THE LIBRARY OF IBERIAN RESOURCES ONLINE

A History of Spain and Portugal

Vol. 2

Stanley G. Payne Chapter 19 The War ! In"epen"en#e an" L$%eral$&'

()1*+ The Reign of Carlos IV (17 !1 " # The Old Regime in Spain ended with the reign of Carlos IV, which collapsed beneath the weight of French Napoleonic imperialism. Spain seemed a comparativel peacef!l and progressive land when Carlos IV came to the throne in "#$$. The order and decor!m shown b the man tho!sands of Spaniards who crowded into %adrid for the official coronation the following ear contrasted sharpl with the revol!tion that was developing in France. The new &ing was abo!t fort ears old, good' hearted b!t wea& and simple'minded. (e hoped to contin!e the general policies of his father)s reign and retained as chief minister the %!rcian law er *os+ %o,ino, Conde de Floridablanca, a strong'minded regalist who had long served Carlos III capabl . The beginning of the French Revol!tion in "#$- drasticall altered the polic of the Spanish crown. Floridablanca adopted a sharpl hostile co!rse and imposed censorship on all news from France. The atmosphere was even more tense after the attempted assassination of Floridablanca b a demented Frenchman in "#-. and a ta/ revolt b the overb!rdened 0alician peasantr in "#-.'"#-". The nascent Spanish press was also s!b1ected to severe censorship, and the progress of the Spanish enlightenment was bro!ght to a near halt. 2arl ()1,+ in "#-3, Floridablanca)s enemies, both personal and political, combined to force him from power. Carlos IV replaced him with the now elderl Conde de 4randa, who while no s!pporter of the French Revol!tion, was a liberal and a Francophile, convinced of the importance of the French alliance. (e rela/ed the censorship, allowing Spanish p!blicists and reformers to contin!e their prosel ti5ing activities. 6efore the end of the ear, however, 4randa was shoved o!t b palace intrig!es, replaced as first secretar b a handsome, st!rd o!ng g!ards) officer from 2/tremad!ra, %an!el 0odo , friend of the ro al famil and sometime social escort 7cortejo8 of the Italian 9!een, %aria :!isa di ;arma. Carlos IV considered him a tr!e friend, one of the few reliable co!nselors among a bev of fops and intrig!ers, and made him <!9!e de 4lc!dia. For most of fifteen ears "#-3'"$.$ 0odo was the real r!ler of Spain. (e was not a politician or administrator of great ed!cation or mental power, b!t considered himself a man of the new generation, a reformer and contin!er of the policies of Carlos III. Thro!gho!t these ears, the overriding concern of the Spanish crown was the challenge presented b revol!tionar France and its s!ccessor, Napoleonic imperialism. Spain 1oined the alliance of legitimac against the French revol!tionar regime in "#-=' "#-> and scored some initial s!ccesses, occ!p ing (enda e and ;erpignan. <espite a ma1or effort b the French to in!ndate northeastern Spain with revol!tionar propaganda, the anti'French str!ggle was 9!ite pop!lar among the Spanish people, whose religio!s and patriotic sentiments were f!ll aro!sed. This was most of all the case in Catalonia? there anti'French feeling was intense, pop!lar vol!nteers were n!mero!s, and the conflict was called la guerra gran. 6!t the 4nglo'Spanish fleets failed before To!lon, and the Spanish arm lac&ed the cadres, e9!ipment, training, or leadership to resist the new French militar masses. The French briefl occ!pied San Sebasti@n and northern Catalonia. ;eace was made in "#-> on the basis of the stat!s 9!o ante, the French regime not pressing its terms, beca!se of its interest in detaching Spain from the 6ritish antirevol!tionar alliance.

The war against revol!tionar France helped to open the first serio!s political fiss!res in the eighteenth'cent!r 6o!rbon regime in Spain. 4lmost from the start, 0odo was resented as no minister of Carlos III had been beca!se he was obvio!sl a o!thf!l favorite and his appointment was a throwbac& to the old s stem of validos which had alwa s been !npop!lar. 4t a time of great stress, the vacillating and conf!sed Carlos IV proved incapable of em!lating his father, who had &nown how to choose professionall competent ministers and arbitrate among them himself. :ibello!s stories abo!t 0odo and the 9!een bro!ght the ro al famil !nder fire for the first time in a ()1-+ cent!r , and lowered respect for the crown. Resentment became more intense after the crown awarded its first secretar the !n!s!all prestigio!s title of prince after he concl!ded peace in "#->. Nor did 0odo )s !ndeniabl reformist meas!res win him s!pport among the progressivist and critical'minded. (e was still acc!sed of being !nderhanded and too a!thoritarian in government. The reformist and progressivist c!rrents of preceding decades all the while gathered force rapidl !nder the stim!l!s of the French e/ample. Ahile onl a few small revol!tionar cli9!es were formed in Spain, the scope of critical opinion among the !pper and middle classes increased considerabl . <iscontent first fo!nd p!blic e/pression in mid'"#-B, after an increase in ta/es and the apparent ineptit!de of the Spanish arm . In %adrid there were p!blic demonstrations of s mpath for the French ca!se for the first time, and b the following ear several small secret prorevol!tionar 1!ntas had been formed in %adrid and in the provinces. 4fter peace was made, these were dissolved and some of the ringleaders arrested. In the meantime, the In9!isition had attempted a wartime crac&down on the dissemination of s!bversive ideas, decreeing in "#-B the abolition of all Spanish !niversit chairs in p!blic ()1.+ and nat!ral law. S!ch meas!res had little effect, however, for after "#-> restrictions on p!blications were rela/ed once more, and after French press!re a Spanish edition of the Encyclopedia was allowed to be p!blished. The crown res!med its enco!ragement of ed!cation, and in the last ears of the eighteenth cent!r reformist and progressivist ideas were circ!lating more widel than ever before. The beginning of a n!cle!s of political liberalism, 9!estioning complete ro al sovereignt ''

however enlightened''was starting to form. This trend toward the e/pression of critical political ideas bro!ght a reimposition of censorship on boo&s at the beginning of "#-$. 4side from its semiliberal polic on ed!cation and printing, the crown)s principal attempt to contin!e and e/pand reform policies came in the fields of ta/ation and commerce. Ro al finances were s!fficientl strong to permit Spain to enter the war of "#-='"#-> on a fairl so!nd footing''so!nder than that of ;r!ssia, for e/ample''b!t after a ear of f!ll'scale war fiscal press!res mo!nted. Ta/es on salaried officials and on the ch!rch were raised, and new iss!es of paper mone were bac&ed b special levies on landowners and on the ch!rch. For the first time, the aristocrac was bro!ght directl !nder ta/ation, and this e/plains part of the opposition to the government in central Spain. In "#->, 0odo )s government too& the step of abolishing the special servicio ta/ on peasants that had first been levied in si/teenth'cent!r Castile, ma&ing the b!rden somewhat less ine9!itable. The econom too& a t!rn for the worse after "#-C, when the government allowed itself to be mane!vered b French press!re and its longstanding trans'4tlantic rivalr with the 6ritish into declaring war against the latter in October "#-C, after signing an alliance with France. <!ring the ne/t few ears, Spanish commerce s!ffered grievo!sl as the fleet !nderwent ma1or reverses. This necessitated drastic changes that portended far'reaching conse9!ences, as in the case of two significant new decrees iss!ed in "#-#. One permitted foreign craftsmen of Christian religions other than Roman Catholic to enter Spain and open shops or factories with a g!arantee of freedom of religion. The second recogni5ed the effectiveness of the virt!al 6ritish naval bloc&ade b s!spending commercial restrictions within the Spanish 4merican empire, permitting all ne!tral nations to trade freel . This was a fatef!l step toward the !ltimate independence of the colonies, for it admitted that at least for the time being Spain co!ld not maintain its pretended monopol . 4nother important precedent was set in "#-$, when the government decided to raise mone b a!ctioning off s!rpl!s b!ildings owned b m!nicipalities. This was the first time that entailed propert was sei5ed and a!ctioned b the state to pa for war e/penses. In ()19+ "#-$, the government also decreed the sale of the propert of most ch!rch charitable fo!ndations, as well as of all remaining !nsold *es!it propert , and d!ring the s!bse9!ent ears f!rther levies were agreed to b the ch!rch to meet militar e/penses. In "#--, a new propert ta/ was levied on the wealth . These meas!res ro!sed the ire of aristocrats and the clerg , while discontent increased among the lower classes. 4s prices increased, real wages fell, and there were several minor riots in "#-#'"#-$. 0odo himself bro!ght in a new gro!p of liberal appointees at the end of "#-# b!t, beca!se of French press!re, was forced to retire as first secretar in %arch "#-$. (e was replaced b the secretar of finance, Francisco de Saavedra, in t!rn s!cceeded a few months later b the anticlerical and regalist foreign minister, %ariano :!is de Dr9!i1o. The financial sit!ation contin!ed to deteriorate, and the crown became increasingl conf!sed b the p!lling and ha!ling of factions. Conservatives among ch!rchmen and aristocrats la!nched a co!nteroffensive against the new reform government of "#-$' "$.., bringing first the dismissal and imprisonment of Dr9!i1o at the end of "$.., then that of the eminent progressivist and reformist minister of 1!stice, *ovelianos, earl in "$.". Th!s within less than a decade the press!res of the French revol!tionar wars had completel bro&en the !nit of the Spanish polit . 4fter two ears absence, 0odo ret!rned to de facto control of Spanish government at the end of "$.. and held that infl!ence !ntil the whole Spanish regime was overthrown in the spring of "$.$. <!ring his second period in power he followed a more moderate line than before, since the luces''the critics and progressivists''remained his committed enemies. Eet 0odo s!ccessf!ll maintained a reform program in some areas and re1ected a gen!inel reactionar polic . One ma1or reform was the partial abolition of the seoro eclesistico in "$.C. ;apal permission was obtained to sell one'seventh of ch!rch properties in ret!rn for state bonds. This was the last great step of eighteenth'cent!r regalist

polic and opened the wa to all'o!t disamorti5ation of ch!rch lands b the s!cceeding liberal regime thirt ears later. Eet all domestic problems had become secondar to the irresistable press!re of French imperialism, whose militar dominance of the western half of the continent had held Spain in satellite stat!s since "#-C. In "#--, Napoleon forced the cession of the vast :o!isiana territor in North 4merica that the Spanish crown had gained from 6ritain onl si/teen ears earlier. 6 "$.", 0odo had been mane!vered b France into the pett border FAar of the OrangesF against pro'6ritish ;ort!gal. Ahen peace was temporaril signed with 6ritain, Spain was able to &eep the 2/tremad!ran border district of ()/0+ OlivenGa it had sei5ed b!t lost the island of Trinidad to 6ritain. The peacef!l ears of "$.3'"$.B helped to revive the faltering econom briefl . 4 high vol!me of trade was momentaril regained with Spanish 4merica, and the co!ntr )s domestic prod!ction reached a new pea& in "$.>'"$.C. (owever, the res!mption of war with 6ritain !pon Napoleonic dictates mar&ed the beginning of the end. The naval disaster of Trafalgar 7"$.>8 completed the virt!al destr!ction of the Spanish nav , and the s!bse9!ent 6ritish domination of the 4tlantic, co!pled with the imposition of Napoleon)s French' controlled economic FContinental S stemF the following ear, threw the Spanish econom into profo!nd depression. Commerce declined catastrophicall , !nemplo ment grew in the towns, inflation mo!nted, the government)s financial sit!ation became almost hopeless, and real wages for wor&ers contin!ed to decline. This completed the discrediting of the government, and the !npop!larit of 0odo increased ear b ear !ntil he became the target of almost !niversal e/ecration. R!mors abo!t 0odo and the 9!een, co!pled with the ineptit!de of Carlos IV, dragged the prestige of the ro al famil in the m!d. The regime drew the opposition ali&e of progressivists and of !ltra'conservatives within the aristocrac and ch!rch. The latter fo!nd a rall ing point in the heir to the throne, the prince <. Fernando, deepl 1ealo!s of 0odo and eager to s!cceed his father as soon as possible. 6oth the elite elements and the ro al famil itself had th!s been divided b political rivalries. The conservative fernandista opposition began to intrig!e with Napoleon to enco!rage removal of 0odo and of the &ing hiimself, who was hated for his wea&ness and for the reformist fiscal policies of his government. The Napoleonic vise grew all the tighter with the signing of the Treat of Fontaineblea! in October "$.# providing for the partition of ;ort!gal and the entr of a si5able French arm into the penins!la. 4 fernandista plot of vag!e dimensions was precipitated and aborted late in "$.#, b!t French press!re forced Carlos IV to pardon his son almost immediatel . Napoleon meanwhile had himself become eager to eliminate 0odo , who was tr ing to follow a do!ble game in a f!tile attempt to free Spain of French domination. 0odo )s final effort was a desperate plan to remove the ro al famil to 4merica, whence an independence str!ggle against French domination might be led 1!st as the ;ort!g!ese crown was attempting to do from Rio de *aneiro. 6efore this scheme co!ld be p!t into effect, 0odo was imprisoned b a riot at the winter palace of 4ran1!e5 in %arch "$.$ that had been enco!raged b dissident fernandista aristocrats. Carlos IV was forced to abdicate. The res!ltant ()/1+ brea&down of Spanish government, precipitated as it was b a s!icidal fe!d in the ro al famil , provided Napoleon with the e/c!se to intervene directl , deport both Carlos IV and <. Fernando to France, and install his brother *oseph 7*os+ I8 as &ing of Spain. The $onapartist Regi%e of 1 " !1 12 The transitor monarch of *oseph 6onaparte achieved the clima/ of enlightened despotism in Spain, 1!st as, according to a common arg!ment, the Napoleonic empire in western 2!rope as a whole clima/ed the entire era of eighteenth'cent!r a!tocralic reformism. The regime of F<on *os+F was, however, an arbitrar imposition of French arms and bro&e inevitabl with the Catholic legitimist spirit of the 6o!rbon monarch . It was based on Napoleon)s 6a onne Constit!tion of "$.$, which stip!lated for Spain a legislat!re composed of a lifetime appointive senate and a three'estate assembl ''clerg ,

