh setting in consorts, and its termination was to be accepted by all ships as the
exact instant for ringing their fire gongs. Ships might fire at any time up to five
seconds after the termination of the Executive sign.

33. In 1929 the Divisional Call sign had been added to the firing signal and
criticism was again directed to the length of the signal.

It was proposed to omit the Divisional Call sign, and the 4-second Executive
sign, and to make the end of the Master ships identification letter the executive signal
for ringing fire gongs. The interval

CHAP. VII. SECT. 5. THE FIRING SIGNAL. 55

between the Range of Deflection and the letter would be adjusted according to the
degree of efficiency which had been reached by the ships taking part.

34. In 1931 the preliminary nought in single fire deflections was omitted
for trial, and T was used for nought in ranges of less than 10,000 yards. These
modifications were adopted in 1932, the T being used for all noughts in the range
component.

35. The present state of the firing signal is as follows:-

The firing signal consists of:-
(1) Range.
(2) Deflection, if required.
(3) Self-evident letter of master ship.

If both range and deflection are passed, the order in which they are placed in
the signal is optional; when the deflection changes it should be included in the firing
signal following that in which the new deflection was made, as a precaution against
incomplete reception when first transmitted.

The self-evident letter is to be preceded by a pause of about 3 seconds for
sight setting, and the termination of this letter is the executive signal for all ships to
ring their fire gongs.

The extent of the firing time is not exactly defined.

SECTION 6. BREAKDOWNS IN COMMUNICATION IN GMS

36. The conclusions set out below were arrived at after trial in capital
ships, but are applicable also to other classes of vessels.

37. In 1924 investigation was directed to the solution of the following
problems:-

(a) Procedure to be adopted by a division in GMS if all communications
with the Master Ship fail.
(b) As in (a) if a consort fails to receive any information from the Master
Ship.

38. Preliminary investigation was directed to the trial of some visual
device, such as a cone worked from the control position, to denote the failure of
communications. It was considered, however, that this was not a sufficiently reliable
or evident method, and that so long as the free Aldis lamp remained available in the
control it was the most effective channel.

39. GIC was felt to be the solution of a general failure of communication
from the Master Ship pending the taking over of control by her next astern.
56 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

40. Any failure to receive by a consort could be met by that ship engaging
another target or attempting to fit in her salvos on the original target between those of
the division. It was considered that such interposition would cause confusion sooner
or later, and that, failing another available target, the ship affected should withhold
her fire.

41. Trials carried out in 1927 enabled the following conclusions to be
arrived at:-

A consort whose G.C. W/T fails should remain in the concentration
using V/S, provided that the master ship dials or lamp can be read direct. Any
ship withdrawing from the concentration for any cause should open fire at the
nearest disengaged target, or withhold her fire should such not be available.

N.B.- This points to the desirability of allotting at least two targets to
each division in the original distribution of fire signal.

A ship quitting the concentration and engaging a fresh target should
not limit her ire to her GIC sector.

Should no signal be received from the Master Ship for 40 seconds and
the remainder of the division are withholding their fire, the second ship should
at once assume master ship.

Further failures should entail GIC throughout the division.

42. If the concentrating unit consisted of two ships the situation would
naturally best be met by a resort to GIC whether the failure at 37 (a) or (b) had
occurred, since it would probably be difficult to decide which of the two ships was
responsible for the failure. Further experience resulted in the following instructions
being embodied in the Firing Manual, 1933:-

If W/T communications fail, it is not desirable to attempt to continue
GMS, using the visual alternatives.

In a concentration of 3 or more ships, a consort experiencing a failure
in communication must shift her fire to a disengaged target, or, if one is not
available, must withhold her fire until the situation is cleared up.

In a concentration of 3 or more ships, if the Master Ships transmission
fails, the next astern is to assume Master Ship. If the original Master Ship is
still able to receive she will act as a controlled ship, otherwise she must
proceed as for a consort whose communication has failed.

In a pair-ship concentration, should the consort fail to receive signals
she should inform the Master Ship by all available means, and should reopen
fire in GIC, endeavouring to fire her salvos as far out of synchronization
with those of the Master Ship as possible.

CHAP. VII. SECT. 7. FIRING AT ENEMY TURNING POINT 57

SECTION 7. CONCENTRATION ON ENEMY TURNING POINT


43. Investigation of this problem was carried out by capital ships between
1925 and 1929.

After the initial firings it was considered that two methods could be used:-

(a) In good visibility.- Fire at each individual ship in turn as she reaches
the turning point. Assuming air spotting is available, this should be
carried out in the normal manner, the aircraft being informed each time
target is shifted.
(b) In bad visibility.- Fire at the end ship visible at any moment. Air
spotting should be confined to spotting on to the mid-point of the turn,
paying particular attention to line.

44. At the end of 1928 the conclusions were summed up as follows:-

There are three possible methods of attacking the problem:-

(i) To concentrate on one enemy ship throughout, either the leading or
rear ship being the most suitable.
(ii) To concentrate of each individual ship in turn as she reaches the
turning point.
(iii) To direct the concentration against the geographical spot on the turning
circle through which enemy ships will have to pass.

Method (iii) has been more generally used to date. It has the advantage of
simplicity; spotting is unnecessary and full rate of fire can be developed. It does
suffer, however, from the disadvantage that only a proportion of salvos fired can be
effective.

Methods (i) and (ii) should theoretically give better hitting results, as fire is
aimed at one particular ship. The procedure is more complicated, however, and
successful results will depend to a large extent on visibility, ability to spot, and also t
keep the correct point of aim under difficult conditions.

45. It has been pointed out that it will probably be a rare occurrence for the
enemy to cay out a large turn in succession, and therefore that no elaborate
organisation is justified in order to deal with an improbable tactical situation. Further,
any organisation should satisfy requirements for both goo and bad weather conditions.

46. Taking all the above points into consideration, it was considered that
method (iii) was the most likely to meet requirements under all conditions.


_________________
CHAPTER VIII


____________


Concentration of Fire in Cruisers


_____________


Section 1.- War Experience and Post-War Development..

Section 2.- Concentration in Close Formation when Normal Procedure is not
suitable.

Section 3.- Concentration by Cruisers widely separated.

Section 4.- Position of Master Ship and Datum Ship.

Section 5.- Method of obtaining the best Rate of Hitting.

Section 6.- The Firing Signal.

Section 7.- Concentration of Fire against Enemy Destroyer Flotillas.



60 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER VIII

___________


Concentration of Fire in Cruisers

____________


SECTION 1. WAR EXPERIENCE AND POST WAR
DEVELOPMENT

1. It was generally accepted that cruisers were normally spread, and were
therefore unlikely to be called upon to fight more than a single-ship action. During
the period May, 1916, to November, 1917, cruisers squadrons were used more
frequently in subsidiary operations in which they were manoeuvred in close order,
and the problem of concentration (which had hitherto been mainly considered from
the point of view of two ships not in company engaging the same target when
intercommunication was valueless) began to be seriously considered and
intercommunication studied.

2. On 17th November, 1917, a cruiser action was fought in which our
ships greatly outnumbered the enemy, and heavy concentrations were necessary.

Progress

3. As a result of this action, the problem of concentration was vigorously
pursued. With a maximum output o six salvos per minute, it was obvious that any
form of sector firing was too unwieldy, and would restrict the rate of fire to a extent
that was unacceptable. The alternatives were GMS or neglect of sectors in GIC.
The latter was tried, but, even with only two ships, and against B.P. targets in clear
weather, it caused the expected confusion in fall of shot, and, for a heavier
concentration, was quite impracticable. It was therefore abandoned. GMS as
developed, and, although the short salvo interval puts a very high premium on
effective intercommunication, it has proved efficient. In 8-inch cruisers the rate of
fire is also sufficiently high to render GIC with time sectors impracticable.

4. It is therefore considered that, for cruisers in close order, or at
distances from each other where P.I.L. correction can be calculated and applied,
GMS will give the best results when concentration of fire is required.

5. The foregoing remarks cover the broad aspect of cruiser concentration,
irrespective of the numbers concerned, but they suppose homogeneity of a squadron,
both in armament and fire control equipment.

CHAP. VIII. SECT. 1. WAR EXPERIENCE 61

6. Post-war construction has resulted in the cruiser forces of the Navy
being composed on 8-inch gun cruisers having the same type of fire control
equipment, cruisers with modern 6-inch guns, but not homogenous as regards fire
control, and older 6-inch cruisers with old 6-inch guns and fire control arrangements.

Further, cruisers are frequently separated yet so placed as to enable two or
more to engage simultaneously a single target, under conditions beyond the scope of
P.I.L. arrangements.

7. The present problem of cruisers acting in mutual support thus divides
itself into three circumstances:-

(a) In close formation, with normal concentration procedure, namely,
Master Ship control.
(b) In close formation in close order under conditions when normal
concentration procedure is not possible. (See Section 2.)
(c) Widely separated, i.e., lines of fire differing by 30 or more. (See
Section 3.)

8. (a) Calls for no special comment since it is covered by the remarks in
paragraphs 3 and 4.

SECTION 2. CONCENTRATION IN CLOSE FORMATION WHEN
NORMAL PROCEDURE IS NOT SUITABLE

9. It may be said now that this situation might arise from:-

(i) Failure in communications.
(ii) Smoke interference.
(iii) Ships fitted with different types of fire control apparatus.
(iv) Ships mounting different calibres of guns.

10. In the initial stages (1926) of this problem, the matter was solely on of
concentrating with 7.5-inch and 6-inch guns. GMS was used, but varying success
was obtained, owing to the difficulty of making the two range together. The
differences in ranging were attributed mainly to unknown ballistic and range table
errors, and to differences in range correction. Further difficulties were foreseen when
the 8-inch cruisers, with their very different fire control tables, came into commission.

11. In 1930 the problem was reviewed in the light of experience gained
1926-1929 and was withdrawn. The situation was summarised as follows, but it
should be noted that I covers only 7.5-inch and 6-inch guns which had the same fire
control tables :-

(i) No reliance can be placed on distinguishing between 7.5-inch and 6-
inch splashes


62 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

(ii) It is unsound to develop a system of concentration dependent on ability
to do so.
(iii) It is unsatisfactory to develop a second method of concentration for use
in special circumstances.
(iv) Provided arrangements are made for known ballistic differences to be
applied, a reasonable spread is probable.

12. The decision was given that Master Ship Control is to be used where
ships armed with different natures of guns are required to concentrate.

13. This closed the question as regards the old 7.5-inch and 6-inch
cruisers, and, as such, the situation no longer arises, with the re-armament of the 7.5-
inch cruisers.

The problem was re-opened in 1933 with respect to 8-inch and 6-inch guns.
Here the problem is still more complicated since both guns and fire control tables
differ.

It was pointed out that firings of this type necessitate the intercommunication
of true range, for which neither tables are equipped. After enumerating the
difficulties to be met, it was stated that the use of GMS concentration by ships
armed with different natures of gun had been definitely abandoned.

14. Experience from 1933-35 tends to show:-

(i) That accurately calibrated time of flight instruments are not of
sufficient assistance to prevent confusion arising.
(ii) No reliance can be placed on differentiating between 8-inch and 6-inch
splashes, though when the two natures are concentrating it may be
possible to distinguish the 8-inch which themselves are liable to
obscure the 6-inch.

15. The problem has thus become:-

If two cruisers in close order simultaneously engage the same target
under conditions when normal concentration is not possible, what form of fire
discipline, to avoid confusion of fall of shot, will cause the least reduction in
output?

It is suggested that consideration be given to a form of individual ship control
without time sectors, in which the leading ship develops the maximum volume of fire,
and the second ship endeavours to fire a few seconds after the leading ship. (cf
procedure for O.O.Q. firing in destroyers.)

It is also desired to try intercommunication of ranges and deflections between
8-inch and new 6-inch cruisers, i.e., those with modern types of fire control
equipment.

CHAP. VIII. SECT. 3. CRUISERS WIDELY SEPARATED 63

SECTION 3. CONCENTRATION BY CRUISERS WIDELY
SEPARATED

16. This subject is bound up with flank marking and investigation was
commenced after the war with the object of providing an organisation whereby-

(i) A cruiser could report the fall of shot on an enemy engaged by other of
our forces.
(ii) Cruisers when not in formation could develop an effective fire against
a common target, aided by mutual fall of shot reports.

17. Preliminary investigations tended to show that the results obtained
from flank marking were generally so unreliable that the deliberate weakening of a
squadron by the employment of one ship for this duty was not advocated.

As, however, a ship might find herself in a suitable position, the organisation
for flank marking must exist.

Flank marking was to be regarded as outside observation, and the W/T
procedure for aircraft was to be used.

18. Certain principles were held to have been established as a result of the
1925 practices:-

(a) The utility of flank marking by a ship conveniently placed is
unquestionable, and therefore a simple organisation for the purpose
should exist in all cruisers.
(b) A ship in action must devote all her efforts to beating her immediate
opponent, and the flank-marking organisation must therefore be kept
separate from the main and H.A. controls.
(c) Ships attacking the same target should not flank mark once both flanks
are in action, unless it is quite clear that the other ships fall of shot is
much in error. The reason for this is the confusion that is bound to
result in identifying signalled fall of shot. Flank marking is likely to be
the most useful at the commencement of an action, when it is probable
that the fall of shot is not near the target.
(d) The principle that a ship within range of the enemy should withhold
her fire is unacceptable. Cases where it is undesirable for a detached
ship to interfere with a very superior concentration against a weak
enemy are best met by the Senior Officer ordering that ship to withhold
her fire and flank mark.
(e) Flank-marking reports should not be made unless the observation is
certain.

64 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

(f) Communication of flank-marking signals should normally be by W/T,
with S/P as a second line.
(g) Flank marking should not be employed where air spotting is available,
and precautions are necessary that aircraft signals are not interefered
[sic] with.

19. It was then suggested that, where only two ships were concerned, it
would be preferable for them to separate and flank mark for each other rather than to
concentrate in GMS. The fallibility of the communications for the latter method
was put forward as the reason. Subsequent experience has shown that better results
are much more probable when GMS is used, but that the tactical situation must
govern the action taken.

20. A summary of the conclusions reached was embodied in the Firing
Manual, 1928, and was as follows:-

(i) The tactical situation may require two or more cruisers who are widely
separated to concentrate their fire on one enemy ship.
(ii) Experience has shown that when the lines of fire of two cruisers are
separated by an angel of about 30 or more, both ships are able to
develop an effective fire, notwithstanding the occasional confusion in
identification of fall of shot which is bound to occur. Moreover, they
may be able to give each other valuable assistance by reporting their
consorts fall of shot.
(iii) Although flank marking may be of considerable value, the
performance of this duty is on no account to interfere with a cruiser
using her own armament to its full effect against the enemy, or suing
her W/T or V/S equipment for making enemy or other important
reports.
(iv) A cruiser may also be in a position to give valuable assistance to any
unit of the fleet by flank marking for them on an enemy ship which she
herself is not engaging.
(v) An organisation for giving effect to the above is to be prepared and
practised in all cruisers. The concentration personnel should be
employed for flank marking as far as possible, using the fore bridge or
after control position. The observing officer must necessarily be one
who has some other duty and flank marking must not interfere with his
performance of this duty.
(vi) W/T communication will not usually be available, and V./S must
therefore be looked on as the normal method, suing a searchlight; with
W/T occasionally available as a better method.
(vii) The following instructions for concentration by cruisers when widely
separated are to be complied with:- A cruiser within effective range of
the enemy is not to withhold her


CHAP. VIII. SECT. 3. CRUISERS WIDELY SEPARATED 65

fire in order to facilitate flank marking, or to avoid temporary
confusion in the fall of shot unless ordered to do so by the Senior
officer. A situation in which the Senior Officer would be justified in
ordering a detached ship to withhold her fire and flank mark, is where
a very superior concentration is engaged against a weak enemy.
(viii) A cruiser, who is herself engaging the enemy on whom she is flank
marking, is only to make a report when she is certain of correctly
identifying the fall of shot. Reports which are not absolutely reliable
are of negative value.
(ix) Reports of the enemys course should not be made unless in a position
to measure them accurately, such as when the enemy is end on or
nearly so.
(x) Flank marking should not be carried out when aircraft observation is
available, and precautions are necessary that aircraft signals are not
interfered with.

