SAN BEDA COLLEGE COLLEGE OF LAW STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NOTES BACKGROUND The Philippine Legal System In Re: Max

Shoop
FACTS - Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in the highest court of the State of New York. - The said rule requires that: New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission without examination under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. (Aside from comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they have practiced at least 5 years in any (district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of it. But admission is still in the discretion of the court.) - The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits admission without examination in the discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases: 1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia 2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law (ECL). ISSUE: WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is established HELD - The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under a civil gov't. established by the Congress. - In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions. - The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL in its present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent. - New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the Phils. similar to those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.

- Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY rule; doesnt establish a precedent with respect to future applications. Reasoning On TERRITORY: a. Comity would exist if we are a territory of the US b.We are NOT an organized territory incorporated into the United States but c. We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another country" either d. Like Puerto Rico, we may not be incorporated but we are a territory since the US Congress legislates for us and we have been granted a form of territorial government, so to that extent we are a territory according to the US Atty. Gen. e. It is not believed that the New York court intended the word "territory" to be limited to the technical meaning of organized territory or it would have used the more accurate expression. f. Therefore, We have a basis of comity to satisfy the first requirement since the full phraseology indicates a SWEEPING INTENTION to include ALL of the territory of the US. On COMMON LAW jurisdiction: (On what principle/s is the present day jurisprudence based?) g. In most of the States, including New York, codification and statute law have come to be a very large proportion of the law of the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a system of case law which has its roots, to a large but not exclusive degree, in the old English cases. h. In speaking of jurisprudence "based on the English Common Law" it would seem proper to say that the jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction Is based upon the principles of that Common Law if its statute law and its case law to a very large extent includes the science and application of law as laid down by the old English cases, as perpetuated and modified by the American cases. i. Common Law adopted by decision: i. In the US, the ECL is blended with American codification and remnants of the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There a legal metamorphosis has occurred similar to that which is transpiring in this jurisdiction today. ii. New York uses the phrase "based on the English Common Law" in a general sense iii. And that such Common Law may become the basis of the jurisprudence of the courts where practical considerations and the effect of sovereignty gives round for such a decision.

iv. If in the Philippines, ECL principles as embodied in Anglo-American jurisprudence are used and applied by the courts to the extent that Common Law principles are NOT in conflict with the LOCAL WRITTEN laws, customs, and institutions as modified by the change of sovereignty and subsequent legislation, and there is NO OTHER FOREIGN case law system used to any substantial extent, THEN it is proper to say in the sense of the New York rule that the "jurisprudence" of the Philippines is based on the ECL. j. IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: i. The extent of the English or Anglo-Am Common Law here has not been definitely decided by the SC. But there is a similarity to the quotations from the American decisions cited with reference to the ECL. ii. Alzua & Arnalot vs. Johnson: we apply Anglo-Am jurisprudence only in "xxxso far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with existing law; nevertheless, many of the rules, principles, and doctrines of the Common Law have, to all intents and purposes, been IMPORTED into this jurisdiction, a RESULT of the enactment of new laws and the organization of new institutions by the Congress of the USxxx" iii. The Spanish judicial system was abrogated replaced with a new one modeled after the judicial systems of the US. Therefore, those Spanish doctrines and principles in conflict with the new one were abrogated. iv. US. v. De Guzman: For proper construction and application of the terms and provisions we borrowed from or modeled upon Anglo-Am precedents, we review the legislative history of such enactments. v. US. v. Abiog and Abiog: The courts are constantly guided by the doctrines of Common Law. Neither ECL or American Common Law is in force in this Islandssave only in so far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions and aren't in conflict with existing law." vi. What we have is a PHILIPPINE COMMON LAW influenced by the ECL or American Common Law. vii. A great preponderance of the jurisprudence of our jurisdiction is based upon AngloAmerican case law precedents-exclusively in applying those statutory laws which have been enacted since the change of sovereignty and which conform more or less to the American statutes, and-to a large extent in applying and expanding the remnants of the Spanish codes and written laws. k. PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW

i. The chief codes of Spain that were extended to us were as follows: Penal Code, Code of Commerce, Ley Provisional, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Code of Civil Procedure, Civil Code, Marriage Law, Mortgage Law, Railway laws, Law of Waters. ii. There were also special laws having limited application. iii. The foregoing written laws had acquired the force of statute law by change of sovereignty. iv. There was no properly called Case Law of Spain since Spanish jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of Stare Decisis. 1.Manresa' s discussion of Art. 6 of the Civil shows how far from a case law system is jurisprudence. Spanish courts are governed by: a. first, by written law b. 2nd, by the customs of the place (derives its force because it is the acknowledged manner on how things are done and not jurisprudence) c.3rd,by judicial decision (when in practice, these were considered last; the development of case law was impeded because the courts were free to disregard any information or decisions of other courts.) d. 4th, by general principles of law l. SPANISH STATUTE LAW i. All portions of political law were abrogated immediately with the change of sovereignty ii. All Spanish laws, customs, and rights of property inconsistent with the Constitution and American principles and institutions were superseded. iii. It was as if Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines modeled upon those same Spanish statutes. m. CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES i. It appears that the bulk of present day Statute Law is derivative from Anglo-American sources; derivative in a sense of having been COPIED, and in the sense of having been enacted by Congress or by virtue of its authority. ii. In all of the cases, Anglo-American decisions and authorities are used and relied upon to a greater or less degree. Although in many cases, the use is by way of dictum, nevertheless, the net result is the building up of a very substantial elaboration of Anglo-American case law. n. CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES i. We use Anglo-Am cases in interpreting and applying the remnants of the Spanish statutes thus showing how permanent the hold of the Anglo-Am Common Law has on our jurisprudence. ii. Anglo-Am case law plays a very great part in amplifying the law on those subjects, which are still governed by the remaining portions of the Spanish statutes, as exhibited in the groups of cases cited in the footnotes.