nobilit , and commons''in part elected, in part chosen b town co!ncils, in part appointed b the &ing. Once in power, the 6onapartist administration tried to enact the same reforms bro!ght b French r!le to other lands. The legal and administrative s stems were reorgani5ed, establishing greater !niformit and opport!nit for the middle classes, the In9!isition was abolished, the ch!rch was bro!ght !nder closer state reg!lation, and in "$.-, most monasteries were abolished and their properties sei5ed. Eet for m!ch of the co!ntr these were mere paper reforms that co!ld not be p!t into effect beca!se of the warfare that raged thro!gho!t the brief ears of French dominion. <espite a conscientio!s effort b the new Corsican monarch, he was re1ected b the great ma1orit of Spaniards, who referred to him sneeringl as ;epe 6otellas 7*oe 6ottles8 beca!se of his s!pposed fondness for drin&. The onl real s!pport for the regime carne from a small minorit of the afrancesado intelligentsia, s!pporters of Napoleonic'st le enlightened despotism, who were no more than twelve tho!sand or so in a pop!lation of more than ten million. Some of the afrancesados were mere opport!nists interested in positions. Others, however, were concerned patriots who chose to serve the new regime o!t of a desire to (ispani5e it, reform the co!ntr along more modern lines, and above all save their homeland from the anarch and destr!ction that threatened it in "$.$. Eet the 6onapartist regime, imposed b force, remained alwa s at the merc of militar events and never effectivel controlled as m!ch as half the co!ntr . ()//+ The &ar of Independen'e The reaction of the Spanish people to French domination was the great revolt of %a "$.$''the broadest pop!lar !prising an where in 2!rope d!ring that era. The rebellion started on %a 3 in %adrid as the last member of the ro al famil was being h!stled into French e/ile, and spread thro!gho!t the co!ntr within a few wee&s, even before Napoleon had officiall imposed a 6onaparte &ing. It was s!pported b all classes of the pop!lation 7tho!gh the nobilit were the most tepid8, to save national independence and also to save the primac of traditional religion. The whole e/perience was incomprehensible to Napoleon, for nothing of the sort had happened in an other area occ!pied b French troops. In Spain, however, even the !pward'striving middle classes''among the elements that elsewhere seemed to have most to gain from Napoleonic reform''were part of the bac&bone of resistance. 6 *!ne "$.$, the Spanish resistance fielded an arm with a nominal strength of "=.,... men. The so!thern contingent !nder 0eneral Casta,os scored the first clear'c!t field victor over a Napoleonic arm in 2!rope b defeating and capt!ring <!pont)s corps of nearl 3.,... French troops at 6ail+n 7north of CHrdoba8 in *!l "$.$. That s!mmer, the French arm of occ!pation was nearl swept from the penins!la, and the Spanish forces were increased to more than 3..,.... <!ring the final two months of the ear, however, Napoleon concentrated his attention on Spain, personall leading an invading force of =..,... men from his best !nits. %adrid was sei5ed, and d!ring "$.- the French occ!pied most of the &e points in the north, center, and northeast, moving into the so!th and east in "$".. The organi5ed Spanish field forces dwindled to no more than "..,... b the close of "$.- and were hard p!t to maintain that strength for the remainder of the war. 6ritain immediatel 1oined hands with the Spanish governing 1!nta, and dispatched an e/peditionar corps !nder Sir 4rth!r Aellesle 7later the <!&e of Aellington8 to establish a firm redo!bt in ;ort!gal. Aellesle proved a master of defensive tactics in holding his position against heav odds for three ears. On the other hand, 6ritain never committed more than >.,... troops to the Fpenins!lar war,F as 6ritish commentators have termed it, and Aellesle )s strateg proved ca!tio!s in the e/treme, ref!sing opport!nities to sei5e the strategic initiative after French forces had grown wea&er. 6ritain)s other main contrib!tion was economic, providing mone and man of the militar s!pplies !sed b the Spanish and ;ort!g!ese forces.

The heart of the Spanish Aar of Independence of "$.$'"$"= la ()/1+ not in the mane!verings of the field armies b!t in the massive pop!lar resistance of all classes. It became the first great people)s war of modern histor . Tho!gh the Spanish field forces were no match for the Napoleonic armies, the main b!rden of the war was carried b irreg!lar forces waging a guerrilla 7little war8. This guerra de partidas 7war of irreg!lar partisan bands8 was a spontaneo!s creation of the Spanish peasantr and ma have involved 3..,... or more combattants. The French fo!nd themselves a beleag!ered island in a hostile ocean, controlling no more than the main towns. The simplest comm!nications became ma1or problems of militar logistics, and the French dared move thro!gh the co!ntr side onl in great force. Small detachments and stragglers were relentlessl c!t down. In the long r!n, the b!l& of the French arm of occ!pation was limited to garrison and s!ppl d!ties. %ost French cas!alties''possibl as man as "$.,... over a five' ear period''res!lted from the wor& of the guerrilleros, who probabl lost no more than 3>,... of their own activists. The main s!ffering, and the main heroics, of the war belonged to the Spanish civilians. French occ!pation polic was harsh, and savage reprisals were e/acted in cities that resisted or in areas closel associated with g!errilleros. Ahole towns were sac&ed, riot and rape b the French soldier were not !ncommon, and tho!sands of civilians were shot merel as e/amples. In t!rn, the most vivid s mbols of the Spanish will to resist were given b the pop!lace as a whole, highlighted b the two spectac!lar sieges'to'the'death of Iarago5a in "$.$ and "$.-. ;op!lar resistance in Spain served as an inspiring e/ample to other peoples held s!b1ect !nder Napoleonic imperialism, most notabl in 0erman , where the post'"$.- patriotic awa&ening was directl stim!lated b the Spanish revolt. The Aar of Independence was in the long r!n a str!ggle of attrition in which the French were gro!nd down b constant harassment and, from "$"3, b the commitment of Napoleon)s main strength to eastern and central 2!rope. The depletion of French forces in that ear made possible a strategic co!nteroffensive b the reg!lar 4nglo'Spanish';ort!g!ese field arm , b!t Aellesle )s overweening ca!tion wasted the opport!nit . The final victorio!s campaign of "$"= bro!ght a stead retreat b the shr!n&en French forces, no longer able to contest ma1or battles in the main part of the penins!la. Tho!gh the final o!tcome was complete victor , the cost was heav . To the destr!ction of the Spanish state was added the devastation of the penins!la)s econom . No other co!ntr in 2!rope s!ffered so heavil from the francesada. ()/)+ The Cadi( Cortes and the 1 12 Constitution Collapse of the Spanish monarch !nder the press!res of French imperialism opened the wa for the first brea&thro!gh of modern Spanish liberalism. This was not the prod!ct of French intervention, for the proponents of drastic reform and a more or less representative s stem of government had slowl been gathering strength for twent ears. Rather, the brea&down of the Spanish s stem !nder French dominion gave reformers the opport!nit to p!t their ideas into practice. Ahen the ro al famil crossed into France to meet Napoleon in the spring of "$.$, Spanish affairs were left in the hands of a small Regenc Co!ncil that ref!sed to recogni5e the abdication of the Spanish throne s!bse9!entl wr!ng from Carlos IV and his heir <. Fernando. Conversel , the Regenc Co!ncil was !nable to f!nction as the government of Spain, for the pop!lar revolt of %a '*!ne "$.$ res!lted in the formation of town and regional 1!ntas in almost ever ma1or district. The 1!ntas were composed of local notables, with the nobilit predominant, b!t the also e/pressed the conviction of the middle' and !pper'class elite in most of the co!ntr that government rested !pon the sovereignt of the people as well as of the crown, and that after the collapse of monarchist government, representatives of the people had the d!t to ta&e charge of affairs. On the one hand there was concern to prevent the sit!ation from degenerating into anarch , and on the other, widespread e/pression among elite elements of the need for representative leadership to provide necessar reforms while g!iding pop!lar resistance. Representatives of the principal 1!ntas in t!rn delegated a!thorit to a national *!nta

Central in September "$.$. The scene of the greatest social ferment d!ring the reign of Carlos IV had been Valencia, and in this region the most revol!tionar o!tb!rsts of the Aar of Independence occ!rred. Aithin the span of a few ears, Valencian political societ moved from the traditional bread riots of the !rban poor, an intermittent phenomenon since ancient times, to organi5ed modern revol!tionar conspiracies. Social revol!tionar riots bro&e o!t in both town and co!ntr side, and several revol!tionar local 1!ntas were formed before the a!thorit of the captain general and the more moderate regional 1!nta co!ld be reimposed over the district. The national *!nta Central meanwhile fled so!th in "$.$'"$.- to escape the French advance, and fo!nd itself increasingl hard p!t to establish e/ec!tive a!thorit on the e/isting ad hoc basis. Reformist leaders in local 1!ntas demanded thro!gho!t "$.- that a representative national Cortes assembl be s!mmoned to reorgani5e the govern'()/*+ ment and restr!ct!re national instit!tions. 4t the end of *an!ar "$"., the *!nta Central resigned its e/ec!tive a!thorit to the Regenc Co!ncil b!t at the same time called for the selection of representatives to a new Cortes''a potentiall revol!tionar act of political representation. This was not merel a sp!r'of'the'moment attempt to fill the gap left b captivit of the ro al famil in France, it was the res!lt of the predevelopment of Spanish liberalism that had been ta&ing shape d!ring the reign of Carlos IV, based on political ideas derived from :oc&e, %ontes9!ie!, and other theorists. It was a liberalism derived from a somewhat romantici5ed conception of Spanish histor that tended to e/aggerate the achievements of the medieval Cortes, positing a parliamentar FSpanish tradition of libert F that had been c!t short b the imposition of (absb!rg despotism after the defeat of the comuneros in ">3.'">3". The seat of Spanish government d!ring the greater part of the Aar of Independence was C@di5, the co!ntr )s leading 4tlantic port, separated from the mainland b a narrow penins!la easil defended from French assa!lt, protected and provisioned b the 6ritish and Spanish fleets. The liberal Cortes and its res!lting constit!tion co!ld probabl have ta&en the shape the did onl in C@di5, the most liberal cit in the penins!la at that time. Open to foreign infl!ence, living off the 4merican trade, led mostl b a middle class that had made its mone from commerce and not landed dominion, the C@di5 environment gave a decisive thr!st to constit!tional reformism. <ep!ties to the C@di5 Cortes were nominall to have been chosen b a s stem of indirect !niversal male s!ffrage in which the votes of twent 'five' ear'old heads of ho!seholds were channeled thro!gh district electoral co!ncils. Since part of the co!ntr was !nder French occ!pation, it was impossible to carr o!t elections in a n!mber of districts. These districts, as well as the 4merican colonies, were represented b s!bstit!tes, suplentes, appointed from C@di5 b local a!thorities, giving disproportionate voice to C@di5 liberalism. S!plentes, however, acco!nted for onl >= o!t of =.. dep!ties. ;riests n!mbered nearl twice as man ''-#''almost one'third of the total. The most stri&ing thing abo!t the social composition of the Cortes delegation was the overrepresentation of the clerical and la intelligentsia, to the e/cl!sion of representatives of concrete social and economic interests, a sit!ation rather similar to that of the 0erman assembl at Fran&f!rt nearl fort ears later. Onl "B of the dep!ties were titled aristocrats. Ahat had happened was that amid the civic brea&down and conf!sion of "$.$'"$"., activists among the intelligentsia had come to the fore and asserted themselves in a societ in which most elements lac&ed e/plicit political conscio!sness. The regions most heavil represented were 0alicia, Valencia, Catalonia, and 4ndal!sia, while the conservative north'central part of the co!ntr , mostl !nder French occ!pation, was !nderrepresented.

