Review of the 1999 Lok Sabha Elections Adopted at the Central Committee Meeting November 20-22, 1999 The

success of the !"-led alliance in the 1999 #o$ %abha elections, resulting in the return of the &a'pa(ee government, is a setbac$ for the democratic and secular forces in the countr() The C"*+M, had set out the follo-ing main tas$s to be achieved in the elections. /efeat the !" alliance, strengthen the #eft and democratic representation and aim for the formation of a secular government at the Centre) The failure to fulfill these aims confirms that the right-ard shift in *ndian politics continues) 0e have to properl( anal(se the election results, assess the present situation and the line of direction of our -or$) General Features The !" alliance has -on 100 seats out of the 231) *f the National Conference is included, the tall( is 103) *n this the !" got 142 seats, the same number as last time) The N/A polled 30)4 per cent of the votes) 5f this, the !" polled 21)6 per cent -hich is 1)9 percentage point less than in 1994) The Congress part( got onl( 111 seats, the lo-est ever figure in its histor() The Congress part( polled 24)3 per cent -hich is an increase of 2)7 percentage points) The #eft parties -on 31 seats, -ith the C"*+M, getting 11, one more than last time) The strength of the #eft has come do-n from 34 last time) The %ama'-adi "art( got 27 seats and the %" 13 +both in 8",, the 9!/ 6, the A*A/M: 10 and the NC" 6 seats) The !" alliance made ma'or gains in Andhra "radesh, Maharashtra, ihar, 9a'asthan and ;ar(ana -here it increased b( 71 seats over its previous strength in these five states) *t held on to its position in Madh(a "radesh and <u'arat) *n Tamilnadu, in alliance -ith the /M:, it got a lead) *t has improved its position in 5rissa, /elhi and ;imachal -here it had a ma'orit( of the seats in 1994) *n Assam though it -on onl( to seats b( adding one more seat, it has substantiall( increased its voting percentage and emerged as the second largest part( displacing the A<") *t has also -on both the seats in <oa for the first time) The states -here the !" alliance suffered reverses -ere :arnata$a, "un'ab and 8ttar "radesh) *n :arnata$a, the Congress got ma'orit( in both the #o$ %abha and assembl( elections) *n "un'ab, the !"-A$ali alliance could -in onl( three out of the 11 seats) The most serious setbac$ for the !" -as in 8ttar "radesh -here it -on onl( 29 seats compared to 26 last time) *n five states, <u'arat, <oa, 5rissa, ;imachal "radesh and /elhi, the !" alliance has polled more than 20 per cent of the total votes) The highest percentage of vote polled is in 5rissa -here the !/- !" alliance got 26)7 per cent of the vote) Assam is the other non-traditional !" state -here it has recorded a substantial increase polling 29)7 per cent) Though the Congress part( increased its polling percentage b( 2)7 per cent despite contesting around 20 seats less than in 1994, it has recorded a dismal lo- of 111 seats) This is mainl( due to its rout in Andhra "radesh -here it lost 17 seats, Maharashtra -here due to the split it lost 21 seats and conceded ground in the states -here it had done -ell in the November 1994 assembl( elections -- 9a'asthan, Madh(a "radesh and /elhi) A significant feature of the Congress performance is that it has lost badl( in the states -here it is running state governments = 5rissa, Madh(a "radesh, 9a'asthan, /elhi and <oa)

Factors Which Favoured the BJP *n the preliminar( revie- made b( the Central Committee in 5ctober 1999, five ma'or reasons -ere cited for the success of the !" alliance) A detailed assessment of the election results and the reports from the states sho- that these -ere the ma'or factors contributing to the success of the !") riefl( put, the( are. +a, the failure to set up an alternative government after the &a'pa(ee government collapsed in April 1999) The refusal to support a Congress-led alternative government b( the %ama'-adi "art( and the subse>uent shortsighted role of the Congress not to support an( other alternative provided the handle for the !") The mood among sections of the people -hich had turned against the !" due to its 11 months record in government -as neutralised b( the failure of the non- !" parties to install a government at the Centre) This proved a big advantage to the !" -hich could pro'ect itself as the onl( part(?combination -hich can provide a coherent government at the Centre) +b, The second factor is the unanticipated conflict -hich erupted in the :argil sector after the "a$istani intrusion) The militar( operations to evict the intruders -ent on for t-o months and the entire people@s attention -as focussed on this) The patriotic feelings of the people -ere aroused) This event before the elections hampered the campaign to eApose the &a'pa(ee government@s 11-month record -ith regard to its communal platform, its economic policies and attac$s on democrac() The success of the :argil operation -as eAploited b( the !" to enhance the image of the "rime Minister) The :argil issue provided the !" an opportunit( to rall( support from the urban middle classes and the (outh) Though the impact -as not uniform in the countr(, it did give the !" an advantage in certain parts of the countr() +c, The third ma'or factor in favour of the !" -as its -ide-ranging alliance) Not onl( -as the alliance forged in 1994 $ept intact but it -as -idened) The onl( difference from 1994 being the /M: replaced the A*A/M: in Tamilnadu) The !" alliance -hich had man( regional parties li$e the T/", /M:, the !/, the #o$ %ha$ti, Trinamul Congress and the %amata -as further strengthened b( the addition of the !/+8,) Not onl( did these parties bring in additional support through their o-n mass base but it helped the !" also in another -a() The fact that man( regional parties of a secular character -ere allied -ith it, blunted to a large eAtent the eAposure of its communal character and its anti-secular policies) The sidetrac$ing of all other issues due to the :argil -ar for a long period and the cover provided b( the regional parties for the !", both helped the !") The first b( preventing the eAposure of its harmful record in economic policies and the second b( providing a cover to the communal character of the !") +d, The fourth factor is the role of the Congress) *n the run up to the elections, the Congress split -ith %harad "a-ar and t-o other C0C members forming the Nationalist Congress "art(, thus from the outset itself the Congress presented the picture of a house divided) Burther the Congress advocated the same economic policies of liberalisation as seen in its manifesto) *n fact it promised further initiatives in this direction) Bl(ing in the face of the ground realities, the Congress part( campaigned that it alone can provide a stable government through single part( rule) %uch a claim having no basis in realit( -as not ta$en seriousl( b( the people) <iven its -ea$ened organisational and ideological state, and its refusal to see$ allies, it -as in no position to counter the po-erful combine of the !") An anal(sis of the trends in the elections sho- that for large sections of the people, the Congress continues to be identified -ith its past record of discredited policies, corruption and misrule) ( refusing to put for-ard an( ne- socio-economic platform in the interests of the people, the Congress allo-ed the !" to ma$e it a contest bet-een Atal ehari &a'pa(ee and %onia <andhi) The reports sho- that the !"@s campaign against %onia