21. Experience to date led to the conclusion that the after control is the
most suitable position for carrying out flank marking for the following reasons.

(i) The existing secondary control personnel and after concentration party
can be utilised.
(ii) The flank-marking officer is in close touch with the searchlight used
for passing reports.
(iii) Communications already exist between the primary and after control
position, and these are adequate.
(iv) Interference, except from cordite and funnel smoke, is at a minimum as
compared with a position on the fore bridge.

Experience had shown, however, that an alternative line of communication
might be necessary due to the limited effective arc of view of the after searchlights on
extreme forward bearings. G/C W/T should be used for flank marking reports if this
is not already in use by other ships.

22. After review of the practices carried out in 1931, the problem was
considered to have been investigated to a sufficient extent, and final conclusions were
drawn and inserted in the Firing Manual, 1933. These conclusions agreed with
those given in paragraph 20 (i), (ii). (iii), and (iv).

23. As regards paragraph 10 (v) and (vi), the revised conclusions read:-

In most cases it will be found advantageous to employ the after
control personnel for the observation of consorts fire; transmission of reports
should be made by the Fire Control W/T set when available, and, when not
available by signalling projector. The latter method is subject to interference
by gun blast.

(C23461) D
66 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

24. Paragraph 20 (vii) to (x) inclusive were re-drafted as follows:-

Instructions governing the transmission of flank reports-

(a) Not to be made if aircraft spotting is in use.
(b) No report should be made unless it is certain that the salvo has been
correctly spotted and identified.
(c) Delayed reports are of negative value and should be withheld.
(d) If more than two units are engaging the same target signals should be
addressed, and bear their source of origin.
(e) Enemy course reports should be made only when the reporting ship is
in a position to make an accurate observation.

In order that delays shall not occur, the communications, particularly when
V/S is being employed, need to be highly organised.

General Considerations

25. If the tactical situation admits a choice, and definite instructions are not
received from the Senior Officer of the unit, a detached cruiser, when practicable,
should avoid the maintenance of a position unfavourable alike for cross-fire or
concentration. Whilst recognition is to be accorded to the general principle that a ship
within range of the enemy should not withhold her fire, circumstances will arise in
which such action may be desirable; a detached ship, for example, might withhold her
fire and mark, in place of joining a superior concentration against one enemy vessel.

26. The general conclusions reached are as follows:-

(a) Cross-fire by cruisers widely separated and the use of flank-marking
signals to assist in establishing early hitting, presents no great
difficulty provided that-
(i) The necessary communications are organised and have been
exercised.
(ii) Ships go into GMS or GIC when the angle separating
them, as measured at the target, falls below 30.
(b) Situations may be expected to arise, such as when cruisers are engaged
in a sweep, or are stationed on the A-K line, when this form of firing
may be effectively used.
(c) The decision as to whether they should close and concentrate in
GMS must naturally rest with the Senior Officer. Should he decide
to do so, however, it should be realised that whilst closing, when the
angle separating the ships has fallen below 30, the effectiveness of
cross-fire, and the value of flank reports will rapidly diminish.


CHAP. VIII. SECT. 3. CRUISERS WIDELY SEPARATED 67


(d) Communications for passing flank reports should be by G/C sets with a
secondary visual line.
(e) The value of the angle separating the ships is indicated by the bearing
P.I.L. correction, which is obtainable up to 30.
(f) Flank signals should be regarded as a secondary aid, to be used with
discretion.


SECTION 4. POSITION OF MASTER SHIP AND DATUM SHIP


27. The condition under which concentration of fire by these vessels may
take place differ considerably from capital ships. The situation may be expected to
change more rapidly, and the ships may be joining or quitting the concentration unit at
undefined moments.

28. The Master Ship has always been the datum ship for the above reasons,
and also because restriction of space and of personnel in cruisers makes the
complication of having the datum ship other than the Master Ship undesirable.

29. In 1919 the leading ship of the concentration unit took Master Ship. If
another ship joined one already engaging the enemy, the latter remained Master Ship
until a further signal was made.

This was amended in 1924 as follows:-

(1) If a group of ships is ordered to engage the same target the Senior
Officer will assume Master Ship unless otherwise ordered.
(2) When a group of ships is engaging an enemy, the Master Ship of that
group retains the duty irrespective of what ships join subsequently.
(3) When a single ship is engaging a target that ship becomes Master Ship
if any other ships join in.
(4) A ship that has assumed master ship does not relinquish the duty on
alteration of course, unless ordered to do so by the Senior Officer, or
because she wishes to turn over the duty to another ship who is in a
better position to observe.

30. In 1933 the above arrangement was amended as regards (1) as
follows:-

The senior ship of the concentration will normally be Master Ship.
The organisation must be so flexible, however, that this duty can be taken over
by the ship that is most favourably situated, taking into consideration the
distribution of enemy gunfire and other circumstances.

(C23461) D2
68 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

31. It is probably that the leading ship of a division will be more heavily
engaged by the enemy than the remainder; it may therefore be preferable to arrange
previously for the second ship to act initially as Master Ship for the division.

SECTION 5. METHOD OF OBTAINING THE BEST RATE OF
HITTING

32. Master Ship Independent (AFR) was, as in capital ships the accepted
solution at the end of the war. Ships were not to check fire because their own salvos
could not be distinguished. The fact that any range corrections applied during AFR
might increase the spread was at that time looked on as an advantage rather than
otherwise, since the target would thereby be more easily retained. At this time, 1922,
it was widely held that Independent was the most effective form of fire for cruisers
firing as single ships and desiring to obtain the maximum output. Trials in the case
with Rapid Salvos showed, however, that the regular and disciplined fire obtain by
their use more than offset any slight loss in total output. Rapid Salvos were therefore
adopted for single ships, and the procedure became one in which the Transmitting
Station rang the fire gongs at a fixed time interval, after the previous rapid salvo had
been fired, irrespective of the number of guns then at the Ready. This time interval
was to vary with individual degrees of efficiency, an done of eight seconds was
accepted as the standard for an efficient 6-inch cruiser under good conditions.

33. Master Ship Independent continued to be the method in concentrations
when the target was found, each ship firing Rapid Salvos. The confusion in range
which was found to result after the reverse correction, if any, at the end of a range
ladder, due to consorts commencing AFR before receiving this reverse correction
from the Master Ship, was to be avoided by the Master Ship not making the signal
AFR until she had fired her first salvo with the corrected range.

34. Cases of this confusion in range over the initial salvos in AFR
continued to occur, and in 1930, destroyers having already abandoned AFR in
favour of Divisional Rapid Salvos, a trial was given to the latter method.

As might be expected the gain in steadiness and fire discipline was so marked
that they were immediately adopted and, rather than a loss of output being the result, a
gain was obtained.
CHAP. VIII. SECT. 6. FIRING SIGNAL 69

SECTION 6. FIRING SIGNAL

35. Until W/T in cruisers was sufficiently developed to be available for
Gun Control purposes, reliance had to be placed on visual methods, and little progress
could be made with any definite form of firing signal.

36. In 1928 W/T was available generally, and it was laid down that the
Master Ship was to make a Gun Control signal (F.D.S., D.E.F., et.) with range and
deflection for each salvo before the target was found. Consorts were to fire the
Deflection and Range salvos with the astern Ship, being careful not to fire unless they
could do so before the Master Ship fired her next step. At this time visual means such
as semaphores were in use for passing the Gun Control signals, and it was questioned
whether it was necessary to overload the G/C. W/T line with these signals. Without
them Range and Deflection, plus the call sign in a signal were not long enough to
slow up ladders unduly.

37. With the adoption of Divisional Rapid Salvos a firing signal for every
salvo became necessary whether in deliberate or Rapid, and consideration was given
as to the form it should take.

Gun Control signals were to be omitted, as was also the divisional call sign,
and the signal became that in use by capital ships, Chapter VII, paragraph 35, the 0
being omitted in single figure deflections.

SECTION 7. CONCENTRATION OF FIRE AGAINST ENEMY
DESTROYER FLOTILLAS

38. Investigations were initiated in 1920 into the best method of cruisers
dealing by gunfire with a flotilla of destroyers attacking the battle fleet. (Cruisers
were armed with four, five, or six 6-inch guns destroyers with four 4-inch or 4.7-
inch guns.)

39. Experience gained in 1921 pointed to the fact that concentration of
gunfire against attacking destroyers was necessary, and that as a general rule ships
should concentrate in pairs. Any larger degree rendered the spread liable to increase
without increase in the density of the fall of shot. On the other hand, it was said that
the large spread of four ships might envelope ore than one destroyer.

40. A conclusion was also drawn, that, unless the tactical situation
precluded it, the range should not be closed below 10,000 yards. If, at any time, the
range was below this, single sip action should be the rule. The relatively powerful
armament of the modern destroyer was a factor in reaching this conclusion.

(C23461) D3
70 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

41. As a result of further experience in 1923 the following conclusions
were considered to be a reliable guide, but it was pointed out that conditions were so
varied that they could be no more than a guide:-

(a) If a flotilla offers several targets, it is better to destroy some than
engage many in the hope of moral effect frustrating the attack.
(b) Concentrate outside 10,000 yards range, but it should not be continued
below this range.
(c) Normal concentration should be by pairs, and in a 5-ship squadron
should be 2, 2, 1 at nearer flank, centre and further flank respectively.
Heavier concentrations could be used at long range.

CHAPTER IX

___________

Concentration of Fire in Destroyers

___________

Section 1. War Experience.

Section 2. Position of Master Ship and Datum Ship.

Section 3. Method of obtaining Best Rate of Hitting.

Section 4. Firing Signal.







(C23461) D4

72 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER IX

__________


Concentration of Fire in Destroyers

__________

SECTION 1. WAR EXPERIENCE

1. As in the case of cruisers, the action of 17th November, 1917 showed
the necessity for an organised system for concentration of fire, since ships had been
unable to identify their own shot. The increase in the rate of fire had already shown
that identification was improbable when two destroyers only were firing.

2. The first system employed was a form of Barrage Fire, when two or
more destroyers were engaging a single target or a group of enemy destroyers.

3. This system soon gave way to the principle of Master Ship control,
but the question of intercommunication was a pressing one. As an interim measure
the main W/T set was made available in practices, in order not to retard progress. All
destroyers were now fitted with a second W/T set primarily for gunnery purposes
during day action.

SECTION 2. POSITION OF MASTER AND DATUM SHIPS

4. Datum Ship. For the same reasons as in cruisers, which reasons are
even more accentuated in destroyers, the Master Ship has always been datum ship.

5. Master Ship. Concentration of fire in destroyers was developed on
the assumption that the normal concentration unit was to be the division. A higher
degree flotilla concentration was allowed form. In divisional concentration the
flotilla leader was to engage a separate target. In flotilla concentration she took
Master Ship, unless otherwise ordered.

In divisional concentration the divisional leaders were Master Ships for their
respective divisions.

It was not considered that allowance of practice ammunition and of
opportunities for training would be sufficient to admit of other ships in addition to the
above being trained to take Master Ship duties.
CHAP. IX. SECT. 2. MASTER SHIP AND DATUM SHIP 73

6. In 1929 it was decided that, as the occasions on which flotilla
concentration was likely to be required were few, and that on those rare occasions
experience tended o show that the expenditure of ammunition entailed would not be
commensurate with the results obtained, flotilla concentration was no longer to be
carried out.

7. In 1930 changes in the attack formations of flotillas led to the flotilla
leader becoming divisional leader for the odd umbered division of her flotilla. She
therefore became Master Ship for that division.

It was laid down that the next Senior Officer to the divisional leader was to be
trained as Stand-by Master Ship in each division.

At the same time the use of the line ahead formation for torpedo attack was
given a trial, thus involving alterations of course in succession.

8. The tactical conditions under which concentration of fire by destroyer
flotillas may be required are such that frequently a torpedo attack will be in progress
at the same time as concentration of gunfire is wanted.

9. Bearing in mind the limited signal and other personnel available, and
the fact that one rangefinder must serve both torpedo and gunnery purposes, it is
desirable to hamper Captain D as little as possible with gunfire distribution and
details, if he has at the same time to control the execution of a torpedo attack by the
whole flotilla.

10. Moreover, it was suggested that in line ahead the leading ship in any
formation is likely to suffer more severely from enemy fire than will her consorts.

11. For these reasons it was decided to test the suitability of making No. 2
(i.e. ship with the next higher fleet number to the divisional leader) in each division
the master Ship. This Master Ship was to be nominated beforehand and trained as
such regardless of the varying formations that might be assumed by a division during
an attack.

No. 3 in each division was to be Stand-by Master Ship.

12. Whilst these tests were proceeding, the trials with line ahead attack
formations showed that these latter were unsuited to quick development of maximum
gunpower against counter attacking flotillas, and that alterations of course in
succession caused a considerable falling off in accuracy in divisional gunfire.

13. It was considered that no one formation was suitable for all occasions,
and that both line ahead and line of bearing formations must be practised and that for
gunfire the important point was for the line of bearing of the division to be roughly at
right angles to the bearing of the gun-target and for alterations of course to be made
together.

74 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

14. The tests as to the position of the Master Ship, however, were held to
confirm that, under normal conditions it is satisfactory for the second ship to act as
Master Ship, and the third ship as Stand-by Master Ship. As the ability of the Master
Control Officer must be the deciding factor the choice must be left to Captain D.

15. The question was re-opened in 1934. Captain D had now been
detached from the leadership of the odd numbered division, thus restoring control of
both divisions to the proper divisional leaders. Captain D was left free to control the
torpedo attack, and to manoeuvre the flotilla as a whole, engaging his own target, or
joining as consort in one of the divisional concentrations as might be most convenient.

16. One of the reasons for divorcing the leading ship from Master Ship
duties had therefore been removed, and doubt was expressed as to whether the
argument that the leading ship should not take Master Ship on account of the
probability of her being the first to suffer damage was sound.

As the line of bearing formation for a division might result in either flank
being more advanced towards the enemy the Master Ship might find herself in No. 3
position, which, on account of funnel and cordite smoke might well be unsuitable.

17. The problem is still under consideration.

SECTION 3. METHOD OF OBTAINING THE BEST RATE OF
HITTING

18. The arguments for Divisional Rapid Salvos are the same as advanced
in the case of cruisers, the higher rate of fire in destroyers placing a still greater
premium on the value of disciplined and regular salvos.

SECTION 4. FIRING SIGNAL

19. Before reliable G/C, W/T became available the use of Master Ship
Independent in destroyers had meant that several salvos would be fired by consorts
between signalled ranges from the Master Ship. The principle was therefore accepted
that the range clocks in consorts should be kept in tune with the clock in the Master
Ship by dint of using the same rate.

Rate therefore required to be signalled.

20. With the advent of a G/C. W/T set, and the sue of divisional rapid
salvos, the length of the firing signal became important. The 4.7-inch Q.R. gun was
coming into service at the same time, and it was decided that under good conditions, a
maximum output of

CHAP. IX. SECT. 4. FIRING SIGNAL 75

8 salvos per minute was practicable. This only leaves 7 seconds for the
transmission of each firing signal. At this time the signal was composed as follows:-

(i) Range.
(ii) Deflection.
(iii) Letter F.
(iv) Executive Sign.

The latter was a long dash of about 3 seconds duration. Its termination was to
be the exact instant of ringing the fire gongs in consorts, and its length was to vary
with local requirements. Deflection might be omitted during range ladders, provided
that it did not change.