()/,+Ta)le 2. Co%position of the Cortes of C*di(+ 1 1" Clerg :aw ers 0ov)t emplo ees %ilitar Intellect!als :andowners %iscellaneo!s

-# C. >> BC 3. "> ".

=.= So!rceJ %. Fern@nde5 4lmagro, Orgenes del rgimen constitucional en Espaa 7%adrid, "-3$8, p. $3.

The dep!ties immediatel re1ected the idea of forming a traditional three'estate Cortes and met as a !nicameral assembl . :iberal elements sei5ed the initiative and set the pace of deliberations from the start. The dominated press and propaganda and incl!ded most of the elo9!ent spo&esmen in the chamber. The Cortes immediatel set to wor& to provide a progressivist written constit!tion for Spain which wo!ld embod both the social and economic ideals of eighteenth'cent!r monarchist reform and the political norms of parliamentar liberalism. 4t that time the onl written representative constit!tion an where in the world was that of the Dnited States, and the C@di5 dep!ties were pro!dl aware that the were ta&ing the lead in continental 2!ropean liberalism. The new constit!tion, completed in "$"3, was based on the principle of national sovereignt rather than ro al a!thorit . It established a !nicameral legislat!re with general control over legislation, leaving the crown onl a s!spensive veto. 2lectoral provisions for !niversal male s!ffrage b ho!seholders) votes on an indirect basis made this theoreticall a more democratic constit!tion than that of either the Dnited States or 2ngland. :ocal administration was placed !nder central control, b!t provision was made for provincial co!ncils, half of whose members wo!ld be appointed and half elected, to deliberate on provincial affairs. Dniform reg!lations for m!nicipalities were created and the archaic g!ild s stem abolished. Sweeping social reforms were established, as all aristocratic legal privileges, seigne!rial ()/-+ 1!risdiction, and the right of entailment were abolished. In s!bse9!ent reg!lations of "$"=, the highl !neven and indirect provincial ta/ str!ct!re was replaced with a series of direct ta/es on b!siness and propert . Catholicism was recogni5ed as the official religion of the state and of the people, b!t the In9!isition''in part an arm of the government''was officiall abolished. Ch!rch censorship was still !pheld, and heres in religion remained a nominal crime. The constit!tion contained =$B articles, nearl three times as man as an s!bse9!ent Spanish code of government, and represented an attempt to wor& o!t a thoro!gh new liberal scheme of government and societ in harmon , as m!ch as possible, with traditional Spanish val!es. It was the most advanced doc!ment of its time in 2!rope, and, while drawing on both 2nglish and French ideas, it tried to form a !ni9!el Spanish s nthesis of old beliefs with new rights and liberties. For the ne/t 9!arter'cent!r it stood as the classic doc!ment of constit!tional liberalism in western continental 2!rope, and infl!enced liberal aspirations in Ital and ;ort!gal partic!larl . The constit!tion of "$"3 was the wor& of the middle'class political intelligentsia, s!pported b most of the middle and part of the !pper classes. The degree of s!pport in the co!ntr at large is !ncertain. Scarcel more than ". percent of the pop!lation were literate at the beginning of the nineteenth

cent!r , and the lower classes lac&ed political conscio!sness. On the other hand, it was clear eno!gh that in a n!mber of regions the peasants stood directl behind liberal reforms insofar as the bro!ght the abolition of seigne!rial e/actions, against which there was increasing protest. Conservatives were o!tn!mbered, o!tmane!vered, and o!ttal&ed at C@di5. The had not e/pected an instit!tional revol!tion of s!ch dimensions, b!t opposition to the new constit!tion grew rapidl . It was led b the officeholders of the government of the old regime, b aristocrats who feared the loss of seigne!rial dominion, b senior members of the militar hierarch 7who felt their a!thorit was being !ndermined8, and b most ch!rch leaders, opposed to loss of ch!rch seigne!rial 1!risdiction 7abadengo8, growth of state control, and the danger of renewed attac&s on ch!rch propert . In the electoral campaign for the first reg!lar Cortes in "$"=, most of the clerg sw!ng into the ran&s of the antiliberal opposition. In t!rn, advanced anticlerical liberals demanded that priests be e/cl!ded from sitting in Cortes. 6 the time the last French troops had deserted the penins!la, Spain was an arena of sharp political strife between s!pporters and opponents of the constit!tion. ()/.+ The ,ernandine Rea'tion+ 1 1-!1 2" The immediate f!t!re of the Spanish political s stem depended on the attit!de of the heir to the throne, who ret!rned from French e/ile in 4pril "$"B to begin his reign as Fernando VII. (e proved in man wa s the basest &ing in Spanish histor . Cowardl , selfish, grasping, s!spicio!s, and vengef!l, <. Fernando seemed almost incapable of an perception of the commonweal. (e tho!ght onl in terms of his power and sec!rit and was !nmoved b the enormo!s sacrifices of Spanish people to retain their independence and preserve his throne. 4t a time when other, more enlightened west 2!ropean r!lers strove to forget past grievances and come to terms with change, Fernando VII tho!ght onl of ret!rning to the sit!ation as it had been before "$.$. Tho!gh originall re9!ired to swear lo alt to the constit!tion, he fo!nd as his tri!mphant homeward 1o!rne led him nearer %adrid that powerf!l forces in the arm , societ , ch!rch, and former b!rea!crac wo!ld s!pport a ret!rn to absol!tism. (ence he gave his blessing to the first direct militar intervention in modern Spanish government, the overthrow of the constit!tional s stem b the arm command in 4pril "$"B. The %adrid rabble was aro!sed to paro/ sms of enth!siasm for its restored sovereign, giving vent to cries of F:ong live the absol!te &ingF and even a few of F:ong live chainsKF 4bsol!te monarch was restored on the terms of "$.$, and all the changes wro!ght b the C@di5 Cortes were swept awa . 4 decree of "$"B restored seigne!rial domain, altho!gh it withheld all 1!ridical rights that had formerl been attached, recogni5ing onl territorial and economic 7b!t not 1!dicial8 1!risdiction. Th!s absol!te monarch reached its height !nder Fernando VII between "$"B and "$3.. The liberals were persec!ted, and tho!gh e/ec!tions were largel avoided, man were imprisoned or harried o!t of the co!ntr . The regime was not at first blood , b!t it was t rannical, s!spicio!s, and above all, administrativel inefficient. Fernando VII)s onl tr!sted association was with a narrow and capricio!s co!rt camarilla, and he reg!larl failed to bac& !p his own government appointees. 6etween "$"B and "$3. the average length of ten!re for cabinet ministers was appro/imatel si/ months. The treas!r la in a state of total disarra and the debt increased steadil . There was one attempt at ta/ reorgani5ation in "$"#, when provision was made for a simplified single contrib!tion on land b all classes, c!tting across seigne!rial d!es and rents, b!t it was not effectivel implemented. 4bsol!te monarch proved completel !nable to meet its own obligations. %eanwhile, d!ring the decade "$".'"$3., most of Spanish 4merica was lost to the independence movements that had emerged in ma1or areas thro!gho!t the colonies at a time when the Spanish ()/9+ government was s!ffering virt!al atroph amid war and reactionar absol!tism. The C@di5 Cortes had wanted to e/tend parliamentar representation to the colonies, b!t insisted on contin!ed centrali5ation of government and administration while ref!sing f!rther de 1!re liberali5ation of trade. In most regions

the Spanish'4merican independence movement was limited mainl to a Spanish creole or Spanish' mesti5o minorit of the landed !pper classes and commercial elite who insisted !pon the right to cond!ct their affairs independentl . Aith certain e/ceptions, the lower classes in 4merica tended to be ne!tral or even pro'Spanish. Onl the collapse of the Spanish state !nder the weight of the French invasion had made it possible for the revolts to achieve s!ccess. 4fter "$"B, Fernando)s corr!pt and incoherent regime was incapable of a ma1or effort to restore Spanish control. The empire was lost mainl b defa!lt. *!st as the si/teenth'cent!r con9!est had been a largel private enterprise that received onl marginal assistance from the ro al government, so the nineteenth'cent!r independence movements met onl marginal opposition from the Spanish homeland. 4t one point even that was almost eno!gh to thwart them, for the one notable e/pedition dispatched !nder 0eneral ;ablo %orillo restored Spanish control over the northern part of So!th 4merica, while an imperial vicero held fast the Spanish bastion of the 4ndean regions. Their efforts event!all failed in a str!ggle of attrition that drew no f!rther s!pport from the mother co!ntr , whose government was e/ha!sted b financial deficits and, after "$3., renewed political conflict. <espite the long association and the importance of the empire to national commerce in the eighteenth cent!r , Spanish people were not activel identified with the empire. %ost classes and regions had never had direct contact with 4merica, and one of the more notable things abo!t its loss was how little attention it attracted in Spain. 4fter "$3>, all that remained of the empire was C!ba, ;!erto Rico, and the island possesions in the ;acific. The .i)eral Trienniu% of 1 2"!1 2/ 6etween "$"B and "$3. the liberal opposition was limited mainl to the small middle'class intelligentsia of the provincial capitals. 4ctive opposition, however, was led b a new element'' dissident sectors of the arm officer corps. This was a radicall new development, for the eighteenth' cent!r arm had been a well disciplined if not alwa s efficientl trained militar force. It had, however, been swamped b the Aar of Independence, which bro!ght in a whole new cadre of middle class officers, man of whom were demoted or left witho!t ()10+ assignment when the old hierarch was restored in "$"B. 4cc!stomed to great power and respect d!ring the war, o!ng officers co!ld not resign themselves to secondar stat!s and miserable pa , or none at all, !nder the ramshac&le Fernandine regime. Their discontent was given an ideological and moral content b vag!e notions of liberalism and constit!tionalism. %oreover, elements of the senior command had alread set the e/ample of political revolt b the overthrow of the constit!tional regime in "$"B. <!ring the ne/t si/ ears a series of minor, abortive co!nter'revolts b nominall liberal officers in vario!s provincial garrisons was finall clima/ed b the rebellion of the ma1or e/peditionar corps that was painf!ll being assembled at militar camps o!tside of C@di5. The s!ccess of this revolt, whose chief leader was %a1or Rafael del Riego, was d!e not to its own strength b!t to the general malaise that gripped Spain in "$3.. There were several so!rces of this dissatisfactionJ the postwar economic depression, the financial prostration of the government, a ellow fever epidemic in the so!th, and the disma felt b a large part of the politicall conscio!s over the capricio!s, inept r!le of <. Fernando. 4t first, Riego)s rebels received almost no s!pport elsewhere''b!t neither was there an show of enth!siasm for the absol!tist regime. 4s Riego led his detachments in a meandering march northward to rall bac&ing, his forces slowl dwindled, b!t so did whatever s!pport remained for the regime in %adrid. Several other provincial garrisons came o!t in revolt, and <. Fernando was finall left with no alternatives save to accede to rebel demands and restore the constit!tion of "$"3. The rebellion of *an!ar "$3. was the first to !se the term pronunciamiento, and foreshadowed what became the standard tactic of militar revolt in nineteenth'cent!r Spain. The pron!nciamiento did not rel on caref!l planning or the !nified s!pport of the arm . %ore often than not it was the wor& of a comparativel small gro!p of senior or middle'ran& officers who did not attac& the government in a