iii. Anglo-Am case law has entered practically every field of law and in the large majority of such subjects has formed the sole basis for the guidance of the Court in developing jurisprudence. iv. The result is that we've developed a Phil. Common Law which is based almost exclusively, except in cases where conflicting with local customs and institutions, upon Anglo-Am Common Law. o. COLLATERAL INFLUENCES i. There are no digests of Spanish decisions to aid the study of Bench and Bar vs. the abundance of digests/reports/textbooks on English/Am. courts. ii. There is a prolific use of Anglo-Am authorities in the decisions of the court, plus, the available sources for study and reference on legal theories are mostly Anglo-Am iii. Therefore, there has been developed and will continue a common law in our jurisprudence (i.e. Phil Common Law) based upon the ECL in its present day form of an Anglo-Am CL, which is effective in all of the subjects of law in this jurisdiction, in so far as it does not conflict with the express language of the written law (where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories) or with the local customs and institutions. (Digest from CMV Mendoza, Scribd user)

Rules on Legislative Drafting Statutes and their Construction (L. Gonzaga) Two steps involved in legislative drafting 1. Ethical or Formulation of Policy 2. Technical or the Mechanics of Bill Drafting 1) Formulation of Policy Two kinds of policy: basic policy and immediate objective Basic policy is the general or overall principle that everyone has agreed upon, while the immediate objective is more specific and targeted. Policy is determined by the judgment of legislators, with the assistance of specialists, pressure-groups, and others. 2) The Drafting of a Statute Legislative drafting involves: mastery of language, and research. Drafters should also take note of: "(a) The exact state of facts in the field to which the law will relate; (b) The form of previous statutes relating to

the same subject in the same jurisdictions;(c) The form of previous statutes relating to the same subject in other jurisdictions; (d) The manner in which such statutes have actually operated; (e) The consensus of opinion among experts as to the best method for meeting the problem." The Legislative Reference Service renders technical assistance to Congress by indexing Philippine laws and drafting bills.

3) Objectives of the Draftsman Drafters should "make his readers understand what is commanded and what is forbidden by the law." They should not adopt the style of literary composition, but should be "more like that of a man who writes directions on how to use a kodak or how to use a Burroughs Calculator. This practice will help minimize problems in interpretation. Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 5 Janz Hanna Ria A2013 But no matter how precise a statute is crafted, there will still be gaps and ambiguities because: one cannot foresee all the possible consequences of the relations between language, and the person or situations where it might apply, and courts in some cases would want to follow a certain policy direction which the statute does not cover 4) Problems of Drafting Either related to the form and structure of the statute, or the language used Form and structure i. Dividing statutes into sections makes them flexible and facilitates amendments ii. Drafters should follow proper construction and logical development of sections and other parts of a statute Length of Sections i. There is no rule on how long or short sections may be, but it should be made as brief as may be compatible with accuracy Sentence Structure i. A legislative declaration consists of a legal subject and a legal action.

ii. More complex provisions also have a case where its operation is confined, and conditions which trigger its operation Language i. Statutes should be written in clear, simple, and concise language, but when they deal with technical matters, like laws regulating accounting practices for instance, specialized terms are unavoidable ii. Drafters should also avoid variations in expression, that the same word should not be used in different senses, and that when one word is used, it should be used and defined uniformly throughout

STATUTES AND THEIR ENACTMENT Laws and Statutes Laws A whole body or system of law Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state Includes RA, PD, EO (Presidents legislative power), PI (ordinance power), Jurisprudence, ordinances passed by sanggunians of LGUs

Statues An act of legislature (PC, PL, BP, Congress) PDs of Marcos during Martial Law EO of Aquino during revolutionary period

Statutory Construction Art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247) Art or process of discovering and expounding on the intended signification of the language used, that is, the meaning which the authors of the law designed it to convey to others (Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws) Art of seeking the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state of facts (Justice Martin, Statutory Construction) Branch of the law dealing with the interpretation of laws enacted by a legislature (American Jurisprudence)

Construction v Interpretation Two terms are not the same although often used interchangeably Construction is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the text from elements known and given in the text, while interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of the language used. Interpretation is limited to exploring the written text, while construction goes beyond and may call in the aid of extrinsic considerations

Classifications of Statutes General Law one that affects the community at large. A law that relates to a subject of a general nature or that affects all people or all of a particular class Special Law different from others of the same general kind, designed for a particular purpose, or limited in range or confined to a prescribed field of action on operation Local Law relates or operates over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory Public Law general classification of law, may be general, local or special. One concerned with the organization of the state, the relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers to the state, to each other, to people and the relations of states to one another. Private Law portions of the law which defines, regulates, enforces, and administers relationships among individuals, associations and corporations Remedial Statute provides means or method whereby causes of action may be effectuated, wrongs redressed and relief obtained Curative Statute one which reaches back into the past to operate upon past events, acts or transactions in order to correct errors and irregularities and to render valid and effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose intended Penal Statute one that defines criminal offenses and specify fines and punishments Prospective Law applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment Retrospective Law one which looks backward or contemplates the past; made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it came into force

