MAYNOOTH PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS ISSUE 4 (2007)

AnAnthologyofCurrentResearchfrom the DepartmentofPhilosophy,NUIMaynooth

IssueEditor: CyrilMcDonnell GeneralEditor: ThomasA.F.Kelly

D EDICATION
The Staff and Students of the Department of Philosophy wish to express heartfelt sadness at the death on 21st February 2008 of Professor Thomas Augustine Francis Kelly, Head of the Department of Philosophy at NUI Maynooth. All of us wish to extend our sincerest sympathies to his wife Marian, his mother Mary, and his extended family and friends.

This issue of Maynooth Philosophical Papers is dedicated to the memory of Thomas, the founder of this Anthology, a colleague, a friend, and a genuine advocate of all things philosophical and worthwhile. He will be sadly missed. May he rest in peace. Grsta Dha ar a anam.

ISBN

9780901519375

2007 TheDepartmentofPhilosophy,NationalUniversity of Ireland Maynooth,andtheIndividualAuthors

CONTENTS

Page ForewordbyProfessorThomasA.F.Kelly EditorsIntroduction i ii

F ACULTY

MichaelDunne:

ABeingtowardsDeath theVadomori

IanLeask:

FirstImpressionsReconsidered:SomeNotes on theLvinasianCritiqueofHusserl

17

Harry McCauley:

Red,RiotousandWrong:IstheSecondary Quality Analogyan UnpalatableDoctrine?

23

CyrilMcDonnell:

UnderstandingandAssessingHeideggersTopic inPhenomenologyinLightofHisAppropriation of DiltheysHermeneuticMannerofThinking

31

T RANSLATION

EdithStein:

MartinHeideggersExistentialPhilosophy Translation byMetteLebech

55

D OCTORAL C ANDIDATES

JohnHaydnGurmin: EdithSteinandTaniaSinger:AComparison of PhenomenologicalandNeurological ApproachestotheProblemofEmpathy

99

DeniseRyan:

JeandeLaRochellesFormulationofthe DistinctionbetweenBeingandEssence

123

F OREWORD

Iamdelighted,asProfessorofPhilosophy,tobeabletowritea forewordtothe currenteditionofMaynooth Philosophical Papers,which has beenedited byDr Cyril McDonnell. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks and warmest congratulationstoallthecontributors,bothfacultyanddoctoralcandidates.Todo thisisaverycongenialdutyforme,sinceMaynoothPhilosophicalPapersisone ofthewaysinwhichourDepartmentrenewsandextendsitsalreadyvitalresearch culture,andstimulatestheworkofouryounger,emergingscholars,aswellasthat ofourwellestablishedstaffmembers. ThepresentassemblyofessaysshowsthatPhilosophyisaliveandwellin NUIMaynooth.Thefinecontributionsofourdoctoralcandidatesalsoshowthat Philosophy is being passed on to a new and very worthy generation of philosophers. The diversity of the essays which form the present collection is witness to the plurivocity of the discipline as it is practised here. Each of them showsadepthofpenetrationandmasteryoftheirdisciplineofwhichtheirauthors can be very proud. I am delighted to see that Dr Mette Lebechs translation of Edith Steins work, never before translated into English, entitled Martin HeideggersExistentialPhilosophy,appearsforthefirsttimeinthisissue.Inmy viewthisrepresentsasignificantcontributionbothtoSteinandHeideggerstudies, andtothehistoryofexistentialandphenomenologicalphilosophy. IwouldfinallyalsoliketooffermycongratulationsandthankstoDrCyril McDonnell,forhisfinecontribution,forhisexcellenteditorshipandforhishard work.

ProfessorThomasA.F.Kelly, GeneralEditor,MaynoothPhilosophicalPapers, Head,DepartmentofPhilosophy, NUIMaynooth.

th 29 November,2007.

E DITOR S I NTRODUCTION

This is Issue No.4 (2007) of Maynooth Philosophical Papers, comprising on going work from both Faculty and postgraduate students in the Department of Philosophy at National University Ireland, Maynooth. Maynooth Philosophical PaperswasanideainitiatedandpromotedbyDrThomasKelly,who,Iamhappy to write, has been recently appointed Professor of Philosophy and Head of the DepartmentofPhilosophyatN.U.I.Maynooth.Studentsandstaffextendwarmest congratulationstoProfessorKelly,andwewishhimalltheverybestinhisnew positionandendeavours. Earlier inthe year,Tomasked me ifIwouldbe interestedineditingthis issue of Maynooth Philosophical Papers 2007, around the theme of ContemporaryPhilosophy,whichIwasdelightedtodoandgratefullyaccepted. Thankyouverymuch,Tom,forthatinvitation.Iamalsogenuinelyappreciative oftheresponsestothecallforpapersthatIreceivedfromstaffandpostgraduate studentsforthisedition. Submissions to Maynooth Philosophical Papers are reviewed anonymously and internationally. A very important and special thank you, therefore,isextendedtoeachoftherefereeswhogavegenerouslyoftheirtime, evaluations, suggestions and comments, which the contributors appreciated and benefitedinkind. Topics addressed in this issue straddle some of the main currents in contemporary philosophy, such as, for instance: existentialism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and analytic philosophy, in addition to topics in medieval philosophy which are of perennial relevance to contemporary philosophical debate. Also presented here for the first time is an English translation of Edith SteinsessayMartinHeideggersExistentialPhilosophybyDrMetteLebechof the Department of Philosophy at Maynooth. Steins original essay Martin HeideggersExistentialphilosophiewasfirstpublishedinGermanasanappendix inEdithStein,EndlichesundEwigesSein.VersucheinesAufstiegszumSinndes Seins (1950), but it was not part of the first edition of her collected works by Herderin1986,andso,nottranslatedbyKurtF.ReinhardtforFiniteandEternal Being(Washington:ICSPublications,1986).Itdoesappear,however,inthenew edition of Steins Gesamtausgabe, bd. 11/12 (Freiburg: Herder, 2006), pp. 445 500 and Mettes translation will feature in the reissue of Finite and Eternal Being(ICSP,forthcoming).Weare,therefore,deeplydelightedand indebtedto Mette(andtoFrSullivanspermissionofICSP)forinclusionofhertranslationin this edition of Maynooth Philosophical Papers 2007. Interestingly, themes toucheduponbySteininheressayarealsotoucheduponbyseveraloftheauthors ofthearticlesthatarepresentedandcollectedhere.ThusSteinsessay isa very fittinginclusioninthisissue. Finally,itremainsformetooffermysincerethankstoeachoftheauthors fortheircontributions.Thoughthewholeisgreaterthanthesumoftheparts,the partsareneeded.Thanks,therefore,tooneandall.

_______________________________

DrCyrilMcDonnell SeriesEditor

ii

ABeingtowardsDeath the Vadomori1

MichaelDunne

Introduction The artistic output of Damien Hirst, especially his most recent work, the jewel encrustedSkullmakessurethatNietzschesunbiddenguestremainssomewhat within Western consciousness, despite the best efforts of modernity to exorcise theprospectofmortality.Thethemeofdeathisofcoursewellinsertedwithinthe philosophical tradition. Plato writes in the Phaedo: The one aim of those who 2 practicephilosophyinthepropermanneristopracticefordyinganddeath, and 3 forSchopenhauerdeathistheinspirationforphilosophy. Muchoftheeffortsof the philosophers in the face of death has been to overcome the emotions associated with it, especially fear, terror, disgust. One thinks of the efforts of Epicurustofreehisfellowmanfromthefearsofdeathandofthepunishmentsof theafterlifethroughacalmacceptanceofultimatedissolutionatdeath.TheStoic insistencethatweshouldrememberthatweare mortal,the memento moriasan ethical rejoinder to the hedonism of carpe diem, reemerges in renaissance and early modern times. From the history of philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries two philosophical movements were particularly influential in associating the acceptance of finitude with authentic human existence, namely existentialism and phenomenology. The HeideggereanSein zum Tode alluded to in the title of this article in some ways represents a secularisation of the Kierkegaardean conception of death as the decisive moment in life, the dies natalis of the Christian. For both the reality of death as an immanent personal possibility forces one to become authentic, no longer to be merely content to enjoy the ride but to accept that it has a terminus. Where thought diverges is over the possibility of turning beingtowardsdeath into beingtowards transcendence.Deathforsomebecomestheclearestindicationoftheabsurdityof human existence, of the anguish of our dual consciousness (Camus) of our desirefordurationandourcertaintyoftermination.Itcanbetransmutedthrough jouissance and the excesses of postmodernism. Or, of course, for most of the westerntradition, itbecomestheturningpoint (,separation and judgment) whichopensuptothebeyond(). ThefusionbetweentheGreekandRomanphilosophicaltraditionandthat ofJudaeoChristianitygaverisetoaseriesof sustainedreflectionsonthe nature of the human condition. Christian soteriology, however, means that the Ancient tragic sense of life is overcome in a hopefilled vision of ultimate redemption, indeedtotheextentasseenintheEriugeniandoctrineofthereturnofeverything to God and so nothing will be lost. Many Christian authors saw themselves as continuingthephilosophicaltraditionandcompletingitinthesenseofproviding aseriesofdefinitiveanswerstothequestionswhichtroubledtheancients. I TheTwelfthCenturyBackground It might seem an extraordinary thing to state but it seems that Death was invented in the twelfth century, i.e., that particular Western idea, linked to 1

judgment and the afterlife, and which persists into modern times as a dominant 4 theme in Western culture. It seems that Death as an abstract entity, or anthropomorphic representation, is absent from the High Middle Ages. He (?) beginstotakeformfromthetwelfthcenturyonwardsandbecomesthecentreofa richartisticandliteraryproduction.Whythetwelfthcentury?Thesuggestion by some is that the emergence of a wealthy and comfortable middle class, rich in materialpossessions, meansan increasedorheightenedawarenessof how much there is to be lost through death. There is also a reaction to this increased hedonismandmaterialismonthepartofthemonkswhosechosenwayofliferuns counter to this new consumer society. There is the development of the contemptus mundi literature with its pitiless depiction of the misery and sordidnessofhumanlifeofthefinaljudgmentandthesufferingsofthedamned. Life isdepictedasanexistential dramawherethe individual ispresentedwith a fundamental choice between salvation or damnation. There is an acute phenomenological description of the stark choices which faces every free individualontheroadoflifeandwheretheultimateturningpointisthemoment ofdeath,amomentwhichissoimportantandyetunknown.Theimpetusforthese monasticwritersisasituationwhereifthereistoomuchloveoflifethatpeople needtoberemindedofdeath,thatEtinArcadiaego.Thesolutionisconversion, penitence and that distance from the world so beloved of Neoplatonism. On a morenegativeside,theobsessionwiththemacabrealreadymentionedbyPlatoin 5 the Republic where Leontius has a compulsion to look at corpses, emerges in vernacularliterature,sermonsandartisticdepictions.Onecouldalsomentionthe factthatthedeadthemselvesareoftenonshowtoremindthelivingofwhatthey will become, a spectacle which still fascinates today in the crypts of some CapuchinmonasteriesinItaly. In TwelfthCentury literature,one could mention the importance of texts such as the De contemptu mundi and that best seller the De miseria humane conditionis of Innocent III. There is the beginning of that long tradition of texts around the theme of the artes moriendi, of preparing for a good death (and familiartomanyIrishpeopleuptorecently,especiallyasrelatedtothepracticeof 6 theNineFirstFridays). AnimportantpoeminFrenchistheVersdelaMortof HlinantofFroidmontandcomposedbetween1194and1197andwhich isseen 7 asbeingoneofthesourcesofthatlatermedievaltraditionoftheDanceofDeath. Hlinantdevelopshisworkaroundthree themes:deathisnearathandtheneedto distance oneself from worldly goods mans destiny in the next life. As the openinglinesputit:
Morz,toisuelentcremirlisage: Orqueurtchascunsasondamage: Quinipuetavenirsirue. Porceaichangi moncorage Etailaissetgieuetrage: (ODeath,thosewhoarewisehavealwaysfearedyou Now,however,everyonerushestotheirdestruction Andiftheydonotmeetyouatthepass,yougalloptowardsthem. Forthisreason,Ichangedmyways Andleftbehindpleasureandmadness)

Unlikelaterauthors,Hlinantdoesnotindulgeinthemacabreheappealstothe 8 mind and the emotions of his reader/ hearer and not to fear or disgust. This,

rather, is something which comes to the fore with the experience of the Black Deathinthefourteenthcentury.Hlinantisalsoimportantsinceheisoneofthe candidates suggested for the authorship of the poem which is our concern here, theVadomori. II TheVadomori WhiledoingsomeresearchonthemanuscriptsoftheLecturaontheSentencesof RichardFitzRalphintheVaticanLibrary,Icameacrosssomeversesattheendof themanuscriptOttoboni679which isofEnglish originandwaswrittentowards the end of the fourteenth century. The verses came atthe end of the manuscript and together with some other lines of poetry or sayings which seemed to be jottingsbythescribeinordertofilluptheparchmentwhichwasleftblankwhen hehadfinishedcopyinghistext.Eachline(atleastinthefirstpartofthepoem) beginsandendswiththe statementVadomori(Iamgoingtodie)and hence the generic name for this type of poem which, while having its origins in the twelfth century, continued as a literary type up to the sixteenth century. The interestforthemedievalistliesinthefactthatthepoempresentsalistofvarious characterswhocomeforward,statewhotheyare,whattheirfunctioninlifewas, andthattheyaregoingtodie.Thuswe haveadepictionofthe varioustypes in medieval society and how they were viewed by a contemporary writer. Each personageisassignedaverseinwhichtheylamenttheirowndeathassomething whichisinevitableandbeforewhichtheyareimpotent,nomatterhowimportant they were in life. The repetition of the phrase vado mori is suggestive of a sombre litany, with funereal rhythms, characterised by melancholy and resignation. The Vado mori genre was very popular, existing in many versions and 9 surviving in over 50 manuscripts scattered throughout Europe. The surviving versionsalldifferintermsofthenumberofversesandthepersonalitieswhichare listed, reflecting contemporary changes in taste, politics, and social status and indeedhowmuchspaceascribewishedtofill!Allwouldseemtoderivefroma commonsourcewithversesbeingaddedtothepoemandchangedordeletedover thecourseoftime.Itisratherironicthatwehaveherearealdeathoftheauthorin the postmodern sense. With each stage of recommitting the textto parchment, the scribe feels empowered to adapt the poem to his own needs and without respectinganyauthorshiporownershipofthetext. Eachwritingofthetextisare reading and reinterpretation without any felt need to subscribe to a master narrative. AsIexaminedsomemoremanuscriptswhilecarryingoutresearchinthe BodleianLibraryatOxford,Idiscoveredsomeothertextsfromroughlythesame time (fourteenth century) and background (AngloFrench). This allowed me to establish the basis for a text which might have circulated at the time but which does not survive in any one manuscript. The possibility of such a text was strengthenedwhenIcameacrosstheeditionsofsimilartextsbyEleanorPrescott 10 Hammondandpublishedin1911. Thetextwhichisgivenbelow,itishoped,is closetotheoriginaltextwhichseemstodatefromthethirteenthcentury.Whatis clearfromthetextisthatitisrelativelyoptimisticand,unliketheDanceofDeath, doesnotseeDeathastriumphingrather,ultimatelyitisDeathwhomustdiesince 11 itisLifewhowinsintheend.PeterDronke wasoftheopinionthatthestyleof

the opening verses with their unusual internal rhyming would suggest a date before 1200. Helmut Rosenfeld tended to go for a later date of the thirteenth 12 century and pointed out that the origin of the expression Vado mori was undoubtedly French,jevaismourir.Indeed,aswill beseen below,oneofthe 13 linesappearsinFrench. 14 In the versions of the text which appear in the worksof Rosenfeld and 15 Don, onlythevadomoriversesappearwithouttheintroductorylines.Bothare relatively late versions. In the version printed below the Vado mori verses are counterbalanced by Vive Deo verses (in some manuscripts they are laid out in parallel columns). The opening lines or exordium begin with a statement of the anguish which arises at the thought of death for no matter what time it is, that momentcouldbeoneslast(vv.23).Theimpartialityofdeathisacknowledged, itsfunctionaslevellerbringingdownbothrichandpoorsinceallmustdie(vv. 49).Thevariouspersonsthenappearonstage,tostatewhotheyareandthento exit.Herewe have Papa(Pope)Rex(King)Presul(Prelate)Miles (Warrior) Monachus (Monk) Legista (Lawyer) Placitor (Advocate) Praedicator (Preacher) Logician (Logicus) Medicus (Doctor) Cantor (Singer) Sapiens (Intellectual) Dives (Rich man) Cultor (Country man) Burgensis (City man) Nauta (Sailor) Pincerna (Butler) Pauper (Poor man) Elemosinarius (Benefactor).Muchhasbeenmadeofthehierarchicalnatureofmedievalsociety and more written of its castelike structure riven with inequalities based upon birth.OnlytheChurch,itseems,offeredthepossibilityforapoormantoriseto the very top. It is rarely pointed out, however, that the structure of medieval societywhilebeinggenerallystaticandconservative(likemostsocieties)didnot havemuchbywayofareligiousjustification.Infact,themessageofChristianity was strongly egalitarian and favoured community of goods rather than private property.Inthisregard,religiouscommunitiesweremeanttoopposethesecular arrangementofsociety,thelatterbeingtemporalwhereasthelifeofthemonkwas seenasananticipationofaneternalsituation. Each reader will finds verses which amuse, strike a chord, or are memorable forone reason or another. The studentof philosophy might pause at thefateofthelogician:Alogician,IlearnedhowtodefeatothersDeathquickly defeated me. The intellectual (Sapiens) finds that his knowledge is of no use whenDeathturnshimintoafool(meredditfatuummorsseva).Theimageofthe cantorisaniceonewhereDeathplays himatune inadescendingscalesoh, fa, mi.

And the butler with a fondness for wine finds that death has served him up poison! In general, however, the tone, is not bitter or overcritical. The advice given to each character in the second section (Vive Deo) is hortative rather than condemnatoryandisultimatelyhopeful.

III Conclusion In the medical school of Salerno, verses were also used in order to help future doctors remember their schooling. However, the author of the verses had to conclude that no matter how much medical learning one had, there was no cure fordeath:Contravimmortis,nonestmedicameninhortis.InourtexttheMedicus canfindnocureandinsteadvomitsupthemedicinewhichhisdoctorsprescribe. In the second section we find that the Medicus is advised one cannot ultimately relyuponmedicalscience(fallaxestarsmedicine).Thehopesofmanythenand nowhavealwaysbeenthatmedicalsciencemightultimatelyprolongourlivesso astoultimatelyexcludedeath.Clearlywehavenotreachedthatpointandevenif wehadthereisnothingtoguaranteethatwemightnotbecomesuchaproblemto ourselves that death might still be chosen by some over living. The challenge remains to integrate the realisation of our radical finitude into our lives, to no longertakelifeforgranted.Ifphilosophyistobeareflectiononlife,thenitmust alsobeareflectionondeathandperhapsevensomesortofguideasweallmake ourwaytothatitertenebrosum.

NOTES
1

IwishtothankProf.PietroB.RossiforhishelpinsourcingsomematerialsinItalianandtoProf. JamesMcEvoywhoreadtheLatintextandmadesomehelpfulsuggestions.Thanksareduealso to Prof. Peter Dronke who provided some very useful information as well as suggesting the arrangementoftheopeninglinesofthepoem. 2 Phaedo 64A.. 3 DieWeltalsWilleundVorstellung,I,54II,c.4. 4 SeeCarloDon,HlinantdeFroidmont,IVersidellaMorte(Parma:PraticheEditrici,1988),p. 7.See,also,theclassicworkbyPhillipeAris,Lhommedevantla mort (Paris: duSeuil,1977). 5 Republic,IV:440a:IonceheardsomethingthatItrust.Leontius,thesonofAglaion,wasgoing upforthePiraeusundertheoutsideoftheNorthWallwhenhe noticedcorpseslyingbythepublic executioner. He desired to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and made himself turn awayandforawhilehestruggledandcoveredhisface.Butfinally,overpoweredbythe desire,he openedhiseyeswide,rantowardsthecorpses,andsaid:Look,youdamnedwretches,takeyour fillofthefairsight. 6 See Mary Catherine OConnor, The Art of Dying Well: the Development of the Ars Moriendi (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1942). 7 See Helmut Rosenfeld, Die mittelalterliche Totentanz, Entstehung, Entwicklung, Bedeutung (CologneGraz,1968).Anexcellentwebsiteandsourceformaterialsonthisandrelatedmatters istobefoundat<http://www.totentanzonline.de/totentanz.php> [accessed9September2007]. 8 Thisisalsoapparentfromhisdispassionatetreatmentoftheinelectuabilityofdeathfromwhat he writes in his De cognitione sui: Clamat nobis certissima mors, et hora mortis incertissima, mortem semper ad omnium pendere oculos, et ideo semper habendam ab omnibus prae oculis, semperquemeditandam,sicutscriptumestinEcclesiastico [7:36]:Memorarenovissimatuaetin aeternum non peccabis (PL 212, col 730) with the novissima being death, judgment, hell or heaven. 9 See Hans Walther, Initia carminum ac versuum medii aevi posterioris Latinorum, 2nd edn (Gttingen: Vandenhoech&Ruprecht, 1969).

10 11

E.P.Hammond,LatinTextsoftheDanceofDeath, ModernPhilology,8(1911),399410. Inalettertome,dated21.12.03. 12 Helmut Rosenfeld, Vadomori, Zeitschrift fr Deutsches Altertum, 124 (1995), 257264 (p. 257): Zu den verbreitetsten Vergnglichkeitsdichtungen des Mittelalters gehrendie latinischen VadomoriGedichten. Sie sind seit dem 13. Jahrhundert in ganz Europa anzutreffen und in zahllosen Sammelhandschriften berliefert, vielfach dabei variiert im Bestand und in der AnordnungderVerse,undsiewurdenindenVolkssprachenangeeignet. 13 WeshouldrememberthattheFrenchspeakingworldatthetimeincludestheNormannobility of England, Wales, Ireland, Southern Italy and Sicily. The placitor hundredis et comitatu mentionedinconnectionwiththephraseinFrenchisanadvocatewithintheAngloNormanlegal systemoftheShires. 14 HelmutRosenfeld,DasAberaltaicherVadomoriGedichtvon1446undPetervonRosenheim, MittellateinischesJahrbuch,2(1965),190204theLatintextistobefoundonpp.195198,and hasaconsiderablyamplifiednumberofpersonages. 15 SeeCarloDon,HlinantdeFroidmont,IVersidellaMorte(Parma:PraticheEditrici,1988), Appendice 1, pp. 102113. This version is completely different from our text except for three verses,Rex, Miles, Medicus andLogicuswhichareidentical.

1 Vadomori

C= StJohnsCollege,Cambridge,E6(109),(XV)ff.39v40v 1 O = StJohnsCollege,Oxford,58(XV),f.1(92v)
2 O = Oxford,Bodleian423,f.354v(mutilated)

V= Vaticana,Ottoboni679,ff.206rb206vb

Editions:
1 B = VadoMori,BritishLibrary,Landsdown397(editedbyEleanor PrescottHammond,1911) 2 B = Lamentatio,BritishLibrary,Royal8BVI(editedbyEleanor PrescottHammond,1911)

<Lamentatiomorituri>
2 Dummortemrecolo crescitmichicausadoloris, 3 Namcunctishoris morsveniteccecito . 4 5 Equalege rapit morsmagnosatquepusillos, 6 7 Nunchosnuncillos precipitandocapit .

Pauperisetregiscommunislexmoriendi,
8 Datcausam flendi sibenescriptalegis.

Gustatopomonullustransitsinemorte,
9 Heumiserasorte labituromnishomo!

VadomoriPapaqui iussuregnasubegi, Morsmichiregnatulitheccine:vadomori. Vadomorirexsum.Quidhonor?Quidgloriaregni? Estviamorshominisregia:vadomori. Vadomoripresul cleripopuliquelucerna,

10 Quifueramvalidus,langueo :vadomori.

Vadomorimilescertaminevictor belli11, Mortemnondidicivincere:vadomori.

12 Vadomorimonachusmundimoriturus amori, 13 14 15 Vt moriaturamordic michi:vade mori. 16 Vadomorilegistafuidefensoregenis , 17 Causidicuscausasdesero :vadomori.

Vadomoriplacitorhundredisetcomitatu,
a 18 (Tor t)eforceorfaut, langueo:vadomori.

Vadomoripopuloverbumvitepredicare
19 Quisolitusfueram,langueo:vadomori. 20 Vadomorilogicus aliisconcluderenoui,

Conclusitbrevitermorsmichi:vadomori.
21 Vadomorimedicusmedicaminenonredimendus , 22 23 24 Quicquidagantmedici respuo :vadomori. 25 26 Vadomoricantorfrangens que notasmodulando, 27 28 Ffrangit morsmodulossolfami:vadomori . 29 Vadomorisapiensmichinilsapientiaprodest , 30 Meredditfatuummorsseva:vadomori . 31 Vadomoridiuesadquidmichicopiarerum ? 32 Cummortemnequeat pellere:vadomori. 33 Vadomoricultorcollegifarrisacervos 34 Quosegoprovilicomputo :vadomori.

Vadomoriburgensiseram censumcumulaui,
35 Omnia morsadimitimpia:vadomori. 36 Vadomorinautafluctussulcans remigando,

37 Morsprorampertransitnauifrago :vadomori. 38 Vadomoripincerna fuitvinummichidulce, 39 40 Propinatmichimorsfellea :vadomori . 41 VadomoripauperproChristocunctarelinquens , 42 43 Huncsequar evitansomnia:vadomori .

Vadomoripietatepotensbenefactoregenis, Hocmorsnonresecathacdote: vadomori.

44 Nullimorspartisconcludenssingulafine , 45 OmniatransibuntpreteramareDeum.

46 Responsiovite

Morsgenusomneteritsequitursedvitafutura,
47 Celicafuturanuncsibifiniserit .

48 49 50 Contenduntmutuo sibi morsetvitaduello , 51 Istasuobelloseparatillasuo . 52 Morsvitamresecat sternitprotemporefortem,

Settandemmortem vitaprobatasecat. Adcertameneo litisliscertatamori,

53 Dicisvadomori consulo viveDeo

ViveDeopapanuncmammonasitdeapape, Desinepapadeevivere:viveDeo. ViveDeoperquemrexesrenullaadorna, Rexrege,RexDeusest, rexhomo:viveDeo. ViveDeopresulcuiusvicestasinhonore,

54 55 Fforma gregi datusesstabene:viveDeo.

ViveDeomilespacempatriamquetuere,
56 Fforcior infidei robore:viveDeo. 57 ViveDeomonachusquidvoverisipsememento ,

Christocommoriensincruce:viveDeo. ViveDeolegistaDeilexveraprobatur, Netelexperdatperdita:viveDeo.

58 ViveDeoplacitoriustassustentaquerelas ,

Muneraquececantrespue:viveDeo. ViveDeopredicansquiviveretudocuisti, Cunctaquepeccataspernere:viveDeo. ViveDeologicepremissasfactibivite, Neconclusatibi sitvia:viveDeo. ViveDeomedicefallaxestarsmedicine, EstmedicinaDeusoptima:viveDeo. ViveDeocantorsitvoxbeneconsonalaudi,

59 Mensbeneconcordetsic bene:viveDeo.

ViveDeosapiensquesursumsuntsapiendo,
60 Desipit hicmundustusape:viveDeo.

ViveDeodivesopibussimuletpietate,
61 Pauperegetferopem,dasibi :viveDeo.

ViveDeocultormanusutilitercolatagrum, ReligioneDeimenspia:viveDeo. ViveDeoseuburgensisseuciviusinurbe,

62 Vtsis vivaDei mansio:viveDeo. 63 ViveDeonautaquia multosobruitunda, 64 Fforsan eritsubitamorstua: viveDeo. 65 ViveDeopincernaDei suntpocula vina, 66 Ffons viuusDeusesthuncbibe:viveDeo

ViveDeopauper tamrequammentebeata,
67 68 Niluthabens ethabens omnia:viveDeo.

ViveDeocarusrapiarisineiusamorem,
69 TotaferinDomini viscera:viveDeo.

ViveDeobeneviviseisivivisamori, Nonpotesante Deum viverepretereum.

T HE L AMENT

OF

O NE W HO I S T O D IE70

WhenIthinkaboutdeath,areasonforsorrowgrowswithinme Foratalltimesofthedaylookhowquicklydeathcomes! Withimpartialitydeathsiezesthegreatandsmall Hurryingtograbnowthese,nowthose. Acommonlawofdyingappliestothekingandpauper Suchawellwrittenlawgivescausefortears. Oncetheapplewaseaten,noonepassesonwithoutdeath Alaswhatamiserableendtoucheseveryman! Pope Iamgoingtodie,thePopewhosubduedkingswithacommand Arenotthesethenthekingdomsthatdeathtakesfromme? Vadomori.

10

King Iamgoingtodie,IamtheKing,whatanhonourandglorytothekingdom Deathistheroyalroadforhumankind. Vadomori. Bishop Iamgoingtodie,aBishop,thelampfortheclergyandpeople Iwhowasstrongnowamweak. Vadomori. Knight Iamgoingtodie,IamaKnight,inconflictthewinnerofthewar IwasnotabletodenyvictorytoDeath. Vadomori. Monk Iamgoingtodie,Iamamonk,onedeadtoloveofthisworld Sothatthislovemaydie,saytome,youwilldie. Lawyer Iamgoingtodie,alawyer,Iwasadefenderofthepoor Anadvocate,Ihavelostmycase. Vadomori. Magistrate Iamgoingtodie,amagistrateatthecountycourt AuthorityandforcenowfailmeandIamweak. Vadomori. Preacher Iamgoingtodie,Iwhopreachedthewordoflifetothepeople Iwhowassolidnowamweak. Vadomori. Logician Iamgoingtodie,aLogicianIknewhowtosilenceothers Deathhasquicklysilencedme. Vadomori. Doctor Iamgoingtodie,aDoctorwhoisnotsavedbymedicine WhateverthedoctorsprepareIthrowitup. Vadomori. Cantor Iamgoingtodie,aCantorwhoshortenednotesandmadetunes Deathshortensmytune,soh,fa,mi. Vadomori. Intellectual Iamgoingtodie,anIntellectual,myknowledgeisnogoodtome UncouthDeathmakesafoolofme. Vadomori.

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RichMan Iamgoingtodie,aRichMan,whatgoodarerichestomenow? Deathisimpossibletodefeat. Vadomori. Farmer Iamgoingtodie,aFarmerIgatheredtogetherheapsofwheat NowIregardthiswithcontempt. Vadomori. Burgess Iamgoingtodie,aBurgessIcollectedtaxes MercilessDeathcarriesoffeverything. Vadomori. Sailor Iamgoingtodie,aSailorsailingoverthewavesbyrowing Deathholesthehull,sinkingtheship. Vadomori. Butler Iamgoingtodie,aButler,winewassweettome NowDeathservesmepoison. Vadomori. Pauper Iamgoingtodie,aPauper,IlefteverythingbehindforChrist Followhim,avoidingall. Vadomori. Benefactor Iamgoingtodie,frommercyarichBenefactoroftheneedy ThisendowmentDeathdoesnotdivideup. Vadomori.

Withoutapart ofitsown,Death finisheseachpartin theend EverythingwillpassawaybesideslovingGod.

T HE R ESPON SE
Death terrifiesallbutinafuturelife Aheavenlylife,therewillbeanendtoDeath.

OF

L IFE

DeathandLifefacedeachotherinawarbetweenthem Oneinbattletheequaloftheother. DeathhaltedLifeandthrewittotheground 12

ButLife,havingbeentested,woundedDeath. Theoutcomeofthestrugglewasfoundinfavouroflove. YousayVadomori,IsaytoyouViveDeo.

Pope LiveinGod, Pope towhomwealthisgod Ifyouwanttolive,leavewealthbehind,ViveDeo. King LiveinGod,hethroughwhomyouareKing,withoutriches IsKingtoaking,GodtheKingismantheking,ViveDeo. Bishop LiveinGod, Bishopinwhoseplaceyoustandinhonour Youaregivenasanexampletoyourflock,standwell,ViveDeo. Knight LiveinGod,Knight,protectpeaceandyourcountry Strongintheassuranceofyourfaith,ViveDeo. Monk LiveinGod,Monk,whatyouvowedremember WithChristhangingonthecross,ViveDeo. Lawyer LiveinGod,Lawyer,thelawofGodisprovedthetruelaw Donotletthesinfullawcondemnyou,ViveDeo. Judge LiveinGod,Judge,byfindingforthejustcauses Spitoutthebribeswhichblind,ViveDeo. Preacher LiveinGod,youwhobypreachinghavetaughttolive Bydespisingallsins,ViveDeo. Logician LiveinGod,Logician,makeforyourselfthepremisesoflife Lestthewaybeconcludedforyou,ViveDeo. Doctor LiveinGod,Doctor,medicalskill isfallible Godisthebestmedicine,ViveDeo. 13

Cantor LiveinGod,Cantor,letyourvoicebeharmoniouswithpraise Andsoyourmindwillalsobewelltuned,ViveDeo. Intellectual LiveinGod,Intellectual,itisthethingsabovewhichshouldbeknown Knowthatthisworlddeceives,ViveDeo. RichMan LiveinGod,RichMan,bothgoodsandmercy, Thepoormanneeds,helphim,ViveDeo. Farmer LiveinGod,Farmer,thehandusefullycultivatesafield ApiousmindthereligionofGod, ViveDeo. Burgess LiveinGod,beyouaburgessoracitizeninthetown SothatyouwillbethelivingdwellingofGod,ViveDeo. Sailor LiveinGod,Sailor,sincethewavessinkmanyships Itmaybeyourdeathwillbesoon,ViveDeo. Butler LiveinGod,Butler,thewinesacksareGods Godisthelivingspring,drinkthis,ViveDeo. Pauper LiveinGod,Pauper,blessedingoodsandmind Whilehavingnothing,youhaveeverything,ViveDeo. Benefactor LiveinGod, DearFriend,becaughtupinhislove ConfideeverythingtothedepthsofGod, ViveDeo.

LiveinGod,youliveinhimifyouliveinlove YoucannotlivebeforeGodwithoutlove,ViveDeo.

14

NotaistosversusprooptimismorsCConclusiomortisproomnigenerehominumdicensVado 2 moriO 2 2 1 recoloB :meditorB 3 1 2 1 Dummortem eccecito:om.CO V O cito:citorB 4 Thetermaequelege(withimpartiality)istobefoundinHorace,OdesIII,1whichalsodeals withthesubjectofdeath. 5 2 rapit:capitB 6 Nunchosaccepitnuncillos,Virgil Aeneid VI,313316,referringtoCharon. 7 2 capit:rapitB 8 2 causam:eamB 9 1 2 sorteCO VmorteO 10 1 langueoCO :langueV 11 1 :certaminevictorbelliC: bellicertaminevictorO V 12 moriturus codd.recte mortuus? 13 1 Vt:O :EtC 14 1 2 dicO V:hicCO 15 1 2 vadeO V:vadoCO 16 1 2 egenisCO VegenusO 17 2 2 1 desero B O :defero CO V 18 2 lineisleftasalacunainVtmriaetfortitudonuncdeficientlangueovadomoriinmarg.B perhapsthisisalegaltermorcommonexpression,giventhatFrenchwasthelanguageusedinthe lawcourts. 19 1 2 Vadomoriplacitor Quisolitusfueramlangueovadomori om.O O 20 1 2 logicusCO VO placestheversesonmedicushereandthelogicusfollows. 21 1 2 redimendusCO VrevolandusO 22 1 medici:mediO 23 2 respuo:reppuoB 24 1 B breaksatthis 25 2 1 frangensB O :fuagensCV: 26 2 queom. B 27 frangitO: FfuagitCV 28 2 Ffrangitmorsmodulandosolfami:Inlacrimasmutocantica:B Vadomoricantor...vado 1 1 2 mori om.B O O 29 1 2 michinilsapientiaprodestCO VdoctornunccessodocereO 30 1 2 MeredditfatuummorsseuavadomoriCO VQuifacunduseramnonorovadomoriO 31 2 AtthispointalargetearbeginsinO ,leavingonly someofthetexttotherightoftheline. 32 1 1 2 2 nequeat B O V:nequiatO nequeantB 33 1 2 acervosCO V:acervosO 34 2 computo:deputoB 35 1 omniaV:diuinaCdimuaO 36 2 sulcans:fulcansB 37 2 Morsprorampertransit nauifrago:MorsproramperimitnaufragaB avariantinthemarginof B2reads: Vadomorinautafluctusquifulcomarinos Naufragoraufereturanchoravadomori SeeE.P.Hammond,LatinTextsoftheDanceofDeath,ModernPhilology,8(1911),399410 (p.8). 38 Pincerna(butler) 39 2 fuitmichi...fellea:fuipotummichifellis,HoraproponandivltimaB fellea:folleaV 40 1 2 Vadomoriburgensis...Propinatmichimorsfelleavadomoriom.B CO 41 1 2 proChristocunctareliquensO V:quempauperChristusamauitCChristuspauperamauitO . 2 InO themanuscripthasbeenmutilatedandwhatremainsofthelinesisasfollows: ndtunisifimus mutarenequimus mundototusadheres asolusheres imosepelitur tadatur homosicadnichilatur

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dumstareputatur etmichicausadoloris veniteccecito. 42 sequar:sequorC 43 1 B endshere 44 Vadomoripietate...singulafineChas: Temale Quisubitorapuitissemori 45 Text ends here in C and there then follows a letter which ends on 40v: Explicit vna epistola vniusItaliciadalterum 46 1 ResponsioviteVom.O 47 2 1 1 2 Mors erit B om. B CO O V. The editor of B2 arranged the text so that the vado mori coupletisfollowedimmediatelybythevivedeocouplet. 48 2 mutuo:varioB 49 1 sibiO :igiturV 50 A reference to the Easter sequence Victimae Paschali Laudes: Mors et vita duello conflixere mirandoDuxVitaemortuus,Regnatvivus. 51 2 Istasuobello separatillasuo:illasuobelloseparatistapiosuoB 52 resecat: rececatV 53 1 consulo O : consule V 54 1 fforma:formaO 55 1Pet5:3Formafacti gregiexanimo 56 1 Fforcior:ForciorO 57 Vive Deo monachus quid voveris ipse memento: Vive deo monache: quodque anueris ipse 2 mementoB . 58 2 ViveDeoplacitor iustassustentaquerelas:Vivedeorethor?iustassustollequerelasB 59 2 sic:sitB 60 decipitV 61 2 sibi:tuaB 62 1 sisO :sitV 63 2 quia:queB 64 1 Fforsan:forsanO 65 1 poculaO :poclaV 66 1 ffonsV:fonsO 67 2 habens:heusB 68 2 habens:heusB 69 2 donumB 70 ThisrenderingintoEnglishisneitherfairnorfaithfulbutismerelyintendedtogiveanideaof thecontentoftheLatinoriginal.

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FirstImpressionsReconsidered:SomeNotesonthe LvinasianCritiqueofHusserl
IanLeask

ABSTRACT This article investigates an intriguing ambivalence in Lvinass reading(s) of Husserls phenomenologyofinternaltimeconsciousness.Thearticlefocusesonthespecifictreatmentofthe Husserlian protoimpression, suggesting that one (underappreciated) aspect of Lvinass approachmayservetoundermine,orevenunsay,itsbetterknowncounterpart.

Introduction Given that Lvinas would eventually declare the deformalization of temporal 1 representation to be the essential theme of his research, it is hardly surprising thattheHusserliananalysisoftimeconsciousnessshouldhavereceivedconsistent critical scrutiny throughout Lvinass oeuvre. To be sure, there is a more prominentfocusupon(andexplicitoppositionto)Heideggerianfinitudebutsuch focus itself seems to presuppose a regular critique of Husserl, particularly his stressonpresenceandrepresentation,inordertoindicateamoregeneralfaultline in so much of the established phenomenological approach to temporality and temporalization. In the notes that follow, I shall outline something of the nature of Lvinass critique in part, by showing something of the phenomenological alternative that he tries to offer. However, by focussing upon Lvinass own, differingtreatment(s)oftheHusserliananalysisofprotoimpression,Ishallalso investigate the possibility of a radically different assessment of Husserlian temporal analysis an assessment which may well beg fundamental questions about the aforementioned Lvinasian alternative. My main concern, I should stress, is more with Lvinass critical understanding than with the fine detail of the object of that understanding: what follows, therefore, is intended as an engagementwithLvinassengagementwithHusserl,ratherthananengagement withHusserl perse. I LvinasonHusserlonTemporality Understandably, Lvinass principal contentions regarding temporality and temporalizationhavebeenmainlyunderstoodintermsofhistrenchantopposition to Heidegger: as the title of Lvinass first magnum opus already indicates, finitude should never be taken as the ultimate horizon which Heidegger himself took it to be and, as has become so well known, Lvinas will contend that the immediate overflow of the Others face suggests a kind of structural measurelessness that is, at the very least, comparable with the Cartesian idea of infinity(wherebyanyideathattheknowingmindmightformisalwaysexceeded by the ideatum of such an idea). Furthermore, beyond the specific question of 17

infinity,Lvinaswoulddevotesomuchofhislaterwork,inparticular,toacertain deconstructionoftheHeideggerianekstases,depictingthemasa(literally)self centred making present or homogenisation of temporal excess: for Lvinas, Heidegger consistently fails to respect the sheer alterity of time (principally by failing to address the question of generation, or generations, which it entails). Overall,forLvinas,theHeideggeriantreatmentoftemporalityisleftstuntedby 2 itsfixationupon Daseinsfinitude. But what, specifically, of Husserl? Lvinass general comments (on the tendency, within phenomenology, towards a will to presence) may be directed mainly towards Heidegger nonetheless, it seems that the critique of Heidegger presupposes, as a kind of armature,the critique of Husserl. More specifically, it seems that the ontological imperialism which Lvinas condemns in Heidegger canalreadybefound,allegedly,inHusserlianphenomenology.Thus,forLvinas, Heideggers(antiethical)concernwithBeingseems,atleastinpart,tobethefull manifestation of certain Husserlian propensities: authentic, carefull Dasein, concerned with the SelfConstancy of anticipatory resoluteness, is (so it seems) merelythedramatic,existential,intensification(andcertainlynotthecontrary)of the monadic egopole that Husserl understands as intentional consciousness. WhichiswhyLvinasregularlyconjoinstheconcernwithBeingandtheconcern with cognition:whetherontologicalorepistemological, so muchoftheprevious phenomenologicaltraditionhasfailedtodojusticetoalterity. Husserlian intentionality, we are told, is almost archetypal in its privilegingoftheknowinggaze.Thus:
[Husserlian]Intelligibility,characterizedbyclarity(claret),isatotaladequationof thethinkerwithwhatisthought,intheprecisesenseofamasteryexercisedbythe thinker upon what is thought in which the objects resistance as an exterior being vanishes. This mastery is total and [] is accomplished as a giving of meaning (sens): the object of representation is reducible to noemata. The intelligible is preciselywhatisentirelyreducibletonoemata[].Clarityisthedisappearanceof 3 whatcouldshock(heurter).

Noesis always seeks to overcome alterity (including sensation) consciousness of always seeks to become the foundation of what shows itself and so phenomenological horizon comes to play a role equivalent to the concept in 4 classical idealism. With Husserl, it seems that reflection and thematization alwayswanttowinout. Above all, though, it is the Husserlian concern with representation (or, more specifically: representation) that betrays a kind of inner truth of phenomenology and which returns us to the specific issue(s) of temporality (and temporalization). For just as Heideggerian ekstases are found wanting, so theirHusserlianfoundationisexposed,supposedly,asavolitionaldrivealways to render temporal disparity present within a simultaneousness, or conjunction broughtaboutby mygrasp.Bydiscovering(orrediscovering)presenceasthe workofconsciousness,Lvinassuggests,theHusserlianegoreducesfatefully 5 the time of consciousness to the consciousness of time. The primordial 6 intrigueoftime isdismissed,oratleastsubordinated,bytheimpositionofare presentational frame: past and future become merely retained or anticipated 7 presents intentionalconsciousnessmaintainscontrolintermsofthepresent Husserlianrepresentationassertsitsownstatusbypositingapurepresentwithout 8 eventangentialtieswithtime.

18

ForLvinas,then,Husserlianrepresentationseeksnevertobepreceded.It anticipates all surprises. It is not marked by the past but utilizes it as a 9 represented and objective element. It denies its own enduring, its temporal succession,byconvertingexteriorityintoitsnoemata,therebyreducingalterityto the work of meaningbestowing thought. (Such is the work, Lvinas declares, 10 oftheHusserlianpoch. )Alltold,theHusserliananalysisassumesthattime has exhausted itself (spuisait) in its way of making itself known or of 11 conformingtothedemands(exigences)ofitsmanifestation. Hence:
The constitution of time in Husserl is also a constitution of time in terms of an already effective consciousness of presence in its disappearance and in its retention, its immanence, and its anticipation disappearance and immanence that already imply what is to be established, without any indication being given about the privileged empirical situation to which those modes of disappearance in 12 thepastandimminenceinthefuturewouldbeattached.

The Husserlian thinking of time is, it seems, essentially as one with its Heideggeriansuccessor.In both,thealterityoftime is forced intoaProcrustean containment future and past are never acknowledged on their own terms. Against both, Lvinas wants to highlight an alterity irreducible to any noetico noematic correlation a lapse of time that does not return, a diachrony 13 refractory to all synchronization. By thinking otherwise, Lvinas claims, he might undo representation and unveil a temporalization which is not mine and which exceeds my now: a future which can never be anticipated, and a past whichwasneverpresent.

II LvinasonHusserlonProtoImpression WefindsomeofLvinassmostconcentratedattentiontoHusserliantemporality attention which seems, initially, to unveil the founding structure of the Heideggerianekstasesintheanalysisheprovides,in OtherwisethanBeing,of the absolute primal streaming, the realm of the protoimpression (or primal 14 impression), which Husserl takes to be the basis of conscious life itself. Needless to say, this apparent selftemporalizing of the acts of consciousness is regarded with deep suspicion: although such a primal realm might seem beyond objectification, beyond intentionality, and beyond (or beneath) selfcoincidence, itstruestatus,Lvinasmaintains,ismoretodowithguaranteeingtheprestigeof autarchicconsciousness. ForLvinas,itisnotjustthattheprimalimpressionis[]notimpressed 15 withoutconsciousness apointwhichmightsuggestadistinctionbetweenthe intrinsicnatureofprimalimpressionandthesecondaryroleofconsciousness.It is also, and more significantly, that the intrinsic nature of primal impression is itself confirmation of the hegemony of presence as Lvinas would have it here, it is the absolute source and beginning of all temporal modification, the spontaneouscentrewhichisindifferent toprotentionandretention. As such, primal streaming becomes, fatefully, the prototype of 16 theoretical objectification it is as if the primacy of presence is already confirmed by this notion of origin and creation. (Protoimpression precedes all else even its own possibility. Its presence is pure.) The primal impression

19

mightseem,initially,tobebeyondintentionalitybutitisalwaysfittedback 17 in the normal order and is never on the hither side of the same or of the 18 origin. Accordingly,thenonintentionalityoftheprimalretentionisnotaloss 19 ofconsciousness fornothingcanbeproducedinaclandestineway(ltre 20 clandestinement), (n)othing enters incognito into the Same, nothing can 21 break the thread of consciousness. The (negative) significance of Husserls analysis of internal time consciousness could hardly be greater, therefore: for Lvinas, the Husserlian interpretation of protoimpression is (nothing less than) themostremarkablepointofaphilosophyinwhichintentionalityconstitutes 22 theuniverse. ButjusthowvalidisLvinasscontention,inOtherwisethanBeing,about this remarkable point in Husserlian thought? Is it the case that originary impressionconfirmsandsanctifiesthedomainoftheSameandhencethatit excludes the diachronic? Is the Husserlian analysis nothing more than the suppressionoftemporalalterity?Istheprimalimpressiontobeunderstoodsolely intermsofautonomy?Inattemptingtoanswerthesequestions,oneofthemost instructive texts we can consult is another penetrating, although very different, reading of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness one which 23 Lvinashimselfgivesus.For,inhis1965essayIntentionalityandSensation, Lvinas reads Husserlian absolute streaming in a way that may not quite contradict his more standard approach, but which certainly throws into question 24 someofthecentralcontentionsjustexamined. The1965workisdesignedasageneral(althoughintensive)surveyofthe significance of intentionalitys corporeal basis and, not surprisingly, given this context, the issue of the protoimpression is at the centre of Lvinass treatment.However,here,unlikeinOtherwisethanBeing,hewantstostressthat the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, overall, is in no sense the deduction or construction of time starting out from an atemporal gaze (dun 25 regardintemporal)embracingtheprotoimpressionanditspalemodifications. On the contrary, Husserl finds the protoimpression pure of all ideality, 26 nonidealityparexcellence tobemorelikeakindofimmanentdisjunction withinconsciousness.(As healsoputsthis:Anaccentuated,living,absolutely new instant the protoimpression already deviates from that needlepoint 27 (pointedaiguille)whereitmatures(mrit)absolutely present. ) The protoimpression is, fundamentally, noncoincidence, presenting itself only in terms of its own departure or deviation from the present. Its very structure is divergence so that the protoimpression in itself is always already beyond itself, always already the event of dephasing. The proto impression is not in sequence it is more a transgression of continuity, a fundamental lapse. Meanwhile (if this is not too inappropriate a term), the protentionandretentionwhichattachtoanyprotoimpressionalinstantarenever adequate to, and are overflowed by, sensational flux: adequation, presence and 28 recuperation are defeated, so to speak. There is a kind of constitutive gap, Lvinas finds, between sensationevent and protoimpression: the former both precedes and succeeds the latter this, in turn, seems to found the diachrony 29 stronger(plusforte)thanstructuralsynchronism thatLvinas findsatthecore ofHusserlianembodiment. Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly of all, Lvinass reading of genesis and origin here seems (again, contra the reading in Otherwise than Being) to undermine rather than bolster the autonomy of the subject: absolute

20

primal streaming can certainly be seen as source, beginning, or creation, as genesis spontanea yet, far from this confirming the primacy of presence and theoretical objectification, what arises in this origin only serves to confirm alterity, the unpresentable. There is, Lvinas insists, unforeseeable novelty arisingwithinthisoriginanyfulfilmentisbeyondallconjecture,allexpectation, all germination, and all continuity, and consequently is wholly passivity (toute 30 passivit),receptivityofanotherpenetratingthesame. (This,inturn,shows the essence of all thought as the reserve of a fullness that escapes (dune 31 plenitude qui chappe). ) Alterity is at the core of the selfs temporalization: deep within immanence, within apparently indistinct sedimentation and thick 32 alluvium, wefindnothinglessthantranscendence(understoodhereliterally,as apassingover,anoverstepping,asagoingbeyonditselfwithinitself,asthe 33 zero point of representation [] [that] is beyond this zero ). The answer to LvinasscentralquestionintheessayIntentionalityandSensationIsthere 34 diachronywithin intentionality? is,therefore,anunambiguousYes:as he willconclude,itisthisdivergencefromthatisnothinglessthan(t)hemystery 35 ofintentionality.