direct co!p b!t simpl Fprono!ncedF or raised the flag of revolt against e/isting government polic . The pron!nciamiento then !s!all had to rel !pon s!pport from other 9!arters or the willingness of the government to compromise. The pron!nciamiento of "$3. demanded a complete change of instit!tions from absol!tism to constit!tionalism, b!t s!bse9!ent pron!nciamientos were often aimed at lesser changes of polic or simpl a shift in personnel. Restored constit!tional government was at first placed in the hands of veteran docea,ista 7"$"38 liberals who had gained e/perience at C@di5. The had profited from the events of the past decade, and proved moderate men eager to conciliate national interests. Indeed, man of the docea,istas were rather !ncomfortable with their own ()11+ "$"3 constit!tion and not !nwilling to reform it in order to give the crown somewhat greater a!thorit , add a second chamber to the legislat!re, and restrict the s!ffrage to the propertied elements. From the ver beginning, however, <. Fernando ref!sed to f!ll accept his role of constit!tional monarch and wo!ld not cooperate in the b!ilding of a viable moderate liberal s stem. The new liberal government repeated the social, instit!tional, and economic reforms of "$"3'"$"=. Se,orLos and abadengo dominion, together with the right of entail, were once more abolished. Separate ecclesiastical legal 1!risdiction was done awa with, the In9!isition abolished, state control over ch!rch orders established, man of the latter s!ppressed, and most monastic lands confiscated. The government soon began p!blic sale of monastic lands, mostl to monied middle class interests. 4 beginning was made at monetar reform and the debt was reorgani5ed, tho!gh no immediate sol!tion was in sight for the government financial crisis. Finall , the territorial reorgani5ation of Spain which the Cortes of C@di5 had beg!n was completed in "$3" b the redistricting of the co!ntr 7incl!ding the 6alearics and Canaries8 into fift 'two administrative provinces. These changes were accompanied b considerable agitation b the peasants of Valencia and several other regions against the remnants of seigne!rial domain. F!rther plans to divide !p village common lands, however, led to signs of hostilit partic!larl among peasants in some so!thern districts, where loss of comm!nit propert wo!ld deprive the r!ral lower classes of practicall their onl so!rce of economic assistance. 6 "$3", the first violent labor protest bro&e o!t in the :evantine town of 4lco , where !nemplo ed te/tile wor&ers and artisans engaged in a :!ddite t pe of destr!ction of new machiner in te/tile factories. The docea,istas soon fo!nd themselves challenged on both the left and the right. Aithin the ran&s of liberalism, press!re came from the exaltado faction of radicals, who were especiall strong in the provincial capitals among the middle class intelligentsia and some small b!sinessmen. From the ver beginning, their *acobin st le of politics did not scr!ple at terrorism, conspirac , or riot. <!ring the si/ ears of the Fernandine reaction, !ndergro!nd liberals had become !sed to f!nctioning b means of secret organi5ation and conspiratorial societies. :ocal chapters of Spanish %asonr had become a common conspiratorial vehicle, and the practice of clandestine sectarian plotting was not given !p after "$3.. The sectors of the arm led b e/altado officers were praised as a necessar pretorian g!arantee of the liberal s stem, and e/altados insisted that s!ch sectors be allowed to f!nction almost as an independent instit!tion. The e/altados rallied s!pport b pla ing on the local interests of ()1/+ provincialism, reenforcing common hatred of militar conscription 7and the rel!ctance to fight the incomprehensible campaigns in 4merica8, demanding red!ction or abolition of the depised consumos 7e/cise ta/es8, and insisting on direct democrati5ation of the s!ffrage. These claims formed the basis of the radical liberal program that tended to dominate the politics of man provincial towns 7tho!gh not the co!ntr side8 for half a cent!r , !ntil "$#B. 4 main factor in cementing the factional !nit of the radical political intelligentsia itself was the intense desire for more government 1obs, partic!larl on the local and provincial level. This was a ma1or political motive for professional and white'collar elements in a societ whose

econom co!ld not provide ade9!ate emplo ment. In %adrid, b contrast, the same social elements were less radical, perhaps beca!se emplo ment opport!nities were greater, b!t there the mob co!ld be mobili5ed on occasion, as the same lower class strata that had cheered <. Fernando were occasionall whipped !p to riot for the e/altados. 4fter the "$33 elections, the e/altados gained control of the government and forced a more radical line, attac&ing the ch!rch iss!e head on. The *es!it order was again dissolved in Spain, the other orders bro!ght !nder strict reg!lation, and plans were drawn !p for a general e/propriation of ch!rch land. Thro!gho!t "$33, hostilit between moderate and radical liberals increased, while s!pporters of absol!tism rallied the northeastern co!ntr side and prepared for civil war. Influen'e of Spanish .i)eralis% on Italy and Portugal Spain had first capt!red the imagination of patriots and reformers in central 2!rope with the national rising against Napoleon. S!bse9!entl , the "$"3 constit!tion served as an inspiration to liberals in Ital and in ;ort!gal, and Spain in fact led in the process of political democrati5ation in western 2!rope !ntil "$B=. Conversel , the Fernandine reaction had some effect in inspiring Italian !ltraconservatives d!ring the postwar ears. The Spanish pattern of conspirac and revolt b liberal arm officers, in association with %asonic and other liberal secret societies, was em!lated in both ;ort!gal and Ital . In the wa&e of Riego)s s!ccessf!l rebellion, the first and onl pron!nciamiento in Italian histor was carried o!t b liberal officers in the &ingdom of the Two Sicilies. The Spanish'st le militar conspirac also helped to inspire the beginning of the R!ssian revol!tionar movement with the revolt of the <ecembrist arm officers in "$3>. Italian liberalism in "$3.'"$3" relied on 1!nior officers and the provincial middle classes, essen'()11+ tiall the same social base as in Spain. It even !sed a (ispani5ed political vocab!lar , for it was led b giunte 71!ntas8, appointed local capi politici 71efes polLticos8, !sed the terms of liberali and servili 7em!lating the Spanish word serviles applied to s!pporters of absol!tism8, and in the end tal&ed of resisting b means of a guerrilla. For both ;ort!g!ese and Italian liberals of these ears, the Spanish constit!tion of "$"3 remained the standard doc!ment of reference. 4ll of this was a spontaneo!s response to Spanish liberalism, for the government of "$3.'"$3= did nothing to intervene in the affairs of either co!ntr . Its own polic in 2!rope was p!rel and strictl defensive. The Se'ond Rea'tion+ 1 22!1 2Violent reaction and reprisal as a response to political change was introd!ced into Spanish politics b Fernando VII in "$"B. The docea,ista moderates were willing to forgive and forget past e/cesses against themselves when the ret!rned to power in "$3., b!t the e/altados demanded revenge and seemed determined to instit!tionali5e a st le of reprisal and atrocit in several spectac!lar political &illings. This in t!rn stim!lated the reaction of !ltra'conservatives. Opposition to liberalism d!ring the trienni!m "$3.'"$3= was based on the same interests as it had been in "$"3'"$"B. To these were added broad dissatisfaction with the contin!ed economic depression, compo!nded b protraction of the state financial crisis !nder liberal r!le. Of abo!t e9!al importance were an increasing hostilit in the foral regions of the northeast to political centrali5ation in %adrid, and a broad sense of resentment in some areas against the primac of !rban economic interests. ;arts of the co!ntr side had been in a phase of social and economic dist!rbance since "$.$, b!t direct opposition to liberalism was centered in the conservative north and more especiall in the partic!larist northeast. :anded aristocrats !s!all resented abolition of seigne!ries, while man peasants feared liberal c!rtailment of traditional peasant comm!nal land rights in favor of middle class, private ownership. One historian has co!nted a total of "33 local revolts against the liberal regime in these ears, and conservative ro alist rebel 1!ntas were set !p at var ing times in three different regions, c!lminating in a separate ro alist Fregenc F in the hills of northern Catalonia in "$33. 6 that time the northeastern 9!arter of Spain was in a state of virt!al civil war.

Religio!s sentiment pla ed a ma1or role in this opposition. The ch!rch was at first disposed to accept constit!tional government in "$3., 1!st as it had initiall in "$".'"$"3. This transigent attit!de was sharpl reversed, however, b the abolition of ecclesiastical 1!risdic'()1)+ tion and the restrictions on orders and their propert , with the beginning of the s!ppression of the monasteries. 2/altados came into power on a flood of anticlerical propaganda, and a n!mber of priests were m!rdered b liberals in the civil strife of "$33'"$3=. 2ven in the elections of "$33 that were won b the e/altados, however, nearl 3. percent of the dep!ties chosen were clerg . 4 considerable proportion of these were s!pporters of moderate liberalism who s!bse9!entl had to go into e/ile, indicating that as late as "$33 the liberal clerg who had pla ed a ma1or role at C@di5 were still infl!ential. 4lmost from the start of the constit!tional trienni!m, Fernando VII tried to enco!rage intervention b the conservative 2!ropean powers of the M!adr!ple 4lliance to save him from constit!tional government. For the first two ears there was little disposition on their part to do so. The Spanish &ing had lost prestige, even among conservative 2!ropean leaders, b his blindl reactionar and vindictive co!rse in "$"B, which had contrased so sharpl with that of the restored 6o!rbon crown in France. The docea,ista cabinet of the first part of the trienni!m did not !nd!l alarm the conservative powers, and tho!gh 4!strian troops intervened in Ital to s!ppress liberal government there in "$3", that was based on general recognition of a distinct (absb!rg sphere of infl!ence in the Italian penins!la. There was no similar determination b France to meddle in Spanish affairs. It was not !ntil after the rise to power of the e/altados, attended b new e/treme meas!res, and the o!tbrea& of virt!al civil war in Spain, that a French e/peditionar force entered the penins!la in "$3=. Indeed, it has been s!spected that <. Fernando first agreed to appoint an e/altado ministr in %adrid in order to complete the polari5ation of Spanish politics and invite conservative intervention. 4t an rate, with the liberals divided among themselves there was little will to resist, and the forces of constit!tionalism, beset b "..,... French invaders and a smaller Spanish Farm of faithF of right'wing peasant militia, soon collapsed. There was no resistance to the French in the Spanish co!ntr side, where liberalism was more often than not viewed with hostilit . The reaction of "$3= far e/ceeded in scope and ferocit that of "$"B. <!ring the ne/t two ears the arm officer corps was temporaril dissolved, tho!sands of liberals driven into e/ile, considerable propert confiscated, man h!ndreds arrested, and scores of e/ec!tions carried o!t. Fernando VII insisted that French militar detachments remain in the co!ntr to protect him, et his behavior embarrassed conservative French militar and political leaders, who tried !ns!ccessf!ll to moderate the Spanish reaction. Fernando)s onl program at first was the complete restoration of absol!tism, bringing the ret!rn of seigne!ries, entailments, the ecclesiastical f!ero, and ()1*+ nearl all the laws and instit!tions that had been abolished, save the In9!isition. ,ernandine A)solutis% )et0een 1ltra!Royalis% and .i)eralis%+ 1 2-!1 // The &ing)s main concern was to preserve absol!te a!thorit for himself, et he had to govern thro!gh ministers whom he was rarel disposed to tr!st and so contin!ed to rel on personal favorites. (ence his alarm on discovering, after the restoration of absol!tism, that a strong !ltraro alist faction of r!ral !pper class and ch!rch leaders had emerged who insisted on stringent reorgani5ation of government to s!ppress liberalism totall . The also wanted to place government completel in the hands of their own reactionar ministers. The apostlicos or negros, as the !ltraro alist reactionaries came to be called, also demanded restoration of the In9!isition as a chec& on p!blic moralit , anticlericalism, and political s!bversion. :ocal F*!ntas de la feF 7Committees of the Faith8 were organi5ed in man districts, partic!larl in the northeastern regions of the co!ntr , and the force of FRo alist Vol!nteersF that had s!pplanted the arm in "$3= was event!all e/panded to "3.,... men. Fernando VII came more and more to fear becoming a prisoner of the negros and, in so doing, losing French militar bac&ing to