Rate was to be signalled after the initial deflection double and subsequently at
intervals.

1. For divisional rapid salvos the firing signal was therefore amended for
trial as follows:-

(a) One of the following range, deflection, or rate.
(b) Letter F.
(c) Executive sign.

As regards (a) these items are made in turn in successive signals, the executive sign
being made at intervals of 7 seconds. Should spotting corrections or alteration of
rate change any one item, the sequence is to be broken, and the item that has changed
is to be made for the next firing signal, the sequence being then continued as before.

22. Should two items change at once they must both be made in the next
firing signal, the temporary lengthening of the firing interval being accepted. The
range must invariably be included in the first firing signal in divisional rapid salvos as
otherwise there is no certainty that the reverse correction, if any, is applied before
divisional rapid salvos are started. Experience shows that the W/T operator is forced
to forecast in his mind to such an extent that, once a salvo is fired there is no time for
him to apply a spotting correction, in divisional rapid salvos, before the next salvo is
fired. Care must therefore be taken that the Master Ship does not get on her
correction one salvo before the remainder of the division. This can be avoided by a
standing order in the Master Ship that no correction is ever applied in divisional rapid
salvos until the next salvo has been fired.

23. Opinion was divided as to the value of signalling the rate. It was
claimed to be preferable to signal the range each time it changed, the necessary
forecast being made by the clock-worker to allow for the rate in use. Consorts then
set their rate to zero and tuned the clock to ranges as received from the Master hip.

76 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

24. This method was, after trial, adopted and rate was no longer signalled.
The orders for the firing signal in divisional rapid salvos were therefore amended as
under:-

Passing of rate to be discontinued.
Range and deflection to be signalled on commencing divisional rapid salvos.
Range and/or deflection should be omitted if they have not changed, but in no
case for more than four successive salvos.
Range and deflection should be signalled if they both change in the same
salvos.

25. At the same time the general amendments whereby the preliminary
nought in single-figure deflection signals was omitted, and the nought in range signals
was passed as T, were adopted.

26. The A.F.C. clock was now coming into service, and certain
modifications were made to the procedure. Since this clock allows automatically for
the movements of own ship, the generated rate is correct if the enemy course and
speed is known. The master ship signals the enemy course and speed settings in use
whenever this can be done without interference with the firing signal, which remains
as before.

CHAPTER X

__________

Night Action General

__________

Section 1. General.

Section 2. War Experience.

Section 3. - Nature of Fire.

Section 4. Value of Tracers.
78 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER X

__________

Night Action General

__________

SECTION 1. - GENERAL

1. Night action is a large subject and requires treatment under several
headings. First of all, however, the conditions governing fighting at night must be
recognised. These are-

(a) Initial difficulty in locating and identifying the target.
(b) The short period during which an engagement at close range will last.
(c) Close range, high rate of change of range and bearing, and drastic
alterations of course.
(d) General necessity for the use of illuminants.

SECTION 2. WAR EXPERIENCE

2. Such practices as were carried out before the war were largely
hampered by the lack of efficient illuminants. Searchlights were not fitted with any
reliable methods of operation or of control, and star shell were non-existent.
Somewhat naturally the results obtained were so poor as to engender a marked
distaste for this form of battle, which was in fact unsuitable for capital ships in our
then superiority, and its thorough investigation was to some extent delayed.

3. In the War the Germans were noticeably our superiors at night both in
material, and, with the exception of the torpedo, it its use, and further consideration
was urgently directed to the problem.

4. Our war experience showed that a searchlight could be a very two-
edged weapon, and the conclusion was reached that, on the whole it was more of a
danger to the ship using it than the enemy. This was based on rather isolated
experiences. At the same time the German star shell appeared to be very efficient,
and it was not perhaps sufficiently realised that the enemy were able to make good
use of their searchlights as well, owing to good drill and to instant development of the
full fire power at the commencement of an engagement.

5. The German identification procedure was efficient, and they enjoyed
the advantage that they were seldom in doubt that nay object sighted was an enemy.

CHAP. X. SECT. 2. WAR EXPERIENCE 79

6. The war conclusions may be summarised as follows:-

Policy

Owing to the usual visibility conditions it may be practicable to avoid
action if desired. In this case naturally every effort must be directed to
concealment and evasion. On the other hand, if successful action is to be
sought the following conditions must be fulfilled:-

(i) An efficient look-out must be kept, using the best glasses
available, and whoever sight an object must be able accurately
to direct the armament and illuminants upon it.
(ii) Quick and effective means must be available for identifying the
object.
(iii) Own presence must not be disclosed until completely ready for
immediate action.
(iv) Once committed to an engagement all efforts must be directed
to the immediate development of the maximum volume of gun
and torpedo fire and no other consideration must be allowed to
interfere.
(v) Sufficient illumination must be provided to allow of a point of
aim and of spotting. Since to initiate an action at night, the
enemy must be sufficiently visible fore someone to locate her
before illuminants are used, the latter must not be allowed to
dominate the use f the armament or to interfere with it.
(vi) Action must only be joined at a range, and under conditions,
where fire will be effective. (This last conclusion is more
applicable to post-war experience.)

SECTION 3. NATURE OF FIRE

7. An ordered fire is of even more value at night than by day, as good fire
discipline and regularity is thereby maintained. With heavy guns it is advisable to fire
broadsides, since this causes less interference to the fire of the secondary armament
and star shell guns, and also to searchlight. It is not necessary, however, to delay the
firing of the initial broadside until all guns will bear, nor of subsequent broadsides to
ensure that all guns are ready.

SECTION 4. VALUE OF TRACERS

8. Tracers have proved of great assistance in spotting fall of shot for line.
Their use for elevation is less marked, owing to the eye being prone to prolong the
flight from the highest point of the trajectory, instead of allowing for the fall of the
projectile from this point to the water. It has been found that tracers are of most

80 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

assistance when fired from guns in the vicinity of the line of sight of the control
officer, and that from guns more remote the tracers are apt to mistaken for those from
a consort. The effective range of tracers is only about 2,000 yards. Outside that range
they are not sufficiently visible to be of use in distinguishing own fall of shot.

9. Tracers fired from Lewis guns cause confusion, as they go out after
about 500 yards, and their use from these weapons at night has been discontinued.

10. Tracers fitted in star shell can be seen from the moment of firing from
a position anywhere on the disengaged side, and from the engaged side, except within
approximately 60 of the line of fire, in which conditions they will not be seen until a
few seconds after firing. They should not therefore be used until the ship is
committed to action. When in company, however, it is unlikely that individual ships
will be able to recognise and control their bursts without the use of a proportion of
tracers.

11. As at present tracers can only be used in nose-fuzed shell their use is
limited.
____________________

CHAPTER XI

__________

Night Action Illuminants

__________

Section 1. Development and Use of Illuminants

Section 2. Silhouetting Effect of Illuminants on Ships using them.

Section 3. Searching an Area with Star Shell.
82 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER XI

__________

Night Action Illuminants

__________

SECTION 1. DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF ILLUMINANTS

1. Star shell came into supply at the end of the War, and were at first used
from the then H.A. armament of 3-inch guns. Star shell of this size were not very
effective, and, as a general rule, there was only one gun available at a time to fire
them. Star shell for 6-inch guns, i.e. the secondary armament of capital ships, and the
main armament of cruisers were therefore developed.

2. At the same time Iris shutters were fitted for searchlights and more
efficient remote control arrangements were supplied.

3. Bearing indicators to ensure adequate direction fo the searchlights and
star shell guns on to the required target were evolved.

4. Trials were then carried out to determine the relative merits of
searchlights and star shell:-

Searchlights

A selective and direct illuminant of great power. Its maximum range
against targets of the order of a cruiser and above is about 5,000 yards,
destroyers 2,000 yards.

Advantages

Good illuminating effect and considerable glare effect on enemy at
short ranges.

Immediately available when required, and can be stopped at once.

Neutralises enemy star shell

Disadvantages

Difficult to ensure that the light is directed on to the desired target
when the shutters are first opened.

Difficult to keep continuously laid and trained, except under
favourable conditions.

Much affected by blast and their illuminating effect spoilt by own
funnel and cordite smoke, or enemy splashes.

Provides a good point of aim and ranging mark for the enemy.

Reduces the effect of own star shell.

Silhouettes own ship on the disengaged side and gives away her exact
position to other craft in the vicinity.

Star Shell

A non-selective and indirect illuminant of less power than a
searchlight. The maximum range about 9,000 and 5,000 yards against cruisers
and above and destroyers respectively.



CHAP. XI. SECT. 1. USE OF ILLUMINANTS 83

Advantages

Provides adequate illumination of a fairly large area.

Bad direction is not necessarily a disadvantage as regards own ship.

Not affected by blast or own smoke.

Control easier in heavy weather.

Flashes of star shell guns do not provide a reliable point of aim nor can
they be ranged on.

Does not disclose exact position.

Disadvantages

Illumination inferior to searchlight and difficult to identify another
vessel by means of star shell.

Not immediately available nor can they at once be stopped.

Silhouette own ship on disengaged side, but not to so large an extent as
to searchlights.

Gives away the general position over a much larger area.

May illuminate hull of own ship at the shorter ranges.

5. As a result of all these trials it was held that both forms of illumination
had their uses, but that star shell were definitely less dangerous to our own side This
rather put defence at a premium, as opposed to effective offence.

The general conclusions drawn were that star shell formed the main method of
illumination, and that the use of searchlights should be reduced to a minimum. An
exception was against destroyers where the dazzling effect of a searchlight at short
range combined with the difficulty of keeping star shell aligned with small, fast
moving craft was in favour of the former under reasonable conditions.

6. There still remained the necessity of using a searchlight in the time
which elapsed between firing a star shell gun and the shell bursting (about 20
seconds). It was found that until a searchlight beam had been exposed for some 25
seconds, reliable ranges on it could not be obtained by an enemy not already fully
aware of own ships presence. Consideration was therefore given to the intermittent
display of the searchlight. This was found to be impracticable as it was difficult to
produce the beam exactly as and when required, and this method did not disconcert
the opponent to any marked extent, whilst it was apt to restrict own rate of fire.

7. Meanwhile, the following improvements in materiel were being made:-

4-inch star shell introduced as these guns came into general use as the
H.A. armament.

More than one gun a side available for star shell.

8. The question of the use of the secondary armament in capital ships,
and of the main armament in cruisers and destroyers, for firing star shell was
investigated. The improvements in material mentioned above enhanced the
effectiveness of star shell from



84 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

H.A. guns, and, although an initial salvo of 6-inch star shell produced good
illumination, it was held that to use a gun which was required for service ammunition
to fire star shell was wrong in principle. Moreover, in war, it was possible that the
inch guns would be loaded with service shell after a previous alarm or action, and so
would not be available when required for star shell.

9. An exception had to be made in the case of destroyers as their main
armaments constituted the only suitable guns for star shell, it was arranged therefore
that these craft should consider the searchlight to be their primary method of
illumination.

10. With the improvement of target indicating devices and gyro laying,
and observing that to initiate action at night the suspicious object must be visible to
somebody before any form of illumination is employed, it was held that it should be
practicable to fire the first service salvo coincidently with the commencement of the
illumination procedure, and that therefore a delay of some 20 seconds would be
imposed on those 6-inch guns firing star shell before they began to use service. The
above method of firing the first service salvo, although not normally practicable at
towed targets for reasons of safety can be, and has been, used at moored targets, and
should be still more feasible at the larger target presented by a ship.

11. Further improvements in material have:-

Stabilised searchlights for elevation.

Provided a reliable and long burning searchlight.

Introduced power control for searchlights giving much greater accuracy of
direction.

Produced brighter star shell.

Introduced flashless propellant for star shell.

12. With these searchlight improvements the immediate and clear effect of
a good searchlight became more obvious, and under suitable conditions its beneficial
effect in the immediate development of the maximum offensive power was marked.
It was also found that identification of the class and course of the enemy was fairly
certain with a searchlight, but doubtful with star shell. Moreover, the latter for the
best effect must burst only some 1,500 yards beyond the target, and the uncertainty as
to the initial range may modify their effect considerable especially in the case of
small, fast craft at short ranges.

13. With the advent of flashless charges for star shell, it becomes possible
for a ship to provide illumination by this means without necessarily disclosing her
exact position, and it has been proposed that the initial rounds of star shell could be
allowed to burst before the first service salvo was fired, thus obviating the use of a
searchlight during their time of flight. This method is not considered sound, as,
assuming the enemy has not taken the initiative, nothing should be

CHAP. XI. SECT. 1. USE OF ILLUMINANTS 85

done which might disclose own ships position before all the armament is ready for
action, and, secondly that at the instant the armament is ready, offensive action should
be taken. It may well happen that the enemy may take offensive action during this
20-second or longer time of flight. It therefore appears that no change in initial
procedure should follow the introduction of flashless propellant for star shell, and it
principal advantage is likely to be restricted to occasions where the firing ship is
searching an area, rather than identifying a ship which has already been sighted. In
destroyers where B gun is the normal star shell gun the absence of disturbance to
the bridge when flashless charges are used makes this improvement of marked benefit
in all cases.

14. Improvements in look-out glasses have led to a wider range of sighting
an enemy at night, and to the possibility of this sighting taking place outside the
effective range of illuminants, and where control of fire and spotting may not be
practicable. Trials have shown that, under good conditions, 15-inch splashes may be
spotted up to a range of 8,000 yards and 6-inch splashes up to 6,000 yards.

Conclusions as regards illuminants

15. Strategical and tactical considerations will govern the employment of
searchlights and star shell, and it may be necessary for these reasons to restrict their
use. Subject to this, illuminants are a means to an end, and searchlights and star shell
should not be regarded as rival forms of illumination. The limitations of each have
been discussed in the foregoing pages. Either or both will normally be required for-

(a) Identification.
(b) To provide a point of aim.
(c) To facilitate observation of fall of shot.
(d) To defeat enemys illumination.

(d) Can only be done by searchlight.

Procedure when action is sought:

Where the initiative is ours

16. If a point of aim is obtainable without illumination, open fire
coincidently with the opening of the searchlight shutter, and the firing of the first
round of star shell.

If no point of aim is available without illumination, expose the searchlight
beam simultaneously with opening fire with star shell.

In both cases obscure the searchlight beam as soon as the star shell becomes
effective, and maintain illumination with star shell so long as circumstances are
favourable. The exception is against destroyers at lose ranges where the dazzling
effect of a searchlight should be exploited to the full, and in destroyers themselves
where star shell should only be used if searchlights are ineffective.

17. Once a searchlight beam is exposed, and fire is opened, the
advertisement of the firing ships position is complete and further searchlights from
the same source will add little to the disclosure.

86 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

Where the initiative lies with the enemy

18. If the enemy uses star shell, the use of own searchlight will neutralise
their effect, but it is probable that a searchlight will not be necessary for obtaining on
point of aim or for spotting.

19. The opening of a searchlight by the enemy does not necessarily mean
that it is being used effectively, and, if he uses a searchlight he gives us a perfect point
of aim and ranging mark, at the same time gaining for himself what may be doubtful
aiming, ranging and spotting. He may of course in addition be obtaining information
as to identity, class and movements of our ship. If we use a searchlight in reply, we
deny the enemy any advantages in identification and knowledge of our movements
but give him definite advantages in gun control that previously were ours alone.

Neglecting weather conditions the use therefore of a searchlight depends on
the relative importance of denial of identification and of gun control

20. Assuming that this denial is not the primary requirement, the best
procedure in action between heavy ships or cruisers is considered to be:-

(i) Open fire with star shell without waiting for the remainder of the
armament, so as to have star shell illumination ready when required.
(ii) If the enemy uses a searchlight do not reply with one so long as his
searchlight enables effective gunfire to be maintained on our part.
(iii) Against destroyers at close ranges searchlights should be used in any
weather where they can be employed effectively.
(iv) In destroyers when discovered the use of searchlight against enemy
heavy ships may have considerable blinding effect, and may help to
neutralise his searchlight.