III Conclusion The issues raised by this disparity in Lvinass approaches to the Husserlian protoimpression have huge significance. For one thing and, admittedly, this mayseemabanaltruismweareremindedoftheimmenseandfecundrichness of Husserls analysis. But, beyond this fairly obvious point, we are also confronted with the possibility unveiled by Lvinas himself that Husserl may well counter the Lvinasian critique of his phenomenology, by thinking otherwise in a way that not only differs from but also profoundly challenges Lvinas.AsLvinasshowsus,Husserluncoversastructuralalteritywithinthe self,aknottedintriguethatisnottheproductoroutcomeoreffectoftheOther. Husserl,that istosay,raisesthepossibilitythat priortoencounterwiththe Other,assuchwealreadyencounteralteritywithinourowntemporalization. Thus, beforeanydelineationoftheLvinasianOther,Husserl may havealready uncovered an irreducible otherness that resists synchronization within noetico noematic correlation but, in this case, the irreducible selfotherness of our absolute subjectivity. It seems that Husserl (read through Lvinass more generous 1965 appraisal) may show us that the consciousness of time neither overwhelms nor suppresses the time of consciousness rather, he shows that the consciousnessoftimeisalwaysalreadythetimeofconsciousnessandso,is 36 alwaysalreadylapse,dispersion,iteration,alterity.

NOTES
1

EmmanuelLvinas,TheOther,Utopia,andJustice,in IsitRighteousToBe?Interviews with EmmanuelLvinas,ed.byJillRobbins(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2002),pp.200210 (p.209)Lautre,utopieetjustice,inAutrement,(102,Nov.1988),pp.5060(p.59).Hereafter OUJ,withthetranslationspaginationprecedingtheoriginals.

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I have treated some of these issues elsewhere. See Ian Leask, Finitude: The Final Frontier? Heidegger and Lvinas on Death,in At the Heart of Education. School Chaplaincy & Pastoral Care, ed. by James Norman (Dublin: Veritas, 2004), pp. 239250, and Contra Fundamental Ontology: the Centrality of the HeideggerCritique in Lvinass Phenomenology, Maynooth PhilosophicalPapers,2,(Maynooth,2004),pp.5158. 3 Emmanuel Lvinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UniversityPress,1969),pp.12324Totalitetinfini.Essaisurlextriorit(Phaenomenologica 8)(LaHaye:MartinusNijhoff,1961),pp.9697.Henceforth,abbreviatedasTI,withtheEnglish translationspaginationprecedingtheoriginals. 4 TI,p.445:15. 5 See Emmanuel Levinas, Diachrony and Representation, in Entre Nous. On Thinkingofthe Other,trans.byMichaelB.SmithandBarbaraHarshay(London:Athlone,1998),pp.159177(p. 163)DiachronieetRepresentation,inRevuedelUniversitdOttowa,55,4,(1985),8598(p. 88). 6 Ibid.,p.164:8889. 7 EmmanuelLvinas,FromtheOnetotheOther:TranscendenceandTime,inEntreNous,pp. 133154(p.138)Delunlautre.Transcendanceettemps,ArchivodeFilosofia,5113(1983), 2138 (p. 25). Hereafter abbreviated as FOTO, with the translations pagination preceding the originals. 8 TI,p.125:98 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 FOTO,p.138:25 12 OUJ,p.209:59 13 EmmanuelLvinas,OtherwisethanBeingorBeyondEssence,trans.byAlphonsoLingis(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), p. 9 Autrement qutre ou audel de lessence (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p.17. Hereafter abbreviated as OB, with the translations pagination preceding the originals. 14 SeeHusserl,ThePhenomenologyofInternalTimeConsciousness,ed.MartinHeidegger,trans. J.S.Churchill(IndianaUP,1964), passim. 15 OB,p.33:41 16 Ibid. 17 OB,p.33:42 18 Ibid. 19 OB,p.34:43 20 OB,p.33:42 21 OB,p.34:43 22 OB,p.33:42 23 Emmanuel Lvinas, Intentionality and Sensation, in E. Lvinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. by R. Cohen & M. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1998), pp.135150 Intentionalitetsensation,inRevueInternationaledePhilosophie,7172,fasc.12,(1965),pp. 3454.HereafterabbreviatedasIS,withthetranslationspaginationprecedingtheoriginals. 24 IShasreceivedsurprisinglylittlescholarlyattention.Foranexceptiontothegeneralrule,see RudolfBernet,LvinassCritiqueofHusserl,inTheCambridgeCompaniontoLvinas,ed.by SimonCritchley&RobertBernasconi(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),pp.82 99,esp.pp.9193. 25 IS,p.142:44 26 IS,p.144:46 27 IS,p.142:43 28 SeeIS,p.144:4647. 29 IS,p.148:52 30 IS,p.144:4647 31 IS,p.145:47 32 IS,p.149:53 33 IS,p.148:51 34 IS,p.143:45 35 IS,p.145:47 36 IshouldliketoexpressmythankstoDrJamesMcGuirkforhishelpfulcommentsonanearlier draftofthispaper.

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Red,RiotousandWrong: IstheSecondaryQuality AnalogyanUnpalatableDoctrine?

HarryMcCauley

I In recent analytical moral theory a debate has been raging for some time now about the merits and demerits of realism about morality. Two main schools of moralrealists haveemergedonoppositesidesof theAtlantic.IntheUS various naturalist realists prominent amongst them, the socalled Cornell realists havecanvassedvariousversionsoftheviewthatmoralpropertiesarerealandare 1 eitherreducibleto,orareconstitutedoutofnaturalproperties. IntheUK moral realismhastakenasomewhatdifferentdirection.MoreunderthethrallofMoore and the open question argument than the Americans, the British realists have tended to reject the naturalist path and have tried to find some way in which to defend a conception of moral properties in which such properties are seen as objectiveandmindindependent,withouttherebybeingreduced,toorconstituted 2 outofnaturalproperties. HangingoverandhauntingthisBritishprojectis,ofcourse,thespectreof Mooreannonnaturalproperties,andBritishrealistsfindthemselvesconstantly confronted with one or other version of a constraint succinctly expressed by PanayotButchvarovasfollows:Theallegedrealityofethicalpropertiesmustbe understoodinastraightforward,familiarandunsurprising fashion.Whatitis for somethingtoberealorexistisperhapsthedeepestphilosophicalproblem,butone does realism in ethics no service by resting it on highly dubious and unclear 3 solutionstothatproblem. One way in which a number of British realists have attempted to meet Butchvarovs constraint has been to canvass for an analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities like colours. The overall argument runs somewhatasfollows:surelysecondaryqualities,likecolours,arestraightforward, familiarandunsurprisingpropertiesofthingsandsurely itwouldalsobeagreed that such qualities are real, mindindependent featuresof the world, i.e. features whoseexistencedoes notdependontheir being actually perceived. Atthesame time it would be agreed that there is, nevertheless, an extent to which such qualitiesalsodependinsomewayonthepresenceofperceiverswithappropriate perceptual systems. As a key supporter of the analogy, John McDowell, put it: (colours)[]arenotbrutelytherenotthereindependentlyofoursensibility though [] this does not prevent us from supposing that they are there 4 independentlyofanyparticular[]experienceofthem. Secondaryqualities,it is maintained, exhibit an intriguing combination of objective and subjective dimensions which enable us at one and the same time, to concede that they are undoubtedly part of the furniture of the world, while also conceding that the presenceofobserverslikeus,withperceptualfacultieslikeours,isnecessaryfor 5 someaspectsofthatfurnituretobelitup. Reflecting on this intriguing combination of subjectivity and objectivity, philosophers like McDowell, Wiggins and McNaughton have argued that we 23

might locate moral properties epistemologically and ontologically by analogy with secondary qualities. When we say that persons or their actions are just or unjust,fairorunfair,courageousorcowardlyor,moregenerally,rightorwrong, goodorevilweare,ontheonehand,claimingthatwhatwearesayingistrue i.e. that things really are as we say they are while, on the other, we would readilyconcedethattermslikegoodandbad,rightandwrong,justandunjustetc. only have application in an order of things in which persons with moral sensibilities like ours are present. McNaughton puts this combination of claims neatlyasfollows:[justas]ourmodeofperceptiondoesnotcreatecolours,but makesus abletoseethem soalsomoralpropertiesare nottobethoughtofas created by [us] [] but as real properties which can only be experienced by 6 beingswhoshareawholenetworkofresponseswithus. One final aspect of the secondary quality analogy (hereafter the SQA) merits a brief mention. By locating a key pole of morality in a wideranging conception of human responsiveness, the supporters of the SQA also hope to captureoneofthemostwidelysharedpositionsincontemporaryanalyticalmoral theory:internalismi.e.theviewthatmoralconsiderationsareintrinsicallyaction guiding. Realists who construe moral considerations as beliefs have wellknown and widely discussed problems squaring their beliefbased realisms with internalism,and,giventhewidespreadsupportforinternalism,suchproblemsare often seen as bad news for those realists. However, supporters of the SQA, by basing morality partly in a conception of human responsiveness which straddles the cognitive and emotive sides of our being, seem well placed to meet the constraints of internalism. If our moral responses engage with how we feel, as wellaswhatwebelieve,thenroomforinternalismseemsclearlyavailable. The SQA, or sensibility account of moral properties thus holds many attractions for realists and it has been widely discussed over the past three decades.However,ithasnotgoneunchallenged.Ithasbeenchallengedbyrealists like Jonathan Dancy, who maintain that it does not deliver a sufficiently robust realism,andbyantirealistslikeSimonBlackburn,whohasclaimedthatthereare so many disanalogies between moral properties and secondary qualities that the 7 viewlacksplausibility. Undertheweightoftheopposition,overtsupportforthe SQAhaswanedinrecentyears,thoughthereremainthosewhostillseepromise 8 intheinterestingcombinationoffeatureswhichitofferstorealists.

II Inarecentpaperontheanalogy,ElijahMillgramhasofferedanovelcriticismof the SQA, claiming that support for it carries with it potentially unpalatable and embarrassing implications. Millgrams claim is that the SQA carries with it the implicationthatmoralfamiliaritywouldbreed,ifnotmoralcontempt,then,atthe very least, a growing moral indifference to evil. Millgram argues that this conclusion follows from a combination of the SQA with its key thought that our detection of, and response to moral properties are rooted in our moral sensibilitiesandanallegedsimpleand indisputable factabouthuman beings and their sensibilities i.e. that the more we are exposed to this or that phenomenon, the less and less acute our responses and reactions to the phenomenon in question become leading to a point at which we may well becomeindifferentto,orboredbythephenomenoninquestion.

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9 FollowingWiggins, Millgramtakesfunnyasaplausiblecandidatefora secondaryqualityandarguesthatwhilewemayrespondonthefirst,secondand perhaps even on a few subsequent occasions, to the same joke by finding it riotouslyfunny,surelybythehundredthtellingthehumourofthejokewillhave fadedandwewillnolongerfinditfunnyatall,willnolongerreacttoitaswedid at the outset. We may even bring ourselves to say the joke isnt funny 10 anymore. Moreover, we see nothing wrong with our responses on such occasionsandwereadilyacceptthatthejokeinquestionhasaswemayputit passeditssellbydateasfarasitsfunninessisconcerned. AppliedtomoralcasesthisreadingoftheSQAanditsimplicationsseems ratherdisturbing.TouseMillgramsownexample:ourresponsestothefirstand secondholocaustsmaycarrywiththemanappropriatesenseofhorrorandmoral outrage, but what of the hundredth holocaust? Just as in the case of the joke, doesnt the SQA suggest that we would greet that hundredth holocaust with a worldweary indifference, and perhaps without any sense of horror or moral outrageatall?Moreover,andstillmoredisturbing,doesnttheSQAsuggestthat in the holocaust case, as in the joke case, our new, jaded response is a wholly appropriate one it seems right to say that this latest holocaust is not really wrongorevilatall,that is nottheresponse itprovokes.Thus, justasthe initial funninessofthejokehasfadedandallbutdisappearedwithtimeandfamiliarity, soalsothewrongnessoreviloftheholocaustshavefadedandallbutdisappeared withtimeandfamiliarity.Justastheonceriotousisnolongerevenfunny,soalso theoncemorallyhorrificisnolongerevenmorallyeyebrowraising. ItseemscentraltoMillgramscriticismoftheSQAthathetakesitthatthe whole story about moral values which supporters of the SQA can tell is a story entirely in terms of the actual reactions which moral phenomena actually elicit fromusonagivenoccasion.ItistruethathebrieflyadvertstoMcDowellstalk 11 of such responses being also merited , but he goes on to construethis claim of McDowells in terms of the agents responses to his/her moral sensibility and claimsthataniterationoftheinitialattackontheSQAwoulddealwithanysuch 12 higherordermovetodefendit. MillgramskeypointisthattheSQAimplies not just that we will in fact respond to similar moral evils etc with diminishing outrage, but that such a response is to be deemed wholly appropriate a conclusionwhichhethinksissurelyunpalatable.Heconcludesasfollows:

Itiswidelythoughttobeafeatureofourmoralconceptsthatrepeatedapplicationof suchaconceptinlikecircumstancesiscorrectinallinstances,ifcorrectinany[]. It is a feature of our moral sensibilities that their repeated exercise in like circumstances gives rise to reactions that are not constant but systematically changing.Itfollowseitherthatasecondaryqualityaccountofvalueisnotasuitable 13 accountofmoralorethicalvalue,orthatitisaradicallyrevisionistone.

NowIdonotwishtoengagehereinawiderangingdefenceoftheSQA 14 itisliabletoawiderangeofdifficultiesandproblems butmerelytoargue that, as generally presented, it has available to it resources which can protect it from the kind of attack mounted by Millgram. I will confine myself here to making fourpointsoneverygeneralpointabouthowtounderstandtheSQA andthreemorespecificpointsaboutthosedimensionsofthetheoreticalsettingof theSQAwhichprovidetheneededprotectionagainstMillgramsattack.

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III (i)HowtoUnderstandtheSQA Twice in the course of his brief paper Millgram suggests that supporters of the SQAtakeitthatmoralvalueseitherare,oraretobeunderstoodassecondary 15 qualities. Thissuggestionofanequationofvalueswithsecondaryqualitiesblurs akeypointbeingmadebythesupportersoftheSQA.Whattheyargueforisan analogybetweenvaluesandsecondaryqualitiesananalogyintendedtothrow some lightontheepistemological andontological statusof moralproperties.To saythatAandBareanalogous is nottosaythattheycan beequatedwith each other, but that there are interesting similarities to be noted in how we are to understandthemandplacetheminourschemeofthings.Inallsuchclaimsthere isarecognitionthattherearealsodifferencestobenotedoftendifferencesof some significance. John McDowell e.g. is quick to point to such significant differencesinhisaccountoftheSQAandtohighlightthepointthattheanalogyis 16 intended as just that: an analogy. Thus, in discussing the SQA it is of vital importancetorecognisethatitssupportersseesecondaryqualitiesonlyasoffering usausefulepistemicandontologicalmodel amodelwhich suitablyadapted canthen beappliedtovaluesand canthrowsome lightontheepistemicand ontological dimensions of our thoughts about values. The SQA is not to be understoodasofferingusanexactparallelwhichwill holdupallalongthe line. AsRichardNormanrecentlyputit,thevalueofthesecondaryqualityanalogyis thatitenablesustoholdontotheideaof objectivityalongsideanacceptanceofa 17 certainkindofanthropomorphism. Millgram, in hisaccountoftheSQA,does notpaysufficientattentiontothisgeneralpointabouthowtotaketheanalogyand thiscolourshispresentationofitandhisdiscussionof itsimplications. (ii)TheSQAandtheLanguageofReactions In addition to this misleading general setting of his discussion, Millgram also seemsinclinedtounderstandtheSQAaccountofourdetectionof,andresponseto moralsituationsinanoverlymechanicalmanner.Thewordhemostoftenusesin hisdiscussionofitisreactions,andindoingsoheconveystheimpressionthat supportersoftheSQAareinclinedtoseeourmoralresponsesassimplyinvolving themoralagentinreactingtocertainfeaturesoftheworldinthewayinwhichit might be reasonable to suggest that colour perception involves such relatively simple reactions. Now it is, of course, true that supporters of the SQA do occasionally talk in such a manner, but by and large their claims are made in terms of our possessing a complex form of moral sensibility which enables and facilitatesustorespondappropriatelytothedemandswhichwefindbeingmade on us in this or that moral situation. These moral responses are not simply reactions in the way we might think of colour perceptions as involving such reactions,ratherdotheyhavetheirplaceinamorewiderangingandsophisticated accountofwhatitisforamoralagenttorespondtoamoraldemand. Thus e.g. David Wiggins explicitly draws a distinction between mere reactions to features of the world and the complex and sophisticated manner in whichsupportersoftheSQAunderstandthesensibilitysideoftheanalogystory. Overtime,Wigginsnotes,ourcapacitiestorespondaredevelopedandfinetuned in a way which takes the SQA account some way beyond any simple

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feature/reaction story. Thus he notes: Finer perceptions can both intensify and refine responses. Intenser responses can further heighten and refine perceptions. And more and more refined responses can lead to further and finer and more variegatedormoreintenseresponsesandperceptions.18 So any suggestion that the SQA is committed to some rather simple feature/reaction account of moral knowledge or moral responsiveness oversimplifiesthecaseregularlymadeandemphasisedbytheleadingsupporters of versions of the analogy. In her recent overview of the moral realism debate, Margaret Little highlights this side of the SQA: just as one needs a certain sensory apparatus to see red things, one needs a certain emotional and motivationalpalettetoseecruelorkindthings[],[butthemoral]sensibilityin questionisnotunderstoodassomemechanisticdispositiontoreact.Itisinsteada practice of responding that is partly constituted by judgments of 19 appropriateness. (iii)AppropriateResponsesandAppropriateAgents Mention of appropriateness brings me to a further dimension of the SQA. SupportersoftheSQAdonotconfinetherefinementsoftheirtheory toaoffering amorecomplexaccountofthewayinwhichweshouldunderstandwhatamoral sensibilityisliketheyalsoregularlyemphasisethepointthatitisonlypersons ofacertainsortwhoshouldbetakenasparadigmsofwhatamoralagentshould be like,andthusasexhibitingtheappropriatesortof moralsensibility.ForJohn McDowell,withhis Aristotelian leanings,thiscomesdowntothepointthatit is onlyvirtuouspersonswhoare,intheend,tobetakenaspossessorsofappropriate moral sensibilities and thus as reliable detectors of moral value. In both Virtue and Reason and Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives? McDowell emphasisesthesepoints.Inthelatter,stressingtheimportancetomoralperception of an appropriate process of character formation, he notes that in moral upbringingwhatone learns is[]toseesituations ina special lightand inthe formerhesays,focusingspecificallyonthemoralactionsofavirtuousagent,that a kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement that situations impose on behaviour []. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of 20 perceptualcapacity. SimilarthoughtsarepresentinWigginsscommentsinthe latersectionsofhispaperASensibleSubjectivism?. These thoughts may be applied to Millgrams remarks about jokes and holocausts. As far as jokes are concerned, while we might agree with Millgram thatbeinganoccasionforlaughteriscertainly connectedwithwhatitistobe 21 funny,surely wewouldbaulkathissimpleequationofthetwo. SurelyWiggins is nearer the mark when, in offering a more developed notion of our comic sensibility, he says that when we dispute whether x is really funny, there is a wholewealthofconsiderationsandexplanationswecanadduce[].Wecandoa 22 littlebetterthansaythatthefunnyisthatwhichmakespeoplelaugh. Aperson withadevelopedandsophisticatedsenseofhumouri.e.anappropriatecomic agent may well agree with Millgram that repetitions of trivial knockknock jokes may bore, fade and finally entirely lose their humour, while resisting the suggestionthatsuch fading isalsoa featureofthecomic momentsofaplay by OscarWilde.AsWigginsnotes:Afeeblejestorinfantilepracticaljokedoesnot deserve to be grouped with the class of things that a true judge would find 23 genuinelyfunny.

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Similarly, to those with sophisticated and welldeveloped moral sensibilitiesi.e.virtuouspersonsthereislittlelikelihoodthatthehundredth 24 holocaust will be greeted with a hohum as Millgram suggests. Moral agents with adequately developed sensibilities can be generally relied upon to respond appropriately to the demands of the situations in which they find themselves. Theseresponsesare,ontheSQA,viewedasinformedanddevelopedresponsesto features of those situations features which are rooted in the moral situations involvedandwhichmeritordemandacertainsortofresponsefromappropriately moralised agents. As McDowell puts it: One cannot share a virtuous persons viewofasituationinwhichitseemstohimthatvirtuerequiressomeaction,but 25 seenoreasontoactinthatway. Toavirtuouspersonitisnotjustthedetection of the evil characteristics of holocausts which trigger off the demand for a condemnatoryresponse,itisalsoamatterofthetypeofpersonavirtuousperson is.Theresponsehasitsrootsinthevirtuouspersonsmoralsensibilityandforas long as that persons moral sensibility remains intact the response will be the sameandwillnottendtofadewithrepetition. (iv)RepetitionsofJokesandHolocausts Thesuggestionthatmoralsituations,likejokes,maybesubjecttosuchrepetition brings me to my final comment on Millgrams criticism of the SQA. Jokes particularlytrivialknockknockjokesmayeasilylendthemselvestothesort of repetition which Millgram suggests will lead to the evaporation of their funniness. However, is the same true with regard to moral situations like holocausts?Morespecifically,wouldthosewhocanvassfortheSQAbelikelyto thinkittrue? The leading supportersoftheSQAwould be inclinedtooffera negative replytothisquestion.AssupportersoftheSQA aregenerallyparticulariststhey would surely be inclined to the view that moral situations do not repeat themselves in the way which Millgrams criticism requires. They resist the suggestionthatmoralitycanbecodifiedandareinclinedonthataccountto rejecttheclaimMillgrammakesthattheapplicationofamoralconceptiscorrect 26 in all situations if correct in any. Wiggins, e.g., explicitly queries the applicabilityhereofsupervenienceoneoftheconceptsuponwhichMillgram 27 hangshiscaseatthispoint. McDowellisperhapsthemostardentsupporteroftheparticularistsideof the SQA story. Time and again he rejects the idea that morality is a matter of applying concepts in a rule governed manner, always in the same way to situations which repeat themselves with sufficient clarity to licence such codifiability. True to his Aristotelian roots he sees virtuous agents not as agents whohavelearnedhowtoapplyasetofrulesoverarangeofcases,butasagents who,throughappropriatecharacterformation,havedevelopedasensitivitytothe salient features of moral situations which enables them to respond to such situations on a casebycase basis. In Virtue and reason he puts the point directly: Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applyinguniversalprinciplesbutbybeingacertainkindofperson:onewhosees 28 situations in a certain distinctive way. If asked how such a person would proceedindealingwithmoralquestions,McDowellisequallyforthcoming:Itis by virtueof hisseeingthisparticular factratherthanthatoneasthesalient fact

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about the situation that he is moved to act by this concern rather than that one. The perception of saliences is the shape taken here by the appreciation of 29 particularcases. Fromsuchaperspectiveitisthevistaoffadingresponsestoasuccession of holocausts which begins to fade. For the particularist the very idea that even simple moralsituationscouldrepeatthemselves inthe mannerof knockknock jokes is a nonstarter not to mention the suggestion that complex moral situations like holocausts could do so. In the absence of such moral repetitions Millgrams final point aboutthe general applicability of moral concepts and the allegedficklenessofhumanresponsesalsolosesitsforce.

IV Conclusion Allinall,then,MillgramscaseagainsttheSQArequiresforitssuccessnotonly asomewhatmisleadingpresentationoftheoverallroleoftheanalogy,butalsothe ignoringofarangeoffeatureswhicharepartandparcelofthetheoreticalsetting internaltowhichtheanalogyisgenerallysetoutanddefended.Thesupportersof the SQA make much of the complexity of the notion of a moral sensibility and specificallyrejecttheideathatitimpliesasimplefeature/reactioncapacity.They also make muchofthe ideathat it isthe complex anddevelopedsensibilitiesof moralagentswhohavebeenappropriatelyeducatedvirtuousagentswhich areinquestionand,finally,theytendtobeparticularistsandthustorejecttheidea thatmoralsituationsrepeatthemselvesandcanbecodifiedinthewayMillgrams accountwouldrequire.WithaproperappreciationthattheSQAisintendedonly asananalogy,andwiththeseadditionalfeaturesofitstheoreticalsettinginplace, the SQA whatever its other difficulties does not carry the unpalatable implicationsMillgramattributestoit.

NOTES
1

ThemostprominentUSmoralrealistsareNicholasSturgeon,RichardBoyd,PeterRailtonand DavidBrink.Foradiscussionoftheirworksee,e.g.,AlexanderMiller, AnIntroductionto ContemporaryMetaethics (Oxford:PolityPress,2003),chapters8and9. 2 Seepart2ofMargaretLittlesRecentWorkonMoralRealism, inPhilosophicalBooks,35 (1994),225233. 3 PanayotButchvarov,SkepticisminEthics (IndianaUniversityPress,1989),p.4. 4 JohnMcDowell,ValuesandSecondaryQualities,inJ.McDowell,Mind,ValueandReality (HarvardUniversityPress,1998),pp.131150(p.146). 5 Whenitcomesto moral realism,thesemovesenablesupportersoftheanalogytorecognisethat inanytalkofamoralrealitythenotionofrealitymustbeunderstoodascruciallyinvolving moralagents.AsDavidMcNaughtonputsit,theveryideaofamoralrealismwhichleftmoral agentsoutofthepicturewouldbecompletelyimplausible.SeeD.McNaughton, MoralVision (Oxford:Blackwell,1988),p.94. 6 McNaughton,p.95. 7 SeeJonathanDancy,Twoconceptionsofmoralrealism,inProceedingsoftheAristotelian Society, SupplementaryVolume60(1986),pp.16786andSimonBlackburn,Errorsandthe

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phenomenologyofvalueinhis EssaysinQuasirealism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993), pp.149165. 8 See,e.g.,JamesRachels,Introduction,inEthicalTheory:TheQuestionofObjectivity,Vol. 1, ed.byJ.Rachels(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),pp.118(p.15)RichardNorman, Makingsenseofmoralrealism,inPhilosophicalInvestigations,20(1997),117135andPeter Sande,ThePerceptualParadigmofMoralEpistemology,inTheDanishYearbookof Philosophy,27(1992),pp.4571. 9 DavidWiggins,ASensible Subjectivism?,inD.Wiggins, Need,Values,Truth(Oxford: ClarendonPress,1998),pp.185214(p.195). 10 ElijahMillgram,MoralValuesandSecondaryQualities, AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly, 36(1999),25355(p.254). 11 SeeMcDowell,p.143. 12 Millgram,p.254. 13 Millgram,p.255. 14 ForaninfluentialandwiderangingassaultontheSQA,seeDavidSosa,PatheticEthics,in ArguingaboutMetaethics,ed.by AndrewFisherandSimonKirchin(London:Routledge,2006), pp.241284. 15 Millgram,pp.253and254respectively. 16 McDowell,pp.138and143. 17 RichardNorman,p.131. 18 Wiggins,p.196.McNaughtonhassomeinterestingthingstosayonthispointinhisdiscussion ofapersonsgradualappropriationofamusicalsensibilitywhichenablesaproperappreciationof jazz.See Moral Vision, p.58. 19 Little,pp.227228. 20 BothpapersappearinMcDowellscollectionMind,ValueandReality,andthequotationsare fromthatbook,pp.85and51respectively. 21 Millgram,p.253. 22 Wiggins,p.195. 23 Ibid.,p.193. 24 Millgram,p.254. 25 McDowell,Mind,ValueandReality, p.90. 26 Millgram,p.255. 27 SeeWiggins,p.197. 28 J.McDowell,VirtueandReasoninMcDowell, Mind,ValueandReality,pp.5073(p.73). 29 Ibid.,p.68.

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UnderstandingandAssessingHeideggersTopicinPhenomenologyin LightofHisAppropriationofDiltheysHermeneuticMannerofThinking
CyrilMcDonnell

ABSTRACT This paper analyses Heideggers controversialadvancementof Husserls idea of philosophy and phenomenological research towards the BeingQuestion and its relation to Dasein. It concentrates on Heideggers elision of Dilthey and Husserls different concepts of Descriptive Psychologyinhis1925SummerSemesterlecturecourse,withHusserlsconceptlosingoutinthe competition,asbackgroundtotheformulationoftheBeingQuestioninBeingandTime(1927). It argues that Heidegger establishes his own position within phenomenology on the basis of a partial appropriation of Diltheys hermeneutical manner of thinking, an appropriation that was laterradicallycalledintoquestionbyLvinasonDiltheyeanhermeneuticalphilosophicalgrounds.

Introduction MartinHeidegger(18891976)isgenerallyregardedasoneofthemostimportant thinkersofthetwentiethcentury.Heideggerisalsoregarded,inparticular,asone of the most influential figures of the new phenomenological movement in philosophythatwasinauguratedinGermanybyEdmundHusserl(18591938)at theturnofthetwentiethcenturyandwhichspreadrapidlythroughoutEuropeand further field in the first half of that century. Yet, despite this prominence, agreement has not been reached about what Heideggers topic in philosophy 1 exactly is, or about the precise nature and actual extent of the influence that Husserls phenomenological manner of thinking had upon Heideggers path of thinking (Denkweg) about the question of the meaning of Being (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein), more often abbreviated by Heidegger as simply the Beingquestion (die Seinsfrage), Heideggers famously selfdeclared topic of research in philosophy and phenomenological research in his unfinished essay 2 BeingandTime(1927). TwoyearspriortothepublicationofBeingandTime, however, Heidegger, in his 1925 Summer Semester lecturecourse delivered at Marburg University, remarks to his students that one should look towards WilhelmDilthey(18331911),andnottoHusserl,tofindtheoriginsofthetopic inphilosophyandphenomenologicalresearchwithwhichheisconcerned,for,in Heideggersestimation,
As superior his analyses in the particular certainly are, Husserl does not advance beyond Dilthey. However, at least as I [Heidegger] see it, my guess is that even thoughDiltheydidnotraisethequestionof[themeaningof]beinganddidnoteven 3 havethemeanstodoso,thetendencytodosowasaliveinhim.

InthisarticleIwanttotakeseriouslyHeideggers indicationtohisstudentsthat whilst Husserls phenomenological analyses are of little use to him in his own 4 effort to raise anew (wiederholen) the question of the meaning of Being, Diltheys mannerofthinkingcertainly is,even if Dilthey himselfdid notdeploy hisenergiesinthatdirection.TherelationofHeideggerswayofthinkingabout

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the BeingQuestion both to Diltheys hermeneutic manner of thinking and to Husserls phenomenological manner of thinking, nevertheless, is much more intricatethanthatasintimatedbyHeideggertohisstudentsinhis1925lectures, for, in this article I will argue that Heidegger uses, at least implicitly, central features of Diltheys hermeneutic method of enquiry, in particular Diltheys interest in the experience of language, in order to correct Husserls unphenomenologicalmannerofreflection whilstadvancingDiltheyshermeneutic towards the question of the meaning of Being, notwithstanding Heideggers highly controversial and repeated claim throughout his career in philosophy that this issue had been left unthought (ungedacht) by Husserl in phenomenology 5 and phenomenological research. In other words, Heideggers development of phenomenologytowardsthequestionofthemeaningofBeinganditsrelationto Dasein is better understood less in terms of a philosophical dialogue (Auseinandersetzung) between himand Husserl, as bothprofessed byHeidegger in various places and reiterated by several critics in recent commentary on the HusserlHeidegger philosophical relationship, and more in terms of an appropriation of Diltheys hermeneutic manner of thinking, just as Heidegger himself intimates in his 1925 lectures but without elaborating upon an appropriation of Diltheys manner of thinking, however, that was later to be radicallycalledintoquestionbyLvinason Diltheyeanhermeneuticphilosophical grounds,orsoshallIargueintheconcludingsectionofthisarticle.Hencethetitle which is also the argument of this article: Understanding and Assessing HeideggersTopicinPhenomenologyinLightofHisAppropriationofDiltheys HermeneuticMannerofThinking.

I HeideggersElisionof DiltheyandHusserlsConceptsofDescriptivePsychology In his 1925 lectures Heidegger suggests to his students that there is an inner kinshipbetweenDiltheysmannerofthinkinginhis1894BerlinAcademyEssay IdeastowardsaDescriptiveandAnalyticPsychologyandHusserlsdescriptive psychological analyses in the two Volumes of his Logical Investigations (1900 6 1901). There is, however, no inner kinship between Diltheys analysis of human experiences and Husserls analyses. In Ideas towards a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology, Dilthey attempts to describe and analyze human experiences from the point of view of their structural totality and inherent 7 historical (and linguistic) depthdimension. Thus plays, poems and novels, as well as State laws, social systems, art, music, economies, philosophies and religions, all document and articulate, in Diltheys eyes, something meaningful about the historically evolving nature of mans selfunderstanding that is never always complete but always partially unfolding in and through history and life itself,andyet,alwaysbelongingtoagreaterwholeofunderstandingofthekindof 8 beingthatweourselvesare. ThusDiltheysawhiswork(afterKant)intermsofa 9 Critique of Historical Reason. In the Logical Investigations Husserl analyses the experiences of a normative logical consciousness as such the life of an abstract (ahistorical) logical consciousness as such and seeks intuitively verifiabledescriptionsofessentialandinvariantapriorifeaturesoflogicalactsof 10 reasoning. Husserl learned his descriptive method not from Dilthey, but from

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FranzBrentano(18381917)whenattendingthe latterslecturesonDescriptive 11 PsychologyatViennaUniversityfrom1884to1886. Itistrue,then,that both Dilthey and Husserl (and Brentano of the Vienna period) call their work descriptivepsychology,asHeideggerinstructshisstudentsinhis1925lectures, 12 but identity in terms is not equivalent to identity in concepts. Behind the terminologicalagreementthatexistsbetweenDiltheyandHusserl(andBrentano) onDescriptivePsychologytherearerealandmajorsubstantialdisagreementsin conceptsofDescriptivePsychology.Whichmethodofdescriptivepsychology that is being appealed to and defended by Heidegger in the development of his ownthoughttowardsthequestionofthemeaningofBeing,therefore,isnotjust of nominal significance but of philosophicalconceptual significance as well. In effect,Iwillarguethatwhatoccursinthe1925lecturesisanelisionbyHeidegger of Dilthey and Husserls concepts of descriptive psychology, with Husserls concept losing out in the competition. Before addressing this matter in Heideggersthinking,then,itwillbeusefultonotefirstlyandbrieflysomeofthe salient features of Brentanos descriptive method that were so influential in the developmentofHusserlsthought,beforeexaminingDiltheysdescriptivemethod andHeideggerssubsequentfusionofbothmethodsofdescriptivepsychologyin the elaboration of his own topic of research in philosophy and hermeneutical phenomenologicalresearch:thequestionofthemeaningofBeing. By the time Husserl attended Brentanos lectures from 1884 to 1886 in Vienna, Brentano had begun to apply his new descriptivepsychological method of analysis, which he had devised some ten years earlier in his unfinished study 13 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), to the task of clarifying the meaningofconceptsemployed inthe normative disciplinesofLogic,Ethicsand 14 Aesthetics. This task, of course, was not the original function of descriptive psychology. Rather, inPsychology from an Empirical Standpoint,the main task that Brentano set for descriptive psychology was to clarify the meaning of concepts for the science of psychology, or, more precisely, the meaning of two central terms used in current scientific debate, namely, physical phenomenon 15 and psychical phenomenon. This clarification was necessary for Brentano because, in his view, there existed much confusion among scientists over the meaning of these terms and neither agreement nor complete clarity has been 16 achievedregardingthedelimitationofthetwoclasses. ThusBrentanoinforms usthathefoundnounanimityamongpsychologistsaboutthemeaningofthese 17 basic terms for their science. And even important psychologists, Brentano furtherremarks,maybehardpressedtodefendthemselvesagainstthechargeof selfcontradictioninthewayinwhichtheyusedandunderstoodthemeaningof 18 these terms. This lack of agreement, coupled with misuse, confusion, and selfcontradiction by some eminent scientists concerning the meaning of the physicalandthepsychical,was,inBrentanosestimation,impedingtheevolution ofthenaturalsciencesingeneral,especiallyphysics,andthebuddingnewscience of psychology in particular, which Brentano now considers as the crowning 19 pinnacle of the natural sciences, that is to say, as the science of the future. SinceBrentano,however,couldnotsettlethedisputeaboutthemeaningofthese terms among psychologists and physicists by appealing to any wellfounded theory elaborated in natural science, nor resolve this difficulty by drawing upon any debatable meaning which these terms may have enjoyed in any particular philosophical or historical understanding of the physical and the psychical, his only alternative was to check the meaning of these terms against the facts of

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20 experience itself. And that meant for Brentano, now following Lockes approach, against the experience of physical phenomena given to outer perceptualsenseexperienceandtheexperienceoftheabilityofconsciousnessto reflect upon itself and to have itself, psychical phenomena (i.e., its own 21 psychicalactexperiences),asacontentforreflectionininnerperception. After thedomainofeachofthesetwobasicclassesofphenomena,presentedviaouter and inner perception respectively, had been appropriately demarcated and the meaningofthetermsphysicalphenomenonandpsychicalphenomenonclearly agreed, the ensuing task of the natural science of psychology, so Brentano believed,wouldbetoexplain,usingthemethodofthenaturalsciences,howsuch psychical phenomena or psychicalact experiences (and their immediate objects) came into existence and went outof existence for that mentally active subject.ThusBrentanodrewa sharpdistinction withinthescienceofempirical psychology between what he called Descriptive Psychology and Genetic 22 Psychology. GeneticPsychologyisthenaturalscientificpartofthescienceof empiricalpsychology.Itsmaintaskistoexplain,throughobservation,hypotheses andexperimentation,howthephenomenaofimmediateconsciousnessreallyand truly exist when we are not immediately aware of them, e.g., colours (physical phenomena)aslightwaves(orlightparticles),soundsassinewaves,etc.,thatis to say, as the theoretically constructed objects of natural science. We could say thatthenatural scientistbeginswithphysicalphenomena(e.g.colours)onlyto demonstratethatthisisnotthewaytheyreallyandtrulyexist(forcoloursexistas light waves, light particles, and are effects of stimuli on the retina and in the 23 brain etc.). Descriptive Psychology, on the other hand, does not rely on naturalscientific theories, noron outer(sense) perception, nor on hypothetical reasoning, but on inner perception and direct intuition of the phenomena 24 themselves (i.e. psychicalact experiences and their objectivities). The task of thedescriptivepartofpsychologyistoyieldclearandunambiguousdescriptions of the phenomena in question themselves, removing all misunderstanding and 25 confusion concerning them that is to say, the sole aim of descriptive psychology is to clarify for use in natural science in general and for the natural scienceofempiricalpsychology inparticularthemeaningoftheterms physical phenomenonandpsychicalphenomenon.InBrentanosschemeofthings,then, thoughbothdescriptivepsychologyandgeneticpsychologyconstitutethenatural science of empirical psychology as he understands it, in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint descriptive psychology serves a preparatory function for empirical psychology its task is to clarify intuitively what genetic psychology laterhastoexplaincausally. Brentano, therefore, never advocated the method of the natural sciences forthedescriptivepartofthescienceofempiricalpsychology.Rather,Brentano held firmly to the Lockean conviction that knowledge of consciousness and its contents in descriptive psychology is to be gleaned directly (nonhypothetically) 26 fromreflectionwithinconsciousness itself. Furthermore,Brentanowasequally adamant that the descriptive part of the science of psychology sought truths of 27 reason, and not truths concerning matters of fact. Only descriptions of phenomena based on truths of reason and grasped at one stroke and without induction can remove any possible selfcontradiction or ambiguity about the meaningofthephenomenathemselvesinquestion,andthataretobelaterstudied by naturalscience.28 Comparatively speaking,then,descriptivepsychology, like mathematics,isanexactscience,andthatincontrast,geneticpsychology,inall

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29 its determinations, is an inexact one. From an epistemological point of view, therefore, knowledge of incorrigible, intuitively demonstrable, a priori features and structures that are embedded in the actual experiences of consciousness and its objectivities is sought in the descriptive part of the science of empirical psychology.This methodologicalrequirementHusserlalsorigorously adheresto and advances in the development of his own descriptiveeideticpsychological investigations,thoughBrentanohimself,asHusserlhimselflaterremarked,much to his own disappointment, could not recognise his [Husserls] ideas [e.g., the 30 intuition of essences] as the fruition of his [Brentanos] own ideas. Nevertheless, this descriptive method of reflection on consciousness and its 31 objectivities, i.e., on intentional consciousness is staunchly promoted by 32 Husserl both in the Logical Investigations and in his version of Kantian transcendental idealism defended in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a 33 PurePhenomenology(1913). According to Brentano, then, the natural sciences, including genetic psychology (empirical psychology), concern themselves only with knowledge claims pertaining to matters of fact, and to matters of fact construed from a particular naturalscientifictheoretical standpoint. In this regard, the scientific method of observation by hypothesis by experimentation is simply not suited to the task of solving disagreements between psychologists and scientists over the meaning of basic concepts that are deployed in the natural science of empirical psychology.Noristhe methodofthe naturalsciences,as Brentano laterargued, capable of clarifying the meaning of concepts deployed in the normative disciplinesofLogic,EthicsandAesthetics,butdescriptiveapriorianalysisofthe essentialfeaturesofparticularpsychicalactexperiences,includingthepsychical actexperiencesofnormativeconsciousnessassuch,canasBrentanoproposes in his lectures on descriptive psychology at Vienna University in the 1880s, thereindevelopingdescriptivepsychologyinadirectionhithertounimaginedby 34 him inthe1870s. In maintainingthisradicaldistinction between lawsof fact andlawsofnormsinhislecturesatVienna,however,Brentano,ineffect,joins in the Back to Kant countermovement against naturalism, positivism and 35 historicism that had emerged in Germany in the late nineteenth century. And here,Husserl,withhisrefutationofanyattempttobasethevalidityoflogical(and ethical)lawsoninductivegeneralisationsofempiricalpsychologyinVolumeOne of the Logical Investigations (1900) (and in other writings on logic), joins his mentorintheBacktoKantmovementtoo,for,asHeideggercorrectlynotesto hisstudentsinhis1925lecturesaboutHusserlsLogicalInvestigations,

Husserl, like Brentano, showed that the laws of thought are not the laws of the psychic course of thinking but laws of what is thought that one must distinguish betweenthepsychicprocessofjudgement,theactinthebroadestsense,andwhatis judged in these acts. Distinction is made between the real intake of the acts, the judging as such, and the ideal, the content of the judgement. This distinction between the real performance and ideal content provides the basis for the 36 fundamentalrejectionof [naturalismintheformoflogical]psychologism.

Thus,itwasatatime(fromaboutthemidtolate1880s)whenBrentano wasdevelopinghisnovelideaofdescriptivepsychologyinhisViennalecturesas anautonomoussciencethatclarifiesthe foundationsofconceptsdeployed inthe normative disciplines of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics that Husserl attended his

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lecturesandencounteredastyleofthinkingandamethodofquestioningthathad suchaformativeimpactonHusserlsinitiationintoandunderstandingofthetasks of philosophy, as we now know and as Heidegger correctly points out to his students. It is undoubtedly true, then, that Dilthey, Husserl and Brentano of the Vienna period, all called their work descriptive psychology, but this does not implythatthereisaninnerkinshipbetweenDiltheyandHusserls(orbetween Dilthey and Brentanos) concepts of descriptive psychology, as Heidegger also asserts in his 1925 lectures. The kinship that does exist between Diltheys descriptivehermeneutichistorical method and Husserls descriptivescientific eideticmethodisprimarilynegativeincharacterbothoftheirmethodsrejectthe applicabilityofthemethodofthenaturalsciencesinthestudyofthemeaningof experiencesthatarecharacteristicallylivedbyhumans:theexperiencesof avalid, normative logical consciousness as such being Husserls selected topic of investigation for a decade (18901900), culminating in his Logical 37 Investigations theexperienceofBeingasthing(SeinalsDing)giventoouter perceptualsense experience and of the experience of Being as (conscious) experience(SeinalsErlebnis)giventoinnerperceptionbeingtheparticularacts of perception that are selected for comparative descriptiveeidetic analyses by 38 Husserl around 190708, and later documented by Husserl in his (in)famous reduction of the natural standpoint to the transcendentalphenomenological standpointin Ideas1(1913) theexperiencesofthewholeoflifebeingDiltheys topicofinvestigationsfromaboutthemid1860stothelattersunexpecteddeath in1911. Heidegger, however, believes that there is a common source to Husserl and Diltheys concepts of descriptive psychology and it is from Brentanos descriptive psychology, and stresses two points to his students in his 1925 lectures. Firstly, he maintains that the decisive move towards the idea of a descriptivepsychologythatbeginsinBrentanosPsychologyfromanEmpirical Standpoint (1874) had a profound impact on Dilthey [in the 1894 Academy essay], and secondly, he remarks that the truly decisive aspect of Brentanos wayofquestioning istobeseen inthe factthatBrentanobecametheteacherof Husserl,thesubsequentfounderofphenomenologicalresearch.39ThatBrentano (the descriptive psychologist) had a profound impact and influence on Husserls initiationandformationinphilosophycannotbedoubted,butaglancebyanyone, including Heidegger, at Brentanos idea and method of descriptive psychology and Diltheys idea and method of descriptive psychology would reveal very different approaches to and concepts of descriptive psychology.40 It is thus difficult to see how Heidegger could justify the claim that he does make to his students in his1925 lecturesthatthe ideaand methodofdescriptivepsychology first muted in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and developed by BrentanoinhisViennalecturesinthe1880sandearly1890sBrentanosway of questioning had any direct influence on Diltheys idea and method of descriptivepsychologysketchedinhis1894Academyessay.Diltheysdescriptive method goes in the opposite direction to Brentanos and Husserls descriptive method.41 Unlike Brentanos (and Husserls) descriptive method, Diltheys methoddoesnotattempttounderstandthewholeof lifeexperiences intermsof its discrete parts, i.e., as abstractable and analyzable mental events occurring, somehow, in consciousness in his 1894 essay Dilthey famously called this latter approach brooding (Grbelei) over oneself.42 Rather, Dilthey sought to

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understand and to analyse the meaning of the parts (individual experiences) in termsofthewhole(oflife),i.e.,Diltheysoughtadescriptivehermeneuticanalytic understanding of the meaning of life itself that is historically embedded and expressedinparticularlifeexperiencesthemselvesandintheproductsofsuchlife experiences (e.g. plays, poems, cultural objects etc.) from within the overall context of their lived experience. Thus Diltheys descriptive method seeks to understand individual life experiences from the whole of life experiences, i.e., from the entire context in which and through which such experiences are expressed,andviceversa,i.e.,thewholeoflifethatispartiallyexpressedinsuch productsthemselves. The influential figure lying behind Diltheys descriptivehermeneutic method sketched in his 1894 Academy essay, of course, is not Brentano as intimated by Heidegger in his 1925 lecturecourse, but Schleiermacher as Heideggerhimself indicates ina shortseriesofpublic lectureswhich Heidegger also gave around this time in 1925, at Kassel, on Wilhelm Diltheys Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview.43 In these lectures Heidegger remarks that it was under Schleiermachers influence, [that] Dilthey sawknowledgewithinthecontextofthewholeof life,andso,the1860swere decisive [for Dilthey], not because of neoKantianism but because of Diltheys tendencytounderstandthehumanconditiononthebasisofatotalcomprehension ofthehumanbeing.44 AftercompletinghisdoctoraldissertationDeprincipiis ethicsSchleiermachers in1864,the1860sculminatedforDilthey,asHeidegger notes, in the publication of the first part of his biography on The Life of Schleiermacher in 1870 (which Heidegger recommended to one of his doctoral students to read in 1918).45 Diltheys researches were extensive, but, as Heideggeralsoremarks, (O)nlytwomajorworksappearedduring his lifetime, and they both remained at volume one: The Life of Schleiermacher [1870] and Introduction to the Human Sciences [1883].46 And other essays that were publishedduringhislifetimewerealways,asHeideggercomments,preliminary, incomplete, and on the way, and entitled Contributions to [], Ideas Concerning[],Attemptsat[].47Indeed,itwasonlyafterDiltheysdeath thattheseincompleteessays(whichhadbeenscatteredinvariousjournals),with other unpublished essays, were collated and published in Diltheys Collected Worksin1914.48Throughouthisacademiccareer,then,Diltheydevotedhimself to developing the hermeneutic manner of thinking, both in his published and unpublished writings, and, especially from 1883 onwards, as one historian of philosophy notes, Dilthey drew a sharp distinction between the abstractness of Kantsthoughtandhisownconcreteapproach[tothewholeoflife].49 By comparison to Dilthey, in the 1860s the influential figure lying behind BrentanosearlyphilosophicalcareerisnotSchleiermacher,butAristotle.In1862 BrentanocompletedandpublishedhisdoctoraldissertationOntheSeveralSenses ofBeinginAristotle(whichHeideggerfirstreadin190750).51Thiswasfollowed by his 1866 habilitation thesis on The Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, which was published in 1867.52 Thus in the 1860sBrentano hadearned for himselfthereputationofa young butsignificant Scholastic commentator on Aristotle (and Aquinas).53 In the 1870s, however, BrentanoturnedhisattentionawayfromtheAristotelianworldview,andadopted a modern conception of psychology that defines its experiential basis and modus operandi by way of the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena.54 Inthisdecade,andthroughoutthe1880sandintothe1890s,the

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dominant figure behind Brentanos philosophizing is Descartes, followed by LockeandHume,whereaccesstoconsciousnessanditscontentsisregardedas peculiarlydirectandcertainascomparedwithourknowledgeofanythingelse.55 Indeed,inPsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint(1874)Brentanonowargues that we can define psychology, contra Aristotle and the Aristotelians, as a sciencewithoutasoul,56
(F)orwhetherornottherearesouls,thefactisthattherearepsychicalphenomena [whoseexistenceisgivenandguaranteedviainnerperceptionasisevidentfrom thecontext].Nothing,therefore,standsinourwayifweadoptthemoderndefinition [of psychology as the science of psychical phenomena] instead of defining psychology as the science of the soul. Perhaps both are correct. The differences, which still exist between them, are that the old definition contains metaphysical presuppositionsfromwhichthemodernoneisfree[].Consequently,theadoption of themodern conception simplifies our work. Furthermore, it offers an additional advantage: any exclusion of an unrelated question not only simplifies, but also reinforcesthework.Itshowsthattheresultsofourinvestigationsaredependenton 57 fewerpresuppositions,andthuslendsgreatercertaintytoourconvictions.