s!stain his government against the liberals. (is rel!ctance to give complete control of affairs to the negros led to several !ltrareactionar militar revolts in "$3B'"$3>. %ore serio!s was the o!tbrea& of the guerra dels malcontents in the western districts of the Catalan co!ntr side in "$3#. This revolt among poor peasants in the Catalan bac&lands, whose econom had been even more depressed than !s!al d!ring the past twent ears, seems to have been instigated b a coterie of !pper'class r!ral reactionaries and apostHlico ch!rch leaders. The apostHlico faction was absol!tel doctrinaire with regard to its reactionar program? the capricio!s, personal, opport!nist absol!tism of Fernando VII seemed to them little more than the prel!de to another ro!nd of liberal r!le. Their aim was to spar& a general r!ral ins!rrection that wo!ld demand absol!te monarchist r!le, nominall !nder Fernando VII b!t act!all !nder complete control of the apostHlicos, restoration of the In9!isition as a g!arantee of tr!e religion, and destr!ction of all remnants of liberalism. This somewhat artificial !prising never spread be ond r!ral Catalonia, and was s!ppressed after several months b the newl reorgani5ed ro al arm . Nonetheless, the g!erra dels malcontents gave voice to the first formal appeal b the negros for the ()1,+ leadership of <. Fernando)s o!nger brother and pres!med heir, the pio!s, apostHlico <. Carlos %arLa Isidro. The formative elements of the s!bse9!ent Carlist movement were ta&ing shape. To avoid the cl!tches of the negros, <. Fernando relied on a small gro!p of practical absol!tists d!ring the last nine ears of his reign. This was not, as some have said, a reversion to enlightened despotism, b!t it did introd!ce into ro al government a sense of the need for economic reform and some concern to conciliate the interests of the more moderate elements of Spanish societ . Old state loans were largel rep!diated, dr ing !p Spanish credit in the international financial mar&ets, b!t the government)s own financial organi5ation was somewhat improved. 2fforts were made thro!gh p!blicit and propaganda to create a positive p!blic attit!de toward the ro al regime. <omestic prod!ction was enco!raged, increased tariff protection was provided for Catalan ind!str , and the first r!dimentar stoc& e/change was set !p. Eet even in its final ears, Fernandine absol!tism made no gen!ine concessions to liberalism. This period was mar&ed b the five' ear reign of the sang!inar Conde de 2spa,a as captain general of 6arcelona 7"$3#'"$=38. (is repression of dissidents was so savage that it greatl enco!raged a new growth of liberalism in the Catalan capital, which had earlier pla ed a ma1or role in the str!ggles of Spanish constit!tionalism d!ring the trienni!m "$3.'"$3=. %inor border inc!rsions b liberal e/iles both from France in the north and 0ibraltar in the so!th were meanwhile t!rned bac& with ease. The local sec!rit commissions organi5ed b the reaction had internal affairs in most districts well !nder control. The Su''ession Crisis and the Royal Statute of 1 /The apostHlico s!pporters of <. Carlos remained 9!iet after "$3# in part beca!se it seemed that the s!ccession of their candidate to the throne of the ph sicall ailing, childless Fernando, three times a widower, was almost inevitable. The &ing)s marriage to the o!ng %aria Cristina of Naples did not alarm them, b!t the birth of a da!ghter to the ro al co!ple was more dist!rbing. Carlists immediatel emphasi5ed the Salic :aw of the 6o!rbon monarch , s!pposedl bro!ght to Spain with Felipe V, according to which the ro al s!ccession co!ld not pass thro!gh the female line. The crown had revo&ed this in "#$-, b!t failed to complete final ratification b the traditional Cortes. Fernando VII, not s!rprisingl , wanted to be s!cceeded b his own da!ghter rather than b a rival and antagonis'()1-+ tic brother, and repeated the revocation b ro al decree. Ahen he s!ddenl fell ill in "$=3 and was virt!all incapacitated, Carlist leaders sei5ed the opport!nit to force the ro al government to cancel the revocation. <on Fernando, still not 9!ite fift ears old, s!bse9!entl recovered and reprom!lgated the revocation, then earl in "$== forced his ambitio!s brother into ;ort!g!ese e/ile. The last cabinet appointed b Fernando VII wor&ed to prepare for the s!ccession of the infant princess Isabel b

red!cing the Ro al Vol!nteers f!rther and eliminating as m!ch of the local administrative infl!ence of the apostHlicos as possible. The death of Fernando VII at the close of "$== left the throne to a three' ear'old da!ghter !nder the protection of the o!thf!l 9!een mother, %arLa Cristina. This Neapolitan regent was a 1oll , spontaneo!s, good'nat!red o!ng princess lac&ing in special ed!cation or intelligence b!t determined to hold the throne for her da!ghter. To accomplish this and beat bac& the e/pected assa!lt of the apostHlicos, it wo!ld be necessar to reno!nce Fernandine e/tremes of absol!tism and reach a compromise that wo!ld gain the s!pport of moderates. 4t the beginning of "$=B, the 9!een regent appointed a new ministr headed b the most prominent of the moderate docea,ista liberals, *os+ %artLne5 de la Rosa, who had served briefl as prime minister d!ring the trienni!m. This res!lted in prom!lgation of the Ro al Stat!te of "$=B. The new Spanish doc!ment was not a cop of the French Charter of "$"B, as has been alleged, nor was it a gen!ine constit!tion. It was an attempt b %artLne5 de la Rosa to replace the C@di5 constit!tion with a new charter fo!nded on a juste milieu between traditionalism and liberalism. The stat!te was th!s a compromise between a real constit!tion and the mere reform of traditional laws, and was also based in part on the st!d of the limited post' "$"> constit!tions of several west 0erman principalities. It provided for a bicameral legislat!re, the lower ho!se to be chosen b the indirect s!ffrage in two stages of some "$,... electors 7appro/imatel ."> of " percent of the pop!lation8, and the senate to be composed of grandes, ch!rch hierarchs, and ro al appointees. The legislat!re wo!ld have little more than a cons!ltative f!nction, for the crown retained absol!te veto powers and the government was responsible to it alone. No bill of rights was incl!ded and administration was centrali5ed in %adrid, b!t regional f!eros were still recogni5ed. The elections of "$=B were then FmadeF from %adrid, initiating what became a common nineteenth' cent!r practice. One ob1ective of government manip!lation was to get more of the middle class interests of the co!ntr represented, as distinct from clerics, b!rea!'()1.+ crats, and the radical intelligentsia. This attempt was to some e/tent s!ccessf!l, as indicated b table =. Ta)le /. Professional $a'2grounds of Cortes 3e%)ers Eear of election "$3. "$33 "$=B 6!siness and professional B> C" "=. 0overnment and militar CC. >= Clerg => 3$ > B

"$=C -$ $C So!rceJ FermLn Caballero, El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto 7%adrid, "$=#8, p. ///iv.

Eet even !nder so restricted a s!ffrage, the dep!ties in the new 2stamento de ;roc!radores, as the lower chamber was called, did not merel form a safe, progovernment bloc. The debates of an open chamber, f!ll p!blicit , and freedom of the press were !sed to disc!ss iss!es e/tensivel . 6 September "$=B the newl emerging ;rogressive faction, heirs of the e/altados of the trienni!m, co!nted ## of the "$$ votes in the lower ho!se and bro!ght !p cens!re votes against the government. %oreover, the were given armed strength in man parts of the co!ntr b reorgani5ation of the middle class Drban %ilitia first formed d!ring the trienni!m. In most towns the %ilitia fell !nder ;rogressivist control. 4nticlerical violence reappeared almost immediatel . In *!l "$=B several monasteries in %adrid were

set afire and a n!mber of mon&s were m!rdered b a mob. The rioters were inflamed b the o!tbrea& of a cholera epidemic''apparentl blamed on the religio!s''and b the armed depredations of clerical Carlists in the northern co!ntr side. <!ring the s!mmer of "$=> similar o!tb!rsts appeared in 6arcelona and several provincial cities. Carlis% and the ,irst Carlist &ar of 1 //!!1 -" 6ands of g!errilleros were formed in the northeast in s!pport of the ca!se of the e/iled <. Carlos soon after receiving news of the death of Fernando VII and the planned Isabeline s!ccession !nder %arLa Cristina at the close of "$==. <!ring "$=B, the str!ggle too& on the dimensions of civil war. The Carlist ca!se was strongest in the three 6as9!e provinces and Navarre, in r!ral mo!ntaino!s Catalonia, and in the more bac&ward and r!ral areas of 4ragHn and the :evant. ()19+ There was also a following in other parts of northern Spain. The common denominators of the movement were localism, religio!s and political traditionalism, and to some e/tent r!ralism. It gro!ped the provincial elements that were most strongl opposed to liberalism, and its &e note was reaction, witho!t a clearl and f!ll artic!lated program save ret!rn to absol!te monarch . The first Carlist contingents were based on former members of the Ro al Vol!nteers and local patriots of the mo!ntain areas. The were led b priests, gentr , and village notables. In the 6as9!e provinces the regard for regional f!eros, partiall threatened b liberalism, was a ma1or factor. In Navarre, religio!s 5eal and respect for traditional leadership ma have been even stronger in enco!raging the movement. In some of the more bac&ward r!ral areas of the northeast there was general resentment of the new !rban' dominated econom and the interests fostered b liberalism. In parts of the Catalan co!ntr side the rebellio!s propensities of peasants and gentr , resentf!l of the o!tside world and given to semi' anarchist o!tb!rsts of banditr in an earlier time, were once more revived. In less than a ear Carlist vol!nteers were formed into reg!lar battalions in Navarre and the 6as9!e co!ntr , their stronghold, and a small field arm began to ta&e shape. Eet the Carlists were !nable to win over the cities, even in that region, and the were alwa s considerabl wea&er in manpower and s!pplies than the government forces. Carlist !nits in Catalonia and the east were more loosel organi5ed, and man of them operated as g!errilla forces. In the 6as9!e core area, conscription was introd!ced and reg!lar discipline b!ilt !p. Fighting in or near their home region, their morale was !s!all better than that of government draftees of so!th and central Spain, and tho!gh the remained deficient in more sophisticated e9!ipment, the ba onet charges of the Carlist infantr proved to be the most effective single tactic in the war. Eet the Carlist arm was most s!ccessf!l on the defensive, rel ing partl on g!errilla !nits. It never developed m!ch offensive strength, and the climactic e/pedition to the o!ts&irts of %adrid in "$=# was !nable to la!nch an assa!lt on the capital. That the civil war lasted nearl seven ears was d!e in large meas!re to the disarra of the nascent liberal regime, !nable to generate the considerable reso!rces of mone , manpower, and material needed to fight campaigns of attrition against regional forces. <on Carlos FV,F the traditionalist leader, t!rned o!t to be destr!ctive to his own ca!se. Irresol!te and incompetent as a militar chief, he also lac&ed political perception and was dominated b a narrow coterie of priests and apostHlicos. There were a n!mber of o!tstanding Carlist militar leaders, the best of whom, the professional 0!ip!5coan officer I!malacarreg!i, was &illed in "$=>. In the end, as the ())0+ traditionalists were worn down b attrition and government forces closed in, a split developed between the fanatical apostHlico elements and the more practical regional traditionalists. Rafael %aroto, a professional general commanding the main Carlist force, became involved in a death str!ggle with the clerical and civilian apostHlico leaders, termed brutos b the professional Carlist officers, and in "$=- accepted a genero!s peace offer from the liberal 0eneral 2spartero. The terms of this FCompromise of VergaraF pledged to eschew reprisals, incorporate Carlist officers in the reg!lar arm , and respect 6as9!e privileges. The last fighting ended when Carlist forces in the east were r!n across

