Compiled Motion To Quash

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MOTION to QUASH - 20140311 People vs Asuncion - Daysheelyn Brillo

G.R. No. 80066 May 24, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Quezon City, and ROLANDO ABADILLA, respondents. Rolando Abadina, a former colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was charged with the offense of Violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 [Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition] The RTC judge dismissed the Information on the ground that it did not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se: o EO 107 which gives holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six (6) months from its effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by Executive Order No. 222, within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, without incurring any criminal liability except if the unlicensed firearm or ammunition is carried outside of one's residence, not for the purpose of surrendering the same, or used in the commission of any other offense, munition may surrender the same to the proper authorities without incurring criminal liability, had ruled that a criminal hability was temporarily filing hfted for mere possession' of unlicensed firearms and ammunition during the period covered People vs. Feliciano: RA No. 482 legalized mere unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition for the limited period specified in said law. The statute in effect, legalizing mere unlicensed possession for a limited period, punishes only (1) using a firearm or ammunition or (2) carrying the same on the person except to give them up. The appellant was not charged with any of these two acts. People vs. Austria, the presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally exist. ... The information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law." The Court is not unaware that accuse-respondent Abadilla, rightly or wrongly, is Identified with the violent arm of the past regime. To many, he is regarded with unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of that regime. The Court, however, is not swayed by appellations or approbriums. Its duty, as a temple of justice, is to accord to every man who comes before it in appropriate proceedings the right to due process and the equal protection of the laws. The information, in this particular charge against accused-respondent Abadilla, is fatally defective. It would be fatally defective against any other accused charged with the same offense. Respondent judge, in dismissal the information, committed no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion. He acted correctly. petition is DENIED.

There is no allegation that the firearms and ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's residence or used in the commission of some other crime.

OSG (petitioner): nothing is contained in said executive orders which legalizes the possession of firearms and ammunition without a permit; that said executive orders merely authorized holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition to surrender the same within a specified filing period without incurring criminal liability; and that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under Pres. Decree No. 1866 which was not repealed by said Executive Order Nos. 107 and 222. Issue: WON the trial court was correct in dismissing the case: YES, it may be true that there is nothing in Executive Orders Nos. 107 and 222 that expressly legalizes the unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court, applying statutes also provided for a period within which a holder or possessor of unlicensed firearms and am-

Valencia vs Sandiganbayan - Victoria Buenaventura


VALENCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. 2004) Summary: Petitioners: Rodolfo G. Valencia, Pedrito Reyes, Remedios Marasigan, Bayani Anastacio, Rumulado Bawasanta, Jose Enriquez, Nelson Gabutero, Jose Genilo, Jr., Jose Leynes and Alfonso Umali Petitioners extended contract of loan (worth Php 2,500,000) to Engr. Alfredo Atienza for the repair of Atienzas motor vessel which petitioners claim was necessary for the transportation needs of inhabitants of Oriental Mindoro which had
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just suffered three successive typhoons. Loan was supposedly extended by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro pursuant to the General Welfare clause or Section 16 of the Local Government Code. They were then charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in an information filed in the Sandiganbayan: That on or about January 12, 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rodolfo G. Valencia, then Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro, Pedrito A. Reyes, then Vice-Governor and Presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro, Bayani Anastacio, Romualdo J. Bawasanta, Emmanuel B. Buenaventura, Cesareo M. Cueto, Violeta D. Dakis, Jose A. Enriquez, Nelson B. Cabutero, Jose G. Genilo, Jr., Jose C. Leynes, Dante A. Manao, Remedios E. Marasigan, all members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro, and Alfonso V. Umali, Jr., then Provincial Administrator, all of whom are public officials of the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro, while in the performance of their official and/or administrative functions, and acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with private accused Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza, and mutually helping one another , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give said accused Alfredo M. Atienza unwarranted benefit, privilege and advantage by entering into a grossly disadvantageous contract of loan, whereby the provincial funds of Oriental Mindoro in the sum of P2,500,000.00 was given to Alfredo M. Atienza to finance the cost of repair, operation and maintenance of his vessel, thereby causing the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro damage and undue injury. Petitioners filed a Motion Seeking an Order to Allow Accused to File with the Ombudsman Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. This was followed by a Motion to Quash filed by petitioner Valencia on April 14, 1997. Reinvestigation was conducted. Two reviewing prosecutors recommended the dismissal of the complaint against all accused on the ground that their liability is civil in nature. In the meantime, petitioners learned that in the administrative case against which involved the same subject matter as the criminal case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against them after finding that the contract of loan was entered into in pursuance of the police power of the local chief executive.

Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order and/or Motion to Resolve Motion to Quash Information but this was denied so they filed certiorari petition under Rule 65. PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS: 1. Sandiganbayan erred in denying motion to quash based on the dismissal of the administrative case despite the following: a. b. subject matter in criminal and administrative case are one and the same degree of proof in criminal case is beyond reasonable doubt whereas in administrative case the proof required is only substantial that 2 prosecutors recommended dismissal of case as they found that contract of loan was entered into pursuant to general welfare clause of Local Government Code

c.

2. 3.

Sandiganbayan erred in denying motion to quash considering that the facts alleged in the information have already become moot and academic and no longer constitute an offense. No satisfactory reason was given by the respondent Ombudsman in delaying inordinately (close to three [3] years) the filing of the information against the petitioners.

ISSUE: Should motion to quash be granted? NO. - Facts which constitute the defense of the accused against the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense o The grounds on which a complaint or information may be quashed are: (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. o Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such motion only such facts as are alleged in the information and those admitted by the prosecutor, should be taken into account in the resolution thereof. Matters of defense cannot be produced during the hearing of such motions, except where the rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription and former jeopardy. Facts which form the defense of the accused do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash (on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter) is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered. However, inquiry into facts outside the information may be allowed where the prosecution does not object to the presentation thereof (People vs. Navarro).

A careful scrutiny of the Information shows that all the above elements are averred therein. It sufficiently alleges that petitioners are public officials discharging official or administrative functions who, in evident bad faith and with manifest partiality, entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government with a private person which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and advantage. RE: EARLIER RESOLUTION OF OMBUDSMAN WHICH RECOMMENDED DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST THEM SC: PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS. o The Ombudsmans resolution must be established as their defense during the trial yet it was not even offered and admitted as evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It was merely attached to petitioners Supplemental Pleading in Support of Motion to Quash Information. Furthermore, the Resolution does not bear the approval of the Ombudsman. In any event, the Ombudsman subsequently denied petitioners motion for reinvestigation. The fact that two prosecutors recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioners is of no moment as they themselves signed the Comment filed before this Court wherein they extensively argued against the instant petition. The continuing objection and opposition of the prosecution to petitioners motion to quash the Information removes this case from the exception to the above-cited rule that in the determination of whether the facts alleged constitute an offense, only the allegations in the Information, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted, should be considered. Findings of the Graft Investigation Officer are contradicted by Ombudsman who found probable cause for the following reasons: In the credit agreement itself, while the problem of transport system was addressed in passing under its whereas clause the same was not mentioned in the body of the said agreement. There is no provision in the contract to obligate Engr. Atienza towards the improvement of transport service for the people of Oriental Mindoro. The loan was a private affair. It suits Atienzas personal aggrandizement.

In the case at bar, petitioners are charged with violation of Section 3 (e), in relation to 3 (g), of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. ELEMENTS OF SEC.3(E): 1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action has caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. ELEMENTS OF SEC. 3(G): 1. The offender is a public officer; 2. He enters into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

RE: DISMISSAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST PETITIONERS SC: PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS o Basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioners is the fact that they were reelected to office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into of3

fice, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. RE: RULING IN TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN SC: PETITIONERS CANNOT INVOKE THIS. o Thus, the ruling in Tatad does not apply here. In that case, the 3-year delay in the preliminary investigation was exacerbated by the fact that the charges against petitioner were found to be politically motivated. In the case at bar, there is no indication that the complaint against petitioners was filed to serve political ends. Neither is the delay vexatious, capricious or oppressive. On the contrary, what appears is that the prosecutors exercised extreme care in verifying, evaluating and assessing the charges against petitioners by having investigations before the NBI then the Ombudsman before making a finding of probable cause.