<andhi@s foreign origin and her bac$ground of lac$ of public eAperience had an adverse impact on sections of the middle classes both in the urban and rural areas) *t -as thus able to benefit from the perception that it alone can provide a stable government) +e, The fifth factor is the absence of a viable third force at the national level) This particularl( affected the #eft and democratic forces) The falling apart of the old 8nited Bront and the differences -hich arose on the >uestion of adopting a line of e>uidistance bet-een the !" and the Congress precluded an( possibilit( of a national level alliance before the elections) This handicapped the part( and the #eft in various -a(s) 5ne effect -as that in the absence of a viable third force in man( states, the traditional anti-Congress votes -ent to the !"-led alliance) The slogan of a secular government at the centre could not help us in the three #eft bases of 0est engal, :erala and Tripura to appeal to -ider sections of people) *n the prevailing situation it -as not possible to pro'ect an alternative government eAcept in vague terms) Apart from these five factors, the four-month careta$er government period -as full( utilised b( the !" to advance their partisan interests) The notorious telecom scam and the sugar scam related to the import of sugar from "a$istan all indicate the -a( resources -ere raised for the elections) The big business controlled media pla(ed a ma'or role in creating an atmosphere in favour of the !") A notable feature of these elections -as the massive use of mone( po-er b( the !" and its allies on a scale not seen so far) %ome important features of the results have to be noted) ++i, The strength of the !" has not increased in terms of seats despite all the advantages and resources it had) *t has been able onl( to retain the number of seats it had in 1994) +ii, The Congress part( has fared badl( and not been able to ma$e an( recover( despite being the ma'or opposition part() *ts past record and present policies continue to be discredited and opposed b( large sections of the people) +iii, /espite the disruption of the 8nited Bront in 1994-99 and the disarra( among the forces of the third alternative, the parties -hich are not part of the !" alliance and -ho do not subscribe to the Congress platform continue to have a significant presence and this is reflected in parliament) %uch parties have around a hundred seats in the #o$ %abha) +iv, The claim that a t-o part( s(stem -ill emerge from these elections has been debun$ed) The results also confirm that no single part( can form a government on its o-n and coalitions have become the norm for the near future) lass !"#lications The political resolution of the 17th Congress had pointed out that the emergence of the !" as a ma'or bourgeois-landlord part( Csuits the interests of imperialism and sections of the ruling classesC) *t had stated Cthe erosion of the Congress had resulted in a shift in class terms of considerable sections of the big bourgeois-landlords in favour of the !"C) The present elections have confirmed this trend) #eaders of the associations of big business li$e the C**, B*CC* and A%%5C;AM publicl( endorsed the platform of the !" as represented in its manifesto) The bul$ of the big business supported the !" openl( and financed it) 8% imperialism -as $een to see the return of the &a'pa(ee regime -ith -hich it had developed a close -or$ing relationship) Dven during the careta$er period of the

&a'pa(ee government in the run up to the elections, the 8% administration continued its agenda of tal$s -ith the &a'pa(ee government on the CT T, 0T5 and :ashmir, anticipating the return of the government) The big business alread( controls the print media) The electronic media -ith privatisation has also come under the influence of big business) The "rasar harati -as alread( being used b( the careta$er government) Thus the entire media including significant sections of the regional media rallied in support of the !" and pro'ected issues in such a manner as to favour the !" alliance) Another aspect of this campaign -as the use of opinion polls and eAit polls to influence public opinion b( pro'ecting a big victor( for the !") BJP$s Perfor"ance 0hile noting the fact that the !" could not cross the 142 seats it -on in 1994 and that its percentage of votes is less than last time, it -ould be -rong to conclude that its mass base and influence is shrin$ing) %ince the 1949 elections it has been steadil( increasing its strength) Perfor"ance of BJP Seats %ear Won 002 047 120 171 142 142 ontested 229 227 374 361 144 119 & of 'otal votes 06)3 11)2 20)1 20)1 22)7 21)6

1943 1949 1991 1997 1994 1999

*n eAactl( a decade the !" has been able to gro- and become first the ma'or opposition part( in parliament +in 1991, and then become the largest single part( in the #o$ %abha in 1997) *n three conse>uent elections in 1997, 1994 and 1999, the !" has emerged as the largest single part( in the #o$ %abha) 0hile it is true that the !" cannot get a ma'orit( on its o-n and has been successful b( forging a broad alliance, the strength of the !" should not be underestimated) ;ere certain points must be noted) +i, The !" percentage has decreased because it has fought nearl( 20 seats less than in 1994) +ii, *ts overall tall( could not increase because of its bad performance in 8)" -here alone it lost 24 seats) +iii, *t has been able to eApand in man( other states li$e Assam, 5rissa, <oa etc) *t continues to attract support from ne- sections of the people and in ne- areas) The !" has created a large constituenc( among the urban middle classes) This applies both to the big cities and to the small to-ns) This trend of support from among these sections had been noted in the 1997 and 1994 elections too) This support for the !" continues, though there are some eAceptions) The middle classes are not the same strata as in the 1970s and 60s) A substantial part of the middle class have benefited from liberalisation) Their numbers have proliferated -ith the eApansion of the services sector) As the 17th Congress political resolution noted.

