ADDITIONAL READINGS

HOBBES. Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Govern-

ment and Society, CH 8
-.-. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic,
PART II, CH 3
HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, IV (A)
DOSTOEVSKY. Poor Folk
SENECA. De Beneficiis (On Benefits),'BK III, CHI8-25
LA BOETIE. Anti-Dictator, the Discours de la servi-
tude volontaire
BODIN. The Six Bookes ofa Commonweale, BK I, CH 5
GROTIUS. The Rights of War and Peace, BK II, CH 5;
BK III, CH 7
VOLTAIRE. "Master," "Slaves," in A Philosophical
Dictionary
as parts of the body, he means no more than is
implied in speaking of the hand and eye as
parts of the body. ., 'The nature of mind and
soul is bodily," he writes. Just as flesh and bones
are composed of atomic particles, so the mind
is formed ofatoms "exceeding small and smooth
and round," and the soul is "made of very
tiny seeds linked together throughout veins,
flesh, .and sinews."
APART FROM THESE exceptions, the traditional
discussion of soul considers it as somehow con-
joined with body to constitute a whole of which
it is the immaterial principle or part. Even
those who, like Descartes, definethe soul as an
immaterial substance, capable of existing by
itself, do not actually ascribe to the human soul
complete independence of the human body.
Nor do the theologians who think of God as a
purely spiritual being and 'of angels as imma-
terial substances attribute soul to them.
Precisely because God and the angels do not
have bodies, neither do they have souls. Wheth-
er everything which has a body also has a soul
is another question.. It is variously answered;
but certainly those who, like Plato and Plo"
tinus, speak of a world-soul or a soul of the uni..
verse, confirm the point that soul is the co-
principle or complement of body. The same
point appears in theories of the celestial bodies
which conceive them as being alive and as
therefore having souls.
Unfolding to Socrates the story of the crea-
tion, Timaeus says: "Using the language of
probability, we may say that the world became
a living creature endowed with soul and intelli-
gence by the providence of God." To the
world, Timaeus explains, God "gave a body,
smooth and even, having a surface in every
direction equidistant from the center, a body
entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 88: SOUL
791
the language of the poets as well as in the
discourse of the philosophers, body and soul
correlative terms. Each affects the meaning
he other. The words are used together in
yspeech. Men who are unaware of, or deny,
metaphysical and theological significance
having a soul, nevertheless use the word
1" with a sense of contrast to body, even
ly to refer to vague manifestations of spirit
elings and sympathies \vhich seem to be
n to the world of matter.
ith few exceptions, traditional theories of
soul involve its distinction from andrela'"
to the body. Berkeley represents one of
major exceptions. Denying the reality of
ter, he conceives the soul as existing in and
tself; souls or spirits differ from God as finite
infinite spiritual beings. The something
ich knows and perceives" and which x ~
ses divers operations,. as willing, imagining,
mbering," .Berkeley says, "is what 1 call
,. spirit, sou/, or myseif." Berkeley,. there-
,would not speak of himself or other men
aving souls, but rather as being souls.
heather major exception is exemplified by
retius. It is not that Lucretius denies soul
erkeley denies body. Nor does he deny that
adds something to body which differenti..
living organisms from inorganic things.. On
ontrary, he declares the mind to be ' 'a part
an no whit less .than hand and foot and
are parts of the whole living being." Dis-
from mind, soul is also .part of a living
g. "Mind and soul are held in union one
the other, and form of themselves a single
re," but whereas the mind is, as it were,
ord or head of the whole body, "the rest
esoul, spread abroad throughout the body,
and is moved at the will and inclination
mind."
ut when Lucretius refers to mind and soul
THE GREAT IDEAS
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VI [169-188) 20
BK x [144-156] 277b; BKXII [79-IIo1321a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV 135a-184a
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 393c
42 KANT:]udgement, i86d-587a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 233
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK
164b-d
54 FREUD: Ego and Id, 715d-716a I Newlnt
ductory Lectures, 838d-839b
I.
II.
Listed below are works not included in Great BotJkS ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapterdeals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in thiscollection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
FRANKLIN. Essay on the African Slave Trade
CHANNING. Slavery
GOGOL. Dead Souls
WHEvVELL. The Elements of Morality, BK II
24
THOREAU. Civil Disobedience
COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, BK VI, CH 6
--a ~ y s t m of Positive Polity, VOL III, Socia
namzcs
NIEBOER. SlavelY as an Industrial System
VINOGRADOFF. The Growth ofthe Manor
HOBHOUSE. Morals in Evolution, PART I, eH"!
KOHLER. Philosophy of Law, CH 6 (12)
MARITAIN. Freedom in the Modern World
MANN. Joseph' and His Brothers
--a Young Joseph
-.-.-. Joseph in Egypt
BERDYAYEV. Slavery and Freedom
'(7. The analogy of tyranny andslavery in the rela-
tions between passions and reason or will:
humantbondage. )
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I"':"II, Q 72,
A 2, REP 4 112b-113a
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 531a-b
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT III, SC II [61-79]
49c-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PREF, 422b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions relevant to the theory of natural slavery, see JUSTICE 6, 6c; LAW
LIBERTY Ia; WILL 7a.
Other discussions of the institution of slavery, see JUSTICE 6c; LABOR If, sa-sc,7c(I); PR.
RESS 3b; PUNISHMENT 4b(3}; STATEsa, sc; TYRANNY Ib; WEALTH 7b(I).
The discussion of slave rebellions and of the emancipation of slaves, see LIBERTY 6b; P
RESS 3b; REVOLUTION4a. .,
Other discussions ofthe forms ofeconomic slavery or servitudein relation todifferent sys
of production, see JUSTICE 8e( I); LABOR If, sa-sc; WEALTH 6a, 7b( I); and for thepoli
aspects of economic slavery or servitude, see CITIZEN 2C; CONSTITUTION 5a; DEMOC
4a(I)-4ar2); LABOR 7d,7f ;LIBERTY 2d; OLIGARCHY 4, sa. "
The differentiation of citizenship,subj:ection, and slavery as three conditions of men 1.1
political rule,see CITIZEN2b; LIBERTY If; TYRANNY sa-sb; and for factors involved i
change from subjection to citizenship, see DEMOCRACY4d; MONARCHY4e(2); TYRANN
Discussions of imperialism and of the government of colonial dependencies and conq1.1
peoples, see GOVERNMENT Sb; LIBERTY 6c;MONARCHYS-Sb; STATE lob; TYRANN
Other discussions of the slavery of men in bondage to their passions, see LIBERTY
rrHE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 88: SOUL
792
bodies. And in the center, he put the soul
which he diffused throughout the body, mak-
ing it also to be the exterior environmenLof it."
Comparing the magnetic force of the load-
stone with the animation of a soul, Gilbert says
that "this one eminent property is the same
which the ancients held to bea soul in the
heavens, in the globes, and in the stars, in sun
and moon.... The ancient philosophers.... all
seek in the ,vorld a certain universal soul, and
declare the whole world to be endo\ved ,vith a
soul. Aristotle held that not the universe is
animate, but the heavens only.... As for us,"
Gilbert ,vrites, "we deem the whole ,vorld ani-
mate, and all globes, stars, and this glorious
earth, too, we hold to be from the beginning
by their own destinate souls governed ..... Piti-
able is the state of the stars, abject the lot of
earth, if this high dignity of soul is denied them,
\vhile it is granted to the \vorm, the ant, the
roach, to plants and morels; for in that case,
worn1S, roaches, moths, were more beauteous
objects in nature and more perfect,inasllluchas
nothing is excellent, nor precious, nor eminent,
that hath not a soul."
On the question whether the earth, each
heavenly body, or the whole world is endo,ved
\vith life, intelligence, and soul, Kepler differs
from Gilbert, Augustine fronl Plato and Plo-
tinus, Aquinas from Aristotle. Nevertheless,
the many-sided controversy indicates the tra-
ditional connection of soul with life and mind
on the one hand, and with-animate or organic
bodies on the other-bodies which manifest
certain properties and tendencies to motion.
THE MAJOR ISSUES CONCERNING soul seem to
follow from these traditional associations.. Does
the soul \vhich is somehow conjoined wi th a
body exist as an immaterial substance or princi-
ple, in such a way that the being composed of
body and soul consists of two distinct sub-
stances or entities, united as related parts of a
whole? Or is the soul the substantial form of an
organic body, with the consequence that the
form and matter together constitute a single
composite substance, which is the living thing?
In the latter alternative the unity of soul and
body, according to Aristotle, is like that of
"the wax and the shape given to it by the die."
On either conception of soul and its relation
to body or matter, further questions arise
cerning the soul's existence apart
body. Does it exist before being united
body? Does it exist after the union is .......... '-'U, I' ".-
HO"T does it exist exists seT:ianlteJtv
aoart from matter? For those, like
conceive the soul as itself ...J
material particles ,vithin the fralne\vork
body, such questions can have little ............,U.lIIIIU
For those, like Plato and Descartes, \vho
ceive the soul as an immaterial entity
being in its o,vn right, these questions can
mediately answered in favor of the
pacity for separate existence. Only
soul is conceived as a form which, T"n.rrPfho........ ... fC
matter, constitutes the substance
body, does there seem to be both
difficulty to the question whether the
tinues to endure separately when a
animal, or a man dies, i.e., when such cornpCJSlt,
substances decompose.
If the individual soul ceases to be
body with which it is someho,,,
it is as mortal as the body. The
theories of personal immortality-such
Platonic myths concerning the
or reincarnation of souls, and ... the
doctrine of man's imlllortalsoul,
created for union with the body, but
to survive its separation from the
theories which involve conceptions
as capable of self-subsistence. The
over these doctrines is dealt with in the
on IMMORTALITY. Here are we
how different implications for
necessarily follow from various
soul.
Still other issues concerning soul
nection\vith other chapters. For eJialffilJle,
question whether soul is to be
living things, or only in animals
plants, or in man alone, is discussed in
ters on LIFE AND DEATH and on
on any conception, is the principle
life, then the distinction between
inanilnate bodies is identical ,vith
tion between things ,vhich have
which do not have a soul.
kind of life possessed by a
radically different from life,
turn from human life, then souls, too,
be differentiated in kind according to the
of life or the range of vital powers of
each type is the principle.
writers, hovvever, tend to equate "soul"
"mind" or "understanding." When, as
II _ ... soul is identified with rational
thinking substance, it is usually at-
...... ,' 11., ......... man alone. Soul is then not thought
to explain the phenomena of life in
animals, at least in no sense of soul
implies either an incorporeal or a formal
nJII1\.... .l ...I ... that is, anything beyond the com-
: .... oforganic parts. Other authors,
Locke, who conceive soul or understanding
merely in terms of rational thought, but
in terms of sensation, imagination, and
may exclude plants, but not animals,
possession ofsoul or mind.