Affirmative Statute one which directs the doing of an act, or declares what shall be done in contrasts to a negative statute which is one that prohibits a thing from being done, or declares what shall not be done Mandatory Statutes one which require and not merely permit a course of action Permanent Statutes one whose operation if not limited in duration but continues until repealed Temporary Statutes duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event Declaratory Statutes - one enacted for the purpose of removing doubts or putting an end to conflicting decisions in regard to what the law is in relation to a particular matter Directory Statutes one the observance of which is not necessary to the validity of the proceedings. It relates to form and manner, and when an act is incidental or acquired after jurisdiction Substantive Law one which creates, defines, and regulates rights Procedural Law one which provides for the manner of enforcing rights Parts of a Statute Title The title of a statute is the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the act is individually known. It is usually prefixed to the statute in the form of a brief summary of its contents. (Statutory Construction, 2 nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. (1987 Constitution, Article VI, section 26 (1)) Purpose: to apprise the legislators of the object, nature, and scope of the provision of the bill and to prevent the enactment into law of matters which gave not received the notice, action and study of the legislators To prohibit duplicity in legislation To prevent log-rolling legislation To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature To fairly apprise the people, through publication of the subjects of the legislation

Used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent when the language of the act does not clearly express its purpose; may clarify doubt or ambiguity *Liberally construed. If there is doubt, it should be resolved against the doubt and in favor of the constitutionality of the statute Lidasan v. COMELEC Facts: Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title YES. RA 4790 is null and void The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill.

This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is

being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. (lawsandfound.blogspot.com)

Tobias v. Abalos FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1) HELD: For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution. Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. (reenfab.wordpress.com)

Enacting Clause That part of the statute which declares its enactment and serves to identify it as an act of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative authority. Be it enacted (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Preamble That part of a statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the objects sought to be accomplished. Usually, it starts with the word whereas. Generally, it is a declaration by the legislature of the reasons for the passage of the statute and is helpful in the interpretation of any ambiguities within the statute to which it is prefixed. (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Purview that part which tells what the law is about Body The main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even procedural provisions. Provisos and exceptions may also be found in the body of the statute. (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Repealing Clause That part of the statute which announces the prior statutes or specifies provisions which have been abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new law (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Saving Clause A restriction in a repealing act which is intended to save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc. from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted repeal (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Separability Clause That part of the statute which provides that in the event that one or more provisions are declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall still be in force (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz) Effectivity Clause That part of the statute which announces the effective date of the law (Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 2003, Judge Noli Diaz)

Steps in the Enactment of the Statute 1987 Constitution, Article VI Sec. 26 (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. Sec. 27 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each house shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object CIR v CTA FACTS: Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar & dining room exclusively for its members & guests claims that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax Law". By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurant, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96 in which the club protested claiming the assessment to be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.

CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel, motels, resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry. ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or resthouses. DECISION: The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. It was then agreed by the SC with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable, hence the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount assessed against it. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute

and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. (ulandi-digest.blogspot.com) Arroyo v. de Venecia Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;

Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious; Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 This case is therefore dismissed. Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. In view of what is essential Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED. First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. In view of the Courts jurisdiction This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction". In view of House Rules No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. In view of grave abuse Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi

judicial power as to amount to lack of power. In view of the enrolled bill doctrine Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (nonamalum.weebly.com) Process Proposed legislative measure introduced by a member of congress for enactment into law Shall embrace only one subject which shall be express in the title Signed by the authors File with the Secretary of the House Bills may originate from either lower or upper House Exclusive to lower house (HR) o Appropiration o Revenue / Tariff Bills o Bills authorizing increase of public debt o Bills of local application o Private Bills After 3 Readings, approval of either house Secretary reports the bill for first reading 1st Reading reading the number and title, referral to the appropriate committee for study and recommendation o Committee hold public hearings and submits report and recommendation for calendar for second reading nd 2 Reading bill is read in full with amendments proposed by the committee unless copies are distributed and such reading is dispensed with

o Bill will be subject to debates, motions, and amendments o Bill will be voted on o A bill approved shall be included in the calendar of bills for 3 rd reading 3rd Reading bill approved on 2nd reading will be submitted for final vote by yeas and nays Bill approved on the 3rd reading will be transmitted to the other house for concurrence (same process as the first passage) o If the other house approves without amendment it is passed to the President o If the other house introduces amendments, and disagreement arises, differences will be settled by the Conference Committees of both houses o Report and recommendation of the 2 Conference Committees will have to be approved by both houses in order to be considered pass President o Approves and signs o Vetoes (w/in 30 days after receipt) o Inaction If the President vetoes send back to the House where it originated with recommendation o 2/3 of all members approves, it will be sent to the other house for approval o 2/3 of the other house approves it shall become a law o If president did not act on the bill w/in 30 days after receipt, bill becomes a law

Evidence of Due Enactment of Statutes Enrolled Bill Theory Mabanag v. Lopez Vito Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory Facts: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was

passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. **Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided,