It is this very modern definition and modern conception of philosophical psychology that advances the method of inner reflection on the nature of consciousnessand itsobjectivitiesthatDilthey decidedlydid notadoptfromthe veryoutsetofhisstudiesinthe1860s,andthroughouthiscareerinphilosophy it being thoroughly abstract (ahistorical).58 For Dilthey, therefore, both the dominant naturalscientific approach to the study of man in empirical psychologyandthemodernselfreflectivemodelofconsciousnessunderstanding itself championed by Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Brentano (the descriptive psychologist) and Husserl (the descriptiveeidetic psychologist) are equally inappropriatemethodstobedeployedinthestudyofthemeaningofexperiences that are characteristically lived by human beings and that are addressed in the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften).59 Thus it is of importance to draw attentiontothepoint,asBambachdoes,that,
The term Geisteswissenshaft(en) is a crucial term for Dilthey []. The term signifies for Dilthey that group of studies dealing with the cultural spirit of humanity: history, psychology, economics, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, politics,religion, literature, and others. It is to be carefully differentiated from the term Naturwissenschaft, which includes all the fields in the natural sciences. The differencesbetweenthesetwobranchesofstudyarenotmerelyterminologicalbut, morefundamental,also methodological.Natureisexplained,asDiltheyputsit,but spirit is understood. This difference between explanation (Erklren) and understanding(Verstehen)pointstothecentralityofhermeneuticsforatheoryofthe 60 humansciences.

We can thus understand why Dilthey would have been particularly impressed by the first volume of Husserls Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena, when it appeared in 1900, wherein naturalism in the particular formofpsychologism,specificallypsychologism intheparticular fieldof logic, 61 asHeideggerpointsouttohisstudents,isrefuted, butlessthanimpressedbythe ensuingsecondvolume,publishedinthefollowingyearin1901,andintwoparts, comprising the Six Logical Investigations which Heidegger notes elsewhere, 62 are three times as long as volume one wherein Husserl clarifies, through descriptiveeideticpsychological analyses, the experiences of a (abstract, ahistorical) normative logical consciousness as such. Diltheys idea of a 38

descriptive psychology begins with what Husserl (and Brentano) leaves out, namely, with the lived nature of human experiences themselves, and seeks a comprehensiveunderstandingofthemeaningofthoseexperiencesinthefacticity of their lived, historical, social, personal, mundane and, ultimately, temporal existence. Meaning is to be found within those experiences themselves, in the contextoftheirlivednature,andnotbywayofeitherfactualinnerperceptionor eideticintuitive inspection of intentional consciousness and its contents in inner reflection as advocated by the BrentaneanHusserlian school of descriptive a prioripsychologyfromaboutthemid1870sonwards. Itwas,therefore, inoppositionto boththenaturalscientificandtheself reflectivemodelofconsciousnessreflectinguponitselfapproachestostudyingthe meaning of human experience that Dilthey proposed an alternative method of studying human experience (Erlebnis) for the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften),onethatwoulddescribeandanalyze,withoutdissecting into atomic units, the way in which human life experience expresses its own 63 understandingofitslifeexperience,frompoetrytoprose. ThusDiltheyargued,
Becauseourmentallifefindsitsfullestandmostcompleteexpressiononlythrough language,[]explicationfindscompletionandfullnessonlyintheinterpretationof 64 thewrittentestimoniesofhumanlife.

It was by taking this cue from Dilthey, however, that Heidegger managed to overcome a main [methodological] difficulty (eine Hauptschwierigkeit) regarding how to actually conduct the manner of thinking that calls itself phenomenology,withwhichhetellsushestruggledformanyyearsinhisearly career in philosophy as he read and reread Husserls texts in phenomenology from1909onwardsandafterhebecameHusserlsassistantlecturerinphilosophy at Freiburg University from 1919 to 1923, teaching and learning in Husserls 65 proximity. Heideggers solution to his difficulty was as simple as it was revolutionary in comparison to Husserls established way of doing phenomenology: the way to practice phenomenological seeing, so Heidegger 66 argues, is to hear what is expressed in the words themselves. Thus in Heideggers Diltheyeaninspired, hermeneutic way of doing phenomenology, hearing what is expressed in the written wordmust replace, and so, displace seeingthatwhich isretrievable in andthroughconsciousnesssreflectionupon 67 itself,i.e.,Husserlsstipulatedwayofdoingphenomenology. Or,perhapsmore accuratelyspeaking,forHeidegger,itisonlythroughhearingwhatisexpressedin 68 the written word that seeing what is talked about is made present. Hence Heideggers singular but characteristic hermeneutic style or way of thinking (Denkweg) about his topic in philosophy and phenomenology as he goes about researchingandengagingwithwhatissaidandwrittenaboutthemeaning of Being, but with particular reference to that which is left unthought (ungedacht)bytheauthorbutnevertheless implicitlyexpressed inthetestimony 69 ofthatauthorstextandinvitingretrieval. Thisisindeed,bothintheoryand inpractice,agenerousapplicationofDiltheyshermeneuticmannerofthinkingto issues in philosophy and phenomenological research, and to the topic of the questionofthemeaningofBeinginparticular,justasHeideggerintimatestohis 70 studentsinhis1925lecturecourse.

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II HearingReplacesSeeing(DiltheyReplacesHusserl) The following gloss by Heidegger in his 1925 lectures at Marburg University, purportedly on the theory of linguistic expression and perception elaborated by Husserl in the Sixth Logical Investigation, indicates the extent to which Heidegger, in his way of thinking, has internalised his methodological switch andadherencetoDiltheyshermeneuticapproach,for,accordingtoHeidegger,
It is [] a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already expressed,evenmore,areinterpretedinacertainway.Whatisprimary and originary here? [Heidegger rhetorically asks, and he answers.] It is not so much thatweseetheobjectandthings[]ratherthereverseweseewhatonesaysabout 71 thematter.

Because Heidegger situates his commentary above directly on Husserls text of the Logical Investigations, some commentators have been lead to believe wrongly, in my opinion that here Heidegger is unearthing and developing 72 something embryonic in Husserls position of the Sixth Logical Investigation. Such is clearly not the case. What Heidegger is defending here is a version of Diltheysviewsonthewaylinguisticactsofmeaningcontainthehigheststepin theexpressionofmeaninginhumanexperience,andnotHusserlsactualposition intheSixthLogicalInvestigation,forwhom (S)ignitiveactsconstitutethelowest 73 step: they possess no fullness whatever [my emphasis]. In direct contra distinction to Husserls views on this matter, Dilthey argued, in his wellknown triad, that all human experience (Erlebnis) contains implicitly some form of understanding(Verstehen)whichinturniscompletedandraisedtoahigherlevel 74 ofmeaninginexpression(Ausdruck). FromaDiltheyeanhermeneuticpointof view,therefore,itisnotafactoflinguisticexperience,asHusserlwouldleadus to believe in the Sixth Logical Investigation, that linguistic acts of meaning are emptyintendingactsrequiringperceptuallyfoundedobjectstocompletetheir meaning(whateverontologicalstatussuchintentionalobjectsmayhave).Itisa factof linguisticexperience, however,thatthe meaningandunderstandingofan individual(lived)experience is notcrossedoutbutraisedand intensified in itsmeaninginitsexpression,beitinaword,asentence,apoem,aplay,astory,a 75 philosophical treatise, or an object of culture etc. And this, of course, can be saidofandincludesthequestionofthemeaningofBeingitselfbecauseittoo, the meaning of Being (Sinn des Seins), as Heidegger insists in Being and Time, pushingDiltheys mannerofthinking inadirectionthatDilthey himself did not go, can be something unconceptualised (unbegriffen), but it never completely 76 failstobeunderstood(esistnievlligunverstanden). Thatistosay,weall,asa matterof fact, have some implicit understanding what it means to be a being in Being (Seinsverstndnis), and this fact of life, or issue is both open to and invites hermeneutic expressionand inquiry.Ifthis isthecase,then Heidegger is quite right to stress in Being and Time that for him, (O)nly as [Diltheyean hermeneutic] phenomenology, is ontology [the study of the meaning of Being] 77 possible. Andso,Heideggersargumentpointedlyunfolds inBeingandTime, despitethelattersincompleteness,thatthequestionofthemeaningofBeingmust be traced back to the lived experience (or facticity) of the There (Da) of Being (Sein), and in which one finds oneself implicated as thatwhichis (als 78 Seiendes) in Being with some understanding of Being (Seinsverstndnis). In

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this reduction, Heidegger clearly composes a Kierkegaardianexistentialistic rendering of Diltheys triad of ErlebnisVerstehenAusdruck in terms of the expressed concern about what goes about (es geht um) and is at issue for that beings understanding of its own being in being in Dasein, at the basis of his attempted retrieval of the question of the meaning of Being in his unfinished 79 essay ofBeing and Time. And yet, this existentialistic rendering of Diltheys thesisisconfigureduponapossibilitythatHeideggerfoundinherentinDiltheys hermeneutic manner of thinking, and not one that is discernible, as Heidegger correctly indicates to his students in his 1925 lectures, in Husserls early descriptiveeideticpsychological analyses of the Logical Investigations or in Husserls later transcendentalidealist analyses of Ideas I (1913) and Ideas II 80 (1924).

III SomeConclusionsandSomeCriticalAssessments According to Heidegger, the understanding of Being that is definitive of DaseinsmodeofbeingintheworlddiffersfromanyunderstandingofBeingthat is gained in and through cognitivereflection on thatwhichis, or on beings as beings.Inpointof fact,identifyingandpointingtothatwhichis(dasSeiende) thateithercomesintoexistenceorgoesoutofexistencecannotaddtoorsubtract from Daseins understanding of Being (Seinsverstndnis) because such indicationpresupposesthefacticityofsomeunderstandingofBeingalreadythere forDasein,butwhose meaning hasbeendeferred intheprocess.Itis,therefore, bothacentralcontentionandafundamentallimitinHeideggersformulationand elaborationofthequestionofthemeaningofBeingin BeingandTimethatthere is an understanding of Being that is always and already present implicitly in Dasein,thebackbehindofwhichwecannotgo,i.e.,thatwecannotthink,when addressing the question of the meaning of Being in phenomenology and phenomenological research. Heidegger thinks that (t)his position onthe facticity ofDasein in phenomenology and phenomenological research is unchallengeable andunquestionable,for,pointingtothatwhichisorbeingsintheirbeing,will,as noted above, obstruct the issue at hand, or at least it will lead to a fundamental mistargetting of the issue at hand (die Sache selbst) that Heidegger wishes to address in his Beingquestion. Doesnt insistence on what is, Heidegger rhetorically asks in his late lecture The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, block access to whatis? (Versperrt die Insistenz auf dem 81 BeweisbarennichtdenWegzudem,wasist?). And,ofcourse,insistencebyus onwhatisdoesindeedpreventsaccesstothewaywhatis,isbecauseinsistenceon thebeingofthebeingof beings invariablydeflectsattention fromthe(implicit) understandingofBeingthat isalreadypresupposedasaprecondition forand in any such (actual or possible) ostentation. And yet, the latter is the way the meaning of whatis is, that is to say, the way the meaning of whatis is lived, understood and expressed, however unconceptualised, so Heidegger insists in Diltheyeanphenomenologicalfashion. ForHeidegger,then,questionspertainingtotheunderstandingofBeing and to the being of the being of beings must be kept not only distinct but also unrelatedinhisstartingpointinphilosophyandphenomenologicalresearch.The former belongs to phenomenology, just as Husserl insists, the latter remains

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outside of phenomenological remit, just as Husserl also insists. The understanding of Being and the being of the being of beings, therefore, are entirelydifferentconceptsofbeinginHeideggersphilosophy.Heideggerhimself clearlyrecognizesthisdistinctioninBeingandTime.Heidegger,inpointoffact, insists on this distinction in Being and Time precisely because his way of thinkingabouttheBeingQuestionanditsrelationtoDaseinclearlyrequiresit. Heidegger, however, does not explore this distinction any further in Being and Time (or in later works). Heideggers starting point and finishing point in philosophy and phenomenological research, therefore, remains asserted, not argued for, nor vouchsafed, and the same throughout his path of thinking about theBeingQuestion,namely:
Entities are [Heideggers emphasis], quite independently of the experiences by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the graspinginwhichtheirnatureisascertained.But[themeaningof]Beingisonlyin theunderstandingofthoseentitiestowhoseBeingsomethinglikeanunderstanding 82 ofBeingbelongs.

In order for Heidegger to maintain this position, nevertheless, Heidegger mustacknowledge,asdeBoeracutelypointsout,thatthereisabeing[smallb] ofthebeingofentitiesthatprecedestheBeingoftheunderstandingofBeing[big 83 B]. Heideggerdoesnotturntothesignificanceofthisfirstbeingofthebeing of entities that is not reducible to the understanding of Being of those entities deposited in Dasein, in his path of thinking about the Beingquestion. The beingofthebeingofentitiesissetaside,andnotreturnedtointhedevelopment of Heideggers thought, just as it had been set aside and not returned to in the developmentofHusserlsthoughteither.HereHeideggerjoinsHusserl(andjoins DiltheytoHusserl).RecallHusserlsfamoustranscendentalreduction.Outsideof allthatwecanknowandactuallydoknowaboutthingsgiventoouterperceptual senseexperience,thereisnothingofanyintelligibleorsensiblenaturetoknow 84 initselfthereisonlynonsensicalthought. Thatsuchthingsorentitiesareis not a matter for phenomenology and phenomenological research. Likewise, outsideoftheapodicticknowledgeoftheexistenceofacurrentlylivedpsychical act experience (and its intentional object, if it exists) in an act of immanent perceptionwhosenonexistenceisinconceivableliesitsexistencebutthat such an experience exists (in its temporal facticity as Dilthey understands it) in immanent perception is not a matter for phenomenology and phenomenological research in Husserls definition of phenomenology. The facticity of individual (lived) experience is to be ignored because its meaning is not susceptible to scientific analysis and scientific generalization or to conceptual analysis in any form,inHusserlseideticeyes.Therecanbenoeideticscienceofthethisnessof aparticularexperiencehereandnow.Andpreciselybecausetheessentialfeatures of such livedexperiences is all that counts methodologically in Husserls definition of phenomenology, the very lived nature of the particular experiences themselves in their uniqueness must be passed over and not entertained as a matter for philosophy and phenomenological research. This is what Heidegger means, influenced by his reading of Dilthey, when he emphasizes in his 1925 lectures to his students in his immanent critique of Husserls philosophical startingpoint that the being of the intentional [acts of consciousness] [] gets lost precisely through them [i.e. through both the eidetic and the transcendental 85 reductions]. AndyetHeideggerhimselfdoesnotreturntothisfacticityofthe

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lifeexperiencesinDasein.ThatIexist,thatyouexist,thatyoudie,thatIdieare notthe concern of Heideggers phenomenology either, but my understanding of 86 myselfinanticipationasabeingfordeath(VorlaufenzumTode)is. Outsideof ones own actual understanding of oneself as a beingfordeath, that you are murdered,orthatbloodlustanddomination exists(notinHeideggersenseof 87 thatterm)isnottheconcernof DaseininBeingandTime. Itisatthispointthat Lvinas, taking up Diltheys comprehensive perspective on a philosophy of life, raises the following critical question from within both Husserl and Heideggers phenomenologies and their respective phenomenological researches: is not the very anonymous existence of things that are and of experiences that are a presuppositionitselfrequiringandinvitingahermeneuticinvestigation?Pursuing this matterfor investigation, however,would lie bothbeyondandoutsideofthe dual limits which Husserl set in the transcendental reduction on the understandingofBeingasthinggiventoouterperceptualsenseexperienceand as (conscious) experience immanently perceived, and beyond and outside of the existentialphenomenological reduction and limit set by Heidegger on the understanding of Being as that which is hermeneutically deposited and retrievableinanxiousanticipation,inthepresent, ofonesowndeathinthefuture inDaseinastherootoftheunderstandingofBeing andthesolematteratstake that needs to be thought methodologically in philosophy and phenomenological 88 research. Rather,pursuingthis facticityoftheunderstandingofBeing in life experiencesforhermeneuticinquirywouldrequire,interalia,acknowledgingthe primacy of the existence of ones own fellow human being outside of any understanding of Being that is capable of being retrieved either by way of Husserlian transcendentalphenomenological reduction to ones own actual, perceptual intentional consciousness and its objectivities or by way of HeideggereananalysisofDaseinforwhomthatbeingsownbeingaloneiswhat counts intheunderstandingofBeing.And, inpointof fact,Heideggerhimself suggests as much to his students in his 1925 lectures, for, as Heidegger queries (rhetorically) against Husserls analyses of Ideas II (which he had received in 89 unpublished manuscriptform from Husserl earlier in the year) and answers (rhetorically)infavorofahintgivenbyDilthey:
Howisthelifeoftheotheroriginallygiven? Asanepistemologicalquestion,itis presentedastheproblemofhowwecometoknowanalienconsciousness.Butthis way of posing the question [by Husserl] is mistaken because it overlooks the fact thatlifeisprimarily alwaysalreadylifewithothers,aknowledgeofthemasfellow human beings. Yet Dilthey never pursued these questions any further. What is essential for him is that the structured context of life is acquired, and thus 90 determinedbyitshistory.

WhetherHeideggeriscorrectinhisestimationthatDiltheyneverpursued any further the question pertaining to the significance of the existence of ones ownfellowhumanbeinginthefactthatlifeisprimarilyalwaysalreadylifewith others, or not, Heidegger certainly does not and cannot press this issue any further because his existentialistic rendering of Diltheys triad of Erlebnis VerstehenAusdruckintermsoftheexpressedconcernthatDaseinhasforitsown being as that which lies at stake in Dasein precludes him. Nevertheless, if Heidegger, following Dilthey, is right, and if our understanding of Being extendsequallytotheworld,myselfandmyfellowhumanbeing,thenthecritical question that Lvinas raises against Heideggers appropriation of Diltheys

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mannerofthinkingisthis:howcanIreachanunderstandingofBeingthatisnot mine but shareable and therefore for the common good of each and any understandingof BeingthatIcananddoreach? FocusingonDasein i.e.on theawarenessoftheThere(Da)ofBeing(Sein),andinwhichonefindsoneself implicated as a being in being and as a beingforonesowndeath methodologically excludes a prioristically such an ethical (or metaphysical in Lvinass sense) possibility within (hermeneutic) phenomenology and phenomenological research. Heideggers insistence in Being and Time on the onticontological priority of the understanding of Being in Dasein as that the backbehindofwhich we cannot think, then, is itself a presupposition, an assertionthatneedstobetestedforitshermeneuticphenomenologicalcredentials. This is why Lvinas, in his work in philosophy and phenomenological research, therefore, believes it philosophically necessary to bring Diltheys manner of thinking backintostep with itself, as it were, and in the direction of the otherness of the other, in order to outstep Heideggers appropriation and stultification of Diltheys hermeneutic in the existential analytic of Dasein 91 promotedin BeingandTime. According to Dilthey, (T)he religious thinker, the artist, and the philosophercreateonthebasisoflivedexperience.Seeninthislight,Biblical verses [that contain the expression and understanding of life experiences of the prophets] do not function here as proof, as Lvinas points out against Heideggersaccountorstoryandformulationofmansselfunderstandingin thehistoricalunfoldingoftheBeingQuestion,butastestimonyofatradition 92 andanexperience. Dontthey,therefore,Lvinasrhetoricallyasks,haveas 93 much right as Hlderin and Trakl to be cited?, and to be invited, in any engagementofmansreflectiononhisandherselfunderstanding?Andofcourse they do, if you follow Diltheys philosophy of life however, if you follow Diltheysstartingpointinphilosophy andHeideggerprofesseshedoeshere there can be no science of mans selfunderstanding, only hermeneutic retrievalandinterpretationofthesignificancesofthewayoflifethatunfolds 94 in and through human experiences (Erlebnisse) themselves. And this entails, both hermeneutically and philosophically, no prioritizing by Heidegger of Daseins concern for its own beingfordeath in the understanding of Being (Seinsverstndnis), and no aprioristic exclusion of the significance of the call (der Ruft) that ones own fellow human being makes, in conscience, on my understanding of Being an understanding of Being that Heidegger acknowledgesextendstoandincludes,equally, notonly oneselfandtheworldbut alsoonesownfellowhumanbeing,butofwhomscanttreatmentcanbefoundor heardin BeingandTime, orinHeideggersearlierorlaterworks.

NOTES
1

ThiscontroversyconcerningwhatexactlyHeideggerstopicinphilosophyis,iswellsummedup byOtto Pggeler,astudentofHeideggers,whenheremarksinhis1983AfterwordtotheSecond Edition of Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (1963) that: in the case of Heidegger, one can validly assert that by means of Sein und Zeit he decisively altered the significant phenomenologicalphilosophyofHusserlandScheler,thatduetoOskarBeckerhebroughtalong the way withhim a philosophy of mathematics andthrough Bultmann anew theology, and that withnewimpetushelater,aboveall,decisivelydeterminedcontinentalEuropeanphilosophy.To be sure, in all of these effects the dispute about what was ultimately at issue in Heideggers thinking remained. Martin Heideggers Path of Thinking, trans. by Daniel Magurshak and

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Sigmund Barber (New Jersey, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1987, 1991), p. 261, my emphasis.Thisdisputeisstillnotresolvedtoday. 2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, 2000) Sein und Zeit (Tbingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1957), also published, in a separateprinting,inJahrbuchfrPhilosophieundphnomenologischeForschung,ed.byEdmund Husserl, Vol. 8 (1927), 1438. Though published asa work in phenomenology, ascertaining the philosophicalinfluenceofHusserlsphenomenologyinHeideggersBeingandTime(andinother works)isquitedifficult.AftermakingthepointthatHusserlsphenomenologywasofparamount importancefortheconceptionandcompositionof BeingandTime,onerecentcommentator,alas, isforcedtocontinueandtoadmit,yetitisdifficulttosayexactlywhatthenatureandscopeofhis [Husserls]influenceonHeideggeramountedtointheend.TaylorCarman, Heideggers Analytic. Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,2003),p.53.UnlessthenatureandscopeofHusserlsinfluenceonHeideggers philosophy is determined, however, it will be difficult to substantiate the claim that Husserls phenomenology was of paramount importance for the conception and composition of the philosophyoftheBeingquestionattemptedbyHeideggerinBeingandTime. 3 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) p. 125 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann), Vol. 20, ed. by Petra Jaeger (1979) SummerSemester Lecture Course, delivered at Marburg University in 1925. Cf., also, HeideggersremarksonDiltheysphilosophyoflifeinBeingandTime,10pp.7273. 4 Heidegger, BeingandTime,p.19:1. 5 Cf.MartinHeidegger,TheEndofPhilosophyandtheTaskofThinking,inM.Heidegger,On TimeandBeing, trans.byJoanStambaugh(NewYork:Harper&Row,1972Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 5573 (p. 72) Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens(1964),inHeidegger,ZurSachedesDenkens(Tbingen:MaxNiemeyer,1969).Taking hiscuefromHusserls(andHegels)call(Ruf)togobacktothethingitself,Heideggerremarks: Wehavechosenadiscussionofthecalltothethingitself(zurSacheselbst)asourguideline (alsWegweiser).Itwastobringustothepath(aufdenWeg)whichleadsustoadeterminationof thetaskofthinkingattheendofphilosophy.[]FromtheperspectiveofHegelandHusserl andnotonlyfromtheirperspectivethematterofphilosophy((D)ieSachederPhilosophie)is subjectivity.Itisnotthematterassuchthatiscontroversialforthecall,butratheritspresentation (ihreDarstellung)by whichthematteritselfbecomespresent.[]Thetwomethods[of Hegel andHusserl]areasdifferentastheycouldpossiblybe.Butthematterassuch,whichtheyareto present, is the same, although it is experienced in different ways. But of what help are these discoveriestousinourattempttobringthetaskofthinkingtoview?Theydonthelpusatallas long as we do not go beyond a mere discussion of the call and ask what remains unthought (ungedacht)inthecalltothethingitself. Questioninginthisway,wecanbecomeaware(Auf dieseWeisefragend,knnenwirdaraufaufmerksamwerden)howsomethingwhichitisnolonger thematterofphilosophytothinkconcealsitself(sichetwasverbirgt)preciselywherephilosophy hasbroughtitsmatter(inwieferngeradedort,wodiePhilosophieihreSache[]gebrachthat)to absoluteknowledgeandtoultimateevidence(insabsoluteWissenundzurletztgltigenEvidenz). (p.6364:7071,myemphases.) 6 HistoryoftheConceptofTime,p.24.Heideggerevenremarksthat(I)nalettertoHusserl,he [Dilthey] compared their work to boring into a mountain from opposite sides until they break through and meet each other. Dilthey here found an initial fulfilment [in Husserls Logical Investigations] of what he had sought for decades and formulated as a critical program in the Academy essay of 1894: a fundamental science of life itself (ibid.). What Heidegger does not point out to his students, however, is that whilst Dilthey certainly did compare his work to Husserls as boring into the same mountain [=Erlebnisse], they did so from opposite sides, and when they meet, it is Husserl who has to give way to Dilthey, not Dilthey to Husserl, in any [interpretive]scienceoflife. 7 WilhelmDilthey,IdeasConcerningaDescriptivePsychologyandAnalyticPsychology(1894), inW.Dilthey,DescriptivePsychologyandHistoricalUnderstanding,trans.byRichardM.Zaner & Kenneth L. Heiges (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 139240Ideen ber eine beschreibende undzergliederndePsychologie,GesammelteSchriften,BandV.:DieGeistigeWelt,ErsteHlfte (Abhandlungen zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften) (Leipzig und Bern: Teubner, 1924).

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Cf.H.P.Rickmann,WilhelmDilthey:PioneeroftheHumanSciences(Berkeley:Universityof California Press, 1979), esp. Chapter 10 The Methodology of the Human Sciences, (pp. 143 162). 9 Cf. Werner Brock, An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1935),pp.2023. 10 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. by John N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) Logische Untersuchungen. I. Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Halle, 1900),II.Teil:UntersuchungenzurPhnomenologieundTheoriederErkenntnis,InzweiBnden (Halle,1901)GesammelteWerke,Husserliana(Dordrecht:Kluwer),VolumeXVIII,ed.byElmar Holenstein(1975)andVolumeXIX,ed.byUrsulaPanzer(1984). 11 FranzBrentano,DescriptivePsychology,trans.anded.by BenitoMller(London:Routledge, 1995) Deskriptive Psychologie, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm & Wilhelm Baumgartner (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982). The first time that Brentano delivered a lecturecourse entitled Descriptive Psychology was in 1887/88, and he repeated these, without major revision, in 1888/89 and 1890/91. (The 188889 lecturecourse was entitled: Deskriptive Psychologie oder bescreibende Phnomenologie, Descriptive Psychology or Describing Phenomenology. See HerbertSpiegelberg,ThePhenomenologicalMovement:aHistoricalIntroduction,3rdrevisedand enlarged edn (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), p. 27.) Thus Husserl, who had attended Brentanos lectures in Vienna University from 1884 to 1886, would not have attended alecturecourse that wasactuallycalledDescriptivePsychologyorDescribingPhenomenology.Mllerinformsus, however, that [E]ven though Husserl left Vienna by the time the present lectures were read by Brentano,he was in possession of a transcript (by Dr Hans Schmidkunz) of the 1887/8 lectures which is kept in the Husserl Archive in Leuven, (call number Q10). (Introduction, Part I, DescriptivePsychology,p.xiii,n.14.)DermotMoranalsonotesthatafterHusserlleftViennain 1886 he still diligently collected Brentanos lecture transcripts, e.g. his Descriptive Psychology lecturesof188791,hisinvestigationsofthesenses,aswellashisstudiesoffantasy,memoryand judgement.EdmundHusserl:FounderofPhenomenology(Cambridge:Polity,2005),pp.1819. Brentano, of course, was working on these issues when Husserl attended his lectures because HusserlremarksthatonelecturecoursehetookwithBrentanocalledSelectedPsychologicaland AestheticQuestions[]wasdevotedmainlytofundamentaldescriptiveanalysesofthenatureof the imagination. Edmund Husserl, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, trans. by Linda L. McAlister,inThePhilosophyofBrentano,ed.byLindaL.McAlister(London:Duckworth,1976), pp. 4755 (p. 47) Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano, in Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre, Appendix II, pp. 153167, (Munich, 1919). Again, another course Husserl took with Brentano, Elementary Logic and its Needed Reform, dealt withsystematicallyconnectedbasicelementsofadescriptivepsychologyoftheintellect,without neglecting, however, the parallel elements in the sphere of the emotions, to which a separate chapterwasdevoted(ibid.).ItwasthesequestionsofdescriptivepsychologythatBrentanowas addressinginhislectures,inparticularthefoundingofthenormativedisciplinesofEthics,Logic and Aesthetics that gave Husserl the courage and conviction to choose philosophy as my [Husserls]lifeswork(pp.4749).ForalucidaccountoftheimpactofBrentanosdevelopment ofhisdescriptivemethodintheselecturesonHusserlsinitiationandformationinphilosophy,see TheodoreDeBoersexcellent,shortarticleTheDescriptiveMethodofFranzBrentano:ItsTwo Functions and Their Significance for Phenomenology, in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. McAlister, pp. 1017. For a meticulous and extensive analysis of the problems that Brentano bequeathed to Husserl, and Husserls response, see de Boers major studyThe Development of Husserls Thought, trans. by Theordore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978) Die ontwikkelingsganginhetdenkenvanHusserl (Assen:VanGorcum,1966). 12 Heidegger,HistoryoftheConceptofTime,pp.2023. 13 FranzBrentano,PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,trans.byAntos.C.Rancurello,D.B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973 Routledge, 1995) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1874). Originally, Brentanohadproposedsixbooksforthisstudybutheonlycompletedandpublishedthefirsttwo, BookOnePsychologyasaScienceandBookIIPsychicalPhenomenainGeneral. 14 Brentanosnextpublishedworkafter PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpointwasinEthics, VomUrsprungsittlicherErkenntnis(Leipzig,1889)OntheOriginofourKnowledgeofRightand Wrong, trans. by Roderick M. Chisholm & E. Schnerwind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969). In the Foreword to this study, Brentano announces this as part of his new work in descriptivepsychology.

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15 16

PsychologyfromanEmpirical Standpoint,p.77. Ibid.,p.77. 17 Ibid.,p.86. 18 Ibid.,p.77. 19 Ibid.,p.3,11,26,7778,8688,9293,9899. 20 Cf.PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,BookII,VASurveyofthePrincipalAttempts toClassifyPsychicalPhenomena,pp.177193. 21 JohnLocke famouslyheldthatallourknowledge camefromthetwinfountsofsensationand reflection.Cf.J.Locke,AnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding,ed.R.Woolhouse(London: Penguin, 1997), Book II, ch 1. The way consciousness knows itself, according to Locke, is by reflecting on its own contents. Brentano never relinquishes this CartesianLockean assumption concerningthemannerinwhichconsciousnesscan,inlightofitsownevidence,gainknowledge about itself from within itself, in the elaboration of his idea of descriptive psychology. In a SupplementtoareissueofhisPsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,Brentanoreiterates and stresses this point: The fact that the mentally active subject has himself as object of a secondary reference, regardless of what else he refers to as his primary object, is of great importance (p. 27677). This assumption, however, is premised on acceptance of a radical metaphysicalseparationofalucidmindandopaquebodywithinthebeingofhumansubjectivity, ametaphysicalassumptionthatwaslatertobecalledintoquestionbyothers,residingoutsideof Brentanosschoolofdescriptivepsychology,onexistentialphenomenologicalgrounds.Cf.Philip Bartok,BrentanosIntentionalityThesis:BeyondtheAnalyticandPhenomenologicalReadings, JournalofHistoryofPhilosophy,vol.43,no.4(2005)43760,esp.p.443andpp.445446. 22 BrentanoalsocoinedthetermPsychognosieforthedescriptivepartofthescienceofempirical psychologyandthetermpsychognostforthedescriptivepsychologist.Heborrowedtheideaof dividing the science of empirical psychology into two component parts of a descriptive and a geneticpartfromamodelthatoccurredinothernaturalsciences.Inthesamewayas orognosy and geognosy precede geology in the field of mineralogy, and anatomy generally precedes physiology in the more closely related field of the human organism, psychognosy [descriptive psychology] [] must be positioned prior to genetic psychology Descriptive Psychology, 1 PsychognosyandGeneticPsychology,pp.311(p.8). Cf.alsoBrentanos lettertohisfriendand former student Oscar Kraus in 1895, published in Appendix to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint:Myschooldistinguishesbetweenapsychognosyandageneticpsychology(indistant analogy to geognosy and geology) (pp. 369370, trans. mod.). Cf., also, Spiegelberg, The PhenomenologicalMovement, p.34. 23 Itistruethatindreamswehavepresentationsofcoloursandsoundsandvariousotherforms, that we are afraid, get angry, feel pleased and experience other emotions. But that which these mental activities refer to as their content and which really does not appear to be external is, in actuality,nomoreoutsideofusthaninus.Itismereappearance,justasthephysicalphenomena whichappeartousinwakinglifereally correspondtonorealityalthoughpeopleoftenassumethe opposite. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, pp. 1756. Thus if we compare (unphenomenologically) physical phenomena in the sense of sensorially perceived objects to whatanaturalscientistdiscoversandestablishesasamatterofnaturalscientificfactastheobject of its research, Brentano thinks (naturalistically) that we are justified in concluding that the sensoriallyperceived objects orsocalledqualiaorsecondaryqualitiesof outerperceptualsense experienceshaveamerelyphenomenalmodeofexistencebycomparisontotheactual(wirklich), real(extramental)modeofexistencediscoveredinnaturalscience,for:IbelievethatIwillnotbe mistakenifIassumethatthedefinitionofnaturalscienceasthescienceofphysicalphenomenais frequentlyconnectedwiththeconceptofforces belongingtoaworldwhichissimilartotheone extendedinspaceandflowingintimeforceswhich,throughtheirinfluenceonthesenseorgans, arouse sensationandmutually influence each other in their action,and of whichnatural science investigatesthelawsof coexistenceandsuccession.Ifthoseobjects[physicalphenomena]are considered as the objects of natural sciences, there is also the advantage [over physical phenomena considered as sensorial objects of actual acts of outer perceptualsense from a descriptivepsychologicalpointofview,asisevidentfromthecontext]thatthisscienceappearsto haveasitsobjectsomethingthatreallyandtrulyexists(pp.99100).EarlierinPsychologyfrom an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano had already asserted the point: The phenomena of light [colours],sound,heat,spatiallocationandlocomotionwhichhe[thenaturalscientist]studiesare notthingswhichreallyandtrulyexist.[Instead]Theyaresignsofsomethingreal,which,through itscausalactivity,producespresentationsofthem[e.g.colours,soundsetc.][fortheexperiencing

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subject].(p.19).Brentanodoesnotexplainhoworwhysuchrealobjectsofscientificdiscovery (e.g.lightrays,sinewaves)actuallyproduce,causally,thesocalledqualiaorsecondaryqualities (e.g. sounds, colours) of outer perceptualsense experience, or the relevance of such natural scientificfactsfordescriptivepsychology. 24 Psychology,likeallnaturalsciences,hasitsbasisinperception(Wahrnehmung)andexperience (Erfahrung).Aboveall,however,itssourceistobefoundintheinnerperception(dieinnere Wahrnehmung)ofourownpsychicalphenomena(dereigenenpsychischenPhnomene). We wouldneverknow whatathoughtis,orajudgement,pleasureorpain,desiresoraversions, hopesorfears,courageordespair,decisionsandvoluntaryintentionsifwedidnotlearnwhatthey are through inner perception of our own phenomena. Note, however, that we said that inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung)andnotintrospection,i.e.innerobservation (innere B e o b ac h t un g), constitutes this primary(erste) and indispensable source (unentbehrliche Quelle) of psychology. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Book I, Psychology as a Science,Chapter2PsychologicalMethodwithSpecialReferencetoitsExperientialBasis(ber dieMethodederPsychologie,insbesonderedieErfahrung,welchefrsiedieGrundlagebildet), 2.,p.404,trans.modified. 25 (S)inceneitheragreementnorcompleteclarityhasbeenachievedregardingthedelimitationof thetwoclasses[ofphysicalandpsychicalphenomena][]Ouraimistoclarifythemeaningof the two terms physical phenomenon and psychical phenomenon, removing all misunderstandingandconfusionconcerningthem.PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,p. 7778. 26 Thisposition,nevertheless,containsmetaphysicaldualisticassumptionsofalucidmindandan opaquebodyinhumansubjectivity.Cf.supra,n.21. 27 Cf. Oskar Kraus, Introduction to the 1924 Edition of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,Appendixto PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,pp.396408(p.370). 28 Ibid. 29 Brentano,DescriptivePsychology,pp.45. 30 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, trans. by John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 28. Phnomenologische Psychologie. VorlesungenSommersemester1925HuaVol.IX,ed.byWalterBiemel(1968).Intheselectures Husserl refers to Brentano as path finder (als Wegbereiter) in this entire area of descriptive psychologicalresearch,cf.Section(d)Brentanoaspioneerforresearchininternalexperience discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic,pp. 237. Reflecting on the philosophical relationship between Brentanos descriptive psychology and his own Logical Investigations, however, Husserl also remarks about their essential methodological difference. TheLogicalInvestigations,Husserlrecalls,arefullyinfluencedbyBrentanossuggestions,and shouldbereadilyunderstandableinviewofthefactthatIwasadirectpupilofBrentano.Andyet theideaofadescriptivepsychologyhasundergone,intheInvestigations,anewchangeandalso anessentialtransformationthroughanessentiallynewmethod,somuchsothatBrentanohimself did not recognise it as the fruition of his own ideas. (p. 28). Brentano, of course, could not recogniseHusserlsdescriptiveeideticpsychologyasafruitionofhisownideas,givenBrentanos viewson(Husserls)essencesasfictionalentities,whichanydescriptiveempiricalpsychology wouldfindincomprehensible.Cf.Brentano,PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,Appendix (1911),SupplementaryRemarks,IXOnGenuineandFictitiousObjects,pp.291301.Cf.,also, DeBoer,TheDevelopmentofHusserlsThought,pp.297298. 31 For an examination of what Brentano means by intentional consciousness, see Cyril McDonnell, Brentanos Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality into a Root ConceptofDescriptivePsychology,YearbookoftheIrishPhilosophicalSociety,ed.byCatherine Kavanagh(2006),124171. 32 Cf.Husserl,Appendix:ExternalandInternalPerception:PhysicalandPsychicalPhenomena, inHusserl, LogicalInvestigations,pp.85269. 33 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertainingto a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology,trans. by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einfhrung in die reine Phnomenologie,(Halle:Niemeyer,1913)HuaVol.III/1&III/2ed.byKarlSchumann(1977, 1995), esp. 77 The Phenomenological Study of Reflections on Mental Processes (Erlebnisreflexionen).

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HencethecriticaltitleofdeBoersarticle,TheDescriptiveMethodofFranzBrentano:ItsTwo FunctionsandTheirSignificanceforPhenomenology(myemphasis). 35 DeBoer,TheDescriptiveMethodofFranzBrentano,p.102. 36 Heidegger,HistoryoftheConceptofTime, p.116. 37 Inhis1925SummerSemesterLecturecourseatFreiburgUniversity, Husserlexplicitlydraws attention to his students of the fact that the task and significance of his Logical Investigations (19001901),whichweretheresultsofmytenyearseffort,layinprovidingeineKlrungder reinenIdeederLogikimRckgangaufdieimlogischenBewutsein,imErlebniszusammenhang logischenDenkenssichvollziehendeSinngebungoderErkenntnisleistung.HuaIX,3.Aufgabe und Bedeutungder Logischen Untersuchungen, p. 20 Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, SummerSemester1925,p.22. 38 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz (Dordrecht:Kluwer,1997) DingundRaum.Vorlesungen1907HuaVol.XVI,ed.byU.Claesges (1973). 39 Heidegger,HistoryoftheConceptofTime,pp.2023. 40 Heidegger would have encountered this difference in concepts of descriptive psychology ab initio in his early career in philosophy, for, around the time he introduced himself to Husserls LogicalInvestigationsinhisfirstsemesteratFreiburgUniversityin1909,hewasbeingintroduced to Diltheys hermeneutic line of thinking in his theology classes. In a letter to Karl Lwith on September 13, 1920, Heidegger informs him that I dont have Diltheys works, only detailed excerpts,in parthandcopied by me asa theologian in 190910. Quoted by Theodore Kisiel in TheGenesisofHeideggersBeingandTime(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1993),p. 524,note 43. Cf., also, Heideggers remarks about his introduction to hermeneutics inhis early students days in his 1922 Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch, in Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 19101927, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 104109 (p. 107). During the time that he read and reread Husserls Logical Investigations in he years following 1909,andHusserlsIdeasI,whenitwaspublishedin1913,Heideggercontinuedtobeinterested in Diltheys work, and in many other thinkers outside of Husserls phenomenology, for, as he recalls in 1957: What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequatelyexpressedIcanonlyindicateitbyaselectiveenumeration:thesecond,significantly enlargededitionof NietzschesTheWilltoPower,theworksofKierkegaardandDostoevskyin translation, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilkes works and Trakls poems, DiltheysCollectedWritings. M.Heidegger,ARecollection(1957)inHeidegger:TheManand theThinker,ed.byThomasSheehan(Chicago:PrecedentPublishing,Inc,1981),p.22.According to Heidegger himself, it was as early as 1915 that my [Heideggers]aversion tohistory, which had been nurtured in me by my predilection for mathematics, was thoroughly destroyed. CurriculumVitae1915inBecomingHeidegger,pp.78(p.8).(Husserl,ofcourse,wasatrained mathematician before seriously studying philosophy with Brentano, and attempted to apply Brentanos descriptivepsychological analysis to arithmetic in his first work in philosophy, publishedin1891,ThePhilosophyofArithmetic.Mathematicswasthemodel ofexactscientific knowledgeforBrentano,too,intheelaborationofhisideaofdescriptivepsychology.Seesupra, n. 29.) Heidegger credits his conversion to the significance of historicalhermeneutics in philosophytohisstudyofFichte,Hegel,Rickert,Dilthey,andlecturesandseminarexercises[in history]ofProf.Finke.(ibid.).BythetimeHeideggerwrotehislettertoGeorgMisch(Diltheys soninlaw)in1922,then,Heideggerisclearlyconvinced,ashisremarksandemphasisindicate, thathisownresearchesinphilosophyandphenomenologyisbringingoutthepositivetendencies of life philosophy, and moving towards a principled meditationonmeaning [Besinnung] within phenomenologicalresearch and its direction (p. 104). Thus Heidegger concludes, contra Husserls idea of phenomenology, and in Diltheyean fashion, that (L)ife is approached [by Heidegger] as the basic comprehensive object of philosophical research. The selfilluminating comportingoffacticlifetoitselfis,onthecognitivelevel,interpretiveexposition[Auslegung]the principled scientific development of this exposition is phenomenological interpretation [Interpretation] the genuine logic of philosophy is accordingly a principled phenomenological hermeneutics. (ibid.). Kisiels study corroborates Gadamers claim that Heideggers main breakthrough to the topic of his philosophy andhermeneutic phenomenology dates as early as 1919,inhis waremergency semester lecturecourse, entitled The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews. Cf. Kisiel, Genesis, p. 16. Though Heidegger read andread Husserls textsinphenomenologyfrom1909onwards,bythetimeofthepublicationofBeingandTimein

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1927 Heidegger had thoroughly internalized (and advanced) Diltheys position and critique of Husserls idea of phenomenology in his own definition and methodological practice of phenomenologyashermeneuticphenomenology. 41 Cf.DeBoer,TheDescriptiveMethodofFranzBrentano,p.101. 42 Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894), p. 63. In comparison to historicalresearch,then,thedescriptivemethodproposedbyBrentanoandHusserl,inDiltheys eyes,isprofoundlyabstractandsolipsistic,andtantamounttobrooding(Grbelei)overoneself. In BeingandTime,however,Heideggerexplicitlymaintainsthathisanalysis ofbeingtowards death,fromamethodologicalpointofview,isaformofbroodingoveronesowndeath,butof course,Heideggeradds,suchbroodingoverdeathdoesnottakeaway fromititscharacterasa possibility [ofactual Dasein] ( p. 305). In fact, Heidegger goes as faras tohold thatthisis an existential task (requirement) of ones life, and so: this possibility [disclosed in anticipation, Vorlaufen zum Tode] must not be weakened it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselvestowardsit[insuchbrooding](p.306).Dilthey,ofcourse,eschewedanysuchbrooding about oneself as a proper methodological requirement of understanding the concreteness and historicalityofanythinginhumanlife,includingthemeaningofdeath. 43 Martin Heidegger, Wilhelm Diltheys Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview, trans. by Theodore Kisiel, in Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early OccasionalWritings,19101927,pp.241274(p.247).KisielnotesthatHeideggerdeliveredhis lectures in Kassel a week or so before his 1925 Summer Semester lecturecourse at Marburg Universitybegan(cf.ibid.,p.240). 44 Heidegger,WilhelmDiltheysResearch,p.247. 45 Cf.Kisiel, Genesis,p.72. 46 Heidegger,WilhelmDiltheysResearch,p.248. 47 Ibid.,p.248249. 48 In 1957 Heidegger recalls his youthful excitement over the arrival of Diltheys Completed Writingsin1914.Seesupra,n.40.KisielnotesthatHeideggers1920SummerSemesterLecture coursePhenomenologyofIntuitionandExpression:TheoryofPhilosophicalConceptFormation beginswithanextensivebibliographyofDiltheysthenwidelyscatteredworks(Genesis,p.524, note 43). Kisiel also notes that in Heideggers Winter Semester Course 19191920 on Basic ProblemsofPhenomenology,Heideggerconcludesthiscoursewithanaccountoftheoriginsof thehistory ofideasandthebirthofhistoricalconsciousness,andofthesignificanceoffactic experienceoflifeintheparticularexperiencesoftheearlyChristiancommunityintheemergence ofthehumansciences(Geisteswissenschaften),but,(O)nethingthatHeideggerdoesnottellhis classisthatthisbriefreadingofthehistoryofideascomesinlargepart,sometimesalmostword forword,fromtwoshortchaptersofDiltheysIntroductiontotheHumanSciences(Genesis,p. 77).AboutHeideggersownlater,citationinBeingandTime(1927)oftheinfluenceofDiltheys thoughtonhisthinkinginthemid1920s,Gadamerremarksthat(T)hisdatingofhisinfluenceis muchtoolate.HansGeorgGadamer,MartinHeideggersOnePath,inReadingHeideggerfrom theStart.EssaysinhisEarliestThought,ed.byKisielandvanBuren(Albany:StateUniversityof New York Press, 1994), pp. 1934(p. 22).Theinfluence,Gadamer observes, hasto have been sometime before 1920 because about his earlier days lecturing at Freiburg University (1915 1923) Heidegger himself had recounted the story to Gadamer in Marburg in 1923 how burdensomeithadbeentolughometheheavyvolumesof theBerlinAcademypublicationsthat containedDiltheyslatework(ibid.). 49 th th FrederickCopleston,AHistoryofPhilosophy,Vol.7,18 and19 CenturyGermanPhilosophy (London&NewYork:Continuum,19632003),p.369. 50 Cf.MartinHeidegger,MyWaytoPhenomenology,inHeidegger,OnTimeandBeing,pp.74 82 (p. 74). Cf., also, Heideggers remarks to Fr Richardson in Vorwort/ Preface, in William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963),pp.viiixxiii(LettertoRichardson,April1962). 51 Franz Brentano, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, trans. by Ralph George (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975) Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nachAristoteles,(Freiburg,1862). 52 FranzBrentano,ThePsychologyofAristotle,inParticularHisDoctrineoftheActiveIntellect, trans. byRalph George (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977) Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poitikos. (Mainz: Kirchheim,1867).