.... ,-" ..r"""C' takes notice of these ambiguities
traditional use of the word "soul." J">rob-
because "men in the earliest times," he
"did not distinguish in us that principle
of which we are nourished, grow, and
all those operations \vhich are COlllmon
the brutes . from that by which we
they called both by the single name
then, the distinction between
thinking, they called that which
mind, believing also that this ,vas the
of the soul. But I, perceiving that the
by which we are nourished is wholly
from that by means of which we think
declared that the name soul when used for
is equivocal; and I say that, when soul is
to mean the primary actuality or chief
ofman, it must be understood to apply
the principle by which we think, and I
called it by the name nlind as often as
to avoid ambiguity; for I consider the
as part of the soul, but as the whole of
which thinks."
place, he uses the word "soul" to
for "that subtle fluid styled the animal
which, pervading the organs of brute
accounts for their peculiar type of
"We can recognize no principle of
in them beyond the disposition of their
and the continual discharge of the ani-
that are produced by the beat of the
it rarefies the blood." Soul in this sense
be confused \vith "the incorporeal and
793
spiritual nature of man's soul." It is "something
corporeal, of a fine structure and subtle, spread
throughout the external body, and the prin-
ciple of all sensation, imagination, and thought.
Thus there are three grades of being, Body,
the Corporeal or soul, and or spirit."
IN THE OPENING PAGES of his treatise On the
Soul, Aristotle says that "to attain any assured
knowledge about the soul is one of the most
difficult things in the world." The difficulty
seems to apply both to what the soul is and to
whether it exists. The questions are connected.
Even Lucretius, who regards the soul as ma-
terial in nature, does not claim to kno\v its
existence by direct observation. It is not, like
the body itself or like other parts of the body,
a sensible object. It must be inferred to exist.
Just as the existence of unobservable atoms is
inferred in order to explain the constitution
and change of all natural objects, so the exist-
ence of soul is inferred in order to explain the
constitution and motion of living things. Those
who conceive the soul as
as substance, principle, or form-would seem to
face an even greater difficulty in establishing its
existence and in describing its nature. Admit-
tedly, the soul as some sort of immaterial being
cannot be discovered by observation and ex-
periment. The alternatives, which represent
traditional solutions of the problem, seem to
include the soul's reflexive knowledge of its
own existence, inferential knowledge about the
soul based on observed facts, various religious
beliefs concerning the nature and destiny of
the soul, and the postulation of the soul's exist-
ence on practical, not theoretic, grounds.
Not all writers agree with Aristotle that the
soul is an object difficult to know, or with Kant
that it is absolutely impossible for us to reach
any sound theoretic conclusions about the
soul's existence. Descartes, for example, says
that if there are "any persons who are not suf-
ficiently persuaded of the existence of God and
of the soul by the reasons which I have brought
forward, I wish them to know that all other
things of \vhich they perhaps think themselves
more assured (such as possessing a body, and
that there are stars and an earth and so on) are
less certain."
The argument for the soul's existence which
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 88: SOUL
794
precedes this remark is the famous Cogito,ergo
sum-"I think; therefore, I am." From the
fact that, in the very act of doubting the exist-
ence ofeverything else, he could not doubt that
he was doubting, and hence thinking, Descartes
assures himself of his own existence, or, more
precisely, of the existence of himself as a think-
ing being. "I knew," he writes, "that I was a
substance the vvhole essence or nature of which
is to think, and that for its existence there is no
need of any place, nor does it depend on any
material thing; so that this 'me,' that is to say,
the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely
distinct from body, and is even more easy to
know than is the latter; and even if the body
were not, the soul would not cease to be what
it is."
Locke appears to agree that "ifI doubt of all
other things, that very doubt makes me per-
ceive my own existence, and will not suffer me
to doubt of that..... I have as certain percep-
tion of the existence of the thing doubting,"
he goes on, "as of that thought which I call
doubt. Experience then convinces us that we
have an intuitive knowledge of our own exist-
ence, and an internal infallible perception that
" we are.
But Locke does not turn the proposition that
a thinking being exists into the assertion that a
spiritual being, the soul as an imll1aterial sub-
stance, "We have the idea of matter and
thinking," he writes, "but possibly shall never be
able to know whether any mere material being
thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the
contemplation of our own ideas, withoutreve-
lation, to discover whether Omnipotency has
not given to some systems of matter fitly dis-
posed,. a power to perceive and think,. or else
joined and fixed to matter so disposed, a think...
ing immaterial substance: it being, in respect
of our notions, not much more remote from
our comprehension to conceive that God can,
if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of
thinking, than that he should superadd to it
another substance with a faculty of thinking."
For Locke, however, our idea of soul is as
clear as our idea of body. "Our idea of body,"
he says, "is an extended, solid substance capable
of communicating motion by in1pulse; and our
idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a sub-
stance that thinks, and has apo,ver of exciting
motion in body, by ,villing or thought
know that people ,,,hose thoughts are
in matter, and. have so subjected their
their senses, that they seldom reflect
thing beyond them, apt to that
cannot comprehend a thinking
perhaps, is true: but I affirm, ,vhen
sider it well, they can no more
extended thing." And in another place,
"If this notion of immaterial spirit may
perhaps, some difficulties in it, not easy
explained, we have, therefore, no more
to deny or doubt the existence of such
than we have to deny or doubt the PV"f,C'T":,......
body, because the notion of body is
with some difficulties, very hard, and,
impossible to be explained or undeJrst()od
us."
Berkeley differs from Locke not
maintaining that we have no idea of
all, but also in holding. that, if we use the
"idea" for sense-impressions or the
rived from them, \ve can have no
or spiritual substance. But we can, he
form what.he calls a "notion" of the
grasps the meaning of the word
signifying "that which thinks, wills,
ceives." He differs from Locke further
portion as he tends to agree
asserting that the existence of a v,.., <.i. ....
stance, a thinking being,
from the undeniable existence of .......'..... ,,,... ""' ....
self.
For both Descartes and Berkeley,
mortali ty of the soul can be
from our knowledge of the soul's eXlsteJnc
nature. "The soul," writes Berkeley,
divisible, incorporeal, unextended,
consequently incorruptible. Nothing
plainer than that the motions,
and dissolutions which we hourly
natural bodies ... cannot possibly
active, simple,. uncompounded
a being therefore is indissoluble by the
nature; that is to say, 'the soul of
urally immortal.'"
The arguments in Plato's Phaedo
proper existence of the soul before
particular body, and for its eXJ.stc::nce
leaves the body to dwell apart before
another body-arguments, in
immortality-seem to stem from a slight-
rl.rtpr,""nr principle. It is not merely that the
is simple or uncompounded and hence in-
I".'"l'-'.L .......... or that the knowledge we have of
e absolute ideas requires us to posit a prin-
ipleof knovvledge other than the. senses
hich can apprehend only changing things. In
clition, Socrates argues that the knower must
like the known. Ifit is the soul which knows
eunchangeable and eternal essences, it must
as unchangeable and eternal as they are.
hen the soul uses "the body as instrument of
fception," Socrates says, it is "then dragged
the body into the region of the changeable
. But when returning into herself she reflects,
n she passes into the other world, the region
'purity, and eternity, and immortality, and
changeableness, which are her kindred."
ArNST ANY FORM of argument for the exist..
eand immortality of the human soul which
ceeds from the nature of our thought or
wledge, Kant takes the position that the
mises do not warrant the conclusion. He
ms to expose the fallacies in what he calls
"paralogism of a rational psychology." The
of the Cogito, ergo surn may be the neces-
logical subject of all our judgments, hut
does not give us intuitive knowledge of a
By existing substance which has the
es of simplicity, spirituality, andperma-
ce or immortality.
'In all our thinking," Kant writes, "the! is
subject in which our thoughts are inherent;
can that I ever be used as a determination
any other thing. Thus everybody
ined to look upon himself as thesubstance,
on thinking as the accident of his being."
t, he goes on, "though the I exists in all
ghts, not the slightest intuition is con-
ed with that representation by which it
t be distinguished from other objects of
ition.... Hence it follows that in the first
gism of transcendental psychology reason
ses upon us an apparent knowledge only,
epresenting the constant logical subject as
knowledge ofthe real subject in which that
-wledge inheres. Of that. subj ect, howeveE,
have not and. cannot have the. slightest
wledge.... In spite of this
t
the proposition
tithe soul is a substance may well. be allowed
795
to stand, if only we see that this concept cannot
help us on in the least or teach us any of the
ordinary conclusions of rational psychology, as,
for instance, the everlasting continuance of the
soul amid all changes and even in death; and
that it therefore signifies a substance in idea
only, and not in reality."
Similarly with respect to the simplicity of
the soul, Kant contends that the absolute, but
merely logical, unity of apperception or thought
is illegitimately converted into the absolute
unity of a real substance. The proposition, lam
a simple substance, he declares,. "teaches us
nothing at all with reference to myself as an
object of experience." Its only value is to
enable us "to distinguish the soul from all mat-
ter, and thus to exempt it from that decay to
which matter is at all times subject."
To this extent, rational psychology may
"guard our thinking selfagainst the danger of
rnaterialistn." The concept of the soul as an
immaterial and simple substance may thus
function regulatively, but we deceive ourselves
with the illusion of knowledge when we treat
that concept as if it had intuitive content-
when, as he says, we change "thoughts into
things." Kant does not deny that the "1"is
substantial in concept or simple in concept.
Though these propositions are "incontestably
true," he says, "nevertheless, what we really
wish to .know of the soul, becomes by no
means known to us in that way, because all
these predicates are with regard to intuition
non-valid, entailing no consequences withte-
gard to objects of experience, and therefore
entirely empty."
The existence and immortality of the soul is,
for Kant, a postulate or demand of the practical
reason. "Of the psychic substance, regarded as
an immortal soul, it is absolutely impossible to
obtain any proof from a theoretical point of
view," but if such an object must he thought
a priori in order for "pure practical reason to
be used as duty commands," it becomes what
Kant calls "matter of faith." Immortality
seems to him rationally required as the prac'"
tically necessary condition for the fulfillment
of the moral la\:v and the endless progress of
the soul toward holiness of will.
William James questions even suchpractical
arguments for the soul. The imperishability of
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 88: SOUL 796
a simple substance does not, he thinks, guar-
antee "immortality of a sort we carefor." Nor,
following Locke, does it seem to him that a sub-
stantial soul is required for personal identity
and lnoral responsibility. \Vriting as an
ical or scientific psychologist, who feels "en-
tirely free to discard the\vord Soul" because
he finds the concept useless "so far as account-
ing for the actually verified facts of conscious
experience goes," James tells those \vho may
find "any comfort in the idea" that they are
"perfectly free to continue to believe in it; for
our reasonings have not established the non-
existence of the Soul; they have only proved
its superfluity for scientific purposes."
JAIvIES' CONCLUSION THAT "the substantial Soul
... explains nothing and guarantees nothing,"
along \vi th the argunlents of Kant and Locke,
may not apply to the soul conceived as the
principle of life rather than as the agent of
thought, or to the soul conceived as the form
of an organic body rather than as a spiritual
being associated \vith or somehow imprisoned
in the body. Precisely because this other con-
ception affirms reality of soul as something
othet than a complete substance, precisely be-
cause it applies to plants and animals as well as
men, this other conception ofsoulwoulcl seem
to require a different sort of criticism.