That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals. (www.uberdigests.info) Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v Gimenez Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill Facts: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: xxx xxx xxx XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunctio n and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended

to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. (www.uberdigests.info) Morales v. Subido Political Law Journals vs Enrolled Bill Facts: Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police

of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy. (www.uberdigests.info) Journal Entry Rule Astorga v. Villegas Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill RULING: Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills

authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. When courts may turn to the journal Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal

discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. (scire-licet.blogspot.com) EFFECTS AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES When Statute Becomes Effective Article 2 of the Civil Code Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Tanada v. Tuvera (1986)

When Regulation Becomes Effective EO 292, Book VII Sec. 3 Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Sec. 4 Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be

expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Sec. 5 Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Sec. 6 Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Sec. 7 Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Sec. 8 Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. Sec. 9 Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. People v. Que Po Lay Tanada v. Tuvera

Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of automatic review. Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official Gazette. Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take effect Held: NO. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned. Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. (lawsandfound.blogspot.com)

When Ordinance Takes Effect RA 7160 Section 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.

(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it. (c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay. Section 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sanggunian panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing. (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted. (c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned. Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils. (b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision. (c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall

declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. (d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. Section 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances. (b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved. (c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected. Section 58. Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned. Section 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. - (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned. (b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof. The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit

concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting. (c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated. (d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation. Bagatsing v. Ramirez Facts: In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others the non-compliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Issue: Whether the publication requirement was complied with Held: The Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code id a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Section 17 of the Charter speaks of ordinance in general. Whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. While the Charter requires publication, before the enactment of the ordinance and after approval thereof, in two daily newspapers of the general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Being a general law with a special provision applicable in the case, the Local Tax Code prevails. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Language of the Statute that shall prevail 1987 Constitution, Article XIV Section 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages.

Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system. Section 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis. Section 8. This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be translated into major regional languages, Arabic, and Spanish. EO 292, BOOK I, Chap. 5 Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted. Manner of Computing Time Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a) National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson Facts: On 10/14/55, the CFI-Mla. rendered judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on 10/21/55 served upon defendants in said case. On 12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as pltff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed w/ the same court, a complaint against defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescription of action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal to the CA w/c was certified to the SC, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of law, namely,

Issue: W/n the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final. This in turn, took place on 12/21/55 or 30 days from notice of the judgment-- w/c was received by defs. on 10/21/55-- no appeal having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55 expired. Pltff alleges that it was 12/21/65, but appellee maintains otherwise, bec. :when the law speaks of years xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 yrs of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3650 days, from 12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65. Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, bec. it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute one yr. Held: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of each "year"-- as the term is used in our laws-- to 365 days. [The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19, 1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.] (casesdigests.blogspot.com) Territorial Extent of Operation 1987 Constitution, Article I, National Territory The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. Civil Code Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a) Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) Revised Penal Code

Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. Prospective and Retrospective Operation of Statutes 1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 22 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Civil Code, Article 4 Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. EO 292, Sec. 19 Prospectivity Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided. RPC, Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. People v. Sumilang It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedures of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the decision had become final before said resolution became effective. In this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17, 1944, and a second motion for re-hearing or consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been pending in this Court (section 1, Rule 54); for

said period had already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any pleading or motion in the present case. (from original text) Salcedo v. Carpio the appointment of the respondent as members of the Board of Dental Examiners is valid. Although there is no express provisions in Republic Act No. 546 abolishing the preexisting Board of Dental Examiner and other boards of examiners, created under Sections 785 and 787 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 4007, and Republic Act No. 417, it is obvious that it was the intention of Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Republic Act are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by said Act No. 4007 and Republic Act No. 417. The last paragraph of Section 1 of said Republic Act No. 546 provides that "except as modified by this Act, all laws governing examinations given by the above-mentioned boards shall continue in force." it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage our Constitution does not in terms prohibit the enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contract or deprived a person of property without due process of law, that is which do not divest rights of property and vested rights. (from original text) Tiu San v. Republic FACTS: Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court due to his conviction on April 25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon that occurred during the intervening two years from promulgation of the decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950 pursuant to R.A. No. 530. The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause (3), this provision is not applicable to the case at bar since the violation of the aforementioned ordinance occurred prior to the enactment of the said R.A. No. 530. ISSUE: Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect?

DECISION: Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, the said Act was meant to have a retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides: This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship... (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Buyco v PNB Mandamus case filed by petitioner Marcelino Buyco praying that the respondent Philippine National Bank be compelled to accept his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, as payment of his obligation with said respondent. ~ there was an amendment in the charter of PNB which prohibits them to accept backpay acknowledgment. The offer was made before the amendment.
"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code). It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez, et al. v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997, 1007); that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect (Montilla v. Agustinian Corp., 24 Phil. 220). These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such may be implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment (Fairchild v. U.S., 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 99 F. 534). (from original text)

Chavez v. Court of Agrarian Relations Facts: Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland with the intention of working it himself but he could not take possession of the land because the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, did not want to surrender the land to its new owner. According to Pablo Chavez his son Eugenio Chavez was working the land for him, he was 74 years of age already. Aquilino de los Reyes filed a petition with this Court against Pablo Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said tenant but suit was dismissed.

Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21, 1958. When he died the law governing tenant and landowner relation is Republic Act No. 1199. Under this statute the tenancy relationship between the petitioner Chavez and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death. On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed a petition, this time R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No. 1199, he amendment provides for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenants death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of the tenants immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally . Issue: Can R.A. No. 2263 be applied retroactively? Decision: NO. Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied retroactively. Since the law in force on October 21, 1958, when the tenant Pablo Chavez died, was Republic Act 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner any successional right to continue as tenant. In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that The amendment to section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenants death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of the tenants immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself persona lly which took effect on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively. To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already become vested. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Tacan v. CA FACTS: Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to Tac-an through a document entitled Deed of Quitclaim as payment for legal services. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-an that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services and that they had hired another lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-

an continued to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio Acopiado sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario. On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim. And on October 7, 1964, he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers, Paghasian and Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga del Norte praying that he be declared the owner of the land and that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and Libetario be annulled and he be paid for damages, attorney s fee, etc. The CFI decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the Acopiados, et.al appealed to CA. The CA voided the transfer of the land to Tac-an applying section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu Contracts w/ Non-Christians Requisites. On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in the trial court, the Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, revoked his approval to the deed of quitclaim for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiados as non-Christians. The petitioner asserts that the revocation of the approval which had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot affect his right to the land which had already vested. Issue: Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao & Sulu still necessary when it is already repealed by RA 4252? Held: Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. All requisites are still necessary. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Eugenio v. Drilon Facts: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondents purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations.

Issue: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. Held: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Alunan III v. Mirasol

AMENDMENTS, REVISIONS, REPEALS Amendments Estrada v. Caseda Facts: On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer, because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave. On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month. On the case being appealed to the CFI, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689. The court correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were needed by plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended in the said Act. The requirements to evict occupants were provided in above-mentioned Act, which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided that the same "shall be in force for a period of two years after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946, amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval." Issue: Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 689 By RA No. 66 Held: Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot be given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The period as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949.

The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the Acts. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board Facts: The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of RA 309 the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines amended by RA 983 are as follows: (1) Philippine Anti-TB Society for 12 Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6 Sundays (3) White Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand Derby Race of PATS - 1 Sunday (5) Private Individuals and entities - 29 Sundays. However, RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO from 6 to 12 Sundays, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable relief OR should be assigned to any day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal Holiday. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the unreserved Sundays. (2) Whether or not the additional sweepstakes races must be inserted in club races as debated in the House of Representatives in the voting of HB 5732/RA1502. Held: (1) No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except holidays) because their holding on races for these days are merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, RA 1502 was enacted increasing by 6 the sweepstakes draw and races but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law - the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by GAB. (2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication.

In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Sarcos v. Castillo Facts: Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office. Such act alleged constituted connivance with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber and selling of the timber cut, for own use and benefit, within the communcal forest reserve of the municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the government. As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of this administrative complaint that the Castillo filed petition ordering the immediate suspension of Sarcos from position as Mayor saying that the acts committed by mayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition was in accordance with theSec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967. Issue: WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos under RA 5185 Held: No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of thePetitioner, Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly theparagraph dealing with preventive suspension: "The President, Provincial Boardand

City or Municipality Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate thetruth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after receipt of such notice." It was theformer law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor toorder preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by theDecentralization Act of 1967. The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order byGovernor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independentcandidate thus of a different political persuasion. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspensionorder by Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to hisposition.*The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended /repealed Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provicniclagorvernor, if the charge against a munucupola officaial was municipal official wasone affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it is the provincialboard which has been granted the power to order preventive suspension. (Richelle_Joy_B_2547,
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Erectors Inc. v. NLRC Facts: In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE. On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231. Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid to him. On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and nonpayment of overtime pay and bonus.

While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a) of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos. Held: No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Revisions and Codifications Montelibano v. Ferrer Facts: In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and general manager, leased a lot to Benares for five years, with an option in favor of Benares of another five crop years. On 1951, the Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which rendered a decision ordering him to eject from the said lot. However, Benares continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to Subdivision. Acting upon Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land of sugarcane planted by Benares. Hence, a criminal case was filed by Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then filed to the petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the complaint and warrant of arrest A civil case against Municipal Judge and Benares was filed alleging that the said judge had o jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case. Issue: Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying upon CA 326, section 22 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides that the City Attorney

shall charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of Bacolod. Held: No, the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case. In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such status originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field, have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the question under consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a different conclusion. In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police wherein it was held that in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal who is given the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the provisions of its Charter found in Sec 39 of Act # 183. The provisions of the Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially identical to that of Manila should then be interpreted the same. Therefore, the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest issued by the judge shall be annulled. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) American Bible Society v. Manila Facts: In the course of its ministry, ABS has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospels throughout Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of Manila informed ABS that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945 without providing the city with Mayor's permit and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028, 3364 and required plaintiff to secure within three days the permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from fourth quarter of 1945 to second quarter of 1952 in P5, 281.45. ABS protested about the requirement but paid to the defendant the said permit and license fees in the said amount.