Issue: WON respondent Judge Navarro committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued various orders appointing and designating a particular prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation? YES. Held: It must be stressed that preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial function. As the officer authorized to direct and control the prosecution of all criminal actions, a prosecutor is primarily responsible for ascertaining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Roberts, Jr. v. CA: [...] although the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest pertains exclusively to the judiciary, the preliminary investigation proper for resolving the question of whether the offender should be held for trial is a function of the prosecutors. Distinguishing preliminary investigation: (1) as an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or as an (2) investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest The first kind is executive in nature and part of the prosecutions job The second kind is more properly called preliminary examination, judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge

Petition dismissed, TRO lifted.

People vs Navaro - John Dominic Tuzon Buhangin


People v. Navarro J. Panganiban March 25, 1997 Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. T/Sgt. Jose V. Sanchez of the PC detachment based in Naga City filed a complaint for qualified theft against minor Carlos Barbosa. The PAO, as counsel for Barbosa, filed a Motion to Quash the Complaint on the ground that Sanchez is not authorized to file a complaint or information in court. Judge Gregorio Manio, Jr. issued an order remanding the case for preliminary investigation and assigned adjudication to Prosecutor Salvador Cajot. Sanchez then filed a motion to withdraw the complaint. Acting on said motion, Prosecutor Cajot issued an order approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, granting the motion to withdraw said complaint and ordering the release of the accused from detention. Subsequently, herein respondent Judge Gloriosa Navarro ordered the Provincial Prosecutor and Prosecutor Cajot to explain why they encroached on the jurisdiction of the court over the case. Prosecutor Cajot replied, asserting the jurisdiction of the prosecutors office in the conduct of preliminary investigation and that when the court ordered the records be remanded to the Office of the Prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation, the court divested itself of its control and jurisdiction over the case. Judge Navarro issued an Order setting aside that of Prosecutor Cajots, which released Barbosa. Respondent judge then ordered Assistant Prosecutor Novelita Llano to conduct the required preliminary investigation.

In this case, the prosecutor still had the power to dismiss the criminal action without the consent of the court since the RTC had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the complaint filed directly before it by Sanchez, who was not a prosecutor. Neither was he authorized by the Provincial Prosecutor to file such case directly with respondent court.

People v City Court of Manila - Lester G Cavestany


Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former conviction of acquittal; double jeopardy.-- When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense in the former complaint of information. However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
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5. 6.

7.

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge; (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party. In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154 SCRA 175 (1987) Facts: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Section 7, in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972. On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the 2 cases, the City Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, RA 3060), by alleging that the accused, "conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to he publicly exhibited completed composite prints of motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in color forming visual moving images on the projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection equipment, which motion pictures have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview, examination and censorship, nor duly passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case F-147348 (for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the same accused, "conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent and immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and lascivious positions, among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other accused Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large. On 26 June 1972, Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. Motion denied. Later, he again moved to quash the information in one of the Criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was according to him, also pending against

him another criminal case, where the information allegedly contain the same allegations as the information in the first criminal case. Court granted the motion. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether the prosecution under RA 3060, and a similar prosecution under Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, constitutes double jeopardy. Held: No. Ratio: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the 2 laws involved would show that the 2 offenses are different and distinct from each other. The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper.

People vs Relova - LA Celebrado


People v. Relova (Celebrado) 1st Division | G.R. No. L-45129 | 06 March 1987 | Feliciano, J. FACTS: Members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, lawfully searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned by Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building owned by Opulencia. During the subsequent investigation, Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he
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had caused the installation of the electrical devices in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. Asst. City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Opulencia for violation of a Batangas City ordinance. The accused pleaded NOT guilty. The accused filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court. The Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony, and the information was filed more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged. Then, Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, an information for theft of electric power under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309, paragraph (1), of the RPC. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second informationviolative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Judge Relova granted the accuseds Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. Fiscals Motion for Reconsideration is also denied. Hence, this appeal by in the name of the People. ISSUES: 1. 2. HELD: 1. YES. The acquittal of Opulencia in the first charge (under a municipal ordinance) against him bars the filing of second charge (under RPC) even if these laws did NOT constitute of the same elements or same purpose. The second sentence of Article IV (22) (1972 Consti) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. [Note: What matters is the act, not the offense] YES. It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. WON the acquittal in the case for violation of the City Ordinance bars his prosecution for theft under the RPC? YES. WON Judge Relova is correct in quashing the 2nd information on the ground of double jeopardy? YES.