The Greek and Latin \vords-psyche and
anima-which we translate by "soul" seem to
have life as their primary connotation. In the
Cratylus, Socrates suggests that "those who
first used the name psyche meant to express
that the soul when in the body is the source of
life, and gives the power of breath and revival."
Other dialogues express the Greek conception
of the living thing as that which has the power
of self-motion, and ascribe this power to the
soul as source. In thePhaedo, for example,
Socrates asks" "What is that the inherence of
which \vill render the body alive?" to which
c;ebes answers, "Soul," and agrees with Soc-
rates' further statement that "whatever the
soul takes possession of,. to that she conles bear-
ing life." In the Laws, Cleinias having identi-
fied the power of self-motion with life, the
Athenian Stranger gains his assent to the prop-
osition that whatever has life or self-motion
also has soul.
To this much Aristotle also agrees.
has soul in it," he says, "differs from
not, in that the former displays life"; to
he adds that "living may nlean thinking
ception or local movement, or Trlr\up,fY\,,"''''' 1-
the sense of nutrition and growth," so
must "think of plants also as
having souls. But Aristotle goes
defining soul as the cause of life, and in
entiating three kinds of
sensitive, and to
powers manifested by the activities of
animals, and men, he uses his general
corporeal substances to state precisely
soul is and how it is related to the body.
Corporeal substances are, according to
all composite of t\VO principles, form and
ter. "What is called nlatter is
\vhat is called form, actuality." As eX1emlPl1lfie.
in works of art, \vood is the matter
the potentiality for a certain shape and
tain function that is the actuality or
chair. In the case of natural things, that
determines "the essential whatness" of a
is its form or, as Aristotle sometimes
formulable essence."
If living things are essentially
inert bodies, as Aristotle supposes
then the forms which determine their
Inust be different from the forms of
substances. It is this difference in forms
Aristotle appropriates the word "soul"
nify. In each kind of living thing,
the substantial form or "the first
actuality of a natural body having
tially in it."
He speaks of the first grade of u. ......
to distinguish merely being alive or
from the various acts \vhich, as op,era.t!o'hs>\
the vital po\vers, constitute living.
an eye had a soul, it \vould consist of
to cut or to see, not in its actually
seeing. While nourishing or thinking
ality corresponding to the cutting and
ing, the soul is actuality in the
sponding to the power of sight and
in the tool ... As the pupil plus the
sight constitutes the eye, so the
body constitutes the animal."
From this conception of soul as ,tile
actuality of a living substance, "it tru1UltJlI:aI
" .Aristotle says, "that the soul is
,...,nal.a.lJ.L\- frolll its body, or at any rate certain
of it are-for the actuality of some of
is nothing but the actualities of their
parts." Where Plato holds that the soul
in existence to the body, Aristotle
that soul and body come into existence
when the organism is generated.
Plato attributes an independent mode
to the soul, distinct in character from
bodies, Aristotle says that "the soul
be without a body. Yet it cannot be a
it is not a body, but something relative
That is why it is in a body and a
of a definite kind," being nothing more
"the actuality or formulable essence of
that possesses the potentiality of
besouled."
CONSEQUENCES fo11o\v from these con-
conceptions orisoul. In the Timaeus,
..-t3C' the vie\v that only the lowest
of soul-the plant soul-is mortal, in
to the souls of animals and men.
would seem to attribute mortality to
grade of soul. If any exception is to be
it is only for the human soul because it
the power of rational thought. Mind
to think, he writes, "seems to be
different kind of soul, differing as
is eternal from what is perishable."
critical point is whether thinking, unlike
psychic powers, is an activity of the
alone. For the nl0st part, "there seems to
case in which the soul can act or be acted
without involving the body.... Thinking
the most probable exception; but,"
ikI.LJl.:Jl.'-"'-L,,-" adds, "if this too proves to be a form
imagination or to be impossible without
agination, it too requires a body as the con-
of its existence. If there is any way of
or being acted upon proper to soul,
will be capable of separate existence; if
is' none, its separate existence is im-
there any way of acting or being acted
proper to soul? Aristotle seems to ans\ver
affirmatively when he says that
as the realities it knows are capable of
separated from their matter, so is it also
the po\vers of mind." On one interpreta-
797
tion this means that the mind or intellect is as
immaterial in its mode of operation as some of
its objects are in their mode of being; \vith the
further consequence that \vhat is capable of
acting apart from body is also able to exist
apart from body. But whether Aristotle's fur-
ther .statement that "mind set free from its
present conditions ... is immortal and eternal"
applies to the intellect alone or to the rational
soul as a \vhole, has been disputed by various
interpreters. Adopting Aristotle's conception
of soul as the form which is the actuality of life
in an organic body, Aquinas for one seems to
think that the immortality of a rational soul
can be demonstrated from the special character
of its intellectual po\vers.
A theory of the soul which regarded it as a
silnple and incorporeal substance, or as having
a being independent of the body, would seem
to hannonize more readily vvith the Christian
belief in the human soul's speoialoreation ,and
its individual survival after death. But Aquinas
rejects such a theory on the ground that then
man \vGuld be two substances or t\VO beings,
not one; or else if the human person is identified
with the soul, man ,vould be a soul using a
body rather than a single substance of com-
posite nature. The doctrine of body and soul
which holds them to be related as matter and
form, preserves the unity of man and, in the
opinion of A.quinas, fits the way in which man
learns through his senses, experiences passions,
and, in thinking, depends upon imagination.
But though he admits that men cannot think
without images, Aquinas also insists, contrary
to Locke, that thinking, insofar as it involves
abstract concepts, cannot be performed by
matter. To make matter think is beyond even
the po\ver of God. Unlike nourishing or sens-
ing, understanding is not and cannot be "the
act of a body, nor of any corporeal power."
This theory-that the acts of understanding
by which the intellect abstracts and receives
universal concepts cannot be accounted for by
the motions of the brain---'is further discussed
in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR.
Here we are concerned simply to note that, for
Aquinas, the fact that the concepts with which
men think are universal, means that they are
abstracted from matter; and the fact that they
are abstracted from matter means that the
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
808
802
806
799
PAGB
801
CHAPTER ,88: SOUL
knowledge of the soul and its powers
The soul's knowledge of itself by reflection on its acts: the soul as a transcenden...
tal or noumenal object; the paralogisms of rational psychology
The concept of the soul in empirical psychology: experimental knowledge of the
soul
being of the soul
The unity of the human soul: the human mode of the vegetative and sensitive
powers
issue concerning the self-subsistence or immortality of the human soul: its
existence or capacity for existence in separation from the human body
The origin of the human soul: its separate creation; its emanation or derivation
from the world soul
The life of the soul apart from the body
(I) The doctrine of transmigration or perpetual reincarnation
(2) Comparison of separated souls with men and angels
(3) The need of the soul for its body: the dogma of the body's resurrection for
the soul's perfection
(4) The contamination of the soul by the body: the purification of the soul by
release from the body
analysis of the powers of the soul
za. The distinction between the soul and its powers or acts
zb. The order, connection, and interdependence of the parts of the soul: the id, ego,
and super-ego in the structure of the psyche
2C. The kinds of soul and the modes of life: vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls
and their special powers
(I) The vegetative powers: the powers proper to the plant soul
(2) The sensitive powers: the powers proper to the animal soul
(3) The rational powers: the powers proper to the human soul
immateriality of the soul
3
a
. The soul as an immaterial principle, form, or substance
3
b
. The immateriality of the human soul in comparison with the materiality of the
plant and animal soul: the intellect as an incorporeal power
The relation of soul and body: the relation of formal and material principles, or
of spiritual and corporeal substances
3
d
. The denial of soul as an immaterial principle, form, or substance: the atomic
theory of the soul
3
c
. The corporeal or phenomenal manifestation of disembodied souls as ghosts,
wraiths, or spirits
purities of sense and passion. "In this
says, "we make the nearest approach
edge \vhen we have the least possible
course or communion with the body,
not surfeited with the bodily nature.
complete purification requires "the
of the soul from the body .. the release
soul from the chains of the body." That is
Socrates tells his friends gathered in the
where he is to drink the hemlock, "true
losophers are ever seeking to release
and "are always occupied in the
dying."
It is also the opinion of Plotinus
for the soul to be in the body. But '............... .l.l.:.l.Hi.U
theologians, for the most part, take
view. Aquinas, for example, criticizes
for holding that "souls v/ere embodied
ishment of sin.' , To him there is
penal andaffiicting nature" in the
with the body. Though
"the corruptible body 'TTAfn-hAf-h
and the earthly presseth
mind," Augustine interprets this to
that the flesh is evil in itself, but f-h"f- .......... ......
set by sin when "the flesh lusteth
spirit. "
"There is no need, therefore," ac(:ordUIQ
Augustine, "that in our sins and vices
'the nature of the flesh to the injury
ator, for in its own kind and
good." Man is both body and
ture is a thing of both flesh and
who extols the nature of the as
good," Augustine continues, "and
the nature of the flesh as if it were
suredly is fleshly both
his hatred of the flesh."
THE GREAT IDEAS 798
I. Conceptions of soul
la. Soul as the ordering principle of the universe: the world soul and its relation to
the intellectual principle;. the souls of the heavenly bodies
lb. Soul as the principle of self-motion or life in living things: soul as the
an organic body
IC. Soul as the principle of distinction between thinking and non-thinking
the.identity or distinction between.soul and mind or intellect
Id. Soul as the principle of personal identity: the doctrine of the self; the emPIrical
and the transcendental ego
various acts of understanding must also, be im-
material-that is, not acts of bodily organs like
the brain. To these premises Aquinas adds one
further principle, namely, that a thing's mode
of being is indicated by its mode of operation.
In these terms he concludes that, since thein-
tellecthas "an operation per se apart from the
body," the human soul, which is called rational
because of its power of understanding, can have
a being per se apart from the body. Hence it is
"something incorporeal and subsistent."
Nevertheless, according to Aquinas, though
the human soul can subsist separately, it be-
longs to its nature to be embodied,that is, to
be the form of a material substance. "The soul,
as part of human nature," he writes, "has its
natural perfection only as united to the body.
Therefore it would have been unfitting for the
soul to be created without the.body." Further-
more, if the entire nature of man were to bea
soul-the soul making "use of the body asan
instrument, or as a sailor uses aship"-there
would be no need for the resurrection of the
body after the Last Judgment. The Christian
dogma of the resurrected body more properly
accords, in Aquinas' view, with a conception
of soul "united to the body as form to matter";
for, as he says in another place, "ifit isnatural
to the soul to be united to the body, it is un-
natural for it to be without a body, and as long
ns it is without a body it is deprived ofits nat-
ural perfection."
