Vacate Order On Larry Sinclair's Lawsuit Against Three Bloggers

Case 1:08-cv-00434-HHK Document 34 Filed 06/14/2008 Page 1 of 133
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Lawrence Sinclair,
Case No.: 1:08-cv-00434-HHK
Plaintiff,
MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY’S NOTICE
vs. OF TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AND
MOTION FOR HEARING ON TEMPORARY
TubeSockTedD, mzmolly and SUSPENSION
OWNINGLIARS,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
Montgomery Blair Sibley (“Sibley”), counsel for Plaintiff gives notice of his automatic,
temporary suspension by this Court on May 21, 2008, and submits this, his verified response and
Motion For Hearing on Temporary Suspension, and states:
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Sibley requests – and believes it is his right under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments – oral
argument1 on the matters raised herein given the complicated nature of the facts and the value that
such an argument would provide to a fair resolution of the issues herein.
SUMM ARY OF ARGUMENT
The errors in procedure and substance in this matter, singularly and collectively, are of such
magnitude that reciprocal suspension is constitutionally impermissible. As this Court is obligated
to consider the record before automatically temporarily suspending Sibley, the errors in the Florida
1
See: Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908)("On the contrary, due process of law has
never been a term of fixed and invariable content. This is as true with reference to oral argument as
with respect to other elements of procedural due process. For this Court has held in some situations
that such argument is essential to a fair hearing."); Federal Communications Commission v. WJR,
The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949)("Without in any sense discounting the value
of oral argument wherever it may be appropriate or, by virtue of the particular circumstances,
constitutionally required . . ." (Footnote Omitted).)
disciplinary proceedings must be heard by this Court. In Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 49 (1917),
the United States Supreme Court concluded by expressly holding:
Thus defining what is open to our consideration, we think we ought

not to foreclose the subject on the answer made to the rule to show
cause in the proceeding which is now before us, but that an
opportunity should be afforded the respondent, confining himself
to the propositions stated, if he is so advised, to file the record or
records of the state court within thirty days from this date with
permission by printed brief, considering the record intrinsically, to
point out any ground within the limitations stated which should
prevent us from giving effect to the conclusions established by the
action of the Supreme Court of Michigan which is now before us,
as we have seen, as part of the petition we are now considering.
(Emphasis added).
Accordingly, before “giving effect to the conclusions established by the action of the
Supreme Court of” Florida, an “opportunity should be afforded” to Sibley to present the “record
intrinsically, to point out any ground within the limitations stated which should prevent us from
giving effect to the conclusions established by the action of the Supreme Court [of Florida] . . . ”.
Such an “opportunity” will reveal much about the Florida so-called justice system2 and is exercised
infra.
I. THE PROCEDURE USED TO MAKE SUCH DETERMINATION WAS SO LACKING AN

OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD A S TO CONSTITUTE A DEPRIVATION OF THE
ATTORNEY 'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
First, the Florida Supreme Court Order of Suspension is void as the judicial actors involved
failed to take the requisite loyalty oaths of offices prior to adjudicating Sibley’s disciplinary
2
Such an opportunity will confirm the continued vitality of President Truman’s 1948
observation that: “The main difficulty with the South is that they are living eighty years behind the
times and the sooner they came out of it the better it will be for the country and themselves.”
Correspondence with friend Ernie Roberts on Civil Rights, August 18, 1948.
2
proceedings.
Second, as the practice of law is unquestionably a "fundamental right", Florida's radical
departure from constitutionally-mandated procedures for suspending that "fundamental right" as
demonstrated by the record below cannot be condoned by this Court by suspending Sibley here.
In particular, (i) attorney disciplinary proceedings are “quasi-criminal” matters and thus to
be accorded the substantial procedural rights attendant thereto, (ii) the failure to permit Sibley to call
witness and obtain documents violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, (iii) the refusal to continue
the Final Hearing was an egregious abuse of discretion by the Referee, (iv) the Referee verbatim
adoption of the Florida Bar’s proposed order and his striking of all Sibley’s affirmative defenses was
plain error and (v) the Referee’s behavior removed the label of “fair and impartial” from him and
thus denied Sibley such a tribunal.
Second, the premise of Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457
U.S. 423 (1982) – that state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal
constitutional claims – is clearly invalid in Florida as all Sibley’s substantial “federal constitutional
claims” were stricken by the Referee and ignored by the Florida Supreme Court.
Third, the Florida Supreme Court's per curiam without-a-written-decision adoption of the
Referee's Report violated Due Process such that this Court cannot be party to such an egregious
breach of fundamental procedural due process.
II. THE PROOF WAS SO INSUFFICIENT THAT THE COURT, CONSISTENT WITH ITS
DUTY , COULD NOT ACCEPT AS FINAL THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT THAT THE SIBLEY ENGAGED IN SUCH MISCONDUCT
The substantive proof errors are just as plain. Simply put, Sibley did not fail to pay child
support – he was unable as the record clearly establishes and such order (i) was not issued by a
3
competent court and (ii) in all events was de facto overturned on appeal.
Likewise, Sibley did not violate Rule 4-3.1 as none of his filings were “frivolous” and the
cited court order to that end fails to even mention that phrase.
Accordingly, this Court may not suspend Sibley from the practice of law before it upon the
Florida Supreme Court’s order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 5, 2002, after hearings stretching back two years to October 24, 2000, Judge
Maxine Cohen Lando of the Florida Circuit Court for the 11th Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-
Dade County, Florida, entered an order in Case No.: 94-18177 FC 19 on child support directing
Sibley to pay $100,000 in back child support and thereafter $4,000/month and giving Sibley until
January 1, 2003, to purge that contempt or face incarceration. A copy of that order is attached as
Exhibit “A” to the Florida Bar Complaint in this matter which is found in the Appendix hereto. The
order of August 5, 2002, was adopted verbatim by Judge Lando from a proposed order submitted
by counsel for Barbara Sibley, the former wife in that action.
Notwithstanding that Sibley had until January 1, 2003, to purge the contempt amount, at a
hearing held on November 22, 2002, Judge Lando, without notice of her intent to incarcerate Sibley
and refusing to allow Sibley to be fully heard, ordered Sibley to commenced a sentence of indefinite
incarceration in the Miami-Dade County Department of Corrections which ultimately ran until
February 7, 2003, for civil contempt due to failure to pay child support. Notably, Judge Lando had
already issued her writ of bodily attachment the day before the hearing, apparently having already
made up her mind to incarcerate Sibley prior to the hearing. A copy of that order is also attached
4
as Exhibit “A” to the Florida Bar Complaint found in the Appendix hereto.
In the subsequent appellate proceedings before the Florida Third District Court of Appeal,
Judges Schwartz, Goderich and Cope issued their opinions on the appeal affirming Judge Lando’s
August 5, 2002, order which contained significant findings of fact by those appellate judges which
had no basis in the record to justify the affirmation.
Finally, in another appeal, Florida Third District Court of Appeal Judges Cope, Gersten and
Green entered an order sanctioning Sibley. It is from this order that the second count of the Florida
Bar Complaint arises. Again, that order contains numerous misstatements of facts in order to arrive
at its apparently pre-ordained conclusion.
Thus, the sole facts upon which Sibley was sanctioned by the Florida Supreme Court rests
on two questionable Florida circuit court orders and one Florida district court order.
II. BACKGROUND
Sibley’s divorce action was commenced on August 12, 1994, by his Former Wife when she
filed a petition for dissolution of marriage upon which a final judgment of dissolution was granted
on September 20, 1994. Sibley was designated in that final judgment as the “primary residential
custodian” of the minor children.
On May 14, 1998, the circuit court entered an agreed order on removing children from
Miami-Dade County which required solely that Sibley give Sibley’s Ex-Wife forty-five (45) days
written notice prior to removing the children from Miami-Dade County.
On March 29, 2000, Sibley gave written notice pursuant to that court order to Sibley’s
Ex-Wife that he intended to relocate to the Washington D.C. area. In early June 2000, Sibley did
relocate and has been domiciled and resided in Maryland since that time.
5
Some 120 days after that March 29, 2000, notice, Sibley’s Ex-Wife filed on July 27, 2000,
an “Emergency Motion for Temporary Primary Physical Residence of the Minor Children and To
Allow Minor Children To Be Enrolled in Private Schools and Prohibiting the Removal of the
Children to Washington D.C.” After numerous delays, Judge Lando finally set for conclusion the
hearing on the “Emergency Motion” for September 24, 25 and 26, 2001 – over 1½ years later.
During that time, Sibley was only allowed to see his children by Judge Lando seven days.
On August 4, 2001, Sibley filed his Supplemental Petition for Modification of Child Support.
That supplemental petition sought relief from the terms of the Marital Settlement Agreement
between the parties that (i) Sibley pay $4000/month in support if he relocated from Miami and (ii)
Sibley pay all the educational expenses of the children. The basis for the Supplemental Petition was
that due to his inability to secure employment as an attorney and the birth of a child by a subsequent
marriage, there had been a sufficient, material, involuntary and permanent in nature change in his
financial circumstances warranting a modification. Significantly, though part of the subsequent
hearings, Judge Lando never entered an order on that Supplemental Petition for Modification.
At the conclusion of the hearings on the motion for temporary custody held on September
26, 2001, as Sibley’s Ex-Wife had not finished presenting her direct case – though having hearings
on October 23, 2000, December 15, 2000, September 24, 25 and 26, 2001, to do so – the matter was
adjourned by Judge Lando to October 8, 2001.
On October 8, 2001, Sibley’s Ex-Wife finally rested her case. Hence, after waiting 438 days
to present his case in the half day allotted to him by Judge Lando, Sibley was able to in minimal form
present his case. Thereafter, Judge Lando gave the parties two weeks to submit proposed findings
of facts and law.
6
On December 15, 2001 – Five Hundred Six (506) days after the filing of the “Emergency
Motion”, Judge Lando finally entered her Order on Emergency Motion for Temporary Custody of
the Minor children. Those children had been residing with the Sibley’s Ex-Wife since July 2000
without benefit of a court order permitting a change in custody until this order was entered on
December 15, 2001. Noteworthy is that the order entered by Judge Lando was identical to the
proposed order submitted by Sibley’s Ex-Wife’s Counsel.
In January, 2002, Sibley’s Ex-Wife filed two motions for contempt relating to enforcement
of the marital settlement agreement between the parties relating to child support. The first sought
payment of $4,000/month in child support from July 2000 until the present pursuant to the terms of
the Martial Settlement Agreement between the parties which they – and notably not the court – had
determined in July 1994 was an appropriate amount given the parties relative financial
circumstances at that time.
The second motion for contempt sought enforcement of the terms of the Marital Settlement
Agreement between the parties which required that Sibley pay 100% of the children’s educational
expenses.
On June 4, 5, 6, 7, 2002, Judge Lando held and then adjourned until July 1, 2002, the trial
on the pending motions related to final child custody, support and modification of Sibley’s
obligations under the Marital Settlement Agreement.
At the conclusions of the hearings on July 1, 2002, Judge Lando – without making her
intentions known on the record – ordered counsel to submit proposed orders and written closing
arguments by July 19, 2002. Sibley timely submitted his 52 page proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. On July 26, 2002, after having the benefit of receiving and reviewing Sibley’s
7
proposed findings, counsel for Sibley’s Ex-Wife belatedly submitted her proposed orders.
On August 5, 2002, some 692 days after the commencement of the hearings which formed
the basis for Judge Lando’s rulings on the motion to transfer custody and contempt, Judge Lando
signed the proposed order granting Sibley’s Ex-Wife’s motion for contempt. A copy of that order
is attached as Exhibits “A” to the Florida Bar Complaint found in the Appendix.
Most conspicuously, a comparison of Sibley’s Ex-Wife proposed order with Exhibit “A” of
the Florida Bar Complaint reveal that they are identical: as such, it is plain that Judge Lando entered
verbatim, the proposed order of Sibley’s Ex-Wife’s Counsel on the contempt motion and ignored
Sibley’s proposed finds and fact and law in toto.
Judge Lando adopted Sibley’s Ex-Wife’s counsel’s findings verbatim and ordered Sibley (i)
to pay $100,000 for past due child support and (ii) remain current on his child support of $4,000 per
month. Next, Judge Lando found that the Sibley “at all times from May 2000 had the present
financial ability to pay but willfully or intentionally failed and refused to do so and wilfully violated
the Order of this Court.” The Court then sentenced Sibley to Ninety (90) days in the Dade County
Jail beginning January 1, 2003, unless he paid the specified amounts by December 1, 2002.3
3
Not one single fact or legal position of Sibley’s from his 52 page proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law was – understandably – included in Sibley’s Ex-Wife’s counsel’s proposed
orders adopted verbatim by Judge Lando. Among those conspicuously absent facts which Judge
Lando failed to recognized in her adopted order that Sibley had demonstrated without refutation by
Sibley’s Ex-Wife were:
! Sibley had remarried and had another child imposing a new set of financial obligation
upon him;
! Sibley had lost his job as an attorney and after diligent search was unable to find
comparable employment;
8
On August 27, 2002, Sibley filed his notice of appeal of the above orders. That appeal was
assigned Case No.: 3D02-2308 by the Third District Court of Appeal.
Notwithstanding that Sibley was given until January 1, 2003, to pay the ordered $275,000,
Judge Lando incarcerated Sibley for “indirect contempt” on November 22, 2002, upon her finding
that Sibley “continues to 1) have the ability to pay the past due child support (of $100,000), and 2)
that he is willfully refusing to pay his child support obligation.” Patently, this action by Judge
Lando was to put the “squeeze” on Sibley given the pending Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays
and his four year old son’s upcoming December birthday.
The following day, November 23, 2003, Sibley filed a notice of appeal with the Florida Third
District Court of Appeal of the November 22, 2002, Family Court order which was assigned Case
No. 3D02-3171.
On December 23, 2003, two judges of the Florida Third District Court of Appeals – Alan
R. Schwartz and Mario P. Goderich – entered the majority opinion in Sibley v. Sibley, Case No.
3D02-3171, 833 So.2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) affirming Sibley’s incarceration “for indirect
contempt,” holding remarkably that (i) “the record shows substantial assets, although admittedly not
! Sibley has and continues to pay the medical expenses of the children and life
insurance for their benefit on himself; a sum in excess of the child support
guidelines;
! Sibley made his motion for modification of his support obligations some six months
prior to the motions for contempt, thereby undercutting a finding of wilful non-
compliance as found by Judge Lando in her contempt orders;
! Sibley was employed in a family-owned start up business which has yet to