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ThisreputationasaScholasticstillsurroundedBrentanoinVienna,for,Husserlrecallsthathe wenttoBrentanoslectures(in1884)atfirstmerelyoutofcuriosity,tohearthemanwhowasthe subjectofsomuchtalkinViennaatthattime,butwhomothers(andnotsoveryfew)deridedasa Jesuit in disguise, as a rhetoritician [viz], a fraud, a Sophist, and a Scholastic. Husserl, ReminiscencesofFranzBrentano,p.47.Cf.also RolfGeorge,BrentanosRelationtoAristotle, inDiePhilosophieFranzBrentanos,ed.byRoderickM.Chisholm&RudolfHaller(Amsterdam: Rodopi,1978),pp.249266. 54 Brentano,PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,BookI,PsychologyasaScience,Chapter 2,2PsychologicalMethodwithSpecialReferencetoitsExperientialBasis,pp.2843. 55 JohnPassmore,AHistoryofPhilosophy(London:Duckworth,1957PenguinBooks,1968),p. 178.Cf.,also,Brentano,PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,p.91. 56 PsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,p.11 57 Ibid.,p.1819. 58 Cf.Heideggerscriticalremarks(laDilthey)onalackofhistorythatcharacterisesHusserls phenomenology and on the need to activate a genuine sense of the past in phenomenological research,inhisWilhelmDiltheysResearch,pp.241274,esp.p.273. 59 Man does not apprehend what he is by musing over himself, nor by doing psychological experiments, but rather by history (Dilthey, Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology, p. 63). Behindthis isalso Diltheys sharp distinction between thenatural sciences (Naturwissenshaften) and a group of sciences that are referred to in German as the Geisteswissenshaften that are concerned about understanding the human being and the latters achievements. Translating Geisteswissehshaften asthe mental sciences inEnglish is somewhat misleading, however, because the Geisteswissenshaften, as Dilthey lists them, comprise such sciences as: history, national economy, the sciences of law and of the State, the science of religion, the study of literature and poetry, of art and music, of philosophical worldviews, and systems,finallypsychology.Copleston, AHistoryofPhilosophy,Vol.7,p.369. 60 Charles Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1995) p. 128129, note 2, my emphasis. Sometimes, Dilthey even leaves psychology out from the list of sciences that comprise the Geisteswissenshaften, for, when psychologyreferstothenaturalscienceofpsychology,thelatterapproachhastoabstractfromthe livednatureofmaninordertoseeand analysemanlikeanyotherobjectofnaturalscience(i.e. fromthepointofviewofatheoretical,abstractconstructione.g.intermsofatoms,orinfraatomic particles etc). Cf., Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 7, p. 369. Unlike the Geisteswissenschaftenthatattempt,inDiltheysview,togetbehindtheexternalexpressiontoan inwardspiritualstructure(thespiritofRomanlaw,ofBaroqueartandarchitecture,andsoon) in order to relive (Erleben and Nacherleben) the meaning, values, attitudes, ideals and understandingoflifedepositedandexpressedinsuchexternalproductsof culture,thephysicist can scarcely be said to attempt to relive the experience of an atom or to penetrate behind the relations of infraatomic particles to a spiritual structure expressed in them. To introduce such notionsintomathematicalphysicswouldmeanitsruin.Conversely,tofailtointroducetheminto thetheoryoftheculturesciencesistoforgetthathewhoexploreshistoryisthesamewhomakes history[Dilthey].Copleston, AHistoryofPhilosophy,Vol.7,p.373. 61 HistoryoftheConceptofTime,p.116.Cf.,also,Heidegger,WilhelmDiltheys Research,p. 249. 62 Heidegger,MyWaytoPhenomenology,inHeidegger,OnTimeandBeing,pp.7482(p.76). 63 Cf.Brock, AnIntroductiontoContemporaryGermanPhilosophy,pp.2023. 64 The Understanding of Other Persons and their Expressions of Life (ca. 1910), in Dilthey, DescriptivePsychologyandHistoricalUnderstanding,tr.byKennethL.Heiges,trans.modified, pp. 123144 (p. 135). (Also available as, The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Life Expressions,inTheHermeneuticsReader:TextsoftheGermanTraditionfromtheEnlightenment to the Present, ed. by Kurt MuellerVollmer (New York: Continuum, 1985 Oxford: Blackwell, 1986),pp.148164(p.161).) 65 Heidegger grounds all of the difficulties he experienced in trying to understand Husserls method of philosophising into one main difficulty (eine Hauptschwierigkeit), namely, the simple question [of] how thinkings manner of procedure (die Verfahrensweise des Denkens) which called itself phenomenology was to be carried out. My Way to Phenomenology, p. 76:83. Heidegger does not tell us in this autobiographical sketch, however, what part, if any, Dilthey played in overcoming this struggle. It is a wellknown fact that Heidegger read other thinkers, outside of Husserls text in phenomenology Heidegger singles out his

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phenomenological readings of Aristotles philosophy, for example, in My Way to Phenomenology (p. 79) and these influences coloured his reading of Husserls phenomenology. In addition to Aristotle, Heidegger reminds us elsewhere about his avid readingsoftheworksofKierkegaard,Nietzsche,Dostoevsky,Hegel,Schelling,Rilke,Trakl,and Dilthey,atthesametimeashereadandrereadHusserlstextsinphenomenology.Seesupra,n. 40and48.Forabrief,clearandsympathetictreatmentofHeideggersinterestinAristotleswork, and the significance of the latter for Heidegger in his confrontation with Husserls phenomenology, see Thomas Sheehan, Hermeneia and Apophansis: the Early Heidegger on Aristotle,inFranciVolpietal.,Heideggeretlaidedelaphnomnologie(Dordrecht:Kluwer, 1988),pp.6780. 66 Cf.Heidegger,MyWaytoPhenomenology,p.79. 67 Heidegger, of course, will give Husserls reflection on this living now of consciousness in Ideas I 77 a distinctively Kierkeagaardian temporal interpretation on top of his appropriated Diltheyeanhistorical interpretation, with the net result of overriding historicality by temporalityinDivisionTwoof BeingandTime.Cf.KlausHeld,HeideggerandthePrincipleof Phenomenology,trans.byChristopherMacann,inMartinHeidegger:CriticalAssessments,Vol. II:HistoryofPhilosophy,ed.byChristopherMacann(1992)pp.303325. 68 There are, clearly, resonances of Schleiermacherean biblicalhermeneutics at play here in Heideggers way of thinking however, these are outside the scope of this present article to entertain. 69 We can thus understand why Husserl, as Heidegger recalls, watched me in a generous fashion, but at the bottom in disagreement (My Way into Phenomenology, p. 79), while Heidegger,asHusserlsassistantatFreiburgUniversityfrom1919to1923,workedonHusserls earlier Logical Investigationsand on phenomenological readings of Aristotle and of other thinkers drawn from the history of philosophy. Husserl, in fact, had secured this position for HeideggeratFreiburgonatwofoldbasis:(1)thatheneededHeideggertointroducestudentstothe beginnings of phenomenological research and (2) that it would provide financial security for Heidegger.Cf. Hugo Ott,Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. by Allan Blunden (London: FontanaPress,1993),pp.115116. 70 This style of philosophising inhis lectures,in which Heidegger engagedhis students, became part of the allure of Heideggers way of thinking. Cf. Rdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: BetweenGoodandEvil,trans.byEwaldOsers(Cambridge,Ma.:HarvardUniversityPress,1998), Ch. 6 Revolutionin Germany and The Question of Being (pp. 89106), especially Safranskis account and analysis of Heideggers use of the example of perceiving a lectern, where the experiencingofthelecternintermsofitworlds(esweltet)inLectureHall2oftheUniversity of Freiburg on a grey February day in 1919 (pp. 9496) becomes a kind of enactment of a perceptionwhereupon(L)ookingatthelectern,wecanparticipateinthemysterythatweareand thatthereexistsawholeworldthatgivesitselftous(p.105).ManyofHeideggersstudentsinthe 1920s (e.g. Gadamer) found it very difficult to discern whether Heidegger was engaged in the delivery of an original interpretation of a selected authors texts in his lecture courses, e.g., of Aristotles views, or engaged in the lectures in the presentation of his own (Heideggers) novel ideas about the question of the meaning of Being. Cf. Ted Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle (London:AthlonePress,1996),pp.1213. 71 HistoryoftheConceptofTime,p.56. 72 Cf.TheodoreKisiel,Ch.2OntheWaytoBeingandTime:IntroductiontotheTranslationof Heideggers Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitsbegriffs, in Kisiel, Heideggers Way of Thought. Critical and InterpretativeSignposts (London &New York: Continuum, 2002), ed. by Alfred Dunker & Marion Heinz, pp. 3663 (p. 38) Dermot Moran, Heideggers Critique of Husserls and Brentanos Accounts of Intentionality, Inquiry, 43 (2000), 3966 (p. 58) Kisiel, TheGenesisofHeideggersBeingandTime(1993),p.49JacquesTaminiaux,Heideggerand Husserls Logical Investigations. In Remembrance of Heideggers Last Seminar (Zhringen, 1973),trans.byJ.Stephens, ResearchinPhenomenology,75(1977),5883. 73 Husserl,LogicalInvestigations,37,p.761. 74 Asearlyas1919attheUniversityofFreiburg,andthroughoutthe1920s,Heideggerisalready usingthistriadasacritiqueofHusserlstheoryonintuitionandexpressiondocumentedinthe Sixth Logical Investigation, although, as Kisiel remarks, the fairly loyal gloss of Husserlian terminology in the early stages of the course [Marburg Summer Semester 1925 lecture course] disguisesthis. Genesis,p. 373.

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Cf. Th. De Boer, The Rationality of Transcendence: Studies in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lvinas (Amsterdam: Giegen, 1997), p. 174, and as de Boer remarks, this is true of the interpretation of anything, as it too, is tuned to the individual, whether this be a psychical experience,anact,aliteraryworkoranobjectofculture(ibid). 76 BeingandTime,p.228. 77 BeingandTime,p.60. 78 TheveryaskingofthisquestionisanentitysmodeofBeingandassuchitgetsitsessential character from what isinquired about namely Being. This entity which each of us ishimself andwhichincludesinquiringasoneofthepossibilitiesofitsBeing,weshalldenotebytheterm Dasein. If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a properexplicationofanentity(Dasein),withregardtoitsBeing.Heidegger,BeingandTime,p. 27. 79 Being with Others belong to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. BeingandTime,p.160:zumSeindesDaseins,umdasesihminseinemSeinselbstgeht SeinundZeit,p.123.Cf.,also, BeingandTime,p.225:181. 80 AccordingtoKisiel,HeideggerreceivedtheunpublishedmanuscriptofIdeenII(dealingwith naturalisticandpersonalisticconsciousness,natureandspirit)fromHusserlinFebruary1925, and this seems to have driven Heidegger, in his preparation for his Summer Semester 1925 LecturecoursetoareneweddetailedexaminationofHusserlswork,especiallytheSixthLogical Investigation, the Logosessay and Ideas I. Kisiel, Heideggers Way of Thought. Critical and Interpretative Signposts, p. 38. We cannot conclude from this, however, that Heidegger is positively developing Husserls position(s) elaborated in any of these works, however Husserls analysesaretobeunderstood,inHeideggersownparticulardevelopmentofphenomenologyin Being and Time (or in earlier or later works and lecturecourses). Nevertheless, for remarks towards this, see Sebastian Luft, Husserls Concept of the Transcendental Person: Another LookattheHusserlHeideggerRelationship,InternationalJournalofPhilosophicalStudies,13 (2005), 14177. See also the review essay by Burt Hopkins, The HusserlHeidegger Confrontation and the Essential Possibility of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl, Psychological andTranscendentalPhenomenologyandtheConfrontationwithHeidegger,inHusserlStudies17 (2001),125148. 81 TheEndofPhilosophyandtheTaskofThinking,p.72. 82 BeingandTime,p.228. 83 DeBoer, TheRationalityofTranscendence,p.119. 84 Husserl, Ideas I, 49. Cf. De Boer, The Rationality of Transcendence, p. 119. Cf., also, TheodoreDeBoer,TheDevelopmentofHusserlsThought, p.338ff.,369,381. 85 HistoryoftheConceptofTime,p.110. 86 Heidegger, BeingandTime,p.353:305. 87 Cf. Theodore de Boer, Enmity, Friendship, Corporeality, in his The Rationality of Transcendence,pp.133146,(pp.141142).Seealso,Th.deBoer,BeyondBeing.Ontologyand Eschatology in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lvinas Philosophica Reformata, vol. 38 (1973), 1729,esp.pp.2324. 88 Such methodological brooding over ones own death would not be regarded by Dilthey as a properrequirementofconcretehistoricalhermeneuticresearchintothemeaningofanyhumanlife experience, including the experience of the anticipation, in the present, of ones own death,and wouldbeimproperlyinvokedassuchifitwere.See supra,n.42. 89 Cf.Kisiel, HeideggersWayofThought,p.38.See,also,supra, n.80. 90 Heidegger, Wilhelm Diltheys Researches, p. 254. Cf., also, Dilthey, The Understanding of Other Personsand their Expressions of Life (ca. 1910),in Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology and HistoricalUnderstanding,pp.205227. 91 Though Seinsverstndnis extends equally to the world, myself and the being of my fellow human being, what Heidegger has to say about ones fellow being is notoriously absent in his thought. Cf. De Boer, Lvinas on Theology and the Philosophy of Religion, in his The Rationality of Transcendence, pp. 169183 (p. 175, note 15). Heidegger, nevertheless, believes thathisappealtoSeinsverstndnisasabasicfactofexperienceissufficientfordismissing,orat leastforevadingmost,ifnotallofthephilosophicalcontroversiesthatemergefromandinrelation to the modern Cartesian solipsistic startingpoint in philosophy. Heideggers interest in and analysis ofDasein,whoseown beinginBeingiswhatisatstakefor thatbeing,however,is,as Lvinas points out, conducted without reference to any genuine exteriority, and thus from the heightofsubjectivity.

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Emmanuel Lvinas, Without Identity, in Lvinas, Humanism of the Other, tr. Nidra Poller (Illinois:UniversityofIllinoisPress,2003),pp.5869(p.66). 93 Ibid.,p.66. 94 Cf. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell(NewYork:HarperCollins,1977),pp.193241.Here,Heideggerisquiterighttocorrect himself (in 1946/ 47) over not dispensing with the inappropriate concern with science and research that he now realises was not contained in the essential help of phenomenological seeing inhis attempt to adhere to a hermeneuticmethodology in phenomenology inhis earliest daysinphilosophy,uptoandincludingthepublicationofBeingandTimeandotherworks,i.e., beforehisturning(dieKehre)(p.235).Somecommentatorstakethisasa(veiled)criticismof Husserls idea of phenomenology and of the latters stress on science and research (into the intricate web of intentional consciousness) but this cannot be the case because the context is clearlyinrelationtoHeideggersownselfprofessedearlierwayofthinkinginphenomenology that called itself scientific. Relinquishing the concern for science and research would, of course, contradict Husserls very definition of phenomenology, but it would not contradict the essential help of phenomenological seeing that a genuine hermeneutic phenomenology or a principledphenomenologicalhermeneutics,toquoteHeideggerfromhislettertoMischin1922, would bring in its definition. See supra, n. 38. From Husserls perspective, the scientific credentialsofHeideggersearlyphenomenologydidleavemuchtobedesired,for,asHusserltells us, after devoting two months to studying Heideggers Being and Time (and other works), he arrivedatthedistressingconclusionthatphilosophicallyI[Husserl]havenothingtodowiththis Heideggerean profundity, withthis brilliantunscientific genius [] thathemay be involved in theformationofaphilosophicalsystemofthekindwhichIhavealwaysconsideredmylifeswork to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has realised this for a long time. Edmund Husserl, Letter to Alexander Pfnder, January 6, 1931, trans. by Burt Hopkins, in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927193I): The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article, The Amsterdam Lectures, Phenomenology and Anthropology and Husserls Marginal Notes in Being and Time and KantandtheProblemofMetaphysics,trans.anded.byThomasSheehan&RichardE.Palmer (Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPress,1997),Appendix2,p.482.

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MartinHeideggers ExistentialPhilosophy
EdithStein

TranslatedbyMetteLebech, DepartmentofPhilosophy,NationalUniversityofIreland,Maynooth. From: MartinHeideggersExistentialphilosophie,inEdithStein,EndlichesundEwigesSein. VersucheinesAufstiegszumSinndesSeins,Gesamtausgabe,bd.11/12 (Freiburg:Herder,2006), Anhang,pp.445500

TranslatorsIntroduction The text which is hereby made available in translation originates as a lengthy appendixtoSteinsmainworkFiniteandEternalBeing.Itwas,however,leftout 1 ofthe firsteditionofthiswork(1950)and inthereprintofEdithSteins Werke and thus the editors of the Collected Works of Edith Stein likewise left it for a futureoccasion.TheomissionhasbeenemendedinthenewcriticaleditionEdith 2 Steins Gesamtausgabe, and a completed English translation will follow in due course. The essay is divided into four sections, each concerned with one of Heideggers(untilthen)publishedworks:BeingandTimeKantandtheProblem of Metaphysics The Essence of Reasons and What is Metaphysics? About two thirds istakenupwithananalysisofBeingandTime,againsimplydivided into anOutlineoftheArgumentandanEvaluation.Thelatterpartaddressesthree questions: What is Dasein? Is the Analysis of Dasein Accurate? and Is it sufficientforadequatelyaddressingtheQuestionoftheMeaningofBeing?. The essay is written in Steins clear and economic style, where rhetoric gives place to reasoning, and where criticism is given straightforwardly without flattery,polemicsor irony.ItcontainsSteinsHeideggercritique,which may be read as a key to Finite and Eternal Being as a whole. The Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger opens up for regarding Steins work as an alternative to Heideggers development of phenomenology, an alternative which draws on the philosophicaltraditioninsteadofrejectingit. AfewcriticalstudiesoftherelationshipbetweenSteinandHeideggerand ofthetextbeforeushaveappeared,suchas,forinstance:HugoOtt,EdithStein und Freiburg, in Studien zur Philosophie von Edith Stein, ed. by E.W. Orth 3 (Mnchen Freiburg: Alber, 1993), pp. 10745 Antonio Calcagno, Die Flle oderdasNichts?EdithSteinandMartinHeideggerontheQuestionofBeing,in AmericanCatholicPhilosophicalQuarterly,74(2000),26985(rewrittenforthe authorsbook,ThePhilosophyofEdithStein(Duquesne:UniversityofDuquesne Press, 2007)) John Nota, Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger, in Edith Stein Symposium, Carmelite Studies 4, ed. by John Sullivan (Washington D.C.: ICS Publications,1987)pp.5073(aGerman version is found inDenkeninDialog: zur Philosophie Edith Steins, ed. by Waltraud Herbstrith (Tbingen: Attempto, 1991), pp. 93117 Lidia Ripamonti, Sein, Wesen bei Edith Stein und Martin Heidegger, in Die unbekannte Edith Stein: Phnomenologie und Sozialphilosophie, ed. by Beate BeckmannZller and HannaBarbara Gerl 55

Falkovitz(FrankfrutA.M.:PeterLang,2006),pp.15568MetteLebech,Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger on the Meaning of Being, in Edith Stein PhenomenologistandTheologian,ed.byKathleenHaney(forthcoming).Forthe purpose of critical examination, the reader is referred to these the aim of the present publication is merely to make available an English translation of the Germantext. TheglossarycompiledbyJohnMacquarrieandEdwardRobinsonintheir translationofHeideggersBeingandTime(Oxford:Blackwell,1967)hasserved as guide to translate terms coined by Heidegger in the four works covered by Steins critique. In addition existing translations of these works have been consulted: Being and Time, trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by James S. Churchill(BloomingtonLondon:IndianaUniversityPress,1962)TheEssence ofReasons,trans.byTerrenceMalick(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1969) What is Metaphysics?, trans. by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick in Martin Heidegger,ExistenceandBeing(London:Vision,1949).Thesetranslationshave beenalteredwheneveritwasthoughtnecessarytobringoutpointsemphasisedby SteinfromtheGermanoriginal,orwhentherewassomedifficultyintheexisting translation. Sein, for example, has consistently been rendered as being, not Being, and other capitalisations have also been avoided (e.g. Existence, Interpretation, Experience, Nothingness). Seiendes has been rendered by the being, the beings or beings and not by either entity, whatis or essent. Augenblickhasbeentranslatedbymomentandnotbymomentofvision Angst byanguishandnotbydread,norhasitbeenleftuntranslated,paceStambauch, to avoid unpalatable hybrid forms like angsted and angsting. Mitsein has not beenleftuntranslatedeither,buthasbeentranslatedbybeingwith.Menschhas been translated by human being and not by man existential by (an) existentialNichtsbynothingnessnichtigbynullEntfernungbydistance Gegenstandbyobject(notobject)andVerfallnotonlybydeterioration,pace Macquarrie and Robinson, but also by decay and degeneration to facilitate a smootherEnglishexpression. Punctuation has been retained as far as possible, but sometimes the sentences have been broken up or a parenthesis introduced. Steins italicisation hasbeenkeptasrestoredbytheeditoroftheGesamtausgabeeditionof Endliches und ewiges Sein, Andreas Uwe Mller. He draws attention tothe fact that Stein uses italics to underline the importance of what is said, and quotation marks to mark either her own translation of a Greek or Latin term, a term that is under discussion,orwhenametalinguisticlevelisindicated(p.xvii).Wehavedeparted from Mller restoration only to italicise also the titles of works by Stein left in quotationmarks. German lends itself to the precise use of pronouns (ihrer, ihre, sein, seinen, seiner, etc.), whereas English of course does not. Hence such pronouns have sometimes been replaced by the noun to which they refer. At other times, however, it, this or these stands in, even if it opens up some ambiguity, which may be less present in the German text. He and she, and their derivatives,areusedasequivalent,whennotreferringtoaspecificperson. Many thanks are due to Sarah Borden for her careful reading of the translation,andforhermanyhelpfulsuggestionstoimproveitindifferentways. ThanksarealsoduetoPatGorevanandCyrilMcDonnell fortheircontributions tothereadabilityandcompletionofthetext.

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BEINGANDTIME

Itisnotpossibleinafewpagestogiveapictureoftherichesandthepowerofthe oftentrulyenlighteninginvestigationscontainedinHeideggersgreattorsoBeing and Time. Perhaps no other book has influenced contemporary philosophical 4 thoughtinthe lastten yearssostronglyasthisone, even ifonerepeatedlygets the impression that only the newlycoined words are picked up, without realisation of their radical meaning and incompatibility with other conceptual 5 toolsoftenthoughtlesslyusedaswell. Here we shall merely attempt tooutline the fundamental structureof the worksoastobeabletomakeajudgementaboutit,insofarasthatispossible.

A.OutlineoftheArgument
6 Theworkhasasitsaimtoraiseanewthequestionofthemeaningofbeing. The reasonsadvancedforaiminginthismanneraretheobjectivescientificprimacyof thebeingquestion:Basicallyallontology[...]remainsblindandpervertedfrom itsownmostaim,ifithasnotfirstadequatelyclarifiedthemeaningofBeing,and 7 conceivedthisclarificationasitsfundamentaltask andtheclaimthatuntilnow no satisfactory solution has been found, nor has an appropriate manner of questioning been achieved. The significant attempts in Plato and Aristotle have not been able to advance towards the goal, because the ontology of antiquity generallyregardedaspecific wayofbeingthebeingpresentathandtobe beingassuch.Asaconsequencebeingwaspresupposedasthemostgeneraland selfevident,neitheryieldingnorneedingadefinition.TheontologyofAntiquity wasretainedthroughouttheMiddleAgesandalsobythemostinfluentialattempts ofmoderntimes:DescartesandKant. In order to obtain an answer to the question concerning the meaning of being,onemustquestion beings,andnotanybeing,butthatbeingtowhosebeing theaskingforthemeaningofbeingandacertainanticipatory(preontological) understandingofbeingbelongs.Thisbeing,whicheachofusishimselfiscalled 8 Dasein, becausewecannotdefineDaseinsessencebycitingawhatofthe kindthatpertainstoasubjectmatter,andbecauseitsessenceliesratherinthefact 9 thatineachcaseithasitsbeingtobe,andhasitasitsown. Asitsunderstanding ofbeingconcernsnotonlyitsownbeing(whichiscalledexistence),butalsothe being which is not Dasein, Fundamental Ontology, from which alone all other 10 [ontologies] may arise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. ThusthefirstpartoftheworkisdedicatedtotheinterpretationofDasein:itsfirst section contains a preparatory analysis of Dasein, the second will show 11 temporality as the meaning of the being we call Dasein. Whereas the understanding of being belongs to the being of this being, time needs to be explainedprimordiallyasthehorizonfortheunderstandingofbeing,andinterms 12 oftemporalityasthebeingofDasein,whichunderstandsbeing. Athirdsection wastohavetreatedofTimeandBeing,inthesensethatnotonlyDaseinwereto beconceivedastemporal,butbeingassuchshouldhavebeenconceivedinterms 13 of time. It seems that this section was written together with the two previous ones (more than once reference is made to its subsections) but it was never

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published. Equally, the entire second part necessitated by reference to the historicality of Dasein and its understanding of being as a destruction of the historyofontology(KantDescartesAristotle)remainsmerelyannounced.

1.ThePreliminaryAnalysisofDasein Thepreliminaryinvestigationdesignatesasacharacteristicof Daseinsbeingthat itisineachcasemine(i.e.isassuchindividualandnotauniversal)thatitrelates to itself and that its being or its existence is its essence. What belongs to the structureofthisbeingisdesignatedasan existential.Theexistentialscorrespond to the categories of the presentathand. Dasein, however, is not a presentat hand,notawhat,butawho.Ithasnopossibilitiesasattributes,butisits possibilities. Its proper being is its havingtobecomeitself.The expressions I, subject, soul, person, even human being and life are avoided, because theyeithersignifyareificationofDasein(theontologyofAntiquityandChristian dogmatics mistakenly place Dasein under the categories of the presentathand according to Heidegger), or intend a kind of nonthingly being which remains unclarified. Daseinisthencontemplatedinitseverydayness.Toitbelongsessentially the beingintheworld, of which different things are emphasised: the inthe world, the who, who are in the world, and the beingin. With world is not understoodthetotalityofallobjectspresentathand,noracertainareaofbeings (like for example nature) but that wherein a Dasein lives, which is not to be understoodintermsofanythingelsethanDasein.Thebeinginhasnothing todo with spatiality. It is an existential, something that belongs to Daseins mode of beingassuch,independentofthespatialextendednessofthebody.Beinginthe world is characterised by concern (in the many senses of enduring, achieving, obtaining, and being apprehensive). Knowing is also a kind of concern.Onefalsifiesitsoriginalcharacterifoneseesitasarelationshipbetween presentathands(subjectandobject).Itisakindofinbeing,andadmittedlynot thefundamentalone,butamodificationoftheoriginalinbeing.Theoriginalin being is a dealing with things, whereby these are regarded not merely as somethingpresentathandbutalsoasequipmentwhichistheretobeusedfor something(material,tool,itemofpracticaluse):asreadytohand.Allofthese are understood to be something for revealed by the sight that is circumspection. The theoretical attitude is in contrast a noncircumspect mere seeing. In frictionless dealings with things which are readytohand, these stay unobtrusive,inconspicuous,docile.Onlywhensomethingshowsitselfasuseless does it stand out and impose itself, in contrast with what is used, but just not available. What imposes itself as useless discloses its beingpresentathand. Failure or uselessness becomes a referral from the individual to the totality of equipment and to the world. Concern arises always already on the basis of a familiaritywiththeworld.Daseinunderstands itselfasa being intheworldand understands the significance of the world. It has with everything in it a certain involvement,andatthesametimeoneletsitbeinvolved,i.e.onesetsthethings free,whentheydonotdirectlyprovokeattackandreformation. Every item of equipment has its place and its region in the totality of equipment where it belongs: it is in its place or it is lying about. This is spatiality, which belongs to the items of equipment as such it is not to be

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explained by a space of indifferent places already presentathand into which thingsareput.Butbecauseoftheunityofthetotalityofinvolvementsallplaces combinetoformaunity.Daseinisalsospatial.Butitsspatialitysignifiesneither that it has a position in objective space, nor a place like the readytohand. It is determined bydistanceanddirectionality.Distance(suppressionofthe far away) means the bringing of readytohand into its proper nearness.[14] Directionality means its having directions in the environment (right, left, up, down,etc.)anditsencounteringallthingsspatial.Bythis,spaceisnotyetmade tostandout,however.Spaceisneitherinthesubject,noristheworldinitas in an already presentathand. Space belongs tothe world as something that co structuresit.InanattitudewhereDasein hasgivenup itsoriginalconcernwhile still contemplating, it can be broughtout for it and seen as pure homogenous space. The who of Dasein is no presentathand substance, but a form of existence.[T]he human beingssubstance is notthespiritasa synthesisofsoul 15 and body it is rather existence. It belongs to Dasein to bewith other beings who also have the form of Dasein. This [beingwith] is not a finding of other subjectsthatarepresentathand,butisinsteadabeingwithoneanotherwhichis already presupposed for learning and understanding (empathy). To Daseins understandingofbeingbelongstheunderstandingofothers.Thisunderstanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordial, existential kind of being, which makes such knowledge 16 and acquaintance possible in the first place. SoDasein is from the start with beingthereintheworld. Its subject and the subject of the everyday Dasein generallyisnotitsownproperself,butatheyself:itisnotasumofsubjects, noragenusorkind,but justliketheauthenticselfwhichiscoveredoverinthe theyself an essentialexistential. Havingclarifiedtheworldandthewho,thebeingincannowbebetter grasped. Dasein means being there, and that implies being here as distinct from over there: openness to a spatial world it means further being there for itself. Thisopenness isclaimedtobethe meaningofthetalkofthe lumennaturale in man, it means nothing other than the existentialontological structure of this being,thatitisinsuchawayastobeitsthere.Thatitisilluminatedmeans thatasbeingintheworlditisclearedinitself,notthroughanotherbeing,butin 17 suchawaythatitisitselftheclearing. Beingopendoesnotrelyonreflective perception, but is an existential, something that belongs to Dasein as such. We findinDaseinthestateofmindandunderstandingasequiprimordial.Thestate ofmindreferstoaninternalmood.Daseinisalwaysinsomemoodorotherit comesneitherfromtheoutsidenorfromthe inside,but isawayof beingin theworld.AnditrevealstoDaseinitsthrownness:itfindsitselfasbeinginthe world and thus in this or that mood. The pure that it is shows itself, but the 18 whence and the whither remain in darkness. Finding itself that means nothingelse,thanthatitisopentoitself.Thisopennessisoneofthemeaningsof understanding.Itharboursmoreoveranunderstandingof[],i.e.apossibility orability,whichasbelongingtoitsbeingistransparent.Daseinisnotapresent athandwhichinadditionpossessesacompetenceitisratherprimarilyitsbeing 19 possible. Existential understanding is that from which both thought and intuition derives. In addition to understanding its own possibilities, the inner worldly possibilities of significance for Dasein are also understood: Dasein

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constantly projects its being unto possibilities. It is in this projection always alreadythatwhichitisnotasyet,becauseofitsunderstandingof being. Understandingmaydevelopintointerpretation,i.e.intoanunderstanding ofsomethingassomething.Suchinterpretationmaynotnecessarilyexpressitself linguistically. Simple understanding is always presupposed as an understanding fromwithinatotalityofmeaninginsuchatotalityofmeaningisimpliedafore having,a foresightanda foreconceptionpointinginacertaindirection. Being,whichisopeneduptoDasein,hasameaning.Whatisunderstood are the beings themselves meaning is not initself, but it is rather an existential determination. Only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless. What is not of Dasein is nonsensical, and only it can be absurd. Meaning is structured by interpretation and already in understanding disclosed as susceptible of being structured. When a readytohand stands out from its context and is having something attributed to it, the interpretation is changed into expression. This impliesthreethings: 1. Pointingoutabeingorsomethingrelatingtobeing 2. Determinationofbeings(predication) 3. Communicationaslettingseewith. Foundedinunderstanding,speechandhearingbelongstothebeingofDasein to its openness and its beingwith. The understood totality of meaning is expressed by its structure through speech. What is spoken is the language (of which speech is the existential foundation). That about which we speak, are beings. IntheeverydayDaseinofthethey,speechhasdeterioratedintoidletalk. Inidletalkthereisnooriginalunderstandingofthings,butamereunderstanding ofwords,whether in hearingorintalking. Whatisunderstood,isnotthebeings butratherthetalkingassuch. Originalappropriationofbeingsissight:intheformoforiginalprudently concerned understanding, knowing or contemplative gazing. As sight relates to curiosity, so speech relates to idle talk.[20] Curiosity is the craving to see for the sake of seeing, not in order to understand it is restless, relentless, leading to distraction.Idletalkandcuriosityarecloselylinked,idletalkdetermineswhatone must have read and seen. Add to this the third characteristic of deterioration, ambiguity: that one no longer knows the difference between original and mere inauthentic understanding. Deterioration is a mode of being wherein Dasein is neitheritself,withthingsorwiththeother,butonlypretendstobeallthis.This kind ofnotbeing has to be conceived as the kind which is closest to Dasein, in whichDaseinmaintainsitselfforthemostpart.ThisiswhyDaseinsdeterioration 21 shouldnotbetakentobea fallfromapurerandhigherprimalstatus. Untilnowtheinvestigationhasclearlyshownexistentialityandfacticityto be the constitution of Daseins being. Existentiality designates the specific characteristic of Dasein, that to its being belongs a relation to itself, that it is broughtbeforeitselfandbecomesdisclosedtoitselfinitsthrownnessfacticity designatesthethrownnesswhichasakindofbeing,belongstoabeingwhichin eachcaseisitspossibilities,andistheminsuchawaythatitunderstandsitselfin thesepossibilities,projectingitselfuponthem.Theself,however,isproximally and for the most part inauthentically the theyself []. Accordingly Daseins averageeverydaynesscanbedefinedasthefallingopenthrownprojectingbeing intheworld,forwhomitsownmostpotentialityforBeingisanissue,bothinits 22 beingalongsidetheworldandinitsbeingwithothers. Nowanattemptismade

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tograspthethuspresentedunderstandingofbeinginitstotality,andtoshowthe intimate relationship of its individual features designated by existentiality and facticity. To this end Daseins fundamental stateofmind, in which this relationship could become clear, is sought. There must be in Dasein an 23 understandingstateofmind inwhichDasein isspecificallydisclosedtoitself. Itwillbeshownthatanguishmeetsthiscondition.Whilefearalwaysisdirected towardssomethingthreateningintheworld,anguishisnotanguishforsomething in the world, but for beingintheworld itself. Yes, it is anguish that brings the world as such in sight. It is anguish for beingaloneintheworld (as solus ipse),i.e.foranauthenticbeingfromwhichDaseininitsdeteriorationfleesinto the world and the they. Even from the point of view of this turning away can anguish be detected with hindsight. That about which Dasein is anguished is its possibilityforbeingintheworld.Thedeteriorationisadeflectionofitsownfree possibilities to be towards beingbytheworld and to the theyself. In the possibilities it is always already ahead of itself and this belongs to being thrownitsbeingaheadisnamedcareandisthefoundationforallconcernand solicitude,allwishingandwilling,alladdictionandurge. According to Heidegger it is a reversal of the order of being to want to understandthebeingofDaseinintermsof realityandsubstantiality.Accordingto himthetraditionunderstandsrealitytobenothingbutthebeingofbeingsthatare 24 presentathand withintheworld (res) [] one could also take it in a wider sense including the different ways of being of innerworldly beings. As the understandingofbeingissomethingthatbelongstoDasein,thereisunderstanding ofbeingonlywhenDaseinis.Fromthisitfollowsthatbeingitself,ifnotbeings, isdependentonDasein.Thesubstanceofhumanbeingsunderstoodascaring isclaimedtobetheirexistence. Iftruthand being belongsocloselytogetherastradition hasalways held sinceParmenides,thentheoriginalmeaningoftruthmustalsobeobtainablefrom the analysis of Dasein. The common definition of truth as adequatio rei et intellectusdoes not managetopointtoanequalityorsimilarity betweensubject andobjectorbetweenideal judgementcontentandfact,throughwhichspeaking ofanagreementcanbejustified.Theassertionstatessomethingofthething:itis thesamethingofwhichsomethingistakentobetrueandofwhichsomethingis stated. Truth is equivalent with being true, and that means being revealing 25 ( revealedness). It pertains thus originally to Dasein. Only in a derived manner is revealednessof beings intheworldtobedesignatedastruth. ThisisbecauseofDaseinsopenness:itisinthetruth.Likewise,however,in its deterioration it is in falsity when covered over by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. The assertion is a pointing to beings growing out of understanding and interpretation. As asserted, however, it becomes readyandpresenttohand, and assuchitisbroughtintorelationwiththereadyandpresentathandofwhichitis anassertion:inthiswayisachievedtheaccordbetweenknowledge(=judgement) andbeings(=res).Themodificationmustbeunderstoodtostemfromthefactthat all truth must first be wrought from beings that revealedness in contrast with hiddennessassomethingunusualdemandsproof.Thetruthofjudgementis thus not the most original [form of truth], but is indeed derived. In its original meaning truth is an existential. As suchtruth is only when Dasein is. There can onlybeeternaltruthsiftherewereaneternalDasein,andonlyifthelatterwere proventoexist, wouldthe former be showntobe.Ontheother handtruth must

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be, as it belongs inextricably to Dasein. We must presuppose it, as we presupposeourselves,i.e.asalwaysalreadyfoundthrownintoDasein.

II.DaseinandTemporality Thepreparatory investigationofDasein isatanend.Itshouldservethepurpose of disclosing the meaning of being.To suffice forthis it should have conceived Dasein in its totality and authenticity. Recapitulating, the question is raised whether this has been achieved with the determination of Daseins existence as care.Itisdecided,however,thatsomethingessentialisstillmissing.IfDasein is concernedwith itsownpossibility,thisobviouslyentailsthatthere is something whichitisnotyet.Inordertobegraspedinitstotality,alsoitsenddeath must be grasped, something which only is possible in being towards death. In order to show moreover the authenticity of Dasein, it must be indicated how it testifies to itself, and this happens in conscience. Only when the authentic possibilityofDaseinsbeingcanbeaccountedforinitsentiretyistheanalyticof Daseins original being secured, and this is only possible when Daseins temporality and historicality have been accounted for. The death, conscience, temporality and historicity of Dasein are thus the objects of the following investigations. ThespecificityofDaseinsbeingascare,inwhichitisaheadofitselfand according to which something of its being always remains outstanding seems to excludeanunderstandingofDaseininitstotality.Itmustthereforebeshownthat death can be grasped, and that as a consequence the entirety of Dasein can be graspedalongwithit. The experience of the death of others is not an authentic experience of death. We experience their notbeinganymoreintheworld, a transition from Daseintosomethingwhichcomesclosetosheerbeingpresentathandbutwhich nevertheless does not coincide with it, as what is left behind is no mere body thing, nor is it something merely dead but for us beingwith and care are still possible in relation to the one who has died. And the ceasing to be is only a ceasingforusitisnotunderstoodfromthepointofviewoftheonewhoisdying, wedonotexperiencethedyingoftheother.Whilestandinginfortheotheris to a large extent possible in the beingintheworld which is concern, no one cantakeuponherselfthedeathofanother.AstheendingofDaseinitisitselfan existential,anditcan,insofarasitcanbeexperiencedatall,onlybesoasmine, notfromthepointofviewofothers. Theoutstanding,whichbelongstoDaseinsbeingandwhichmaturesin death,isnottheoutstandingofanotyetreadytohand,whichbecomesdisposable ofitskind(likeanoutstandingdebt).Itisnottheimmaturityofthefruitwhichis consumedintheripening,anditisnotliketheunfinishednessoftheroadending onlyatthegoal.Theendingthatliesindeathisalsonotadisappearing(likethe rainthatstops).Itcannotbeunderstoodintermsofanythingelsebutthebeingof Daseinitself,i.e.intermsofcare.Dyingisneitheridenticaltotheperishingofa livingbeing,nortothedemiseasapassage fromlifetobeingdead,but itisthe 26 modeofbeinginwhichDasein istowardsdeath. Theexistentialinterpretationofdeathtakesprecedenceoveranybiology and ontology of life. But it also founds any investigation of death which is historicobiographical,orethnologicopsychological.[]Ontheotherhandthere

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is in the ontological analysis of beingtowardstheend no anticipation of our taking any existential stance towards death. If death is defined as the end of Dasein, i.e.of beingintheworld,thisdoes notimplyanyonticaldecision asto whether afterdeath stillanotherbeing ispossible,whether higherorlower,or whetherDaseinlivesonorevenoutlastsitselfasimmortal.Norisanything decided ontically about the otherworldly and its possibility, any more than about the thisworldly []. But the analysis of death remains purely this worldly insofaras itinterpretsthephenomenon merely intheway inwhich it entersintoanyparticularDaseinasapossibilityofitsbeing.Onlywhendeath is conceived in its full ontological essence can we have any methodological assurance in even asking meaningfully and with justification what may be after 27 death. Beingtowardsdeathisprefiguredincareasthebeingaheadofoneself. It belongs as originally to Dasein as beingthrown and expresses itself most clearly in anguish but it is mostly hidden, as Dasein flees it in the mode of deteriorationtowardsthepresentathand.Whatimpendsisthepossibilitynotto be,theownmostpossibilityofbeingfreefromallrelationsbutitimpendsnotas something exterior imposing itself but as an ownmost possibility to be. The everyday idle talk of the they makes this an event which the they comes across,fromwhich,thus,onesindividualselfcanfeelsecure.[28] Idletalkmakes anguish out to be fear of a threatening event and thus as something which one oughtnottoindulgeinitdoesnotletthecouragetoanguishbeforedeathcome up,buthidesDaseinsownmost,nonrelationalpossibilitytobe.Inthatthethey accords to death only an empirical certainty (as a fact of general experience), it hides Daseins own authentic certainty belonging to its openness: the specific certainty thatdeathispossibleateverymoment,eveniftemporallyundetermined. Daseinis,withthiscertainty,alreadygiveninsomekindoftotality. The authentic being towards death is no concernful wantingtomake available, no waiting for a realisation it envisages the abilitytonotbe as pure possibility,inthatitanticipatesitasitsownmostpossibility,whichitmusttakeup itselfindependentlyofallrelations,andwhichthereforerevealstoititsauthentic beingtogetherwiththe inauthenticityofaverage being andtheothersauthentic possibilitytobe.Frominsidetheanguishedstateofmindthispossibilityposesa threat.Butforitstotality it hassignificance, as anticipationoftheunrepeatable possibility opens up all its presented possibilities with it, it harbours the 29 possibilityofanexistentialanticipationofthewholeofDasein. Daseins authentic possibility for being whole, announcing itself in the anticipationofdeath,needs,however,anattestationofthepossibleauthenticityof itsbeingfromDasein itself.Such is found inconscience.Frombeing lostinthe they Daseinmustbecalledtoitself.Thevoiceofconsciencehasthecharacterof a call. Called is Dasein itself silently, despite the they. The calling is again Dasein, but the appeal is not accomplished by me, rather it comes upon me: Daseininitsanguishconcernedwithitsownpossibilitytobeascare,isthecaller. The self is, for the Dasein lost in the they, a foreigner from this stems the foreignnessofthecall.Theappealtotheself[]doesnotforceitinwardsupon 30 itself, so that it can close itself off from the external world. The call points 31 forwardtoDaseinspossibilitytobe[].Itcallsusbackbycallingusforth. It speaks notof occurrences and gives nothing to talk about. When it speaks of guilt, this guiltiness designates an existential: a reason for a notbeings being. (Thisisfundamentaltoallhavingofguilt.)Dasein,asthrownintoexistence(i.e.a beingasproject),isreasonforitsbeing:itisdeliveredovertobeingasreasonfor

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thepossibilitytobe.Asitalwaysstaysbehinditspossibilities,asitinbeingoneis not being another, it is essentially always reason for notbeing and therefore alwaysguilty(inasensewhichisnotorientedtowardsevil,butispresupposedfor goodandevil).Thecorrectunderstandingofthecallofconscienceisthuswanting tohaveaconscience, towillinglyactfromthefreelychosenabilitytobe, andthus to be responsible. In fact all action is necessarily conscienceless, not only because it may failtoavoidsome factical moral indebtedness,butbecause it for the null reason of its null projection already has, in beingwithothers, become guilty towards them. Thus the wantingtohaveconscience becomes the taking over of that essential consciencelessness within which alone the existential 32 possibilityof beinggoodsubsists. Thusconsciencemanifestsitself[]asan attestationbelongingtoDaseinsbeing,inwhichitcallsDaseinfacetofacewith 33 itsownmostpossibilitytobe. Whenthehabitualinterpretationofconscienceas goodor bad reckons things passed or warns againstthings in the future,this (mis)represents the call of conscience from the point of view of everyday concernedness, directed at the presentat or readytohand and fleeing from authentic being. The correct understanding of the appeal of conscience is as a mode of Dasein, indeed as its openness. The corresponding state of mind is uncanniness,theappropriatetalktoremainsilent,inbothofwhichDaseintakes uponitselfitspossibilitytobe.Thewholeistobedesignatedresoluteness,and 34 thismeansadistinctivemodeofopenness, whichisidenticaltooriginaltruth. Dasein is not by this released from its beingintheworld, but is only now authentically situated and hence capable of authentic beingwith and authentic solicitude. In the wholeness which is hidden by anticipation, the temporality of Daseinmarkingallitsfundamentaldeterminationsshowsforth.Asbeingtowards the end which understands, i.e. as anticipation of death, resoluteness becomes 35 authenticallywhatitcanbe. Beingresolvedmeanstobehiddenandhideinthe possibilitytobe, i.e.tobe inthetruthandtoappropriate in beingconsciousthe takingofsomethingtobetrue. The current situation is notto foresee and it is not given beforehand as a presentathand it merely gets disclosed in a free 36 resolvingwhichhasnotbeendeterminedbutisopentodetermination. Hearing theappealofconsciencemeansDaseinsrevertingbacktoauthenticbeing,aswell astheacceptanceofitsownmostpossibilitytobeindeath,comingwithanguish anduncertainty.Tomakethisauthenticbeingshineforthisnoteasy:itmustfirst beweanedfromthedissimulatingeverydayattitude. WiththetermcareisdesignatedtheentirestructureofDasein(facticity as thrownness, existence as selfanticipation including being towards the end, deterioration).TheunityofthiswholeexpressesitselfintheselforI:itisnotto be understoodasres, noras res cogitans nordoes itspeak fromtheI,but it expresses itself silently in care, and it is independent in authentic being. It belongstothemeaningofcare,i.e.tothebeingofabeingforwhichthisbeingis anissue,thatthisbeingunderstandsitselfinitsbeing.ThemeaningofDaseins beingisnotsomethingfreefloatingwhichisotherthanandoutsideofitself,butit 37 is the selfunderstanding Dasein itself. The understanding of self is understandingoftheownmostpossibilitytobeandthisispossiblebecauseDasein comes to itself in its being. Likewise it is what it has been, and it is this by somethingpresent:future,havingbeen(past),andpresentareitsoutsideitselfor theecstasesofitstemporality.Thefuturehasprimacy.WithitDasein,futureand

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temporality are given as finite. What in relation tothis original time the infinite meansstillremainstobeshown. If the being of Dasein is essentially temporal, this temporality must be noticeable in all that belongs to its constitution of being. Understanding as projectionisauthenticallyorientedtowardsthefuture,insofarasitanticipates.In contrasteverydayunderstandingascarehasonlyauthenticfutureinthatitexpects the caredfor. The moment is the authentic present, in which the self recollects itself and opens up a situation by its resolution. Authentic understanding takes havingbeenbeinguponitself,whileconcernlivesinforgetfulnessofthehaving been.Thetemporalityofinauthenticunderstandinginwhichtheselfisclosedup isthusaforgettingmakingpresentexpecting. The state of mind, which beingthrown unveils and which accompanies every understanding, is founded primarily on havingbeenbeing, even if it is directed towards future things for example, anguish is authentically, and fear inauthentically, flight from havingbeenbeing and from the lost present intothe threatening future that must be faced. It is essential to the havingbeen which belongs to the stateofmind of anguish that it brings before Dasein its repeatability: Anguish brings back to the pure that of the most authentic individualised thrownness. This bringing back has neither the character of an evasiveforgettingnorthatofaremembering.Butequallydoesanguishnotimply a repeat taking over of existence in resolution. On the contrary, anguish brings backtothrownnessassomethingthatcanpossiblyberepeated.Andinthiswayit is revealed with the possibility of an authentic possibility to be, which, in 38 repetitionmustcomebacktoitsthrownthere. Deterioration has itstemporalityprimarily inthe presentwherecuriosity alwaystendstobeoccupiedwithsomething its emptiness stands inthegreatest possiblecontrasttothemomentofauthenticbeing. Totemporalitybelongsatalltimesallthreeecstases,andthesearenotto beunderstoodasonenexttotheother. 39 The being which bears the title Dasein is cleared, not through a presentathand implanted power, but in that ecstatic temporality clears the 40 there primordially. Through it the unity of all existential structures becomes possible.Fromitbeingintheworldistobeunderstood,[aswellas]themeaning oftheworldsbeinganditstranscending. Prudentconcernandtheoreticalunderstandingaremodesofbeinginthe world.Itischaracteristicofthetemporalityofprudentconcernthatthewherefore of the present and retained totalities of involvement are expected. The current concerntakesofffrominsideatotalityofinvolvement.Itsoriginalunderstanding is called overseeing and has its light from Daseins possibility to be. Practical deliberation concerning the involvement relations of the readytohand is a makingpresentofpossibilities.Inthetransitiontotheoreticalknowledgeliesnot only an example of praxis theory requires no less its own praxis but a revisionof whatisnowpresentathand:outside itsrelationsand itsplace, inan indifferent space. This is thematisation, in which the uncovered presentathand can be set free and meet us as an object a special makingpresent founded in resoluteness inthedisclosednessofthetheretheworld isdisclosedalong 41 withit andinDaseinstranscendingofthematisedbeing. ToDaseinbelongthethreeecstasesandbeingintheworld,whichisitself temporal. Daseins being as thrown, concerned, making present, and even as thematising and objectifying, always presupposes a world in which something

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presentathandorreadytohandcan be met.On theotherhand, withoutDasein 42 there is no world either. It is existing its world. The subject as an existing 43 Daseinwhosebeingisgroundedintemporality, obligesustosay:theworldis moreobjectivethaneverypossibleobject. Daseinstemporalityisnotoneinwhichspaceiscoordinatedtotime.But thespatialityofDasein istemporal.Dasein is notatapoint in space, butrather takes up space (and not only that which the body fills. Because Dasein is spiritual, and only because of this, can it be spatial in a way which remains 44 essentiallypossiblefortheextendedcorporealthing). Itisdirectedoutinspace and uncovers regions wherefrom and whereto it expects something and where thingsbecomepresent.Itstemporalitymakesitpossibleforittotakeupspace.In the approaching making present which gives preference to deterioration, the yonderisforgottenanditappearshereafteronlyasathinginspace. EverydayDaseinhasitsownspecialtemporality.ItisasDaseinisforthe most part running its course like yesterday, so today and tomorrow and in addition including an habitual calculation with time. Everydayness thus means temporalityasthismakespossiblethebeingofDasein,anadequateconceptual delimitation of everydayness can succeed only in a framework in which the meaning of being in general and its possible variations are discussed in 45 principle. Because understanding of being is necessary to disclose the meaning of being, and as understanding of being is something that belongs to Daseins constitution,theanalysisofDaseinisusedasapreparationfortheinvestigationof themeaningofbeing.TheanalysishassofardeterminedthebeingofDaseinas careandtherewithasbeingtowardsdeath.Forthesakeofcompletion,moreover, birthandtherelationshipbetweenbirthanddeathistobeincluded.Thisrelation is not to be conceived as a succession of real moments in time. Daseins temporality with its three equally real ecstases shows that Dasein does not primarilyorderitselfaccordingtotime,itsbeingisaselfstretchingtowhichbirth anddeathalways belong,andtowhichtheseare whathappens.This happening, which follows from Daseins temporality, is a precondition for history (= the scienceofwhathas happened).Historicalityand beingintimebothfollowfrom originaltemporalitythereforehistoryisalsosecondaryintime. According to common linguistic usage historical has a fourfold sense it signifies: 1. What has passed (and that as either what is no longer influential or whatremainsso)2.Thatwherefromsomethingcomesaboutordescends3.The wholeofthatwhichisintimeinparticular:4.Thebeingthatishuman(spirit, culture). The four senses are taken together in the affirmation that: History is thatspecificoccasioningofexistentDaseinwhichcomestopassintime,sothat thatwhichispastinthebeingwithoneanother,andwhichatthesametimehas beenhandeddowntousandiscontinuinglyeffective,isregardedashistory inthesensethatitgetsemphasised.[46] ButprimarilyhistoricalisDasein,which is not past (no longer presentathand), as it never was presentathand and secondarily allthatisinternaltothe worldof a havingbeenDasein(it iscalled theworldhistorical): forexample,equipmentthatstill ispresentathand when theworldinwhichitwasreadytohandnolongeris. Dasein exists in possibilities that are handed on and into which it is thrown,butwhichitneverthelesstakesuponitselfinfreeresolutionasitsdestiny. By destiny we designate the primordial happening of Dasein, which lies in authenticresolutenessandinwhichithandsitselfover,freefordeathitself,ina

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47 possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. Fate as the powerless superiorpoweroftheconcealedpreparingitselfforadversity,readyforanguishin a projection of itself on its own beingguilty requires care as its ontological 48 conditionforitspossibility,thatistosay,[itrequires]temporality. Onlyabeingwhich,initsbeing,isessentiallyfuturalsothatitisfreefor its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual there by shattering itself against death, that is, only a being which, as futural, is equiprimordially havingbeen, can, by handing down the inherited possibility, take over the own thrownness and instantaneously be for its time. Only authentic temporality whichatthesametimeisfinitemakessomethinglikefate,thatistosay,authentic 49 historicality,possible. Repeatingisexplicithandingdown,thatistosay,thegoing backtothe 50 possibilitiesoftheDaseinthathasbeenthere. Itallowsnotonlyareturningto what was previously real. It does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. Both are indifferent to authentic existence in the moment.[51] InbeingwithothersDaseinhaspartinthedestinyofthecommunity.Fate anddestinyarebeingtowardsdeath.Thusallhistoryhasitsgravityinthefuture, whichonlyinauthentichistoricalitycoversup. The innerworldly presentathand is historical notonly insofar as it is in the world, but insofar as something happens to it (which is fundamentally different compared to natural events). In the inauthentic sense of everyday concernthedistractedDaseincollectsitslifefromtheseparticularhappenings.In theauthenticbeingofresolutenessitlivesinitsfateandinfaithfulnesstoitsown self. History is existentially founded in Daseins essential historicality. Its themeisneitherwhatmerelyhappensonce,norsomethinguniversalwhichfloats 52 aboveit,butthepossibilitywhichhasbeenfacticallyexistent: Thepossibilities whichdrivehistory,whicharefromtheitselfhistoricallydeterminedDasein,are repeated. Nietzsches tripartition [of history] in monumental, antiquarian, and 53 criticalisnecessary,andcorrespondstothethreeecstasiesoftemporality. The final chapter will show what significance temporality and internal time have for the origin of the vulgar concept of time. Before all measuring of time,Dasein countsontime(whichithas,hasnot, loses,etc.).Itfindstimefirstin theinnerworldlyreadytohandandpresentathand,anditunderstandsitselfasa presentathand. The origin of the vulgar concept of time derives from Daseins temporality. Everydayconcernalwaysexpressesitselftemporallyasexpectingwhen, retentivethen and present now. Thus it dates all then, when, at the time that, now, as. The irresolute Dasein always loses time and has therefore none. The resolute never loses time and thus always has some. For the temporalityofresolutenesshas[]thecharacterofamoment[].Thiskindof 54 temporal existence has always time for what the situation demands of it. Because Dasein exists with others, who understand its now, then, etc., as also datedbyothers,timeisnotunderstoodasonesown,butaspublic. Countingontimeis founded necessarily inDaseins basicconstitutionas 55 care. Daseins being thrown is the reason why public time exists time in which there is withintime presentathand and readytohand. As brightnessbelongstothesightoftheworldintowhichDaseinisthrown,Dasein dates according to day and night (it is time to ), counts time in days, and

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measuresthesebythepositionofthesun.Thetimewhichisbasedinconcernis always time to ... it belongs tothe worlds worldliness and is therefore called worldtime. It is datable, tense, and public.Toreadthe time is always a now saying expressing a makingpresent. In the measuring of time its being made publicisaccomplished,accordingtowhichitalwaysandatanytimeisgivenfor everyone as now, now and now. It is dated according to spatial measurement relations,withouttherebybecomingspatialitself.Onlythroughthemeasurement oftimedowearriveat thetime,andtoeverything initsowntime.Itisneither subjectivenorobjective,asitmakesworldandthebeingoftheselfpossible.Only Daseinistemporalthereadytohandandthepresentathandexistmerelywithin time. Theaboveservesasafoundationtoshowtheoriginofthevulgarconcept oftime:withtheopennessoftheworldtimeismadepublicandbusy.Insofaras Daseincountsonitself,itcountsontime.Oneregulatesoneselfaccordingtotime bytheuseoftheclock,byreadingthepointers.Inthisliesapresentretentionof then and a making present of later. The time that shows itself in this is the 56 countedexpecting,counting followingofthetravellingpointershowing itself. ItexpressestheAristoteliandefinitionof timeasthenumberofmovement:itstays with the natural understanding of being without making it into a problem. The moreconcernlosesitselfintheequipmentprovided,themorenaturallyitcounts on time, without paying attention to it itself, and it takes it as a sequence of constant presentathand, simultaneously passing away and coming along now, 57 as a succession, as a stream of now []. This worldtime = nowtime, lacks the datability (= meaningfulness) of temporality: This is original time. Because timeisseenasapresentathandnowsuccession,onecallsittheimageofeternity (Plato). The tension of worldtime, which follows from the extendedness of temporality,remainscoveredup.Becauseeverynowisunderstoodbothasajust now and an immediately, time is understood to be infinite. This is founded on care,whichfleesfromdeathandignorestheend.Onespeaksofthepassingaway, butnotofthebeginningoftime,asonecannotconcealtheevanescenceoftimeto 58 oneself:Daseinknowsitfromitsfleetingknowledgeaboutitsdeath. Also in the irreversibility of time is revealed its origin from temporality, whichisprimarilyfutural. The moment cannot be explained from the vulgarly understood now, nor can the datable then and at that time. In contrast, the traditional concept of eternitycanbeseentooriginatefromitasastandingnow.Fromthepointofview oforiginaltemporality,Godseternitycanonlybeunderstoodasinfinitetime.In the juxtaposition of time and soul or spirit in Aristotle, Augustine, Hegel an approachtotheunderstandingofDaseinastemporalityisopenedup.