In the consideration of the relation of body
and soul, an opposite estimation of the body's
role goes with an opposite theory of the soul's
nature. Socrates, in the Phaedo, describes the
body as the soul's prison-house,or worse, the
source of the soul's contamination by theim-
THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, \vhich are ttte volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [ 265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
801
Ie. Soul as the principle of distinction between
thinking and non-thinking beings: the
identity or distinction between soul and
mind or intellect
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 3 [406b26-407bI3]
636b-637b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature ()fThings, BK III [94-416]
31b-35c
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51d-52a;
PART V, 56a-b; 59a-60c / Meditations, 71b-d;
II 77d-81d / Objections and Replies, 119d-
120a; DEF VI 130c; 135b-136b; 152b,d-156a
passim; 207a; 208c-d; 219b-220a; 224d-226d;
249d-250b
35 LOCKE: Hunzan Understanding, BK II, CH
XXIII, SECT 5 205a-b; SECT IS 208c-d; SECT
18-22 209a-d; SECT 28--32 211b-212d; CH
XXVII, SECT 12-14 223a-224b passim
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 26-28
418a-c; SECT 89 430b-c; SECT 98 432a; SECT
135-142 440a-441c passim; SECT 148 442b-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 47
24a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 85a-b; 130b-131a; 139b-
140a
2a. The distinction between the soul and its
powers or acts
8 Soul, BK I, CH I [402b9-I2] 631d;
CH 5 [411 5--31] 641c-d; BK II, CH I [412a2I-28]
642b; CH 2 [4I3bIO-"414a4] 643c-644a; BK III,
CH 9 [43
2aI
S-
b
9] 664d-665a; CH 10 [433
a
33-
b
4
] 666a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 7
[6S2b7-'I6] 177d-178a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 168b-c
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 2 107a-
108a / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 23-25 169c..
171b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 77,
AI 399c-401b; AA 5-6 403d-405c; Q 79, A I
414a-d
ld. Soul as the principle of personal identity:
the doctrine ofthe self; the empirical and
the transcendental ego
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III,
SECT 4-5 113b-c; BK II, CH XXVII, SECT 7
220d-221a; SECT 9.-29 222a-228c esp SECT
12-'14 223a-224b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 139 440d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 49c-51d esp 51c-d; 120c-
129c esp 121a-124d, 126a-128b; 200c-204c esp
203d-204c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 47
24a-b; ADDITIONS, 28 121b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 188a-197a esp 191a-192b,
194b-196a; 213a-240a esp 213a, 216b-220a,
221a-225b, 232b-238b
2. The analysis of the powers of the soul
lb. Soul as the principle of self-motion or life
in Iiving things: soul as the form of an
organic body
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93b-d / Phaedrus, 124b-c /
Phaedo, 244b-246c / Laws, BK X, 763a-764a
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK IV, CH 6 [127bI3-18]
177a-b / lvfetaphysics, BK V, CH 8 [IOI7bIO-17]
538b; UK VII, CH 10 [103SbI4-28] 559a-b; BK
VIII, CH 3 [I043a29-b4] 567d; BK XII, CH 5
[107Ia2-:-4] 600e; BK XIII, CH 2 [I077a20-23]
608c / Soul 631a-668d esp BK II, CH 1-3 642a-
645b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH I
[640b3o-64i,a33] 163c-164b / Generation of
Animals, BK I, CH 19 [726bIS-30] 266d-267a;
BK II, CH I [73Ib29-3I] 272a; [733b23-73Sa28]
274a-276a; CH 3 [737
aI8
-34] 278a-b; CH 4
[738bI8-27l279c; CH 4 [74
0b2
S]-CH 5 [74
Ia
30]
281d-282b; BK III, CH II [762aI8-b27l303b-d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH I 167a-b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 21 265b-c;
BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d
17PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I la-6b passim /
Second Ennead, TR III, CH 13 46c-47b; TR IX,
CH 7 69c-70a / Fourth Ennead, TR I 139a-b;
TR III, CH 8, 146b-d; clI 19, 151d; CH 23, 153d;
TR IV, CH 29 173b-174b; TR v, CH 7, 188b-c;
TR VII 191c-200c / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 2
208c-209b; TR II, CH 2 215a-c / Sixth Ennead,
TR IV, CH 16, 305a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VII, CH 23,
256b-c; BK XIII, CH 2 360b-361a; BK XIX, CH
3, 510a-b; BK XXI, ClI 3, 561c-d; BK XXII, CH
4588b-d
9 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q3, AI,
ANS 14b-15b; Q 18, A 3, ANS and REP I 106b-
107c; Q 51, A I, REP 3 275b-276b; Q 70, A 3,
ANS and REP 2 365b-367a; Q 72, A I, REP I
368b-369d; QQ 75-76 378a-399b; Q 97, A 3,
ANS 515a-d
20 AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I-II, Q56,
A I, REP I 30a-c; PART II-II, Q 23, A 2, REP 2
483d-484d; PART III, Q 2, A 5, ANS and REP 3
715a-716b; Q5, A3 737d-739a
1 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII
[40-54] 80b-c; xxv [1-108] 91b-92c; PARA-
DISE, II [127-148J 109a-b; IV [49-S4]111b
3 I-IOBBES: Leviathan, INTRO, 47a-b; PART IV,
251a
8 HARVEY: On Animal Generation 384d-390b
passiln; 488d-496d passim '
JAMES: Psychology, 139b-140a
Ib to 2a CHAPTEn. 88:SQUL
28 HARVEY: On Animal Gefleration, 426b-429b
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL,
370a / Optics, BK III, 542b-543a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 767c [n 18]
42 KANT: Judgement, 565d
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 115b-117a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 216d-218b;
BK XII, 561b-c; BK XIV, 608a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 658b-659a
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR I, CH 436d-3
TR II 40a-42a; TR III, CH 2 42c-d; CH 13 4-
47b; CH 16-18 48b-50a; TR IX, CH 467c-
CH 7-9 69c-72a passim / Third Ennead, T
CH 4 79d-80a; TR II, CH 3, 84b; TR IV, CH
99d; TR V, CH 6 103b-104a; TR VII, CH II
126a-129a; TR VIII, ClI +-5 / Fo
Ennead, TR III, ClI 1-2 141c-143b; CH 4 1
144b; CH 6-7 144c-145d; CH 9-10 146d-1
TR IV, CH 6-16 161b-166b; CH 22 168d-1
CH 26-27 171b-172a; CH 29-45 173b-183a
sim; TR VIII, CH 1-2 200d-202a passim;
VIII, CH 7"-TR IX, CH S 204b-207a,c /
Ennead, TR I, CH 2, 208d-209a; CH 6-8 21
213a; CH 10, 213c; TR II, CH 2 215a-c; TR
CH 3 247b-d; CH 13-14 251a-d
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK IV, CH II
194c-196a; BK VII, CH 6 248a-b; ClI 9, 24-
250a; CH 13 251c-252a; CH 23256b-25
BK XIII, CH 16, 367c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,Q
8, ANS 19d-20c; Q 18, A I, REP I 104c-105
47, A I, ANS 256a-257b; Q70 , A3 365b-36
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III su
Q 79, A I, ANS 951b-953b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 162b
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK II, 38b; BK v, 1
l05d
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower hal ves of the right-hand side of
the page. For exalnple, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page
16
4.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:4S-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a. \vhole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
t. Conceptions of soul
ta. Soul as the ordering principle of the uni-
verse: the world soul and its relation to
the intellectual principle; the souls ofthe
heavenly bodies
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93c-d / Phaedrus, 124b-d /
Apology, 204d-205a / Phaedo, 241b-242b /
Timaeus, 447a-455d esp 449c-450c / Philebus,
618b-619d / Latus, BK x, 757d-765d esp 762b-
765d; BK XII, 797c-798b
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK II, CH I [284a27-bl]
376a; CH 12 383b-384c / Metaphysics, BK XII,
CH 6 [I07Ib32-I072a3] 601d / Soul, BK I, CH 3
[406b26-407b2S] 636b-637b; CH 5 [41 I
a
6-23]
641a-b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, ClI 14 120d-
121c
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 29 266a;
SECT 40 267a-b; BK V, SECT 30 273a; BK VI,
SECT 38 277c-d; BK VII, SECT 9-10 280b-c; BK
VIII, SECT 7 286a; BK X, SECT 6-7 297a-c; BK
XII, SECT 30 310a-b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VI [724-751] 230b-231a
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 853b-856a; 890a..
895b; 896a-897a; 914a-b; 932a-933a; 959a-
960a / Harmonies of the World, l080b-1085b
esp 1083b.. 1085b
800
THE"GR,EAT IDEAS
2c(3) The rational powers: the powers proper
to the human soul
7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 350b-353d; BK VI,
386d-388a; BK VII, 389d-390b; BK IX, 421a-e
/ Timaeus, 453b-454a / Theaetetus, 535b-536a
8 ARISTOTLE: l\1etaphysics, BK IX, CH 2 571e-
572a; CH S 573a-e / Soul, BK II, CH 3 [414bI 7-
20] 644d; [4Is87-I2J 645b; BK III, CH 3-8
65ge-664d
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CM I
[S88
8
I8-
b
4] 114b,d / Ethics, BK I,CH 7
[Io97b23-I098aI9] 343a-e; CH 13 347b-348d;
BK VI, CH I [II38b3S]-CH 2 [II39
b
S] 387b-388a
/ Rhetoric, BK I, CH I [I3SSbI-3] 594d
10 GALEN: NaturalFaculties, BK I, eH 12, 173a-e
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 23, 170a-
171d; BK IV, CH 7, 233a-b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT IS-I6
262d-263a,e; BK V, SECT 16 271e-d; BK IX,
SECT 8-9 292b-d; BK XI, SECT I 302a-b
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 3, 202e
/ Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 10, 213d-214a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VII, CH 23,
256b-e; CH 29 26la-b; BK XII, CH 23.357d-
358a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A
I, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; Q
76, AS' REP 4 394e-396a; Q 78, A I, ANS 407b-
409a; QQ 79-80 413d-428d;QQ 82-81 431d-
440b; Q 118, A 2 60le-603b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50,
AA 4-S 9a-10d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII
[I-7S] 79d-80e; XXV [61-84] 92a-b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 427d-428a
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 55b-d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 56a-h; 59c-
60e I Meditations, 7Ib-d; III, 82d-83a; IV 89a-
93a; VI 96b-l03d passim / Objections and
Replies, 156a..,d; 207a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, AXIOM 2 373d
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [9S-'II6] l77b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKII,CH VI
131b-e; CH XI 143d-147b esp SECT 9-11 145b-
146a; CH XXI, SECT 4-21 178d-183b passim,
esp SECT s-6 17ge-180a, SECT 15-20 181e-
183a; CH XXIII, SECT S 205a-b; SECT IS
208e-d; SECT 18 209a; SECT 22209d; SECT 28-
30 211b-212b; BK IV, CH XIV, SECT 3-4 364d-
365a; CH XVII, SECT 1-3 371c-372b
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 270a-27l b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41e-42b; 164b-e / Judge-
ment, 465e-467a esp 466a-e; 474b-475d; 522b;
568e-S7Sb esp 568c-d, 570e-571e, 572b-575b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 168b-d;
PART I, 257d-258a; PART III, 304d-305b
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 278a-h
53 JAMES: Psychology, 85a-b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 384c-385c
esp 38Sb-c / Unconscious, 42ge-d I General
Introduction, 532a
802
(2. The analysis of thepowers of the soul. 2a. The
distinctioll, between the soul and its powers
or acts.)