SECTION 2. SILHOUETTING EFFECT OF ILLUMINANTS

21. Instructions that this point should be the subject of investigation were
issued to capital ships and cruisers early in 1929.

CAPITAL SHIPS

22. The following conclusions were drawn as the results of the 1929
practices:-

Searchlights

(i) When used on the engaged side only, under ordinary circumstances
give a perfect silhoueting [sic] effect of the ship using them to an
observer on the disengaged side.
(ii) When used on both sides they do not silhouette the ship using them to
any appreciable extent.

CHAP. XI. SECT. 2. EFFECTS OF ILLUMINANTS 87

(iii) Searchlights burned ahead by the leading ship of a division make it
very difficult of destroyers attacking from ahead to estimate inclination
and also assist materially in preventing silhouetting.

Star Shell

(iv) Star shell are more apt to silhouette ships than searchlights burnt on
both sides simultaneously.

23. These conclusions were generally confirmed during 1930.

24. In a divisional night firing under conditions of full moon the firing
ships did not require to use illuminants, but both types were used against destroyers
which attacked them on the disengaged side. It was stated tat, owing to the moon, the
inclination of the battleships was easy to judge, and they were well silhouetted by the
gunfire of the engaged battery.

25. In another squadron a continuous searchlight sweep on both sides was
found to be very effective in preventing silhouetting.

CRUISERS

26. At the end of 1929, only one report had been received, which referred
to conditions on a dark and clear night. The summary was as follows:-

Star Shell

Star shell have little or no silhouetting effect when burst at 5,000 yards,
except to an observer on the disengaged side who is within 15 of the direct
line between the ship and star shell. The distance from the firing ship on the
disengaged side up to which this silhouetting effect is obtained was not stated;
and further, since the date of this report the brilliancy of star shell has been
increased.

Searchlights

On the disengaged side a ship is well silhouetted by her own
searchlights particularly when the observer is more than 20 from the line of
the beam of light.

Point of Aim and Observation of Fire

When under the above conditions, ships are silhouetted, although a
good point of aim was provided, it was remarked that observation of fire
would be difficult.

27. In 1930 these conclusions were confirmed. It was pointed out that a
searchlight, being a beam of light, was more likely to silhouette ships in the
immediate vicinity of the ship of origin as was a star shell, which was a point of light.

28. The question was then withdrawn, since it was considered unlikely that
further information would be obtained in the course of normal practices.


88 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

SECTION 3. SEARCHING AN AREA WITH STAR SHELL

29. In 1923 it was considered that an organisation should exist whereby an
area could be searched quickly with star shell. Investigation of the problem was
confined to destroyers as presumably this class of vessel would be the most likely to
carry out the duty.

30. The conditions laid down were:-

(a) Ships to be ready for immediate action.
(b) It is undesirable to introduce complicated procedures which differ
largely from normal night action procedure.
(c) Normal star shell and stand-by star shell guns only are to be used, with
normal fuze-setting of 5,000 yards.
(d) Bearing ordered was to be a relative one.

31. The slewing dials of star shell guns were at that time marked with stars
at 6 intervals from the black pointers, and it was therefore feasible for the star shell
gun to be kept trained by director at 6 or multiples thereof, away from the directors
line of sight.

Arrangements for the trial were therefore to spread the star shell in increments
of 6, the guns using gunlayers firing.

32. The problem was further divided into two portions:-

(1) Search of a limited area by a division.
(2) All round search by a flotilla.

33. The first trials showed that an arc of 4 points could rapidly be
illuminated by a division, illumination becoming effective over this area at 5,000
yards in about 80 seconds after commencing the procedure. Four salvos of two star
shell each per ship were used, and this was found to be adequate to cover the four-
point area.

34. It was found, however, that 5,000 yards was too short a fuze range, as
firing ships became self-illuminated. 7,000 yards was tried, using the same procedure
as before, and the following conclusions were reached:-

(a) An arc of 45 was sufficiently illuminated to reveal any ship in it, and
though certain dark spots occurred at various times and on various
bearings, no one portion of the 45 sector was never illuminated.
(b) Ships disclosed could be seen sufficiently well through glasses for fire
to be opened (the range was between 2,000 and 3,500 yards).
(c) Firing ships were self-illuminated sufficiently to reveal their type
number and course to the targets, but not well enough for these to open
fire.

CHAP. XI. SECT. 3. SEARCHING AN AREA WITH STAR SHELL 89

35. It was considered that with a flotilla, extension of the divisional search
to one by both divisions was the most practical method of solving paragraph 32(2). It
was decided, therefore, to restrict the whole problem to a divisional search covering
an arc of 45 on any relative bearing, and from any formation. Illumination to be
produced as the result of a preparatory signal by the divisional leader followed by an
executive signal.

36. A gyro bearing was introduced instead of a relative one, and subject to
the fact that if the signalled bearing or its reciprocal was that on which the division
was formed, blank spots must occur, it was found that the following procedure was
effective, and that it did not interfere with the handling the division by W/T
concurrently with the search:-

(i) The divisional leader orders a search on a gyro bearing. All ships
prepare to fire with star shell and stand-by star shell guns using 7,000
yard setting.
(ii) The executive order to commence is the firing of the first round by the
divisional leader. This should not be more than 30 seconds after the
search signal.
(iii) Each ship fires four salvos of two star shell each as follows:-

First salvo .. On bearing ordered.
Second salvo .. 6 outwards from bearing ordered.
Third salvo .. 12 outwards from bearing ordered.
Fourth salvo .. 18 outwards from bearing ordered.

(iv) Outwards means away from the ships of the other sub-division.
Bearings right ahead or astern in line-ahead, or abeam in-line-abreast
should not be ordered for a search as the foregoing definition breaks
down in these circumstances.
(v) If any ships are seen at the edge of the illuminated area, the end ship
affected continues to spread star shell to complete identification.

37. Further trials of the above procedure in the Mediterranean fleet gave
rise to the following report:-

(1) It is impossible to forecast the exact tactical situations in which
a division of destroyers may be required to search an area, but
they would appear to be very infrequent. Such situations may
vary from the division being alone in an area in which no
enemy is expected, to one in which the division is in company
with own heavy ships and in which the enemy is known to be
in the vicinity.
(2) For the above reasons it is held to be unsound to use any
organisation which does not leave the division ready to engage
the enemy immediately the first star shell is fired.
90 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

(3) To search an area with star shell pre-supposes that the initiative lies
with our own ships. In order to engage an enemy effectively, all guns
must bear. Therefore should the area to be searched lie outside the A
arc, or in a line through the line of bearing of the division it should be
the policy to dispose the ships of the division as required before
commencing the search.
(4) It is considered that B gun should be the only gun used for firing star
shell, and that X gun is not needed as a stand-by gun, nor for
assisting in the search. This will avoid both the sacrifice of 50 per
cent. of the ships armament to star shell, and also the complications of
control when using an after gun for this purpose.
(5) It is therefore proposed to modify the rules given in paragraph 36 as
follows:-

(a) Double rounds to be fired from B gun, and X gun no
longer to be considered as a star shell gun.
(b) When ordering the bearing on which a search is to take place
the divisional leader must make due allowance for the rate of
change of bearing should he have any knowledge of the
probable enemy movements.

On the other hand the Atlantic Fleet reported that one gun firing double rounds
was too slow to produce the required illumination.

38. Further trials affirmed that B gun only was necessary, and the
present system is as shown in paragraph 36, but using B gun only.
CHAPTER XII

____________

Night Action Procedure when in Company


____________

Section 1. General.

Section 2. A Division of Capital Ships.

Section 3. A Cruiser Squadron.

Section 4. A Division of Destroyers.
92 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER XII

___________


Night Action Procedure when in Company

____________


SECTION 1. GENERAL


1. This differs from single ship procedure in that co-ordinated action is
required, and that the functions and peculiarities of different classes of ships are liable
to require greater difference in treatment. In all cases some definite arrangement is
required for the handling of illuminants of the ships in company.

The subject is considered below for a normal unit of a division of capital ships
or destroyers and a squadron of cruisers.

SECTION 2. A DIVISION OF CAPITAL SHIPS

2. When the problem was first reconsidered after the war, it was apparent
that the Admiral should promulgate the policy for the night by signal before dark.
This policy signal should include-

(1) Degree of readiness for action to be assumed.
(2) Expectation or otherwise of being attacked.
(3) Range for the night (to be altered as necessary).
(4) Intended action if enemy is encountered.
(5) Position of own ships on the screen.
(6) Challenge procedure to be adopted.
(7) Any special orders as to the use of star shell and searchlights.

3. At this time the use of searchlights from capital ships was as limited as
possible. The intention normally was that the secondary armament would be loaded
with star shell, and it was considered that a salvo of star shell from these guns would
illuminate at least one, and perhaps more ships on either side of the one sighted.

A searchlight was to be used initially to illuminate the enemy before star shell
became effective, and for the purpose of indicating the direction of attack to ships in
company, but in neither case was the beam to be exposed for more than 25 seconds.

4. Subject to the Admirals intentions the illumination procedure was-

The sighting ship exposed a searchlight, and opened fire with star
shell, at the same time opening fire with service.
The remainder opened fire with service, and star shell on the target
first sighted.

CHAP. XII. SECT. 2. NIGHT ACTION A DIVN. OF CAPITAL SHIPS 93

Star shell should be stopped if the enemy was identified as destroyers
at close range, otherwise sighting ship obscured her searchlight when star shell
became effective, or after 20 seconds, whichever was the shorter.

5. Opinion was divided as to the merits of a searchlight sweep to disclose
any further enemy. The searchlight would have to be used for this purpose, as ships
engaging a target would already be employing their H.A. armament for star shell as
well as all the secondary armament that could be spared.

6. The Atlantic Fleet held that any further enemy would almost certainly
reveal their presence by the flash of their own guns or the use of searchlights (this
seems to leave out of account attacks by destroyers), whilst the Mediterranean Fleet
considered that this sweep was necessary; but it was restricted to the end ships of the
division sweeping about 30 outwards from the enemy already illuminated; the centre
ship (third ship if more than 3 in a division) taking over the responsibility for
illumination on the initial enemy. This sweep might be repeated at the discretion of
the end ships.

As regards further illumination of the target the Atlantic Fleet laid down that
all ships were to use star shell, reinforced by their own searchlight, whenever star
shell became ineffective. Only one ships searchlight was to be on any particular
target at one time, the ship to burn it being the leading one of those suffering from
poor star shell illumination. In the Mediterranean Fleet the centre ship became
responsible for the illumination of the first target. A second target was to be taken
over by the second searchlight in the centre ship, and further targets by ships on either
side of the centre ship in turn, each ship being responsible for a maximum of two
targets.

8. Further experience led to the adoption by both fleets of the centre ship
as being the one to take over the responsibility for the first target if any searchlight
was required, thus leaving the end ships free for further identification sweeping by
searchlights.

9. Consideration was now directed to the question of whether a different
procedure to the foregoing was required to deal with attacks by light craft. It was
decided that a searchlight sweep on the engaged side was desirable to ensure
disclosing the extent of the attack. Trials disclosed the fact that, with ships whose
searchlights were all situated abaft the bridge, the sweep ahead by the leading ship
was apt to interfere with the control of gunfire, and might have to be undertaken in
this case by star shell.

10. As regards the disengaged side opinion was not unanimous.

The greater silhouetting effect of searchlights over star shell or gun flashes
was a reason for not employing searchlights more than necessary as this silhouetting
would help attacking craft whether

94 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

on the original engaged or disengaged side. On the other hand, star shell are not so
reliable for illuminating small fast craft at close ranges, and the dazzling effect of a
searchlight under these conditions is great.

Furthermore, searchlights used simultaneously on both sides will tend to
neutralise each others silhouetting effects, and once fire is opened the additional
disclosure of the general position by using plenty of searchlights is of little
consequence.

11. The deciding argument is held to be, that when once committed to an
action, all efforts must be directed to the immediate development of the maximum
offensive power, and no other considerations should intervene.

12. Since, therefore, the searchlight helps the offensive by its dazzling
effect at close ranges, and is also normally more suitable than star shell against light
craft, its use on the engaged side is sound, and the silhouetting effect must be
accepted. As regards the disengaged side, a star shell sweep may be successful, but if
searchlights are in use on the engaged side, no disadvantage attends their use on the
disengaged side also, and this will neutralise the silhouetting effect. To ensure this,
searchlights should therefore always be used on both sides if at all.

13. The present position in both fleets is as follows:- Subject to the policy
signal, to the suspicious vessel being with effective range of illuminants and to
captains retaining full discretion to acta as circumstances may require:-

On sighting a suspicious Ship.

(i) Sighting ship is at once to make the squadron alarm (Mediterranean
only.)
(ii) When ready to take offensive action, the sighting ship is to establish
the identify of the stranger; if hostile, a searchlight is to be switched
on, and fire opened with star shell and armament.
(iii) Should the enemy sigh first, and successfully illuminate a ship, that
ship is to act as sighting ship (HF only).

If the Vessel is Identified as a Capital Ship

(iv) Sighting ship is to obscure her searchlight when star shell becomes
effective.
(v) All ships are to use star shell to illuminate their selected target
reinforced by searchlights as necessary.

CHAP. XII. SECT. 2. NIGHT ACTION A DIVN. OF CAPITAL SHIPS 95

If the vessel is identified as a cruiser or destroyer

(vi) All ships are to commence star shell (Mediterranean only).
(vii) The division nearest the attack provides searchlight illumination as
follows:-

Engaged side

(a) The two centre ships, if possible, are to take over the illumination of
the target or targets first sighted.
(b) The end ships are then to sweep outwards continuously between the
target and their own fore and aft line (or extreme searchlight bearings).
(c) Any further target disclosed must be held by one searchlight of the
sweeping ship until taken over by a centre ship, while the second
searchlight continues the sweep.
(d) It is important to illuminate continuously all torpedo craft, and also
small cruisers, in order to dazzle them.

Disengaged side

(e) The senior officer present or the senior officer of the division may
initiate a sweep on the disengaged side with searchlights or star shell.
(f) This sweep is then to be carried out by the end ships, sweeping
outwards from the beam allowing an overlap.
(g) If this sweep discloses a target the procedure for the engaged side is to
be carried out.

Precautions whilst Sweeping

(viii) As large alterations of course are likely during a night engagement,
special vigilance is necessary to avoid lighting up a friendly ship.

Control of Gunfire

14. Some difference of opinion existed between the two fleets on this
question, and the original opinions are here given separately.

Atlantic Fleet

15. Range for the night should be the same for all ships.

Both W/T and V/S lines of communication should be available as in day
action.

An alarm gyro bearing is useful, and should be passed, but once fire has been
opened intercommunication of range and bearing appears to be of little value, owing
to the very raped sequence of events, and to the large P.I.L. corrections required.


96 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

Mediterranean Fleet

16. Doubtful if intercommunication of bearing is of much use. The risk of
warning the enemy, if W/T is used before disclosure, could not be accepted, and the
lag of communication is then too great for any useful purpose to be served.
Intercommunication of range, however, is recommended.

Both Fleets

17. Both fleets were agreed that whilst normally all ships should open fire
at the enemy first sighted, captains of ships had complete discretion to shift on to any
other enemy who was heavily engaging them, who was unfired at, or who was in a
menacing torpedo position.

18. Subsequent experience has not modified the views expressed above as
to the undesirability of any organised form of concentration of fire at night. The
arguments for and against concentration are discussed more fully in the section on
cruisers and destroyers.

19. Further trials, however, have shown that it is inadvisable to signal the
range for the night at intervals during the dark hours, since it is not desired to use V/S
for this purpose, and W/T silence is likely to be in force. It has been decided,
therefore, to omit any reference to the range for the night in the policy signal.