Cillusions are fostered among them about the benefits of liberalisation) The communal forces are also able to eAert and appeal on the urban middle class) The bourgeois media targets these sections to foster mindless consumerism and anti-democratic values)C 0ith the decline of the Congress and the eAhaustion of the old Nehruvian frame-or$, ne- sections among the middle class loo$ to ;indutva as an alternative ideolog() There are atleast 20 to 70 million people belonging to this categor( -ho are setting the pace of public opinion) The !" is dra-ing sustenance from these sections in the absence of a po-erful democratic movement among them) The important role pla(ed b( this strata in the !"@s success can be seen from the fact that out of a total of 19 parliamentar( constituencies in the four metropolitan cities, 14 have been -on b( the !" and its allies) Another aspect of the !"@s performance is the support it has garnered among substantial sections of the (outh) %ections of educated (outh both in urban and rural areas have been attracted to the !") This is a disturbing feature as -ith the decline of the Congress, instead of the #eft and democratic forces, sections of the (outh are being attracted to a right-ing communal part() The 1997 election revie- had pointed out that the !"@s gro-ing influence is based on the penetration of the ;indutva ideolog( through the organisational net-or$ run b( the various outfits of the 9%%) Dducational institutions, adivasi organisations, and caste organisations are all being used b( the 9%% outfits) The &anavasi :al(an Ashram is -or$ing in the tribal areas s(stematicall( -hich is also motivated b( the necessit( to counter the influence of Christian missionaries) *t is significant that the !" has -on the bul$ of the %T seats in 5rissa, ihar, M" and <u'arat) Left Perfor"ance The #eft parties have -on 31 seats in the #o$ %abha +in 1994 it had got 34 seats,) 5f this the C"*+M, has -on 11 +one more than in 1994,, the C"*@s strength has come do-n to four from 9 the( had in 1994, the 9%" has 1 seats and the Bor-ard loc 2) 5ne seat has been -on b( the #/B partner in :erala, the :erala Congress+!,) Apart from this, the "0" has -on 1 seat in Maharashtra and the C"*+M#, 1 seat from Assam) (ur Part)$s Perfor"ance 5f the 11 seats -on b( the "art(, 21 are from 0est engal, 4 from :erala, 2 from Tripura and 1 each from Tamilnadu and ihar) The "art( lost three seats in 0est engal compared to its 1994 tall() *t got t-o more seats in :erala = from 7 to 4 and retained both seats in Tripura -ith bigger margins) *n Tamilnadu, the "art( -on the Madurai seat and in ihar, the hagalpur seat) West Ben*al + The #eft Bront has -on 29 seats out of the total of 32 -hich is 3 less than last time) 5f this, the C"*+M, lost 1 and the 9%" 1) The #eft Bront secured more or less the same percentage of votes as in the 1994 elections) *t has no- secured 37)6 per cent as compared to 37)4 percent in 1994) The !"-Trinamul Congress increased their vote b( 2)7 per cent -hile the Congress vote declined b( 2)9 per cent) The elections -ere fought in the state in the face of the unfavourable national situation -here the failure to form an alternative government and the absence of a third force -as utilised b( the TMC- !" combination to launch a big offensive) The mainstream media conducted an anti #eft Bront campaign as usual) ut -hat -as notable this time -as the viciousness of the s(stematic campaign launched b( the ma'or ne-spapers against the C"*+M, and the pro'ection of Mamata aner'ee) A ne- feature -as the large-scale terror tactics and violence indulged in b( the Trinamul- !" combine in %outh 23 "arganas, Murshidabad and parts of Midnapore, ;ooghl( and an$ura) This indicates a ne- anti-Communist offensive)