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50,
A 2 7e-8a; Q 83, A 2, REP 3 l72b-173a; Q 110,
A 4 350d-351d; PART III, Q 6, A 2, ANsand
REP 1,3 74le-742a; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A I,
REP 4 893d-895d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IV 11-18]
57e; xxv [37-84] 91d-92b
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 54b-e
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 20a-b / Objections and
Replies, 135b-136b; 208e-209a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH I,
SECT 9-25 123a-127d esp SECT 10 l23b-d; CH
XIX, SECT 4 176a-b; CH XXI, SECT 6 l79d-
l80a; SECT 14-20 l81b-183a
35 BERKELEY: I-fuman Knowledge, SECT 98
432a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 130b-131a
'Ab. The order, connection, and interdepend-
ence of the parts of the soul: the id,ego,
and super-ego in the structure. of the
psyche
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, l28a-12ge / Republic, BK
II-IV, 316a-356a; BK IX, 425e-426a / Timaeus,
466a-467a
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 5 [41 Ia23-b3I]
64Ib-d; BK III, CH 6-13 662d-668d
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 10 [703a
28-
b
I] 239a / Ethics, BK I, CH 13 347b-348d;
BK v, cn II [II38bS-IS] 387a,e; BK VI, CH I
[II38b3S]-CH 2 [II39bI3l387b-388b; BK IX,
CH 4 [II66bI3-24] 419d-420a / Politics, BK I,
CH S [I2S4a34-12SSa2] 448a-e; CH 13 [I260
a
4-8]
454e; BK III, CH 4 [I2778S-I2] 474a;BK VII,
CH 14 [I3338I7-2S] 538a
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 826d-827a
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I la-fib passim /
Fourth Ennead, TRIII, CH 3 l43b-e; CH 19
l51d-152b; TR IV, CH 17, / Sixth En-
nead, TR IV, CH IS, 304e-d
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God,. BK XIX, CH 13,
519a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 77,
AA 4-7 403a-406b; PARTI-II,Q 9, AA 1-2 657d-
659c; Q37, A I, ANS 783d"784e
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q IS,
A 9, REP 3 794e-795b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IV [1-18]
57c; XXV [37-84] 91d-92b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II,
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 444e-445e;
447a-b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [79....97] 321a I
Areopagitica, 407b
54 FREUD: Ego and Id, 701d-703a; 703e-708e;
712a-717a,e esp 712b-e, 714b-e, 715e-716a /
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721d-722c
esp 7
i
22b-c / New Introductory Lectures, 830a-
840a esp 836d-839d
2c. The kinds of' soul and the
vegetative, sensitive, and --..-""...........4
and their special powers
7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 350e-353e;
421a-427b / Timaeus, 469d-470a
8 ARISTOTLE: BK CH 4
184c; BK VI, CH 10
Heavens, BK II, 12
BK I, CH I
[4783-6] CH
641a; BK II, CH 2-3 .. ,-r.Ja-u-rJU
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK
[64I833-bIO] l64b-c / Generation
BK II, CH 3 [73682S-7378I9]
[74
ob2
S]-CH S [74
18
3] 281d-282b;
7 [757
bI
4-30] 298e-d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH I
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature ofThings, BK III
33a-34b
12 AURELIUS: Meditalions, BK III,
263a,c; BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 854b
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I 1a-6b
Second Ennead, TR II, CH 3
CH 2, 67a / Third Ennead, TR IV,
Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH
153d-154b; TR IV, CH 13
172a-173b; TR VII, CH 14 200b-c;
206a-b / Fifth Ennead, TR II, CH 2
III, CH 9 220d-221b
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK
256b-c; CH 29 261a-b; BK XIX, CH
Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 8,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,
AA 1-2 l04e-106b; A 3, ANS
A 2, REP I 361e-362e; Q A3 .10,:l
77-83 399b-440b; AA 1-2
PART I-ll, Q 17, AA
20 AQUINAS: Summa
110, A 4, REP 3 .'j:,\llICl-L'j:'IJ a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY,
57e; XXV [37-84] 91d-92b; PARADISE,
148] 116b-e
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation,
386b-388a; 397e-398e;
447a-b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V,
jections and Replies, 156a-d; 207a
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V I LU)U-'LlUlLJ I
l86a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK
SECT II'-IS 140b-141a; CH XXVII,
220a-e "
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 271a
42 .KANT: Judgement, 465e-467a
2c(1) The vegetative powers:
proper to the plant soul
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 469d-470a
SARISTOTLE: Generation and
CH 5 417b-420b / Soul, BK I, CH
641d; BK II, CH 2 [413820-34]
)102c(3) CHAPTER 88: SOUL
9] 643e; CH 4645b-647b; BKIII, CH 12 [434822-
26] 667a-b
pARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK II,CH
4 [74
ob
9-74
Ia
S] 281e-282a
GALEN: Natural Faculties 167a-215d esp BK
1, CH I l67a-b, CH S....8 169b-171a
PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR IV,CH2 97d-98a
{Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 22 168d-169c; CH
26-27171b-172a
AUGUSTINE: City of God,BK VII, CH 23,
256b-e; CH 29 261a-b
pAQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18,
A 3, REP 3 106b-I07e; Q 78, A I, ANS 407b-
"409a; A 2 409a-410a; Q 118, A I 600a-60Ie; Q
119, A I, ANS 604e-607b;A 2, ANS 607b-608d;
PART I-II, Q 17, A 8 692a-e
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q So,
A 3, REP I 8b-9a; PART III SUPPL, Q 80, .A 4,
ANS 95ge-963a
HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 384d-390b
passim; 404b; 418b-419d; 427c-428b
DESCARTES: Meditations, II, 78d-79a / Ob-
jections and Replies, 207a; 244b-c
The sensitive powers: the powers proper
to the animal soul
PLATO: Timaeus, 466a..467d
ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH S [41 Ib27-3I] 641d;
II, CH 2 [4I3b4-IO] 643e; [4I 3bI 7-24] 643d;
[414
81
-3] 644a; CH 3 [4I4829-b20] 644e-d; BK
It, CH S-BK III, CH 3 647b-661b; BK III, OR 8-
664b-668d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 7
[448bI7-44982I] 687d-688d
RISTOTLE: Parts of Animals,. BK .I, CH I
P41833-bIO] 164b-e; BK III, CH S [667b2I-32]
96a / Motion ofAnimals, CH 10 238e-239a /
eneration of Animals,BK II, CIl 3 [736a24-
37
81
9] 276d-278a;cH S [74186-3] 282a-b /
thies, BK VI, CH 2 [II39aI7-2I] 387d
i\LEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH I 167a-b
URELIUS: Meditation$, BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d
LOTINUS: First Ennead, TR r,cHII5b-c /
Qurth Ennead, TR III, CH I9l51d-152b; CR
153d-154b; TR IV, CH 20-21 167d-168c; eH
16ge-171b
GUSTINE: City of God, BK VII,CH 23,
6b-e; CH 29 26la-b
UlNAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Ei2 72 ,
I, REP I 368b-369d; Q 7S, A 3 380e-381b;
78, A I 407b-409a; AA 3-.,4 QQ
-81 427a-43Id; Q 118, A I 600a-60le; PART
II, Q 17, A 2, REP 2 687d-688b
NTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXV [34-
191d-92a
ARVEY: On Animal Generation, 369d-370a
ESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-20a /Discourse,
RT v, 56a-b; 59a-60e / Meditations, II, 78d-
/ Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 226a-d
Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX-X
passim, esp CH IX, SECT II-IS
CH X, SECT 10 143c-d; CH XXVII,
5 220b-c
803
The corporeal or phenomenal manifesta-
tion of disembodied souls as ghosts,
wraiths, or spirits
OLD TESTAMENT: I Samuel, 28:8--r9-(D) I
Kings, 28 :8-19
4 HOMER: Iliad, BKXXIII [5+-17] 161d-162b /
Odyssey, BK XI 243a-249d; BK XXIV [1-203]
317a-319a
5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [623-842] 21d-24b /
Eumenides [94-139] 82a-c
5 A.RISTOPHANES: Birds [1552-1564] 561b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK IV, 126d-127a; BK v,
179c-180a
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 232d-233b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [102-135]
2b-d; BK IV [26-41] 44b-d
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK II [771-794] 146a-b; BK v
[719-745] 206a-b; BK VI 211a-235a
14 PLUTARCH: Cimon, 392b-c / Caesar, 603d...
604d / Dion, 781d-782a / AIarcus Brutus,
816d-817c
Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV
472b-473c esp DIV 52, 472d; DIV 58
Tristra1n Shandy, 231a-b; 270a-271b
Decline and Fall, 136d
judgement, 557c-558a
Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 48
ADDITIONS, 2 115d; 16 118d-119a /
oflIistory, PART I, 255c-256b
to 3e CHAPTER 88: SOUL 805
188b-c; TR VII 191c-200c esp CH 8, 197c-198b; 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [6891-6896] 168b
TR IX 205a-207a,c / Fifth Ennead, TRI, CH 2 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 27b-28a; 68a-b
208c-209b / Sixth Ennead, TR IV, eH I 297b-d; 53 JAMES: Psychology, la-4a esp 2b-3a; 118b-
CH 4-5 299a-300a; CH 12-16 303a-30Sc; TR 119b; 139a-140a
VII, CH 4-53.23c-324b 54 FREUD: Interpretation ofDrea1ns, 154c-155a
AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK x, CH 29, 317b-c;
XIII, CH 2 360b-361a; BK XIV, CH 5 37ge- 3d. The denial of soul as an immaterial prin-
380b; BK XIX, CH 3, 510a-b; CH 13, 519a; BK ciple, form, or substance: the atomic
XXI, CH 3 56Ia-562a; BK XXII, CH 4 588b-d theory of the soul
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8, A 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 235b-236c; 238b-:240a /
REP 2 34d-35e; A2, REP 2-3 35c-36b; Q 51, Sophist, 567a-568a / Laws, BK x, 761b
AI, ANS and REP 3 275b-276b; Q52, AI 278d- 8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BKII,
Q 75, A I 378b-379c; A 2, ANS 37ge- CH 6 [334aIO-IS] 435a I Soul, BK I, CH 2-5
380e; A 4 381b-382a; A 5, ANS 382a-383b; Q 633a-641d
76 385e-399b; Q 81, A 3, REP 2 430c;.431d; Q 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-
84, A 4, ANS 444d-446b; Q 89, A I, ANS 473b- 173c
475a; Q 110, A 2, REP 1 565d-566d; PART I-II, 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [94-829]
Q 4, A 5, REP 5 632e-634b 31b-40c; BK IV [722- 817] 53d-54d; [877-961]
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56, 55d-56d
A 4, REP 3 32b-33e; Q 58, A 2, ANS 42a-43a; 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR I, CH 3 79b-e /
PART III, Q 2, A I, ANS and REP 2 710a-711e; Fourth Ennead, TR VII 191c-200c esp CH 1-4
A 5 715a-716b; Q 6, A I 740b-741h; AA 3-4 191c-193c, CH 8, 195b-196a, 196c-197c
742a-743d; Q 8, A 2, ANS 757c-758a; Q 17, A 18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK VIII, CH 5, 268b-d
2, REP 4 808d-809d; Q 62, A I, REP 2 858c- 19 AQUINAS: Sum1na PART I, Q 75,
A4, REP 1,3 861a-862a; PART III SUPPL, A I 378b-379c; Q 84, A2, ANS 442b-443c; A6,
A ANS 897d-900d; Q 75, A I, REP 3-4 ANS 447c-449a
Q 80, A I, ANS and REP I 956c- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 80a-b; PART III,
957c; Q 92, A I, ANS and REP 8-10 1025c- 176d; PART IV, 250c-251c; 269d-271b
1032b; Q 93, A I 1037d-1039a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 264b-267a
DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXV [10- 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 226a-d
108] 91c-92c 35 LOCKE: fluman Understanding, BK IV, CH III,
...... "".u.IJA.J...,. Leviathan, PART IV, 250c-251b SECT 6 313c-315b; CH X, SECT 5 350a-b; SECT
MONTAIGNE: Essays, 264a-b 10 351b-352a; SECT 17 353b-c
On Animal Generation, 431b-434a 35 BERKELEY: lluman Knowledge, SECT 93 43Ib;
433c-d SECT 137 440b-c; SECT 141 441a-b
Advancement of Learning, 49b-50b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 126c-d / judgelnent,
Discourse, PART IV, 51d-52a; 582b-c; 600c-d
V, 56a-b; 60b-c / Meditations, 72d-73c; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 255d
77d-81d passim; VI 96b-103d esp 99d-l01a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II" 689c-
Objections and Replies, 114d-115a,c; 119d- 690a
127c-d; DEF VI-VII 130c-d; DEF X 130d; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 95a-119b
IV 133c; 135d-136b; 152b,d-156a;
207d-208a; 219b-220a; 224d-226d; 3e.