When contact or probable contact has been gained with the enemy, however,
the advantages of a squadron gyro alarm bearing are held to be sufficient to justify its
immediate transmission by W/T by the sighting ship. This signal serves chiefly as an
alarm, and the rough bearing is all that is practicable or necessary.

SECTION 3. - A CRUISER SQUADRON

20. In this case definite trials were carried out in 1924 with a view to
evolving a common procedure. It was held that, as the transmission of information
about the enemy is just as much the duty of cruisers by night as it is by day, it may
often be more necessary for cruisers to ensure passing their information than to
become closely engaged.

Subject to the above, and to the policy signal, the illumination procedure
evolved was the same as for capital ships, with the exception that the second ship took
over the initial target.

Control of Gunfire

21. When more than one enemy is disclosed initially, or at short intervals
after the first alarm, it is extremely difficult for individual ships to distinguish which
of their consorts is firing at which target. The intercommunication of ranges and
deflections is therefore merely confusing, since there is no certainty as to what target
they apply. A bearing signal will not clear up the difficulty owing to the short range
and rapid change of bearing, combined with the inherent lag in transmission and
reception.

CHAP. XII. SECT. 3. NIGHT ACTION A CRUISER SQUADRON 97

22. Cases will arise, however, in which only one enemy is present. If this
target is to be engaged with decisive effect by several ships it is necessary that these
ships shall all use the same range (corrected for P.I.L.). There is therefore a strong
argument for an organised concentration procedure, and, since by day GMS has been
proved to be the most effective form of concentration, the same should hold good by
night.

23. The range at which the action takes place, however, is a modifying
feature. Up to about 2,000 yards the fixed sight procedure is suitable, i.e., ships using
fixed sight range will in any case be using the most effective range, and this range
does not require signalling. Moreover, in ships whose outfit includes tracer fitted
projectiles, it has been found generally feasibly to distinguish own fall of shot up to
2,000 yards when several ships are engaging the same target.

24. With careful training of the personnel, rangefinder ranges may often be
obtained at moderate ranges, and, in this case, bearing in mind the difficulty of
assessing accurately the P.I.L. correction, rangefinder control by individual ships will
probably be more effective than any form of concentration procedure. Care is
necessary that ranges are not taken of own star shell.

25. In addition the rapid change of range and of bearing, at these short
ranges, may not give time for an organised form of concentration to be initiated
before the action is over.

The conclusion, therefore, is that inside about 2,000 yards such concentration
is unnecessary.

26. With the extension of effective range of star shell, improvements in
illuminating power, and control of searchlights, the advent of better night glasses, and
the possibility of illumination by flares or by other ships not in formation, the
practicability of engaging enemy ships at medium ranges by night is becoming more
marked.

When more than one enemy is present the arguments against concentration
still hold good, but with only a single enemy, decisive results are unlikely to be
obtained by indiscriminate firing by ships in company.

27. GMS concentration has been practised by night, and has given good
results at target firings. Its use has so far been considered undesirable, however,
mainly owing to:-

(a) Difficulty of accurate assessment of P.I.L.
(b) The need for flexibility.
(c) Difficulty experienced by the master control officer in spotting
consorts salvos, their line of fire at short ranges differing considerably
from that of master ship.

(C23461) E

98 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

(a) Difficulty of accurate assessment of P.I.L.

28. This is still unsolved, as an accurate knowledge of the distance of the
master ship from a consort is not at present determinable. An approximation is
practicable, however, if it is assumed that the consort is in station, or if it is known
that she is outside.

(b) The need for flexibility

This is merely a matter of drill. As already stated, if one enemy only is
present no confusion will arise. Emphasis is only required on the fact that
immediately more enemy are disclosed organised concentration is at once at an end,
and each commanding officer is perfectly free to take what action the situation
demands.

(c) Difficulty experienced by Master Control Officer in spotting consorts salvos

At ranges outside 2,000 yards this is not so marked. In any case it has often
been advocated that by day the master control officer should attempt to pot on his
own salvos, rather than on the general fall of shot, and this procedure at night should
be effective.

29. It is considered, therefore, that under the stated conditions, i.e., only
one enemy present and outside 2,000 yards, GMS concentration should give better
results than indiscriminate firing. It is questionable, however, whether, owing to rapid
changes of course and differences of bearing, it is of any advantage to signal the
master ships deflection. It should be sufficient for the master ship to use divisional
rapid salvos, and for the firing signal merely to contain the range and her self-evident
letter.

Should any other enemy be disclosed, or the range fall below 2,000 yards, GIC
is at once signalled and organised concentration ceases.

SECTION 4. A DIVISION OF DESTROYERS

30. In this case, the large number of flotillas who are normally
investigating the same problem at any one time, has given rise to a great variety of
opinion, and the co-ordination of ideas has been more difficult.

Illumination Procedure

31. The previously discussed advantages and disadvantages respectively of
searchlights and star shell hold good with the following modifications:-

Searchlights

Only one fitted per destroyer and that of low power. Mechanically
controlled, and of little use except in moderately smooth water.

Star Shell

Must be fired from guns of the main armament.

CHAP. XII. SECT. 4. NIGHT ACTION A DIVN. OF DESTROYERS 99

32. The illumination procedure evolved in the cruiser trials of 1923
enabled considerable progress to be made by destroyers in 1924, and the following
conclusions were arrived at:-

Searchlights

Under suitable weather conditions, one searchlight provides
illumination for one target for a whole division, and this searchlight should be
shown by the sighting ship, subsequent illumination being maintained by her.
A stand-by searchlight is required, and should be in one of the centre ships
(Nos. 2 and 3).

Star Shell

B gun should be the star shell gun with X as a stand-by.

Disadvantages of B gun are: Loss of service fire on ahead bearings and the
effect of flash on the bridge personnel in the early stages of an encounter.

The advantages are: As a destroyer searchlight will not bear ahead, it is very
advantageous to be able to fire star shell on these bearings. Ease of control of a gun
near the bridge.

It was considered that two ships were sufficient to produce illumination. They
were to be the centre ships, thus leaving the end ships free to shift their fire to another
target as required.

The rate of fire for star shell remained undecided, and opinion on this point,
differed between the maximum rate of fire of the gun, or with, or directly after, the
main armament salvos.

33. Practices in 1925 still disclosed many differences of opinion but the
following points were held to have been established:-

Searchlights

One was not always sufficient to enable all ships of the division to spot
their fall of shot. It could not be done with certainty by a ship more than one
station in the line away from the searchlight ship. If any concentration of fire
was to be used, the divisional leader, as master ship, would require efficient
illumination, and therefore at lease one of the searchlight ships should be her
next astern. It was undesirable to draw enemy fire on to the master ship.

It was also clear that the sighting ship must initiate the searchlight procedure,
since she must not delay offensive action.

34. The following instructions were therefore laid down for trial:-

(a) Sighting ship switches on her searchlight.
(b) The two ships next astern of the Senior Officer switch on and provide
the illumination for the whole unit. If the sighting ship is not one of
these two, she is then to switch off.

(C23461) E*
100 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

(c) If either of the illuminating ships fails, the nearest ship is to take over.
(d) Nothing above precludes the Senior Officer from opening his shutter at
any time should he so desire.

Star Shell

35, The balance of opinion confirmed that these should be fired from the
centre ships, leaving the end ships free to shift their fire as required. This procedure
implied that, if not the sighting ships, the centre ships were to take over from her as
soon as possible.

If the division were a 5-ship on, i.e., flotilla leader present, her 3-inch H.A.
gun might be used to improve the illumination from her own point of view.

The rate of fire should not be restricted, but should be the maximum.

36. The following instructions were laid down for trial:-

(a) Sighting ship opens fire with star shell.
(b) Nos. 2 and 3 open fire and take over. If sighting ship is not one of
these she stops firing star shell when Nos. 2 and 3 become effective.
(c) Star shell rate of fire is to be the maximum.
(d) Two groups of fuzes, 5,000 yards and 3,000 yards, are to be kept set.
Sighting ship is to use 5,000 yards setting. Nos. 2 and 3 are to use the
group which will give the nearer bursts to the target, but not less than
1,500 yards beyond it.
(e) Nothing in the foregoing prevents the Senior Officer taking
independent illuminating action.

37. The results in 1926 confirmed these instructions, and the searchlight
and star shell instructions were combined as under:-

(a) Sighting ship opens searchlight shutter and begins firing star shell at
the maximum rate.
(b) Searchlight is obscured when star shell becomes effective.
(c) Nos. 2 and 3 are the illuminating ships for the division. They assume
duty as soon as they can, and if the sighting ship is not one of these,
she then ceases to illuminate.
(d) If Nos. 2 or 3 fail, the nearest ship takes on.
(e) The Master Control officer (normally the Senior Officer) may use
independent illumination.
(f) Any ship shifting fire to a new target must provide her own
illumination.

CHAP. XII. SECT. 4. NIGHT ACTION A DIVN. OF DESTROYERS 101

38. The question of which was to be the star shell gun was re-opened. The
flash from B gun with an unrestricted rate of fire was found to be disturbing to the
bridge personnel, and the directors crew. It was also suggested that, if the target
sighted were abaft the beam, the limited training of B gun might make the standard
procedure unworkable, and it was suggested that X gun should be the normal star
shell gun for the rear ships.

The introduction of flashless star shell propellant was expected to, and in fact
has settled, the flash problem in favour of B gun, and the limited arc of training is
not considered of sufficient importance to justify departure from the present
arrangements. All modern destroyers have increased arc of training for B gun.
Fuzes set to 5,000 yards were found on occasions to illuminate the firing ship and new
settings were introduced:-

Long setting, 7,000 yards.
Short setting, 5,000 yards.

39. Experience in the following years was confirmatory, but in 1928 it was
thought that the illumination instructions were too rigid, and that the sighting ship
should act initially as if she were alone, the choice of illuminants, if any were
required, being decided by her commanding officer, subject to the policy signal.

40. The question of a sweep for disclosing further enemy was raised, and it
was decided, subject to the policy, that the end ships should sweep up to 45 outwards
from the target. This sweep to be carried out once only. No decision was given as to
what illuminants should be used for the sweep.

41. In 1929 the following modification to the illumination procedure was
included in the instructions-

(a) The sighting ship should act as if she were alone and be guided by the
policy signal.
(b) Consorts must not rely on illumination from others, but may withhold
illumination if from other sources they have a satisfactory point of aim.

42. Concentration practices have tended to show that a searchlight
provides too directional a light for the spotting officer to see more than a few of his
splashes. This may necessitate the use of star shell when concentrating.

In this event it has been suggested that star shell fired by ships other than the
master ship and her next astern, are of no value to the master control officer, by
reason of their being on a different bearing from the target as viewed by the master
ship.

43. Occasional difficulty has been caused by the star shell gun to the
control of the main armament. It has been seen that the maximum rate of star shell
fire is disturbing to bridge personnel.

102 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

With the improved star shell now available, an unrestricted rate of fire after the first
burst is not so necessary, and one commensurate with that in use by the main
armament is found to be sufficient. If the star shell gun, which is normally in
gunlayers firing, fires on hearing the main armament fire gong, any delay in the
director firing may be taken by other guns to indicate a director miss-fire. This may
be avoided if the star shell gun fires directly after each main armament salvo, being
prepared to fire by order of the star-shell control officer should the target be lost or
there be an undue delay with the main armaments.

Control of Gunfire

44. The practicability of concentration of fire at night has been remarked
upon in the cruiser section. It has powerful arguments in addition for destroyers.

(a) The closer station keeping in destroyers lessens the P.I.L. correction
required.
(b) No modern destroyer at present carries tracer fitted shell.
(c) With their rapid firing guns it is even more difficult to distinguish
individual fall of shot.

45. The question of organised concentration was considered after the war.
At that time the method of day concentration was a barrage fire, requiring
comparatively infrequent signals, which was partly necessitated by the meagre control
and communication fittings available. Opinion was in favour of master ship control at
night (no ship then carried night tracers) and it was held:-

(a) It is impossible for individual G.C.O.s to spot their own fall of shot,
therefore some system of Master ship control is essential.
(b) All signals gunnery, torpedo and manoeuvring can be more
efficiently passed through the common line of communication ,i.e.
W/T via the transmitting station.

Emphasis was laid on the necessity of simple and flexible organisation, and
consideration was directed to whether or not the sighting ship should become master
ship.

46. By 1926 sufficient progress had been made to enable rules for the
conduct of practices in 1927 to be laid down. It was still considered that all gunnery,
torpedo and manoeuvring signals could be passed through the transmitting station.

The following is a summary of these rules:-

(i) Senior Officer is to signal the range for the night keeping it corrected
as necessary.
(ii) No signalled orders for distribution of fire will be given.

CHAP. XII. SECT. 4. NIGHT ACTION A DIVN. OF DESTROYERS 103

(iii) Sighting ship proceeds exactly as if she were alone, except that she
immediately signals the relative bearing of the enemy by W/T, and
may also signal her gun range after the first spotting correction for
information of consorts.
(iv) All ships open fire without delay in individual control on the target
first sighted, using the range for the night or sighting ships gun range
as desired, reverting to GMS if and when the signal GMS is made
by the Senior Officer, who will take the duty of master ship.
(v) Concentration is not desirable below 1,000 yards.
(vi) Range only will be signalled. (A.F.R. was in use.)
(vii) All ships firing at master ships target are to use his ranges corrected
for P.I.L, but concentration is permissive and the selection of targets in
all cases rests with individual commanding officers.

Instructions were also given about engaging another target. If this appeared
abaft the original one, the rear ship broke off and engaged it, and vice versa.

Should the master ship shift target, the fact was to be indicated by the signal
SOB, and the concentration (still permissive) might continue.

47. It should be noted that these rules appear to have been drawn up
without thorough investigation of the difficulty of distinguishing each ships target at
night, or of the confusion that is likely to arise if concentration is attempted when
several targets present themselves. The relative alarm bearing was employed partly
owing to all ships not being fitted with gyro compasses.

48. In 1928 it was confirmed that the flotilla leader if present, should act as
a consort, and that the divisional fire control organisation, with the divisional leader
as master ship, should remain unaltered. The Senior Officer if the foregoing
summary therefore became the Divisional Leader.

Coloured light procedure was also to be used for the alarm bearing in addition
to W/T, and the bearing so signalled was to be a gyro one.

49. By 1929, a considerable amount of trial had been given to the
foregoing procedure, and the opinion had been formed that it was becoming too
complicated to stand the test of war.

The 1927 procedure (paragraph 46) was therefore modified as follows:-

(i) If one enemy is sighted and illuminated, all ships should at once
concentrate upon her. The cardinal rule by night, however, is that no
enemy must be left unfired at.
(ii) At close range, independent control is essential and no order ACY
need be made or expected.

104 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

(iii) At longer ranges, if the enemy is inferior in numbers, and
concentration of fire is therefore possible, the maximum hitting power
can only be produced if the ships concentrating use the same ranges.
The divisional leader or sighting ship under these conditions may use
MSC procedure, but the signal MSC is not to be taken as an order, but
as an indication that the ranges being transmitted are those that must be
used if fire is directed upon his target.
(iv) In exceptional conditions, where the visibility is greater than about
6,000 yards, it may be desirable to employ concentration, and, in these
circumstances day procedure should be used.
(v) A special night concentration procedure is only required, therefore,
between roughly 2,000 and 6,000 yards, and not always even then.
When used it should be in accordance with (iii) above.

50. Further and more realistic trials led to the discovery of the practical
impossibility, when more than one target was presented, of distinguishing which ship
was firing at which target. It appeared therefore that, in this case, no form of
concentration was practicable.

Opinion between the two main fleets now diverged.