predictably turn a profit in its first year though it is a viable company manufacturing
custom made goods for, among others, White House Communications, C-SPAN, and
the Smithsonian.
9
in the purge amount, in his [Sibley’s] own name” and (ii) Sibley “may command, simply by asking,
the payment of the purge amount through his very wealthy father. . .”
In the dissenting opinion the Honorable Judge Cope, pointed out that the holding of the
majority that Sibley’s “very wealth father” can pay was issued by the majority based on the “`tipsy
coachman’ doctrine, or `right for the wrong reason’ rule” for which there was no factual support in
the record. Notably, though this appeal of Judge Lando’s orders resulted in a de facto reversal of
the conclusion that Sibley willfully failed to pay child support, the Florida Bar omitted this appeal
from its Complaint.
Subsequently, Sibley took another appeal to the Third District Court of Appeal which was
assigned Case No.: 3D03-2083. The second count of the Florida Bar Complaint arises from that
portion of the opinion in that matter which held in pertinent part:
The former wife contends that the husband's appeals have repeatedly
been shown to be without merit and have constituted an abuse of the
legal process. Upon consideration of the motion, the former husband's
response filed January 5, 2004, and after review of this court's files,
we agree. . . .The former husband has served as an unending source
of vexatious and meritless litigation. This has caused needless
consumption of resources by the court system and needless expense
to the former wife. Awards of attorney's fees have not served as a
deterrent, as the former husband has not paid them. We conclude that
the standards of Lussy are met. We have considered the criteria set
forth in the Safir decision and conclude that those are met as well. We
therefore prohibit the former husband from further self-representation
in this court.
On November 12, 2004, Father made a motion for rehearing challenging the panel to cite even one
case brought before it in which Father was deemed to have filed –either by the Court or Sibley – a
frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible pleading. Notably, in denying the motion for rehearing, the
panel was unable and/or refused to so do.
10
III. COURSE O F PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. THE DISCIPLINARY COMM ITTEE HEARINGS
On November 22, 2002, Judge Lando – who apparently couldn’t wait to report her premature
incarceration of Sibley to the Florida Bar – wrote a letter to the Florida Bar reporting her “finding”
of contempt of Sibley – five weeks before the January 1, 2003, deadline to purge the terms of her
August 5, 2002, order. As a result, the Florida Bar assigned that complaint TFB File No. 2005-
00,557(2B) alleging failure to pay child support.
Delaying the matter apparently to allow the process to be the punishment – and with full
knowledge that the State of Maryland would not admit Sibley to practice as long as there was a
disciplinary proceeding pending in Florida – it was not until (i) November 5, 2005 when the
Grievance Committee found probable cause and (ii) July 12, 2006, that the Florida Bar filed the
instant complaint – a delay of One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Eight (1,328) days from
Judge Lando’s contrived complaint to filing of the first count of the instant Complaint on TFB File
No. 2005-00,557(2B).
The Second Count of the Complaint which alleges a violation of Rule 4-3.1 (Meritorious
Claims) arose from the Complaint of Sibley’s Former Wife’s attorney filed with the Florida Bar in
early December 2004 arising from the November 4, 2004 opinion in Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So.2d 980
(3rd DCA 2004) in which the Court found that Sibley was “a source of vexatious and meritless
litigation.” That matter was assigned TFB File No. 2003-00,597(2B). Again, making the process
the punishment, it was not until (i) December 1, 2005 that the Grievance Committee found probable
cause and (ii) July 12, 2006, that the Florida Bar filed the instant complaint – a delay of Six Three
Hundred Fifteen (615) days from the complaint to filing of the second count of the Complaint arising
11
from TFB File No. 2003-00,597(2B).
B. THE LEON COUNTY REFEREE
Continuing the pattern of using the nuisances of procedure to inflict punishment through
process prior to adjudication, Justice Lewis of the Florida Supreme Court in an order dated July 27,
2006, referred the matter to the Circuit Court of Leon County for assignment of a Referee. This
“assignment” was done without an iota of facts in the Complaint supporting venue in Leon County
and was plainly incompetent under Florida Bar Rule 3-7.6(d). Subsequently, the Honorable Judge
John E. Crusoe was appointed to act as Referee in the Florida disciplinary matter.
On July 15, 2006, Sibley served and filed his Notice of Depositions Duces Tecum and of
Production from Non-Parties” seeking the depositions of the judges who had issued the order upon
which solely the Florida Bar sought discipline.4
On September 15, 2006, Sibley filed his (i) Answers and Affirmative Defenses to the
Complaint, (ii) his “First Omnibus Motion” seeking, inter alia, a change in venue and (iii) motion
to compel production of documents previously requested from the Florida Bar.
On September 20, 2006, notwithstanding the pending motion to change venue, the Referee
entered his order denying Sibley’s “First Request for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum” seeking
the depositions of the afore-mentioned judges. On September 26, 2006, Sibley promptly filed his
“Motion to Re-Consider Order Denying Sibley’s First Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum”.
On October 3, 2006, as the Florida Bar couldn’t not raise a single argument in opposition to
4
Judges Gerald B. Cope, Jr., David M. Gersten, Melvia B. Green, Mario P. Goderich, of
Third District Court of Appeal, Alan R. Schwartz, Former Judge Third District Court of Appeal and
Maxine Cohen Lando, Judge, 11th Judicial Circuit.
12
the motion to transfer venue and thus did not object, the Referee granted Sibley’s motion to change
venue to Miami-Dade County, the only permissible venue under Florida Bar Rule 3-7.6(d).
C. THE MIAMI-DADE COUNTY REFEREE
Pursuant to Justice Lewis’ order of October 4, 2006, this matter was then transferred to
Miami-Dade County. The appointment of the Honorable Orlando A. Prescott as the successor-
Referee was made on October 11, 2006, by 11th Circuit Chief Judge Farina. According to the Florida
Supreme Court order of October 4, 2006, the Referee was ordered to (i) conduct a case management
conference within sixty (60) days, to wit, December 10, 2006, and (ii) to issue his Report by April
9, 2007.5
On September 1, 2006, the Florida Bar moved to strike Sibley’s Affirmative Defenses. On
December 15, 2006, without affording Sibley an opportunity to be heard in opposition, the Referee
granted the motion thereby striking those affirmative defenses which included, inter alia, federal
constitutional claims, and – commencing a pattern and practice of the Referee – signed the Florida
Bar’s proposed order without prior comment by Sibley on that order.
The next event is clouded due to its ex parte origins between the Referee and counsel for the
Florida Bar, but on December 18, 2006, again without prior consultation with Sibley, the Florida
Bar noticed a “Telephone Status Conference” for January 2, 2007. At that hearing, the Case
Management Conference to “establish a schedule for the proceedings” was set for January 23, 2007
– notably Forty Five (45) days after the Florida Supreme Court’s order requiring such a hearing by
December 10, 2006.
5
Putting the initial resolution of this matter at One Thousand Six Hundred (1,600) days since
the initial complaint by Judge Lando.
13
On January 16, 2002, the Referee entered an order granting Sibley’s motion to reconsider the
issuance of subpoenas for the afore-mentioned judges.
At the conclusion of the January 23, 2007, hearing, the Referee requested further briefing on
Sibley’s First Request for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum filed on September 16, 2006. Full
briefing was accomplished by the parties and non-parties as ordered by February 15, 2007.
Either prior to or after the hearing on January 23rd, the Referee – despite asking the parties
to submit an agreed-as-to-form order of his rulings at that hearing – entered the Florida Bar’s
proposed orders:
(i) Denying Sibley’s Motion to Compel production;
(ii) Denying Sibley’s Motion for More Definite