248b; 261a-b; 276a-c
PART II, PROP 11-13 377b-
PART V, PREF 451a-452c
Pensees, 512 262a
Human Understanding, BK II, CH I,
11-12 123d-124c; CH XXI, SECT 4 178d-
CH XXIII, SECT 15-32 208c-212d; CH
SECT 27 227d-228a
Human Knowledge, SECT 18-20
SECT 26-27 418a-b; SECT 148
THE GREAT
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH
/ Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 8, IY':'IU-J'fr.A
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, VII, par 2,
19 AQUINAS: Sumrlla Theolog
zca
, PART I,
A I, REP 2 14b-15b;<rQ 7, A 2, REP 2
Q 7S, AA 2-3 AA S-6
Q79, AI, REP 4414a-d; A2, REP I'+I .... O-I:.I,IK.
A3, REP 3 416a-417a; A 4, REP 4-S
A S, REP 1-2 418c-419b; A 6, REP
420d; Q 83, A I, REP 5 436d-438a; Q
ANS 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c;
ANS 444d-446b; A 6, ANS
A 6, ANS 458d-459c; Q 87, A 3, REP
468a; Q89, A I, ANS 473b-475a; PART
A6 ANS 619d-620d; Q 3S, AS, ANS
20 Sum1na Theologica,
A4 9a-10b; QS3, AI, ANS and REP 2-3
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY,
84] 92a-,b ..
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generatton,
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 20a-b / .
PART V, 60b-c / Objections and Repltes,
3c. The relation of soul an? the
of formal and materIal
spiritual and corporeal sul)stanlces
7 PLATO: Charmides, 2d-3c / Cratylus,
Phaedo 220a-251d / Republic, BK
/ Timaeus, 453b-454a; 466a-467d;
/ Laws, BK X, 761b-765d
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VI, cH
206a / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 10
559a-b; BK VIII, CH 3
569d-570d; BK XII, cH 10
/ Soul, BK I, CH I
[407bI 3-25] 637b; CH 5
641b-d; BK II, CIl 1-2
CH 4 -[4ISb8--28] 645d-646a /
Sensible, CH I [436b3-8] 673b-c
CH 2 [46SaI8-32] 710c-d / ,
Breathing, CH 1--4 714a-716b
720d-721a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals,
[640b30-64Ia33] 163c-164b; CH
169c; BK II, CH 7 [6S
2b
7-'I7]
III, CH 5 [667bIS-32] 195d-196a /
Animals, Cll 9-10 238a-239a
Animals, BK II, CH 4 ''''''''''-'1r7'>_'7'/1
Politics, BK I, Cll S
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature
31b-40c
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III,
BK IV, SECT 21 265b-c; BK XII,
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VI [7
2
4-7S
1
]
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 29a-b
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 893a
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I
Ennead, TR I, Cll 5, 37c; TR II, CIl
Third Ennead, TR VI, CH
Fourth Ennead, TR I-II I '"t..L'l..
143d-144b; CH 8-2.3, 146b-154b;
166d-167b; CH 20-21
169c-171b; CIl 29 173b-174b;
804
3. The immateriality of the soul
3a. The soul as an immaterial principle, form,
or substance
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-126c / Phaedo, 223d-
225c. 231c-234b / Republic, BK x, 435a-43?c
T
" 449b 450c 452d-454a / Sophzst,
/ zmaeus, - ,
567c-d / LatuS, BK X, 761a-765d
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK VII, CHa 10
[I03SbI4-28] 559a-b; BK VIII, CH 3 [
10
43
2
9-
b
/
] 567d; BK XIII, CH 2 [I077a20-2.3] 608c /
BK I, Cll I [403a3-o19] 632a-d; BK II,
CH 1-2 642a-644c
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 21 265b-c,
BK XII, SECT .?o 310a-b Third
17 PLOTINUS: Fzrst Ennead, TR I 1a-6b /
Ennead TR I CH 8-9 81d-82b; TR VI, CH 2
107a-108a / Fourth Ennead, TR I-II 139a-141c;
TR III, Cll 2 142a-143b; CH 8, 146b-d; ell 20-
2
3 152b-154b; TR VII 191c-200c; TR IX, CH 4,
206c-d / Fifth Ennead, TR II, CH 2 215a-c /
Sixth Ennead, TR IV, CH I 297b-d; CH 4-5
299a-300a; Cli 12-16 303a-3.05c
19 !\QUINAS' Summa Theologzca, PART I, Q SI,
, I REP'3 275b-276b; Q 7S, A I 378b-379c;
AA '4-S 381b-383b; Q 76, A I 385d-388c; A 4,
REP I 393a-394c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269d-271b .
31 DESCARTES: Discourse,. PA.RT IV, 51d-52a,
. PART V, 59c-60c / Medztattons, 71b-?; 72d-
73c. II 78a-80a; VI 96b-103d paSSim,
'101d-l02a / Objections and Repltes,
114d-115a,c; 119d-120a; 127c-d; DEF VI-VII
130c-d; DEF X130d; PROP IV 133c; 135d-136b;
153c-155d; 170b-c; 207d-208a; 209c; 224d-
225d; 231a-232d; 261a-b; 276b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, 451a-452c.
35 LOCKE: Human Understandzng, BK II, Cll
- XXIII, SECT S 205a-b; SECT IS SEcT
22 209d; SECT 28-32 211b-212d . passim; Cll
XXVII, SECT 12-17 223a-225a paSSim; SECT
2
7
227d-228a; SECT 29 228b-c; BK IV, CH III,
SECT 6 313c-315b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 26 418a;
SECT
8
9 430b-c; SECT 141 441a-b; SECT
1
4
8
442b-d
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 271a-b
'40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 186b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 120c-129c esp 124d-128a,
203d-204c
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 27b-28a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 220b-223b esp 221a-222b
,,?b. The immateriality of the soul in
comparison with the materlahty of the
plant and animal soul: the intellect as an
incorporeal power
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 4 [408bI8-29] 6;8C;
Cll S [4IIbI3-I8] 641c-d; BK II, cH 2 [4
1
3
2
4-
2
9] 643d-644a; BK III, CH 4 [429aIO_b23] 661b-
662a; CH 5 662c-d .
-9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Anzmals, BK II, CH
3 [736bIS-737l1I2] 277b-d
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 88:, SOUL
806
(3. The immateriality of the soul. 3e. The cor-
poreal or phenomenal manifestation of
disembodied souls as ghosts, wraiths, or
spirits.)
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 15
200c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 89,
A 8, REP 2 479c-480c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
Q 69, A 3 887d-889c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, III [16-
33] 56a; xxv [79-108] .92b-c; PARADISE, III
[1-30] l09b-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 51b-52b; 80a;
PART IV, 250c-251c paSSim; 258c-d; 270c-
271h passim; 274b-c
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III, ACT V,SC III [118-
176] 144d-145c / Julius Caesar, ACT IV, SC III
[275-308] 591c-d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT I, SC I [40-175]
30a-31c; sc IV [38]-sc V [91] 36b-37d; ACT
IiI, SC IV [102-136] 55d-56a / Macbeth, ACT
III, SC IV [37-17] 298a-d I Cymbeline,AcT v,
SC IV [30-122] 481c-482b
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 95b; 114b-115aesp 115a-b
[fn I]; 189a-b; 193b-c; 373a; 394c-d; 412a... b;
472b-c
54 FREUD: War and Death, 763d-764a
4. The being of the soul
4a. The unity of the human soul: the human
mode the vegetative and sensitive
powers
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 5 [4IObIO-I6] 640c;
[411a.:z3-b3I] 641b-d; BK II, CH 2
414a4] 643c-644a; BK III, CH 9 [432aI5-b8]
664d-665a; CH 10 [433
a
32-
b
4] 666a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [II02a27-32]
347d
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 143b-c;
CH 19 151d-152b; TRVII, CHI4 200b-c; TR
IX, CH 2-3 205c-206b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 76,
AA 1-3 385d-393a; Q78, A4, REP 5411d-413d;
Q 81, A 3, REP 2 430c-431d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2,
A 2, REP 2 711d-712d;PART III SUPPL, Q 79,
A 2, REP 3 953b-955c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IV [1-12]
57c; XXV [37-84] 91d-92b; PARADISE, I! [127-
148] l09a-b
4b. The issue concerning the self-subsistence
or immortality of the human soul: its
existence or capacity for existence in
separation from the human body
5 EURIPIDES: Helen [1013-1016] 307d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 75b
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-c/ Meno, 179d.. 183a /
Apology, 211b-212a,c /- Phaedo 220a-251d /
Republic, BK x, 434d-436a /
793c-d / Seventh Letter, S06a
8 ARISTOTLE : Metaphysics, BK XII,
21-28] 599c / Soul, BK I, CH I
632a-b; CH 2 634d; BK
[4I3a3-9] 643a; CH 2
BK III, eH 4
662c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals,
3 [736bI5-737aI2] 277b-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature ofThings,
34b-c; [417-194] 35c-44a,c
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II,
SECT 17 259b-d; BK IV, SECT 21 L.l'.'.'--.-'"OT"
SECT 13 271b; BK VIII, SECT 37
SECT 5 307d-308a; SECT 14 308c
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 29a-b
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CII 2,
Ennead, TR I 139a-b; TR IV, CH
TR VII 191c-200c
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BKVI, CH 12,
BK X, CH 31 319b-d; BK XIII, CH 2
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,
2, REP 3 315c-316a; Q 75, A 2
383c-384c; Q 76, A 3, REP 1-2
PART I-I!, Q22, A I, REP 3
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,
A 6 182d-184a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy,
[1-108] 91b-92c; PARADISE,
116b-c
22 CHAUCER: Second Nun's Tale
467a
23 lIoBBEs: Leviathan, PART III, I ...,-,1:("-11
IV, 250c-251c; 253b-255b; 269d-271b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 264a-269b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V,
tations, 69a-71a,c passim;
tions and Replies, 127c-d; DEF
DEF X130d; PROP IV 133c I
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PROP
PROP 29-33459b-460c; PROP
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK X
292b
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 194-195,
271b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge,
441a-b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 120c-129c esp
201b-c; 203d-204c; 218d-223d
234c-240b esp 234c-235c) F I ,r -F.... ',...
tical Reason, 291a-292a; 344a-c;
Judgement, 600c-d; 603b-d; IJlIIIII-IJI'/L..