the border in "$B.. Eet Carlism did not die after its militar defeat. Tho!gh the d nastic iss!e of Salic male legitimac remained the central Carlist claim, what reall &ept the movement alive was the strength of religio!s traditionalism and the insistence on regional identit and privileges. The so'called Second Carlist Aar of "$BC'"$B- was no more than a rising of the Catalan bac& co!ntr , not et integrated into the liberal social and economic s stem. (owever, the fr!stration and relative fail!res of representative government d!ring the middle decades of the cent!r made it diffic!lt to create real !nit and overcome the t!g of localism and c!lt!ral traditionalism. 4 more d namic societ than that of the Spanish middle classes might have been able to integrate the interests of vario!s parts of the penins!la, b!t the halting development of the co!ntr left archaic interests intact. The liberal regime in %adrid tended to !s!rp local privileges witho!t offering the advantages of a modern central government. The e/cesses of Spanish radicalism in a later generation also contrib!ted to the revival of traditionalism after it had seemed to be losing m!ch of its s!pport. Tho!gh the Carlist movement la largel dormant !ntil after "$C-, it &ept m!ch of its latent appeal in the conservative r!ral areas of the northeast. The Triu%ph of .i)eralis%+ 1 /4!1 -" 6 the mid'"$=.s, Spanish liberalism had become distinctl stronger than d!ring the trienni!m. The beginning of economic recover d!ring the last ears of Fernando VII, the spread of liberal ideas and a growing rev!lsion against Fernandine absol!tism, which sw!ng &e regions s!ch as the !rban districts of Catalonia on the liberal side, all pla ed a part in this. The need for allies to s!pport the Isabeline s!ccession had provided for a smooth governmental transition !nder the Stat!te of "$=B, b!t d!ring "$=B and "$=> the Carlist reaction ())1+ gathered strength in the 6as9!e co!ntr and other northeastern regions. The moderate government of %artLne5 de la Rosa soon fo!nd itself between two fires, 1!st as its predecessor had d!ring the trienni!m. 4 wave of radical revolts in man of the leading provincial towns bro&e o!t in *!l "$=>, e/ceeding an thing in "$33'"$3=, and the government had little choice b!t to strengthen itself b moving to the left. In September, the financier *!an 4lvare5 de %endi5@bal replaced %artLne5 de la Rosa as prime minister, and his cabinet was charged with the tas& of amending the Stat!te in a more liberal direction. <!ring the ens!ing debate the split between %oderates and ;rogressives became clearer than ever. For new elections that were held in %arch "$=C, 9!alifications were lowered so as to do!ble the s!ffrage, raising it to between =.,... and >.,... electors. Aith the assistance of a degree of government manip!lation from %adrid, the %oderate elements were almost completel eliminated and a strongl ;rogressive chamber was elected. %eanwhile %endi5@bal moved to solve two problems sim!ltaneo!sl J financing of the civil war against Carlism and the disposing of monastic properties 7restored to the ch!rch b the Fernandine reaction8. In %arch "$=C the government declared all monastic lands to be national propert and began their sale immediatel at p!blic a!ction. <!ring the following ear plans were made for the confiscation and sale of all ch!rch lands, tho!gh so sweeping a meas!re was not immediatel enacted into law. The aim of this broad disamorti5ation of formerl entailed ch!rch propert was not simpl to dispossess the ch!rch and finance the civil war? it was meant to strengthen the middle classes economicall , and it was hoped b some that it wo!ld create a stable, liberal, lower'middle'class, propert 'owning peasantr . The beginning of the great disamorti5ation of ch!rch land completed the total estrangement of the Spanish Catholic Ch!rch from liberalism. Tho!gh a few bishops s!pported the %oderates, most ch!rch leaders became completel committed to Carlism, and legal sanctions were ta&en against some gro!ps in the clerg for political reasons. 4s a res!lt of this tension between ch!rch and state, thirt 'two of the si/t 'two sees in Spain were vacant b "$B..

Tho!gh nearl all Spaniards remained nominal Catholics, and religio!s or spirit!al anti'Catholicism, as distinct from political anti'clericalism, was almost !n&nown, the middle decades of the cent!r mar&ed the nadir of Spanish Catholicism)s p!blic position and infl!ence on the elite. %iddle class Catholic b!sinessmen saw no spirit!al contradiction in despoiling the ch!rch of its lands, and even the %oderates protested the wa it was done more than the act of ())/+ disamorti5ation itself. %an mon&s and priests of !ncertain vocation left the clerg , and it has been estimated that d!ring the first decades of liberalism appro/imatel one'third reno!nced their vows altogether. The 9!een regent, %aria Cristina, who f!nctioned as head of state, was a comparativel simple woman b!t b no means lac&ing in common sense. She reali5ed that the %oderates were m!ch more interested than the ;rogressives in preserving strong ro al prerogatives in Spain. 4fter more disorders and m!ch intrig!ing b the %oderates, she dismissed %endi5@bal in %a "$=C and replaced him with a %oderate leader, IstNri5. For the elections to be held in *!l the s!ffrage was broadened b decree, lowering propert 9!alifications to enfranchise appro/imatel >.,... of the wealth and ">,... ed!cated men and officials 9!alified as capacidades 7those who are speciall 9!alified8, of whom abo!t C,... were arm and national g!ard officers. This total of C>,... amo!nted to .> to .C of " percent of the Spanish pop!lation, and was act!all a greater proportion than were enfranchised at that time in France, which had no provision for capacidades. In the elections of *!l "$=C some government infl!ence was no do!bt emplo ed, b!t the %oderate factions also relied on more effective organi5ation, forming an alliance with nonradical ;rogressives. 4ppro/imatel two'thirds of the new electorate made !se of the ballot. In the first ro!nd of voting, the government alliance won abo!t eight seats, to fift 'si/ for the opposition, which carried most of the larger cities. The radical sectors had no intention of being eliminated from power. 6efore the second ro!nd of voting co!ld be held, the ;rogressives began a series of revolts in provincial capitals, starting at %@laga on *!l 3>. These c!lminated in a pron!nciamiento b noncommissioned officers at the ro al s!mmer palace of :a 0ran1a in 4!g!st, forcing the 9!een to restore the C@di5 constit!tion of "$"3. 4 ;rogressive ministr too& power !nder *os+ %aria Calatrava. It mobili5ed new militar and financial reso!rces for the civil war, and then held elections''the third in less than a ear''in October "$=C, on the basis of the "$"3 s stem of !niversal male ho!seholders) s!ffrage in a three'stage indirect process. 6 that time the b!l& of the p!blic were growing wear of t!rmoil, and the more moderate elements of the ;rogressives gained control of the Cortes. The ear "$=# was a cr!cial one in the First Carlist Aar, as the government forces were nearl paral 5ed b m!tin and the traditionalist arm came close to sei5ing %adrid. 4t the same time, the Cortes was occ!pied with preparing a new constit!tion to s!persede that of "$"3. The res!ltant constit!tion of "$=# was a conciliator and balanced doc!ment. Tho!gh the principle of national sovereignt ())1+ was restored, government a!thorit was shared b crown and parliament, with the former retaining ma1or powers. The new constit!tion stated that the crown co!ld not r!le witho!t the parliament, b!t government ministers were to be s!mmoned and dismissed b the crown alone. The legislat!re was made bicameral, with the senate to be appointed b the crown from among names proposed b wealth electors. Finall , m!nicipal governments were placed !nder local control thro!gh pop!lar elections b a broad s!ffrage and were also given 1!risdiction over local !nits of the reorgani5ed National %ilitia, The semidemocratic voting provisions of "$"3 were dropped in favor of a censitar s!ffrage onl slightl broader than that of "$=C. 4ppro/imatel #$,... voters were enfranchised directl , b!t provision for capacidades was considerabl red!ced b comparison with the "$=C law. Eet the s!ffrage provisions in general were m!ch broader, for there was also concern to enfranchise peasant smallholders who paid little in the wa of direct ta/es. (ence a secondar provision gave the vote to an peasant farmer who owned a o&e of cattle. In some provinces of the northwest this incl!ded man

comparativel poor peasants, res!lting in 33,... 9!alified voters in ;ontevedra and "$,... in 4st!rias. 4ltogether, the s!ffrage list for the co!ntr as a whole was increased to 3C>,... 73." percent of the pop!lation8. This amo!nted to " voter for ever B$ inhabitants, compared to " for ever 3.. !nder the "$=" electoral law in France. The %oderates deno!nced the "$=# constit!tion as too radical. In the campaign for the ne/t elections 7September "$=#8, the developed the first appro/imation of a reg!lar political organi5ation in Spain b forming coordinated committees of 1o!rnalists and other activists to promote their propaganda. Dnder the broader s!ffrage, there was onl >C percent participation. %oreover, radical ;rogressives abstained in man of the larger cities in protest against the government leadership of the more moderate ;rogressives, whose constit!tion the deno!nced as too conservative. The %oderates gained primar s!pport from the larger landowners of central and so!thern Spain and benefited both from the radicals) abstention and from a general rightward swing among the middle and !pper classes after the recent series of revolts and m!tinies. The won 3.. seats to the ;rogressives)s C. in one of the fairer elections to be held in nineteenth'cent!r Spain. The %oderates held power for nearl two ears, b!t on increasingl poorer terms with the liberal leaders of the reg!lar arm . The latter finall bro!ght the crown to dissolve the Cortes once more and hold new elections in "$=- that, co!pled with the abstention of the %oderates, res!lted in a radical ;rogressive victor . This coincided with the end of the primar phase of the civil war and the tri!mph for ()))+ the liberal ca!se, b!t bro!ght new tension and drastic polarit to liberal politics. The ;rogressive Cortes was then in t!rn dissolved, and the %oderates organi5ed a Central Commission to give them official leadership in new elections at the beginning of "$B.. These ma not have been so relativel free of governmental interference as the preceding contests of "$=# and "$=-. 4t an rate, the res!lted in a new victor for the %oderates, who then prepared to safeg!ard the tri!mph of moderate liberalism b new instit!tional changes that wo!ld eliminate the bases of ;rogressive strength. The 3ilitary in Politi's+ 1 /-!1 -" It was d!ring the First Carlist Aar that the basic pattern of militar intervention and leadership in politics was established, a pattern that persisted for at least fort ears. This intervention was e/pressed in a variet of forms, ranging from o!tright m!tin , partic!larl in "$=#, thro!gh direct pron!nciamientos in "$=> and "$=C, to more indirect forms of s!asion behind the scenes, beg!n in "$=B b moderate arm liberals who became spo&esmen for a more representative polic . That militar leaders pla ed s!ch cr!cial roles was d!e first of all to the instit!tional vac!!m in which liberalism was reintrod!ced after the final decade of Fernandine absol!tism, and to the poor organi5ation of the liberal forces and the relative wea&ness of the interests on which the were established. The two main rival factions, the %oderates and ;rogressives, co!ld not even agree !pon r!les of the game, and the ;rogressives, partic!larl , felt 1!stified in s!mmoning both civilian mobs and armed intervention b s mpathetic militar elements. 29!all important was the fact that liberalism was being established d!ring a ma1or civil war in which the militar leadership was of cr!cial significance and hence pla ed a disproportionatel infl!ential role. %ost of the arm and its officers remained aloof from politics, b!t of the minorit who became involved, the greater n!mber reinforced either %oderate or ;rogressive liberalism. This proliberal orientation can be e/plained b a n!mber of factors. %ost officers felt a patriotic responsibilit to s!pport the liberal ca!se with which the established national government was becoming identified. %ost were of middle class bac&gro!nd? the leaned toward liberalism beca!se of its m sti9!e of moderni5ation and new opport!nit . Th!s the pla ed the role of a moderni5ing middle class elite in a societ in which the core of the middle classes were not et read to ta&e f!ll charge. %ore m!ndane factors were also involved, s!ch as poor pa 7and after the war, !nemplo ment8, personal rivalries, and