The serious flood -hich affected the 12 districts in the middle of the elections affected the people badl() The "art( -as full( engaged in rescue and relief -or$) ;o-ever the problems created b( the floods also affected the people@s mood and in some places hampered their voting) 5vercoming all these, the "art( organised an intensive campaign to reach out to all sections of the people) The over-helming ma'orit( of the rural poor, scheduled castes and tribals supported us) *n the industrial areas and urban centres our results -ere comparativel( better than in 1994) 5ut of the 293 assembl( segments the #eft Bront has -on in 149 assembl( segments -hile the TMC- !" combine has -on in 41) The Congress got leads in 20 Assembl( segments) The revie- made b( the 0est engal state committee has noted that in the rural belt in villages and to-ns dominated b( the middle class our influence has declined) %imilarl( the (outh belonging to the middle classes have been turned a-a( from us) An important fact is that sections of the refugees from angladesh have rallied to the !"-TMC combine ) This is especiall( true of sections of the ne- generation among the refugee families and the post 1961 influA of refugees -ho have come under !" influence) After 21 (ears of #eft Bront government there are positive and negative aspects) The gro-th of unemplo(ment, inade>uate facilities for education, health, roads etc have had a negative impact) 0here -e have failed to improve the functioning of the pancha(ats and local bodies and remove the malfunctioning and -rong practices, sections of people have been alienated including those belonging to the basic classes) At the organisational level, the reports about inactivit( of a small section of "art( members and lac$ of unit( in the part( in certain units are problems -hich need to be tac$led) The rectification campaign -ithin the part( and the drive to improve our functioning in the elected bodies at all levels including the performance of the government, must engage the attention of the "art( on a priorit( basis) ,erala + The elections are al-a(s closel( contested bet-een the #/B and the 8/B in :erala) The results in 1999 -ere the same as last time in terms of seats = 9 for the #/B and 11 for the 8/B) The #/B polled 31)3 per cent of the vote -hich is 0)9 per cent less than last time) The 8/B polled 37)7 per cent -hich is 1 per cent more than last time) The difference bet-een the #/B and the 8/B is 1)1 per cent) The "art( conducted a highl( organised and intensive campaign against the 8/B) The Congress in its desperation came to a secret understanding -ith the !" in t-o seats = Mu$undapuram and Trivandrum to help each other) 5verall the record of the "art( in defence of secularism and the election campaign had its impact on the minorities and it -as eApected that there -ould be a substantial s-ing in favour of the #/B) ;o-ever, unli$e in 1994, -hen all the Muslim organisations li$e the *N#, the "/" and the !amaat-e-*slami had contested independentl(, this time the( supported the *8M# and the 8/B candidates) This consolidated the Muslim vote in man( areas behind the 8/B) %imilarl( the Christian votes in man( areas got consolidated behind the 8/B) The part( -as able to reach out to people outside our sphere of influence through the organisation of tens of thousands of famil( meetings, a ne- feature in the campaign) Traditionall( in :erala there is a divergence in the voting pattern for the assembl( and parliament elections) Normall( the 8/B gets a bigger vote for the parliament election, even -hen simultaneous elections to the assembl( are held are held) #ast time too the 8/B got a ma'orit( in 41 out of 130 assembl( segments) ;o-ever, this time, it -as able to increase it to 91 -hile the #/B -on in 39 segments) This and the fact that there -as a percentage -ise decrease for the #/B in 12 constituencies must

be treated seriousl() Dven though the #/B government has underta$en man( -orth-hile policies li$e the people@s planning process and the maintenance of the public distribution s(stem and other benefits for the people, -e must eAamine ho- its implementation has had its impact on the people) A larger >uestion is ho- -e can advance the "art(@s influence among the minorities and -in over sections -ho are still tied to the 8/B parties) 'ri#ura. *n Tripura -e have -on both the seats -ith bigger margins polling 23)4 percent of the vote in Tripura Dast +%T, and 26)2 per cent in Tripura 0est) A nefeature of the elections -as the formation of the Trinamul Congress after the split in the Congress on eve of the elections) The Trinamul Congress had an alliance -ith the !" and the T8!%) The T8!% bro$e its longstanding alliance -ith the Congress) The "art( and the #eft Bront had to counter the !"-Trinamul-T8!% combine as its main opponent and also overcome the difficult situation created b( the continuing eAtremist violence -hich has disrupted life in man( tribal areas) *t is creditable that the "art( has been able to achieve success in such difficult conditions) *t is the determined fight -aged b( the "art( units of :erala, 0est engal and Tripura -hich has enabled the "art( to -ithstand the combined onslaught off the !" alliance and the Congress) *n t-o of these states, 0est engal and Tripura, the Trinamul- !" alliance has emerged as the main opponent of the #eft) *n :erala, the 8/B and the !" acted in concert to tr( and isolate the #/B) *t is creditable that given the overall national situation -e have been able to beat bac$ these attac$s and maintain the position of the #eft in these three states) *n the other states eAcept for the victor( in Madurai and hagalpur, the performance of the "art( has been disappointing) *n the second seat in Tamilnadu +North Chennai, the "art( came second polling 1)1 la$h votes) *n "urnea, the second seat in ihar, -e got onl( 29,000 votes) The results in other seats are disappointing, not because -e eApected to -in an( of the seats, but because -e could not increase our voting strength) *n Andhra "radesh some erosion of support has ta$en place) 0e contested 6 #o$ %abha seats) Though -e did not eApect to -in an( of them, -hat is of concern is that there has been an erosion in the voting base of the "art() Compared to the 2)4 per cent voted polled in 1994 contesting 1 seats in alliance -ith the T/", the "art( has polled onl( 1)3 per cent contesting 6 seats) *n the assembl( elections, the part( has polled 1)6 per cent contesting 34 seats) 5ur performance in Telangana area -as better -hile -e lost ground in the coastal districts) 0e -ere able to -in t-o seats -hile the C"* failed to get an() Bor 13 (ears the "art( had an alliance -ith the T/" and last (ear after -e bro$e -ith the T/" -e tried to assert our independent position and campaigned against the T/" government@s policies) Eet, after the brea$ it is clear that -e have not gained an( ne- sections from this prolonged alliance -ith the T/", rather some of our o-n votes have gone to the T/") *n Assam, the "art( contested t-o seats) *t polled 1)31 la$hs in arpeta and in :arimgan' 13,220 votes) *n Maharashtra -e contested three seats) *n /ahanu -e polled 49,329) ;ere our vote has been declining in the last three elections) *n the second Malegaon -e got 79,132 votes and in Nandurbar -e polled 11,722 votes) *n "un'ab, in the one seat contested, %angrur, -e polled 1)9 la$h votes) *n 9a'asthan, in the %i$ar seat the "art( got 40,000 votes) *n Madh(a "radesh -e contested a netribal seat %argu'a -here -e polled 11, 942 votes) *n 8ttar "radesh -e contested t-o seats -ithout an( alliance = Chandauli and A$barpur -here -e fared poorl( getting 4711 and 2261 votes respectivel() *n the :ashmir &alle(, the election -as mar$ed b( large-scale rigging and misuse of the official machiner() %uch tactics have further alienated the people) 5nl( in Anantnag seat, because of the presence of a strong