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History,
247a; 255c-256b
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 25b-28a
380b-381a
49 DARWIN: Descent ofMan, 593c-d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VII,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 224a-225a
54 FREUD: War and Death,
to 4d(2)
The the human soul: its separate
creauon; Its emanation or derivation
from the world soul
OLD TES!AMENT: Genesis,. 1:26-27; 2:7; 5 :1-2 /
Ecc!estastes, 12:7 / Isarah, 42:5; 57:I6-(D)
4
2
:5; 57:16 Ezekiel, 18:4-(D)
chlel, 18:4 / Zecharzah, I2:r-(D) Zacharias
12:1 '
.t\POCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:23; I5:I
1
-
(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 2:23; IS:!I
!'JEW I Corinthians, 15:45
7 PLATO: Ttmaeus, 452c-454a /Philebus 618b-
619d '
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature ofThings, BK III [32 3-3491
34b-c; [670-712] 38d-39b
12 AURELIUS: Afeditations, BK IV, SECT 21
265b-c; BK XII, SECT 30 310a-b
Aeneid, BK VI [724-751] 230b-231a
7 Second Ennead, IX, CH 3-4
67b-68a, CH 7-8 69c-70d / Thu'd Ennead, TR
IV, CH 2-5 97d-99b / Fourth Ennead, TRII, CH
I-TR III, CH 7 139c-145d; TR III, CH 9-
18
146d-
15lc; TR VII, CH 13 200a-b; TR VIII, CH 3-
T
R
IX, CH 5 202a-207a,c! Sixth Ennead, TR IV,
CH 4 299a-d; CH 12-16 303a-305c
a/AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK VII, CH 29 261a-b;
BK x, CH 31 319b-d; BK XI, CH 22, 334c; BK
XII, CH 23 357d-358a
9 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 75,
A 6, REP 1 383c-384c; Q 90 480c-484a; Q100,
A I, REP 2520d-521c; Q118 600a-604b
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PARTIIr, Q 6,
A 3, REP 2 742a-743a
1 DANTE: Divine Comedy,- .PURGATORY, XVI
[85-93] 77d; xxv [37-84] 91d-92b; PARADISE,
IV [49-54] 111b; VII [64-75] 115d-116a; [121-
148] 116b-c
HOBBEs: Leviathan, PART III, 173d; 176d;
PART IV, 251a-b
SiMoNTAIGNE: Essays, 264b-c
PHACON: ofLearning, 54b-c
1 Dtscourse, PART V, 56a-b; 60b-c /
Medttattons, III, 88b-c
SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 29-3
1
366b-
367a; PART II, PROP I I, COROL 377b-c
GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 186b
GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 640a-b [n 8]
KANT: Judgement, 565d
The life of the soul apart from the body
1) The doctrine of transmigration or per-
petual reincarnation
HOMER: Odyssey, BK XI [298-34] 246a
HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 75b
PLATO: Phaedrus, 125b-126a / Meno,
183a. / Phaedo, 226c-234c; 246d... 250b / Re-
publtc, BK X, 437c-441a,c I Ti111aeus, 452d-
1
53b
; 476b-477a,c / Laws, UK X, 767c-768d
RISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 3 [406a30_bS] 635d
[47
bI
3-2S] 637b '
807
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK 1[102-
11
9]
2b-c; BK III [67-783] 38d-40a
12 AURELIUS: BK IV, SEGT2I 265b-c
13 VIRGIL: Georgzcs, IV [219-227] 8gb / Aeneid
BK VI [73-751] 229b-231a '
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 29a-b
17 PL<;>TINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH II Sb-c /
Thzrd Ennead, TR II, CH 13 88d-89b; CH I ,
91d-92b; TR III, CH 4, 95b-c; TR IV, CH
97d-98c; CH 6 99b-l00b / Fourth Ennead, TR
III, CH 8, 145d; CH 9, 146d; CH 13-
1
5 149b-
150c; C.H 24 154b-d; CH 27, 156d; TR IV, CH 5,
161a-b, TR VII, .CH 14 200b-c; TR VIII, CH 3-5
202a-203d / Stxth Ennead, TR IV, CH 14-
16
304a-305c; TR CH 6-7, 324c-32Sa
18 AUGUSTINE: Ctty of God, BK X, CH 30 318b..
319b; BK XII, CH 20 355b-357a; BK XIV, CH 5
379d-380b; BK XXII, CH 27-28 613b-614a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL
A I, ANS 943a-944d; Q79, A I, ANS
21 Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [49-
6
3]
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 206c-207a 249b-250a;
264b-265c; 268a-269a -'
35 LOCKE: Hum
6
an Understanding, BK II, CH
XXVII, SECT 220c-d; SECT 14 223d-224bo
SECT 27 227d-228a '
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit oif' Laws, BK
207a-c XXIV,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 2d-3a
41 GIBBON: D.ecline and Fall, 135a; 226b
46 HEGEL: Phtlosophy ofHistory, INTRO 187a-bo
PART I, 255c-256b "
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 316b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VII. 295b-c
54 FREUD: War and Death, 764b
4d(2) Comparison of separated souls with
men and angels
NEW TESTAMENT: Luke, 20:34-3
6
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR HI, CH 18
151b-c
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK XIII, eH I 360a-b.
BK XXI, CH 10 569d-570b; BK XXII CH 29'
614b-d ' ,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 29,
A I, REP 5 162a-163b; Q 62, A 5, CONTRARY
321 b-322a; Q 77, A 8 406b-407a; Q 89 473a-
480c; PART I-II, Q 4, A 5, REP 6632c-634b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 67
81b-87c; Q 68, A 6 93c-94c; PART II-II Q 26
A 13 519d-520d; PART III SUPPL, Q A 3:
REP 5 887d-889c; Q 70 893c-900d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY XXV [1-
108] 91b-92c '
35 LOCKE: Hunlan Understanding, BK IV, CH
XVII, SECT 14 378c-d
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 318b
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 192d-193a; 363a-b
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karama"'ot' BK II 22c
23a IV - , , -
809
II.
EPICURUS. Letter to Herodotus
TERTULLIAN. A Treatise on the Soul
GREGORY OF NYSSA. On the Soul andthe Resurrection
CHAPTER 88: SOUL
I.
Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These \vorks are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follo\vs the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I,
7-8,11-12,52-53, 62-65; PART IV, 196-197
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART II, CH II
BERKELEY. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and
Philonous
HUME. A Treatise of Htunan Nature, BK I, PART IV,
SECT V-VI
--. Ofthe bnmortality ofthe Soul
-.-. Of Suicide
KANT. Prolegomena to Any Future 'Aletaphysic, par
46-49
"Concerning the Procreation of the
as Discoursed in Timaeus," in Moralia
On the Immortality ofthe Soul
Magnitude ofthe Soul
The Soul and Its Origin
On Being and Essence, CH IV
Sunlma Contra GentileJ, BK II, CH 56-90;
CH 79-95
On Spiritual Creatures, A I I
Disputatae, De Veritate, Q 19;
AA 1-2, 6-15, 17-21
Unicity ofthe Intellect, II
Convlilio (The Banquet), THIRD TREATISE,
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Other discussions of the notion of a world soul and of the theory that the heavenly bodies
have souls, see ASTRONOMY 8b; \VORLD Ia.
Another consideration of the soul as the principle of life, see A.NnvIAL Ia; LIFE AND DEATH 1-2;
and forother considerations of the soul as identical \vith mind or intellect and as the princi-
ple of thought, see MIND Ib-Id, If.
The problem of personal identity, see ONE AND MANY 3b(s); SAME AND OTHER lb.
Other discussions of the parts or powers of the soul, and for discussions relevant to the dis-
tinction of several kinds of soul, see ANIMAL I-IC(2); LIFE AND DEATH 3-3b; I-IC,
4-Sa; SENSE Ia,2a-2c.
The treatment of specific powers of the soul and of their relation to one another, see DESIRE
3-3d, S-6c; EMOTION I-la, 2-2C, 4a; 11EMORY AND IMAGINATION I-Id; l\1IND Ia-ra(4),
Ie-If, Ig(2); ONE AND MANY 3b(S), 4a; OPPOSITION 4a; SENSE Ia-Id, 3-3e; WILL
1-3b.
controversy over the immateriality of the soul and its relation to the body, see l\NIMAL
Ie; BEING 7b(2), 7b(4); ELEMENT se-sf; FORM 2C-2C(I), 2d; LIFE AND DEATH 2; MAN
3a-3c; MATTER 2d, 3a, 4c-4d; MECHANICS 4c; MIND 2a-2e; ONE AND 1vfANY 3b(4); and
for the related controversy over the immortali ty of the soul, see IMMORTALITY 2-3b;
METAPHYSICS 2(L
Other discussions of the transmigration of souls, see IMMORTALITY sa.
Theories about the state and operations of the soul in separation from the body, see ANGEL 4;
IMMORTALITY Sb; MAN 3b; MIND 4e; and for the doctrine of the resurrection of the body,
see GOD 7g; Il\1MORTALITY Sg
Other discussions relevant to the spiritual dignity of human nature which requires all men
to be treated as ends, see JUSTICE 6, 6c; LIBERTY Ia; SLAVERY 2d, 3d ; WILL 7a.
The nature and problems of psychology as the science of the soul or of man, see I{NOWLEDGE
sa(6); MAN 2a-2b(4); MIND 6; and for discussions relevant to the distinction bet\veen ra-
tional and empirical, or philosophical and scientific psychology, see PHYSICS 2; ScIENCE IC.