Issue: Whether or no the Ordinances of Manila Nos. 3000 as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364 are applicable to the case at bar. Held: Yes, the city ordinances mentioned are still in force and effect. When the old statute is repealed in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enacts all or certain portions of the pre-existing law, the majority view holds that the rights and liabilities whihc have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizeds the repeal, therefore continueing the law in force without interruption. In the case at bar, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 of the city of Manila were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The only essential difference between these two provisions is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CTA Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, Petitioner Corporation was engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. for which petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section

24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from such amount referring to rents, etc. to gross income. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon. Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively applied. Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein ,the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them. (coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com) Ortiz v. COMELEC Facts: The petitioner was appointed as COMELEC Commissioner by then President Marcos for a term expiring on May 17, 1992. Following the installation of the Aquino government, the petitioner submitted a "courtesy resignation" which was accepted by President Aquino. The petitioner requested for payment of retirement benefits by invoking RA 1568, as amended by RA 3595 and re-enacted by RA 6118, which was denied by the respondent on the ground that he is "not entitled to retirement benefits under RA 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason therefor. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits as provided by RA 1568 and re-enacted by RA 6118. Decision: YES. RA 6118 as a retirement law is remedial in character which should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to benefit thereby. This is, as it should be, because the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com)

Mecano v. COA FACTS: Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. HELD: NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioners claim for benefits. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia. (engrjhez.wordpress.com)

Repeals Civil Code, Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a) Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 5 Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided. Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise. US v. Soliman Facts: Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code. Issues: (1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury. (2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge.

Held: (1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury,

not expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697. (2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters v. Feliciano Facts: On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government agency he may designate - is repealed by RA 3452. Issue: Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national emergency is repealed by RA 3452 Held: No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452. Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the

rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no inconsistency. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Lagman v. City of Manila Facts: Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public service Commission to operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing business under the name and style of Marco Transit, began operating twelve (12) passenger buses along his authorized line. On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to section 18, paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended (otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), enacted ordinance no. 4986, entitled an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and for other purposes, which the city mayor approved. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes; Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the City of Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of ordinance no. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. He contends that regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of which are vested, under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. He also contends that the public Service Commission has the only right to enact Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the said office. In compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act. Issue: WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila) prevails over Commonwealth Act no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146, as amended)? Held: Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the provisions of the former and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail. Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of C.A. no 146 to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision which can be found in this statute vesting

power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate or control the streets of the city of manila or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this authority is conferred upon the city of manila. The power vested in the public service commission under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to the said city under section 18(hh) of its revised charter. Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of public works------to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national roads and streets. This being the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by implication are not favored, and special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman. (lawfacilitate.wikispaces.com) NAPOCOR v. Arca Facts: On 26 December 1963, the Philippine Power and Development Company and the Dagupan Electric Corporation, filed an injunction suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 55824) to restrain enforcement by the National Power Corporation of a revised rate of charges for the electric power and energy sold by said defendant, which schedule of new rates would take effect 1 January 1964. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that the disputed revised rates, which would increase the cost of electric power and energy being purchased from defendant by plaintiff Philippine Power and Development Company by 24% and that purchased by plaintiff Dagupan Electric Corporation by 30 %, are unreasonable, excessive and unnecessary; that the said revised rates had not been previously approved by the Public Service Commission; and that the unilateral revision by the defendant of the rate and its imposition upon the plaintiffs of the amended contracts embodying said new rates, without first submitting them to arbitration, was in gross violation of the provisions of the current contracts between them. Plaintiff filed a TRO to prevent the scheduled enforcement and was awarded to them. Defendant moved to dissolve the injunction but was dismissed by the court. Issue: Whether or not the lower court has no jurisdiction over the matter and only the PSC was vested the said jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of RA 2677. Held: No. The authority to inquire into the rates of charges for services rendered by NPC does not devolve upon the Public Service Commission. Commonwealth Act No. 120, creating the National Power Corporation, specifically provides that the NPC has the power/function/right to sell electric power and fix rate for any service rendered provided that the rates of charges shall not be subject to revision by the Public Service Commission. It is true that under Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act 2677, amending the Public Service Act and approved on 18 June 1960, the Public Service Commission was vested with jurisdiction to fix the rate of charges by public

utilities owned or operated by any instrumentality of the National Government or by any government-owned or controlled corporation. But the enactment of this later legislation, which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed or withdrawn the exempting proviso of Section 2, paragraph (g), of the earlier Commonwealth Act No. 120 above quoted. For it is now the settled rule in this jurisdiction that a special statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. In the present case, there appears no such legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the earlier special law. From the explanatory note to House Bill No. 4030, that later became Republic Act No. 2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Public Service Commission over the public utilities operated by governmentowned or controlled corporations is to be confined to the fixing of rates of such public services, "in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition detrimental to operators and to the public interests. No other conclusion appears possible, therefore, than that the authority of the Public Service Commission under Republic Act 2677, over the fixing of rates of charges of public utilities owned or operated by governmentowned or controlled corporations, can only be exercised where the charter of the government corporation concerned does not contain any provision to the contrary. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Gaerlan, Jr. v Catubig Facts: Gaerlan Jr and Catubig were registered candidates for councilors in 8-seat City Council of Dagupan in the 1963 elections. Catubig was proclaimed one of the eight elected councilors while Gaerlan lost his bid. However, Gaerlan went to Court to challenge Catubig's eligibility for the office on the averment of non-age. Catubig was below 25 years of ages as of the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy or date of election or date of assumption of office. Catubig claims that the question of ageeligibility should be governed by RA 170 which provides that the elective members of the Municipal Board shall be qualified electors of the city residents therein for at least one year and not less than 23 years of age and not RA 2259 which provides that no person shall be a city mayor, vice mayor or councilor unless he is at least 25 years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter. Issue: Whether or not Section 12 of RA 170 (23 years of age) should give way to Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age)
Held: No. Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age) should prevail. RA 484 amending Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter (RA 170), took effect on June 10, 1950 whereas RA 2259 became law on June 10, 1959. The question whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly upon the intent of Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its

members intended to amend or repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259,except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. All cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said act are subjct thereto. Hence, the age-limit provision in RA 2259 is continuing, because Dagupan City was not excluded. Therefore, its charger provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. This is because the last statute si so broad in terms and so clear and explicit in its words so as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject and therefore to displace the prior staute. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)