***

The analysis of Dasein was the way to prepare the question of the meaning of being.ThedifferencebetweenDaseinlikeandnonDaseinlikebeinghashitherto not been elucidated nor has the fact thatontological interpretation, which since time immemorial has been directed on thingly being, has again and again deteriorated.Everythingwasorderedtoshowtemporalityasthebasicconstitution of Dasein. Thus the investigation ends with the question: Is there a way which

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leads from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself manifest 59 itselfasthehorizonofbeing?

B.Evaluation The goal of the entire work was nothing else but to ask the question of the meaning of being in an appropriate manner. Is thus the question with which the work rings out identical with this question that was put aside, or is a doubt expressedastowhetherthewaychosenwastherightone?Whateverthecaseis,it invitesustolookbackattheroadtakenandtoquestionit. It will not be possible to give attention to all the difficulties which the 60 quite short abstract lets shine through. To this end a large volume would be necessary.Hereweshall merelyconcentrateonthe main featuresofthethought andattempttoanswerthefollowingquestions: 1.WhatisDasein? 2.Istheanalysisof Dasein accurate? 3.Isitasufficientfoundationforposingthequestionofthe meaningofbeinginanadequatemanner?

1.WhatisDasein? ItcanhardlybedoubtedthatHeideggerwantstounderstandDaseinasthehuman kind of being. We could also say: human beings, as Dasein often is called a being,withoutopposingthebeing,asthatwhichis,withbeingitself.Itisalso directly said that the essence of human beings is existence. That means nothing else than that something is claimed for human beings which according to the philosophiaperennis isreserved forGod:the identityofessenceand being.The humanbeingisneverthelessnotsimplyputintheplaceofGodDaseindoesnot simplymeanbeing,butaparticularwayofbeing,incontrastwithwhichthereare others:thepresentathandandthereadytohand,andalsosomethingwhichhere and there is hinted at, but which is not further discussed. The human being, however, is conceived as a little god insofar as it is claimed to be the being distinguishedamongallbeingsasthatbeingfromwhichaloneinformationabout themeaningofbeingistobehopedfor.Godisspokenofonlynowandthen in footnotes, and then only in a dismissive fashion: that divine being is something which could have significance for the meaning of being remains completely excluded. The choice of the name Dasein for human beings is positively founded onthefactthatitbelongstotheirbeingtobetherei.e.beingopentoitselfina worldinwhichitisalwaysdirectedtowardsayonder.Thenegativereasonis that the traditional and dogmatically determined definition of human beings as 61 consisting of two substances, soul and body, which is implied by the name humanbeing,shouldbeexcludedinadvance.Thatthehumanbeinghasabodyis notdisputed,butnothingfurtherissaidaboutit.Incontrast,thewayinwhichthe soulisspokenaboutindicatesthatthisisawordbehindwhichthereisnoclear meaning. This must not be understood to suggest that what we have here is a materialist outlook. In contrast: it is clearly stated that the spirit (this is 62 admittedlyalsoawordweoughtnottouse)haspriority. Apparentlytheanalysis

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ofDaseinshouldgiveustheclaritythatuntilnownodoctrineofsoulhasbeen ableto. Whatisleftofthehumanbeing,whenitisabstractedfrombodyandsoul? That another quite large volume could be written about this is perhaps the best proof of the distinction of essence and existence in human beings.[63] That Heidegger does not get away from this distinction, even when he denies it, is shown bythe factthatheconstantlyspeaksofthebeingofDasein: something which would have no meaning if by Dasein was meant nothing else than the human kind of being. Moreover, he also speaks about something that belongs essentiallytoDasein.Andwhenbeingintheworldissetforthasbelongingto Dasein,andwhoisdistinguishednotonlyfromtheworldbutalsofrombeing in,thenitisexpressedthatthewordDaseinisusedfordifferentthingsintimately belongingtogethertothepointwheretheycannotbewithouttheothers,and yet without being identical. Thus we must say: Dasein, for Heidegger, designates sometimeshumanbeings(referredtoaswhomorself),sometimesthebeingof human beings (in this case the expression the being of Dasein is often used). Thisbeing,initsdifferencefromothermodesofbeing,iscalledexistence.Ifwe think of the formal structure of beings, as shown in our investigations somethingthatis thensomethingexpressesthewhoorself,thethatis articulated by body and soul, whereas the being becomes valid in existence. Sometimes the analysis is concerned with the self, but mostly, however, it is 64 dedicatedtobeing.

2.IstheAnalysisofDaseinAccurate? It is nowhere expressly said even though it probably is presupposed as self evident that the analysis as a whole does not claim to be complete. The fundamental determinations of the human being e.g., stateofmind, thrownness, and understanding must be very undetermined abstractions, as they do not take account of the specificity of the psychosomatic being into consideration.(Thestateofmindseemsparticularlyimportanttomeinorderto ascertainwhatisbodilyandwhatisofthesoul,andhowtheserelate,butitsfull meaningcannotbecompletelyclarified,ifitisnotseeninitsunfoldingasrelating tothe being of body and soul). This incompleteness does not exclude, however, that what is said is genuinely informative about the human way of being. The description of the already mentioned fundamental constitution and its changing between the two different modes of everyday and authentic being must be described as masterly. It is probably largely thanks to this that the book has occasionedastrongandlastingeffect.Is,however,this fundamentalconstitution tobeevaluatedasananalysisofthehumanbeingwhichproceedsasfarasitcan? Doestheinvestigationnotinmanyplacesandinsurprisingwayshaltinfrontof referenceswhichpresentthemselvesinadirectandimperiousmanner? The human being isdesignatedasthrown. Withthis it isexpressly made clear that the human being discovers itself in Dasein, without knowing how it came to be there, that it is not from and through itself and that it also cannot expectinformationconcerningitsoriginfromitsownbeing.Withthis,however, thequestionconcerningtheorigindoes notcompletelydisappear.One mighttry bywhateverpowertosilence ittill itdiesortoprohibit itas meaningless it always inevitably arises again from the displayed distinctiveness of the human

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being and requires a something which is founding without being founded, something which founds itself: One that throws the thrown. Thus thrownness 65 revealsitselfascreatureliness. Especially plausible is the exposition of everyday Dasein: beinginthe world, the concerned commerce with things, the beingwith others. It must also unhesitatingly be conceded that human life firstly and for the most part is life with others in traditional forms, before ones own and authentic being breaks through athought which MaxScheler already emphatically stressed. Are the reasons for this fact sufficiently illuminated, however, through the distinction between the theyself and the authentic self, and the designation of either as an existential or form of existence? What we are to understand by an existentialisrepeatedlystated:thatwhichbelongstoexistenceassuch.Andby existence we are to think of the being of beings, in which their being is in question,i.e.thehumanbeingasdistinctfromothermodesofbeing.Incontrast, the expression form is left completely unclarified. And we know from the investigations of this book how much in need of clarification it is.[66] Thus we cannot gain from the expression form of existence any information about the meaning and the mutual relationship of the two selves. That a who or a self belongs to existence seems obvious. But what characterises this existential againstanother(as,forexample,beingintheworldandunderstanding)?And again:whatistherelationshipbetweenthetheyselfandtheauthenticselfatthe levelofbeing?Isitnotclearthatintheconstitutionofbeinginhumanbeingsthe selfplaysaveryspecialrole,whichitshareswithnootherexistential?Andhas notHeidegger madethe necessaryclarificationofthisspecialrole impossible in advancebydecliningtotalkaboutIorPerson,whileinsteadenumeratingthe possible meanings of these terms? With due regard to earlier clarifications we maywelldaretoaffirm:whatHeideggerintimateswiththeselfisthepersonal beingofhumanbeings.Anditisthedistinctionofpersonalbeingbeforeallelse that belongs to being human, that the person as such is the bearer of all other existentials. Canboththeauthenticselfandthetheyselfbeclaimedtobepersonin thefullsense?Itseemstomethatonetakesidletalktooseriouslyifonewanted toshowthetheythishonour.Inordertogettotheheartofthematter,wemust furtherinvestigatewhatinfactismeantbythethey.[67] Incommonparlanceoneoftenusesone,inthesamesenseinwhichIjust usedithere:onetakesidletalktooseriouslyInsteaditcouldhavebeensaid that whoever would, hed take [idle talk too seriously]. It is an expression of undeterminedcommonalityofa hypotheticalcharacter:totakingseriouslyas a personalattitudebelongsapersonalbearerbutitisnotaffirmedasafactandnot attributedtoaspecificperson.Thestatement:oneusesthewordusually inthis senseaffirmativelyestablishesafact.Itconcernsmoreoverapersonalattitude:to aseriesofindividualcaseswhicharebothexperientiallyestablishedandyetstill to be expected, and to an undetermined circumference that common experience allows one also to affirm with a special certainty. Often the speaker designates him or herself, as well as the one or those addressed, equally by one: for example: one could go for a walk on Sunday? This can be due to a certain shyness to express the we, which in fact is meant, and it can thereby give expression to a not yet fully confessed or secretly guarded community perhaps thisisalsoashynesswhichwouldliketohidefromoneselfaswellasfromthe addresseetheclaimwhichliesinthequestion,thefeelingsofthequestionerthat

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he perhaps goes further than what he ought to,or which could gain acceptance. With this we touch something that seems to lie in the Heideggerian one. The speakerknowshimorherselftoberuledbyacommonlaw,oratleastbyarule ofassessment.Heorshehasanimpressionof whatoneoughtandoughtnotto do.And inthisthe onehasacommon meaning: itdesignatesanundetermined circleofhumanbeings,towhomthespeakerknowshimselforherselftobelong. Tosumupwecansay:onemeans: 1.Acertaingrouporanundeterminedcircleofindividuals,ultimatelyall human beings, for whom something is valid as a common fact, or who are concernedbyacommonruleofattitude 2. The individual insofar as he stands under the common law or knows himself todoso. Shouldwe conclude fromthisthatthe individual flees from his own self intotheone[thetheyself]andshiftsitsresponsibilityontoit?Letussticktothe examples Heidegger himself gives: One prescribes, what one ought to have read.Itstandshere in bothsenses:referringtotheonethatdictates,andtheone concernedbythedictate.Thosewhomusthavereadthisorthatbookarethose belonging to a certain social stratum within a certain culture: barbarians need notourbuilders,insofarastheystillliveaccordingtotheirstateanddonotclaim to build cities, need not either but the cultivated European must. Many levels areheretobeobserved:somethingsareexpectedfromtheprofessor,thestudents, the lady of society, others are limited to a scientific speciality. Who determines what mustberead?Itisalsothosewhobelongtothesame level,though notall thosewhomaketheclaimtheirs,butasmallselectionofpredominantindividuals. It is here much as it is in a state: here there is authority and subjects it is simplynotlaiddownbylawandinfactnotatalldeterminedwhobelongstoone groupandwhototheother.Atanyrate,inonecaseas intheother,theone is not existing outside of and next to the individual human beings, nor is it an authenticselfitdesignatesacommunity(inawidesenseoftheword,including every kind of structure grown out from individuals as something that includes 68 them), as well as the members belonging to them as such. The predominant individuals belong to a wider community but form among themselves a more restrictedone. What can then the flight intothe one [the theyself] mean? Who flies? Why and whereto? The individual flees so we heard before his or her ownmost and authentic being, which is a lonely and responsible one, into the community, andunloads hisorherresponsibilityontoit,whetheruntothe more restricted one or the wider one. This can, strictly speaking, only be called a flight, when the individual is awake to authentic being and is conscious of responsibility.The firstDasein, inwhichthe human being findshimorherself thrown isnot,however,thelonelyone,butthecommunalone:thebeing with. According to its being the human being is cooriginally individual and communityoriented, but its conscious life as an individual begins laterthan the communal life in time. The human being acts with and like what he sees others do,andisledanddrawnbythis.Andthisisperfectlyinorderaslongasnothing else is demanded of him. A call is needed to awake the ownmost and most authentic being. If this call has been felt and understood, and if it has not been paidattentionto,thentheflightfromauthenticbeingandfromresponsibilityfirst begins.Andonlythendoesbeingwithbecomeinauthenticbeing:orbettersaid 69 perhapscounterfeitbeing.Beingwithisnotassuchcounterfeit. Thepersonis

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justas muchcalledtobeinga memberastobean individual but inordertobe abletobebothinitsownparticularway,fromwithin,itmustfirststepoutofthe imitatingmodeinwhichitlivesandisboundtoliveatfirst.Itsownmostbeingis inneedofthepreparationprovidedbythebeingwithothersinordertobe,inits turn,guidingandfruitfulforothers.Thismustbeignoredifonedoesnotwantto acknowledgedevelopmentasanessentialfeatureofthehumanwayofbeingand one must ignore development if one denies human beings an essence different fromtheirDasein,thetemporalunfoldingofwhichisitsexistence. If it is recognised that the individual needs the communitys support rightfrombecomingawaketohisorherownidentityassuchandinaspecific sense(i.e.asamember)andthattoacommunitybelongleadingspirits,who formanddetermineitslifeforms,thenitisnolongerpossibletoseethetheyasa formofdeteriorationoftheselfandnothingelse.Itdoesnotdesignateapersonin thestrictsenseoftheword,butapluralityofpersonslinkedincommunitywhofit themselvesintoitsformsbytheirDasein. Responsibilitybeginswiththeawakeningoftheindividualtoitsownlife. Onecanspeakoftheresponsibilityofthecommunity,whichisdifferentfromthat of the individuals. But this is borne for the community by its members, and to differentdegrees:itisbornebyallthosewhoarecapableofit,i.e.thosewhoare 70 awaketotheirownlife,butitisbornefirstandforemostbytheleader. Nowtothequestionofwhatonemusthaveread.Inacommunitythere arecertainlyhumanbeingswhoaremorequalifiedthanotherstojudgewhatmay contribute to genuine spiritual education. They carry then in this regard an intensifiedresponsibility,anditisthusappropriatewhenthosewhoarelessable to judge let themselves be led by them. In the reference to the they lies the remains of an understanding of the fact that every community must preserve a treasureofacquiredwisdomforwhichtheindividual,withhisorhernarrowfield ofexperienceandmodestdepthofinsight,doesnotsuffice,but[whichheorshe] on the other hand cannot renounce without substantial loss. Deterioration, however, consists in this: the predominant often are not at all those with professionalexpertise,andtheylettheirunprofessionaljudgementbebroadcastin anirresponsiblemanner.Ontheotherhand,however,themassalsosubjectsitself irresponsibly to the judgement of nonprofessionals and lets itself be bossed around when instead an independent, responsible attitude is called for. Irresponsibledoesthusnotmean herethathuman beings have noresponsibility, ratheritmeansthattheyclosetheireyestoit,andmoreoverseektopretenditis notthere. In this really lies a flight from ones own authentic Dasein. That it is possible is founded in the human being itself we can happily say: in the essenceofthehumanbeinginthatitslifeenclosesarichnessofpossiblekinds of attitudes and that freedom allows for choosing between drawing back and engagingoneself,betweentakingastandinthiswayorthat.Itis,however,also founded inthe natural bondingof human beings witheachother,inthedriveto participateandtomakeoneselfcount:thedriveofthestrongtoforceothers to follow, the drive of the weak to fit in and assure themselves a place by justifying the other. In this is expressed the care for ones own possibility, in which,accordingtoHeidegger,existencereallyconsists.Whatismeantbythis remains to be seen, but the question of deterioration must first be further clarified. Deteriorationdoesnotconsistincommunallifeassuch,norintheletting oneself be guided, but in undiscerning collaboration ignoring the call of

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conscience,atthecostoftheauthenticlifetowhichoneiscalled.WhenDasein deteriorates,neitheritsindividual,noritscommunitylifeisgenuine.Yetitsounds verystrangewhenHeideggerdeclaresthatthedeterioratedDaseinoughtnottobe 71 understoodtohavefallenfromapurerandhigheroriginalstate. Whatmeaning candeteriorationhave,ifthereistobenoreferencetoafall?(Thisisaparallel tothrownnesswithoutathrowing).Thereasonadvancedalsoispoor:because deteriorated being (it is even called nonbeing) is the closest kind of being to Daseins,inwhichthelatterexistsforthemostpart,deteriorationoughtnottobe interpretedasafall.Whentheaverageeverydayhumanbeingischaracterisedas deteriorated, this is only possible in contrast with authentic being, of which we mustalsohaveknowledge.Andinrelationtodeterioratedbeing,authenticbeing is,quabeing,moreoriginal.Afurtherquestionishowthetemporalrelationshipis tobeconceived.ThisissueisobscuredbyHeidegger,ashedoesnotobservethe difference between the breakthrough from a previous level of development to authenticbeingandtheturningbackfromadegeneratecondition.Itispossiblein thenaturalorderofthingstorisefromanearlierincompletedevelopmentalstage toamoreperfectbeing.Fromadegeneratecondition,however,nomoreperfect stage can be reached, according to the natural order. All decay also temporally presupposes a fall: not unconditionally in the being of the individual, but as a historical event from which it results. The special kind of fall which we know fromRevelationcannotbederivedfromthis.Butwemustsay,however,thatthe teachingoftheChurchconcerningtheFallisthesolutiontothepuzzlewhichhas arisenfromHeideggersexpositionofdegeneratedDasein. Wherefrom comes then the required knowledge of authentic being? It is announced in the voice of everyones conscience. This voice calls Dasein from being lostindegeneratebeingwith,backtoitsauthentic being.Thecaller must, inHeideggersview,againbeDasein.Ifthecallsoundsasifitcomesuponme, andnotfromme,thisisexplainedbytheauthenticselfbeingforeigncomparedto theselflostinthethey.What,however,testifies,againstappearance,tothefact thatthe one called should also be the caller? As far as I see, nothing does apart fromthefundamentalattitudethatissuesfromanddominatesthewholework:that thesolusipseisdistinguishedaboveallotherbeing,thatitisthatfromwhichall answers concerning being is to be expected, the ultimate origin beyond which there is nothing further. The uninhibited investigation of this solus ipse, however,againandagaincomesupagainstreferencestestifyingtothefactthatit isitselfnottheultimate:notultimatelyfundamentalandnottheultimatelight. We will not further concern ourselves with the call of conscience, but dwellinsteadontheaffirmationthattherearetwoformsofbeing:degenerateand authentic, and then ask of what authentic being consists. The mode of Dasein which corresponds to the call of conscience is resoluteness a special kind of opennessorbeinginthetruth,bywhichthehumanbeingtakesuponitselfits authenticbeing,whichisanunderstandingbeingtotheend,ananticipationof 72 death. We have now reached the essential feature of Dasein which Heidegger obviously has privileged. That it is always aheadof itself, that it is concerned withitspossibilitytobe(expressedbythewordcare),thatthefuturehaspriority among the three ecstases of its temporality, all this is merely preparatory references to the fundamental attitude: that the human being has its ultimate possibility indeathandthatitsopenness, i.e. itsunderstandingof itsownbeing, from the very first includes this ultimate possibility. This is why anguish is

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perceived to be its fundamental state of mind. An answer to the question that concerns us, of whether the analysis of Dasein is accurate, can therefore not be possiblewithoutprobingwhatissaidaboutdeath. We must first and foremost ask: What is death? Heidegger answers: the endofDasein.Heimmediatelyaddsthatwiththisnodecisionshouldbefavoured astothepossibilityofalifeafterdeath.Theanalysisofdeathremainspurelyof thisworld:itlooksatdeathonlyinsofarasitbelongstothisworldasapossibility ofthe particular Dasein. What comes after death is a question that can only be asked meaningfully and with justification when the ontological essence of death 73 has been grasped. Much is strange in this discussion. If it is the ultimate meaning of Dasein to be being towards death, then the meaning of Dasein should be clarified by the meaning of death. How is this possible, however, if nothing else can be said of death than that it is the end of Dasein? Is this not a completelyfruitlesscircularity? Moreover:doesthepossibilityof a lifeafterdeathreallyremainopen, if oneseesdeathastheendofDasein?Dasein has here beentaken inthesenseof beingintheworld.Oneshouldthusbeabletosay:itispossiblethatthebeingin theworldofhumanbeingsends,withoutthemthereuponceasingtobeinanother sense. But this would run against the sense of the previous analysis, which, although underlining other existentials besides beingintheworld (e.g. understanding), did not regard these as separable. Furthermore: if something of whathasbeenshowntobelongtothebeingofDaseinremainswhileotherthings cease(andhowcouldonethenspeakaboutlivingon?),onecouldnolongerspeak abouttheendofDasein. Finally: could we speak about having grasped the ontological essence of deathaslongasoneleavesitopenwhetheritistheendof Daseinorthetransition fromone modeofbeingtoanother?(We musthereunderstandthewordDasein asHeideggerhasuseditintheentirepreviousinvestigation,tomeannotonlythe endofearthlyexistence buttheendof human beingsas such).Isthis notrather thedecisivequestionconcerningthemeaningofdeathandthereforedecisivefor themeaningofDasein?Shouldittranspirethatnoanswertothequestionistobe gained from the analysis of Dasein, then it would be shown that the analysis of Dasein is incapable of clarifying the meaning of death and thus of giving sufficientinformationconcerningthemeaningofDasein. AsithappensHeideggerquicklypassesoverthequestionofwhatdeathis, 74 andconcentratesonthequestionofhowitcanbeexperienced. Heclaimsthatit cannotbeexperiencedasthedeathordyingofothers,butonlyasanexistential, as belonging to Dasein. (As dying also is designated as the ending of Dasein, thereisapparently nosharpdistinctiontomake betweendeathand dying.)We will now treat these questions: 1. Is there an experience of ones own death? (Heidegger says yes!) 2. Is there an experience of the death of the other (Heideggersaysno!)3.Howdothetworelate? According to Heideggers interpretation dying is that way of being in 75 which Dasein is towards its death, and by this is not meant its demise as transition from life to death, but something belonging to Dasein as such, which coconstructsitaslongasitlasts.Dowenotmeetanotherambiguityhere:onthe onehand,deathanddyingareanendtowardswhichDaseinisproceedingand,on theotherhand,itisthisproceedingitself?Inthefirstsense,deathisalwaysyetto come in the second, Dasein is itself a continuous dying. Both meanings are

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acceptable,butwe mustbeclearwhichone is inquestionwhenwe speakabout deathordying. WenowtakedeathinthesenseofwhatisyettocomeforDasein.Dowe haveanexperienceofit?Certainly,andevenasanexperienceinthebodydying meanstoexperiencedeath inthe body.Inacompletely literal,nonmetaphorical sense,wecanonlyhavethisexperiencewhenwedie.Inthemeantimemuchofit is already anticipated in life. What Heidegger calls dying being towards death or anticipation of death testifies to this. (That he does not take into accountthisanticipationascomparedwithauthenticdyingislinkedtohisgeneral overvaluation of the future and devaluation of the present. With this is also connectedthefactthathecompletelyomitsconsiderationofthephenomenonof fulfilment fundamental to all experience). We must here distinguish between anguish as the state which reveals to human beings their being towards death and the resoluteness that takes it on. In resoluteness, anguish has reached understanding. Anguish as such does not understand itself. Yet Heidegger interpretsitasbothanguishforonesownbeingandasanguishaboutonesown being.Doesbeingheremeanthesameinthesetwocases?Ormorecorrectly:is it the same being wherefore and whereabout one is anguished? That wherefore one is anguished is the possibility notto be,towhich anguish testifies: it is the experience ofthe nothingness of our being. That about which one is anguished, andlikewisethataboutwhichhumanbeingsareconcernedintheirownbeing,is beingasafullness, whichone wouldliketopreserveandnotleavebehindof which there is no mention in Heideggers entire analysis of Dasein and through which it would nevertheless first be founded. If Dasein were simply notbeing, then no anguish would be possible for the abilitynottobe and about the possibilitytobe.Botharepossiblebecausehumanbeingsshareinafullnessfrom whichsomethingcontinuallyslipsandsomethingiscontinuallywon:bothlifeand death. In contrast, authentic dying means the loss of fullness right to complete emptying, and death means emptiness or nonbeing itself. We now have to ask whethertheunderstandingofthepossibilityofonesownnonbeingandeventhe insightintotheinevitabilityofdeathwouldgrowoutofanguish,ifthiswerethe only way in which our own death was anticipated. Rationally we can only concludefromthenotnessofourbeingtothepossibilityofnonbeing,nottothe necessityofanexpectedend.Inthepretheoreticalunderstandingofbeingwhich belongs to human beings as such, there is a purely natural and healthy life feeling,acertaintyofbeingthatissostrongthat,whenunbrokenbyanguish,one wouldnotbelieveindeathwereitnotforothertestimonies.Thereare,however, such other testimonies, and they are so convincing that the natural certainty of being is annihilated when confronted with them. These are first and foremost ones own neardeath states: severe illness, especially when it brings sudden or progressivedeteriorationofpowersorthethreatofimmediate,violentdeath.Here iswheretherealexperienceofdyingsetsin,eveniftheenddoesnotcomeinthe caseswherethedangerpasses. In severe illness, which brings us face to face with death, all concern stops: all the things of this world, with which one has been concerned, lose importanceandfadecompletelyfromview.Thisalsomeansaseparationfromall 76 thosewhoarestillcaughtupinconcernonestopslivingintheirworld .Another care may replace it, as long as the inevitability is not yet understood or recognised:theexclusivecareforonesownbody.Butthatwillalsoend(evenif it is possible that someone might stay prisoner to it and even be surprised by

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death in the midst of it), and then there is finally only one important question: beingornotbeing?Thebeingnowinquestionismostcertainlynotbeinginthe world.Thathasalreadyendedwhenoneactuallyseesdeatheyetoeye.Itisthe endofbodilylivingandofallconnectedtobodilylife.Beyondthat,however,isa large,darkgate:onemustpassthroughitbutwhatthen?Thiswhatthen?is therealquestionofdeaththatisexperiencedindying.Isthereananswertothis questionevenbeforeonepassesthroughthegate? Peoplewhohavefaceddeathandthenturnedbackareanexception.Most arefacedwiththefactofdeaththroughthedeathofothers.Heideggerclaimsthat wecannotexperiencethedeathofothers,andwedoofcoursenotexperienceitin the same manner as our own death. Yet the dying and death of others are fundamentaltoourknowledgeoftheseandthusalsofortheunderstandingofour ownbeingandofthe human beingassuch. We would notbelieve intheendof ourlivesandwewouldnotunderstandanguish,yes,inmanyanguishwouldnot even erupt (without it being disguised as fear for this and that), if we did not constantly experience the fact that others die. As children we usually first experiencedeathas beingnolongerintheworld.People,whohavebelongedto ourcloseordistantenvironmentdisappear,andwearetoldthattheyaredead.As longaswedonotexperienceanymorethanthat,anguishisnotawoken,noristhe horror of death. On this basis, what Heidegger calls one dies, can grow: a knowledgethatallhumanbeingsonedaywillbecutoutoftheworldinwhich we live,andthatalsosuchadaywillcome forus.It isa factthatwedonotdoubt. Butwedonoteitherhavealivelyexperientialfaithinit:itisnotahappeningthat is embraced with a live expectation. Therefore it leaves us cold, we are not concernedaboutit.Forthese first yearsofchildhoodthis carefreeness is natural andhealthy.Ifitismaintained,however,intomaturityandperhapsthroughones whole life, then one must say that such a life is not authentically lived. A full human life implies an understanding of being which does not ignore the last things.Evenathoughtfulchildissoondisturbedbythedisappearanceofpeople in its neighbourhood and wants to know what it means to be dead and the explanationonegiveshimwillinducereflectionupondeath.Perhapsalreadythis sufficestoshatterthecarefreenessofonedies.Itiscertainlyshatteredbyseeing someonedead.Evenattending funeralscan have thiseffectonasensitive child. Theclearingofthecoffinthatfirstwascoveredinflowers,thecarryingawayand the lowering of the coffin into the grave, make one shudder in the face of the finalityofthefarewell,perhapsitalsoawakesahorroratthewrenchingawayof thesoul. If religious education has not given death a new meaning through referencetoeternal life,seeingthedeadaddswrenchingawayofthesoultothe interpretation of death as beingnolongerintheworld. This is so particularly whenoneunderstands vital livelinesstopredominate in living human beings,as comparedwiththespiritualexpression.Heideggermustignorethiscontemplation of death as it would force him to consider body and soul in their mutual relationship, something which he excluded from the start. Human beings have, since time immemorial, spontaneously met the experience of death with the questionofthedestinyofthesoul. The question is definitely awoken when one sees not only the dead, but lives through the dying process with the person dying. The one who has once witnessedadifficultdeathisforalwayslosttotheindifferenceofonedies.Itis thepowerfulsunderingofanaturalunity.Andwhenthestruggleisover,thenthe

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humanbeing,whohasfoughtorinwhomthefighthastakenplace,isnolonger there. What is left of her is no longer her self. Where is she? Where is what made her into this living human being? If we cannot give an answer to this question,thefullmeaningofdeathisnotcleartous.Faithknowsananswer.But doesthereexist,withintherealmofourexperience,somethingthataffirmsit?In fact there does. Heidegger rightly says that no human being can take away someoneelsesdeath.ItpertainstoDasein,andeverysingleonehasherdeathas shehasherDasein.Andsowhatoneseesatvariousdeathbedsisinnowayisthe samething.Idonotrefertothiscasebeingadifficultfightandthatonebeinga mildfallingasleep.Irefertothefactthatmanyadeadpersonliesthere,afterthe fight, like a victor: in majestic calmness and deep peace. So strong is the impressiononthesurvivorsthatthepainoverthelossfadesincomparisontothe importance of what has happened. Could the simple cessation of life, the transition from beingtonotbeing, bring forthsuchan impression? Andcould it be thought that the spirit, which has impressed this seal on the body, does not existanymore? There is a dying in which something else happens: in which all signs of struggleandsufferingdisappear,evenbeforebodilydeathsetsin.Herethedying personisilluminedbyanotherlifeinamannervisibletoallthosewhosurround him.Heisilluminatedashiseyesseeintoalightoutofreachforus:Itsglorystill lingers in the body whose soul has been wrenched away. Anyone who had not heard of a higher life, or who had lost belief in such a life, would in this sight meetthelikelihoodofitsexistence.Themeaningofdeathasatransitionfromlife inthisworldandinthisbodytoanotherlife,fromonemodeofbeingtoanother, is revealed to him. Then, however, Dasein as being towards death is not being towards the end, but towards a new [kind of] being: even though it is reachedthroughthebitternessofdeath,theviolentsunderingofnaturalexistence. Theconsiderationofdeathshould helpustounderstandauthentic being, towhichthehumanbeingiscalledbackfromitseverydayliving.Authenticbeing revealsitselfasabeingtowhichthehumanbeingtuneshimselfbyreferencetoa differentbeing,andloosenshimselffromeverydaybeing,inwhichhefirstfinds himself. In this manner we have three ways or degrees of being within Dasein itself,whichwe fromthepointof viewof faith canunderstandas natural life, life of grace, and life of glory. It is obvious that if one replaces the life of glory with nonbeing, then for the life of grace the being to an end is replaced withasteppingintononbeing.WemustnowaskwhetherwithinDaseinitself and not only from within its dying and death reference can be found to an authentic(i.e.fuller,notmoreempty)being.Suchsuggestionscanbefound inHeidegger,inexpressionsfromwhichonecanclearlyseethatauthenticbeing meansmorethantheanticipationofdeath.Resolutenessinvolvesunderstanding ones own possibility, which renders the human being capable of throwing herself forth, as well as an understanding of the factual situation and its demands.Livingauthenticallymeanstorealiseonesownmostpossibilitiesand to meet the challenges of the moment, which always expresses the given life conditions. Howshouldweunderstandthis,ifnotinthesenseoftherealisationofan essenceoraspecificity,which isgiven with beinghuman(i.e. withwhichone is thrown into Dasein), that, however, for its development needs free cooperation andhenceisentrustedtoone?Whatelsecantheconceptsofthemoment andthe situation mean apart from an understanding of an order or a plan, which the

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humanbeinghasnotherselfprojected,butinwhichshe neverthelessisincluded andplaysarole?AllthismeansabondbetweenDaseinandabeingwhichisnot itsown, butwhich isthe foundationandgoal for itsown being.Italso means a breaking open of temporality: the concerned bustling that dwells on no particularthing, butalways hastenstowardsthe futuredoesnotdojusticetothe moment.Hereinisexpressedthatallmomentspresentafullnessthatshouldbe brought out. Much is hereby said. First, that the moment is not simply to be takenasameremomentintime,asectionbetweenstretches ofpastandfuture. Itratherdesignatesthewayinwhichthetemporaltouchessomethingwhichisnot itselftemporal, butwhichreaches intoitstemporality.Heideggerhimselfspeaks oftheinterpretationoftimeastheimageofeternity,butonlyinordertoexclude it.Fromthestandpointofanunderstandingoftimethatknowsofnoeternityand declares being as such to be temporal, it is impossible, however, to clarify the meaning hegivestothe moment.Inthe momentandthisdoeshere meana moment intime something meetsusthatperhaps noothermomentwilloffer us.Tobringitout,i.e.totakeitupcompletely intoonesownbeing,wemust openourselvestoitandhandourselvesover toit.Itismoreovernecessarythat wedonotrelentlesslyhastenontosomethingelse,butstaywithituntilwehave broughtitoutoruntilamorepressingclaimobligesustorenounceit.Todwell withmeansthatwe,becauseourbeingistemporal,needtimetoacquirethe timeless. That we, however, despite our beings fleeting nature, can take the timeless up into ourselves, maintain something (what Heidegger calls having beenbeingisamaintaining),provesthatourbeingisnotsimplytemporal,thatit doesnotexhaustitselfintemporality. Therelationship betweenthetemporalityofourbeingandthetimeless it cantakeintoitselfandrealiseaccordingtothepossibilitiesdecidedinitis nosimpleequation.Ourearthlyexistencedoesnotyearnfortherealisationofall our possibilities, nor to take up all that is offered to us. The decision for a possibility and the letting go of others is designated by Heidegger as a being guilty,whichisunavoidableandtowhichwemustconsciouslyacquiesce,aswe resolutely take our existence upon ourselves. He fails to distinguish this guilt, founded in our finitude, from the avoidable and therefore sinful denial of an obligation.Itisprobably alsoa muchtooidealisedpictureofthe resoluteone, when he affirms that he never loses time and always has time for what is demandedof him inthis moment.Eventhe holy one,whocomes closesttothis ideal,willoftensaythatthenecessarytimeislackingforhimtofulfilallthatis requiredofhim,andheisnotcapablealwaysofclearlydiscerningthebestchoice 77 amongthedifferentpossibilitiesopentohim. Hewillfindrestintheconfidence thatGodpreservestheonewhoisofgoodwillfromatragicmistake,andmakes his involuntary errors serve a good end. But he also is convinced of his own fallibilityandthatGodaloneistheunrestrictedly openone. Theinabilityofourtemporalbeingtofullyunfoldouressence,toexpress whatwearebidtoassumeintoourselvesandpossessasawhole,pointstothe fact that the authentic being which we in temporality are capable of resolutenessfreedfromthedeteriorationofeverydaymediocrityandobedient tothecallofconscienceisstillnotourfinalauthenticbeing.Inthisconnection weshouldrememberasayingofNietzsche:Woetotheonewhosays:end!For alldesirewillseternity,willsdeep,deepeternity.Desiremustherenotbetaken inanarrowandlowlysense.Itmustbethoughtofasthedeepliberationinwhich the fulfilment of yearning is experienced. Heidegger does not want care to be

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understood as a state of mind, and not in the sense of a worldviewethical 78 judgementofhumanlife, butpurelyasthespecificityofthehumanbeing:that humans by their being are concerned with their being. But it is probably no coincidence that the word care has been chosen, and that his investigation, on theotherhand,leavesnoroomforwhatgiveshumanlifefullness:joy,happiness, love.Daseinisforhimemptiedtothepointofbeingasequencefromnothingto nothing.Andyet,itisratherthefullnessthatfirstreallymakesitunderstandable why the human being is about its being. This being is not only a temporal extension and therefore constantly ahead of itself the human being always requires being given new gifts of being in order to be able to express what the momentsimultaneouslygivesherandtakesaway.Shedoesnotwanttoabandon whatfulfilsherandshewouldliketobe withoutendandwithoutlimitsinorderto possess itentirely anddefinitively.Joywithoutend,happinesswithoutshadows, love without boundaries, the most intense life without sleep, the most powerful actionwhichatthesametimeiscompletestillnessandfreedfromalltension thatiseternalbliss.Thisisthebeingaboutwhichhumanexistenceis.Thehuman beingreachesoutinfaith,asshehereispromised,thatshewillbeinthefullsense when she is in full possession of her essence this promise speaks from her deepest essence, because it reveals the meaning of her being. To this belongs openness in a double sense: as transition from all possibilities into reality (the perfection of being) and in the Heideggerian sense as unlimited understandingofonesownbeingandabsolutelyallbeing,limited[only]through thelimitsofonesownfinitebeing.Inboth[ofthesesenses]therecollectionof thetemporalextensionintoaunity,referredtobyKierkegaardandHeideggeras themoment, is necessary. The modeof being in whichthedifference between the moment and duration is surpassed and the finite reaches its highest possible participation intheeternal isa midway between time andeternitythatChristian 79 PhilosophyhasdesignatedasAion(aevum). Hencethereisnomorethorough distortionoftheideaoftheeternalthaninHeideggersremark:IfGodseternity can be constructed philosophically then it may be understood only as a more 80 primordialandinfinitetemporality. A beingthathasreached fullpossession of its own being is no longer concerned for it. And also: to the extent that it is freed from the disfiguring tension of care for its own existence in order to embrace abandonment and the relaxation of the selfforgetting gift of self to eternal being, to this extent even its temporal being is already filled with the eternal. Care and temporality are therefore in no way the final meaning of the human being, but rather according to their own testimony what must be surpassed as far as possible, in order to reach the fulfilment of the meaning of being. Itisclear,then,thattheentireunderstandingoftimegiven inBeingand Time needs to be revised. Temporality, with its three ecstases and its extention, musthaveitsmeaningclarifiedasthewayinwhichthefinitegainsparticipation in the eternal. The significance of the future, so strongly emphasised by Heidegger,mustbeexplainedintwoways.FirstasHeideggerdoesasthecare for its preservation stemming from understanding the flux and nothingness of ones own being secondly as a direction towards a fulfilment yet to come, a transition from the dispersion of temporal being to the gathering of authentic, simple,eternity filled being.Moreover,thepresent mustbeaccordeditsrightful position as the way of being open to fulfilment,which like a flash of eternal

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lightopensuptheunderstandingtobeingsfulfilment,andthepastastheway ofbeingthatgivesanimpressionof durabilityinthefluxofourbeing. ThereisofcoursemuchmoretosayaboutHeideggersanalysisofbeing. Butwehavecomefarenoughtoanswerthequestionofwhetheritisaccurate:itis accurateinacertainsense,in[thesensenamely]thatitrevealssomethingofthe basicconstitutionofthehumanbeing,andsketchesacertainwayofbeinghuman withgreatclarity.Iknowofnobetterexpressionforthiswayofbeing,whichhe calls Dasein and understands to pertain to all human beings, than unredeemed being. Unredeemed is both its deteriorated everyday being, and that which he holds to be its authentic being. The first is the flight from authentic being, the avoidingofthequestion:beingornotbeing.Thesecondisthedecisionfornon being against being, the turning down oftrue, authentic being. With this is said thatthehumanwayofbeingassuchiscaricatured,despiteitbeingelucidatedin its ultimate depths. The exposition is not only defective and incomplete becauseitwantstounderstandbeingwithoutreferencetoessenceandstickstoa particular way of being it is also deceptive in regard to its subjectmatter, because it isolates this from the totality of ontological relations to which it belongs, and thus cannot reveal its true meaning. The description of everyday beingisambiguous,asitcomesclosetothemistakenaffirmationthatcommunity life as such is deteriorated, and that authentic being means lonely being, whereas in fact both solitary and community life have their authentic and deteriorated forms. And the description of authentic being replaces it with its denial.

3.IstheAnalysisofDasein aSufficientFoundationforAddressingtheQuestion of theMeaningofBeingAppropriately? HedwigConradMartiussaysaboutHeideggersapproachthatit is as ifadoor, solongleftunopenedthatitcanhardlybeopenedanymore,isblownwideopen with enormous strength, wise intention and unrelenting stamina, and then immediately closed again, bolted and so thoroughly blocked that any further 81 openingseemsimpossible. HehaswithhisconceptionofthehumanIworked outwithinimitablephilosophicalclarityandenergythekeytoanontologywhich, dispellingallsubjectivist,relativistandidealistghostscouldleadhimbackintoa truly cosmological and Godborne world. He establishes being first and foremost in its full and complete rights even if only in one place: the I. He determinesthebeingoftheIbythefactthatitunderstandsbeing.Thustheway isclearedtobringouttheunderstandingofbeingthatbelongstothehumanbeing undisturbed by the critical question of how the knowing I can reach out beyonditselfbutalsotobringoutthebeingoftheworldandallcreatedbeing, which inturngroundstheunderstandingofdivinebeing.Insteadofthis,theIis thrown back on itself. Heidegger justifies his taking the analysis of Dasein as pointofdeparturewiththefactthatonecanonlyaskabeingforthemeaningof being, if it belongs to its meaning to have an understanding of being. And as Dasein notonly hasunderstanding foritsownbeing,butalsoforotherbeings, onemuststartwithananalysisofDasein.Butdoesnottheoppositefollowfrom thisreasoning?Becausethehumanbeingunderstandsnotonlyitsownbeingbut

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alsootherbeings,itisnotreferredtoitsownbeingastotheonlypossiblewayto themeaningofbeing.Surelytheselfunderstandingofbeingmustbequestioned, and it is advisable to take ones own being as point of departure, so that the understanding of being can be laid bare in its root and critical reservations be encounteredfromthestart.[82] Butthepossibilityalwayspersistsofbeginningwith thebeingofthingsorwithprimarybeing.Onewillnotgetfromthisasufficient explanation ofthehumanbeing,butonlyreferencestoitthatmustbechecked.On theotherhand,thehumanbeingalsogivesonlyreferencestootherwaysofbeing, andwe mustquestionthese if wewanttounderstand it.They[83] willofcourse not answer in the same manner as a human being answers. A thing has no understandingofbeingandcannottalkaboutitsbeing.Butitisandhasameaning thatisexpressedinandthroughouterappearance.Andthisselfrevelationbelongs tothemeaningofthinglybeing. Heidegger cannot accept this however, as he recognises no meaning distinctfromunderstanding,butdissolvesmeaninginunderstandingalthough meaningisseenasrelatedtounderstanding.(Wewillhavetospeakofthislater.) That one cannot reach understanding of other ways of being from the starting pointofthehumanbeing,ifonedoesnotapproachthislatterwithoutprejudice,is shownbythedarknessinwhichthebeingpresentathandandthebeingreadyto handareleftbyHeidegger.Infactthehumanbeingiscaricaturedalreadyinwhat it shares with the being of things: in the deletion of its essentiality and substantiality. ItisobviousthatHeideggers investigation is bornealongbyaparticular and presupposed understanding of being, not only by a preontological understanding of being which belongs tothe human being as such and without whichnoquestioningofbeingispossible.[Itis]alsonot[borne]byanygenuine ontology, as Heidegger himself would have understood it: research which with persistentfocusonbeingbringsthistospeak.Fromthestarteverythingismeant to demonstrate the temporality of being. Hence a barrier is raised everywhere whereaviewcouldopenontotheeternalthereforetherecannotexistanessence distinctfromexistencethatcoulddevelopinexistence,nomeaningdistinctfrom understandingthatisgrasped inunderstanding, noeternaltruth independentof humanunderstanding.Inallthesethetemporalityofbeingwouldbebrokenopen, and this is not allowed to happen, even though existence, understanding, and discovering cannot be understood apart from something that is independent of themandtimeless,whichenterstimethroughtheseandinthese.Languagetakes on a particularly bitter and spiteful tone when such urgent references must be toned down: for example, when eternal truths are designated as belonging to those residues of Christian theology within philosophy which have not yet been 84 radicallyextirpated. Insuchpassages,anantiChristian feelingcomesthrough which is generally mastered, however, perhaps in a struggle with [Heideggers] own, far from dead, Christian being. It also shows in the manner in which the philosophyofthe Middle Ages istreated:in minorsideremarkswhich it seems superfluoustodiscussinearnest,asdeadendswheretherightquestionaboutthe meaning of being got lost. Would it not have been worthwhile to investigate whether the real question of the meaning of being lives in the discussion of analogiaentis?Inamoreseriousinvestigationitwouldalsohavebeenclearthat traditiondidnotunderstandbeingintermsofmerebeingpresentathand(i.e. thingly persistence). It is moreover very conspicuous how the discussion of the conceptoftruthinthesenseofthetraditionissimplysaidtopertaintojudgement,

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when Saint Thomas, in the first Quaestio de veritate answering the question: What is truth?, distinguishes four senses of truth, and in no way considers the truth pertaining to judgement to be the primary, even if [he considers it to be] primary in relation to us. When he, with Hilary, denotes the true as being that reveals and explains itself, it reminds one specifically of Heideggers truth as revealedness.Andwhereisthejustificationoftalkabouttruthasanexistential, ifnotinrelationtothefirsttruth?Godaloneiswithoutrestrictioninthetruth, whilethehumanspirit,asHeideggerhimselfemphasises, isequally inthetruth andinfalsehood.ThecriticsofBeingandTimehaveseenitmostlyastheirtask to demonstrate the rootedness of this philosophy in the leading spirits of the previouscentury(Kierkegaard,Nietzsche,KarlMarx,Bergson,Dilthey,Simmel, Husserl,Scheler,etc.).Itseemslostonthemtowhatextentthestrugglewith Kant has been decisive. (The Kantbook has made that clear.) And of no less importance is the constant reference tothe original questions of the Greeks and their transformation in later philosophy. It would be worthwhile in a separate investigation to assess Heideggers relation to Aristotle and Scholasticism, from thewayinwhichhequotesandinterpretsthem.Thatcannot,however,beourtask here. Whenwelookattheworkinitsentirety,weareleftwiththeimpression thatitattemptedtoshowthehumanbeingastheultimatefoundationtowhichall otherwaysofbeingleadback,butthattheoriginalattemptbecamequestionable intheend.ItwillbegoodtocomparethiswithHeideggerslaterpublicationson thequestionofbeing,inordertoseewhetherthisimpressionremains.