Sb. The concept of the soul in ...
chology: experimental kno'W'le<lee
soul
53 JAMES: P:>:ychology, xiiib-xiva;
119b; 126a-127b; 221a-226a esp
822b
54 FREUD: Origin and Det1elopment
Analysis, 12d-13d esp 13c-d / .lntlf!1'1Jjretarll
Dreams, 154d-155a / UnconscIous,
431b-d; 434c / General Int:roduct,zo1Z,
550b / New Introductory Lectures,
passim, esp 831c
s. Our knowledge ote.the soul and its powers
Sa. The sours knowledge of itself by reflection
on its acts: the soul as a transcendental
or noumenal object; the paralogisms of
rational psychology
7 PLATO: Phaedo 220a-251d / Republic, BK IV,

808 THE GREAT IDE,AS
(4d. The life of the soul apart from the bod.y.) 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH I
BK II, en 4 [4I5aI4-22] 645b-c; BK III,
4d(3) The need of the soul for its body: the [429
b
S-9] 661d; [429b25-29] 662b;
dogma of the body's resurrection for the
soul's perfection 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics'fIf'BK IX, CH 9
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, HK x, CH 29, 31Zb- 424a
318b; BK XIII, CH 16-20 367a-371a; BK XIV, 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH I,
CH 3 378a-d; CH 5 379c-380b; BK XXI, CH 3, 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK XI,
561d-S62a; BK XXII, CH 26-27 612c-613c / 302a-b
Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 24 630c-631a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 29, 336d-338a
A I, REP 5 162a-163b; Q 51, A I, ANS 275b- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,
276b; Q 89, A I, ANS 473b-47Sa; A 2, REP 1 464d-468d
47Sa-d; PART I-II, Q 3, A 3, ANS 624b-625a; 21 DANTE: Divine C01nedy, PURGATORY,
Q 4, AA 5-6 632c-635a [49-
60
] 80b
L
c
20 AQUINAS: Surnnla Theologica, PART III SUPPL, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 261c-269b passim
Q75 935a-939c; Q 80, A I, ANS and REP I 956c- 30 BACON: Advancement
957c; A ANS and REP 2 958b-959c; Q 81, A 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV
4 966d-967d; Q 93, A I, ANS 1037d-l039a sim, esp 51c-52a / Meditations,
21 DANTE: Divine Co1nedy, HELL, VI [94-111] 77d-81d; VI 96b-l03d / Objections
9b-c; PARADISE, XIV [1-66] 126d-127c 207b; 224b,d
25 Essays, 311a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics,
383c
4d(4) The contamination of the soul by the 35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK
body: the purification of the soul by re- SECT 1-8 121a-123a esp SECT 7--8 . LJJ.:'L-" ',,",'U'
lease from the body SECT 10 123b-d; CH IX, SECT 1-2
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93d; 95c / Phaedo, 223a- XIX, SECT I-2175b-d; CH XXI, SECT
226c; 230d-234c / Republic, BK IV, 350c-355c; CH XXIII, SECT 208c-212d
BK VII, 388a-390b; BK IX, 425c-427b; BK X, 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT
434c-441a,c I Timaeus, 474b-476b / Seventh I0453c-455b
Letter,80Sd-"806a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 150c
12 EPiCTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 9, 115a-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-b; 32a-c;
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VI [724-751] 230b-231a 101b; 120c-129c esp 124d-128a;
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 4, 2b; CH 9- passim; 218d-223d esp
10 4c-5b; CH 12 5c-6a; TR II 6b-l0aesp CH 4-5 234c-235c, 237d-238a /
8a-9a; TR IV, CH 4-16 14a-19b; TR VI, ClI 6 physic of Morals, 271a-c;
24a-c; TR VII, CH 3 26d-27a; TR VIII, CH 4 28c- / Practical Reason, 291a-293b
29a; eH 7-8 30c-31c; CH II 33a-d / Second 292a-293b; 294a-b;
Ennead, TR IX, CH 15 74d-75b; CH 17-18 76b- 337a-c; 344a-c; 348b-349b / /uc.tfle1net.lt,
77d / Third Ennead, TR I, eH 8-10 81d-82b; 600d
TR IV, CH 2-6 97d-l00b passim; TR VI, CH 4-5 46 HEGEL: Philosophy
/ Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 32 158c- 14a-c; PART I, par
159a; TR IV, CH 17, 166c-d; TR VII, CH 10 198d- 120c-d; 25 121a / rluloslojJllV
199c; TR VIII, Cli I 200d-201b; cn 3-8 202a- I, 257d-258a; PART III,
205a passim / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 1-2 208a- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 121a-b;
20gb; CH 10--12 213c-214c; TR III, CH 17 226a-c 178a; 191a-197a esp 191a-193a,
/ Sixth Ennead, TR IV, CH 14-16 304a-305c; 232b-238b esp 233a-b, 236b [fn I]
TR VII, cn 34-3
6
338b-339d; TR IX, CH 8-11 54 FREun: Interpretation ofDreams,
358b-360d conscious, 429c-430c / General
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIII, CH 16 451b; 620a
367a-d; BK XIV, CH3 378a-d; CH 5 379c-380b;
BK XIX, CH 4, 512a-513c
19 !\QUINAS: Summa Theologica, ,PART' I, Q 89,
A I, ANS 473b-475a
THE GREAT .. IDEA.S
811
INTRODUCTION
dise, Dante meets Piccarda Donati in the Heav-
en of the Moon. She explains to him that this
place "which appears so far down," is assigned
to those who have violated their vows in some
particular. Dante wonders why .she and the
others do not "desire a more exalted place, in
order to see more."Piccarda replies: "Brother,
virtue of charity quiets our will, and makes us
wish only for that which we have, and quickens
not our thirst for aught else.... So that as we
are, from seat to seat throughout this realm, to
all the realm is pleasing, as to the King who in-
,vilIs us with His will; and His will is our peace."
This speech of Piccarda's makes it clear to
Dante "how everyvlhere in Heaven is Paradise,
even if the grace of the Supreme Good does
not there rain down in one measure." These
different measures of beatitude in the diffusion
of God's love and light are represented by the
celestial spheres from the earth-adjacent moon
to the Crystalline Heaven, the outermost
bound of the physical universe, of which Dante
says that it "has no other Where than in the
Divine Mind."
WHEN THE WHOLE EXPANSE of physical space
or the boundary of the universe is considered,
Ne\vton no less than Dante conceives the omni-
presence and eternity of God as that which
somehow encompasses all space and time. God
"is not duration or space," Newton writes at
the end of the Principles, "but He endures and
is present .. and by existing always and every-
where, He constitutes duration and space." In
the concluding queries of the Optics, Newton
appears to think of infinite space as the Divine
Sensoriuln in which all things are at once pres-
ent to God, ,vho "being in all places is more
able by His will to move the bodies within His
boundless uniform sensorium, and thereby to
form and reform the parts of the Universe, than
Chapter 89: SPACE
. N the level of our everyday observations,
space and time seem to be the obvious,
common, and the connected properties of
sical things. We distinguish things from one
ther by their position in space, as we mark
penings by the date of their occurrence.
ewhere and ,v-hen of a thing is oftentused to
utify it, for it is generally agreed that t\VO
ies cannot occupy the same place at the
time, and that at the same time two dis-
t places cannot be occupied by the same
y. According to a theologian like Aquinas,
elimitations of space and time apply even
odiless things, i.e., to angels.
1\n angel and a body are said to be in .a
e," he \vrites, "in quite a different sense."
ereas a body is in the place which contains
la,n angel is said to be in a corporeal place by
iication of the angelic power ... not as be-
contained, but as somehow containing it."
Haws, nevertheless, that at a given time an
"is not every\vhere, nor in several places,
n only one place." Nor does the incorpo-
y of angels permit more than one angel to
the same time in the same place. Accard-
o the manner in which an angel is at a
-by the action of his po\ver-"there can
ly one angel in one place," Aquinas de-
s, even as there can be only one body in
lace at a time.
tation or position in space, and spatial re-
ships such as higher and lower, nearer and
er,are so familiar and intelligible that they
icle terms of reference whereby men speak
phoricallyofthe n10ral hierarchyand spirit-
istances. The whole of Dante's Divine C01n-
Jfor example, involves a spatial metaphor
sets forth the gradations of sin and the
es of blessedness in terms of places be-
the earth and in the heavens above.
he mounts from sphere to sphere in Para"
LAMETTRIE.Man a Machine
VOLTAIRE. "Soul," in A Philosophical.L./.j["H{)'nm",,,.
HELVETIUS. Traite de l'esprit
--. A Treatise on Alan
SCHELLING. Von der WeJtseele
EMERSON. "The Over-Soul," in Essays, I
GRATRY. Philosophie. De la connaissance de
BAIN. Mind and Body
CLIFFORD. "Body and Mind," in VOL II,
and Essays
LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK II-III
--. Metaphysics, BK III, CH I
--. Outlines of Psychology
FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART II;
PART V, CH 16; PART VII, CH 10-1 I
BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK I,
BK II, CH 23
--. Collected Essays, VOL 1 (20)
VONIER. The Human Soul and Its
Other Spirits
DRIESCH. Mind and Body
BERGSON. Matter and Men10ry, CH 4
._-. Mind-Energy, CH 2
WHITEHEAD. Religion in the Making, CH
--. Adventures of Ideas, CH 2
B. RUSSELL. Religion and Science, CH 5
JUNG. Modern Alan in Search of a Soul
--. Psychology and Religion
SANTAYANA. Scepticism and Animal
--. The Realm of Matter, CH 8-9
--. The Realm of Spirit, CH 1-3
I-II
MELANCHTHON. Comlnentarius de Anima
JOHN OF THE CROSS. Spiritual Canticle
--. Dark Night ofthe Soul
--. The Living Flame of Love
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XIII (14),
XXXIV (5)
BURTON. The Anatomy of Melancholy, PART I,
SECT 1, MEMB II, SUB-SECT 5-1 I
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Tho-
misticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART IV, QQ 1-12
MARVELL. Dialogue Between the Soul and the Body
MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la verite, BK I,
CH 10 (I, 3)
--. Dialogues on jUetaphysics and Religion, 1
LEIBNITZ. Discourse on .i\1etaphysics, XXXIII-XXXIV
--. Philosophical Works, CH 12 (A New Syste1n of
the Interaction of Substances), 13 (The Reply of
M. Foucher Concerning the Interaction of Sub-
stances), 23 (Considerations on the Doctrines of a
Universal Spirit), 34 (The Principles of Nature and
of Grace)
--. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding,
BK IV, CH 9
--. Monadology, par 19-28
LAMETTRIE. Histoire naturelle de l' alne
810
PROCLUS. The Elements of Theology, (N)
SAADIA GAON. The Book of Beliefs and Opinions,
TREATISE VI-VII
A.LBERTUS MAGNUS. De Natura et Origine Animae
--. On the Intellect and the Intelligible, TREATISE