VESTIL V.

IAC SUMMARY: Theness Tan Uy bitten by Andoy, dog of the Vestils; she died Dog previously owned by deceased father, maintained in house being leased to boarders The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court Law talks about possessor, not owner There is liability even if dog is tame even if escaped or lost ! even if removed from control Three year old cannot be faulted for what she may have done to animal death certificate conclusive proof of fact of death, not cause Art 2183 based on natural equity and principle of social interest ! he who possesses an animal for utility, pleasure or service must answer for damage which such animal may cause NATURE Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court. FACTS July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia. Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. Petitioners Claim The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog that bit her. Respondents Comments The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. ISSUE WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog. HELD Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. Reasoning ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly. Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. DISPOSITION The Court approves the time.

DIGEST PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents. SUMMARY: Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court. FACTS: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. ISSUE: Whether or not the Vestils are liable? HELD: CA decision affirmed, they are liable. RATIO: Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death certificate declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo: On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established.

Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house that bit Theness. According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.