Statement; and
(iii) Granting the Florida Bar’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (though he denied the motion orally during
the hearing)
After consultation between the parties, they submitted the agreed-as-to-form order which the
Referee entered on January 29, 2007. Notably, accurately reflecting what transpired at the hearing,
the Florida Bar’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. Hence, despite the Florida Supreme
Court’s order requiring compliance with Florida Bar Rule 3-7.6(c) by December 10, 2006, as of
January 29, 2007, the Referee had ignored without (i) giving explanation or (ii) seeking leave to
delay his obligations to resolve the initial matters within the requisite Sixty (60) days.
Of perhaps determinative status, on January 31, 2007, Sibley filed his “Second Request for
Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum” seeking the deposition of Joanne E. Sargent, Counsel, Third
District Court of Appeals whose testimony was relevant to the matters at hand to demonstrate the
open hostility of the Florida judiciary to Sibley and serve as a basis to impeach the various orders
14
which were the sole accusations against Sibley made by “persons motivated by malice,
vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy”.6 A copy of the letter from Joanne E. Sargent
which demonstrates the hostility and bias of the Third District Court of Appeals in support of that
request is attached as Exhibit “B” to the Appendix. Significantly, the Referee never troubled himself
to rule upon this the Second Request and to this day it remains outstanding.
On March 8, 2007, shepard of the Referee’s obligations that the Florida Bar plainly sees its
role, counsel for the Florida Bar wrote the Referee requesting an order to set a final hearing date.
The Referee ignored this letter. On March 19, 2007, Mr. Min continued his secretarial duties for the
Referee reminding him again that the Referee had failed to discharge this Court’s order to set a final
hearing.
On March 27, 2007, the Referee in an ex parte communication contacted Mr. Min to request
Mr. Min to draft a motion to the Florida Supreme Court to enlarge time to finish the Report due on
April 9, 2007. Though specifically requested by Sibley to detail the nature of that ex parte
discussion pursuant to The Florida Bar v. Mason, 334 So.2d 1,7 (Fla. 1976)7, the Referee refused
to disclose the sum and substance of that ex parte communication.
Notably however, when contacted by Sibley making the same demand, Mr. Min stated “I
was contacted by Judge Prescott's assistant to submit a proposed Motion for Enlargement of Time.”8
6
Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 595 (1974) (Douglas, dissenting).
7
“We are unimpressed with Sibley's argument that the punishment is too severe,
particularly in view of Sibley's willful failure to disclose the ex parte communications after
being asked to do so by opposing counsel.” Id. at 7.
8
Mr. Min initially represented to Sibley that he was “contacted by the Referee” and only after
being accused of improper ex parte communication did he change his story to being contacted by
“Judge Prescott's assistant”.
15
A priori this is not an accurate representation by Mr. Min as the substance of the ex
parte communication obviously had to be quite a bit more than that as Mr. Min’s draft for the
Referee of the motion to enlarge time including the language as to the “good cause” for the delay.
Therefore, the ex parte communication between the Referee and Mr. Min was necessarily quite a bit
more than has been disclosed.
Thus, on March 27, 2007, Mr. Min indeed drafted a motion to enlarge time and forwarded
to the Referee who promptly and ultimately ignored it. Upon receipt of this proposed motion, Sibley
immediately made on March 28th his “Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Sibley's Fourth Affidavit
and Motion to Disqualify”.
After receipt on March 28th by the Referee of Sibley’s “Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively,
Sibley's Fourth Affidavit and Motion to Disqualify”, the Referee in a burst of judicial attention
without apparent forethought to this matter entered orders (i) clarifying his prior orders which had
both granted and denied the Florida Bar’s motion for summary judgment and (ii) denying Sibley First
Request for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum9.
Additionally, on March 28th, the Referee entered a “Notice of Final Hearing” setting April
16, 2007, at 1:00 p.m. for the putative, out-of-time and void Final Hearing. A copy of that “Notice
Setting Final Hearing” is attached to the Appendix as Exhibit “C” to the Appendix.
Notably, (i) there was no certificate of service on the “Notice”, thereby violating the
applicable Florida Bar Rules and (ii) the envelope in which the order was sent did not contain any
stamp and thus is of uncertain mailing date.
Moreover, notwithstanding the Referee had faxed orders to Sibley on various occasions (see
9
Though, as noted above, ignoring Sibley Second Request for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces
Tecum.
16
Exhibit “D” in the Appendix), the Referee decided it was appropriate to let Sibley – who lives in
Maryland – know of the hearing date by U.S. mail. Additionally, the “Notice” failed to indicate the
number of days for the hearing – not surprising as that issue was never raised or addressed at the
January 23, 2007, status hearing and indeed was incapable of being resolved as Sibley still had
discovery requests outstanding. Finally, the Referee never checked with Sibley as to his availability
for that hearing on April 16, 2007..
Upon receipt of the “Notice for Final Hearing” on April 5, 2007, Sibley immediately made
a motion to continue the trial for two weeks or, alternatively, appear by telephone hearing for the yet-
to-be held requisite Case Management Conference. The basis for the continuation request of two
weeks was that Sibley was (and still is) involved in a very-high profile case with issues both legal
and of national security concerns the discharge of which required his professional attentions to his
client in Washington, D.C., during the last two weeks of April.
On April 10, 2007, Mr. Min again reminded the Referee that the April 9th deadline had come
and gone, and suggested a motion for enlargement of time to file the Report might be politic.
Accordingly, on April 10, 2007, the Referee made a factually unsupported motion to enlarge,
seeking Forty-Five (45) days, to finish the matter – though the Referee did not believe it was
necessary for him to explain how he did not have time to finish this matter though given notice on
October 11, 2006, that he had to finish this matter by April 9, 2007.10 Significantly, in that motion
the Referee makes conclusory factual statements that Sibley specifically challenges as to their
validity.
On April 12, 2007, though having (i) failed to hold the requisite Case Management
10
The Florida Supreme Court granted that motion gratuitously converting it to a motion to
enlarge time without giving Sibley a chance to reply.
17
Conference at all, (ii) ignored this Court’s April 9, 2007, deadline to finish the final hearing and (iii)
belatedly asked for and received a Forty Five (45) extension from this Court to finish the matter, the
Referee refused Sibley’s “Motion to Continue Final Hearing”, for two weeks and refused to permit
Sibley to appear by telephone pursuant to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 2.071(c)
on April 16, 2007. A copy of that order is attached as Exhibit “D” to the Appendix.
On April 16, 2007, without permitting Sibley to appear by telephone, the Referee conducted
and concluded this matter at an ex parte hearing with Mr. Min thereby trying Sibley in absentia.
Sibley, due to the nature of his professional obligations, was unable to attend.
On or about April 20, 2007, Sibley and the Florida Bar submitted proposed Reports. On June
28, 2007 – adopting verbatim except for an increase of the term of suspension recommended by the
Florida Bar from two (2) to three (3) years the Florida Bar’s proposed Report and failing to include
a single fact or conclusion proposed by Sibley – the Referee putatively issued his Report, though –
continuing a pattern of passive-aggressive behavior towards Sibley – failed to serve it upon Sibley11.
A copy of that Report and Recommendation is attached as Exhibit “E” to the Appendix.
Given that the putative Report contained factual representations by the Referee which were
demonstrably false and included an ad hominem attack on Sibley, Sibley sought from the Florida
Supreme Court a subpoena duces tecum ad testificatum directed to the Referee given that Referee
misrepresented facts in the Report when he stated “The undersigned attempted to schedule a
mutually convenient time for the final hearing and left messages for the Sibley to determine what
his schedule was. As of the filing of this report, none of those messages have been returned.”
(Report, p. 2). This blatant prevarication can be established through telephone records and oral
11
This failure to serve by the passive-aggressive Referee was arguably to allow the time to
appeal to lapse thereby foreclosing appellate review.
18
examination of the Referee regarding this as to exactly when he “left messages” and Sibley’s alleged
failure to return them.
That request for discovery was denied by the Florida Supreme Court.
D. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS
On July 31, 2007, Sibley timely filed his “Petition for Review” with the Florida Supreme
Court despite the acknowledged improper attempts by the Referee and the Florida Supreme Court
to fore-shorten the time for that filing by (i) not properly serving Sibley and (ii) ex cathedra ignoring
the requirements of Florida Bar Rule 3-7.7(c)(1). Briefing by Sibley and the Florida Bar thereon was
concluded on November 15, 2007. Sibley’s appeal specifically raised the following issues:
1. Sibley was Denied A Fair and Impartial Judiciary;
2. Sibley Was Put to Charges Not Made Under Oath;
3. Sibley Was Denied His Right to Confront and Cross