People vs Del Carmen - Bianca Deslate


PEOPLE vs DEL CARMEN 1. Defendants were prosecuted in the municipal court of manila for the crime of malicious mischief, for the destruction of the "Banguera" and Media Agua" of the house of Felix Verzosa: That on or about the 16th day of March, 1949, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, and actuated by feelings of hate and resentment towards one Felix Verzosa, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously remove and destroy the "Banguera" and "Media Agua" of the house of the latter at 406 G. Tuazon St., this City, valued at P150, to the damage and prejudice of the said Felix Verzosa in the aforesaid sum of P150, Philippine Currency. Municipal court dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to prove that the destruction of the property was inspired by resentment, rancor, or desire for revenge. 2. The same fiscal who filed the aforementioned information with the municipal court, then filed an information for coercion in the CFI of Manila for the crime of coercion, for preventing Felix Verzosa from leaving intact the "Banguera" and "Media Agua" of his house: That on or about the 16th day of March, 1949, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, without authority of law, and by means of violence, force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prevent one Felix Verzosa from leaving intact the "Banguera" and "Media Agua" of his house located at 406 G. Tuazon Street, in said City, and instead forcibly removed the same against his will and consent by means of crow-bars, hammers, and other tools and throwing them on the ground or otherwise violently depositing them elsewhere, thereby causing as a consequence damages in the total sum of P150, to the damage and prejudice of said Felix Verzosa in the aforementioned sum of P150, Philippine currency. Counsel for defendants filed a motion to quash the second information on grounds of double jeopardy and insufficiency of allegations. ISSUE: w/n the second complaint is barred by double jeopardy HELD: YES. While the offenses in each information are different, the act from which said offenses arise is the same: the act of removing and destroying the banguera and media agua of Felix Verzosa. To hold otherwise could lead to multiple prosecutions depending on the prosecuting officer's ability to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by an act or omission by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. For example, the crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin.

2.

People vs Yorac - Pat Domingo


People vs. Yorac [GR L-29270, 23 November 1971]
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En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Rodrigo Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical certificate issued in 10 April 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since 8 April 1968 up to the present time for head injury." Then came a plea of guilty by Yorac on 16 April 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor. He started serving his sentence forthwith. On 18 April 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information, this time in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging Yorac with frustrated murder arising from the same act against Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated 17 April 1968 issued by the same Dr. Zulueta. The later information for frustrated murder was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week from the former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was much more thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained. The lower court, presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no supervening fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash (filed on 10 June 1968) in an order of 21 June 1968. The People appealed. Whether the new medical findings warrant the filing of the new information against the accused, without violating the rule against double jeopardy. No. "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." A defendant in a criminal case should be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his future accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation.

There is likewise the observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit. As ruled in Melo vs. People, the rule of identity does not apply "when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent." Stated differently, if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes" on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." There is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. Herein, if the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on 17 January 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on 10 December 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. The new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on 10 December 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made. No supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason the general rule of double jeopardy should be applied.

Issue: -

Held: -

People vs Tan - Mcgyver Guildenstern Doria


People v. Dante Tan TIDBIT: Dante Tan is an Erap crony. As widely known in Phil business circles, the criminal cases filed against him were somehow related to the murder of Bubby Dacer. Ang sabi-sabi is Dacer refused to help Tan during the Belle Corp scandal (jai-alai kickbacks). That, or a big govt deal failed because of Dacer. Facts: two informations filed against Dante Tan for violation of Rule 36(a)-1, in relation to Sections 32(a)-1 and 56 of the Revised Securities Act (essentially, failure to file with SEC a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of Best World Resources Corp shares) he pleaded not guilty to both charges during arraignment At the RTC:
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While prosecution was scrambling to have all its evidence admitted by RTC, Tan filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and to admit the attached Demurrer to Evidence o Motion was granted by the RTC and the Demurrer was admitted (but not yet granted) o Prosecution opposed this Demurrer o RTC issued Order granting Tans Demurrer Petitioner filed for certiorari before CA At the CA: o certiorari was denied because according to CA, the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one of the merits and operates as an acquittal; hence, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy o prosecution filed MR but was denied Petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not apply in cases decided by the TC without jurisdiction and in violation of petitioners right to due process o

when the trial court acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (e.g. prosecution denied opportunity to present case or sham trial)

Contrary to petitioners contention, its right to due process was not violated. It was given ample opportunity to present its case. In fact, after the prosecution first attempted to make a formal offer of evidence, to which Tan filed an opposition, instead of filing a reply to such opposition, it filed a Motion to Withdraw Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-Open Presentation of Evidence. Even considering the fact that the RTC did not hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, after the prosecution filed motion to that effect, such act would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment (abeyance not mandated however) and not an error of jurisdiction.