opposition -hich maintained lin$s -ith the people, such efforts -ere th-arted to an eAtent) *n this seat despite the threats of eAtremist violence and rigging, our candidate polled over 17,000 votes getting 12 per cent of the vote) *n 5rissa in the t-o seats -e contested in "uri and %undargarh -e got around 11,000 votes in each seat) *n ;ar(ana, the "art( contested hi-ani seat and got 10,211 votes) The performance of our "art( in general outside the three strong states sho-s that -e have not been able to either eApand or consolidate the "art(@s influence in an( manner commensurate to the various activities of the "art( and the mass organisations) *n the revie- of the 1997 elections -e had pinpointed some of the factors responsible for this as follo-s. C*n pro'ecting the independent political line of the "art( among the people, in ta$ing ideological and class positions distinct from the bourgeois parties, the "art( is lagging behind) 0hen such -ider alliances and 'oint fronts -ith other political parties are forged and this independent political ideological stand is absent or lagging, the "art(@s gro-th gets limited) *t is difficult for the people to see the distinct identit( of the "art() C%econdl(, the call for independent activities of the "art( is often ritualisticall( observed in a formal manner -ithout sufficient initiative ta$en at the grassroots level to ta$e up the class and mass issues and launch struggles and movements) The capacit( to ta$e up independentl( issues b( the part( and to -age militant struggles has been giving -a( to general campaigns and reliance on electoral tactics not ver( dissimilar to bourgeois parties) *n such a situation, the methods utilised b( the bourgeois allies such as caste mobilisation, populist slogans devoid of a class content and tendenc( to tail behind the slogans of the dominant bourgeois partners is becoming increasingl( manifest) C*n such a situation, neither the "art(@s independent strength nor its electoral influence gro-s and the tendenc( to tail behind the bourgeois parties ends up in strengthening them and not the "art( and the #eft forces)C This self-critical appraisal still remains valid and -e have not been able to overcome the various -ea$nesses) Review of !"#le"entation of Electoral Line The 17th "art( Congress -or$ed out the political-tactical line -herein -e targetted the !" as the main danger -hich has to be fought) 0e did not adhere to the line of e>uidistance bet-een the !" and the Congress given the changed political situation) *t is based on this that the electoral tactics -ere adopted) D>uidistance -ould have meant failure to appreciate the ne- political situation and diluting the main direction of attac$ against the !" and the communal forces) The -ithdra-al of support b( the A*A/M: led to the fall of the &a'pa(ee government) 5ur intervention at that time and the stand -e too$ during the &ote of Confidence -as in line -ith the direction given b( the "art( Congress to -or$ for the defeat of the !" government) The failure to put in an alternate government -as a setbac$ but it does not detract from the line that -e pursued to defeat the !") The Ma( 1999 CC meeting -or$ed out the electoral line) *t stated. C*n the coming general elections, our main tas$ is to defeat the !" and its allies) 0e have to -or$ to strengthen the "art( and the #eft and rall( all the secular and democratic parties and forces -ho are opposed to the Congress policies too) 0hile directing the main fire against the !", -e should also oppose the Congress "art(Fs politics and policies in

such a manner as to pro'ect the need for a third alternative) The #eft -ill have to advocate the alternative policies -hich can attract all sections of the -or$ing people and the ordinar( citiGens)C 0hile giving priorit( to the defeat of the !"-led alliance, the line called for the opposing the Congress part(Fs politics and policies and to pro'ect the need for a third alternative) The "art( had correctl( assessed that there is no viable third force available in these elections and that in some states the fight -ould be bet-een the !" and the Congress) *n such states, it -as decided that. C-e should fight onl( a feseats -here -e can effectivel( register the "art(Fs presence and in the state as a -hole campaign to defeat the !"C) *n t-o states -- Tamilnadu and Andhra "radesh --e had to deal -ith the specific situation -here our erst-hile allies, the T/" and the /M:, had deserted to the !" camp) *n the case of ihar, -e had alread( decided that not-ithstanding our opposition to the 9!/ state government, -e should cooperate -ith the 9!/ at the national level in the fight against communalism) ( and large the line -as implemented $eeping in mind the different situation prevailing in the states) ;o-ever, soon after the Ma( meeting itself, an impression -as created b( some statements of the "art( leadership that our fight against the Congress is confined to the three states of 0est engal, :erala and Tripura) This implied that -e -ere cooperating -ith the Congress else-here -hich -as not true) 0e -ere fighting both the Congress and !" in man( places as in Assam, Andhra, :arnata$a, 8" etc) 0hen the !" and later %harad "a-ar raised the issue that %onia <andhi cannot be prime minister as she is a citiGen of foreign origin, -e too$ the correct position that no citiGen can be barred from the rights accorded in the Constitution b( origin of birth) ut repeated remar$s in the press and articles that %onia <andhi is eligible to be ")M) led people to believe that -e -ere endorsing her actual candidature for prime ministership) That -hile recognising the right of an( citiGen including %onia to be "M, -e had our opposition to the Congress and its leadership, -as not at all brought out) %ome remar$s of eAtending support to a Congress-led government, after the elections, also reinforced the impression that -e -ere adopting a pro-Congress line) *t must be self-criticall( noted that such statements created the impression that -e -ere $een for cooperation -ith the Congress and -as not serious about rebuilding a third alternative after the election) %uch an impression among the #eft s(mpathisers and the media pro'ections created difficulties according to the reports of man( state committees) There -as an overestimation of the strength of the Congress in the assessment made b( the "art( Centre in the course of the election campaign) Huestions have arisen about the -a( -e implemented the line in Tamilnadu) The Central Committee had decided that -e should have a seat ad'ustment -ith the A*A/M: and not have a front -ith the A*A/M: and its partners li$e the Congress and the *N#) ;o-ever, in practice, -hat developed -as a front -ith 'oint campaign -ith all the parties) The approach -ent be(ond the line -e -or$ed out vis-a-vis the Congress) *n "un'ab, in the %angrur seat -hich -e contested, the Congress did not put up a candidate) ;ere also 'oint campaigning -ith the Congress too$ place) oth these instances strengthened the impression of our having an alliance -ith the Congress) Another point of self-criticism is that though -e stated that -e should popularise alternative policies, -e hardl( reflected this in our campaign) 5ur alternative policies are different and oppose to both the !" and the Congress and other bourgeois parties) This aspect -as hardl( pro'ected) Anti- !" propaganda alone does not constitute the comprehensive alternative platform of the "art() This amounts to a