Examine His Accusers and to Call Witnesses in His
Defense;
4. The Premise of Middlesex Was Violated by the

Striking of All Sibley's Affirmative Defenses Which,
Inter Alia Included Federal Constitutional Claims;
5. Sibley Could Not be Punished by Florida for Properly

Pursuing State and Federal Court Remedies; and
6. Florida Bar Disciplinary Proceeding Are a

"Quasi-criminal" Proceeding and Not a
"Quasi-judicial Administrative Proceeding";
Though Sibley had (i) moved to disqualify the Florida Supreme Court Justices and (ii)
specifically demanded oral argument by motion, the Florida Supreme Court never ruled upon these
requests and the appeal was submitted to the Florida Supreme Court for decision on November 21,
2007, without oral argument.
19
On February 29, 2008, Sibley-here filed as attorney for Florida J.A.I.L. 4 Judges12 a suit
against The Florida Bar, The Florida Supreme Court, and its sitting Justices. That suit was filed in
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and assigned Case. No.:
08-cv-20533-Altonaga, where it now pends.
On February 29, 2008, Laura Rush, counsel for the Florida Supreme Court and Justices
stipulated to and accepted service on behalf of the Florida Supreme Court and its Justices of the
Florida J.A.I.L. 4 Judges lawsuit. On March 4, 2008, Sibley The Florida Bar waived service of the
summons and complaint in that suit.
On March 7, 2008 – some One Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Three (1923) days or
over five (5) years after the original complaint was filed and Three (3) days after service of the new
federal complaint upon it – the Florida Supreme Court entered its order adopting the Referee's
Report and Recommendation and ordered the suspension of Sibley from the practice of law in
Florida for a period of three (3) years A copy of that order is attached as Exhibit “F” to the
Appendix.
Notably, in the March 7, 2008, order the Florida Supreme Court failed to address even one
12
Florida J.A.I.L. 4 Judges is actively seeking to amend Article V of the Florida Constitution
with certain provisions known as “The Judicial Accountability Law”(J.A.I.L.). The J.A.I.L. proposal
would create special grand juries to investigate complaints against judges. These grand juries would
have the power to discipline judges by levying fines, removing them from the bench and, where
appropriate, subjecting them to criminal proceedings before special trial juries. Under present
practice, the judiciary is de-facto self-regulated and this has led in many instances to intolerable
abuses of judicial discretion without recourse for those harmed. These instances have involved
conflict of interest, denial of due process, withholding of evidence, and other violations of the
constitutional rights of individuals, including arbitrary and unjustified fines, sanctions, seizure of
property, loss of parental rights and incarceration. United under the banner of Florida J.A.I.L. 4
Judges is a broad coalition of citizens from all backgrounds, professions, and political persuasions
who are dedicated to the mission of reforming the Florida judiciary.
20
of Sibley's points on appeal in its per curiam adoption without written explanation of the Referee's
Report.
On April 14, 2008, in response to a motion to stay filed by Sibley, the Florida Supreme Court
stayed Sibley’s suspension until May 14, 2008, pending further action by the United States Supreme
Court.
E. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS
On April 8, 2008, Sibley filed his petition for certiorari to review the Florida Supreme Court
suspension with the United States Court where it pends as Case No. 07-10270 and is set for
conference on June 5, 2008.
21
ARGUMENT
I. PROCEDUR AL ERRORS
A. THE SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT IS

VOID
On May 8, 2008, and on May 22, 2008, Applicant first learned from the Florida Supreme
Court Administrator (“Administrator”) that six (6) of the seven (7) justices of the Florida Supreme
Court did not take their requisite loyalty oaths prior to ruling on over twenty-five (25) interlocutory
and potentially dispositive motions relating to Applicant’s disciplinary hearing. That Administrator
provided copies of those Justices’ loyalty oaths which are attached and show the following:
(i) Justice Cantero13 has two oaths of office on file with

Florida. The first was un-dated and failed to comply
with both United States Code, 4 §§ 101 and 102. The
second, is dated October 10, 2007, more than five (5)
years after he was appointed by Governor Bush on
July 10, 2002.
(ii) Justice Bell’s14 has two oaths of office on file with

Florida. The first was dated December 7, 1990 – well
before his appointment as a Florida Supreme Court
Justice on December 30, 2002, by Governor Bush.
The second is dated October 10, 2007, almost five (5)
years after he was appointed.
(iii) Justice Charles T. Wells assumed his duties as Justice

of the Supreme Court on June 16, 1994, but did not
execute a loyalty oath until October 10, 2007, over
thirteen (13) years after he was appointed.
(iv) Justice Harry Lee Anstead advanced to the highest
13
On May 1, 2008, Justice Cantero resigned as a Justice of the Florida Supreme Court effective
September 6, 2008.
14
On May 24, 2008, Justice Cantero resigned as a Justice of the Florida Supreme Court
effective October 1, 2008.
22
judicial office in Florida government on July 1, 2002,

when he became Florida's 50th Chief Justice.
However, he did not execute his loyalty oath until
October 18, 2007, more than five (5) years after he
became Chief Justice.
(v) Justice Barbara J. Pariente was appointed as a Justice

of the Florida Supreme Court on December 10, 1997.
She has two oaths of office on file with the
Administrator. The first, improper as it is without a
notary jurat, apparently is dated stamped September
15, 1993, four years before she became a Justice. The
second is dated October 10, 2007, almost ten (10)
years after her appointment as a Justice.
(vi) Justice Peggy A. Quince was appointed to the Florida

Supreme Court on December 8, 1998, but did not
execute the loyalty oath until October 10, 2008,
almost ten (10) years after she was appointed.
(vii) Justice R. Fred Lewis was appointed to the Supreme

Court of Florida on December 7, 1998, and properly
executed his loyalty oath on January 13, 1999.
On May 16, 2008, the Miami-Dade County State Attorney’s Office Public Corruption
concluded its investigation of – among other judges – Judge Orlando Prescott – the Referee in this
matter.15
That investigation found in pertinent part:
Judge Orlando Prescott also stated to investigators that this matter

came to his attention when he was contacted by Ms. Kearson. He was
also a newly-appointed County Court judge in 2000. Judge Prescott
acknowledged that the signature on the Loyalty Oath form
submitted in his name was a forgery. He indicated that he had
15
Florida Bar Rule 3-7.6 “Procedures Before a Referee” states “(a) Referees. The chief justice
shall have the power to appoint referees to try disciplinary cases and to delegate to a chief judge of
a judicial circuit the power to appoint referees for duty in the chief judge’s circuit. Such appointees
shall ordinarily be active county or circuit judges, but the chief justice may appoint retired
judges.(Emphasis added). Thus, Applicant is entitled to a county, circuit or retired judge.
23
signed numerous documents at the time of his appointment, and