the fact that the liberal ())*+ government was so ill organi5ed d!ring the war that commanding officers sometimes had to intervene in government administration simpl to care for the needs of their troops. 5spartero and the ,ailure of Progressi6is%+ 1 -"!1 -/ The dominant fig!re in the Spanish arm at the close of the First Carlist Aar was 0eneral 6aldomero 2spartero, who commanded the government forces in the north d!ring the climactic campaign that concl!ded with the compromise peace of Vergara in "$=-. (e had become identified with ;rogressive interests in opposition to rivals in the militar who s!pported the %oderates, and his infl!ence was in large meas!re responsible for the dissol!tion of the %oderate Cortes and the brief ret!rn of the ;rogressives to power in "$=-'"$B.. The %oderate government that regained control in "$B. then passed legislation raising propert 9!alifications for the vote, and moved to c!t the base from !nder ;rogressive strength in the provincial towns. Tho!gh the principle of pop!lar election of provincial assemblies and m!nicipal co!ncils was retained, a new law stip!lated that the ministr of interior in %adrid wo!ld alone have the right to appoint ma ors and other officials of provincial capitals from among all those local co!ncilors elected, and that the appointive jefes polticos in charge of provinces wo!ld choose all officials for smaller towns from among those elected in them. These laws were in fact constit!tional amendments, however, and co!ld not be instit!ted simpl b ma1orit vote of parliament. Their imposition amo!nted to a civilian pron!nciamiento, and the ;rogressives threatened revolt. 4t this point the 9!een regent tried to gain the s!pport of the commander'in'chief of the arm , 2spartero, who was in 6arcelona. 6!t 2spartero was even more vehementl implored b the ;rogressives to be their savior, and he ref!sed to sanction the new laws, while stressing his s!pport of the 9!een regent and the o!ng 9!een. (ence %arLa Cristina offered to appoint 2spartero prime minister as the onl hope of finding a compromise that wo!ld s!pport the throne. Ahen she ref!sed to sanction ann!lment of the m!nicipalities law, however, the ;rogressives bro&e into two months of protracted street demonstrations and minor disorders in provincial capitals all over Spain. This forced appointment of 2spartero as prime minister on the ;rogressives) own terms, and !ltimatel drove %aria Cristina to abdicate the regenc . 2spartero then became interim regent in October "$B., and de facto head of state, the first and onl time that a militar fig!re held that position !ntil "-=C. New elections in "$B" nat!rall bro!ght an ()),+ overwhelming ;rogressive victor and ratification b the new Cortes of 2spartero as regent for life. The ;rogressive ca!dillo was the son of a Castilian wheelwright. (e had little ed!cation and scant political !nderstanding or talent, and was given to bo!ts of indolence alternating with periods of activit . (e had not so!ght a political career b!t had been eagerl pressed into service b the ;rogressives as the onl means of ass!ring their tri!mph. (is political ideas were limited to vag!e notions abo!t the c!rrent of the times and pop!lar sovereignt , later e/pressed in his pop!lar catchphrase F:et the national will be f!lfilledF''a slogan witho!t content adopted in lie! of a program. (e was gratified to be hailed b ;rogressive crowds and en1o ed the stat!s which politics had bro!ght him, b!t he had little in the wa of p!rposef!l leadership to offer. The onl significant initiative of the government in "$B" was to begin to p!t the lands of the sec!lar clerg as well as monasteries on the mar&et for private p!rchase. The onl wa in which Spanish politics became more liberal !nder 2spartero was in the s!ffrage. Than&s to the yuntero 7cattle owner8 cla!se of the "$=# constit!tion, the n!mber of electors had risen to =B=,... in "$=- and B3B,... in "$B. 7=.> percent of the pop!lation8. This amo!nted to " voter for ever "= inhabitants of 4lava, l for ever "B in 0!ip!5coa, "> in Iamora, "C in Orense, and "# in ;ontevedra''the broadest 2!ropean s!ffrage of the period. 6 "$B=, the voting lists had increased to >..,... or more.

The response of one gro!p of the %oderates to the 2spartero regime was a co!nter'pron!nciamiento b a handf!l of militar and civilian fig!res in the 6as9!e co!ntr in October "$B". This was easil 9!ashed, for it drew no s!pport from the temporaril e/ha!sted Carlists. It did bring the elimination of 6as9!e f!eros. ;rovincial governments were established in place of the traditional 1!ntas, 6as9!e tariff privileges were abolished, and reg!lar conscription was introd!ced. Reaction to the attempted %oderate pron!nciamiento served as catal st in a new ;rogressive o!tb!rst in 6arcelona. There a *!nta de Vigilancia was set !p to defend against the danger from the right, b!t within a month it had been converted into a *!nta ;op!lar that demolished the Ci!dadela, 6arcelona)s fortress b!ilt b Felipe V as a s mbol of centralist sovereignt in the Catalan capital. The *!nta ;op!lar represented a broad mobili5ation of elements of the middle and also the lower classes. 6efore it was forcibl s!ppressed, it demanded government protection for domestic ind!str and collaborated with the first significant efforts to organi5e trade !nions in Spain. One ear later, in November "$B3, the str!ct!re of government in 6arcelona bro&e down altogether. The possessing classes were alien'())-+ ated b 2spartero)s free'trade polic , while the wor&ers were disgr!ntled over the uinta s stem of general militar recr!itment''a comp!lsor draft for certain elements of the poor''and over the high level of e/cises. Aithin fort 'eight ho!rs a ta/ riot of sorts had flamed into a broad pop!lar revolt, and a new *!nta <irectiva ;op!lar too& over the government. Ahen 2spartero dispatched an arm to red!ce 6arcelona b force, the more restrained middle class elements formed a Conciliation *!nta to wor& o!t a compromise sol!tion. 4fter the government insisted on !nconditional s!rrender, it was s!pplanted b a new radical 1!nta of the lower classes. The rebels raised the first blac& flags of total defiance seen in 6arcelona, as 2spartero bombarded the cit , then occ!pied it b militar force and carried o!t a severe repression. 6 this time 2spartero)s hone moon with ;rogressive opinion had long since ended. Incapable of governing effectivel himself, he was dominated b a cli9!e of militar associates 7nic&named 4 ac!chos b their enemies, since some of them had been present at the final Spanish defeat of 4 ac!cho in So!th 4merica in "$3>8. (e paid little attention either to the ;rogressive Cortes or to the wants and demands of the provinces, and s!ppressed newspapers to protect himself from criticism. Spanish ;rogressivism had proved invertebrate and ineffective. Not strong eno!gh or s!fficientl !nited to govern thro!gh civilian politics, it had relied on a militar strong man who was incapable of providing leadership. 6 "$B=, man of the ;rogressives themselves were loo&ing for an alternative sol!tion. The strongest opposition to 2spartero was being coordinated b a gro!p of %oderate senior officers in e/ile, led b 0eneral RamHn %arLa Narv@e5. Their conspirac drew s!pport from the more moderate Carlists, from m!ch of the clerg , and from the French government of :o!is ;hilippe, which feared that affairs in Spain were getting o!t of hand. It was also s!pported b a significant n!mber of the ;rogressives, who fo!nd themselves !nemplo ed !nder the c!rrent scheme or o!t of favor with the r!ling cli9!e. Some of these ;rogressive conspirators did not necessaril want to overthrow 2spartero, b!t the did want to force a change in polic and get rid of the 4 ac!cho gro!p, whose hands were on the levers of power. The Cortes elections of "$B= were won b a coalition of %oderates and Fp!reF ;rogressives 7as the anti'2spartero sector of the ;rogressives called themselves8. Finding himself !nable to control the new assembl , 2spartero dissolved it, b!t this merel served as the spar& to to!ch off the 1oint %oderate'Fp!reF ;rogressive pron!nciamiento that overthrew the regenc . It was a snowballing revolt that started late in %a in several of the 4ndal!sian provincial capitals. 4fter winning ma1or militar s!pport in *!ne, it was clima/ed b a s&irmish ()).+ o!tside %adrid between a rebel force and a few !nits still lo al to 2spartero. 6 that time his power had melted awa ? he was defeated and forced into retirement, replaced b a temporar compromise ministr faced with the tas& of restr!ct!ring liberal

government in Spain. The last ro!nd of this conflict was fo!ght b the radical left in 6arcelona, where the pop!lar militia ref!sed to disband after the new government had been formed. The third pop!lar revolt in 6arcelona within two ears occ!rred d!ring September "$B=, when the cit was dominated b a new radical 1!nta representing artisans, factor wor&ers, and the !nemplo ed. It lac&ed clear leadership or program b!t made demands for greater democrati5ation and for social and economic concessions from both the government and propert owners. The revolt ac9!ired the slang name of the !amancia, from the g ps !sage jamar meaning Fto eat,F indicating its identification with the lowest social strata. :i&e its predecessors, the *amancia was s!ppressed b force 7November "$B=8, b!t this time there were no fearf!l reprisals. ,oreign Affairs+ 1 14!1 -/ <!ring the decade that preceded the Aar of Independence, Spain had s!n& into the h!miliating role of a Napoleonic satellite. The heroic resistance of the Spanish people preserved national independence, b!t the res!lting economic prostration, the revolt in 4merica, and the total ineptness of the Fernandine regime placed the co!ntr in a position of diplomatic impotence after "$"B. Spanish representatives pla ed no role at the Congress of Vienna and were almost completel ignored, nor did Spanish diplomac fare better in s!bse9!ent ears. The pett , vengef!l, e/traordinaril narrow'minded Fernando en1o ed no esteem even among other conservative r!lers. The ma1or effort which his government e/erted in "$"$ to elicit help from other 2!ropean powers to repress the Spanish 4merican revolt was a complete fail!re. In addition, the 6ritish government stood read b "$3= to bloc& an marshalling of s!pport for the Spanish repression in 4merica, and the Dnited States adhered to this position in its %onroe <octrine. The wea&ness and dependenc of the first half of the Fernandine regime was then clima/ed b reliance on French troops to restore absol!te monarch . <!ring Fernando)s reign, Spain became a debtor nation for the first time in its histor . This was the almost inevitable res!lt of being deprived of the b!l& of Spanish 4merican reso!rces and the trade and reven!e accr!ing from them, especiall at a time when the ())9+ co!ntr was s!ffering from heav war losses and the administrative s stem had fallen into deca . There was some improvement in the handling of the national debt d!ring the second half of the reign, insofar as it was better administered and new loans were negotiated, b!t as a res!lt of these loans the foreign debt do!bled between "$3B and "$=B. 4fter the death of Fernando VII, the Spanish government was able to enter a phase of more fr!itf!l diplomatic relations. 6etween "$=. and "$=B, France, Spain, and ;ort!gal all 1oined the ran&s of constit!tional monarch alongside 6ritain, and in the latter ear the fo!r powers signed a M!adr!ple 4lliance. This was not an association of e9!als, however, and merel ina!g!rated a phase of 6ritish and French t!telage. 4mbassadors of these two powers tried fre9!entl to intervene in domestic affairs d!ring the "$=.s and "$B.s, the 6ritish government leaning toward the less radical of the ;rogressives and the French toward the %oderates. The domestic division res!lting from civil war and political stalemate was s!ch that the principal effort to sec!re more h!mane treatment of prisoners d!ring the First Carlist Aar was not arranged b Spaniards b!t was negotiated thro!gh 6ritish intermediaries in the 2lliott Convention of "$=>. 6ritain s!pplied m!ch of the e9!ipment and mone for the government tri!mph, which also represented victor for the polic of the two main western powers and was viewed !nfavorabl b the conservative governments of central and eastern 2!rope. Tho!gh 6ritish infl!ence seemed predominant for a time, French diplomac ass!med a stronger role after the overthrow of the ;rogressives in "$B=, and government reliance on foreign loans accent!ated this relative dependence.

5'ono%i' 7e6elop%ent+ 1 14!1 -/ The political cleavages and fail!res of the 9!arter'cent!r that followed the Aar of Independence wo!ld !ndo!btedl have been m!ch less severe had the period not been one of economic doldr!ms. The ears "$"B'"$3. were a time of !nrelieved postwar depression. 4 brief revival began d!ring the liberal trienni!m, then was cho&ed off b international depression. Revival of Catalan man!fact!res was hampered b the flow of French te/tile e/ports that !ndersold Catalan prod!ction inside Spain. 0eneral recover in Spain did not get !nder wa !ntil "$3#, and Catalan te/tile prod!ction increased mar&edl after abo!t "$=.. The general !pswing owed comparativel little to government polic J the program of hard mone and general deflation that was followed in "$"B'"$3. reenforced depression. This ()*0+ financial polic was reversed d!ring "$3"'"$3= b!t was restored !nder the second Fernandine reaction. %!ch of the mone bro!ght in b foreign loans between "$3= and "$3# was simpl stolen b the co!rt camarilla. 6eginning in "$3#, the state began to wor& in greater cooperation with private finance, achieving a higher level of honest and coherence in its financial operations, and this assisted the importing of machiner for te/tile prod!ction. The polic of liberal government d!ring the trienni!m and after "$=B also stressed bringing in mone thro!gh foreign loans, b!t incl!ded a degree of monetar deval!ation, which apparentl stim!lated prod!ction. 6 "$=B those with social and economic power were in fair agreement on the desirabilit of liberal constit!tionalism, b!t disagreed among themselves abo!t the e/act form. :arge landholders and proto' ind!strialists favored the %oderates, while commercial interests and smaller entrepene!rs and shop&eepers s!pported ;rogressivism. Nevertheless, man of the r!ral districts of Spain still lived largel o!tside the orbit of the commerce and ind!str of a new and developing nineteenth'cent!r econom . Self'contained regions of local artisan prod!ction were still almost more the r!le than the e/ception in the geograph of Spanish man!fact!res, and this was et another factor that made the social and economic mobili5ation of a cohesive liberalism 9!ite diffic!lt. In t!rn, economic distress enco!raged the drift of marginal elements to the towns, where the formed a s!bclass easil stirred !p b ;rogressive agitation. Seigne!rial 1!risdiction over r!ral properties was not definitivel eliminated !ntil after "$=C, and the new settlement of propert rights was at first not f!ll clear. Seigne!rial territorial 1!risdictions were often transferred into private propert rights, an enormo!s boon to the landholding aristocrac , for the henceforth held in absol!te title what had previo!sl been restricted b a &ind of condominial relationship. Nevertheless, propert titles to small towns !nder former Seigne!rial domain, and land from which onl marginal d!es were collected, remained bones of contention. <!es and rights had been conf!sed ever since the start of the Aar of Independence and in some cases were not entirel settled !ntil decades after the act!al abolition of seigne!ries in "$=C. Tho!gh some aristocrats who formerl held e/tensive domains were recogni5ed as private owners of these h!ge tracts, s!ch ownership normall co!ld not be e/tended over small towns, villages, and mo!ntain areas. Some nobles lost the economic benefits of most of their seigne!ries almost entirel . :aws!its went on for ears, and certain dispossessed lords were event!all awarded pensions or other compensations.