failure to pro'ect the independent line of the "art() Wo"en andidates This time, -e could field onl( 2 -omen candidates -hich is 2 less than last time) oth in 0est engal and :erala -e put up one less -oman candidate) *n Andhra "radesh, though -e contested 6 seats, -e could not put up a -oman candidate) This time, since elections -ere held after 14 months, it -as difficult to have advance planning for candidates or change those alread( there) Eet, -e must ensure that atleast the stronger states field more -omen candidates) *n these elections, man( bourgeois parties put up more -omen candidates than us proportionate to the total number the( contested) Rectif) (r*anisational -efects The overall revie- of the election -or$ put in b( the "art( in various states sho-s that outside the three strong states of 0est engal, :erala and Tripura, the activities of the "art( and the mass organisations are not eApanding, nor translated into political influence of the "art( even after a long period of -or$) The ma'or organisational -ea$nesses pinpointed in the 5rganisational 9eport of the "art( in the 17th Congress and in the CC document on 9ectification are the main reasons for this failure) *f planned and time bound steps are not ta$en to rectif( the situation, the "art(Fs advance -ill not onl( be hampered but in the prevailing situation, the eAisting mass base of the "art( can be eroded b( the hostile forces) The reports from the states indicate certain negative features) *n some states, there are reports of a fe- "art( members, including some local leaders, -or$ing against the "art( line and -or$ing for the candidates of other parties) This is not confined to one state) %uch reports have come from Andhra "radesh, Assam, Maharashtra and even 0est engal) Darlier, there used to be reports of inactivit( b( "art( members) This time ho-ever, there are reports of "art( members going against the "art(Fs line even though the( ma( be fe- in number) *t is necessar( that such cases are immediatel( dealt -ith as such persons cannot be of an( use to the "art() *n selection of seats due care -as not ta$en to assess our actual position in some cases -hich led to -rong choice of seats) *n assessing our prospects and the results also, "art( committees rel( on our peripher( rather than the general masses) Dven in :erala after repeated assessments, the reports provided b( the committees -as that -e -ould -in 16 out of the 20 seats) This sho-s either that sub'ective considerations prevail or, -e do not have ade>uate lin$s -ith the masses) The Andhra "radesh revie- notes C%elective consideration of realities according to our sub'ective inclinations, lac$ of comprehensive approach, inabilit( to gather concrete information, re'ection of information received from non-"art( sources are some of the shortcomings -hich hampered the process of proper assessment)C *n future -e should ensure that assessments are made after getting a proper feedbac$ from different sections of the people, particularl( non-"art( sources) The need for raising the ideological and political level of all "art( members and providing intensive ideological education has assumed urgenc( given the gro-th of reactionar( ideologies and the gro-ing aggressiveness of anti-#eft forces) Baced -ith deliberate attempts to increase religiosit( and caste identities, purve(ing of consumerist and egoistic values through the media and large-scale anti-Communist propaganda, -e must be able first of all to e>uip our "art( members, to meet this offensive) oth the :erala and 0est engal revie- reports underline the role pla(ed b( the "art( ne-spapers in informing the people about the "art(@s positions and countering the anti-#eft propaganda) /eshabhimani and <anasha$ti sa- an increase in their