would have personally signed the oath had it been presented to him.
Judge Prescott successfully ran for retention in 2002, and was
elevated to the Circuit Court in 2005. After he was apprised of the
forged Loyalty Oath form, he executed a new oath on February
4, 2008. (Emphasis added.)
A copy of that report is attached hereto. Accordingly, Judge/Referee Prescott did not take the loyalty
oath until almost one (1) year after he issued his Report and Recommendation that Applicant be
suspended for three (3) years from the practice of law in Florida.
The significance of the failure of six (6) of the Florida Supreme Court Justices and
Judge/Referee Prescott to take the federally-required loyalty oath is straightforward: Both the federal
constitution and federal statutes require the loyalty oath to be executed before an individual may
commence the duties of their public office. Here, that was not properly done.
Article VI of the federal Constitution states: “The Senators and Representatives before
mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers,
both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to
support this Constitution.” (Emphasis added).
United States Code, Title 4, §101 states: “Oath by Members of Legislatures and Officers.
Every member of a State legislature, and every executive and judicial officer of a State, shall,
before he proceeds to execute the duties of his office, take an oath in the following form, to wit:
“I, A B, do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States.” (Emphasis
added). Following is 4 U.S.C. §102 which requires: “Same; by Whom Administered. Such oath may
be administered by any person who, by the law of the State, is authorized to administer the oath of
office; and the person so administering such oath shall cause a record or certificate thereof to be
made in the same manner, as by the law of the State, he is directed to record or certify the oath of
24
office.”
In Florida, that “law of the State” is found at the Florida Constitution, Article II, §5(b)16 and
Florida Statute §876.05(1)17. Here, indisputably, Judge/Referee Prescott failed to take that oath
before he conducted the disciplinary proceedings against Applicant. Likewise, as evidenced from
the docket sheet of Applicant’s disciplinary proceedings before the Florida Supreme Court, that
Court entered over twenty-five (25) orders on motions – many of them dispositive – before the six
Justices realized in October 2007 that they had failed to follow federal and Florida law related to
loyalty oaths and began to execute proper oaths of office.18
The consequence of the failure to take the loyalty oath is plain: All actions take prior to the
oaths being taken are void. While federal law is undeveloped on this point, the Florida Supreme
Court has repeatedly confirmed the “void” nature of such pre-loyalty oath activity. In Treasure, Inc.
16
“Each state and county officer, before entering upon the duties of the office, shall give bond
as required by law, and shall swear or affirm: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support,
protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and of the State of Florida;
that I am duly qualified to hold office under the Constitution of the state; and that I will well and
faithfully perform the duties of (title of office) on which I am now about to enter. So help me God.”,
and thereafter shall devote personal attention to the duties of the office, and continue in office until
a successor qualifies.”
17
“Public employees; oath. All persons who now or hereafter are employed by or who now or
hereafter are on the payroll of the state, . . . are required to take an oath before any person duly
authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments for public record in the state in the
following form: I, _____, a citizen of the State of Florida and of the United States of America, and
being employed by or an officer of _____ and a recipient of public funds as such employee or officer,
do hereby solemnly swear or affirm that I will support the Constitution of the United States and of
the State of Florida.”
18
“Generally, state officials know something of the individual's basic legal rights. If they do
not, they should, for they assume that duty when they assume their office. Ignorance of the law is
no excuse for men in general. It is less an excuse for men whose special duty is to apply it, and
therefore to know and observe it.” Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 129 (1945)(Justice
Rutledge, concurring, emphasis added).
25
v. State Beverage Dept, 238 So.2d 580, 583 (Fla. 1970), the Florida Supreme Court stated:
The exercise of sovereign power is constitutionally restricted to those

who meet the constitutional requirements – and only to those. The
taking of the oath and the issuing of the formal commission not
only constitute the official conveyance to the recipient of a
portion of the state's sovereign power, but serve to impress upon
the appointee or elected official the great public trust and
confidence which is placed in him by his appointment. This
Court long ago held that in the absence of a duly executed
commission, the person appointed to exercise the state's power
lacks the authority to exercise such power. (Emphasis added).
Similarly, in Tappy v. State ex rel. Byington, 82 So.2d 161, 165-166 (Fla. 1955) the same
Court held:
Section 2, Article XVI, of the Constitution provides, so far as it is

material here, that 'Each and every officer of this State * * * shall
before entering upon the discharge of his official duties take the
following oath of office * * *.' There can be no doubt that because of
this provision, the taking of the official oath by Governor Collins
was an indispensable ingredient of the installation in office which
the Constitution required, and that until this oath was taken
Governor Collins was not 'duly qualified' as governor, for the
reason that without the oath he had no power or authority to
discharge the official duties of the office of governor.” (Emphasis
added).
Accord: Opinion of the Justices, 14 Fla. 277 (Strict compliance with state loyalty oath law is
necessary, and failure to comply strips an officer of all governmental power); Attorney General
Opinion, AGO96-41.19
19
“You have asked for my opinion on substantially the following questions: 1. May a person
elected to the Charter Board of the City of Tamarac assume that office without taking the statutorily
prescribed oath set out in section 876.05, Florida Statutes? . . .In sum: 1. All elected officers of the
City of Tamarac are required by law to take the oath set forth in section 876.05, Florida Statutes. .
. .The provisions of the statute apply to all employees and elected officers of the state, including the
Governor and constitutional officers and all employees and elected officers of all cities, towns,
counties, and political subdivisions, including the school system . . .The oath must be taken before
a person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments for public record and must be filed with
26
Accordingly, the judicial actions taken by Judge/Referee Prescott and the six Florida
Supreme Court Justices were void and Applicant will prevail on this issue.
B. RULE 3-7.7(F) VIOLATES FLORIDA AND FEDERAL LAW
The procedural rights attendant upon this disciplinary proceeding are determined by the
nature of this proceeding. The Florida Supreme Court has defined the nature of attorney disciplinary
proceedings as “a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding.” Rule 3-7.7(f)(1). By so doing, the
Florida Supreme Court has violated Federal law thereby denied to Sibley his fundamental procedural
rights. Accordingly, Sibley takes exception to the characterization of Florida attorney disciplinary
proceedings as “a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding” under Rule 3-7.7(f)(1).
As the United States Supreme Court has stated: “Disbarment, designed to protect the public,
is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380, 18 L.Ed.
366; Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515. He is accordingly entitled to procedural due process,
which includes fair notice of the charge. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273. . . .These are adversary
proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,
550-551 (1968). Accordingly, notwithstanding any Florida Rule or pronouncement by the inferior
Florida Supreme Court,, the attorney disciplinary proceedings must not trespass upon those rights
guaranteed to Sibley under the United States Constitution.
Moreover, the significance of attorneys in our society cannot be ignored either. In an 8-1
decision, the Supreme Court recognized:
The lawyer's role in the national economy is not the only reason that
the opportunity to practice law should be considered a “fundamental
right.” We believe that the legal profession has a noncommercial role
and duty that reinforce the view that the practice of law falls within
the records of the governing official or employing governmental agency.” (Footnotes omitted).
27
the ambit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Out-of-state

lawyers may -- and often do -- represent persons who raise unpopular
federal claims. In some cases, representation by nonresident counsel
may be the only means available for the vindication of federal rights.
The lawyer who champions unpopular causes surely is as important
to the “maintenance or well being of the Union,” as was the shrimp
fisherman in Toomer or the pipeline worker in Hicklin.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
Here, Sibley – an “out-of-state lawyer” – has and continues to raise “unpopular federal
claims” in the Florida courts – when only he can for (i) lack of local counsel willing to incur the
wrath of a demonstrably vindictive Florida judiciary20 and (ii) the natural ability to persevere
regardless of personal cost imposed by a Florida judicial resolution system which is “fair” in name
only.
Accordingly, Sibley was denied those procedural rights secured by the federal Constitution
and thus, pursuant to Addendum 5, Rule 5(B)(1) has shown that “the procedure used to make such
determination was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of
the attorney's due process rights”.
C. THE DELAY IN RESOLUTION DENIED DUE PROCESS TO SIBLEY
While it is doubtlessly true that: “The constitutional right to a speedy trial in criminal cases
has no application to civil proceedings”21, the United States Supreme Court had held that:
“Disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the. . . .These
are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-551
(1968). Accordingly, some aspect of speedy trial rights must attach to such this disciplinary
20
See Exhibit “B” to the Appendix hereto.
21
Julian v. Lee, 473 So.2d 736, 739 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); see also Amend. VI, U.S. Const.
28
proceeding. Indeed, while the constitutional right to speedy trial in attorney disciplinary proceedings
has never been expressly addressed, analogous situations abound compelling this Court to recognize
the delay here has frustrated the assertion of Sibley’s rights and damaged him immeasurably. 22
Here, the allegations were brought to the Florida Bar’s attention in December 2002. Now,
some One Thousand Six Hundred (1600) days or Four and One Half (4 ½) years later, this matter
is still pending against Sibley.
In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967), for example, where the government's
delay in the prosecution for criminal trespass of a civil rights demonstrator was found to be
unjustified under the Constitution's speedy trial clause, the court noted that the right to quick
resolution of controversies “has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first
articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein
it was written, ‘We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right’
. . .”23
22
“Many of the same considerations that impel judicial protection of the right to a "speedy
trial" in criminal cases or implementation of civil decrees with all deliberate speed are not
inapposite in agency deliberations. Those situations generally involve protection of constitutional
rights, but delay in the resolution of administrative proceedings can also deprive regulated entities,
their competitors or the public of rights and economic opportunities without the due process the
Constitution requires.” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. F. C. C., 627 F.2d 322, 341 (D.C. Cir.
1980)(Footnotes omitted, emphasis added.) Accord: Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring; citation omitted)(“Society's interest in avoiding undue delay in criminal
trials stems from a general presumption that governmental delay is unfair: "Despite the difficulties
of proving, or disproving, actual harm in most cases, it seems that inherent in prosecutorial delay is
'potential substantial prejudice' . . . ."); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926)
("(p)roperty may be as effectively taken by long-continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end
to confiscatory rates as by an express affirmance of them.").
23
Regarding the application of the constitutional speedy trial right at least in quasi-criminal
administrative proceedings, see Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 Mich.L.Rev.
1423, 1436-39 (1978).
29
Likewise, Sibley has a federal “constitutional right to be brought to trial within a reasonable
time.” The State of Florida has an obligation imposed on it that “justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay”.24 Can this Court publically say that a Sixteen Hundred (1600) day
delay in adjudication is discharging that burden?
Here Sibley has been significantly harmed by the delay. Factual issues have become clouded
due the passage of time. Documents are no longer available. On a professional level, the bar
complaint against Sibley has caused Sibley to repeatedly lose clients who did not want to invest their
legal matters with an attorney who may be disbarred. Moreover, the State of Maryland has refused
to admit Sibley to practice as long as the Florida Bar proceedings continue. Last, lost to the gowned-
ones is the stress that this constant Damocles sword hanging over Sibley’s head for over four years
this proceeding represents. To further delay is simply to continue to punish Sibley without a hearing
implicate the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual prohibition.
D. THE LACK OF SWORN ALLEGATIONS AND REFUSAL TO PERM IT