People v. Pimentel Facts: As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 ( AntiSubversion Law) as amended before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest was issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not be found. Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live ammunition was found in his possession. On June 1990, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion to quash the information invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he claims that alleged possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was granted by RTC and CA. Issue: Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700) should be applied retroactively to Tujan Held: Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively. The repeal by said law of RA 1700, as amended was absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal. With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)

Hagad v. Gozo Dadole Facts: On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No.

018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue. The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension. Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160. Held: No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)

Republic v. Marcopper Mining Corp.

NATURE AND CONCEPT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION National Federation of Labor v. Eisma People v. Mapa Luzon Surety Co. Inc. v. De Garcia Matabuena v. Cervantes People v. Nazario

OBJECTS AND METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION Verba Legis or Literal interpretation/ plain meaning rule If a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Colgate Palmolive Phil. Inc. v. Gimenez Facts: On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof.". The OIC of ETA of CBP approved the application for refund of the special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate. However, the auditor of CBP refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amout fixed by OIC of ETA on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt form Section 2 of ETC. The Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law

refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Issue: Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to refund under Section 2 thereof Held: The ruliong of Auditor General is based on the principle "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose". It is applicablle only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in teh enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, the items do not belong to the same classification. On the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. Therefore, the decision is reversed and the Colgate-Palmolive is entitled of the refund which was approved by OIC of the ETA in the thotal amount of P23, 958.13 (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Ratio Legis or Interpretation by considering the spirit and reason of the law /Golden rule Hidalgo v. Hidalgo Facts: Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas. In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the

respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor. In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor. The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale. OR Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants? Held: The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Taada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent. Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian court to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Procorpio Hidalgo for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the observations made. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)

Mens Legislatoris / Mischief Rule It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discemible in such codal provision would not be attained. US v. Toribio Facts: The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Issue: Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition contained in Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases: (1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer. Held: The prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit. Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer. Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and

33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co. Facts: Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company ate Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City. Although quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill many of them preferred to commute and the deceased went home about thrice a week, to which the respondent furnished the transportation. On the day following the accident, Conrado and Leonora were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. Leonora gave birth to the posthumous daughter at the deceased named Raquel. Issue: Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Held: Yes, they are dependents whiting that of expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents. It is also supported in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of DSTC. Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail. In US v. Toribio, SC held that no construction is to be adopted that would tend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator." Therefore, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of awarding the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the compensation and attorney's fees is affirmed. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)

Equity of the Statute Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. Amatan v. Aujero Facts: Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended party and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the approval of the judge, the information was amended to attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The plea bargaining agreement was entered into and approved by Judge Aujero pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - which allows an accused with the consent of the offended party, to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. Amatan filed an administrate suit against Judge Aujero for gross ignorance of the law for approving the plea bargaining agreement and sentencing the accused for the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge explained that what he did was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Issue: Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Held: Yes, Judge Aujero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum. However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a

result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code 5 admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience. These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE Common Meaning Rule Kuenzle & Streiff v. Collector of Customs Facts: From the record it appears that the plaintiff and appellant imported into Philippine Islands a quantity of merchandise, which was invoiced as "cases roast coffee, chicory, cereals." Said merchandise was classified by the department of customs as "Bonanza mixture." Against that classification the plaintiff, through its attorney, protested, alleging "that the mixture is a product and manufacture of the United States, in chief value of the growth of the United States; the shipment came direct, was accompanied by the proper certificate of origin; the goods should have been passed free of duty as American products, under section 5 of American Tariff of 1909." Said protest was duly considered by the Insular Collector of Customs, who decided that: "This claim for the free entry of certain `bonanza mixture' as a manufacture of the United States under section 12 of the Philippine Tariff Law of 1909, is overruled and denied, for the reasons stated in the decision of this office, on protest 7298 of the same importers (copy attached), which decision has been affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Manila. As stipulated by the parties, the "bonanza mixture" is a mixture of coffee, cereals and chicory; that the coffee it contains was originally imported coffee it contains was originally imported into the United States in the bean, and was there roasted, ground and finally mixed with the chicory and cereals which are, nevertheless, products of the United States. According to the report of the Bureau of Science, the proportion of the mixture is about 50 per cent of real coffee and the rest is chicory and cereals.