10

circulation through special drive for the campaign period) The eAperience of the other dailies is also positive) ;o-ever, at the central level, the circulation of "eople@s /emocrac( and #o$ #ehar actuall( declined in this period) This is a matter of concern and should be loo$ed into immediatel() As pointed out in the 17th "art( Congress resolution, it is necessar( for the "art( to conduct intense ideological -or$ amongst the middle classes to dra- them into the democratic movement) %pecial efforts must be made b( "art( units -or$ing among middle class emplo(ees to step up ideological -or$) Along-ith this, the issues affecting the middle classes and their perceptions of political issues must be given due attention in our "art(Fs propaganda) *n vie- of the inroads made b( the !" in certain areas among the (outh, -e -ill have to pa( special attention to the (outh and students and for developing their movements and activities in such a manner as to counter to eApose the ;indutva forces and counter the influence) The "art( Congress has dra-n attention to the need to counter the 9%% organisationFs -or$ among the adivasis and other sections of people) 0e have to ta$e up this -or$ seriousl( as per the direction given in the "art( Congress) *n vie- of the inabilit( to register advance in most of the states, among ne- sections of the people, or, to maintain the eAisting spheres of influence, it is essential that the Central Committee ta$e steps to implement the organisational directives of the "art( Congress on a priorit( basis) Bor this purpose, the neAt Central Committee meeting of the "art( should discuss the immediate tas$s to be ta$en up for "art( organisation on the basis of a report submitted b( the "olit ureau) Left .nit) /ue to differences in approach bet-een us and the Bor-ard loc and 9%" on the >uestion of e>uidistance bet-een the !" and the Congress it -as not possible for us to have an( 'oint manifesto of the #eft parties as -e did in 1994) 5ur understanding -ith these t-o parties -ere there at the states level in 0est engal, :erala and Tripura -here the( are part of the #eft-led fronts) The C"*+M, and the C"* had a common understanding about the tactics to be pursued in the elections) ( and large the t-o parties -or$ed together) ;o-ever, in some places strains developed) *n Andhra "radesh, the state unit of the C"* advocated going -ith the Congress after the T/" and the !" came together) ut our "art( did not agree and it -as onl( after prolonged tal$s and the failure of the C"* to come to an understanding -ith the Congress that -e -ere able to -or$ out an understanding to -or$ together in the #o$ %abha and the assembl( elections) *n ihar, the ad'ustment could not be reached bet-een the 9!/ and the C"*) The C"* -as unhapp( about being allotted onl( three seats and decided to fight nine seats) As -e had arrived at an understanding -ith the 9!/ -e decided to support the C"* onl( in the first three seats -hich -ere given to them as part of the overall understanding) The C"* in ihar not onl( -or$ed against the 9!/ in man( seats but did not support us in hagalpur despite our repeated re>uests) *n :erala, the split in the 9%" created problems for their contesting the :ollam seat since the dissident faction declared that the( -ould not support the official 9%" candidate) *n such a situation -e had to insist that -e -ould fight the seat in order to prevent the Congress ta$ing advantage of the division) The setbac$ suffered b( the C"* is a matter of concern as it can affect the #eft base) 0e should ma$e special efforts to strengthen #eft unit( and -or$ 'ointl( -ith the C"* at various levels so that the mass base of the #eft as a -hole is consolidated to pave

11

the -a( for enhanced #eft activities) aste /##eal An important feature of these elections has been the continuing caste appeal and gro-ing fragmentation based on caste -hich has been noted in the 1997 and 1994 election revie-s too) *n some of the states this has got further heightened) *n the last fe- (ears this caste appeal and fragmentation has not been confined to the ;indi states alone, it has spread to other states too) 0e have been stressing in the recent period the necessit( for the "art( to ta$e up the >uestion of caste and social oppression along-ith economic and da( to da( issues of livelihood of the oppressed sections) 0hile basing ourselves on the class issues -hich unite all oppressed sections, a general campaign against caste oppression, the disruptive role of caste divisions and an appeal addressed to eAploited sections of all castes and communities is essential to be able to ma$e head-a() 0hile accepting this generall(, "art( committees -ith fe- eAceptions, have not -or$ed out concrete tactics in their respective areas) 0inorities The voting patters of the minorities sho-s that in man( states the Muslim minorities have given up their earlier antagonism to the Congress after the abri Mas'id event and voted for it -here there -as no other ma'or secular force to defeat the !") ;o-ever, in some poc$ets -here the regional parties are strong, despite their alliance -ith the !" the( have remained -ith the dominant regional part( li$e the T/" in coastal Andhra "radesh) 0e have repeatedl( noted that in the absence of our "art(@s intervention and -or$ among these sections there is no advance of democratic consciousness amongst the minorities -ith their immediate concern being their securit() *n states li$e 0est engal -here the minorities have been supporting the C"*+M, and the #eft Bront, -e have to see ho- -e can ta$e up their problems of education, emplo(ment and social advance so that their democratic consciousness and role in the democratic movement can be heightened) The attac$s on the Christian minorit( has been consciousl( used b( the !"-9%% combine to consolidate votes on the basis of a ;indutva ideolog() The Christians being a ver( small minorit( in man( areas are eas( targets and the vicious campaign is used to arouse and consolidate the ;indu follo-ing) *t is significant that in the areas -here the Christians came under attac$ li$e in the /angs district of <u'arat and in Madh(a "radesh and 5rissa, the !" has been able to achieve electoral success) -an*erous !"#lications of BJP1s Return The return of the !"-led government -ith a comfortable ma'orit( -ill mean rene-ed efforts to undermine the secular-democratic bases of the *ndian %tate and polit() The 9%% -ill penetrate the %tate apparatus in a more s(stematic fashion) No arm of the %tate -- the bureaucrac(, the 'udiciar(, or the armed forces -- -ill be spared) The educational and research institutions -ill be moulded to serve the ;indutva ideolog() The long-term aim of the 9%% is to subvert the secular republic and push for a ;indutva-oriented %tate -ill come into pla() Though the !" -ill not put the ;indutva agenda on the governmentFs agenda officiall(, given the nature of its coalition, the 9%% and its various outfits -ill continue the 'ob of spreading communal ideolog( and building up of movements) The recent campaign against Christians during the "opeFs visit is an illustration) The !" -ill covertl( use the government machiner( to advance its real agenda) The !" regime -ill be aided b( 8% imperialism) An authoritarian ;indutva regime