SIBLEY TO CALL WITNESSES
The Florida Supreme Court has held that: “In addition to the authority to hear this evidence
provided by the Florida Evidence Code, a referee in a bar-discipline case can consider any evidence
he or she deems relevant to resolving a factual question.” The Florida Bar v. Clement, 662 So.2d
690,f/n #3 (Fla. 1995).
24
Florida Constitution, Article I, § 21. Access to courts.
30
However, Sibley expressly challenges this holding as the superior federal law prohibits this
court from allowing disciplinary proceedings which trespass upon those rights guaranteed to Sibley
under the U.S. Constitution. Those rights include the right under the Sixth Amendment to “be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” Thus, notwithstanding any Florida
law to the contrary, under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, the Acts of
Reconstruction and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, Sibley has the right to confront his
accusers before suffering any “punishment or penalty imposed” upon him.
The United States Supreme Court held that “(i)n almost every setting where important
decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). Likewise, in
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959), the court found that cross-examination and
confrontation must be permitted whenever “governmental action seriously injures an individual, and
the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings” was one of the “immutable' principles of
our jurisprudence.”
Most significantly, in Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530 (1824), the Court was presented with
a motion for mandamus to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, to restore Mr. Burr to his
place of attorney at the bar of that Court. In detailing the level of proof necessary to remove an
attorney from the practice of law, the Court held: “In the case at bar, the proceedings were supposed
to be irregular, because Mr. Burr was put to answer charges not made on oath. That the charges,
in a regular complaint against an attorney, ought not to be received and acted on, unless made on
oath, is admitted. It is a course of proceeding which is recommended by considerations, too obvious
31
to require that they should be urged.” (Emphasis added).
Here, The Florida Bar failed to present charges under oath or permit Sibley to “be
confronted with the witnesses against him”.
Moreover, Sibley was denied an opportunity to call witnesses in his defense, i.e., Judge
Lando, the six Third District Court of Appeal Judges and their legal counsel, Joanne Sargent.
Thus, it bordered upon the intellectually dishonest for the first Referee to cite United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) for the proposition that Sibley should be denied the testimony of
the un-sworn complaining witnesses as requested when the history of that case clearly establishes
that Sibley falls within the exception to the general rule cited in United States v. Morgan..
The Morgan line of cases arose from the validity of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture
fixing maximum rates to be charged by market agencies at the Kansas City Stockyards. Packers and
Stockyards Act 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181 – 229. In the first case, Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S.
468 (1936), the contention that the plaintiffs had not been accorded the hearing which the statute
made a prerequisite to a valid order was at issue. The district court had struck from plaintiffs’
complaints the allegations that the Secretary had made the order without having heard or read the
evidence and without having heard or considered the arguments submitted, and that his sole
information with respect to the proceeding was derived from consultation with employees in the
Department of Agriculture. United States v. Morgan, 304 U.S. 1, 14 (1938).
The Supreme Court concluded that first case by stating “that it was error to strike these
allegations, that the defendant should be required to answer them, and that the question whether
plaintiffs had a proper hearing should be determined.” Id. (Emphasis added).
Hence, finding that the Secretary of Agriculture sat in a similar position to that of a judge
32
required fundamental due process25, the Supreme Court went on to order that the Secretary answer
question under oath concerning the nature of the actions he took in his judicial capacity so that the
plaintiffs’ allegations could be properly considered. “The defendants should be required to answer
these allegations, and the question whether plaintiffs had a proper hearing should be determined.”
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 482.26
Subsequently, “after the remand, the bills were amended and interrogatories were directed
25
“That duty is widely different from ordinary executive action. It is a duty which carries with
it fundamental procedural requirements. There must be a full hearing. There must be evidence
adequate to support pertinent and necessary findings of fact. Nothing can be treated as evidence
which is not introduced as such. United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway Co., supra. Facts
and circumstances which ought to be considered must not be excluded. Facts and circumstances
must not be considered which should not legally influence the conclusion. Findings based on the
evidence must embrace the basic facts which are needed to sustain the order. . . A proceeding of this
sort requiring the taking and weighing of evidence, determinations of fact based upon the
consideration of the evidence, and the making of an order supported by such findings, has a quality
resembling that of a judicial proceeding. Hence it is frequently described as a proceeding of a quasi
judicial character. The requirement of a 'full hearing' has obvious reference to the tradition of
judicial proceedings in which evidence is received and weighed by the trier of the facts. The 'hearing'
is designed to afford the safeguard that the one who decides shall be bound in good conscience to
consider the evidence, to be guided by that alone, and to reach his conclusion uninfluenced by
extraneous considerations which in other fields might have play in determining purely executive
action. The 'hearing' is the hearing of evidence and argument. If the one who determines the facts
which underlie the order has not considered evidence or argument, it is manifest that the hearing has
not been given. ” Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480-481. (Emphasis added).
26
In fact, “The part taken by the Secretary himself in the departmental proceedings is shown
by his full and candid testimony. The evidence had been received before he took office. He did not
hear the oral argument. The bulky record was placed upon his desk and he dipped into it from time
to time to get its drift. He decided that probably the essence of the evidence was contained in
appellants' briefs. These, together with the transcript of the oral argument, he took home with him
and read. He had several conferences with the Solicitor of the Department and with the officials in
the Bureau of Animal Industry, and discussed the proposed findings. He testified that he considered
the evidence before signing the order. The substance of his action is stated in his answer to the
question whether the order represented his independent conclusion, as follows: 'My answer to the
question would be that that very definitely was my independent conclusion as based on the findings
of the men in the Bureau of Animal Industry. I would say, I will try to put it as accurately as possible,
that it represented my own independent reactions to the findings of the men in the Bureau of Animal
Industry.’” United States v. Morgan, 304 U.S. 1, 18.
33
to the Secretary which he answered. The court received the evidence which had been introduced at
its previous hearing, together with additional testimony bearing upon the nature of the hearing
accorded by the Secretary. This evidence embraced the testimony of the Secretary and of several
of his assistants. The district court rendered an opinion, with findings of fact and conclusions of
law, holding that the hearing before the Secretary was adequate and, on the merits, that his order was
lawful. On this appeal, plaintiffs again contend (1) that the Secretary's order was made without the
hearing required by the statute; and (2) that the order was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial
evidence.” United States v. Morgan, 304 U.S. 1, 14. (Emphasis added).
After reviewing the testimony of the Secretary, the Supreme Court found that there was a
failure to accord due process holding:
The maintenance of proper standards on the part of administrative

agencies in the performance of their quasi judicial functions is of the
highest importance and in no way cripples or embarrasses the
exercise of their appropriate authority. On the contrary, it is in their
manifest interest. For, as we said at the outset, if these multiplying
agencies deemed to be necessary in our complex society are to serve
the purposes for which they are created and endowed with vast
powers, they must accredit themselves by acting in accordance
with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic
concepts of fair play. As the hearing was fatally defective, the
order of the Secretary was invalid.
United States v. Morgan, 304 U.S. 1, 22. (Emphasis added).
Here, Sibley is alleging – and he is collaborated by the dissent in Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So.2d
847(Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2002) – that the judicial actors who entered the orders upon which the two
counts of the complaint are based were not relying upon the record before them. Moreover, that the
Third District Court of Appeal judges – just as the Secretary in Morgan – could not have made their
determination that Sibley’s cases were “meritless” in the cases which they were not empaneled to
34
decide.
Accordingly, the trilogy of Morgan cases clearly establishes the exception to the general rule
which prohibits the deposition of judges: where the facts upon which they relied are at issue.
Here, Sibley was not seeking the “meaning” of the subject orders, but instead the “relevant
facts” relied upon by the judges in each of the cases the Florida Bar relied upon to maintain that
Sibley behaved in a manner which violated the cited Florida Bar Rules. If, as Sibley maintains with
authority, those judges relied upon evidence (i) “which was not introduced as such” and/or (ii)
“which should not legally influence the conclusion”, then due process has been denied him and no
finding of an ethical breach can be premises upon such discredited orders.
Additionally, the right to confront and cross examine is particularly relevant when the
complaining witnesses – here the judges and their legal counsel – can be demonstrated to be made
by “persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy”.
This point is made indelible – and thus binding upon this inferior Court – in Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-497 (1959), where the Court stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our