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This booksetsout,onHeideggersownaccount,toshownotonlywhatKant in 86 facthassaid,butwhatheintendedtosay. ItisalsomeanttoshowthatBeing and Time is a repetition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e. a new attempt to foundmetaphysicsthroughwhichtheownprimordialpossibilityoftheKantian 87 attemptisdisclosed. We will not here investigate whether this interpretation, which must 88 necessarily resort to violence, interprets Kant truly. Our task is only to find furtherclarificationofthequestionraisedinBeingandTime:thequestionofthe meaningofbeing.Thequestion,withwhichthefirstpartof BeingandTimerings out is there a way which leads from original time to the meaning ofbeing ? 89 Does time manifest itself as the horizon of being? must probably be designatedastherealthemeoftheKantbook.Theentireinvestigationisintended toletapositiveanswertothisquestioncomethrough. Traditional metaphysics,onwhich Kantbases himself, hascombinedthe question of beings as such with the question of the totality of beings and the excellentrealmof beingsassuch[]throughwhichthetotalityofall beings is 90 determined. Thequestionofbeingassuchisanearlierone.Butinordertobe abletounderstandtheessentialdeterminationofbeingsthroughbeing,beingitself 91 must firstbegrasped. Should thequestion, whatdoesbeing mean? findan answeritmustbeclarifiedfromwhereoriginallyananswercanbeexpectedat 92 all. Hence the question: From where at all are we to grasp something like

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93 being[]? isstillmoreprimordialthanthequestionconcerningbeingsassuch and being as such. We are thus driven back to the question concerning the 94 essenceoftheunderstandingofbeingassuch. Inordertoshowthepossibility ofaknowledgeofbeings,thefoundingofmetaphysicsmustbeanelucidationof 95 the essence of a relation to beings, in which these show themselves as such. Onticknowledge(=knowledgeofbeings)becomespossiblethroughontological knowledge, i.e.throughanunderstandingof beingsconstitutionofbeing,which liesbeforeexperience.Asitbelongstotheessenceofhumanreasontotranscend itselftowardsbeings,andasthis fundamentalconstitutionofthe human spirit is called transcendence, the fundamental ontology which must achieve the founding of metaphysics is called Transcendental Philosophy. Thus transcendence isbroughttothecentreoftheinvestigation:Because metaphysics 96 the questioning of being lies in human nature, the foundation of metaphysicsmustdisclosethatintheconstitutionof[the]beingofhumanbeings, which is the reason for their understanding of being. Fundamental ontology is therefore analysis of Dasein and especially of its transcendence. In transcendence,however,thefinitudeofhumanbeingsannouncesitself.Itiswhat makesallfiniteknowledgepossible:aturningtowardswhichbuildsahorizon through which (i.e. in which) the objectivity of an object becomes possible. 97 Transcendence makes the beings themselves accessible to a finite being. In transcendence,Daseinmanifestsitselfasneedoftheunderstandingofbeing[]. 98 ThisneedistheinnermostfinitudethatcarriesDasein. Thehumanbeingisin themidstofotherbeingsinsuchawaythatthebeingthatsheisnotandthebeing 99 thatisherselfalwaysalreadyaremanifesttoher. Dependentonthebeingthat she is not,the human being is, at bottom, not even master of herself. With her existence there occurs an irruption into the totality of beings such that, by this even, the beings become manifest in themselves, i.e. manifest as beings this manifestationbeingof varyingamplitudeand havingdifferentdegreesofclarity and certitude. However, this prerogative [...] to be in the midst of beings, delivered up to them as such, and of being answerable to oneself as a being, involves in itself the necessity of a need for an understanding of being. The human being must,insofaras it is, beabletoletbe,and forthisshe musthave 100 already projected that which she encounters as a being. Existence (i.e. the human way of being) is in itself finitude and, as such, is only possible on the basis of the understanding of being. There is and must be such as being only 101 wherefinitudehasbecomeexistent. Themostoriginalactionofthefinitespiritisthebuildingofthehorizonin whichbeingscanmeet.Thisactioniscompletingpresentation.Itproducesthe 102 immediate aspect of the now as such, which belongs to any seeing of the present,and likewiseofthe notanymoreofthe pastorthen,which isunitedto the now and presupposed for all retaining. The seeing of the present, and the remembering of what has been, are inseparable: to these belong thirdly the understanding of the present and the past as the same: it relies on a search, a prospectingproceeding.Thisprospectsthehorizonofproposednessingeneral, it is the original formation of that which makes all intending possible, i.e. the 103 future. Andso,thatwhichisformedasthehorizonofbeingsistime.Theforming ofthehorizonis,however,takentoengageoriginaltime:Timeispureintuition in that it spontaneously preforms the aspect of succession and, as a creative taking, proposes this aspect as such to itself. This pure intuition concerns itself

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with that which it intuits (forms) [...]. Time is, according to its nature, pure 104 affectionofitself. Timeisnotanactiveaffectionengagingapresentathand self butaspureself affection, itformstheessenceofallself concernedness.So far,however,asthepowerofbeingselfconcernedbelongstotheessenceofthe finite subject, time as pure selfaffection forms the essential structure of subjectivity[].Aspureselfaffection,itoriginallyformsfiniteselfhoodinsuch 105 awaythatselfconsciousnessbecomespossible. Pureselfaffectionprovides 106 thetranscendentaloriginstructureofthefiniteselfassuch. TheIis,liketime itself,notintime.Fromthisitdoesnotfollow,however,thatitisnottemporal, 107 but that it renders time itself as such possible according to its own essence. The abiding and remaining of the I do not mark it as substance, but belong essentiallytothelettingbeofthingswhichtheIaccomplishes.Thisabidingand remaining are not ontic assertions concerning the immutability of the I but [] transcendentaldeterminations[].TheabidingIissocalledbecauseitastheI think, i.e. the I represent, proposes subsistence and persistence to itself. As I, it 108 formsthecorrelativeofsubsistenceingeneral. Becausethepureobtainingof purepresentsight istheessenceoftime,theabidingandpersistingI is theIin the original forming of time, i.e. as primordial time. The full essence of time comprisesthereforetwothings:pureselfaffectionandthat whichspringsfrom [109] it,andwhichcanbecaughtsightofwithintheusualcountingon time . Originaltimeistheultimatefoundationtowhichthehumanunderstanding of being is led back. The reference to the understanding of being is, however, founded on the finitude of humans. This is why the question of finitude as the basic constitution of the human being becomes the fundamental question of the foundation of metaphysics. (Only in this sense is it possible to make 110 anthropology thecentreofphilosophy.) ThusHeideggerregardsitastheessentialtaskoffundamentalontologyto showhowfartheproblemofthefinitudeinhumanbeingsandtheenquirieswhich itcalls for necessarilycontributetoourmastery ofthequestionof being,[] it must bring to light the essential connection between being as such (not beings) 111 andthefinitudeinhumanbeings. Thisessentialconnectionisseeninthatthe constitutionofbeingofallbeings[]isaccessibleonlythroughunderstandingin 112 so far as this [latter] has the character ofprojection. With transcendence (or 113 beingintheworld)theprojection[...]ofbeingsingeneralhappens. Inthat Dasein needs understanding of being, it is cared for thatthe possibility that somethinglikeDaseincanbe.Thetranscendentalneedisasinnermostfinitude 114 carrying Dasein. And care is the name for the structural unity of Daseins essentiallyfinitetranscendence. For the critique of care (and thus of the entire Daseinanalysis as fundamental ontology and foundation of metaphysics), Heidegger has himself handed us the perspectives they should show thatthe transcendence of Dasein and consequently the understanding of being does not constitute the innermost finitudeofhumanbeings,sothatthefoundationofmetaphysicsdoesnothavean essentialrelationtothe finitudeofDasein,and finally,thatthebasicquestionof the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is not opened up by the problem of theinnerpossibilityoftheunderstandingofBeing.[115] As these three perspectives strike the core of Heideggers existential philosophy, we will now dare to test their validity. The first question goes like this: Is Daseins transcendence and hence the understanding of being the

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innermostfinitudeofhumans?Inordertoanswerthequestion,wemustbeclear aboutwhatismeantbytranscendence,understandingofbeing,andfinitude. What transcendence means has been thoroughly dealt with. It is synonymouswithbeingintheworldormoreaccurately:whatfoundsitthe humanfindsitselfasabeinginthemidstofbeings,andthebeingheishimselfis disclosed to him along with other beings, as he forms a horizon in an original turningtowards, in which beings can meet. This formation of the horizon is thoughtofasunderstandingofbeing,andindeedasunderstandingprojectionofa beings constitution of being. Transcendence and understanding of being thus coincide. Theyshouldalso,however,coincidewith finitude.Whatismeantbythis isnotsoeasilyexposed.Variousthingsareexcludedwhichshouldnotbemeant byit:1.Thefinitudeofhumansshouldnot bedeterminedastemporalityitalso does not mean imperfection: imperfections do not let the essence of finitude be seen,theyareperhapsonlysomeof itsdistantfactualconsequences.2.Finitude must not either be interpreted as creatureliness: And even if we succeeded in doing the impossible, i.e. in proving rationally that the human being is created, thenthecharacterisationofthehumanbeingasanenscreatumwouldonlypoint upthefact ofthisfinitudewithoutclarifyingitsessenceandwithoutshowinghow this essence constitutes the fundamental constitution of being of the human 116 being. Weareconvinced,withthetradition,thattheimpossible ispossible, i.e. that createdness can be proved rationally perhaps notthe special kind of creation which is presented by the biblical narrative of creation (with regard to this actual historical happening we talk aboutthe mystery ofcreation), but the necessity,nottobeperseorase,butabalio,whichfollowsfromthefactthatthe human being is something, but not everything. Is this not precisely the authenticmeaningoffinitude?Heideggertouchesonthiswhen he finally brings up the question: Is it possible to develop the finitude in Dasein, even as a problem, without presupposing infinity?[117] He must immediately add a further question: What is the natureofthis presupposition in Dasein? What doesthe infinitudethus posed mean? Withthesequestions headdresseswhat,aspre ontologicalunderstandingofbeing,hasgivenpurposeanddirectiontoourabove efforts regarding the meaning of beings: Finitude can only be understood in relationtoInfinity,i.e.totheeternalfullnessofbeing.Theunderstandingofbeing of afinite spirit is as such always already a breakthrough from thefinite to the Eternal. With this we have in advance answered more than the question under discussionconcerningtherelation betweentranscendenceand finitude. We must nowtakeourthinkingtoitsconclusion.Enscreatumhasnotonlythemeaning oftheactuallycreated,butalsothatofsomethingwhichisessentiallyconditioned by the infinite. Herein lies the meaning of finitude: to be something and not everything.Thismeaningoffinitude,however,isnotonlyfulfilledinhumansbut ineverybeingwhichisnotGod.Thusfinitudeassuchandtranscendencedonot simply belong together. Transcendence means the breakthrough from finitude, whichaspiritual,and,assuch,knowingpersonalbeing,isgiveninandthrough itsunderstandingofbeing.Heideggersometimesspeaksofthespecificfinitudeof human beings, but without ever saying what he understands by it. In order to explainit,[he]wouldhavetoabolishthatwhichdistinguishesthebeingofhuman beingsfromthatofnonpersonalspiritualbeingsandfinitepurespirits.

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We come now to the second question: is the foundation of metaphysics ultimatelyconcernedwiththefinitudeofDasein?Heideggerhasnotgivenupthe oldsenseofmetaphysicageneralisasthedoctrineconcerningbeingsassuch, butonlyemphasisedthatitisnecessarytoclarifythemeaningofbeinginregard toit.Inthisweagree.Hehas,however,takenastepfurtherandclaimedthatone, in order to understand the meaning of being, must investigate the human understanding of being, and as he found the ground for the possibility of the understanding of being in the finitude of human beings, he saw the task of founding metaphysics to lie in a discussion of human finitude. Against this, reservationsmustbemadefromtwosides.Metaphysicsconcernsthemeaningof being as such, not only of the human being. We must of course question the human that is ourown understanding ofbeing as regards the meaning of being. But this means that we must ask what it intends when it speaks about being.Andthisquestion may notbereplaced by theotherquestionofhowsuch understanding of being happens. The one who neglects the question of the meaningofbeing implicit intheunderstandingof being itself,andprojects it carelesslyasthehuman understandingofbeing,isindangerofcuttinghimselfoff from the meaning of being: and as far as I can see, this is what Heidegger succumbsto.Wewillhavemoretosayaboutthis.Thenconsiderthisotherpoint: Wesawthattheunderstandingofbeingdidnotbelongtofinitudeassuch,asthere are finite beings which have no understanding of being. The understanding of beingbelongstothatwhichdistinguishesspiritualandpersonalbeingsfromother kindsofbeing.Internaltothis,thehumanbeingsunderstandingofbeingmustbe distinguishedfromthatofotherfinitespirits,andallfiniteunderstandingofbeing must be distinguished from infinite (divine) understanding of being. What understanding of being is as such, however, cannot be explained without clarifying what the meaning of being is. Therefore it remains that for us the fundamental question for the foundation of metaphysics is the question of the meaning of being. What significance the human understanding of being has for themeaningofbeingisimportantfortheevaluationoftherolewhichthefinitude ofhumanbeingsmustplayinthefoundationofmetaphysics.Thiscoincideswith the third question which it remains for us to discuss: whether the fundamental question of the foundation of metaphysics is contained in the problem of the internal possibility of the understanding of being. The problem is not yet dealt withbythefactthatwehavedesignatedthequestionofthemeaningofbeingas the fundamental question. These two are intimately connected: to ask for the meaningofbeingpresupposesthatwe,thequestioners,haveanunderstandingof being,thatsuch[understanding]ispossible.Toinvestigatethisunderstandingof being in itsinnerpossibility, i.e.accordingtoitsessence, istopresupposethat the meaning of being is accessible to us. For understanding means nothing else thanhavingaccesstosomebeing.Meanwhileitispossibletoaskthequestionof the meaning of being without also asking how the understanding of being is achieved, since we in understanding something are turned towards the meaning andnottowardstheunderstanding.Itis,incontrast,notpossibletoinvestigatethe understanding of being without including the meaning of being. If disconnected from accessible meaning, understanding is no longer understanding. In any case wehaveashiftinthemeaningof foundation, ifoneconsidersthequestionofthe understandingofbeingandnotthequestionofthemeaningofbeingasthe fundamental one. It would still be possible, however, that the meaning of being

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also would be clarified in a faithful and sufficient investigation of the understandingofbeing.IsthisthecaseinHeidegger? Heidegger says that the human being must be able to let beings be and 118 mustalsohaveprojectedthatwhichheencountersasbeings. Moreover:such as being is and must be only where finitude has become existent. Finally: the beingof beings isonlyunderstandable[] ifDaseinonthe basisof itsessence 119 holds itself into nothingness. In order to be able to understand this last sentence, we must seek information as to what is meant by nothingness. At a 120 previousoccasion thatwhichpureknowledge knowsthepure horizon wasdesignatedasanothingness.Anditwassaidofit:Nothingnessmeans:nota being,butyetsomething[...]Whatisseeninpureintuition(spaceandtime)is called ens imaginarium, and this expression is explained as follows: the ens imaginariumbelongstothepossibleformsofnothingness,i.e.towhatisnota 121 beinginthesenseofbeingpresentathand. Accordingtoalltheseexplanationswhat isunderstoodby nothingness is not absolutely nothing. As there is talk of various forms of nothingness and theseare notfurtherexplained, itremainsunclearwhatkindofsomethingwas meantearlier.Ifwetakeallthepassagesquotedtogether,andmoreoverremember whatwassaidaboutoriginaltime,nootherinterpretationremainspossiblethan that by nothingness is here meant a beings constitution of being, which is projected with understanding by human beings, i.e. being itself. If this really is what is meant and everything points towards it, in the Kantbook even more clearly than in Being and Time , then beings and being are torn apart in a mannersuspendingthemeaningofbeing:ifwedesignateathingasabeing(even Heideggeradmitsthinglybeingwhichhecallsthepresenttohandtobeaformof being), we mean that it itself is, that it has being independently of our understandingofbeing.Heideggerhascorrectlyemphasisedthatinbeingawhat (essence, essentia), thatbeing (reality, existentia) and beingtrue always means somethingdifferent,andthatitisnecessarytoclarifythereasonforthisdivision of being and the meaning of being. (This in fact is the big question of the analogia entis.) In any case we always mean by being something which is something, is essential, is real or true, is itself and not something in which it is capturedatthesametimebyourunderstandingofbeing.Yes,evenourownbeing issomethingwhichwecomeupon.Heideggerseekstojustifycallingthehuman understanding ofbeing anaccepting intuition, a thrown project. But his whole effortiscentredoncharacterisingtheprojectassuch.Thrownness(=finitude =referrednesstootherbeings) ispicturedasthe fundamentalconstitutionofthe humanbeing,butitdoesnotobtaintheclarificationitcould,andwhichwouldbe able to disclose the meaning of being and of the understanding of being. Heidegger expressed the conviction that Kant would have recoiled from the resultsofhiscritiqueof purereason.Tothisheaddstheremarkablequestion:do ourownefforts[]notevidenceasecretevasionofsomethingwhichweand 122 certainlynotbyaccidentnolongersee? Heregardsitthusaspossiblethat his own foundation of metaphysics holds back from what is decisive.[123] With thisthepointtowardswhichwesteeredhasbeenreached.Heideggersexistential philosophywithdrawsandstopsinfrontofwhatgivesbeingmeaningandtowards which all understanding of being is directed: in front of the infinite, without which nothing finite and the finite as such can be comprehended. That it is a withdrawalandamakinghalt,and[thatitis]notasimpleoversight,isseenfrom thefactthatfollowingKantfiniteknowledge,appearanceorobjectandbeingas

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suchareopposed:Thetermappearancereferstothebeingitselfastheobjectof finiteknowledge.Moreprecisely:onlyforfiniteknowledgeistheresuchathing as an object. Only such knowledge is exposed to the beings which already are. Infiniteknowledge,incontrast,revealsbeingstoitselfbylettingthemariseand has at the same time the arisen only in the lettingarise i.e. as revealed arisen [].Theyare beingsas beings inthemselves, i.e.notasobjects.The being of theappearanceisthesamebeingasthebeingassuch,butasobjectitdiscloses itselfinconformitywiththemannerandscopeofthepossibilitytoacceptwhich 124 isatthedisposaloffiniteknowledge anditbelongstofiniteknowledgethatit 125 asfinitealsonecessarilyconceals... Inwhatfollows,however,thisopposition [betweenfiniteandinfiniteknowledge]hasbeendropped.Onlyfiniteknowledge istalkedabout,andthebeingwhichitacceptsasan object.Therebyare,however, beingsinthemselvesreplacedbyobjects,andtheformalstructureprojected by finiteknowledge fortheobjectclaimedtobebeing itself.Isthis shifttobe justifiedbythe factthathumanreasonas finite iscircumscribedbythe limitsof finitude and must renounce the claim to understand and say something about beings as suchand infinitereason? Is it not rather so,thatthe knowledge of ones own limits is necessary for breaking through these? Knowing oneself as finite means knowing oneself as something, and not everything, but by this everythingisenvisaged,evenifnotcomprehended,i.e.enclosedandmastered by human knowledge. Human understanding of being is only possible as a breakthrough from finite to eternal being. Finite being as such must be known fromthepointof viewofeternal being.Butsincethe finite spiritonly glimpses eternal beingwithoutbeingabletocomprehend it,finitebeing,andalso itsown being, remains uncomprehended, a magis ignotum quam notum: the eternal embarassment,thewhichwemetasstartingpointforAristotles metaphysics, and which comes to an end in Heideggers foundation of metaphysics. Ifthe Kantbookwaswritten inordertoanswerthequestion withwhich BeingandTimerangout:whetherawayledfromoriginaltimetothemeaningof being, whether time is the horizon of being, then it obviously did not reach its goal. The ambiguity of time, being both seeing and seen, projection and projected,and likewisetheshimmerofwhatiscalledthehorizon,already bars thewaytothemeaningofbeing.IftheroadtakenattheendofBeingandTime became questionable, looking back on it from the perspective of the Kantbook makes iteven morequestionable. Andwhathas sinceappeared inprintchanges nothinginthisregard.[126]

THEESSENCEOFREASONS LiketheKantbook,sotoothetwosmallwritingsTheEssenceofReasons127 and 128 WhatisMetaphysics? shouldservethepurposeofclarifyingthepreviousgreat work,refutingmisinterpretations[ofit]andclarifyingsomepointsthathadbeen left in the dark, while drawing up earlier lines that were merely indicated and continuingthemon.Thusbeingintheworldismoreclearlyconceivedunderthe name of transcendence in the treatise concerning the essence of reasons. TranscendingmeanshereafterthatDaseinconstantlygoesbeyondallbeings,also itself,inthedirectionoftheworldi.e.nottowardsthetotalityofallbeings,nor towardstheentiretyofallhumanbeings,buttowardsbeinginitstotality.Worldis

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129 essentiallyDaseinrelated andDaseinisintheessenceofitsbeingforming 130 theworld. AsthelanguageofScripture(thelettersofSt.PaulandtheGospel ofSt.John),aswellasthatofSt.AugustineandSt.Thomas,isusedtoclarifythe conceptofworld,itcangivetheimpressionthattheobviousantiChristianfeeling 131 ofBeingandTimehasbeensurmounted. Inthefootnoteswearealsoassured thattheontologicalinterpretationofDaseinasbeingintheworldtellsneitherfor 132 nor against the possible existence of God and that Dasein should not be construedtobetheauthenticbeingassuch:ontologicalinterpretationofbeing intermsofthetranscendenceofDaseinisbynomeansonticalderivationofnon 133 Daseinal[beings]frombeingsquaDasein. Inregardtothesecond[criticism], thecriticshaveinfactnotleftbeingpresentathandandbeingreadytohand in the darkness in which Heidegger left it, but rather developed it in a way not foreseen by him. And by a quite faithful and sufficiently farreaching interpretation of the essential selftranscending, a view of Dasein could have been gained which, at least, left open the possibility of a beingtowardsGod. ButactuallynosuchinterpretationiscarriedthroughinBeingandTimeorinthis latertreatise.InfacttheinterpretationwhichbeingreceivedintheKantbook evenmoreevidentlythaninBeingandTimeleavesnopossibilityopenforany being [Sein] independent of Dasein. When, furthermore, transcendence is interpretedasfreedom,bythepowerofwhichDaseinprojectsworldanditsown possibilities, and in connection with the establishment of the finitude of Dasein (witnessed by the limitation of its really realisable possibilities) the question is 134 raised:Anddoestheessenceoffreedomannounceitselfasfiniteinthis? This (quitelikelyrhetorical)questionexcludes[thepossibility]thatthebeingofDasein pertains to all personal being and it denies it toGod: at least tothe God of the ChristianFaithandalsotothatoftheothermonotheisticreligions.ThatDaseinis thrownamong beingsasfreepossibilitytobethatitdoesnotstandwithinthe poweroffreedomitselftobeaccordingtoitspossibilityaselfwhichitactuallyis 135 accordingtoitsfreedom, thisinsightserveshereaslittleasearlierasthepoint ofdepartureforproceedingtowardsanunthrownthrowerwhowouldbeinfinitely free.

WHATISMETAPHYSICS? TheFreiburginaugurallectureWhatisMetaphysics?centresonthediscussionof nothingness.ForthereaderoftheKantbook,thisisnotassurprisingasitmight be foranunprepared memberofthe audience,asaquestioningofnothingness was already called for in the investigation of the understanding of being of the horizon,whichmakesbeingaccessibletoDasein.Asmeanwhilethemeaningof nothingness still remains obscure, it is worthwhile to go through the new developmentsdedicatedtoit. All science aims at beings. The breakthrough to the totality of beings which belongstohumanexistencebreaks beings up intowhattheyareandhow 136 they are, and thus helps beings to come to themselves. That to which the worldrelationship refers are beings themselves and nothing else. And now this apparently barely escaped nothingness is grasped in a surprising fashion: 137 Butwhataboutthisnothing? Reasoncannotdecideaboutit.Nothingnesscan not be understood as negation of the totality of all beings, as nothing is more 138 originalthanthenotandthenegation.

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ThefundamentalhappeningofourDasein,whichdiscoversbeinginits entirety, is the being in a state of mind or the mood authentic boredom, for example(notwhenone is boredwiththisorthatthing, but[whenone is bored] simply). The mood in which the human being is brought face to face with nothingness, is as we already know anguish: as beings fade and we fade awayourselves,anguishrevealsnothingness.Itrevealsitselfinanguish,notasa 139 being and not among beings: it meets [us] as part of the totality of beings. This [totality] is neither destroyed nor denied, but it becomes obsolete. Nothingnessdoesnotaimatitself:itisessentiallyrejecting.Thisrejectingfrom itself is,however,assuchthe lettingfadereferringtothevanishingof beings in theirtotality.Thisrejectingreferringtothevanishingtotalityofbeings,aswhich nothingcrowdsaroundusinanguish,istheessenceofNothing:thenihilation.It is neither destruction nor does it spring from negation. Nothing nihilates of itself.[140] Itrevealsbeingsintheirtillnowhiddenstrangenessassimplyotherin 141 contrast with nothing. In the clear night of anguishs nothingness, beings are revealed as such in all their original evidence: that they are beings and not nothing[].Theessenceofnothingasoriginalnihilationliesinthis:thatitalone 142 bringsDaseinfacetofacewithbeingsassuch. Nothingisthatwhichmakes the revelation of beings as such possible for human existence. Nothing does not merely provide the conceptual opposite of beings, but belongs originally to the essence ofbeing itself.It is in the being of beings thatthe nihilation of nothing 143 occurs. A witness to the steady and extended, and yet dissimulated evidence of nothinginourexistenceisthenegation.Itexpressesitselfinanosayingabouta not,butdoesnotmanagetobringa nothingoutof itself,as itcanonly negate 144 whenthereissomethingtheretobenegated. This,however,isonlypossible,if allthinkingassuchisalreadyonthelookoutforthenot[].Thenotdoesnot arisefromthenegation,butthenegationisbasedonthenotwhichderivesfrom 145 the nihilation of nothing. Negation is also not the only negating attitude counteracting,disdaining,renouncing,prohibiting,andlackingarealsogrounded onthenot.ThepermeationofDaseinbynihilatingattitudespointstothesteady, 146 everdissimulatedmanifestnessofnothing. Themostrepressedanguishwhich itmakesmanifestisbroughtforthintheaudaciousDasein.Butthisoccursonly for the sake of that for which it spends itself, so as to safeguard the supreme 147 greatnessofDasein. Theanguishoftheaudaciousisnotopposedtothejoyor tothe pleasant enjoyment of the satisfied Dasein. It stands [] in secret union withtheserenityandgentlenessofcreativelonging.[148] TheextendednessofDaseinintonothingness[]makesthehumanbeing thestandinfornothing.Sofinitearewethatwecannot,byourownchoiceand will, bring ourselves originally face to face with nothingness []. The extendedness of Dasein into nothing on the basis of hidden anguish is the overcoming of the totality of beings: transcendence []. Metaphysics is the enquiryoverandabovebeings,withaviewtogetitbackforconceptualisationas 149 such and in totality. The question of nothing concerns metaphysics in its entirety as being and nothing hang together [], because being itself is essentiallyfinite and only reveals itself in the transcendence of Dasein extended 150 intonothing. The metaphysics of Antiquity understood nothingness as unformed matter, as in the expression ex nihilo nihil fit, and letonly the object count as being.Christiandogmaticsdeniesthephraseandaffirmsinstead:exnihilofitens

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creatumandunderstands by nihiltheabsence pertainingtonondivine beings. The questions concerning being and nothing as such remain in both cases unasked.ThusthereisnoneedtobeworriedbythedifficultythatifGodcreates outof nothing he, above all, must be able to relate himselfto nothing. But if GodisGod,hecannotknownothing,assumingthattheabsoluteexcludesfrom 151 itselfallnullity. In Heideggers interpretation the sentence takes on a different meaning, andoneappropriatetotheproblemofbeingitself,soastorun:exnihiloomneens quaensfit.OnlyinthenothingnessofDaseincanthetotalityofbeingscometo 152 itself,accordingtoitsmostauthenticpossibilities,i.e.asfinite. Allquestioning ofbeingsreliesonnothingness:Onlybecausenothingnessisrevealedinthevery 153 basisofDaseinisitpossiblefortheutterstrangenessofbeingstodawnonus. MetaphysicsisthefundamentalphenomenoninandasDaseinitself.Ithappens throughaspecial thrustofitsownexistence,intothefundamentalpossibilitiesof Daseinasawhole.Forthisthrustthe followingthingsaredeterminating:firstly, theleavingroomforthetotalityofbeingsfurthermore,thelettinggoofoneself into nothingness [] and finally, the letting swing out of the floating where it will, so that it may continually swing back again to the basic question of metaphysics,whichiswrestedfromnothingnessitself:Whyisthereanythingat 154 allwhynotfarrathernothing?

*** Itisobvious:Thisspeech,whichisdesignedtoinspireratherthantoteachpeople whoarenottrainedinthesubject,fallsshortoftherigorofascientifictreatise.It casts floodlighthereandthere, butgives noserene clarity.Thus it isdifficultto takeanythingconcretefromit.Themannerofspeakinghasinseveralplaceseven mythological tones to it: nothingness is spoken about as if it were a person that shouldbehelpedtoclaimrightsthathadalwaysbeensuppressed.Oneisbrought to remember Nothingness, the nothingness that at first was everything. But it wouldbefruitlesstosticktosuchobscurephrases. Perhapswewillonlyreachclarityonthismatterifwetakeourleadfrom thevariousinterpretationsofthesentenceexnihilonihilfit.Didmetaphysicsin Antiquity really mean unformed matter when it spokeof the nothingness outof whichnothingcomes?Inthatcasetheabovesentencecouldnotmakesense,asit states that everything formed was formed out of unformed matter. It distinguishes between not being simply ( ) and nonbeing, which in some 155 senseisnamelyaccordingtoitspossibility( ). Andthisisthematerial outofwhichallthat,whichintheauthenticsenseis,isformed.Thatfromwhich nothingcancome,hasalsonopossiblebeingitisabsolutelynothing. In which sense then is the phrase: ex nihilo fit ens creatum to be understood?Heretoonihildoesnotmeanthemattertobeformed.Thedoctrine ofCreationinfactdeniestheavailabilityofamaterialbeforeCreation.According toHeideggerDogmatics intends by nothingnesstheabsenceofallextradivine beings.Wewillleavethequestionopenofwhetherthemeaningofnothingness is fully brought out in this way. In any case nothing can be made from nothingness understood in this manner as though from some preexisting material. Nothing is taken from it. Creation means, rather, that all that the creatureis,includingitsbeing,stemsfromtheCreator.Thephrasecanthusonly

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beunderstoodtomeanthattheCreatorincreatingisunconditionedbyanyother being,thatthereinfactarenobeingsliketheCreatorandthecreation.Whatabout thedifficultythatGodmustrelatetonothingnessinordertocreatefromnothing? It must be conceded that God must know of nothingness in order to create something.Butthisknowledgedoesnotmeannothingnessinanyabsolutesense, as all knowledge, including that of nothingness, is positive as such. God knows nothingnessastheoppositeofhimself,i.e.astheoppositeofbeingitself.Andthis idea of nothingness is presupposed for Creation, as everything finite is somethingandnoteverything,ameaningwhosebeingincludesnonbeing.Isit truetherefore,whenHeideggerclaimsthatChristianDogmaticsquestionsneither beingnornothingness?ItistrueinsofarasDogmaticsassuchdoesnotatallask, 156 butinsteadteaches. Thatdoesnotmean,however,thatitdoesnotconcernitself with being and nothingness. It speaks of being when it speaks of God. And it speaks of nothingness in several connections, for example when speaking of Creation,andwhenbycreaturereferringtoabeingwhosebeingincludesanon being. Thus we can say that being and nothingness belong together but not because being essentially is finite, but because nothingness is the opposite of being in the mostoriginal and authentic sense, and because all finite being falls betweenthismostauthenticbeingandnothingness.Aswearesofinite[]that we [] cannot bring ourselves face to face with nothingness through our own decisionandwill,themanifestationofnothingnessinourownbeingindicatesthe breakthrough from this our finite, nonexisting being to infinite, pure, eternal 157 being. And thus the question in which the being of the human being expresses itself changes from why is there being at all, and not rather nothing?, to the questionoftheeternalfoundationoffinitebeing.

NOTES
1

Ed. by Lucy Gelber and Romaeus Leuven (Freiburg: Herder, 1986) as it had already been publishedseparatelyinVol.VI(1962). 2 Vol.11/12,ed.byAndreasUweMller(Freiburg:Herder,2006). 3 IamgratefultoProf.KlausHedwigforavertingmyattentiontothisarticle. 4 MaximilianBeck(PhilosophischeHefte 1,Berlin,1928,p.2)saysthatinitalllivingproblemsof contemporary philosophy are thought through in the most consistent manner to their final conclusion. 5 Georg Feuerer, Ordnung zum Ewigen, Regensburg, 1935, is completely conditioned by Heideggers thought, but without ever mentioning his name, and interpreting his expressions in such amanner as to give the impressionthat the whole without furtherado can be brought into harmonywiththebasicChristiantruths. 6 SeinundZeit,p.1.[Hereafter,abreviatedasSZ. PagenumbersrefertotheGermaneditiononly, astheyarereproducedinMacquarrie&RobinsonsEnglishtranslation.] 7 SZ,p.11. 8 SZ,p.7. 9 SZ, p.12. 10 SZ,p.13. 11 SZ, p.17. 12 SZ,p.17. 13 SZ, p.18.

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14 [ Macquarrie and Robinson explain their translation of the terms Entfernung, entfernung, Entferntheit in Being and Time, n. 2, pp. 138139 (relating to SZ, p. 105). I follow their translationandrefer thereaderto theirreflections, of which Iherereproduce some: Thenouns Entfernung and Entfernheit can usually be translated by removing, removal, remoteness, or even distance. In this passage,however, Heidegger is callingattention to the factthatthesewordsarederivedfromthestemfern(farordistant)andtheprivativeprefix ent.Usuallythisprefixwould be construedasmerelyintensifyingthenotionofseparationor distanceexpressedinthefernbutHeideggerchoosestoconstrueitasmorestrictlyprivative, so that the verb entfernen will be taken to mean abolishing a distance or farness rather than enhancingit.Itisasifbytheveryactofrecognisingtheremotenessofsomething,wehaveina sensebroughtitcloserandmadeitlessremote.][Endnotesinsquarebrackets,asinthisone, aretranslatorsnotes.] 15 SZ, p.117. 16 SZ, p.123. 17 SZ, p.133. 18 SZ, p.134. 19 SZ, p.143. 20 [ Steinhastheidlytalkedabout(dasGeredete)insteadofidletalk(dasGerede).Wetakethisto beamistake,however.] 21 SZ, p.176. 22 SZ,p.181. 23 SZ,p.182. 24 SZ,p.209. 25 [ Because this translation is being made available online, standard Microsoft Basic Greek symbolsarebeingused,andnotSteinsoriginalGreeklettering.CMcDEditor.] 26 SZ,p.247. 27 SZ,p.2478. 28 [ DasManorMancanbetranslatedbythey(asdoMacquarrieandRobinson)orbyone, whichisthemoregrammaticallycorrect.] 29 SZ, p.264. 30 SZ, p.273. 31 SZ, p.280. 32 SZ, p.288. 33 Ibid. 34 SZ,p.297 35 SZ,p.305. 36 SZ,p.307. 37 SZ,p.325. 38 SZ, p.343. 39 SZ, p.350. 40 SZ, p.351. 41 SZ, p.365. 42 SZ, p.364. 43 SZ, p.366. 44 SZ, p. 368. [Steins text mistakenly reads mglich in stead of unmglich, yet that mistaken readingalsomakessense,albeitinaslightlydifferentmanner.] 45 SZ,p.372. 46 [ SZ,p.379,accordingtoUweMllerp.381] 47 SZ,p.384. 48 SZ,p.385. 49 Ibid. 50 SZ,p.386. 51 [ Ibid.] 52 SZ,p.395. 53 Followingthediscussionofhistoricality,referenceismadetotheconnectionwiththeworkof DiltheyandtheideasofCountYorck [SteinhasYork]. 54 SZ, p.410. 55 SZ, p.411. 56 SZ, p.421.

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SZ, p.422. SZ,p.426[p.425]. 59 SZ,p.438[p.437]. 60 Theabstractkeepscloseto Heideggersownexpositionandterms:retainingalltheambiguity that attaches to these. For a critical appraisal, this approach must be abandoned, as it would otherwise be impossible to gain clarity. In contrast to this approach stands the reflection: the meaningofallthatHeideggerteachesbecomesotherwhenonediscussesitinalanguageforeign to its own (Maximilian Beck, Philosophische Hefte I, p. 6). If one were to stop because of this difficulty,onewouldhavetorenounceentirelymakingsenseofthebookandevaluatingit.Alfred Delps, Tragische Existenz (Freiburg: Herder, 1935) is an example of how difficult it is to understandthework,somuchsothatitsexpositionisunsatisfactoryonessentialpoints.Onp.53 isclaimedthatDasein=resevenifHeideggerstressesthatDaseinshouldnotbeconceivedasres. Onp.54itisclaimedthatthebeingofexternalthingsislimitedtothebeingofequipment.That Heideggerdistinguishesbeingpresentathandfromthereadytohandofequipment,ashaving its own mode of being (even if he does not clarify this distinction) seems to have been completelyoverlooked. 61 Denzinger295and1783.[HeinrichDenzinger,ClementeBannwart,JohannesBaptistaUmberg, Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, a common referenceworkoftenusedbyStein.] 62 ComparewithwhathasbeensaidaboveconcerningDaseinsspatiality,SZ, p.368. 63 [ Stein has Dasein for what is here translated by existence. We translate with existence becauseDaseinmeansexistence,andbecause Steinisreferringtotheclassicaldistinctionbetween essenceandexistence.] 64 Heidegger himself would not agree with the distinction outlined here. In his Kantbook he attemptstoshowthattheIisnotdifferentfromoriginaltime.(Comparewiththefollowing.)Itis alsoidentifiedwiththeIthink.Inthisisexpressedthatoneshouldnolongerdistinguishbetween the pure I and its being (or life). But with this is betrayed my understanding of the original meaningofI,andHeideggersownexpressionscontradicthispointofview. 65 Heidegger underlinesintheKantbook(p.226)thatthrownnessconcernsnotonly comingto Dasein, but completely dominates Dasein. Still it designates also the comingtoDasein. Concerningthrownnessandcreatureliness,comparethefollowing. 66 [ Stein clarified the notion of form in Finite and Eternal Being, to which this essay is an appendix,ChapterIV,34.] 67 [ DasManistranslatedbyRandM.asthethey,butgrammaticallythetheycannotfunction ascandasMan.Amoreliteraltranslationwouldbetheone,whichcanbeusedgrammaticallyas dasManisused,butwhichsoundsstrangewhenrenderedasasubstantive.Inthefollowing,when SteinmakesuseofthegrammaticalpossibilitiesofMan,weshalltranslateitbyone,although weshallsometimesaddthetheyforclarity.] 68 We do not need to go into the question here of whether there also exists subhuman and superhumancommunities. 69 There are places in Heidegger which show that he also recognises a genuine beingwith and even attaches great importance to it, but within the boundaries of the theyself and the inauthenticself,itdoesnotcomefullyintoitsown. 70 Compare Edith Stein, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, in Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und phnomenologischeForschung,ed.byEdmundHusserl,Vol.V(1922),p.252ff.andEdithStein, Eine Untersuchung ber den Staat, in Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und phnomenologische Forschung,Vol.VII(1925),p.20ff.[IndividualandCommunity,inEdithStein,Philosophyof Psychology and the Humanities, tr. by Mary Catharine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000), p. 279 ff., and Edith Stein, An Investigation ConcerningtheState,tr.byMarianneSawicki(WashingtonD.C:ICSPublications,2006),p.34 ff.] 71 Compare SZ,p.176. 72 SZ,p.305. 73 SZ,p.247. 74 This corresponds to the replacement of the question of being by the question concerning the understandingofbeing. 75 SZ,p.247. 76 HeideggerhashimselfmentionedTolstoysnovelTheDeathofIvanIlychinanote(p.254).In itisnotonlythebreakdownoftheonedies(wheretoHeideggerrefers)masterlyexposed,butalso

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the deep rift between the dyingandthe living.In War and Peace this does nothappen withthe samecrassrealism,butperhapswithevenclearerfocusontheessential. 77 Itiswellknownhowmajorcrisesofconsciencemaybecausedbyvowsalwaystodothemore perfectdeed. 78 See his Kantbook, p. 226. [Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GesamtausgabeIAbt.,Bd.3(Frankfurta.M.:VittorioKlosterman,1991)(henceforthreferredto as: KPM, 43. Stein is using the first edition. Whereas the texts of the first, second and third editions are unchanged, the page numbers have changed each time. We will therefore give the page numbers of the translation only: Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington London: Indiana University Press, 1962), henceforth referredtoasChurchill,p.245.] 79 See[ThomasAquinas] SummaTheologica I,q.10,a.5corp.. 80 SZ,p.427,n.1.ComparewithdifferencebetweentrueandapparenteternityinHedwigConrad Martius, DieZeit,PhilosophischerAnzeiger II,Bonn,1927,p.147. 81 HedwigConradMartius,HeideggersSeinundZeit (Kunstwart,1933). 82 [ ThisiswhySteintakesthebeingoftheIasthepointofdeparturefortheontologysheworks outinFiniteandEternalBeing.] 83 [ Stein speaks of only one other way of being here, but for grammatical clarity it has been renderedintheplural,whichisconsistentwithhermeaning.] 84 SZ, p. 229. The question of Christian Philosophy need not here be taken up again, as it was sufficientlytreatedinFiniteandEternalBeing,Introduction,4. 85 [ Stein is making use of the first edition, Bonn, 1929. As this is not widely available, the paragraphnumberhasbeenincludedwiththereferencetothetranslation.] 86 KPM,p.193.[35,Churchill,p.206.] 87 KPM,p.195.[35,Churchill,p.208.] 88 KPM,p.193.[35,Churchill,p.207.] 89 SZ,p.438(Inthepreviousp.66). 90 KPM,p.6(seep.211).[1,ThequotationfromHeideggerrunsinitsentirety:Sie[dieerste Philosophie] is sowohl Erkenntnis des Seiendenals Seienden ( ), als auchErkenntnis des vorzglichstenBezirksdesSeienden(),ausdemhersichdas SeiendeimGanzen () bestimmt. Churchill, p. 12. Steins adaptation seems uncharacteristically clumsy, althoughthemeaningisrelativelyclear.] 91 KPM,p.213.[40,Churchill,p230.] 92 KPM,p.215.[40,Churchill, p.232.] 93 Ibid. 94 KPM,p.216.[40,Churchill,p.233.] 95 KPM,p.9.[2,Churchill,p.15.] 96 KPM,p.162.[31,Churchill,p.176.] 97 KPM,p.113.[24,Churchill,p.124.] 98 KPM,p.226.[43,Churchill,p.244.] 99 KPM,p.218.[41,Churchill,p.235.] 100 KPM,p.219.[41,Churchill,p.236.] 101 Ibid.Thelatterphraseisunderlinedbyme.[Churchill,p.236.] 102 KPM,p.171.[Churchillp.184.] 103 KPM, p. 178. [ 33 c), Churchill, p. 191: erkundet den Horizont von Vorhaltbarkeit berhaupt.]WhatissaidhereistheKantianpuresynthesis,initsthreemodesofApprehension, Reproduction and Recognition.(Ihave on purpose avoided the Kantian expressions inthe text.) Heideggers analysis of time far exceeds that of Kant, and must be compared with Husserls LecturesonthePhenomenologyofInternalTimeConsciousness(HusserlsYearbook,IX,1928it alsoappearedinaseparateprinting),publishedbyHeideggernotlongbeforetheappearanceofhis Kantbook. 104 KPM, p.180f.[34,Churchill,p.194.] 105 KPM,p.181.[34,Churchill,p.194.] 106 KPM,p.183.[34,Churchill,p.196.] 107 KPM,p.184.[34,Churchill,p.198.] 108 KPM,p.185.[34,Churchill,p.198 9.] 109 [ Zeitrechnung literally means counting with time, or the counting of time apart from designatingtheorderweindicatebyA.D.orB.C.Wecouldhavetranslatedkeepingoftime,thus

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expressingsomeoftherealityevoked,yet,countingontimewaschosenasitdesignatesthemost centralmeaningavailableinordinaryEnglish.] 110 KPM,p.199ff.andp.210.[probablyChurchill,p.211ff(sectionfour)andp.222(38).] 111 KPM,p.212.[39,Churchill,p.228.] 112 KPM,p.223.[42,Churchill,p.240.] 113 KPM,p.225.[43,Churchill,p.243.] 114 KPM, p. 226. [ 43, Churchill, p. 244. Churchills translationhas been altered. The German reads:dassberhauptsoetwaswieDaseinseinkann.] 115 [ 43,Churchillp.246.] 116 KPM,p.210.[39,Churchill,p.227.] 117 [ 45Churchillp.254.] 118 KPM,p.218.[41,Churchill,p.236.] 119 KPM,p.228.[43,Churchill,p.246.] 120 KPM, p. 114 ff. [The two fs suggests that Steinis quoting from memory. In fact Ihave not been able to retrieve the quotation, nor anything said about the horizon in those approximate pages. What comes closest to the following quotation is: Ist das Sein nicht so etwas wie das Nichts?41.ItcouldberenderedasSteindoes:Heideggeraskswhetherbeingisnotsomething likenothingis,whichclearlypresupposesthatnothingissomething,justlikebeingis,whichisthe senseSteinretains.Thequotationmarkshereshouldthereforebetakenwithagrainofsalt.] 121 KPM,p.136.[28Churchill,p.150.] 122 KPM,p.235.[45Churchill,p.253.] 123 [ These brackets are not quotation marks. Stein is merely reiterating and emphasising the consequencesofwhatHeideggeraffirmedintheprevioussentence.] 124 KPM,p.28.Herewithitisneglectedthatinfiniteknowledgealsospansfiniteknowledgeand theobjectasitappearstofiniteknowledge.[5Churchill,p.356.] 125 KPM,p.30.[5,Churchill,p.38.] 126 [ SteindiedduringtheWar.WhatshewouldhavemadeofHeideggerslaterthoughttherefore remainsanobjectforspeculationand furtherstudy.] 127 In the HusserlFestschrift, Halle, 1929. [The edition used here is Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons. A Bilingual Edition, Incorporating the German Text of Vom Wesen des Grundes, trans. by Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). Vom WesendesGrundesishenceforthabbreviatedWGanditstranslationMalick.] 128 Thisisthepublicinaugurationlecture,whichHeideggergaveonthe24July1929intheAula oftheUniversityofFreiburgimBresgau,publishedbyCoheninBonn,1930.[Wewillmakeuse ofWasistMetaphysik?(Frankfurta.M.:Klosterman,1969),thepaginationof whichisdifferent. This edition is abbreviated henceforth as Klosterman. Translation is taken from What is Metaphysics?, in Martin Heidegger,ExistenceandBeing,trans. by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick (London:Vision,1949),p.3578.TheworkishenceforthabbreviatedWMandthetranslation HullandCrick.] 129 WG,p.96[Malick,p.86 7.] 130 WG,p.97[Malick,p.88 9.] 131 PerhapsthisturncanbeexplainedfromthefactthatthetreatiseofTheEssenceofReasonis conceivedinHeideggersMarburgtime,underthestronginfluenceoftheprotestanttheologians, fromwhichitprobablyalsoreceivedsomenotice. 132 WG,p.98,note1.[Malick,p.90 1.] 133 WG,p.100,note1.[Malick,p. 98 9.] 134 WG,p.104.[Malick,p.110 1]. 135 WG,p.110.[Malick,p.128 9]. 136 WM,p.9.[inseinerWeisedemSeinendenallererstzuihmselbst.Klostermanp.26Hulland Crickp.357 8] 137 WM, p.10.[Klosterman,p.26HullandCrick,p.358.] 138 WM, p.12.[Klosterman,p.28HullandCrick,p.361.] 139 WM, p.18.[Klosterman,p.34HullandCrick,p.368.] 140 [ WM, p.18.Klosterman,p.34HullandCrick,p.369] 141 Ibid.Onegetstheimpressionthatnothingnesshereismeantinamoreradicalsensethaninthe Kantbook.Therelationshipbetweennothingnessandbeingisadjustedcorrespondingly. 142 WM, p.19.[Klosterman,p.34HullandCrick,p.369.] 143 WM, p.20.[Klosterman,p.35HullandCrick,p.370.] 144 WM, p.21.[Klosterman,p.36Hull andCrick,p.372.]