()*1+ Ta)le -. Sales of Chur'h and Co%%on .ands+ 1 /8!1 48+ 6alued in reales (4 reales e9ualled one peseta# Eears "$=C'BB "$B>'>B "$>B'>C Total cost of ch!rch lands sold, "$=C'>C Cost of common and wastelands sold, "$=C'>C :ands of sec!lar clerg =--,3>$,-C# B>,=$.,-.C =>B,-"3,B-3 :ands of reg!lar clerg >.=,>#",B33 33,BC>,#B> $.,>-=,->" ",B.C,"$=,B$= >"-,"C$,#3$

0rand total ",-3>,=>3,3"" So!rceJ :. S@nche5 4gesta, "istoria del constitucionalismo espaol 7%adrid, "->>8, p. BC=. The transfer and sale of ch!rch lands was not completed for several decades. 4ll ch!rch properties were not thrown on the mar&et !ntil the new r!lings b the 2spartero regenc in "$B", and the sale of the properties of the sec!lar clerg was not f!ll cons!mmated !ntil the "$>.s. The most val!able lands transferred to private ownership were in New Castile, 2/tremad!ra, and 4ndal!sia, the regions of the great thirteenth'cent!r endowments. The disamorti5ation was a comparative political s!ccess b!t a distinct economic fail!re. The first phase was carried o!t in "$=C'"$=# amid great haste to complete the first ro!nds of sales to ;rogressive s!pporters before the %oderates co!ld intervene. :ands were sold at little more than ". percent down, with ten ears to pa . Rates were often well !nder the fair mar&et val!e. Tho!gh the state gained the s!pport of a new elite, its finances deteriorated. Concentration of landholdings accelerated after "$=C. :and rents from peasants rose, while bracero wages remained stagnant. The heavil !nbalanced agrarian str!ct!re of modern Spain, partic!larl in the center and so!th, had ass!med its f!ll dimensions b the "$B.s. Since the new liberal elite was f!ndamentall land'based, one of the first acts of restored constit!tional government in "$3. had been to contradict its nominal doctrines of the free mar&et b setting rigoro!s import restrictions on grain. This violated Spain)s cent!ries'old tradition of cheap food imports, g!aranteeing higher grain prices that lowered the standard of living b!t maintained the principal so!rce of income for the new elite. ()*/+ Spanish Ro%anti'is% For the first time in more than one h!ndred ears Spanish esthetics, e/pressed in the romantic art of the earl nineteenth cent!r , gripped the 2!ropean imagination. The central fig!re in this was Francisco 0o a :!cientes 7"#BC'"$3$8, whose finest achievements were his later paintings done in the nineteenth cent!r . Change in the perception of the Spanish esthetic was also the res!lt of a reval!ation b art critics and historians of western 2!rope, who began earl in the cent!r to pro1ect the image of a FRomantic Spain.F Foreign writers who tavelled in Spain''Th+ophile 0a!tier, ;rosper %erim+e, Aashington Irving, and others''elaborated this image in the literar world of the "$=.s and after, contrib!ting to a m sti9!e based on one'sided glimpses of g psies, bandits, flamenco dancing, and %oorish resid!es which in its e/treme form was more 4ndal!sian than Spanish. Eet with this there came, for the first time in modern 2!ropean c!lt!re, an appreciation for the positive as well as the negative 9!alities of the !ni9!el (ispanic.

There was a romantic generation in Spanish literat!re and criticism as well, headed b the essa ist %ariano *os+ de :arra and lin&ed with the liberal political movement in %adrid and the provincial capitals of the so!th. In Catalonia, on the other hand, the sense of romanticism was more conservative and was associated with historical themes and infl!enced b 2nglish and 0erman writers, partic!larl Scott. 4 sense of the individ!alit of Catalan societ was intensified. The development of (ispanic romanticism had the effect of reviving regional lang!ages and 9!ic&ening their literar !se? the hegemon of Castilian that had end!red for three cent!ries was challenged. 6 mid'cent!r there were also evidences of more pop!lar c!lt!ral forms in the Catalan' spea&ing regions, with wor&ing class choral gro!ps in 6arcelona and pop!lar theatricals in both 6arcelona and Valencia. This reawa&ening of pop!lar c!lt!re was reinforced b the costumbrista trend in the literat!re of the ne/t generation, devoted to capt!ring regional st les and mores. The growth of regionalist c!lt!re did not at first challenge Spanish !nit or the broader hegemon of Castilian Spanish c!lt!re. 6 the end of the nineteenth cent!r , however, it helped to inspire dissociative regionalism, compo!nding the diffic!lties of integrating a liberal s stem.

B$%l$ 2raphy ! r Chapter 19 (-0)+ The most detailed acco!nt of Spanish government from "#$> to "#-> is still (ermann 6a!mgarten, Gesc#ic#te $paniens %ur &eit der fran%'sisc#en (evolution 76erlin, "$C"8. The last chapters of Richard (err, )#e Eig#teent#*Century (evolution in $pain 7;rinceton, "->$8, deal with the politics of the "#-.s. 4 recent brief acco!nt is Carlos Corona, (evolucin y reaccin en el reinado de Carlos +, 7%adrid, "-C38. 4ntonio 2lor5a, -a ideologa liberal en la +lustracin espaola 7%adrid, "-#.8, gives e/amples of the passage from 2nlightenment reformism to political preliberalism. Salvador de %o/H, -a incorporacin de seoros en la Espaa del .ntiguo (gimen 7%adrid, "->-8, treats meas!res to red!ce seigne!ries. 0eneral st!d of nineteenth'cent!r Spain sho!ld begin with Ra mond Carr)s $pain /010*/232 7O/ford, "-CC8. ;olitical histor is s!pplemented b <iego Sevilla 4ndr+s, "istoria poltica de Espaa 7"$..'"-C#8 7%adrid, "-C$8. The best wor& on the 9!arter'cent!r of Fernando VII is %ig!el 4rtola, -a Espaa de 4ernando ,++ 7%adrid, "-C$8. 0abriel :ovett)s 5apoleon and t#e 6irt# of 7odern $pain, 3 vols. 7New Eor&, "-C>8, provides a descriptive acco!nt of Spain d!ring the Aar of Independence. The classic Spanish narrative is the Conde de Toreno)s "istoria del levantamiento8 guerra y revolucin de Espaa, > vols. 7%adrid, "$=>'=#8. Several &e aspects of the str!ggle are st!died in the s mposi!m -a Guerra de la +ndependencia espaola y los sitios de &arago%a 7Iarago5a, "->$8, and V. 0enov+s 4morHs, ,al9ncia contra 5apole 7Valencia, "-C#8, treats the conflict in the :evant. On the rise of Spanish liberalism d!ring the war, see two wor&s b %ig!el 4rtola, -os orgenes de la Espaa contempornea 7%adrid, "->-8, and -os afrancesados 7%adrid, "->=8? (ans *!retsch&e, -os afrancesados en la Guerra de la +ndependencia 7%adrid, "-C38? RamHn Solis, El Cdi% de las Cortes 7%adrid, "->$8? the special vol!me devoted to the "$"3 constit!tion b the (evista de Estudios :olticos, no. "3C 7Nov.'<ec., "-C=8? and %an!el 4rdit)s boo&let, Els valencians de les Corts de Cadis 76arcelona, "-C$8. The conflict between traditionalism and liberalism has been reinterpreted b Frederico S!@re5 Verdag!er in -a crisis poltica del .ntiguo (gimen en (-0*+ Espaa ;/011*/0<1= 7%adrid, "->.8. *os+ :!is Cornelias has written two important wor&s in the same veinJ -os primeros pronunciamientos en Espaa, "$"B'"$3. 7%adrid, "->$8, and -os realistas en el primer trienio constitucional, "$3.'"$3= 7;amplona, "->$8. :!is 4lonso Te1ada, El ocaso de la +n uisicin 7%adrid, "-C-8, deals with the

e/treme right in the last decade of Fernando VII. Spanish %asonr can be approached thro!gh Vicente de la F!ente, "istoria de las sociedades secretas antiguas y modernas, 3d ed. 76arcelona, "-==8, and Iris %. Iavala, 7asones8 comuneros y carbonarios 7%adrid, "-#"8. There is no ade9!ate histor of Carlism, b!t see Rom@n O ar5!n, "istoria del Carlismo 7%adrid, "-B.8, and %elchor Ferrer et al., eds., "istoria del )radicionalismo espaol, =. vols. 7Seville, "-=.' "->-8. 2dgar (olt, )#e Carlist >ars in $pain 7:ondon, "-C#8, is a brief descriptive acco!nt. *esNs ;abHn, -a otra legitimidad 7%adrid, "-C>8, is a caref!l st!d of the claims of d nastic legitimac . The revolt of "$3C'"$3# is st!died b *aime Torras 2lias, -a guerra de los .graviados 76arcelona, "-C#8. R. RodrLg!e5 0arra5a, 5avarra de (eino a provincia ;/0?0*/0</= 7;amplona, "-C$8, treats Navarrese politics in the "$=.s. 4 thoro!gh st!d of the initial political str!ct!re of the Isabeline monarch has been made b *. T. Villarro a, El sistema politico del Estatuto (eal ;/03<*/03@= 7%adrid, "-C$8. 2ric Christiansen, )#e Origins of 7ilitary :oAer in $pain8 /011*/0B< 7O/ford, "-C#8, is an e/cellent st!d of the Spanish 4rm and its political activities for those ears. The best s nthesis on an region of nineteenth'cent!r Spain is *aime Vicens Vives)s Catalua en el siglo C+C 7%adrid, "-C"8. Salvador de %o/H, -a disolucin del rgimen seorial en Espaa 7%adrid, "-C>8, is an able st!d . 2. 4llison ;eers, . "istory of t#e (omantic 7ovement in $pain 7:iverpool, "-B.8, is a classic. See also :eon'FranGois (offmann, (omanti ue EspagneD -E+mage de lEEspagne en 4rance entre /011 et /0B1 7;aris, "-C"8, and *. F. %ontesinos, Costumbrismo y novela 7Valencia, "-C.8. The standard histor of Spanish foreign relations in the nineteenth'cent!r is *erHnimo 6ec&er, "istoria de las relaciones exteriores de Espaa durante el siglo C+C, = vols. 7%adrid, "-3B'"-3C8. On the emancipation of the mainland colonies, see *!lio F. 0!ill+n, +ndependencia de .mrica, = vols. 7%adrid, "->=8. *aime <elgado, Espaa y 7exico en el siglo C+C, = vols. 7%adrid, "->.'"->=8, deals mainl with the ears "$3.'"$B>. See also :. %. 2nciso Recio, -a opinin espaola y la independencia #ispanoamericana8 /0/2*/0?1 7Valladolid, "-C#8. 0iorgio Spini, 7ito e realtF della $pagna nelle rivolu%ioni italiani del /0?1*/0?/ 7Rome, "->.8, shows the infl!ence of earl Spanish liberalism in Ital .