jurisprudence. One of these is that, where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action
depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has
an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the
case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the
evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory
might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons
motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or
jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements
of confrontation and cross-examination. . . . This Court has been
zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not
only in criminal cases . . . , but also in all types of cases where
administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny.
35
Here, this Court would sanction the extreme harm to Sibley by government action of
suspension or disbarment by judges demonstrably “motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance,
prejudice, or jealousy” without requiring those individuals to swear to their charges or permit Sibley
to cross-examine them all the while shielding their judicial acts from any sort of scrutiny under the
(i) per curiam affirmance without written decision policy and (ii) the defense of judicial immunity
to any claim against a judge.
Hence, the failure to (i) permit Sibley to take discovery or call as witnesses the subject judges
and (ii) acknowledge and rule upon the request to take Joanne Sargent’s deposition rises to a level
of Sixth Amendment constitutional deprivation and as such, Sibley was denied those procedural
rights secured by the federal Constitution and thus, pursuant to Addendum 5, Rule 5(B)(1) has
shown that “the procedure used to make such determination was so lacking in notice or opportunity
to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of the attorney's due process rights”.
E. THE REFEREE’S ABUSE OF DISCRETION VIOLATED DUE PROCESS
It was a plain abuse of discretion for the Referee to refuse to continue the putative “Final
Hearing” for two weeks to accommodate Sibley’s pre-existing professional obligations.
Clearly, the Referee ignored the Florida Supreme Court’s orders on the timely resolution of
the disciplinary matter. Thus, the Referee while granting to himself the ex cathedra right to do
whatever he pleased, Sibley – who sought only a Fourteen (14) day delay in a matter that was Sixteen
Hundred (1600) days old – could not be afforded that minimal courtesy by the Referee.
“A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and
absent abuse of that discretion the court's decision will not be reversed on appeal.” Ziegler v. Klein,
590 So.2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). “Factors to be considered in determining whether the
36
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance include whether the denial of
the continuance creates an injustice for the movant; whether the cause of the request for continuance
was unforeseeable by the movant and not the result of dilatory practices; and whether the opposing
party would suffer any prejudice or inconvenience as a result of a continuance.” Fleming v. Fleming,
710 So.2d 601, 603 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 1998). Accord: United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1359
(9th Cir.) (Flynt ), amended, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.1985).
Here, (i) Sibley had not sought a continuance before, (ii) no “injustice” would be created by
delaying the final hearing two weeks, (iii) Sibley’s continuance request was “unforeseeable” as the
Referee did not give notice to Sibley of the final hearing until ten (10) days before the hearing and
failed to indicate the length of the hearing, (iv) Sibley engaged in no dilatory practices but promptly
and timely filed each document and (v) no “prejudice or inconvenience“ would be suffered by a two-
week delay.
Moreover, and most significantly, by refusing to continue the Final hearing two weeks, the
Referee forced upon Sibley a “Hobson’s Choice”27 of attending the hearing or breaching his
professional obligations to a client who was in constant need of them during a significant point in
her criminal and civil proceedings in Washington D.C.28
27
Hobson's choice is an apparently free choice which is really no choice at all. The phrase is
said to originate from Thomas Hobson (1544–1630), a livery stable owner at Cambridge, England
who, in order to rotate the use of his horses, offered customers the choice of either taking the horse
in the stall nearest the door—or taking none at all.
28
In the District of Columbia, Sibley represent Deborah Jeanne Palfrey, a/k/a the “D.C.
Madam” who (i) was indicted in a matter assigned Criminal Case Number: 07-046-GK and (ii) has
had all her assets seized in a civil forfeiture matter in Case No.:1:06-CV-01710-GK. During the
time frame of mid-April 2007, Sibley was faced with (i) an injunction against him personally
regarding records he held and (ii) preparing the documents for the transition of her criminal
appointed attorney to a new attorney. Additionally, significant issues regarding communications
with the White House Counsel’s office were on-going during this time. These, and other matters that
37
Additionally, at the hearing on January 23, 2007, the Referee failed to discharge his
obligations pursuant to Florida Bar Rule 3-7.6(c) which states:
Within 60 days of the order assigning the case to the referee, the
referee shall conduct a pretrial conference. The purpose of the
conference is to set a schedule for the proceedings, including
discovery deadlines and a final hearing date. The referee shall enter
a written order in the proceedings reflecting the schedule determined
at the conference.
Again, the Referee at the January 23rd hearing failed to:
(i) Set a schedule for the proceedings;

(ii) Set discovery deadlines;
(iii) Set a final hearing date; or
(iv) Enter a “written order “reflecting the schedule
determined at the conference” (notably because no
such schedule was determined at the conference).
Instead, Sibley is ambushed on April 5, 2007, by an order to appear for the putative “Final
Hearing” absent notice of (i) who the witnesses of the Complainant will be and (ii) who he may call
in his defense. Plainly, this Court cannot condone such behavior and conclude that “due process”
was accorded Sibley here.
As such, it was an abuse of discretion to require Sibley to drop everything – including his
personal child care responsibilities – and rush off to Miami for the Referee’s putative29 final hearing.
Last, it is worthy of note that Sibley sought leave to appear by telephone for the yet-to-be
concluded requisite Case Management Conference on April 16, 2007, but the Referee refused that
Sibley is unable to disclose at this time, precluded Sibley from disappearing to Miami for a hearing
of indeterminate length during the last two weeks of April without breaching his obligations to his
client and the Court which had entered a temporary injunction against him.
29
“Putative” is the correct adjective here as (i) the Case Management hearing had never been
completed and (ii) the Referee had never ruled upon Sibley’s Second Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum.
38
request by ignoring it.
the attorney's due process rights.
F. THE DENIAL OF DOCUMENTARY DISCOVERY
On August 10, 2006, Sibley served upon the Florida Bar a request to produce. On August
14, 2006, The Florida Bar served its response. Sibley promptly file a motion to compel production
of the documents requested. On January 23, 2007, the Referee denied Sibley’s motion to compel.
A review of Sibley’s Requests 1, 2, 5 and 6, reveal that at the very least, each may “ lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence”. Briefly stated:
Request #1: All documents related every instance when

Complainant has disciplined a member for the Florida Bar for
violation of Rule 4-8.4(h) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar –
The selective prosecution of Sibley by Complainant is a central
affirmative defense in this matter and as such the relevance of the
disposition of similarly situated Sibleys is relevant. Cf.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
Request #2: All documents related every instance when

Complainant has disciplined a member for the Florida Bar for
violation of Rule 4-3.1 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar – see
#1 above.
Request #5: All documents related to reports detailing the number

of complaints processed by Complainant for each of the last three
years – Plainly, Sibley has a right to have “justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay”. The time of processing
complaints by the Complainant thus is relevant to a determination of
whether Sibley’s rights to “justice without delay” have been violated
by Complainant.
Request #6: All documents related to reports detailing the length
39
of time to process complaints by Complainant for each of the last

three years – see #5 above.
As noted in Greene, supra, “. . .where governmental action seriously injures an individual,
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it
is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence . . .” Here, the denial to
Sibley of the sought-after documentary evidence also denied to Sibley fundamental due process.
Accord: Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)(“Although the Due Process Clause has little
to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded . . . it does speak to the
balance of forces between the accused and his accuser.”)
The requests were particularly relevant as (i) there is no reported decision sanctioning an
attorney as Sibley was sought to be sanction here for alleged “meritless” filings and (ii) since the
amendment in 1995 to the Florida Bar Rules to include Rule 4-8.4(h), there has been no reported
sanctioning of an attorney for violating this Rule of not paying child support. Accordingly, how the
Florida Bar has treated other similarly situated attorneys is clearly relevant to Sibley’s claims herein.
Accordingly, for the denial of access to relevant documentary evidence, Sibley was denied
those procedural rights secured by the federal Constitution and thus, pursuant to Addendum 5, Rule
5(B)(1) has shown that “the procedure used to make such determination was so lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of the attorney's due process rights.
G. STRIKING O F AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
On September 1, 2006, the Florida Bar moved to strike Sibley's Affirmative Defenses. On
December 15, 2006, without affording Sibley an opportunity to be heard in opposition, the Referee
40
granted the motion and struck all of Sibley's affirmative defenses.30
As this Court knows, Sibley sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Florida Bar
Disciplinary Proceedings against him in United States District Court. This Court ruled in dismissing
the appeal of the district court abstention on Younger grounds: “To the extent that Appellant's
claims are based on state litigation which had already concluded when he filed his complaint, such
claims are barred by Rooker/Feldman” and (ii) “Appellant's claims arising from his current bar
disciplinary proceedings, including his challenge to the Florida Supreme Court's recusal practices,
. . . are precluded by Younger/Middlesex abstention principles.” Sibley v. The Florida Supreme
Court, Case No.: 07- 14563-B (11th Cir. 2008).
The petition for certiorari on those claims is pending before the United States Court. See:
Sibley v. The Florida Supreme Court, et al., Case No.: 07-9171.
Sibley's claims in that regard were dismissed by this Court under the doctrine enunciated by
the Court in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
In Middlesex, the Supreme Court held:
Proceedings necessary for the vindication of important state policies

or for the functioning of the state judicial system also evidence the
state's substantial interest in the litigation. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431
U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977). Where vital
state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain "unless
state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims."
Moore, 442 U.S. at 426. "[T]he . . . pertinent inquiry is whether the
state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the
30
Sibley’s constitutional claims raised in his stricken affirmative defenses included, inter alia,
his: fundamental rights as a parent as a parent recognized in M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 116
(1996), fundamental right to access court, First Amendment right to petition the government, Article
IV, Privileges and Immunities Clause right to access court, Fifth Amendment Due Process right to
access court, federal Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection right to access court, Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process right to access court, federal right to access federal court recognized in
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964).
41
constitutional claims. . . ." Id. at 430. See also Gibson v. Berryhill,