Issue: Whether or not the roasting, grinding and mixing of coffee with chicory and cerals constitutes a manufacture Held: The bonanza mixture is not a manifacture article. The Philippine Tariff Law of August 5th, 1909 in paragraph 242 provides for a duty upon coffee. said duty depends upon the condition of the coffee or the manner of its packing. Paragraph 243 provides for a duty on chicory. Paragraph 215 218 provide for duty upon various classes of cereals. There is no express provisions in the law of a duty upon a mixture of said articles. In order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of these words, resort may be had to the definitions given by well-recognized lexicographers. Webster, in his valuable International Dictionary, defines manufacture as "The operation of making wares or any product by hand, by machinery, or by other agencies; anything made from raw material, by the hands, by machinery, or by art, as clothes, iron utensils, shoes, machinery, saddlery, etc." Black, in his valuable Law Dictionary, defines manufacture as "Any useful product made directly by human labor, or by the aid of machinery directed or controlled by human power, and either from raw materials or from materials worked up into a new form. Also the process by which such products are made or fashioned." Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, defines manufacture "To make or fabricate raw materials by hand or by machinery, worked into forms convenient for use;" and, when used as a noun, "anything made from raw materials by hand or by machinery or by art. The application of labor to an article, either by hand or by mechanism, does not make the article necessarily a manufactured article within the meaning of that term as used in the tariff laws, unless the application of such labor is carried to such an extend that the article suffers a species of transformation and is changed into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character or use. If the mixing of the different kinds of ground coffee or different grades of tea does not constitute manufacture, then it would seem to be reasonable to say that the mixture simply of ground coffee with other ground materials or articles such as chicory and cereals, would not constitute a manufacture. The courts have been obliged to formulate their definitions in order to give effect to the purpose of legislative enactments, while lexicographers have been free to define said term upon the pure etymology of the word. Courts have been obliged to define the terms in order to make it applicable to practical affairs. It is the duty of the court to give the Tariff Law a strict interpretation, which will give force and effect to such law. The primary purpose of the law is to produce revenue. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)

Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Philippines Facts: During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the term "chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans. Issue: Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended. Held: No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not. On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively, the amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar. The appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January - October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree which is after September 3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com)

Tan, et. al. v. People Facts: On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were confiscated. Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section 68,[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277.

The accused were all convicted for failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code which requires: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber dealer permit. The CA found no cogent reason for the reversal or modification of the decision. Issue: (1) Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is unconstitutional. (2) Whether or not "lumber" is to be construed as "timber" and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705. Held: (1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license.". One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not charged with the *unlawful+ possession of firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity. (2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court held that lumber is included in the term timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Websters Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Section 68 would emasculate the law itself. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Terms with Legal Meaning Bernardo v. Bernardo Facts: On December 31, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines purchased from Roman Catholic Church the estate known as the "Capelania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under the provisions of section 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes the expropriation or purchase of private lands and that lands acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots, for resale at reasonable prices to " their bona fide tenants or occupants." Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein, applied to the Rural Progress Administration for

the purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo, et al ., contested the application and claimed preferential right to such purchase, and on January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration resolved to recognize the petitioners as entitled to preference. The respondents then appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter upheld their claim, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are bona fide occupants of the lot in question. Held: No, Enrique does not come under the description of bona fide tenant or occupant employed in the statute. The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant) has been defined as "one who supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested with true title but is ignorant that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware to that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to over each another. It is also in contrary that the words "bona fide occupants" employed in the Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to "actual" occupants. The first reason is that Section 7 of Act 1170 of the old Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate tenure. The second reason is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that the term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to cloak and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of trust. The SC ruled that a person who, at the time of the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and who does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth Act. No. 539. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Terms with Multiple Meaning Manlayaon v. Lising

Facts: Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides - should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal Held: No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal. (simplelawstudent.blogspot.com) Doctrine of Associated Words or Noscitur a Sociis Buenaseda v. Flavier

Ejusdem Generis Rule Vera v. Cuevas

Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius Rule San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. v. CIR

Casus Omissus Rule People v. Manantan

Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos

Ramirez v. CA

Doctrine of Last Antecedent Florentino v. Philippine National Bank

Reddendo Singula Singulis People v. Tamani

Doctrine of Necessary Implication DAR v. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp.

Verbal or Clerical Errors Rufino Lopez & Sons v. CTA

Number, Gender and Tense Santillon v. Miranda

Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words Amon Trading Corp. v. CA

Use of Shall and May Office of the Ombudsman v. Macabulos

AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION Intrinsic Aids Title Central Capiz v. Ramirez

Preamble People v. Purisima

Punctuation Marks

US v. Hart

Definition Sections and Interpretation Clauses People v. Buenviaje

Capitalization of Letters Extrinsic Aids Legislative History Prior to Enactment Contemporaneous Circumstance Policy Sarcos v. Castillo Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of Customs Unabia v. City Mayor

Legislative History of Statute Oliva v. Lamadrid

Contemporaneous and Practical Construction Nestle Philippines v. CA

Other Aids (Dictionaries, documents, scientific and political writing, legal treatises, etc.) CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE, ITS PART AND OTHER STATUTES Araneta v. Concepcion Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City of Cebu Magtajas and City of Cagayan de Oro v. Pryce Properties Corp. and PAGCOR Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA National Tobacco Administration v. COA Co v. Civil Register of Manila

STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION: MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY People v. Terrado

Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Torres

THE STATUTE AND THE CONSTITUTION Nitafan v. CIR People v. Munoz Ordillo v. COMELEC Calderon v. Carale Manila Price Hotel v. GSIS