Manantan vs CA - Jyrine Enteria


Manantan v CA January 29, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner George Manantan was found NOT GUILTY by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas. CA noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9 a.m. and 11 p.m. It found that petitioners act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136) and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioners act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.

Issue: w/n the CA erred in precluding the People from prosecuting its cases against Dante Tan NO Held: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits ,tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. Moreover, the elements of double jeopardy are present in this case. Elements of double jeopardy: 1. 2. 3. 4. the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction the court had jurisdiction the accused had been arraigned and pleaded the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his consent alternatively, w/n dismissal of a criminal action by Demurrer operates as an acquittal YES

ISSUES: (1) WON the CA placed him in double jeopardy in finding him liable for indemnity and damages when he was already acquitted by the RTC NO. What was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. In modifying the lower courts judgment, the appellate court did not modify
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Neither does this case fall under the (only) exception to the rule on double jeopardy. Exception to double jeopardy

the judgment of acquittal nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. (1) Acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (2) Acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is for the same act or omission. *Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. (2) WON petitioners acquittal extinguished his civil liability NO. The petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.

Salazar v People Callejo, J. FACTS: An information for estafa was filed against Salazar and co-accused Timario with RTC. Upon arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing. Petitioner gave a check worth P214,000, which was subsequently dishonoured After the prosecution rested its case, the prosecution filed for Demurer of Evidence particularly alleging the following: o (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; o (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; o (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The TC acquitted petitioner of the crime but order to remit the check as payment The petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent.

ISSUES: (1) WON the Civil Liability can still be appealed Held: Yes Ratio: The last paragraph of Section 2 (Rule 111) of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil ac9

Salazar vs People - John Raymund Fullecido

tion prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits. The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where o (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; o (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; o (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the criminal action. The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.

1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director or Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next of- kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. On November 2, 1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 informations of murder against the defendant and 25 policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman and in a re-investigation, the informations were amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of charges, the case was later transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC not due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. Before the arraignment, the witnesses of the prosecution recanted their statements while the seven (7) private complainants submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The cases were dismissed. It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice new affidavits of new witnesses which it began to investigate and to file with the RTC. The respondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition stating that Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure bans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the Court of Appeals denied. On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The defendant filed for determination of probable cause and an outright dismissal in the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be provisionally dismissed and the new cases as mere revivals. Under Section 8 rule 117 of RRCP of 2000, the cases were dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. RULING: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case should be dismissed. There is no question that the new rule can be given retroactive effect given article 22 of the RPC. There can be no ruling, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is need of proof to show the following facts: (1) provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused (2) whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party
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People vs Lacson - Dan Galang


People vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002 (From the internet) FACTS: Soon after the announcement on May 18, 1995 that the Kuratong Baleleng gang had been slain in a shootout with the police, two witnesses surfaced providing the testimony that the said slaying was a rub-out. On June 1,

(3) whether the two (2) year period to revive the case has already elapsed (4) whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 year period. The respondent expressed consent, however, the records do not reveal whether the notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double Jeopardy by the defendant was tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive with regards to the 2-year bar, if within or without. Because of this, both prosecution and defendant must be given ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the adduced evidence. PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003 FACTS: Before the court is the petitioners motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases a. Was express consent given by the respondent? b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims? Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal, 2) offended party notified, 3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally, 4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims. 2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice. Held: Motion granted PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for Reconsideration given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments. The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while Sec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. 2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
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Los Banos vs Pedro - Carlos S. Hernandez Jr.


The Supreme Court, in a recent case, had the occasion to differentiate motion to quash and provisional dismissal, two seemingly confusing processes in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the case of Los Banos vs Pedro (G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009) The Court said through Associate Justice Brion: a. Motion to Quash A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information.The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or information. The rules governing a motion to quash are found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows: (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. b. Provisional Dismissal On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states that: SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional

dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: 1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle of double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused. Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional. A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash
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is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain. A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash - the complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and the exception stated in Section 6. Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8. This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply. Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals: First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.

Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal. Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information. Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are present. Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the timebar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration. To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.

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