51. In the Mediterranean Fleet it was considered that decisive results
outside about 2,000 yards could only be obtained against a single enemy if
concentration was employed. If this was to be done the most effective form of
concentration MSC should be used, and, if MSC was to be used, it should be done
by a definite order. At the same time, it should be made perfectly clear what was to
happen if and when another target presented itself.


52. The Mediterranean procedure therefore became as follows:-

Range 2,000 yards and under

Concentration is not to be used. If the range decreases to 2,000 yards
during concentration, the master ship is to make the signal ACY.


Above 2,000 yards

Concentration is not to be employed unless only one enemy ship
appears to be present. If, while concentrating, a fresh enemy is disclosed,
consorts are free to take independent action at once, and the master ship is
immediately to make the signal ACY.

Subject to the above the Senior Officer of any formation will decide if and
when concentration is to be employed. If it is employed, the signals made by the
master ship will indicate to consorts that it is an order to concentrate which is being
signalled and not merely permission.
CHAP. XII. SECT. 4. NIGHT ACTION A DIVN. OF DESTROYERS 105

The flotilla leader will normally be the Senior Officer of the leading division,
and will take duty as master ship for that division.

When concentrating day procedure is to be sued except that:-

(a) Divisional rapid salvos are to be fired throughout.
(b) No distribution of fire signals are to made or awaited. The master ship
merely making MSC followed by the usual firing signal. (N.B.- This
included deflection.)

P.I.L. Correction

It is to be assumed, unless obviously incorrect, that ships are in station.
The G.C.O. should memorise the corrections for various bearings, and pass
them to the Transmitting Station as necessary.

53. The remainder of the procedure, e.g., action by sighting ship, remained
as before.

This system received a thorough trial, and was found to be efficient if limited
to the conditions laid down for its use.

54. In the Atlantic fleet, on the other hand, it was considered that the
previous instructions (paragraph 49) met the requirements.

55. The situation was complicated by the fact that at this time (1930) there
were conflicting opinions as to the use to be made at night of the gun control W/T set.
Owing to its value for manoeuvring purposes, it was normally so used by most
flotillas, though it was officially available for gun control, and the foregoing
procedures had been worked out on the assumption that this was the case.

An Admiralty decision (November 1932) was given as follows:-

Gun control W/T set need not be regarded as immediately available
for fire control purposes at night.

The position was now modified considerably. Since the essence of master
ship control lies in quick and reliable inter-communication, the interruption caused by
the intrusion of a manoeuvring signal may be disastrous. Against this must be
balanced the confusion that is likely to arise if several ships engaging the same target
are using different ranges.

56. The procedure outlined in paragraph 49 is now considered to be the
correct one. It is uncertain, however,

(a) Whether or not the Divisional Commander should have more control
of the fire distribution.
(b) Whether it is suitable for the sighting ship to act as master ship.


___________________



CHAPTER XIII

______________

Trend Spotting

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108 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER XIII

___________


Trend spotting

___________

1. In 1930, certain C class cruisers investigated the employment of
reverse ladder after the target had been crossed, instead of using a single reverse
correction. The object was to ensure straddling with at least one of the first three
salvos fired in rapid.

2. The Admiralty view was that the system had the following
disadvantages:-

(i) The potential rate of hitting is reduced by two-thirds.
(ii) The rate of fire is affected by the necessity for spotting corrections.
(iii) Added complication, and therefore increased liability to error. This is
greatly increased in the event of one of the salvos of the ladder falling
out for line.
(iv) Introduction of rules applicable to one class of cruiser only;

and it was directed that no further trials were to be carried out.

3. This proposed system did not embody the principle of spotting
according tot eh trend of the fall of shot but did recognise the probability of the rate in
use being in error.

4. In 1934, proposals, similar to each other in principle, were received at
the Admiralty in which a radical change in the existing spotting rules were suggested.
These proposals came from an 8-inch cruiser squadron, a destroyer command and
H.M.S. Excellent. Generally speaking, each proposal was based on the essential
factor that, in actions between high speed ships, the rate would be in error to an extent
which would result in the burst of rapid salvos, following a reverse correction after a
ladder had located that target, being fired at an incorrect range, even if the enemy took
no avoiding action.

5. The proposed rules aimed at the employment of a method which would
cover the error in rate assumed to be present.

6. It was proposed to achieve this by firing groups of salvos which
contain salvos fired at the best known range, at a specified amount above this range
and at a similar amount below this range (the cruiser squadron and Excellent
suggested that a group should contain three salvos the destroyer command
suggested that the number of salvos fired should depend on the time of flight), rapid
salvos never being employed.

CHAP. XIII. TREND SPOTTING 109

7. By this means it was hoped that at least one salvo in each group would
straddle in spite of errors in rate, and that straddle would provide information on
which to base a further group.

8. The obvious criticism was that the proposed systems were too
complicated, but nevertheless authority was given for them to be tried by an 8-inch
cruiser, some 6-inch cruisers, and certain destroyers.

Cruiser Report, 1935

1st Cruiser Squadron (8-inch)

9. As regards the results obtained, the prolonged firing carried
out by one cruiser at Centurion provided a searching test. Whilst it is not easy
to obtain an exact comparison with the normal spotting rules solely by
conjecture, it is probably that three ore straddles would have been secured by
the trial rules in the time under fire, with a saving of about 36 rounds of
ammunition. This saving of ammunition was due to the firing of four-gun
salvos* until the target was found, and to an assumed higher rate of fire with
the old rules firing rapid broadsides.

It is not contended on the other hand, that the rate of fire will
necessarily be slower with the new rules. On this occasion, the Control and
Spotting Officers had not used them previously, and although no difficulty
was found in applying them, unfamiliarity naturally led to a slowing down of
the control. Even if experience shows that a slightly reduced rate of fire must
be accepted, this appears to be amply justified if a higher rate of hitting can be
obtained on a smaller output of ammunition.

It is considered that the results obtained with the new rules are
exceedingly promising, and that trials should continue. It is further
recommended strongly that all ships should be authorised to use these rules
against high-speed targets in time of war.

3rd Cruiser Squadron (new and old 6-inch)

10. Target and throw-off full calibre firings, carried out by ships of
the 3rd Cruiser Squadron have created an unfavourable impression as to the
ability of the ships, not only to obtain early hitting, but also to hold the target
once it has been found.

One D class cruiser has stated that it is harder to hold the target for
range and line with a D class cruiser fire control equipment than in more
modern classes of cruisers, and considered that the adoption of the spotting
proposed by Excellent would enable a D class cruiser to maintain good
hitting results once the target has been found.

*The firing of four-gun salvos when opening fire is prejudicial to early hitting
and is not authorised. In any case it is not a feature of trend spotting, since it
applies to the salvos before the target is found.

(C23461) F
110 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

C.-in-C. Mediterranean

11. It will be seen that whereas the Rear-Admiral Commanding,
1st Cruiser Squadron is much in favour of the principle of Trend spotting,
the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, recommended the
retention of the normal rules. The difference of opinion is probably due to the
different main armament of the two squadrons.

I am not entirely convinced that Trend spotting should be abandoned
by 6-inch cruisers.

Summarise cruisers as a whole, it appears that-

(a) The new rules are better for single-ship firings.
(b) The new rules are slightly more difficult to apply.
(c) No advantage will be gained by using the new rules in
concentration or night firings.

General

12. Results up-to-date are not conclusive enough to warrant a
recommendation that the principle of Trend spotting should definitely be
adopted by any one type of ship, and slow speed peace time practices will
frequently show that better results would be obtained by using the normal
rules. I am convinced, however, that with the high speeds that will be used
during action conditions, better hitting results will be obtained by using the
Trend principle, provided that the slightly greater difficulties of application
can be overcome.

2nd Cruiser Squadron

13. These spotting rules have been found difficult to manipulate,
but the requisite percentage of straddles has invariably been obtained.

C.-in-C. East Indies

14. The spotting rules have been tried in one 8-inch cruiser during
full and sub-calibre throw-off practices. It appears that the rules give good
results, but there is a considerable chance of the spotting officer mistaking the
fall of one salvo for that of another. This is probably more likely to occur in a
thro-off practice than when firing at a target or a ship. The need for very
careful drill by the rating operating the fall of shot hooter is evident.

The rules under trial made it somewhat difficult for the Control officer
to keep in touch with the situation. For example, if he has been in consultation
with the rate officer and then turns his attention to the spotting, it is not easy
for him to appreciate what happened while his attention was elsewhere. On
the other hand, if rapid salvos were being fired, it would be comparatively
easy to grasp the situation immediately.



CHAP. XIII. TREND SPOTTING 111

Destroyers

Admiralty remarks

15. Of these firings, there are sufficient Centurion and throw-off practices
to enable comparisons to be made with the results obtained when using the standard
code under similar conditions.

Curves of rates of hitting have been computed from the results of these firings.
The results are interesting in that, while by the standard rules the rate of hitting
steadily diminishes as the range increases, the Trend rules appear to give a regular
rate of hitting at all ranges 7,000 yards and upwards. On the other hand below 6,000
yards the rate of hitting due to the standard rules tends to rise sharply. Evidence as to
the results to be expected from the Trend rules at these lower ranges is lacking.

The formula employed for calculating the rate of hitting embodies the overall
rate of fire. For 1935 the average rates of fire are 5.0 (standard) and 4.4 (Trend). At
what may be termed the likely range of 8,000 yards, where the rate of hitting by the
two sets is the same, the corollary is that the Trend rules are producing a higher
percentage of hits to rounds fired.

Another aspect to be considered is the certainty of hitting. From a comparison
of the minima, it appears that there is a greater certainty of hitting with the Trend
rules. On the other hand there cannot be a lucky shoot producing an unusually high
rate of hitting.

The original spotting rules for destroyers, introduced during the war, were
based on keeping as many salvos in the air as the time of flight allowed. Experience,
however, showed that this was beyond the capacity of the control officers then
available, and the rules had to be modified to keeping a maximum of two salvos in the
air except when in rapid salvos. The control officers of that period had done no
gunnery courses as Sub-Lieutenants, and so had had less preliminary training than the
present G.C.O.s Further, modern fire control gear relieves the present day G.C.O. of
many of the distractions which beset his predecessor during a firing. At the same time
it must be borne in mind that, in seniority and experience, destroyer G.C.O.s in a
future war will not vary greatly from those of the past. Unless therefore some
control officers aid (as suggested by Rear-Admiral (D)) can be made effective, it
may be unwise to accept as standard, spotting rules which contain the same principle
the maximum umber of salvos in the air as those rejected on wartime experience.

Commodore D

16. It appears that these rules provide distinct possibility of
increasing hitting results at high speed targets particularly in single-ship
action.

(C23461) F2

112 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

Rear-Admiral D

17. Taking into consideration the experience so far gained in the
Seventh Division, and the various arguments that have been put forward
during the last year, the following is my view of the problem.

In theory the new rules are greatly superior.

In practice this is equally true provided the control officer is efficient
in the application of the rules.

The new rules therefore stand or fall not on their own merits, but in the
ability of the control officer to apply them correctly and quickly.

In most of the firings during the year this has been done with sufficient
measure of success to uphold their superiority.

This measure of success, however, is bound to be reduced under war
conditions. The crux of the problem appears to be therefore:-

Will the embarrassment of war conditions neutralise the
superiority which the new rules undoubtedly possess in peace
practices?

Viewed in this light, the case for the new type of rules cannot by any
means be considered definitely proved without some aid to overcome a
formidable array of obstacles.

To summarise it is considered that-

(a) The advantages to be obtained from the new rules are very
considerable.
(b) To ensure them being realised their application must be
facilitated.

General

18. Experience in all classes of ships indicate that the trend spotting
rules are unsuitable for use in concentration, at night, and at very short ranges.

__________________
CHAPTER XIV

__________________

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Long Range

__________________

Section 1. Rate of Fire.

Section 2. Reduction of Rate of Fire and Increase of Dead Time when Loading
Difficulties Increase 4-in. Guns.

Section 3. Concentration Identification of own Bursts.

Section 4. Use of Guessed Data for Opening Fire.

Section 5. Possibility of Spotting for Fuze Length or Height

Section 6. Value of Flank Observation Reports


(C23461) F3
114 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER XIV

___________

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Long Range

___________

SECTION 1. RATE OF FIRE


1. Fleet firing with H.A.C.S. commenced in 1930, and the progress made
in increasing the rate of fire and reducing the dead time can be judged from the
following table:-

4.7 in. 4 in.
Rate of Fire. Rate of Fire. Year.
Normal Best
Dead
Time.* Normal Best
Dead
Time.*
Secs. Secs.
1930 6 7-8 15 6 7-8 15
1931 6 - 12 8 10 11
1932 6.3 (Av.) - - 7.7 (Av.) 12 8-12
1933 - 13 11 - 20 5-8
1934 12-14 15 - 15-20 20 5-8
1935 12-12 - 10 15-20 24 5-8
* With hand fuze-setters.

2. In 1934 views began to crystallise as to the most satisfactory rate of
fire to be used from the point of view of steadiness and accuracy, taking into account
probably weather conditions, possibility of fatigue, etc., and opinion began to form as
follows:-

(a) 4.7 inch. 12-12 rounds per minute with a dead time of about 10
seconds, except when continuous prediction gear and automatic fuze
setters are fitted, when a dead time of 5 seconds can be used.
(b) 4 inch. 16-18 rounds per minute with a dead time of from 5 to 7
seconds, though there was doubt whether 15 rounds per minute could
be exceeded if there was motion of the ship or respirators were being
worn.

4-inch Guns

3. In 1935 opinion began to harden in favour of the adoption of a
standard rate of fire of 16 rounds per minute. (One ship achieved 24 rounds per
minute.)

CHAP. XIV. SECT. 1. RATE OF FIRE 115

4. This great increase in the rate of fire brought other difficulties in its
train:-

(1) The need for increasing outfits of ammunition. It was approved to
increase outfits from 150 to 250 rounds per gun.
(2) This rate of fire could only be maintained between certain limits of
elevation. Below and above these limits both the rate of fire and dead
time must be altered (see Section 2).
(3) When two or more ships are engaging one target, difficulty may be
experienced in identifying own burst (see Section 3).

SECTION 2. REDUCTION OF RATE OF FIRE AND INCREASE OF DEAD
TIME WHEN LOADING DIFFICULTIES INREASE 4-INCH
GUNS

5. The rates of fire and dead time commented on in Section 1 can only be
adhered to between certain elevations, and investigations are being carried out as to
the best method of reducing the rate of fire and increasing the dead time when loading
difficulties increase.

This problem is not simple and there are various factors to be considered in
seeking a solution, some of which are discussed hereunder.

Dead Time

6. Dead time is made up from:-

(a) Time to predict and transmit a new fuze by voice say 1 seconds.
(b) Time to receive and set this fuze at the fuze setting position say 1
seconds.
(c) Time to load, lay the gun from loading elevation and fire it.

Notes. (a) and (b) are fixed factors which, with hand fuze setters, cannot be
reduced and may be exceeded.

(c) is a variable factor depending on the firing elevation. At the easier loading
elevations from 2 to 3 seconds is the minimum.

7. There is some minimum figure for 4-inch H.A. guns, of the order of 5
seconds, below which the total dead time cannot at present be reduced, which will
require perfect drill to achieve, and which will not be easy to maintain for any but a
short firing period.

8. If the minimum possible dead time is used at the easier loading
elevations, some increase will be necessary as loading difficulties increase.

(C23461) F4
116 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

9. There is some evidence to show that, whatever the firing elevation may
be, a total dead time of 8 seconds (i.e., 5 seconds for factor 6(c)) can be used provided
that the rate of fire is not too high.

Rate of Fire

10. Rate of fire is governed by factor 6(c) above and in addition by:-

(x) Time of recoil and run out.
(y) Time to come to the loading elevation (if necessary).
(z) Fatigue and physical capability of the guns crew.