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145 146

WM, p.22.[Klosterman,p.36HullandCrick,p.372.] WM, p.23.[Klosterman,p.37HullandCrick,p.373.] 147 Ibid. 148 [ WM, p.23.[Klosterman,p.37HullandCrick,p.374.] 149 WM, p.24.[Klosterman,p.38HullandCrick,p. 374.] 150 WM, p.26.[Klosterman,p.39HullandCrick,p.377.] 151 WM, p.25.[Klosterman,p.39HullandCrick,p.376.] 152 WM, p.26.[Klosterman,p.40HullandCrick,p.377.] 153 WM, p.28.[Klosterman,p.41HullandCrick,p.378.] 154 WM, p.28.[Klosterman,p.42HullandCrick,p.380.] 155 SeeAristotlesMetaphysicsA1003band1089ab. 156 Saidmoreprecisely:Dogmaticscanaskwhethersomethingbelongstothefaithornot,butwhat isacceptedasdogmaisnolongerinquestionforDogmatics. 157 The reader of Heideggers writingsis necessarily left with the impressionthathis existential philosophy aims at exposing the essential and necessary finitude of being and all beings. In contrast to this stands a remarkable oral utterance, wherein he rejects such understanding. His justification has reached us in the following manner: The concept of being is finite but this teachingsaysnothingaboutthefiniteorinfinitecharacterofbeingsorofbeingitself.Anybeing, which,inordertounderstandbeings,needsaconceptofbeing,isfinite,andifaninfiniteessence existsitwillnotneedaconceptofbeingtoknowbeing.Wehumansneedconceptualphilosophy in orderto bring being to light, because we are finite andour particularnature as finite beings, yes,eventheessenceofthisparticularityoffinitude,isbasedonthenecessityofusingtheconcept of being. God, in contrast, as infinite, is not such that he is subject to the necessary limits of knowledge.Goddoesnotphilosophise.Butthehumanbeingisdefinedbyhavingtoconceptualise beinginordertorelatetobeingandthushemakesuseoftheconceptofbeing(Seetheaccountof R.P. Daniel Feuling O.S.B.in La Phnomnologie, Journes dtudes de la Socit Thomiste, I, Les Editions du Cerf, Juvisy, 1932, p. 39). Here the sharp distinction between being and understandingofbeingismade,thedistinctionwelackedinthewritings,andthusthepossibility for eternal being is left open. As this exposition only relies on oral utterances, which have no groundinginHeideggerswritings,itisonlyreferredtohereinanote.Ontheotherhand,sinceit stems from a talk that was aimed at preparing a public report concerning Heideggers phenomenology,itseemstooimportanttoomit.

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EdithSteinand TaniaSinger: A ComparisonofPhenomenologicaland NeurologicalApproachestotheProblemofEmpathy

J.HaydnGurmin

ABSTRACT ThispapercomparesEdithSteinsphenomenologicalapproachtoempathyinOntheProblemof Empathy (1917) with that of more recent neurological explanations of empathy, broadly exemplified by Tania Singers (2006) work. Given that we are dealing with two different methodologies that reflect the general debate that exists between phenomenology and natural science (neurology), a consideration of method will be discussed prior to our comparative analysis of Stein and Singers account of empathy. In conclusion, we argue that Steins phenomenologicalunderstandingofempathyprovidesthemostcomprehensivedescriptionofthe actofempathytodateforneurologiststoreflect on.

Introduction EdithSteinsOntheProblemofEmpathy1 waspublishedin1917andrepresents oneoftheearliestphenomenologicaltreatisesonintersubjectivity.Hersupervisor Edmund Husserl had become interested in the question of intersubjective 2 experience around 1911 when he began his work on the natural attitude. According to Moran, Husserl noticed that connected with the focus on the ego necessarilycomestheproblemoftheexperienceofotheregos,ofalteregos,the experience of the foreign, the strange, the other (Fremderfahrung) in 3 general. Husserlrecognisedthataccounting forhowweexperiencethe foreign was problematic, especially after his discovery, around 1908, of the absolute modeofexistenceofonesownactualconsciousnessinimmanentperceptionand thecontingencyofthemodeofbeingofthingsgiventoouterperceptionuponthe harmony of ones actual (conscious) experiences, a position which he later publishes in terms of his famous reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendentalphenomenological attitude in Ideas I (1913). And yet, the experience of the other is, nevertheless, an experience, and as such, open, at least in principle, to phenomenological analysis. Thus Husserladopted the term Einfhlung (infeeling) from Theodor Lipps to describe this experience however, Husserl understood Einfhlung (empathy) in a manner different from Lipps. It appears, therefore, that although Husserl had not formulated a precise account of Einfhlung (before 1917), he followed Steins characterisation of 4 empathyaspublishedinOntheProblemofEmpathy. Infact,Steinspublication of On Empathy predates Husserls own published reflections in this regard in 5 IdeasII. 6 Steinbelievedempathywasafoundingact(eineArterfahrenderAkte), intheHusserliansense:thatistosayempathy isakindof foundation forother acts that is indispensable for their execution. More significantly for Stein, 7 however,empathy isa foundingact suigeneris and so,itcannotbedefined in anyothertermsexceptwithreferencetothekindofexperienceitis,i.e.,itcannot bereducedtoother,similaractsofconsciousness,suchas,memory,expectation,

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sympathyorfantasy(seeSectionIII).AccordingtoStein,then,empathyisakind of act which allows us to experience the foreign individual. For Stein, we sensein or infeel (Einfhlung) the foreign. In this way, we have a primordialexperiencewhichisledbynonprimordialcontent.Thisacknowledges the experiential fact that we can live in the others experience in an intuitive manner but [we] dont undergo that experience [ourselves] in an original 8 fashion. It has been ninety years since Steins publication ofOn Empathy. In the intermittent yearsthere have been major scientificdevelopments manyofwhich were due to the work of Albert Einstein and to the advancement of quantum 9 physics. Intermsofneurologythestudyofthelivingbrainbecameincreasingly 10 possiblewiththeadventofPETandfMRI technologies.Withthesetechnologies scientistsandpsychologistscannowanalysethehumanbraininvivo(i.e.,inreal time)asitactuallyencounterstheforeignindividual.TaniaSingersarticleThe neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: Review of literature and implications for future research (2006) characterises, in many respects, the 11 neurologicalresearchtodateinrelationtoempathy. Singersapproachtothetopicof empathy(andmindreading),however,is quitedifferenttoSteinsphenomenologicalapproach.Singersapproachreflects and advances naturalscientific method and findings, whereas Steins approach develops the phenomenological method of inquiry proposed by Husserl. This difference in methods was one that Husserl himself encountered in the development of his own phenomenological method of inquiry. In order to compareSteinsphenomenologicalinsightsandSingersneurologicalaccountsof empathy, it will be of importance to outline the main features of the various methods deployed, with a view to finding out what either approach can offer to the others findings. Thus the following section will focus on general methodological issues concerning natural science and phenomenology. Then Stein and Singers analyses will be compared in subsequent sections. In conclusion, we shall argue that Steins phenomenological approach can offer neurologists a comprehensive account of empathy that will aid them insofar as theyreflectonscientificexplanations.

I MethodologicalConsiderations:NaturalSciencev.Phenomenology As noted above, phenomenological and neurological approaches to empathy are difficulttorelatebecauseofthedifferentmethodologiestheyemploy.Thefather ofthephenomenologicalmethod,EdmundHusserl(18591938),brokeawayfrom the purely positivist orientation dominant in natural science for philosophy, in favour of giving weight to subjective experience as the source of all of our knowledge. As such, Husserls turn away from positivism places his phenomenological method of analyses in conflict with the naturalscientific methodofscrutinywhichemphasisesanobjectiverealistapproachtoknowledge. Neurology is founded on the scientific methodology of explanation. It tests a hypothesis by observing causal connections, carrying out experiments and by publishingreportsoffindingswhichcansubsequentlybetestedandcomparedin any similar controlled environment (e.g. a laboratory). Scientific knowledge is

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builtupbycontinuoustestingandrefinementoftheproposedhypothesisandthis hypothesisconstantlyseeksoutfalsificationasoutlinedbyPopper.12 While the scientific method has tended to be streamlined, although dependingonthesituationvariationsdoarise,thephenomenologicalmethoddid undergodevelopmentbyHusserl.In fact,Husserlsturntowardstranscendental idealism did come as a shock and a surprise to some of his students. Thus it is important to note the main differences between Husserls early descriptive psychological approach in the Logical Investigations (190001) and his later transcendentalphenomenological stance in Ideas I (1913). Furthermore, as Husserl developed phenomenology and gained a following, his followers developed phenomenology in varying and different directions to both the early andlateHusserl.Thus,abriefoutlineofthisbackgroundofHusserlsearlyand late phenomenology, with particular concern for the development of Husserls phenomenological method of inquiry, will be undertaken prior to considering 13 Steinsmethodologicalstance. (i)HusserlsEarlyPhenomenologicalMethod Husserlsmovementawayfromthepositivistphilosophyofhistimebroughthim into the subjective realm and face to face with the questions of consciousness, perception and meaning. In the Logical Investigations Husserl maintains that 14 consciousnesshasameaningconferringrole. Inthisway,weactivelyinterpret whatwearegivenascontent.As suchit isduetotheactivityofconsciousness that a certain design (or arabesque) or a certain sound appears to us as a 15 meaningful word. This according to de Boer is the first appearance of the concept of constitution i.e., consciousness is shown to play a role in the constitution of what appears. As perception is a mode of access through which thingsappeartoconsciousness,Husserlcametothepositionthatperceptionwas aconstitutiveactivity:
in perceiving the subject is directed to the perceived object via the sensations 16 (Empfindungen) []. Husserl places a great deal of emphasis on the difference betweenimmanentcoloursensations(empfundeneFarbe)andobjectivelyperceived 17 colour.Theformeris erlebtandimmanent,whilethelatteristranscendent.

This again raises a central issue that creates problems for comparing the methodology of phenomenology and the methodology of the natural sciences (neurology).ForHusserltheobjectivelyperceivedcolourisnottobeunderstood as a turn to the object in a philosophical realist way (e.g., as an accidental modification of a substance). In fact, the perceived colour, from a descriptive psychological point of view, is nothing but a sensation interpreted in a 18 transcendent or objective sense. The existence of the external world is thus bracketed for descriptivepsychological methodological considerations, and so, anyquestionsorinterestintheobjectivecolourinarealistsense i.e.,asexisting independently of ones actual experiences, is placed outside of the early phenomenological(descriptivepsychological) mannerof inquiry.Inthisregard, thequestionoftheoriginofthesensation,andhowsuchacolouredobjectarises fortheexperiencingsubject,isnotaddressedorconsidered.Examiningtheorigin of such sensation and senseperception, rather, is regarded as a metaphysical matter which does not fall within the domain of what is phenomenologically 19 given. Phenomenologists are thus precluded from the kind of investigations

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whichareundertakenbythenaturalsciences,suchas,forinstance,inthescience of physics,onmethodologicalgrounds. Asonecommentatorputsit:

(I)tappearsthatHusserl,likeBrentano,[considers]thereal,independentlyexisting thingto be the object of physics (in laterterminology, das physikalische Ding). It lies behind the perceived phenomena and is the cause of the sensations. Consequently, Husserl is realist at this point, but not in virtue of the doctrine of intentionality[ofconsciousness].Theintentionalobjectisnotidenticalwiththereal objectinthesenseoftheindependentlyexistingobject.20

In this respect, therefore, Husserl wishes to remain faithful to the Cartesian startingpoint by proceeding only from that which is phenomenologically given, i.e.,thesphereofconsciousnessanditsobjectivities.Anyquestionspertainingto theexistenceofextramentalthingsaretherebyconsignedtometaphysics.Thus, fortheearlyHusserl,asDeBoernotes:
Thismeansthat,thoughthetechnicaltermsarestillabsent,thereisintheLogical Investigations an [descriptivepsychological] epoch and a disconnection of the existenceoftheextramentalobject.Andherereductionhasthemeaningwhichit is so often wrongly said to have in the first volume of the Ideas putting within bracketstherealexistenceoftheobject.21

Thequestionoftranscendence, formulated intermsofhowcanIgainaccessto theexternalworld,still,however,remainsaproblemfortheearlyHusserlsince implementationofthedescriptivepsychological epoch,asdeBoeracutelypoints out, does not solve the problem but eliminates it. It is an emergency measure which limits itself to the given (consciousness plus cogitata), because the real 22 questioncannotbeanswered. Inotherwords,bymaintainingthepositionthat anyquestionsorissuespertainingtotheextramentalexistenceofthingsisnotto be taken into consideration, on methodological grounds, in any descriptive psychologicalorphenomenologicalanalysesof intentionalconsciousness and its objectivities,theproblemoftranscendence,inHusserlsearlyinvestigations,is 23 evaded rather than solved. The implementation of this descriptive psychological epoch,nevertheless,stillassumesthatthereisanexternalworldof things in existence outside of ones actual intentional consciousness. Only later didHusserlrealisethatthispresuppositionoftheexistenceoftheexternalworld that he himself subscribed to in his early thinking is a thoroughly unphenomenological and untested hypothesis (of the natural attitude) about the existenceofworldinandofitself.So,fromthisinterpretationofHusserl,wecan concludethatthereisanunderlyingrealismintheearlyHusserl,anditisonethat is based on what Husserl later calls the prejudice of an independent, absolutely existingworld. (ii)HusserlsLaterPhenomenologicalMethod
24 ThelaterHusserlmovesforwardtoconsidertheprejudiceoftheexistingworld andtodemonstratethepointthat,asdeBoer comments,

thepresuppositionofanaturalisticontologyi.e.the(hypo)thesisofthenatural attitude has no phenomenological foundation. It is an illusion. The true presupposition (ground) of the world is consciousness. This is the Copernican revolution in ontology which Husserl desires to bring about by the transcendental reduction.Theeffect ofthistranscendentalreductionorepocheisnotthatbeingis

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putwithinbrackets,aswasthe caseinthe LogicalInvestigations.Whatisputwithin bracketsisaparticular,absurdinterpretationofbeing![]Husserl[isnow]ableto say that the reduction does not imply the loss of anythingat all. What is lost is a mere naturalistic prejudice and its insoluble problem of transcendence. [] The thingofphysics[]isnotanindependentrealitybehindthephenomenalworld,but a particular formal interpretation of the latter it isa conceptual cloak (Ideenkleid) whichshouldnotbetakenontologisticallyastruenature.25

Husserl moved consciousness away from nature as such and thereby held that matter was not the foundation of consciousness. Since ones own actual consciousnessisanecessary(pre)conditionfortheveryappearingoftheworldof things to consciousness, then (T)he existence of a [absolutely independent] 26 naturecannotconditiontheexistenceofconsciousness. Inthisway,theview ofconsciousnessasbeingpartofnatureisnowreplacedbyacomprehensiveview ofidealismbasedonphenomenology.Throughthetherapeuticactofthereduction of the natural attitude tothe transcendentalphenomenological attitude, then, the explanatorysciencesofnatureandconsciousnessarenotrejectedbutfreedfrom 27 theirimplicit,naturalisticphilosophy. (iii)SteinsPositionwithregardtoHusserlianMethodology Edith Stein among others disagreed with Husserls movement towards transcendentalidealism.ManyfromtheMunichschoolsawphenomenologyasa realist philosophy of pure description of objects and emphasised the objective truth discoverable through close description of the essential features of such objects, i.e., descriptiveeideticpsychological analyses. Regarding the early followers of Husserls descriptiveeidetic phenomenological analyses, Dermot Moranremarksthat,
An elegant expression of this outlook can be found in Reinachs Concerning Phenomenology? essay of 1914 and in Roman Ingardens later study, On the Motives Which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism. These students did not followHusserlinhisreductionsandtranscendentalidealism,apositionHusserllater characterised as empirical phenomenology as opposed to his transcendental phenomenology.In1907agroupofstudentsatGttingenfoundedasimilarcircleof phenomenology, the Gttingen Philosophy Society, led by Theodor Conrad and including Hedwig ConradMartius, [] Jean Hring, Fritz Kaufmann, [] 28 WinthropBell,[]RomanIngarden,[]AlexandreKoyr,andEdithStein.

InthecaseofEdithSteinthemethodologyofphenomenologydoesnotpreclude therealityoftheexternalworldortheperceptionofonesownbodywhichisan object of outer perception also, but in keeping with Husserls early descriptive psychological methodology questions pertaining to the external world is bracketed. Even when Stein considers the reality of the psychophysical 29 individual she does so from the sphere of pure consciousness. Given that her descriptive analysis of the body, both in its living and physical dimensions, bringshertoreflectonthecausalprocessesthataregiventoconsciousness,many believe she has not remained totally faithful to the early phenomenological 30 reduction. However, that being said, it does appear valid that Stein can legitimately analyse the realm of the causal from the sphere of pure consciousnessassheexperiencesthat(i.e.causal)realityasitisgiventothe 31 streamof (anincarnate)consciousness.

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III SteinsUnderstandingandAnalysisofEmpathy(Einfhlung) It is in the second chapter ofOn Empathy that Stein descriptively analyses the essenceoftheactofempathy(das WesenderEinfhlungsakte).Shebegins her analysis by discussing the relationship between outer perception and empathy. Thisinturnleadsontoherconsiderationoftheprimordialexperiencewehaveof our own conscious deliberations (such as perception, sensation) and the non primordialcontentthatweexperienceinaprimordialfashion(empathy).Thenshe movestooutlinehowempathydiffersfrommemory,expectationandfantasy.The chapter continues with a discussion of the distinction between empathy and fellowfeeling (sympathy). It is at this juncture that the differences between SteinsandLippspositionvisvisempathyarestated.Theconcludingsections of the chapter consider genetic theories of the comprehension of foreign consciousness and finally Scheler and Mnsterbergs theories of comprehension offoreignconsciousness.Forallintentsandpurposeswewillfollowmostofthe chronological structure of the chapter to facilitate our outline of Steins understandingofempathy. (i)Primordiality
32 Stein understands empathy to be an act which is primordial as present 33 experiencethoughnonprimordialincontent. Shehighlightswhatshemeansby thisbydescribingtheprocessasfollows:

WhileIamlivingintheothersjoy,Idonotfeelprimordialjoy.Itdoesnotissue live from my I. Neither does it have the character of once having lived like rememberedjoy.Butstilllessisitmerelyfantasisedwithoutactuallife.Thisother subject is primordial although I do not experience it as primordial. In my non primordialexperienceIfeel,asitwere,ledbyaprimordialonenotexperiencedby 34 mebutstillthere,manifestingitselfinmynonprimordialexperience.

Primordialactsaregiventous inadirectwayasthey issue live fromtheIas such.Empathyischaracterisedasbeingnonprimordial,inthisway,afeelingof joy, sadness,guilt,regretmaybe issuing live from my I inthepresent moment butwhenIencounterthejoyofanotherindividualIamawarethatit(thejoy 35 oftheother)isnotflowingpresentlyfrommyIinanoriginalfashion. Thus, wearecapableofdifferentiatingtheprimordialandnonprimordialexperienceof joyand assuchIcancometoidentifymy I asthepoleof experience.This distinction is prior to my constitution of myself as a self but it brings aboutthe phenomenologicalmanifestationoftheI.Sobyhavingsuchawarenesswecan decipherbetweenourownexperienceandtheexperiencethatisbroughtaboutin us in relation to others. From this perspective we are aware of feelings which issue primordially and those that do not arise or emanate live from our I. The problemSteinnowencountersishowdowedistinguishempathyfromotheracts thataregiventousnonprimordiallysuchasmemoryandfantasy?Asshestates:
Thereisawellknownanalogybetweenactsofempathyandactsinwhichourown experiences are given nonprimordially. The memory of a joy is primordial as a representational act now being carried out, though its content of joy is non 36 primordial.

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(ii)Memory Sohowdowedistinguishbetweenempathy,memoryandfantasygiventheyare analogously nonprimordial in content? In terms of remembered joy we do not experience it as alive per se. In fact remembered joy is experienced as once havinglivedbutnotnowalive.AsSteinoutlines:
the past memory of joy has the characteristic of a former now which is remembered.TheIassuchbecomesthesubjectoftheactofremembering,and inthisactofrepresentation,theIcanlookbackatthepastjoy.ThepresentIand thepastIfaceeachotherassubjectandobject.Theydonotcoincide,thoughthere 37 isaconsciousnessofsameness.

Furthermore,Steinoutlinesthatitispossibleformetorepresentapastsituation 38 tomyselfandbeunabletoremembermyinnerbehaviourinthissituation. So memorycanhavethecharacterofdoubt,conjecture,orpossibility,butneverthe 39 character ofbeing. The experience of joy in empathy is given to us as having being, i.e., we do not experience the doubt that arises with the experience of memory. (iii)Fantasy In terms of fantasy Stein tells us that the I producing the world of fantasy is experienced primordially while the I living in that world (of fantasy) is experiencednonprimordially.Fantasisedexperiencesallowustomeetourselves asinmemory,i.e.tomeetanIwhichIrecogniseasmyself.Forfantasyasin the case of memory there is a connection between the primordial and non primordialcontentinwhatwemightcallthestreamoftheI.Butempathyis an experience of a foreign I as such and in this way there is not a complete connection betweenourprimordialandnonprimordialexperience inthestream of the I. In other words, there should be a disconnection between the primordial experience and the nonprimordial experience which issues from a foreignI.Stein developsthispositioninrelationtoLipps. (iv)SteinsdiscussionofLippspositionvisvisEmpathy Stein notes that Lipps theory of empathy in general agrees with her position in manyrespects.SheoutlinesthatLippsdepictsempathyasaninnerparticipation in foreignexperiences.However,Lipps stressesthatempathy isakintomemory andexpectation.Fromwhatwehaveoutlinedaboveitiscleartoseethatatthese pointsSteinwilldivergefromLippsposition.Steindoesnotbelievethatthereis a complete coincidence with the remembered, or expected, or empathised I, 40 thattheybecomeone. InthisregardLippshasfailedtodistinguishbetweenthe followingtwoacts: (i) being drawn into the experience at first given objectively and fulfillingitsimpliedtendencieswith (ii)thetransitionfromnonprimordialtoprimordialexperience.

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A memory is entirely fulfilled and identified when one has followed out its tendenciestoexplicationandestablishedtheexperientialcontinuity tothepresent. But this does not make the remembered experience primordial as Lipps 41 maintains. SteinelaboratesthedifferencebetweenherpositionandLippsinan examplethatallofuscanempathisewithtoagreaterorlesserextentgoingto thecircusweseeanacrobatperformwhatweconsiderdizzyingfeatsatdizzying heights.ForLipps,whenweseetheacrobatwebecomeonewithhim/her.But for Stein we would not be one with the experience of the acrobat but at the acrobat. In this way, Stein says we do not gothrough the acrobats motions but quasi. Stein stresses that Lipps does not go so far as to say that one would outwardly go through the acrobats motions [] but the inward dimensions are still a problem for Stein. According to Stein, the inward movements do not correspond to the movements of the body, the experience that I move is not primordial, it is nonprimordial for the seated individual. But through the non primordialmovementonefeelsled,accompaniedbytheacrobatsmovements.42 The major fault in Lipps account is brought via the delusion of self forgetfulness.Inthiscaseoneforgetstheselftoanyobject,withadissolutionof theItotheobject.This happenswhentheI beingentertained bytheacrobat becomes merged with the acrobat. Thus, strictly speaking for Stein, empathy is notafeelingofonenessasitisforLipps. (v)EmpathyandImitation43 Now that Stein has differentiated empathy from fellowfeeling or sympathy shemovestoconsiderempathyandimitation.
Achildseeinganothercryingcries,too.WhenIseeamemberofmyfamilygoing aroundwithalongface,Itoobecomeupset.WhenIwanttostopworrying,Iseek out happy company. We speak of the contagion or transference of feeling in such cases.Itisveryplainthattheactualfeelingsarousedinusdonotserveacognitive function,thattheydonotannounceaforeignexperiencetousasempathydoes.So we need not consider whether such a transference of feeling presupposes the comprehension of the foreign feeling concerned, since only phenomena of expression can affect us like this. On the contrary, the same change of face interpretedasagrimacecertainlycanarouseimitationinus,butnotafeeling.Itis certainthataswearesaturatedbysuchtransferredfeelings,weliveinthemand thusinourselves.Thispreventsourturningtowardorsubmergingourselvesinthe 44 foreignexperience,whichistheattitudecharacteristicofempathy.

Steinnotesthatitispossibletobeaffectedbyimitationandcontagionassuchbut we are not affected in the sense that we submerge ourselves into the other individual.Onthecontrarythefeelingmaybetransferredtousandassuchwe live in them and therefore in ourselves. We have not merged with the foreign individual to become one with them as Lipps contends. In this way imitation doesnotserveasageneticcausalexplanationof empathy. 45 Imitation seemsto happen in an automatic way and does not necessarily arouse a feeling in us as such. Stein differentiates between imitation and affective empathy when she realisesthatthesamechangeoffaceinterpretedasagrimacecertainlycanarouse imitation inus,butnotafeeling.Intermsofneurologicalresearchanumberof findingshaveoutlinedthataffectiveempathyisbroughtaboutthroughimitation viamirrorneurons(wewillconsiderimitationandmirrorneuronsinmoredetail presently).

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In sum, Steins theory of empathy is a phenomenological account ofthe way we experience the foreign individual. It makes use of an epistemological distinction, based upon descriptivepsychological analysis, of the distinction between our primordial experience and the nonprimordial content given to us from without. In her inquiry Stein realises that there are problems with Lipps accountpreciselyintheareaofprimordiality.SteincontendsthatLipps,wrongly, holdsthatthereisaonenessinempathythatallowsamergingwiththeforeign individual such that we forget (in the sense that we unconstitute or lose our personal identity) ourselves. For Stein, the primordial nature of our empathetic experiencepreventssuchamergence.However,shedoesnotethatitispossibleto betakenoverby contagionorimitationbutcontraLippsshearguesthat westill are not one with the other individual. While we can be saturated by [] transferredfeelings,weliveinthemandthusinourselves.Ourprimordialityis maintained.

IV NeurologicalConsiderationsSingersAccount Neurological explanations of empathy garnered new insight from the discussion 46 47 of mirror neurons published by Gallese et al. in 1996. It has been eleven years since scientists first noticed the function of these mirror neurons in the macaquemonkeybrain.AsGalleseremarks:
Abouttenyearsagowediscoveredinthemacaquemonkeybrainaclassofpremotor neuronsthatdischargenotonlywhenthemonkeyexecutesgoalrelatedhandactions like grasping objects, but also when observing other individuals (monkeys or humans)executingsimilaractions.Wecallthemmirrorneurons.48

What Gallese noticed was that the observation of an objectrelated hand action (suchaswhenyouseesomeoneliftanobject)leadstotheactivationofthesame neuralnetworkactiveduringitsactualexecution.Inthisway,actionobservation causes in the observer the automatic activation of the same neural mechanism 49 triggered by action execution. In 2006 Tania Singer undertook a literature review of the scientific advances over the past decade and the implications for 50 51 future research. It is without doubt that the study is in its infancy but from earlyresearchSinger believeswecanaccount for mirroringorempathisingon twolevelsmentalandaffective. (i)TheoryofMind(Mentalising) Singer informs us that there are distinctive areas of brain structuration for 52 different forms of empathising. As such she distinguishes between those components involved in mentalising (with regard tothe thoughts, intentions and 53 beliefsofothers)andthosewhichareinvolvedinfeelingoraffectivestates. Singer restricts her definition of empathy to its association with feelings (brain structuresdevelopedearlierinontogenyareconsideredinthisregard).Incontrast mentalising(whichreferstohigherorderactivitiessuchasintentions,beliefsetc.) developlateinbrainstructuralgrowth.Asshestatesinherabstract:

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Social neuroscience has recently started to investigate the neuronal mechanisms underlying our ability to understand the mental and emotional states of others. In this review, imaging research conducted on theory of mind (ToM or mentalising) andempathyisselectivelyreviewed.Itisproposedthateventhoughtheseabilities are often used as synonyms in the literature these capacities represent different abilities that rely on different neuronal circuitry. ToM refers to our ability to understand mental states such as intentions, goals and beliefs, and relies on structuresofthetemporallobeandtheprefrontalcortex.Incontrast,empathyrefers toourabilitytosharethefeelings(emotionsandsensations)ofothersandrelieson sensorimotor cortices as well as limbic and paralimbic structures. It is further argued that the concept of empathy as used in lay terms refers to a multilevel construct extending from simple forms of emotion contagion to complex forms of cognitiveperspectivetaking.54

This distinction between mentalising and empathy is somewhat artificial in the sense that mentalising and affective mirroring are both organic structures of a holistic reality the human brain. Singer realises this when she considers that 55 mentalising and empathising are not only separate but intertwined. Psychological and scientific research visvis mentalising predates studies on 56 mirror neurons by about twenty years. The early studies concentrated on monkey brain activity. More modern research has made use of the advances in 57 technologytoexaminehumanadultbrains bymeansoffMRIandPETimaging. Theexperimentsinvolvedscientistsusingstories,cartoons,picturesequencesand 58 animatedgeometricshapes inordertoexaminethe human brain in action. The stories, cartoons etc. represented in different ways the intentions, beliefs and 59 desiresofothers. AccordingtoSinger:
thestudieshaverepeatedlygivenevidencefortheinvolvementofthreebrainareas: the temporal lobes, the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) and most 60 consistentlyanareainthemedialprefrontallobe(mPFC).

Interestingly,itwasdiscoveredthatalthoughthemedialprefrontallobe(mPFC) was found to be involved when we mentalise about the thoughts, intentions or beliefsofothers italsowasdiscoveredtobe involvedwhenweareattendingto 61 ourownmentalstates. Therefore,ithasbeensuggestedthatthisareamaysub 62 serve the formation of decoupled representations of beliefs about the world. Onequestion,whichnowconfrontsusisbywhatmeansorbywhatprocessis this mirroring activated? In other words what is the causal mechanism that 63 stimulates mirroring? Recent research is outlining that we have the ability to represent other peoples goals and intentions by the mere observation of their 64 motoractions. Thusobservationorperceptionactivatesbrainstructures.Inthis way,webecomeawareofanactionandcanbringitsteleologytoourselves, i.e. wearecapableofknowingthatabuilderwithahammerisgoingtohammeranail 65 whileabankrobberwithahammerismostlikelygoingtouseitasaweapon. In terms of evolutionary theory this provides a great advantage to humans as they can bring an action to conclusion before it concludes in real time thereby providing us with the possibility of taking immediate action to avoid danger. WhatSingercontendsisthatthediscoveryofmirrorneuronsdemonstrat[s]thata translation mechanism is present in the primate brain and automatically elicited 66 whenviewingothersactions. Inthisway,themirrorsystemmightunderlieour abilitytounderstandotherpeoplesintentionsbyprovidinguswithanautomatic 67 simulationoftheiractions,goalsandintentions.

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68 From observing (perceiving/ imitating) the motor actions of the other individual we are led as it were to understand their mentalising. The intentional attitudes of other individuals are in general hidden from us we do not have direct access to a persons personal realm unless we have the ability to mind read. However, through the actions of others we automatically imitate them to ourselves.Thisisundoubtedlyahighlyadaptiveprocessasithappenswithout consciouseffortassuchandprovidesinformationaboutourenvironmentallowing us to determine how safe or dangerous it may be. Moreover, being automatic it allows us to respond in a timely fashion to imminent danger, if and when it presents itself. Motor action is a vehicle through which we gain access to mentalising.

(ii)AffectiveEmpathy Singer now turns her attention to what we might call affective empathy and highlightsthat:
Inadditiontotheabilitytounderstandthementalstates(propositionalattitudes)of others, humans can also empathise with others, that is, share their feelings and emotionsintheabsenceofanydirectemotionalstimulationtothemselves.Humans canfeelempathyforotherpeopleinawidevarietyofcontexts:forbasicemotions and sensations suchas anger, fear, sadness, joy, pain and lust,as well as farmore complexemotionssuchasguilt,embarrassmentandlove.69

Empathyisundoubtedlynecessaryforthesuccessfulcreationofanaffectivebond between mother and child and later between family members, partners, social groupings and communities. In terms of affective empathy Singer gives the followingdefinition:
Atthispointitisimportanttostressthatalthoughempathisingisdefinedasaffect sharing the affective state in self and others is not simply shared but has to be 70 induced in the self by the perception or imagination of an emotional state in anotherpersonand,evenifitfeelssimilar,isneverthelessdistinguishablefromthe samefeelingoriginatedinourselves.71

But we are faced with the question again of how is the human being able to understand what someone else is feeling? There is no emotional or sensory stimulation of our own body to provide information as such. Influenced by perceptionactionmodelsofmotorbehaviourandimitation,PrestonanddeWaal proposed a neuroscientific model of empathy, suggesting that observation or imagination of another person in a particular emotional state automatically activates a representation of that state in the observer with its associated 72 autonomicandsomaticresponses. So as with the other cases of mentalising and motor action the human brainseemstojustbeabletomirrorintermsofperceivingtheforeignindividual. Singer highlights that imaging studies in the past two years have started to investigate brain activity associated with different empathic responses in the domainsoftouch,smellandpain.Likementalandmotormirroring:
the results have revealed common neural responses elicited by the observation of 73 picturesshowingdisgustedfacesandsmellingdisgustingodoursoneself, likewise 74 by being touched [] and observing videos of someone else being touched. Whereas the former study observed common activation in anterior insula (AI)

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cortex, a cortex which has been found to be associated with the processing and feeling of disgust, the latter study identified common activation in secondary somatosensorycortex(SII),apartofthecortexinvolvedinprocessingandfeeling 75 thesensationoftouch.

(iii)EmpathisingPain Inrelationtopainsomestudiesoutlinethatthereareuniquenetworksinempathy 76 for pain. In experiment, couples were recruited allowing the assessment of empathy in vivo by bringing both partners into the same scanner environment. Brainactivitywasthen measured inthe femalepartnerwhilepainfulstimulation wasappliedeithertoherownortoherpartnersrighthandviaelectrodesattached to the back of the hand. Both subjects saw their hands and the hands of their partners, colours were fired pointing to which hand was going to receive the stimulation and whether it would be painful or nonpainful. This procedure enabledthemeasurementofpainrelatedbrainactivation(thepainmatrix),when 77 painwasappliedtothescannedsubjectortoherpartner(empathyforpain).
Theresultssuggestthatsomeparts,butnottheentirepainmatrix,wereactivated when empathising with the pain of others. Activity in the primary and secondary somatosensory cortex was only observed when receiving pain. These areas are knowntobeinvolvedintheprocessingofthesensorydiscriminatorycomponentsof ourpainexperience,thatis,theyindicatethelocationofthepainanditsobjective quality.78

Interestingly the bilateral AI, the rostral anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), brainstemandcerebellumwereactivatedwhensubjectseitherreceivedpainora signalthatalovedoneexperiencedpain.Thesearetheareasofthebrainthatare 79 involvedintheprocessingoftheaffectivecomponentofpain.
Thus,boththeexperienceofpaintooneselfandtheknowledgethatalovedpartner 80 isexperiencingpainactivatesthesameaffectivepaincircuits.

Singer sums up the findings and notes that they suggest that we use representationsreflectingourownemotionalresponsestopaintounderstandhow the pain of others feels. Moreover, this ability to empathise may have evolved from a system which represents ourown internal feeling states and allows us to predicttheaffectiveoutcomesofaneventforourselvesandforotherpeople.81 So in terms of neurological insights as outlined by Singer et al. we can notethatthereareanumberofareaswheremirrorneuronsoperate.Theyoperate in response to motor actions in an automatic way so that we can prepare to respondquicklytoaction.Intermsofmentalisingwepresenttheinternalstatesof otherstoourselves,wecandothis by perceivingwhatanother isdoing(usually through their motor actions). Then there is mirroring in terms of affective empathywherethereisnodirectactionorcontactassuchwemerelymirroror takeontheemotionsofothers.Wewillconsiderthislastpointfurtherinrelation toautomaticandappraisalmodelsofempathy.Beforemovingtoouranalysisof Steins position visvis neurological insights we will outline a summary overviewofthevariousbrainstructuresinvolvedinmirroring.

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(iv)Summaryofbrainstructurationinvolvedinmirroring
VariousBrainAreasConcernedwithMirroring Motor(imitation) Mentalising Affective empathy anteriorinsula (AI)cortex83 anteriorcingulate cortex(ACC) Somatosensory Cortex(SII)(feel pain perse)84

PreMotorneurons Temporalpoles MacaqueMonkey(STP) Posteriorsuperiortemporalsulcus (STS) Medialprefrontallobe(mPFC)82

EmpathisingAnothersPain Painfeltbyindividual painmatrix& SomatoSensorycortex Painempathised painmatrixonly

IV ConsiderationofthePossibilityof BridgingMethodologies From the perspective of the phenomenological reduction we have invariably turned away from the natural attitude and as such the phenomenological reductionhasmovedepistemologyfromwithouttowithin.AsSonjaRinofner Kreidlexplains:
Due to the phenomenological reduction, epistemology cannot be considered an integrated part of positive science. Any epistemological analysis requires a foregoing shift of the object domain,leaving behind scientific research fields [] Analysing objects of diverse kinds (which is the task of empirical science) is not identicalorcontinuouswithanalysingthewayobjectsappeartous(whichisthe taskofphilosophicalscience)[]Aphenomenologicalcritiqueofknowledgeneed nottakeanyscientificallyachievedknowledgeasapremiseofitsowninvestigation. Neither does it make use of deductiveaxiomatic explanations nor does it identify some privileged foundation in order to justify the objective validity of the knowledge we actually possess. Instead, it is interested in the meaning structure lyingbeneathallourknowledgeclaims.Thephenomenologicalreductiondoesnot establish a tabula rasa situation for analysing pure consciousness [] phenomenologically understood, epistemology investigates the forms of (valid) 85 intentionalrelationstoobjects.

Fromthisperspectiveitisdifficulttoseehowonecanbridgethechasmtowards an integrated worldview in relation to phenomenology and natural science/neurology. However, phenomenology as described by RinofnerKreidl does not discount the possibility of reflecting on scientific knowledge as it is giventous.Moreover,naturalscientistsreflectingontheirexperimentation may try to define the essence of some law or mathematical formula in relation to phenomenology.86 HermannWeylwasonesuchindividualwhotried(withmuch admirationfromHusserl)tolinkthenaturalscienceofmathematics/physicswith eideticanalysis.AsFeistoutlines,

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Weylhighlightedthattheobjectiveworldofphysicswasinfactaworldthatphysics [] endeavours to crystallise out of direct experience. So, in some sense, this structure is implicit within the experiences of ordinary consciousness. In a similar vein, Weyl stresses that there must be a primordial link between the world and consciousness.Thislinkappearswithinconsciousnessasafeltcausality,whichis our deepest connection to the world it is prior to that connection we call 87 perception.

Feist contends that Weyls work and writings especially in SpaceTimeMatter 88 were very similar to Husserls phenomenological investigations of essences. Perhapsthe factthatHusserlwasso impressed by Weyl highlightsthat factthat the two methodologies of phenomenology and natural science are not as diametrically opposed as one would first suppose. Feist supports this point of viewintheclosinglinesofhisarticle:
By[Husserls]approvalofWeylsgraftingrelativityontophenomenology,wegain an insight into just how closely science and philosophy can operate, a close 89 cooperation that Husserl himself stresses. Husserl insists that his phenomenological analysis of the foundations of human experience in no way preventsuchcooperation.ItcomesasnosurprisehowpleasedhewaswithWeyls 90 work.

In this regard, a phenomenological approach to empathy may be able to assist natural science focus their reflection on their object of inquiry, such as empathy,byengagingindescriptiveeideticanalysesofvariousparticularacts ofempathy,memoryandperceptionforthepurposesofdemarcatingclearly thephenomenainquestionandthesignificantdifferencesbetweenthesespecific experiences of the psychical that need to be attended to for both the natural scientistandthephenomenologist.WewillturnnowtoanalyseSteinandSingers particular approaches to the problem of empathy in light of the preceding discussion.

V AnalysisofSteinand SingersApproachestoEmpathy As we have noted neurological investigations of empathy is in its initial stages and as such there remains a great deal of speculation regarding the insights that havebeengained.Yet,whiletheliteraturehasbeenbuildingmomentum,anexact definitionofempathyhasbeenfoundwanting. (i)DifferencesinDefinition WehaveoutlinedthroughoutthepaperthatSteinheldempathytobeafounding act, which we are cognitively aware of when it arises in us. In this regard we experience nonprimordial content coming from somewhere other than our own experiencewhichissueslivefrommyI.Thereisalackofaunivocaldefinition ofempathy inthe neurological literatureperse. Neurologistsrealisethis lackof uniformity and it appears they are aiming to move forward towards a cohesive definition.AsFrederiquedeVignemontstates:
Thereareprobablynearlyasmanydefinitionsofempathyaspeopleworkingonthe topic.Therearetwomaintrends:someargueforabroaddefinitionofempathyasan

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understanding of another persons feelings, affect sharing or as an affective 91 responsemoreappropriatetoanotherssituationthanonesown.

Under these definitions empathy subsumes emotional contagion, sympathy, personal distress and cognitive perspectivetaking. De Vignemont alongside Singerwishtolimitthedefinitionofempathytothefollowing:
There is empathy if: (i) one is in anaffective state (ii)this state is isomorphic to another persons affective state (iii) this state is elicited by the observation or imaginationofanotherpersonsaffectivestate(iv)oneknowsthattheotherperson 92 isthesourceofonesownaffectivestate.

Working through this definition, empathy is viewed as an (i) affective response andassuchwearerespondingtotheemotionalpositionofanotherindividual.If theotherindividualissad,thefeelingthatariseswithinmewillbesadtoo(hence it is (ii) isomorphic but how isomorphic is a particularly challenging question giventhatwehavenoepistemologicalwayofknowingtheinternalexperienceof anotherindividual).ThereasonwhyIperceivethisemotionalstateisgiventome via(iii)observation(imagination)andweareawarethatwearenotthesourceof 93 thisaffectivestateasitisnotprimordiallygiventomyI. In terms of Singers 2006 article The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: Review of literature and implications for future research thereisasimilarunderstandingofempathyasoutlinedbySteinin1917:
itisimportanttostressthatalthoughempathisingisdefinedasaffectsharingthe affective state in self and others isnot simplyshared buthas to be induced inthe self by the perception or imagination of an emotional state inanother personand, even if it feels similar, is nevertheless distinguishable from the same feeling 94 originatedinourselves.[emphasisadded]

ForSteintheinclusionofimaginationintheactofempathywouldbesomewhat problematic. The trouble with imagination is akin to the problems that arise in relation to memory and fantasy as discussed earlier. In each of the former cases we are present toourselves in the continuity of experience. As Stein noted with regard to fantasy, the I that is now imagining is primordial in nature. That whichisimaginedisnonprimordial.Butthetwoexperiencesarerelatedbythe continuity that exists in the stream of the I. In this way, Singers definition whenthetermimaginationisincludedfailstotakeintoconsiderationthefactthat empathyisgivenasbeingnonprimordialincontentoutsidethecontinuityofthe streamofexperience.Thisprecludes imaginationasa means bywhichwe bring empathy about. Again empathy is a founding act for Stein and has no underpinningjustlikeperception. (ii)AutomaticvAppraisalmodelsofempathy
95 Neurologistspointoutthatempathyisgiventousunconsciouslyassuch. Ifthe brain does this automatically then we may be confronted with the reality that 96 empathy is akin to emotional contagion or imitation. Stein through the phenomenological methodoutlinesthatempathy asweexperience it is notmere contagion. Moreover, contagion and imitation could not be seen to underpin the actofempathy.Howcanthesetwoviewsbereconciledperhapsitispossibleto highlightthat the actual description of how empathy is experienced in no way

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jeopardises or is jeopardised by causal explanation. Neurology may outline that this is what occurs but what is actually experienced may in fact be totally different.However,itisprobablyworthnotingagainthatneurologicalresearchis recentinthisareaandthatcausalexplanationsaresomewhatspeculative.Infact, someneurologistsconsiderittoosimplistictoholdthatempathyisautomatically mirrored as such. These neurologists outline that a contextual approach to empathy is needed. In one experiment, subjects were found to show smaller empathicresponsesinpainrelatedareaswhentheyknewthatthepaininflictedto the other individual was justified to cure the other. So, for instance, a person lookingatasurgeonoperatingonapatientwithasharpbladewouldnotinvestas muchof anempatheticresponse becausetheyknowtheperson is beingcured. Butthesamepersonwatchinganindividualbeingtorturedwouldinvestahigher 97 level of empathy. This raises an interesting question concerning whether we haveaconsciousappraisalofasituationpriortotheactofempathy.Or,perhaps, does the act of empathy happen automatically and then a subsequent appraisal take place to modulate our initial empathic response? Current research has not distinguishedbetweenwhetheraconsciousappraisaloccurspriororsubsequent 98 totheactofempathy. ForStein,awarenessispresentintermsofempathising weareawareoftheforeignweareundoubtedlyawareofthecontextthrough outer perception and as such the contextual approach to empathy may sit well 99 withSteinspositionasopposedtoimitation. (iii)Development In terms of brain development there is a lot to consider in the findings of neurology which Stein obviously was not privy to given her death in WWII. Neurologists highlight that empathy develops in accordance with overall brain growth(ontogeny).Lowerstructuressuchasthe limbicandparalimbicsystems 100 are involved with the feelings associated with empathy. Interestingly, the structuraldevelopmentofthebrainpointstotherealitythatthefullcapacityfor effective and adaptive empathic responding is [perhaps] not developed until [25 101 years of age]. Singer outlines, the empathetic developmental stage does not stop through life as explicit forms of mentalising may differentiate and get 102 more and more complex. Stein begins her descriptive analysis of empathy withoutgivenparticularattentiontobraindevelopmentassuch(althoughshedoes talkaboutunfolding).However,intermsofexperience youngchildrenareprivy to the act of empathy even if their brain has not developed completely and assuredlymostofuswillrecallempathisingatrelativelyyoungageswhetherit wastheexperienceofapetdyingorunderstandingwhy wewerebeingscolded. Soalthough neurologypointstodevelopmentalprocesses involved in empathy we must ask the question do they actually correspond to an incremental increase in empathy through time such that a mature person will be filled with empathy andachilddevoid?Perhapsatthatnexus it is importanttolookatthe life of the mind of the subject and consider the realm of spirit. Causal developmentsatthatlevelmayrepresentpotentialbutnottheactualrealityofthe subjectperse. WhileweoutlinedthatSteindidnothavetheneurologicalinsightstotake intoconsiderationbraindevelopmentassuch,shewasneverthelessawarethatthe individualunfoldedthroughtime.InthefourthchapterofherworkOnEmpathy Stein considers Empathy as the Understanding of Spiritual Persons. For Stein

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thehumanindividualhasapersonallayeralayerthatisopentotheworldof values.Assuch:
It is conceivable for a mans life to be a complete process of his personalitys unfoldingbutitisalsopossiblethatpsychophysicaldevelopmentdoesnotpermita 103 completeunfolding,and,infact,indifferentways.

Thepersonalrealmbeingopentotheworldofvaluesismotivatedinonewayor anothertochoseoneobjectoveranotherforsomerationalreason.Neurological findingsappeartoindicatethatSteinspersonallayerwould(asstated)undergo 104 modifications through time as our orbitalfrontal cortex develops. The frontal cortex isoneofthe laststructurestoreach full maturationataround25 yearsof age.Butastohowthecausalrelatestothementalisdifficulttoascertain.Surely the environment as a factor has to be taken into consideration in terms of expressingthephenotypebutifwetakeacausalexplanationalonewewouldbe leftdevoidofresponsibilityforouractionsbecauseofouryouththelawseems to take this into consideration when juveniles receive more compassionate hearings and more lenient sentences. Is it too simple to say that because their personality or neurological structures have not fully developed that they were less capable of judgement? If that were the case then surely all young people would be incapableofabiding by lawsortakingnobleactions.Undoubtedlythe lifeofthe mindopentotheworldof motivationandvalueshasan important roletoplayinanyanalysisofmindandatthatjuncturephenomenologymightbe ofparticularassistancetoneurologists.

VI Conclusion Inthispaperwe investigatedSteinstreatmentoftheproblemofempathy in her OnEmpathy(1917)incomparisontocurrentneurologicalscientificreflectionson theproblemofempathy.Herdescriptionofempathyrevolvedaroundthefactthat we experience our own experience as primordial while the experience of the foreignisgiventousasnonprimordialincontent.Neurologicalfindingsreckon that mirror neurons are the brain structures involved in empathy. Some neurologicalresearchpointstothefactthatempathyisimitatedinanautomatic andunconsciouslevelotherresearch,however,pointstoacontextualapproach to empathy with a cognitive appraisal being required. Neurological research hasalsogivenusinsightintothedevelopmentalprocessofempathyinrelationto brain growth. This was not considered by Stein per se. It appears that neurologists, nevertheless, are moving towards a more precise definition of empathyand inthisregardsome haveoutlinedempathy intermsakintoSteins 1917definition.Thephenomenologicalenterpriseofdescriptiveanalysisappears toofferarigorousaccountofinnerstates.Suchanalysesmightproveusefulto neurologyastheyreflectuponanddemarcatevarious brainstructuresinrelation to mental and affective states. De Vignemont and Singer note that the phenomenological treatment of empathy remains to be acknowledged [within 105 neurology]. This is obviously an avenue that remains open for exploration in thefuture.