12

committed to open up the econom( and the mar$et -ould be ideal for the 8% plans for global hegemon() This has serious implications for *ndiaFs sovereignt( and foreign polic() The !" governmentFs total commitment to privatisation and liberalisation augurs bigger onslaughts on the people) The earlier 11-month &a'pa(ee regime sa- the launching of a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent after the "o$hran tests) The success of the :argil operation -ill give a fillip to the forces advocating militarism and chauvinism -hich -ill be ver( detrimental to the interests of the -or$ing people) The danger of the !" reactionar( forces being in po-er at the Centre recognised b( the 17th "art( Congress, has got heightened as a result of the 1999 #o$ %abha elections) %oon after assuming po-er, the "rime Minister -arned of tough measures to be adopted) Dven before the results, a 30 per cent rise in diesel prices -as enforced) This had a cascading effect -ith rise in prices of transportation, bus fares etc) More such attac$s on the "ublic /istribution %(stem, on other essential items for the people are in the offing) The biggest attac$ on the public sector is under-a( -ith the large-scale disinvestment of the public sector shares in the profitable units, proposed closure of eight public sector underta$ings and starving the public sector of funds and orders) The fiscal situation of the state governments has reached a crisis point) %ome of the states are unable to pa( the salaries of their emplo(ees on time) *t is estimated that 23 state governments have demanded 9s) 12 thousand crores to meet their immediate financial re>uirements) The agenda of the ne- !"-led government includes the opening up of insurance, further privatisation of ban$s, more concessions to foreign capital in all basic sectors and a more braGen pro-big business policies) The !"-led government has, -ithout dela(, appointed persons -ith !"-9%% bac$ground in $e( institutions of higher research and education such as the 8<C, the *C%%9 and the *C;9) *t is going ahead -ith setting up of a Commission to revie- the Constitution -hich is 'ust a device for proposing changes in the secular character of the Constitution and for replacing the parliamentar( s(stem -ith a presidential form of government) 0ithin a month of !"Fs coming into po-er, high level tal$s have been held -ith the 8nited %tateFs administration and secret diplomac( through %trobe Talbott-!as-ant %ingh tal$s have been resumed) The advent of the !" alliance to po-er -ith a bigger ma'orit( presages more attac$s on the #eft and democratic forces) The situation in Tripura has -orsened in the recent -ee$s) The eAtremist groups are launching indiscriminate attac$s, resorting to $illings and abductions) %uch violence has intensified after the previous !"-led government -ithdra-n the arm( and para-militar( forces deplo(ed there) The refusal of the Central government to heed the repeated re>uests of the state government -as politicall( motivated intended to discredit the #eft Bront government amongst the people) *n :erala, the !" has repeatedl( collaborated -ith the 8/B to isolate the #/B) *n 0est engal too, there -ill be efforts to forge a united platform under the leadership of Mamata aner'ee to attac$ the #eft Bront) urrent 'asks *t is imperative that the "art( be in the forefront to oppose all efforts b( the 9%% to penetrate the %tate apparatus) An( attempt to push through the ;indutva agenda on all fronts must be resolutel( opposed) The C"*+M, and the #eft must be the consistent

13

force to rall( all other secular forces in the defence of secularism) 0e must fight bac$ an( anti-democratic moves contemplated b( the government) The ne- government formed b( the !", -ill run into difficulties given the nature of the alliance that has been formed) 8nli$e the !", its ma'or partners do not share the ;indutva ideolog() The( have their o-n regional identities and aspirations) The disparate and conflicting aims of the alliance partners -ill bring to the fore contradictions) *t -ill ta$e some time for these developments to unfold) As -e develop mass movements on the peopleFs issues, these differences -ill come to the fore) The economic situation is going to -orsen) A number of retrograde polic( measures -ill be brought in "arliament, such as the *9A ill for adoption) The "art( must ta$e the initiative to rall( all other forces to oppose such policies) The "art( must activel( build up movements and united struggles against the economic policies of the !"-led government and connected harmful measures ta$en b( the state governments) *n building up the resistance to these policies, the "art( must lend full support to the united struggles of the mass organisations and the trade unions) The "art( eAtends its full support to the call of the insurance and ban$ing unions for the movement against privatisation beginning -ith the march to "arliament on November 29 follo-ed b( mass demonstrations in the state capitals) The "art( eAtends its full support to the proposed 'oint struggles of the public sector trade unions and the sponsoring committee of trade unions) *n the month of /ecember, the struggle against the privatisation of insurance and in defence of the public sector should be the focus for a big mobilisation and protest actions) The "art( and the #eftled governments should ta$e the lead in championing the rights of the states and for -or$ing out a s(stem more in tune -ith the federal principle) The open alliance of the !"-led government -ith the 8nited %tates and the tal$ of strategic partnership must be eAposed and a po-erful anti-imperialist campaign launched) The proposed visit of "resident Clinton earl( neAt (ear should be the occasion for a -idespread campaign against the imperialist pressures mounted on *ndia on the economic and political fronts, and for eApressing anti-imperialist solidarit( -ith all those countries of the -orld -hich face 8% aggression) 0e have to seriousl( underta$e ideological -or$ -hich must accompan( the all-sided activities of the "art() *n the eAisting situation, the "art( must ma$e a serious efforts to approach different sections of the people, even those -ho have been s-a(ed b( the !"Fs appeal) "atient -or$ is necessar( for advancing our political influence) Bor our o-n "art( -e must underta$e a programme of "art( education b( conducting classes) 0hile immediatel( concentrating on developing the mass movements on the specific issues connected -ith the harmful policies of the central government and -here it concerns the state governments, the "art( should also see$ to forge lin$s -ith the non-Congress secular parties -ho can be dra-n into 'oint struggles and activities) 0ithout eApecting the immediate formation of a third force at the national level, -e should -or$ to-ards the reforging of such an alternative)

14