11. Factor 6(c) directly affects the dead time : factors 10 (x), (y) and (z)
affect it only indirectly, and become of importance only at the difficult loading
elevations.

12. If, at the difficult loading elevations the guns are fired in alternate
salvos, or if provision can be made by other means for the effect of 10 (x), (y) and (z),
it should be possible to assess an upper limit of time for factor 6(c) which represents
the lowest figure that an be achieved under all conditions. Experience indicates that
this time is about 5 seconds, as stated in paragraph 9.

Drill and Fuze Prediction

13. A rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute has been reached by several
ships. The drill to achieve this rate has not been standardised, and varies in different
ships. The drill used has an important bearing upon the method of changing the rate
of fire.

14. A factor to be considered in drill is whether a single or a double
overlap is used. This is determined by the rate of fire and dead time settings used.

Single Overlap

15. With a rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute, to secure a single overlap,
the dead time must not be more than 6 seconds.

Double Overlap

16. With a rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute a double overlap results
when the dead time is above 6 seconds and less than 9 seconds.

Prediction Sequence

17. The moment in the drill sequence at which the prediction fuze is
passed by telaupad to the fuzesetters is important. With a ship using a dead time of
5 seconds and 20 rounds per minute, the fire gong will commence to ring 0.5
seconds after the moment when prediction is made. The gun is therefore likely to fire
at the moment the fuzesetters are receiving the new fuze by teleupad. With a ship
using a dead time of 8 seconds and 20 rounds per minute, the fuze is received
immediately after the fire gong has ceased ringing and the gun has fired.


CHAP. XIV. SECT. 2. REDUCTION OF RATE OF FIRE 117

Change from Single to Double Overlap

18. If, when the change from normal to slow rate of fire is made, the
settings on the fuze and firing interval clock are altered, a change from single to
double overlap may result, depending upon the new settings used. The drill is
simplified if the same overlap is maintained, but the change is feasible.

Details of Drill in use in the Fleet

19. The following different methods of solving the problem of reducing
the rate of fire, and increasing the dead time, when loading difficulties increase, are
typical of those which were used with success in the Fleet during 1934.

Method A

20. Settings of 20 rounds per minute with dead time 8 seconds are used
under all conditions. At difficult loading elevations the guns fire alternate salvos.

21. The advantage of this method is its extreme simplicity and flexibility.
No change of settings is necessary in the T.S., and there is no risk of confusion to the
control. Moreover, the change can be effected ad any elevation which experience, or
the conditions of the moment, show to be desirable.

22, There are two disadvantages:-

(1) A loss of output occurs at the reduced rate of fire. Twenty one-gun
salvos per minute are in effect fired, whereas, it may be possible to fire
up to 15 two-gun salvos per minute, if certain disadvantages are
accepted.
(2) A dead time higher than the minimum that has been shown possible is
used at the easier loading elevations. This is done deliberately for the
reason given in paragraph 12, and to avoid the need for a change of
settings and a change of overlap. It does, however, allow a margin for
action conditions.

Method B

23. A rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute with a dead time of 6.3 seconds
is normally used. This gives a single overlap. The slow rte of fire is 18 rounds per
minute, but guns fire alternate salvos, with a dead time of 9 seconds. This gives a
double overlap.

24. The change is effected by a definite drill in the T.S. and at the guns. In
the T.S. the change from normal to slow rate of fire is ordered when the gun elevation
reaches 43 increasing, and 15 decreasing; the change from slow to normal rate when
the gun elevation reaches 50 decreasing and 13 increasing.

118 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

25. The change at the guns, necessary on account of the change in overlap,
is ordered in all circumstances when the elevation is 48 or 15.

26. These conditions are selected to satisfy requirements in a direct
attack run, with an aircraft speed 100 knots at a height of 5,000 ft. The T.S. has
latitude to alter the moment of change should the angle of presentation and height of
the target indicate that the aircraft is carrying out some manoeuvre other than a direct
attack.

27. The effect on the fuze and firing interval clock is to cause an extended
interval between fire gongs, when changing from normal to slow rate, and a reduced
interval when changing from slow to normal rate. Prediction is undisturbed.

28. This method is criticised because of its rigidity. Perfect drill, and a
difficult drill, is required if no confusion to the control is to result. Moreover it does
not develop the maximum output at the reduced rate of fire.

Method C

29. A normal rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute with dead time 6
seconds, and a slow rate of fire of 12 rounds per minute with dead time 10 seconds are
used. Each of these settings is on the exact border line between single and double
overlap, i.e., prediction and gunfire occur simultaneously. No difficulty is reported
with this procedure.

30. The change is effected in the T.S., at predetermined elevations, by
altering the settings on the fuze and firing interval clock. The resulting disturbance to
the prediction and fire gong sequence is not stated to cause difficulty.

31. The disadvantage of this method is that the two rounds fired
immediately after the change over, are fire with incorrect fuzes. They are unlikely to
be effective, and may embarrass the control.

32. The method does have the advantages of employing the highest rate of
fire possible under most conditions, the lowest possible dead time at the easy
elevations, and a margin of 2 extra seconds of dead time at the difficult elevations.

Method D

33. At the easy elevations, the highest rate of fire and lowest dead time
with which the guns crews can compete, are used. On reaching the difficult loading
elevations, the rate of fire and dead time settings on the fuze and firing interval clock
are altered gradually, but by a definite amount, after each salvo, until the desired
settings are reached.

CHAP. XIV. SECT. 2. REDUCTION OF RATE OF FIRE 119

34. This method has the advantage that the highest rate of fire and lowest
dead time possible are used under all conditions. When the change in settings is being
made, it introduces the disadvantage that the rounds will be fired at a different dead
time from that for which the fuzes were predicted. Provided the change in settings is
small after each salvo, the error should not be great and may prove acceptable.

35. Unanimity was not reached as a result of experience during 1935. One
view held was that a reduction in rate of fire might be necessary for reasons other than
difficult loading elevations, e.g. fatigue, casualties or breakdowns. The suggestion
may, therefore be expected to come from the gun which likelihood makes Method A
preferable. On the other hand, another view was that Methods A, B and C were
insufficiently flexible to meet war requirements and therefore Method D was
preferable.

Conclusions

36. It is not desired to restrict the lines upon which further investigation of
this problem should proceed, but it should be noted that, in war, the majority of salvos
will be fired at the easy elevations. A method which employs, at the easy elevations,
a longer dead time or a slower rate of fire than is necessary, would therefore appear to
be undesirable.

SECTION 3. CONCENTRATION IDENTIFICATION OF OWN
BURSTS

37. With the slow rates of fire achieved in 1931, no difficulty was
experienced in identification of won bursts during simultaneous firings with two,
three and four ships.

38. As the rates of fire increased difficulties began to be experienced when
two or more ships were firing at the same target. It was considered unsound to restrict
the output and possible solutions appeared to be-

(a) Tracers.
(b) Coloured bursts.

It seems probable that in war, concentration would be required at long ranges,
and identification must be effective at extreme range. Tracers would not meet this
requirement, and investigations into the possibility of producing a coloured burst were
put in hand.

39. At the same time the fleets were instructed to test the principle by
firing H.A. practice projectiles as identifies during H.E. practices and vice versa.
120 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

40. During 1935 experience of the difficulty of distinguishing own ships
bursts was variable. Generally, with only two ships firing, no difficulty was found,
provided that one ship had had time to make initial adjustments to speed and angle of
presentation to establish line, before the other ship opened fire.

41. Experience showed that while H.E. identifiers employed in a firing
with practice ammunition are entirely effective, the same is not always true under
service conditions, viz, firing with H.E. using practice shell as identifiers, since the
large burst of the H.E. may obscure the bursts of the identifier rounds.

Trials are to be carried out with H.E. shell filled powder. Meanwhile, every
endeavour is being made to produce H.E. shell giving different coloured bursts.

42. In commenting on Queen Be firings one report suggested that as it is
more than likely that each ships normal individual errors will cause such a pattern in
the sky as will ensure aircraft being thoroughly harassed, a suitable general rule for
control officers might be:-

If while engaging enemy aircraft at long or medium range it is
observed from the number of bursts that other ships are also firing at the same
targe, identifier shell should not normally be fired unless some of the burst
indicate an obvious error in vertical and lateral deflection applied in one or
more of the ships firing at that target.

SECTION . USE OF GUESSED DATA FOR OPENING FIRE

43. In 1931, when the normal dead time in use was of the order of 15
seconds, it was customary to open fire using a guessed height in order to cut down the
time from enemy in sight to first round.

44. The suitability of this policy was questioned. The desirability of
shooting to instrument was recognised, but it was considered essential to open fire on
a menacing target as early as possible. In some cases a delay of a few seconds could
be justified while waiting for an observed height, but it was considered that such a
procedure should not normally be employed and it was held that proper liaison
between the control officer and range-taker would enable the former to determine the
right course of action.

45. This opinion was reiterated in 1933 after further representations from
sea as a result of 1932 practices.

46. The considerable advance in the efficiency of A.A. gunnery in 1933
led to a slight revision of this policy. Experience clearly indicated that no useful
purpose was served in opening fire with guessed data, unless the target is immediately
threatening. It is also extremely wasteful of ammunition.

CHAP. XIV. SECT. 4. USE OF GUESSED DATA 119

47. With ships able to open fire with properly predicted rounds within 25-
30 seconds of the Alarm (if good conditions less than 20 seconds) it is considered
that the question of whether fire should be opened on guessed data is dependent on
the circumstances at the time, and the standard of the A.A. armament.

SECTION 5. POSSIBILITY OF SPOTTING FOR FUZE LENGTH OR
HEIGHT

Direct Observation

48. When firing at sleeve targets it is quite impracticable to spot the
position of bursts for range in relation to the target, but the advent of wireless
controlled aircraft led to a suggestion that against actual aircraft this might be
possible. Opinion is not unanimous, but the general trend appears to be that spotting
for range may be possible under certain conditions.

10x Stereo Spotting Glasses

49. Full investigation during Queen Bee firings indicates that no reliance
can be placed on the results of observations with these instruments.

Long Base (12 ft.) Stereo Spotting Telescope

50. Consideration was first given to the possibility of stereo spotting in
1931 in combination with stereo height finding. Trials carried out in 1934 brought
out the following points:-

(a) The importance of the observer being experienced in stereo-
observation.
(b) For successful observation, bursts must be close to the target for line.
Observation of bursts not close for line may be misleading.
(c) Reliability of results increases as the range decreases.

51. Trials of a long base instrument in 1935 gave rise to the following
remarks:-

It was found that the position of bursts relative to the target could be
assessed with reasonable accuracy up to ranges of approximately 6,000 yards,
provided bursts were within one degree for line, and in certain cases beyond
that range. Some difficulty arose, however, in making full use at the time of
the information obtained since an alteration to the ballistic height correction in
use was considered to be unjustifiable unless the burst reported happened to
have been predicted exactly on the true prediction line, or the report was
contradictory to that expected from the error in prediction. Even then it is
doubtful if it is desirable to make an alteration on the evidence of an isolated
salvo, observing that a report is generally based on the observation of only one
burst of each salvo. There is little

122 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

doubt that the instrument would be of value in affording a means of correcting
a consistent error during one firing before engaging another target; the
possibility of determining the ballistic height correction for the day, prior to
engaging a target, also appears worthy of investigation.

From the limited experience gained, the results obtained were
promising.

Further trials will be carried out and four more instruments are being
manufactured, two of which will have fixed wander marks.

52. Arrangements are being made in most H.A.C.S. directors now on order
to accommodate a duplex rangefinder, one band of which, if results with the trial
instruments are successful, could be used for spotting.

SECTION 6. VALUE OF FLANK OBSERVATION REPORTS

53. The possibility of making use of flank observation reports has
continuously been under consideration. It is held that it would be unsound for a ship
to take immediate action on flank observations because:-

(a) The flank observations refer only to past errors, which will not
necessarily recur.
(b) Of the difficulties of communication at the necessary speed.

54. Such observation, however, may be of value in eliminating a consistent error
before the next target is engaged, and it is under consideration to adopt the following
policy:-

(a) If a consistent error throughout an engagement of one target is
apparent, it is justifiable for an arbitrary correction to be made since
the most probably cause of this consistent error is the heightfinder
being out of adjustment.
(b) Any ship in a suitable position to observe the position of the burst for
range of another ship should communicate the general trend of the
burst of the firing ship immediately on conclusion of a run or
engagement of one target.
(c) For this purpose the bursts are to be divided into groups of about five
or six, and the M.P.I. of each group signalled. The distances of the
bursts over or short should be measured in degrees, and converted
approximately into hundreds of yards, allowance being made for the
range of the target from the marking ship and the direction of the line
of fire.


____________________

CHAPTER XV

___________

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Close Range

___________


Value of tracers in observation of fire and proportion to be used.
124 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER XV

___________

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Close Range

___________

VALUE OF TRACERS IN OBSERVATION OF FIRE AND
PROPORTION TO BE USED


Value of Tracers

1. The problem of observation of fire from the M Pom-Pom is a
difficult one, and continuous investigations have been carried out since 1930. The
first conclusions reached as a result of trials carried out in that year with single pom-
poms were:-

(i) Observation of fire by means of tracers is only 100 per cent. definite
when no part of the trajectory crosses the target, as seen from the firing
ship.
(ii) Tracers are only of value for indicating the existence of large errors in
line and relatively very large errors in elevation.

2. The reports of firings carried out at sea between that date and 1935
were conflicting, but the general view appeared to be that tracers were of little value,
except at very short ranges, and to indicate very large errors.

3. Further extensive trials were carried out in 1935, and the following
conclusions were reached:-

(a) Accurate observation of tracer against a target at any range over about
1,000 yards is almost impossible to obtain. At shorter ranges the
accuracy may be expected to improve provided the observer is near the
gun.
(b) It is not possible to make any use of deductions resulting from the
observation of tracer without affecting the accuracy of aiming.
(c) In any case the deductions made are inevitably stale by the amount of
the time of flight, and are generally misleading except at very short
ranges.
(d) The only value of tracer for pom-poms and 0.5-inch machine guns is to
show up large errors (errors of 2 and less will not be shown up), and
to indicate at what targets the various guns are firing. For the latter
purpose, tracer should be fired in bunches from all barrels separated by
an interval from the next bunch.

CHAP. XV. VALUE OF TRACERS 125

Proportion of Tracer to be used

4. It is an important factor that tracer fitted shell (of small calibres) are
less effective than non-tracer since some of the explosive is displaced. It is necessary
that the loss of effective fire in such weapons as the M pom-pom must be reduced
to the minimum, consistent with the meeting of requirements. It is a question,
therefore, of correlating this requirement with that for observation of fire.

5. As a result of trials carried out in 1931, instructions were given to
reduce the number of tracers to the supply to two barrels only, the number being 5 to
each belt of 28 rounds or 3 to each belt of 14. It was hoped that practices in 1932
would enable some decision to be reached, but such was not the case, and it was
necessary to allow Commander-in-Chief a free hand in investigating the proportion.

6. After the 1933 practices the Home Fleet reported that no improvement
could be made on the proportion indicated in paragraph 4 above, but the
Mediterranean Fleet opinion favoured one tracer in five from all barrels.

7. The Home Fleet, after 1934, favoured the firing of tracers from all
barrels in order to portray a complete pattern, but in order to reduce the number of
barrels in which tracer were fired, and thereby increase the effective density of the
pattern, a trial was also made of firing tracers (first and eighth rounds) from the
barrels covering the four corners of the pattern and this was favourably reported on.

The Mediterranean Fleet established that tracers from two barrels were
insufficient, while China suggested that the minimum acceptable was one in five from
two barrels.

8. Further extensive trials were carried out during 1935, and the
recommendation made to continue to use tracer for the purposes mention in paragraph
3(d) in the following manner:-

2-pdr. Mark M, pom-pom .. 1 night tracer every 7 rounds from all
barrels.
0.5-in. machine gun .. .. 3 consecutive tracers every 20 rounds.