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1

EdithStein,ZumProblemderEinfhlung (Halle:BuchdrckereidesWaisenshauses,1917), trans.byWaltrautSteinas OntheProblemofEmpathy (WashingtonD.C: ICSPublications, 1989).HenceforthabbreviatedinnotesasOnEmpathy. 2 Husserlbelievedthatournaturallifeisalifeinacommunity,livinginaworldofsharedobjects, sharedenvironment,sharedlanguageandsharedmeanings. DermotMoranoutlinesthisnatural attitudeasfollows: whenIseeatreeinthegardenandknowitisapubliclyaccessibleobject,a treeotherscanalsosee,notjustasaphysicalobjectbutindeedpreciselyasa tree.Inotherwords, myperceptionofthetreealreadyindicatestomethatitisatree forothers.DermotMoran, IntroductiontoPhenomenology (London& NewYork:Routledge,2000), p.175 3 Ibid. 4 ItmustbenotedthatHusserlsreflectionscontinuedtogrowasphenomenologywasinits infancyandagreatdealofissueswereyettobeconsidered.SteinsworkOnEmpathy was obviouslyheldinhighregardbyHusserlashepromotedherthesisforthedoctoratedegree. Furthermore,SteinlatercollaboratedwithHusserlontheseissues.AccordingtoMoran,Steins positionin19161917mostlikelyexpressesHusserlsthinkingatthatstage.(MarianneSawickiis nottotallyconvincedofthisidenticalmodeofthinkingin1917see,MarianneSawicki, Body, Text,andScience:TheLiteracyofInvestigativePracticesandthePhenomenologyofEdithStein (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer,1997), p.131.)Husserlsmaturephenomenologicalwork causedstrainwithinthephenomenologicalschoolsthatgrewuparoundhim. By 1923theproblem ofempathybegantotakeongreaterprecedenceforHusserl.Steinhadnoticedinherthesisthat empathywasacentralissueinthephenomenologicalenterprise.Husserlseemstohaverecognised theneedtoaddresstheissuehimselfandinhislecturesonFirstPhilosophy(19231924)he considerstheproblemofthe constitutionoftheforeignindividual.Hedevelopedtheproblem furtherinhisFifthCartesianMeditation.Husserlwishedtomaintaintheprimacyoftheegoin constitutingtheforeignindividual:Itisfromoutofmyselfastheoneconstitutingthemeaningof beingwithinthecontentofmyownprivateegothatIattainthetranscendentalotherassomeone justlikemeandinthiswayIattaintheopenandendlesswholeof transcendental intersubjectivity,preciselyasthatwhich,withinitscommunalisedtranscendentallife,first constitutestheworldasanobjective world,asa worldthatisidenticalforeveryone. Phenomenology andAnthropology,inEdmundHusserl,PsychologicalandTranscendental PhenomenologyandtheConfrontationwithHeidegger(19271931),trans.anded.byThomas SheehanandRichardE.Palmer(Dordrecht:Kluwer,1997)p.498.ButHusserlspositionvisvis transcendentalphenomenologyalienatedhisearlierfollowers.Hisearlyfollowersnotedthat Husserlwasnowarguingfortranscendentalidealism(Husserlpreferredthetermtranscendental phenomenology)overandagainstphenomenologicalrealism(whatHusserltermedempirical phenomenology).WeshalladdresstheseissuesintermsofmethodologyinsectionIofthis article.SeeMoran,p.77.ForatreatmentofSteinandHusserlwithregardtorealistand transcendentalphenomenology,seeAlasdairMacIntyre, EdithStein:APhilosophicalPrologue 19131922 (Oxford&NewYork:Rowman&Littlefield,2006),pp.7589. 5 WhileSteinsworkpredatesHusserlintermsofpublicationHusserlwasalreadyworkingon theseproblemssince1912.MostlikelyHusserldesignatedSteintolookafterthisissueofempathy whenshebeganherthesisin1915becauseHusserlhadnotformulatedaprecisedefinitionof empathyhimself.SeeMacIntyre,p.71.Withregardtothepublicationof IdeasIIMoranoutlines thatHusserlseemstohavehurriedlyscribbledinpencilIdeasIIand IdeasIIIinthesummerof 1912.Hewrote IdeasIearlierin1912.However,in1915Husserlrewrotethemanuscriptof Ideas II,planningtopublishitinhisJahrbuch,butheheldbackandcontinuedrevisingituntil1928 whenhefinallyabandonedit,inpartbecausehefeltthathehadnotworkedouttheproblemof constitution.[]EdithSteincloselycollaboratedwithHusserlonthedraftingandorganisationof thework,whichwasfinallypublished in1952.ThedraftformoftheworkinfluencedMerleau PontyandHeidegger.See Moran,p.80 6 OnEmpathy, p.11.Husserlsawphenomenologyasbeingengagedintheconstantactofradical founding(Letztbegrndung).Moran, p.2. 7 OnEmpathy, p.11 8 Moran, p.176. MoranrelatestherelationshipbetweenSteinsunderstandingandthatof Husserlswhenhestates:Empathyis,forSteinasforHusserl,anonprimordialexperiencewhich

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revealsaprimordialexperience(ibid.). Wecouldalsodescribeempathyasaprimordial experiencewithnonprimordialcontentreferringtoaprimordialexperience. 9 Einsteinsreflectionsonatomsandtheenergythattheycontainedallowedforthedevelopment oftechnologysuchasPositronemissiontomography(PET).See,RobertMatthews,Einsteins legacyinFocus,Issue146(Jan.2005),1108(p.53). 10 Functional magneticresonanceimagingalongsidePositronemissiontomography(PET)arenew technologiesthatenablescientiststostudylivingbrainsatwork.Thesetechnologiesdonotrequire physicalcontactwiththebrain.TheyoperatebyproducingimagessimilartoXraysthatshow whichpartsofthebrainareactivewhileapersonperformsaparticularmentaltask.WhilePET operatesbyshowingthepartsofthebrainthatareusingthemostglucose(aformofsugar), fMRI worksonthebasisofhighlightingthepartsofthebrainwherehighoxygensuppliesarebeing delivered(henceincreasedactivityisobservedinthecaseofPETthroughglucoseandfMRIin relationtooxygenlevels).See RichardRestak,BrainAnatomyinWorldBook, (WorldBook, Inc., 2005multimediaedition). 11 SeeTaniaSinger,Theneuronalbasisandontogenyofempathyandmindreading:Reviewof literatureandimplicationsforfutureresearch,inScienceDirect, NeuroscienceandBiobehavioral Reviews30(2006)855863 12 Inotherwords,thenaturalsciences/neurologydoesnotperformthe epoch andthusremainsin thenaturalattitude.Asoutlined,Husserlsmainmethodologicalprocedurewastobracketor suspendallournaturalattitudestowardstheobjectsintheworldandtowardsourpsychological acts,[by]suspendingallourtheoriesaboutthesematters,[Husserlbelieveditwilllead]backour attentionto[the]pure essencesofconsciousness.See Moran,p.136.Neurologydoesnot undertakesuchabracketingtowardsanobject.ThusneurologyoperatesinwhatHusserltermed thenaturalattitude (dienatrlicheEinstellung). 13 WewilloutlineHusserls methodologicaldevelopmentswiththeaidof TheodoredeBoers TheMeaningofHusserlsIdealismintheLightofhisDevelopment,trans.byH.Pietersma, AnalectaHusserliana,2(1972),322332.Forafullerandextensivetreatmentofthisissue,see de Boersdetailedstudy,TheDevelopmentofHusserlsThought,trans.byTheordorePlantinga(The Hague:MartinusNijhoff,1978) DieontwikkelingsganginhetdenkenvanHusserl (Assen:Van Gorcum,1966). 14 de Boer,T.,HusserlsIdealism, p.324 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.pp.324325 21 Ibid.p.325 22 Ibid.p.326 23 Ibid. 24 Foranindepthanalysisoftheproblemofexistence,seeAronGurwitsch,TheProblemof ExistenceinConstitutivePhenomenology,TheJournalofPhilosophy,58(1962),625632 25 de Boer,T.,HusserlsIdealism, p.329 26 st Ideen Vol.I(1 edition),p.96quotedbydeBoer,HusserlsIdealism,p.330. 27 Ibid. However,themethodologyofthenaturalscienceswhichplaceparticularimportanceinthe objectiverealityoftheexistentobjectoverandagainstthatofthesubjectivelyperceivedobject wouldprobablyfindthisfreedomfromnaturalisticphilosophyasastepbackwardsin technologicalandscientificprogression. 28 Moran,pp.7677. 29 See OnEmpathy,p.41. 30 AsSawickistates: thethirdoftheextantchaptersof[Steins]dissertation[OntheProblemof Empathy]isunliketheothertwo[]Theexpositionisnolongerconscientiously phenomenologicaltheargumentgoesbyfitsandstarts(p.131). 31 Later,Steinwouldcometo realisethatincomparisontotheCartesianLockeandualisticviewof transparentconsciousnessandopaquebodyunderpinningHusserlsmodernphenomenological approachtohumansubjectivity,anAristotelianThomisticaccountoftheunityofhuman subjectivitywouldbetteraccommodateherreflectionsonthismatterofhumanincarnate consciousness.

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Steinusesthetermprimordialtorefertothoseactswhicharegiventousdirectly.Shestates therearethingsotherthantheouterworldgiventousprimordiallyforinstance,thereisideation whichistheintuitivecomprehensionofessentialstates.Insightintoageometricaxiomis primordiallygivenaswellasvaluing.Finallyandaboveall,ourownexperienceastheyaregiven inreflectionhavethecharacterofprimordiality[].Allourownpresentexperiencesare primordial.Whatcouldbemoreprimordialthanexperienceitself?OnEmpathy,p.7. 33 Ibid.p.10. 34 Ibid.p.11. 35 Onanygivendayweareopentothepossibilityofencounteringforeignindividualswhoare energisedtovariousdifferentextentswithwhatwemighttermlifepower(Lebenskraft).Some daysIamtiredandcranky(lowlifepowerlevels),theexperienceIhaveofbeingdeenergisedis giventomeinaprimordialfashion.Iamthesubjectthatexperiencesthisrealityfromwithin.It issueslivefrommyI.WhileIcanbedeenergisedIcanencounterapersonwhoisfullofjoyon thestreet.Fromthiscausalencounterwithanother Icanexperiencetheforeignindividual.I knowthatthejoyisnotissuing livefrommyI.Thejoythusmustcomefromsomeotherplace. SteindevelopstheanalogyoflifepowerfurtherinherPhilosophyofPsychologyandHumanities (WashingtonD.C:ICSPublications,2000),esp. pp.2425. 36 OnEmpathy, p.8. 37 Ibid.p.8. 38 Ibid.p.9. 39 Ibid.emphasisadded. 40 Ibid.pp.1213. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.pp.1718. 43 Steindiscussesimitationinchaptertwo,5DiscussioninTermsofGeneticTheoriesofthe ComprehensionofForeignConsciousness.Here,shewishestoinvestigatewhetherimitationor associationorinferencebyanalogyactuallyaccountforempathy.Insomewaysherearlier characterisationofempathyasafoundingactalreadyproposesthatthereisnosuchgenetictheory tounderpinhercharacterisationofempathy.Imitationfails(asatheorytoexplainempathy) becauseinthecaseofimitationwedonotperceivethefeelingofnonprimordialcontent.Infact withtransferredfeelingswe livein themandthereforeinourselvesinthiswaynonprimordial contentisnotgiven.Withassociation(whichisarivaltheorytoimitation)therearealso problemsnotleastofwhichisthevaguenessofwhatassociationreferstoexactly.However,inthe caseofassociationSteinaccountsforthedifferencesbyguidingusthroughanexampleto highlightthedifferencesbetweenitandempathy:Iseesomeonestamphisfeet.IrememberhowI myselfoncestampedmyfeetatthesametimeasmypreviousfuryispresentedtome.ThenIsay tomyself,Thisishowfuriousheisnow.Heretheothersfuryitselfisnotgivenbutits existenceisinferred.Byanintuitiverepresentation,myownfury,Iseektodrawitnear.(On Empathy,p.24).Butinthecaseofempathytheexperienceispositedimmediately,anditreaches itsobjectdirectly withoutrepresentation.Forassociationyouhavetorepresenttheprevious experiencetoyourselfandassuchthetheoryofassociationdoesnotexplainthegenesisof empathy.Inrelationtothetheoryofinferencebyanalogy,Steincastigatestheproponentsofthis theory.Weareawareofouterandinnerperceptionbutweonlygetatthefactsthatthese perceptionsgiveusbymeansofinferences.Iknowmyownphysicalbodyanditsmodifications butonlyinrelationtotheconditionsandimplicationsofmyexperiences.SowhenIknowthe foreignphysicalbodyanditsmodificationstheknowledgeofitisdependentalsoontheconditions andimplicationsofmyexperiences.Whatweareleftherewithisaprobable knowledgeofforeign experience.Steinholdsthatthetheorydoesnotaimtogiveageneticexplanationassuchbut merelyspecifiestheforminwhichknowledgeoftheforeignconsciousnessispossible.This positionisemptyforSteinthevalueofsuchanemptyform,notorientedtowardthenatureof knowledgeitself,ismorethandoubtful.Exactlyhowappropriatetheinferencebyanalogywould beforsuchademonstrationcannotbetreatedhere.Steinbelievesthatthosewhoholdthis positionhaveinmanyregardsfailedtorecognisetheactandtheexperienceofempathy perse. (OnEmpathy,p.27). 44 Ibid.pp.2324. 45 Ibid.p.24. 46 Mirrorneurons is a descriptive term to account for how the sameneural circuits involved in action control in the first person experience of emotions and sensations are also active when witnessingthesameactions,emotionsandsensationsofothers,respectively.See,Vittorio Gallese,

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Intentional Attunement. The Mirror Neuron system and its role in interpersonal relations, in Interdisciplines <http://interdisciplines.org/mirror/papers/1/printable/paper> [accessed 27 November2006]. 47 VittorioGallese,FogassiL.Fadiga,andG.Rizzolatti,ActionRecognitioninthepremotor cortexinBrain,119(1996),593609. 48 Gallese,IntentionalAttunement,esp.2Themirrorneuronsystemforactionsinmonkeys andhumans:empiricalevidence. 49 Ibid.emphasisadded. 50 GiventhatSingersarticleamountstoaliteraturereviewoftheprecedingacademic contributionsinrelationtomirrorneurons,theoryofmind,empathyetc.,wewillrefertoit considerablytooutlinethefindingsinneurologyandpsychologyvisvisempathyasitrepresents oneof themostcurrentoverviewstodateofthestateofresearchinthisregard. 51 Singer, p.859. 52 GiventhatmodernneurologycanaccountfortheprocessofbraindevelopmentSingerproposes thatweoughttoteaseapartthedifferentareasinordertounderstandthemmorefullyintheirown right(ibid.). 53 Asshestates,weusethetermempathisingtorefertotheprocesswhichallowsusto experiencewhatitfeelslikeforanotherpersontoexperienceacertainemotionorsensation(e.g., qualia).The capacitytounderstandotherpeoplesemotionsbysharingtheiraffectivestatesis fundamentallydifferentinnaturefromthecapacitytomentalise.Thus,sharingthegriefofaclose friendfeelsfundamentallydifferentthanunderstandingwhatthispersonishavingasthoughtsand intentions,thelatterlackingabodilysensations(p.856). 54 Ibid.,p.855. 55 Eventhoughwehavearguedforseparatedevelopmentalpathwaysforempathisingand mentalisingabilitieswiththelatterdevelopingmuchlaterthantheformer,weassumethat(a)on bothneuronalandpsychologicalgroundsthetwodevelopmentalpathwaysalsointeractwitheach otherand(b)bothcapacitiesundergodevelopmentalchangesthroughoutchildhoodand adolescence.Singer,p.861. 56 D.Premack,G.Woodruff,Doesthechimpanzeehaveatheoryofmind?inBehavioraland BrainScience 1,(1978)515526,quotedinSinger,p.856. 57 Thehumansabilitytomentalise(i.e.tomakeattributionsaboutpropositionalattitudessuchas desires,beliefsandintentionsofothers)isabsentinmonkeysandonlyexistsinrudimentaryform inapes.See D.J.Povinelli,J.M.Bering,Thementalityofapesrevisited.inCurrentDirectionsin PsychologicalScience, 11(2002),115119,quotedinSinger,p.856. 58 Otherstudies,involvedthebrainimagingofsubjectswhiletheyplayedstrategicgameswith anotherpartnerorwithacomputeroutsidethescannerroom.See K.McCabe,D.House,L.Ryan, V.Smith,T.Trouard,Afunctionalimagingstudyofcooperationintwopersonreciprocal exchange. ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciencesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica 98, (2001)1183211835 59 H.L.Gallagher,C.D.Frith,Functionalimagingoftheoryofmind5. TrendsinCognitive Sciences, 7(2003),7783. 60 Singer,p.856. 61 SeeJ.P.Mictchell,M.R.Banaji,C.N.Macrae,Thelinkbetweensocialcognitionandself referentialthoughtinthemedialprefrontalcortex. JournalofCognitiveNeuroscience,17(2005), 13061315. 62 Decoupledinthesensethattheyaredecoupledfromtheactualstateoftheworldandthatthey mayormaynotcorrespondtoreality.See Singer,p.857. 63 Thereisalottoconsiderinrelationtotheabilityofthehumanmindtomirror.Arewehard wiredtoformcommunities,toexistinsocialunits?Doestheabilitytomirrortheintentionsof othersgiveusanabilitytoescapedanger?Inthiswaymirroringprovidesanevolutionary advantageandepistemologicalinsightinordertoavoiddangerbybringingthepossibilityofa foreignintentionalacttoconclusionwithinbeforeitactuallyiseffectedbytheforeign individual. 64 Thisresearchisreferringtothefactthatthereareneuronsinthepremotorcortexofthe macaquebrainthatfirebothwhenthemonkeyperformsahandactionitselfandwhenitmerely observesanothermonkeyorahumanperformingthesamehandaction.See,G.Rizzolatti,L. Fadiga,V.Gallese,L.Fogassi,Premotorcortexandtherecognitionofmotoractions.in CognitiveBrainResearch,3(1996),131141.

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Steinhasaconceptofthementalspherewherebywecanunderstandactionthroughtakinginto considerationmotivation.Motivationaccountsforhowactsarebroughtaboutinrelationtosome objectintermsofitsvalue.AsSteinoutlines: Motivation,inourgeneralsense,istheconnection thatactsgetintowithoneanother:[]anemergingoftheoneoutoftheother,aselffulfillingor beingfulfilledoftheoneonthebasisoftheotherforthesakeoftheother.Philosophyof PsychologyandHumanities,p.41.Thus,thehammerisvaluedbytheworkmanasheismotivated tobuildahouseandvaluedbytherobberasaweapon.Motivationalactsarerationalinthesense thatwecandeterminewhytheycomeaboutbyreadingthevaluationbackthroughtheact. 66 Singer, p.857. OneofthemorepuzzlingquestionsthatM.Iacobonidealswith(andwhichwe shalloutlinetohighlightthecomplexityinvolvedinmirrorneuronresearch)ishowdoweimitate anactionthatwedonothaveinourrepertoirepreviously.Itrequiresadifferentmechanismto considerthisactionaccordingtoIacoboni etal. Theirfindingshighlightthatthereisaconnection betweenthepremotorcortexofthebrainandthesuperiortemporalsulcus(ahigherordervisual region).Thisnewlyidentifiedregionhas,accordingtoIacoboni etal.alltherequisitesforbeing theregionatwhichtheobservedactions,andthereafferentmotorrelatedcopiesofactionsmade theimitator,interact.SeeM.Iacoboni,L.Koski, M.Brass,H.Bekkering,R.Woods,MC. Dubeau,J.Mazziotta,G.Rizzolatti,Reafferentcopiesofimitatedactionsintherightsuperior temporalcortexinProceedingsintheNationalAcademyofSciencesoftheUnitedStatesof America,(2001),1399513999: imitationisacomplexphenomenon,theneuralmechanismsof whicharestilllargelyunknown. 67 Gallese,V.,Goldman,A.,Mirrorneuronsandthesimulationtheoryofmindreading, Trends inCognitiveSciences,2(1998), 493501. 68 AccordingtoGrezesandDecetythecircuitryinvolvedinmotoractionmirroringinvolvesthe supplementarymotorarea(SMA),preSMA,premotorcortex,thesupramarginalgyrus, interparietalsulcusandthesuperiorparietallobe.See,J.,Grezes,J.,Decety,Functionalanatomy ofexecution,mentalsimulation,observation,andverbalgenerationofactions:ametaanalysis. HumanBrainMapping,12(2001),119. 69 Singer,pp.857858. 70 Steinwouldhaveparticularissueswiththeuseofimaginationwewillconsiderthisfurtherin relationtoouranalysisofSteinspositioninrelationtoneurology. 71 Singer, p.858.WenoteatthispointthatthisdefinitionissimilartoSteinsunderstandingof empathyasbeingnonprimordialcontentgiventotheIwhichisawareofitsownprimordial reality. 72 S.D.Preston,F.B.M.deWaal,Empathy:itsultimateandproximatebases, Behavioraland BrainScience,25(2002),172. Thetermautomaticinthiscasereferstoaprocessthatdoesnot requireconsciousandeffortfulprocessing,butwhichcanneverthelessbeinhibitedorcontrolled. 73 B.Wicker,C.Keysers,J.Plailly,J.P.Royet,V.,Gallese,G.Rizzolatti,Bothofusdisgustedin myinsula:thecommonneuralbasisofseeingandfeeingdisgust, Neuron,40,655664 74 C.Keysers,B.Wicker,V.Gazzola,J.L.Anton,L.Fogassi,V.Gallese,Atouchingsight: SII/PVactivationduringtheobservationandexperienceoftouch1. Neuron,42,335346. 75 Singer, p.858. 76 T.Singer,B.Seymour,J.ODoherty,H.Kaube,R.J.Dolan,C.D.Frith,Empathyforpain involvestheaffectivebutnotsensorycomponentsofpain, Science,303(2004),11571162. 77 Ibid. 78 Singer,p.858. 79 Interestinglythefindingsofanew study bySingeretal.indicatethatoverallempathyrelated activationforunfamiliarpersonsinpainislowerthanwhenempathisingwithalovedoneinpain. See T. Singer, B. Seymour, J.P. ODoherty, K.E. Stephan, R.J. Dolan, C.D. Frith, Empathic neuralresponsesaremodulatedbytheperceivedfairnessofothers. Nature439,(2006),466469 80 Singer,pp.858859. 81 Ibid. 82 Theareaconsideredtobeinvolvedinmirroring.Asstatedpreviously,themPFChasnotonly beenfoundtobeinvolvedwhenmentalisingaboutthethoughts,intentionsorbeliefsofothersbut alsowhenpeopleareattendingtotheirownmentalstates. 83 Theanteriorinsulacortex(AI)hasinvarioustestsbeenfoundtobeassociatedwiththe processingandfeelingofdisgust. 84 Thesomatosensorycortext(SII)isinvolvedinprocessingandfeelingthesensationoftouch onlyactivatedinthepersonsufferingthecausaleffectofpainperse.However,onestudyhas foundthat therewasreducedmotorexcitabilityspecifictothemusclethatthesubjectsobserved

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beingpenetrateddeeplybyneedlesinanotherperson,contrastingwithanotherstudyshowingonly secondarysomatosensorycortexactivity.Thiscausesaparticularchallengeinrelationtothe degreeofisomorphisminempathy.See,deVignemont,F.,Singer,T.,Theempathicbrain:how, whenandwhy? inTrendsinCognitiveSciencesVol.10No. 10(2006), 434441. 85 SonjaRinofnerKreidl,WhatisWrongwithNaturalisingEpistemology?APhenomenologists reply,inHusserlandtheSciences,ed.byRichardFeist(Ottawa:UniversityofOttawaPress, 2004),pp.5152. 86 SeeRichardFesit,ReductionsandRelativityinHusserlandStein, ed.byRichardFeist& WilliamSweet(WashingtonD.C:TheCouncilforResearchinValuesandPhilosophy,2003),pp. 89103andRichardFeist,HusserlandWeyl:Phenomenology,Mathematics,andPhysicsin HusserlandtheSciences,pp.129153. 87 Feist,ReductionsandRelativity,p.96 88 Ibid.p.97 89 FeistreferstoHusserl, IdeasI,p.169.SeehisReductionsandRelativity,p.101,cf.n.40. 90 Feist,ReductionsandRelativityp.99 91 F.deVignemont,T.Singer,Theempathicbrain:how,whenandwhy?,p.435. 92 Ibid. 93 Emotional contagion would not be considered as empathy in relation to the above definition becauseitdoesnotdistinguishbetweenselfandotherasrequiredby(iii)and(iv)ofthedefinition. Thiswouldbringthedefinitionclose(althoughnotsynonymous)toSteinsdescriptionofempathy asitrulesoutcontagion. 94 Singer, p.858.See supra,n.71. 95 deVignemont&Singer,Theempathicbrain:how,whenandwhy?,pp.435436.Inthis accountLippstheoryonempathyseemstoberight.AccordingtoSinger,Lippsunderstandsthat whenweinternallyimitateafacialexpression,wehavedirectaccesstotheemotionthattriggered thatfacialexpression.[Thus,thediscoveryof]mirrormatchingsystemsinthemotordomainis consideredasthefirstneuralevidenceofLippstheory:theperceptionofsomeoneelsemoving sufficestoelicitamentalsimulationoftheobservedmovementand,ifnotinhibited,the subsequentphysicalexecutionofthatmovement.Imitationisthusaprepotentautomaticresponse tendency,evenifusuallyinhibited.(p.437). 96 Ibid. 97 Thisisobviouslyofbenefitinthatyouknowtoavoidthedangerofbeingtorturedyourselfif youseesomeoneelsebeingmistreated. 98 deVignemont&Singer,Theempathicbrain:how,whenandwhy?,pp.437439. 99 Againwemustmaintainthat,phenomenologicallyspeaking,Steinsmethodologyremainsthe descriptiveanalysisoftheinteriorexperiencegiventousandassuchevenifempathyhappens unconsciouslyinanautomaticsenseitisnottheexperiencegiventousconsciously.Although unconsciousreferstonotbeingawareoftheprocess,Steindoesnotholdthatthereisan unconsciousasputforwardbyauthorssuchasFreud. 100 AsSingerstates:findingssuggestthatlevelsofempathicrespondingthatinvolveimplicit affectsharingandarebasedonlimbicandparalimbicstructuresaswellasonsomatosensory corticesshoulddevelopearlierthanourabilityforcognitiveperspectivetakingbecausetheformer relyonstructureswhichdevelopearlyinbraindevelopment,whereasthelatterrelyonstructures oftheneocortexwhichareamongthelatesttomature,suchastheprefrontalcortexandlateral partsofthetemporalcortex.Thefindingthatthe[dorsolateralprefrontalcortex]hasnotfully matureduptoanageof25isinterestingwithrespecttoitspossibleroleinthemodulationand controlofaffectiveresponsesand mightsuggestthatthefullcapacityforeffectiveandadaptive empathicrespondingisnotdevelopeduntillateadolescence.See,Singer,p.860. 101 Ibid.ThestructuraldevelopmentprocessisoutlinedbySinger(cf.,p.861)asfollows: 1day18months: New born babies already have the ability for emotional contagion (crying) before they have developed selfawareness and the distinctionbetweenselfandothers. Selfawareness develops, children also display the first manifestations of prosocialbehaviourtowardsothers. Theabilitytohaveempathicresponsesintheabsenceofanyemotional cue develops probably later [than 24 months] and should parallel the

1824months:

>24months:

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maturationofmemorysystemsandmentalimagery.Moreover,explicit forms of empathy should coincide with the emergence of conscious representationsofonesownfeelingstatesallowingforstatementssuch as I feel sad or jealous. The capacity to understand other peoples feelings when there is congruency between ones own and another persons feeling states probably develops earlier than the capacity to understand others feelinginthe absence of any representation of this state in oneself. Whereas the formermost likely relies on ones own representationofagivenfeelingstateinoneself(limbicstructures),the latterprobably relies purely on mentalising capacities (prefrontal and temporalstructures). 4years Mentalising abilities develop about the age of four and are probably based onthedevelopmentofthemPFCandtemporalstructures.Thus the basic capacity for mentalising seems to be clearly in place long before the complete maturation of the neurocircuitry subserving it. This suggests that not only empathising but also mentalising abilities may change innature from early childhood to adolescence. Similar to emotional contagion preceding more complex forms of implicit and explicitempathy,explicitformsofmentalisingabilitiesareprecededby processes allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states, e.g., the ability of an infant to direct its attention/gaze towards the attentional focus of the mother (joint attention) already develops aroundtheageof1218monthsorevenearlier.

610years

Firstorder(attributingabelief toanotherperson developsc.4years) and secondorder beliefs (attributing a belief about another persons belief)developsbetweenthesixtotenyears. 102 Interestingly,whilementalisingisassociatedwithlaterdevelopmentalstructuresinbrain ontogenythesestructuresappeartosuccumbtooldagebeforeearlierdevelopedempathising structures(limbic,paralimbic).Thissuggestshighervulnerabilitytostructureswhichdevelop laterandarephylogeneticallyyounger(e.g.prefrontalcortex).Itmaythereforebethatempathic responsesarepreserveduptoveryoldagewhereasmentalisingabilitiesshowearlierdecline.See Singer, p.862. 103 OnEmpathy,p.111. 104 Ithasbeenshownbyonestudythatneuronsintheorbitofrontalcortexencodevalue.See, CamilloPadoaSchioppa,JohnA.Assad,Neuronsintheorbitofrontalcortexencodeeconomic value,Nature,Vol.441/(11May2006),223227. 105 F.deVignemont,T.Singer,Theempathicbrain:how,whenandwhy?,p.436.

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JeandelaRochellesFormulationoftheDistinction betweenBeingandEssence
DeniseRyan

ABSTRACT Thedistinctionbetweenbeingandessencearoseintheelaborationofthetheoryofuniversal hylomorphism, defended by the Franciscans, which maintained that there is a composition of matter and forminall beings otherthan the First cause.This paper focuses on a formula which JeandeLaRochelle(1190/12001245)borrowsfromBoethius(c.480524)toexplainhowthe beingofthesoulisdistinctfromtheessenceofthesoul.Itconcludesbyraisingthequestion whether Jeans formulation anticipates that of St Thomas Aquinass (12241274) in his early writingsonDeEnteetEssentia.

Introduction JeandeLaRochellesSummadeAnimaistestamenttothegrowinginterestinthe new GreekArab sources which were made available in the thirteenth century. ThispaperispartofmyongoingdoctoralresearchintotheSummadeAnimaof JeandeLaRochelle,criticallyanalysingitsphilosophicalcontentandtranslating 1 thetext(288pages)intoEnglish. TheaimofthispaperistosetoutJeandeLa Rochelles position on being and essence in the context of the debate between thosewhodefendedthetheoryofuniversalhylomorphismi.e.,thetheorythatall of created being is composed of matter and form and those who, like Thomas Aquinas(12241274),rejectedthedoctrinewhichattributedacompositenatureto thesoul.

I Jeanraisesthequestioninchapter13oftheSummaWhatisthesoulaccordingto essence? First he considers the origin of the soul which is understood in two ways,namely,thatwhichconcernscausalityandthatwhichconcernsdurationor time. Regarding causality Jean investigates the soul according to the four AristoteliancauseswithregardtotheoriginintimeJeansetsouttoprovethatnot all souls were created at one time, an issue which was vigorously debated in medievalphilosophy. Whenreferringtotheformalcauseofthesoulinchapter17oftheSumma Jeanemploystheconceptsofquodestandquoest.Thesehavebeencalledthe forgottenformulaeofBoethius,which,asCrowleynotes,werereintroducedby 2 Philip the Chancellor (d.1236). Philips work, entitled the Summa de Bono, is frequentlythetheologicalreferencepointforJeanintheSumma.Thequodest,as interpreted by Jean, refers to the being of the soul, the quo est refers to the essenceofthesoul.Thebeingofthesoulhastwomodes,(1)essentialbeing,as whenwesaythathumanbeingsarerationaland(2)accidentalbeing,aswhenwe saythatapersonisjustorwise.Thisdistinctionbetween quodestandquoesthas

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beenvariouslyinterpretedbyphilosophersthroughouttheMiddleAges.Boethius (c.480c.525) introduced the distinction in his treatise De Trinitate where he arguesthattheDivineSubstanceisformwithoutmatterandisitsownsubstance. 3 JeanquotesfromtheDeTrinitate (thefirstofBoethiussfivetreatisesknownas theOpusculaSacrawhichsurvivedintotheMiddleAges)insupportoftheview that created being is of a composite nature whereas divine being is of a simple nature.Inthethirdtreatise,Quomodosubstantiaeineoquodsintbonaesintcum nonsintsubstantialiabona(Howsubstancesaregoodinvirtueoftheirexistence without being substantial goods) Boethius deals with being and goodness. He posesthefollowingproblem:ifeverythingisgoodinthatitis,andifeverything receives its goodness from God, is everything, therefore, identical with God? Boethiuss solution is contained in the distinction between id quod est et esse: Beingandthethingthat isaredifferent.Forsimple beingawaits manifestation, butthethingthatisisandexistsassoonasithasreceivedtheformwhichgives 4 itbeing. Jean statesthatthe constitutive principles quod est and quo est are to be found in everything below the First cause since everything below the First is a beingthroughparticipation.Therefore,thebeingorthesubject(quodest) of an essence isdifferent from itsnature,the latterbeingthatthroughwhich it isan essence (quo est). If we say that God is goodthrough his essence, since by our understanding he is good, to be and to be good are the same for him. With regardtoanythingbelowtheFirstcause,however,acreatureisgoodbecauseitis orderedtowardthe highestgood.Withregardtothesoul it isacreatedbeing (quod est) created by God out of nothing, the nature of the soul (quo est) is understoodasanessencereceivedfromGod.Inadditiontotheircompositionof 5 matterandformwhichisareceptiveandpassivepotentialinacreature, human beings,therefore,havethissecondcomposition,thatofbeingandessence. Jean asks whether there are specific differences between the soul and an angelevenifitcanbesaidthattheysharethesameformalcauseoftheirbeing.In sofarasitcanbeapartofanangelscompositionthatthroughwhichanangel exists isintellectualityand thatwhich it is is an intellectualsubstance inthe case of human being that through which it is a human being is rationality and thatwhichitisisarationalsubstance.Jeanaccountsforanumberofdifferences according to species and according to essence, e.g., the angelic intellect is not directedtowardssensationwhereasthehumanintellectbeginsatthislevelandit is sodirected.Anangel has beingasaperson,a soul has beingasa formanda perfection.AnangelislikeGodinitsintellectandaccordingtoactbecausefrom thebeginningof itscondition ithasthe forms imprintedon itforthepurposeof knowingthenatureofthings.IncontrastJeanholdsthatthehumansoulislikea clean writing tablet which contains possibilities for the forms but not the acts. Jean wants to present an argument forthe formal cause of the soul in a manner which is acceptable to Christians but in admitting composition of quod est and quoestJeanseemstodenythesimplicityofthesoul. ItisinterestingtonotethataccordingtoBurrellitwasphilosophersinthe Arabictraditionwhowerethefirsttodistinguishwhatconstitutestheindividual, 6 namely itsexisting, fromwhat makes itthekind ofthing it is butaswe have seen these speculations were already familiar to medieval thinkers, especially 7 from the ninth century when they first aroused interest. According to Parviz Morewedge,however,itisamatterofcontentionastowhetherAristotlemadea 8 distinction between essence and existence. He acknowledges the monumental

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9 10 11 workof AM.Goichon andN.Rescher whorefertoapassage inAristotles PosteriorAnalytics.InthesameworkGoichonalsomentionsseveralpassagesin Platos dialogues where the essenceexistence distinction is supposedly upheld. As part of my studies I am interested in finding out to what extent Avicennas theory shaped Jeans thinking on the essenceexistence distinction which was 12 enormously important in postclassical Islamic intellectual history but, at present, it is suffice to notethat Avicenna, as Wisnovsky remarks, laid down a limited number of positions on the distinction, positions that would eventually 13 formthecoreofaradicallyexpandedspectrumofpositions.

II Avicennasfamousflyingmanargumentisquotedverbatimatthebeginningof JeansSummaitiscalledanargumentbutitisathoughtexperimentinwhich man finds himself floating in the air or in a void in such a way that he is not conscious of his physical body and yet he is aware ofthe existence of his own essence,adualisticperspectivewhich,atfirst,appearstobesimilartoDescartess cogito,butthesimilarityturnsouttobesuperficialbecauseasWisnovskypoints outboththecontextandthepurposeofthe flying manthoughtexperimentare very different to those of the cogito. Avicennas argument is a claim about essence,thatnothinggraspsathingwithoutgraspingitsownessenceasgrasping. Augustine,inasimilarvein,statesthatinfantshaveanimplicitselfknowledgeof 14 themselves, the soul never ceases to know itself, just as in memory we retain things even when we are not paying attention to them. While Descartes cogito waswritten inthecontextof his search for firstprinciples hisdoctrineof innate ideas has much in common with Augustine with regard to knowing the self as nonbodily. According to Descartes we have already received the ideas of thingsthroughourcapacitytothink, imagine, feel,orexperience butourideas withregardtoGod,theselfandselfevidenttruths,thesearealreadypresentinthe babyinthewomb.Descartesstheoryisfarmorecomplicatedthancanbestated here but it would be more correct to say that Descartess cogito is closer in meaning to Augustine than to Avicennas thoughtexperiment. Avicennas objectiveis,accordingtoHasse,topointtotheindependenceofthesoulandthat theotherthesespertainingtotheexistenceofthesoul,the selfawarenessofthe 15 soulandthesubstantialityofthesoul,areonlyimplied. Despite his dualism Avicenna holds that there are close connections between the soul and the body. Describing Avicennas psychology of the soul Deborah Black states that the body is the instrument of the soul and is a 16 necessarycondition for itscreationand individuation. Anangeloraseparate intelligence(i.e.,separatedfrommatter)isaspeciesuntoitselfbutmanbelongsto asinglespecieswhichiscommontomanyindividualsandis,therefore,composed of matter and form. As Black further states, Avicenna places the creation of humansoulswithinthecontextofhistheoryofemanation.Wheretheconditions arepresent inthesublunaryworld, i.e.,whenahumanembryo isconceived,the agent intellect (Avicennas separate Agent Intelligence) creates a human soul to inform that body. Soul and body are thus made for each other, with the soul havingaspecialattractiontoitsownbody. Oneofanumberofpositionsonthedistinctionisthatbetweenthingand existent. Existence or being is recognized by reason itself without the aid of

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definition or description. Since it has no definition, it has neither genus nor 17 differentiabecausenothingismoregeneralthanit. AccordingtoThrseAnne Druart,AvicennacenteredhisownmetaphysicsinhisworkentitledtheShifon 18 the distinction between existence and essence. For Avicenna the term existencehasmanymeanings,suchas,forinstance:therealityofsomething,the fact that it exists, the particular existence of something but, it is clear that he meansthattheobjectis,i.e.,thatitisanexistent.InMetaphysics1.5oftheShif Avicennausesthewordthingasanattributeofbeingratherthanessence,and so, thing and existent, as Wisnovsky puts it, are extensionally identical but 19 intensionallydifferent, that is to say, thing and existent are coimplied but they have different meanings. Avicenna explains what he means by this mysteriousthingbystatingthattherearethreeprimaryconcepts,being,thing andnecessary.FollowingBlacksaccountpriorityisgiventobeing:thingis a substitute forthe Platonic one, an attribute of being which she states is not in Aristotle. Wisnovsky and Black both argue that this concept is borrowed from kalm (Islamic doctrinal theology) and used by Avicenna to ground his 20 distinction between essence and existence. Black states that thing is not synonymouswithessence,butwhateverisathinghasanessenceorquiddity.This distinctionappliestoallotherbeingsandexplainstheircontingency(uponaFirst Cause). In God alone there is no distinction between his essence and existence. Avicennasthirdnotion,thatofthenecessarybeing,introduceshismostoriginal contributiontoIslamicphilosophy,namely,thedistinctionbetweennecessaryand possible existence. Everything is either necessary, possible or impossible, a conceptwhichleadstoAvicennasfamousprooffortheexistenceofGod. ThomasAquinas(12241274)in DeEnteetEssentiaisespeciallyindebted to Avicennas remarks made on essence and existence, for, Thomas too argues that in God alone there is no distinction between essence and existence, no becoming, no potency, because he is pure existence without contingency or 21 finiteness. He rejects the formmatter composition in nonbodily substances and, instead, ascribes the essenceexistence composition to them. Thomas restrictedhylomorphiccompositiontocorporealbodieswhileBonaventure(1217 1274) held the opposite view that angels must be hylomorphically composed 22 otherwise they would be pure act and God alone is pure act. Bonaventure appealed to the doctrine of seminal reasons in order to explain how forms are impartedtomatterintwomodes:inonemode,theprimarycauseisGod,butina secondary manner we see that parents produce new life through their activity. Thereis,then,forBonaventure,asonecommentatorputsit,somethinginmatter, aseed,likeanacornwhichbecomesanoaktreeilludpotestesseformaetfit forma,sicutglobusrosaefitrosatheagentgivestotheessencealreadypresent in matter a new form of existence, transforming an essence really existing in 23 matterfromapotentialtoanactualform. Thisthen,Bonaventureconcludes, is our position: that no created agent produces any essence, be it substantial or accidental,butratherbringsaboutasituationwhereanessencechangesfromone 24 situation to another. While the souls of animals and plants arise entirely from seminalreason,thehumansoulentersthebodyafterithasgonethroughaprocess whichisexplainedintermsofthecelestialbodiesandthefourelements.Thusthe humanbodyisacompositeofmanyforms.Thomas,however,arguedagainstthis positioninthedebateonthepluralityofformswhichprovokedlivelydiscussion inthethirteenthcentury.ForThomas,formisultimate,thereisonlyoneformof

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the living human being, its soul, and as Gilson remarks there is no form of the 25 form. Arguing for his position regarding angels Thomas appealed to the distinction betweenpotencyandactassomethingwhichrunsthroughthewhole of creation and as such he can claim that angels display potentiality in their performance of actsof will and intellect.There is a further distinction which he can make between God and a separated spirit, i.e., that no finite being exists necessarilyithasorpossessesexistencewhichisdistinctfromessenceasactis 26 distinctfrompotentiality. ForThomas,anangel is formalonebutexistence is that by which a form is. Therefore, there is composition in an angel, namely, compositionof formandexistence.In substancescomposedof matterand form, however, there is a double composition of act and potentiality, the first is a composition of matter and form, the second a composition of the latter with existence.ThissecondcompositioniscalledbyThomasthequodestandesseor 27 thequodestandthequoest. InachapteroftheDeEnteetEssentiaentitledThe Compositeness of Intelligences, Thomas makes use of the formula quo est et quodestashestatessosomepeoplesaysuchthingsarecomposedofthatwhich 28 and that by which, or from that which exists and existence as Boethius says. However,theeditorsoftheLeonineeditionoftheDeEnteetEssentiapointtoa 29 variant reading of the line in question and to its authenticity. According to Etienne Gilson, there is great confusion regarding the use of Boethiuss 30 terminology in itsThomistic meaning. InGilsons view,the veryprecisionof his [Boethiuss] formulas was to make it more difficult for his successors to go beyond the level of substance up to the level of existence, however, as Gilson alsonotesandcontinues,butthey helpedthose whosucceeded indoing[so]to 31 formulate their own thought in strictly accurate terms. In fact, this formula is 32 usedbyThomasinthirtysixcasesthroughouthismanyworks.

III Conclusion InsomeinstancesThomasacknowledgestwosourcesandtwoformulations,they are:idquodestetesse,attributedtoBoethiusandthatof quodestetquoest,the source of which is attributed to quidam or in another case to alii (translated respectivelyascertainpersonsandothers).Consideringthedatesoftwoofthe works in which Thomas employs the formulae indicates he maintained the distinction throughout most of his works, one example, which I have already referred to, is the De Ente et Essentia, written between 12521256, the second 33 work,theQuaestionesDisputataedeAnimawhichwaswrittenintheyear1269. However,ifweexaminesomequotesfromJeansSumma,weseeclearlythathe hadalreadymadethisdistinctionwithregardtoimmaterialsubstances.Take,for example, in chapter 17 where he writes: that which exists and that through 34 whichitexistsisdifferentincreatedbeing, andagain,thereforeitisclearthat thatwhichexistsandthatthroughwhichitexistsnamelytheessencedifferin 35 the soul, and further, therefore one should say that spiritual beings and the rationalsoulhaveacompositionmadefromtheessentialparts,whicharetheparts 36 that which exists and that through which it exists. Thus Jean Summa, written between 12351236 may have been the source for Thomass position in De Ente et Essentia. Further evidence which connects the two authors can be

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foundintheprefacetoaneditionofThomassQuaestionesDisputataeDeAnima. The editor, B.C. Bazan, states that without doubt it was Jeans Summa which influencedThomassstructureofthedisputedquestionsonthesoul.Hepointsto Chapter36oftheSummawhereJeanexplainsthestructureofhisworkinterms 37 which anticipates the structure of Thomass questions. Jeans work was, therefore,wellknowntoThomasanditistestamenttothequalityofhisworkthat itinfluencedThomasinhiswritingonthesoul,thequestionistowhatextentthis willbecomeclearerasmyworkprogresses.

NOTES

1 2

JeandeLaRochelle,SummadeAnima,ed.by JacquesGuyBougerol(Paris:Vrin,1995). Theodore Crowley, Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in Philosophical Commentaries (Louvain&Dublin:Duffy&Co.Ltd.,1950),p.81. 3 SummadeAnima,p.68:Hoc videturperBoecium,inlibroDeTrinitate:Inomnieoquodest citraPrimum,esthocethoc. 4 Boethius,DeTrinitate,ed.StewardRand,Loebclassics,vol.74,ch.2,p.41:Diversumestesse et id quod est ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit. This distinction would appear to be echoed in Heideggers meditation on the ontologicaldifferenceandthelattersfamousattempttoraiseanewthequestionofthemeaning ofBeing(SinnvonSein)initsdifferencefromthatwhichis(dasSeiende). 5 Summa de Anima, p. 70: Secundum primum modum, est in creatura potencia receptiva et passivaiuxtasecundummodum,potencia activa. 6 DavidB.Burrell,AquinasandIslamicandJewishthinkers,in TheCambridgeCompanionto Aquinas,ed.byNormanKretzmann&EleonoreStump(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993),pp.6084(pp.6465). 7 DavidLuscombe,MedievalThought(Oxford&NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),p. 21. 8 Parviz Morewedge, The Metaphysica of Avicenna (Ibn Sin) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1973),p.182. 9 A.M.Goichon,LadistinctiondelessenceetdelexistencedaprsIbnSin(Avicenna)(Paris: deBrower,1937),p.132,citedinMorewedge,p.183,n.56. 10 NicolasRescher,StudiesinArabicPhilosophy(Pittsburgh:PittsburghUniversityPress,1967), p.73,citedinMorewedge,p.185,n.62. 11 Aristotle,PosteriorAnalytics(92b8):Butfurther,ifdefinitioncanprovewhatistheessential nature ofa thing, can it also prove that it exists? Andhow will it prove them both by the same process,sincedefinitionexhibitsonesinglething,andwhathumannatureisandfactthattheman existsarenotthesamething? 12 RobertWisnovsky,AvicennaandtheAvicennianTradition,inTheCambridgeCompanionto Arabic Philosophy, ed. by Peter Adamson & Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,2005),pp.92136(p.114). 13 Ibid,p.110. 14 Richard Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death (Oxford:ClarendonPress,2006),p.216. 15 Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicennas De Anima in the Latin West (LondonTurin: The Warburg Institute&NinoAragnoEditore,2000),p.81. 16 Deborah L. Black, Psychology: Soul and Intellect,in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, pp.308326(p.310). 17 Morewedge,p.15. 18 ThrseDruart, Metaphysics in CambridgeComapanion toArabic Philosophy, pp.327348 (p. 337).

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19 20

Wisnovsky,p.108. Druart,p.337. 21 Luscombe,p.101. 22 Frederick Copleston, AHistoryofPhilosophyVol2.(NewYork:ImageBooks,1962),p.49. 23 MichaelDunne,TheThreeWaysofStBonaventure,MilltownStudies,45(2000),pp.1643 (p.21). 24 Bonaventure, InIISent.,d.7,p.2,a.2,q.1,ad6. 25 EtienneGilson,HistoryofChristianPhilosophyintheMiddleAges(London:Sheed&Ward, 1955),p.376. 26 Copleston,p.51. 27 Ibid.,p.52. 28 Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, in Aquinas Selected Philosophical Writings, ed. by TimothyMcDermott(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.1993),p.105. 29 SanctiThomae de Aquino, Opera Omnia, DeEnte et Essentia, Tomus XL111. Editori di San Tommaso,Roma,1976.p.351ch. 4.line.165: [componiexquoestetquodest,velex quod estet esseutBoethiusdicit] Au lieude quod,lesanciens sauf b g - ont quo:cetteleondelarchtype nepeutserecommandernideBoce,quicrit:diversumestesseetquodest(PL64,1311 B)ni de saint Thomas, dont lautographe du Contra Gentiles 11, 54, lieu parralle de celuici, porte exactement:quibusdamdiciturexquodestetesse,velexquodestetquoest.(ms.Vat.lat.9850, fol.42vb). 30 Gilson,p.421. 31 Gilson,p.105. 32 A search in the Index Thomisticus at <http://corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age> [accessed 5 September2007]revealedthisresult. 33 ThomasAquinas,QuaestionesDisputataedeAnima,ed.byB.CarlosBazn.OperaOmnia,t. XX1V,1,Rome,Paris,CommissioLeoninaEd.DuCerf(1966),p.51:EthincestquodBoethius dicit in libro ebdomadibus, quod in aliis que sunt post Deum diiffert esse et quod est, vel, sicut quidamdicunt,quodestetquoest,namipsumesseestquoaliquidest,sicutcursusestquoaliquis currit. 34 SummadeAnima,p.69: Etideoeritdifferensinentecreatoquodestetquoest. 35 Ibid.:Patetergoquoddiffertinanimaquoest,scilicetessenciaetquodest. 36 Ibid.: Dicendumestergoquodspiritualiaetanimaracionaliscomposicionemhabentexpartibus essencialibusquepartessuntquodestetquoest,quiasuntaDeoetdenichilo.. 37 Bazn, Preface, in Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputante De anima, p. 102: Saint Thomas a structur soigneusement la srie de questions disputes sur lme unie au corps: sept questions consacreslessencedelmeseptquestionsconsacreslmeunieaucorpsseptconsacres lmespareducorps.Cettestructureluiatsuggr,sansdoute,parlaSummadeanimade JeandeLaRochelle.Eneffet,danslechapitre36(XXX1V)delapremirepartiedecettesomme, JeandeLaRochelleexpliquelastructuredesonoeuvredansdestermesquirappellentlastructure desquestionsdesaintThomas:Dictodeanimasecundumesseabsolutum[...]secundademodo essendiincorporeterciadeessepostseparacionemacorpore(ed. Bougerol,p.114).

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