9. The Admiralty remarked:-

It is possible that the proportion recommended (1 in 7) will be
sufficient if fired from the four wing barrels of the pattern only. Further
information is required on this point. Pending further reports from sea,
arrangements are being made to supply tracer in the proportion of one tracer in
7 rounds for half the outfit only.

_______________

CHAPTER XVI

_____________

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Use of Guns primarily
Mounted for Anti-Ship Purposes

_____________

Section 1. Long Range Fire.

Section 2. Close Range Fire.
CHAP. XVI. SECT. 1. - A.A. GUNNERY LONG RANGE FIRE 129

7. The following policy as to the employment against aircraft of guns
primarily mounted for anti-ship use was approved in 1934:-

Whether to be used
for A.A. at
Class of Ship. Armament.
Long
Range.
Short
Range.
Fuzes to be used.
All Capital Ships Main No No -
All Capital Ships Secondary No Yes Short burning
C, D, and E
cruisers
Main No No
Later cruisers Main No Yes Short burning
Aircraft carriers with
combined H.A. and
L.A. armaments
Main Yes Yes Time mechanical
Aircraft carriers with
separate H.A. and
L.A. armaments
Main No Yes Short burning
(See also Sect. 2, para. 14.)

8. The provision of A.A. control arrangements for anti-ship guns was
again urged in 1935, and the question is being reconsidered. Initial investigation is
being directed towards a means of employing the geometric data provided by the
H.A.C.S. of the main A.A. armament so as to enable the fire of anti-ship guns to
augment that of the main A.A. armament and, of course, to enable the anti-ship guns
to open fire on the target of the main A.A. guns before it comes within range of the
latter.

9. For destroyers and smaller craft not fitted with H.A.C.S., another
system is being developed; and trials of the first set will be carried out during 1936.
H.A. firing trials, designed solely to test the suitability of the 4.7-in. 40-degree
mounting for H.A. fire, have been carried out.

10. Meanwhile, an opinion was expressed that there may be occasions on
which it will be desirable to augment the fire of the A.A. guns of the fleet with fire
from anti-ship guns e.g., before aircraft come within range of A.A. guns, or in the
case of aircraft encountered only by destroyers with no A.A. guns even though these
anti-ship guns have no form of control. Briefly the method to be employed is as
follows:-

The ranges at which salvos are to be fired are predetermined, and fuzes
set beforehand. The tangent elevations for these ranges are predetermined.
The director lays on the aircraft, and, when the rangefinder indicates the
appropriate range, rapid fire is opened for about 30 seconds. Lateral
deflection is estimated, and vertical deflection included in the tangent
elevation. This produces a series of bursts on the line of sight at different
heights, rather than a barrage of bursts at one fixed point in the sky.

130 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

SECTION 2. CLOSE RANGE FIRE

Use of Shrapnel from Turret Guns

11. Trials were carried out against a glider target during 1926, to try out
the use of shrapnel from turret guns against close range air attack.

12. The conclusion drawn was that the use of shrapnel from main
armament guns, in circumstances where a clear field of fire is available, is likely to
cause considerable damage to attacking torpedo aircraft (but see Section 1, paragraph
7).

Splash and Splinter Barrage Trials

13. Trials were carried out in 1928 to investigate the possibility of using a
splash and splinter barrage as a means of defence against torpedo aircraft attack.
Anti-ship shell with a delay setting were used, and were fired to hit the water in the
line of the attacking aircraft about 1,000 yards from the firing ship. It was hoped that
in addition to the splash barrage put up, the shell would ricochet and burst at a
considerable height, thus forming an additional splinter barrage. The shell used were
anti-ship shell.

1. The information produced was:-

(a) A proportion of shell will be blind, particularly in smooth water.
(b) The burst will take place too low (8 ft. above water) to be really
effective.
(c) The effect of setting fuzes to delay in order to get bursts at a greater
height appears to be small.

Barrage with Time-fuzed Shell

(See also Section 1, paragraph 7.)

15. Concurrently with the Splash and Splinter Barrage, trials were also
carried out using time-fuzed H.E. shell. The general conclusion reached was that the
latter type of barrage is likely to prove more effective than the former.

16. Further trials carried out in 1930 confirmed the value of a time-fuzed
H.E. barrage, but it was pointed out that the fleet would to be able to make use of this
form of defence as suitable ammunition and fuzes were not in supply. Action was
initiated to develop special fuzes with a maximum time of burning of the order of 5
seconds since the time of burning of No. 198 fuzes was too irregular at short ranges.

These fuzes (No. 400) became available in 1935, and, in 1936, some 6-inch
innocuous shell for practice purposes.

17. At the same time, the supply of fuzes was extended to Q.F. 4.7-inch
guns in destroyers in consequence of demands from sea.

CHAPTER XVII

_____________

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Night

_____________
132 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

CHAPTER XVII

_____________

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Night

_____________

1. Prior to 1935 it was not the policy that night A.A. practices should be
carried out. This policy was adopted at a time when concentration on the problem of
day A.A. defence was of extreme importance. By this date ships had become
considerably more efficient in day practices, and the ammunition allowance had been
increased.

2. On this account it was considered that the time had arrived when more
attention should be paid to night A.A. defence. Generally speaking, the policy was
and is evasion, but it is obvious that there are some occasions on which gunfire must
be employed as a defensive measure.

3. Reports indicated that the material supplied was not entirely suited to
night firings, and information was asked for.

4. Night firings at Queen Bees were carried out by the Home Fleet
during 1935. It was stated that little difficulty was found in obtaining a reasonably
satisfactory plot, once the aircraft was well illuminated. Rangetaking was easier when
the aircraft was in the edge, rather than in the centre, of the bear, and easier still when
the aircraft was illuminated by the searchlights of another ship.

5. Night throw-off firings have been carried out by ships of the China
Fleet. The conclusion reached from these practices is that little value is to be obtained
from throw-off firings. Experience of A.A. defence at night can best be obtained
from the control point of view by dummy runs and from the gun point of view by
sleeve target firings.

6. In the first night throw-off firing carried out by the China Fleet,
difficulty was experienced owing to the glare of the searchlight, which, in the Kent
class, is close to the H.A. director, interfering with the H.A. control. In a later firing
this was overcome by employing the next astern as illuminating ship; and under these
conditions it was reported that the aircraft provided an ideal target on which to range.

CHAP. XVII. - ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNNERY NIGHT 133

7. The desirability of siting searchlights away from control positions has
been noted.

8. The conclusions of the Commanders-in-Chief, Home Fleet and China,
as to the ease of ranging on a target at night (paragraphs 4 and 6 above) are not
endorsed by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who considers that at least
three and sometimes six searchlights, depending on meteorological conditions and
height of aircraft, are required to obtain the intensity of illumination necessary for
heightfinders to get a clear cut.

Illumination

9. It was stated in 1935 that it had been proved that star shell, set to burst
over and in the vicinity of a sleeve target, are capable of illuminating it so that it can
be picked up and held in a searchlight beam.

10. Owing to the danger of illuminating the firing ship, this method of
illumination is undesirable at short ranges.

11. Trials have been carried out in the Home and Mediterranean Fleets
using Army sound locators. These confirmed conclusions reached in previous trials
that the Army sound locator is not suitable for Naval purposes.

Experiments are now being made with another form of locator which is being
designed for automatic control of searchlights. There appears to be little hope at
present of producing a sound detector (as opposed to a directional locator) which
will be suitable for use on board.

12. Experience has shown that the possibility of picking up a target with a
searchlight with no form of sound locating device is small. Further, it is, in general,
undesirable to expose a searchlight beam from ships unless the light is trained on the
target, since the attacking aircraft is assisted in locating its objective and is at once
provided with a point of aim. It is concluded that for the defence of the fleet in
harbour at night reliance must be placed in the first instance on shore searchlights,
sound locators and guns, assisted by the guns of the fleet.

Considerable attention was directed to the problem of A.A. defence in
consequence of the critical international situation arising
134 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

from the Italo-Abyssinian war, and the searchlight policy brought into force in the
Mediterranean was, summarised, as follows:-

In Harbour
Ship Lights
Policy No.
Night
Condition.
Shore Lights.
Main Body. Selected Ship.
Remarks

Defended Harbour.

1 Dark Yes No No
2 Light Yes No No

Undefended Harbour

3 Dark - No Yes* * But only after
fleet has been
discovered
4 Light - Yes Yes

Partially Defended Harbour

5 Dark Yes No Yes But only to take
over from shore
lights
6 Light Yes Yes Yes

Attention is called to the possibility of craft in the air or on the surface being
sent in to cause the Fleet to divulge its position to the air, or to illuminate the Fleet or base
by flares, before the main attack is made.

At Sea

7 Searchlights will not be used unless the Fleets position has been disclosed by
illuminating surface targets.

14. Steps are being taken to remedy the known shortcomings of existing
searchlight control for A.A. work, and consideration is being given to the fitting of
large searchlights in future destroyers, the units of the fleet which, owing to their size,
can perhaps best afford to betray their position.

________________

CHAPTER XVIII

________________

Bombardment

________________

Section 1. Spotting Rules.

Section 2. F.O.O. v. Ship Control.

Section 3. Orientation of the Clock when used for Ground Observation.

Section 4. Accuracy, and Roll on which Salvos should be Fired.
136 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36


CHAPTER XVIII

________________

Bombardment

________________

SECTION 1. SPOTTING RULES

1. The Spotting Rules contained in the Text Book of Naval
Bombardment, 1935 have been recently evolved. They are the result of firings over
land ranges, and are supported by Army experience and advice.

2. The suitability of the size of the corrections when verifying a hit or a
contradiction while ranging, have been questioned, however, and further information
is required on this point.

SECTION 2. F.O.O. v. SHIP CONTROL

3. With ground observation the question as to whether the F.O.O. or the
ship control officer should normally be in control of the fire has given rise to
argument. The question was raised so long ago as the Chanak operations in 1922, but
no record of it occurs in Progress in Naval Gunnery until 1932.

4. The conditions under which an alternative to ship control exists only
arise when the ship is at anchor. When under way, the shoot must be considered as a
normal naval practice at a fixed target, and observation from the ground is merely
another line of information for the shi control officer, supplementing direct or air
spotting.

When at anchor, however, the conditions are different, and the firing may be
considered as being carried out by a rather inaccurately sited fixed gun.

5. The arguments for and against F.O.O. and ship control should only be
influenced by those practices carried out against land targets.

Firings against moored targets are of no value as a guide to results which may
be expected in war.

Moreover, if the conditions for observation are easy, there is probably little to
choose between the two forms of control.

Thus until the Cape Wrath range became available, the last deductions of any
real value were made after the practices at Gallipoli in 1923. These conclusions
were:-

When using ground observation, the advantages of ordering the actual
spotting corrections from an O.P. which has any command over the ground are
very marked, and this procedure

CHAP. XVIII. SECT. 2. - F.O.O. v SHIP CONTROL 137

is definitely recommended. The F.O.O. is often able to form a good
impression of the actual position of the fall of each round, but is unable to
communicate this information to the ship to the full extent that he himself is
able to appreciate it. The success of control from the O.P. naturally depends
on an absence of mistakes in the firing ship, as the F.O.O. will not be able to
realise when a mistake occurs. If the communications between the O.P. and
the ship are bad, however, the ship must be prepared to take over the control,
making the best use of whatever spotting reports are available; the extreme
case of this would be a total failure of communications when, if firing is to be
continued, it must be controlled from the ship.

If the O.P. has command over the ground, the F.O.O. can tell with
certainty when the shots are falling very far from the target, and so can save a
further waste of rounds, whereas the tendency in such a case when controlling
from the ship is to mistrust the report.

6. In Progress in Naval Gunnery, 1932, the question is mentioned with
the preliminary statement that -

Experienced artillery officers were strongly of the opinion that F.O.O.
control should be the normal procedure when the firing ship was at anchor.
The chief argument adduced being the added safety to our own troops.

7. The following objections to this proposal were then given:-

(i) It can only be used when the ship is at anchor, and even then it is
probable that the yaw of the ship would entail alterations to the range
and line ordered being made in the ship.
(ii) The Control Officer in the ship is in direct touch with his director
layer, and, under conditions where errors in laying may be expected, is
able to discriminate between bad and good shots.
(iii) Good control by N.F.O.O. requires a considerable amount of practical
experience.

8. As regards (i) it is quite agreed that it can only be used when the ship is
at anchor, but this is no valid reason for not using the best method under those
conditions. The fact that the corrections may have to be superimposed in the ship is
no more an argument against F.O.O. control than are corrections for range due to rate
imposed in the Transmitting Station, an argument against control from the fore top in
normal naval firings. Such corrections will merely neutralise inaccuracies in the
position of the gun, and should not affect the sequence of the observers calculations.

As regards (ii), this close touch by no means ensures that director and
gunlaying errors are immediately appreciated. In any event,
138 C.B.3001/1914-36. PROGRESS IN NAVAL GUNNERY, 1914-36

if a bad shot is made, the information that it is a bad shot can be conveyed to the
F.O.O. almost as easily as it can be to the Control Officer in the ship.

As regards (iii), this is considered to be the kernel of the dispute. It was felt
by commanding officers that it would be unwise to place the making or marring of the
whole shoot in the hands of a comparatively untrained officer, and they were reluctant
to admit that the F.O.O. could, with his command of the ground near the target,
handle the armament better than could all the resources of the ship with information
from the F.O.O. at their disposal.

9. Subsequent practices in which F.O.O. control has been employed have
shown that the difficulties of this form of control have been over emphasised. The
following good reasons exist for its adoption as the normal method of control when
ground observation is used at anchor:-

The Ship Control Officer can have little idea of the command of
ground available from the O.P. On this command depends the method of
controlling the fire, and good results are more probable when the person with
this command (F.O.O.) has the handling of the fire control. This is especially
the case where observation is difficult. The Ship Control Officer cannot know
how much weight to attach to each report whereas F.O.O. knows that burst in
certain sectors give more definite indications than in others. With F.O.O.
control rounds can be placed in good sectors in order to obtain reliable
spots.

SECTION 3. ORIENTATION OF THE CLOCK WHEN USED FOR
GROUND OBSERVATION

10. The first suggestion that the Clock Code method of reporting fall of
shot could be used when employing shore single line observation was made as a result
of experience in 1926 practices and authority was given for its use for amplifying
reports as a result of 1927 practices. It was customary to orient the clock with 12
oclock at True North.

11. The suitability of this orientation was question in 1932 and it was
suggested that it would be preferable that the vi-xii line should be set along the line
OT.

12. This, however, entails the position of the OP being accurately known
in the firing ship. The chances of which, in war, re likely to be remote, since it is
questionable whether the F.O.O. will himself be able accurately to fix his position.

13. It was considered more practicable for the clock to be oriented with xii
at True North, and further experience in 1933 confirmed this.
CHAP. XVIII. SECT. 4. - ACCURACY AND ROLL ON WHICH 139
SALVOS SHOULD BE FIRED

SECTION 4. ACCURACY, AND ROLL ON WHICH SALVOS SHOULD BE
FIRED

14. Firing accurately laid salvos has always been recognised to be of
importance, and in 1934 it was stated that it was preferable that all salvos should be
fired on the upward roll, since any tendency to be late in firing will minimise the
chances of danger to own troops.

15. This decision was questioned on the grounds that if an error was made
to the extent of firing a round on the wrong roll, the danger to own troops would be
increased.


16. From the point of view of safety to own troops, it would appear that
the decision depends on whether the probable error will be

(a) To fire on the wrong roll, or
(b) To fire inaccurately on the selected one.

The possibility of a hang-fire, even with an accurately laid salvo must be
considered.

17. No decision has been reached and further information is required.


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