411 U.S. 564 (1973). (Emphasis added).
Id. at 432. In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled: "So long as the constitutional claims of Sibleys
can be determined in the state proceedings, and so long as there is no showing of bad faith,
harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate, the
federal courts should abstain." Id. at 435. (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court – and its putative impartial Referee – were
obligated to "afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims. . . ." Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979). Here, Sibley sought to raise his federal constitutional claims in his
affirmative defenses to the Complaint of the Florida Bar. They were stricken from consideration by
the Referee and ignored on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.
Hence, the conceptual underpinning of Middlesex – that Florida's state courts are competent
to determine federal constitutional claims – has been proved to be false. Here, not only were all
Sibley's claims stricken by the Referee, the Florida Supreme Court – though properly presented with
an appeal raising these issues – ignored each and every issue in its per curiam adoption of the
Referee's suspension recommendation.
Thus, unlike the Sibley in Middlesex who"had an ‘opportunity to raise and have timely
decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved,' Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. at
577", Sibley here had no such opportunity. Middlesex at 437.
Therefore, Sibley was denied the procedural rights secured by the federal Constitution
through Middlesex and thus, pursuant to Addendum 5, Rule 5(B)(1) has shown that “the procedure
used to make such determination was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute
a deprivation of the attorney's due process rights.”
42
H. VERBATIM ADOPTION OF BAR ’S PROPOSED ORDER
A review of the proposed “Report” from the Florida Bar and the “Report” eventually signed
and submitted by the Referee reveal that they are de facto and de jure identical.
The U.S. Supreme court noted in Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985):
We, too, have criticized courts for their verbatim adoption of findings
of fact prepared by prevailing parties, particularly when those
findings have taken the form of conclusory statements unsupported
by citation to the record. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1964); United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 615, n. 13 (1974). We are also aware
of the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the part of
attorneys preparing findings of fact when they have already been
informed that the judge has decided in their favor.
As a result, the proceedings before the Referee were violative of the right to an impartial
tribunal and as such Sibley was denied those procedural rights secured by the federal Constitution
I. SIBLEY WAS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL
In his Answer to the Florida Bar Complaint, Sibley demanded “a trial by jury of each issues
raised by the pleadings and so triable”, or, alternatively, an advisory jury.
Clearly, it is black letter law that criminal defendants have a fundamental right to jury trial
and infringement of that right is fundamental error. Given that an attorney disciplinary hearing is
a “quasi-criminal” proceeding, the novel question arises as to whether Sibley was similarly entitled
to a jury trial as he requested.
The first landmark decisions since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution which confirmed the
43
right of the defense in a criminal case to not have the bench make a decision on motions until all
legal arguments had been made by both sides before the jury, United States v. Fenwick, 25 F. Cas.
1062; 4 Cranch C.C. 675 (1836); and, 22 F. Cas. 1322; 5 Cranch C.C. 573 (1839)(Right to make
legal argument to jury). Later the Fourth Circuit in U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F 2d 1002, 1006 (1969)
affirmed the right of jury nullification, stating,
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to

acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge,
and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long
as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts
cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which
they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the
defendant is accused, is unjust, or that exigent circumstances
justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which
appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit,
and the courts must abide by that decision. (Emphasis added).
As such, in this quasi-criminal matter, Sibley was entitled – and denied – a jury trial on the
claims in the Florida Bar Complaint. Thus, Sibley was denied those procedural rights secured by
the federal Constitution and thus, pursuant to Addendum 5, Rule 5(B)(1) has shown that “the
procedure used to make such determination was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as
to constitute a deprivation of the attorney's due process rights”.
J. FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
Indisputably Sibley is entitled under the Fifth Amendment to the “absolute right” to an
impartial and competent tribunal. “The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative
proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of
unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected
individuals in the decision making process.” Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
44
Here, in five particulars that right has been trampled by the Referees’ behavior in this case:
1. By entering the Order of August 7, 2006, without affording Sibley a

chance to be heard in opposition – which would have included among
other issues that it was arguably federal contempt of court for the
Referee to proceed at that point in time as the matter had been
removed to federal court – the Referee indulged in prohibited judicial
behavior – deciding a matter before hearing both sides.
2. The Referee’s apparent attempt to cover-up the failure to abide by the

thirty (30) day ruling requirement by the Referee, apparently
manipulating the record to avoid an undesirable result for him
personally and professionally as it appears the Referee has done so
here.
3. The Referee simply signing any proposed order the Florida Bar
presents to him without any real understanding or concern for the
issues presented.
4. In an egregious example of ex parte communications, the Referee and

the attorney for the Florida Bar have engaged in improper ex parte
communications.
5. The Referee has ignored the express order of the Florida Supreme
Court to timely conduct a Case Management Conference and final
hearing to Sibley’s prejudice by forcing him to make motions to
disqualify thus inflaming a judge’s sense of un-reviewableness.
As a result of which, neither of the two Referees can be considered fair and impartial in this
matter.
Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court’s impartiality was repeatedly questioned given the
pending federal suits individually and on behalf of J.A.I.L. for Judges against the Florida Supreme
Court and its Justice by Sibley which questioning was ignored by that Court.
Accordingly, for denial of a competent and impartial magistrate, Sibley was denied those
procedural rights secured by the federal Constitution and thus, pursuant to Addendum 5, Rule
5(B)(1) has shown that “the procedure used to make such determination was so lacking in notice or
45
opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of the attorney's due process rights”.
K. FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
Last, the Florida Supreme Court's order of March 7, 2008, adopting per curiam without
written reasons the Referee's report violates due process guarantees imposed on a court to detail the
ratio decidendi for a decision.
In Black v. Romano 471 U.S. 606 (1985), Justice Marshall in his concurrence wrote:
The theme unifying these cases is that whether due process requires
written reasons for a decision, or for a particular step in the decision
making process, is, like all due process questions, to be analyzed
under the three-factor standard set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976). When written reasons would contribute significantly
to the "fairness and reliability" of the process by which an individual
is deprived of liberty or property, id., at 343, reasons must be given
in this form unless the balance between the individual interest
affected and the burden to the government tilts against the individual.
Id., at 335. Whether written reasons would make such a contribution
in any particular case depends on a variety of factors, including the
nature of the decision making tribunal, the extent to which other
procedural protections already assure adequately the fairness and
accuracy of the proceedings, and the nature of the question being
decided. (Footnotes omitted.)
Here, a patently procedurally defective disciplinary proceeding demanded a written decision
from the Florida Supreme Court to comport the challenged-by-Petitioner procedures with federal
constitutional constraints. Yet, instead, all the Florida Supreme Court did was adopt a Referee's
Report which had struck from consideration – and thus ignored – Petitioner's substantial federal
constitutional objections. A litigant might as well be in the Coliseum before a Cesar for all the due
process such a disciplinary proceeding by the Florida Supreme Court provided.
Accordingly, federal Constitutional law obligated the Florida Supreme Court to articulate
their ratio decidendi in determining Petitioner's constitutional challenges. Otherwise, the rule of law
46
and the promise of stare decisis is lost in to Petitioner and the premise of Middlesex is completely
undermined and rendered invalid.
Therefore, Sibley was denied those procedural rights secured by the federal Constitution and
thus, pursuant to Addendum 5, Rule 5(B)(1) has shown that “the procedure used to make such
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ERRORS – RULE 4-8.4(H )
The first count of the Complaint alleges that Sibley violated Rule 4-8.4(h) by failing to pay
child support. That Rule states that a lawyer shall not: “willfully refuse, as determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, to timely pay a child support obligation”.
Here, for below reasons, the allegations of the Florida Bar Complaint and upon the law that
this Court is bound to notice that the orders were not based upon any record evidence and that Sibley,
lacking the ability to pay, did not “wilfully refuse” to pay child support obligations.
A. THE AUGUST 5, 2002 CONTEMPT ORDER WAS NOT BASED UPON

RECORD EVIDENCE
This Court cannot ignore that the August 5, 2002 contempt order was not based upon record
evidence and, as it was a verbatim adoption of a proposed order, it must be rejected as a basis for any
action as detailed at, “Verbatim Adoption of Bar’s Proposed Order”, supra.
1. SIBLEY V. SIBLEY , 833 SO .2D 847 (FLA .APP. 3 DIST.

2002)
Though not an exhibit to the Florida Bar Complaint, in response to that Complaint, Sibley
raised the decision in Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So.2d 847 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2002) as evidence that Sibley
did not violate Rule 4-8.4(h) as recognized by the dissent written by Judge Cope in that matter.
47
Similarly, the majority opinion written by Judges Schwartz and Goderich which affirmed Judge
Lando’s decision is so full of factual errors that Judge Cope was compelled to point them out in his
dissent. As a result, Sibley cannot be said to have violated Rule 4-8.4(h) upon the result obtained
in Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So.2d 847 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2002).
Moreover, this Court must take notice of the decision in Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So.2d 847, n.
2 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2002), which plainly holds that “Notwithstanding that the [Sibley] has adamantly
refused to reveal many of his financial records – which in itself raises a strong presumption against
him, City of Miami v. Rantanen, 645 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) – the record shows substantial
assets, although admittedly not in the purge amount, in his own name.”
Accordingly, Count I’s allegation that “Sibley violated Rules 4-8.4(h) of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar” cannot be premised upon the trial court’s orders attached to the Complaint as those
orders were expressly overruled on appeal. Indeed, in his dissent, Judge Cope pointed out:
“The incarceration order in this case was entered precisely on the theory that the former husband
does have $100,000 in assets in his personal possession with which to satisfy the purge amount. The
majority opinion concedes that the record does not adequately support the trial court's view of the
matter.” Id. at 850.
Additionally, Rule 4-8.4(h) states that a lawyer shall not: “willfully refuse, as determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, to timely pay a child support obligation”. Here, the court which
entered the order was not competent to do so when the order was entered.
That order of Judge Lando was incompetent as she was without authority to proceed in Case
No.: 94-18177 FC 19 after the filing by Sibley of his affidavit and motion for disqualification on
August 20, 2002, pursuant Florida Statute §38.10 and Judge Lando’s failure to rule upon that
48
affidavit pursuant to Florida Rules of .Judicial Administration, Rule 2.160. Accordingly, Judge
Lando was not competent to issue the subject order which is Exhibit “A” to the Florida Bar
Complaint.
As such, Sibley did not “willfully” refuse to pay a child support obligation as he did not have
the ability to pay such obligation and that determination was not made by a competent court.
2. THE AUGUST 5, 2002 CONTEMPT ORDER DOES NOT

DEMONSTRA TE SIBLEY HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY
A review of the findings of fact in the Contempt Orders establish that it fails to make the
requisite findings of fact and as such depart from the essential requirements of law in this regard.
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, Rule 12.615 – “Civil Contempt in Support Matters”
requires that such an order must (i) “contain a recital of the facts on which these findings are based”
and (ii) contain “separate affirmative finding that the contemnor has the present ability to comply
with the purge and the factual basis for that finding”. Thus, in order to be competent under this
Rule, an incarcerative order must contain facts that the contemptor at all times relevant had the
ability to pay the court ordered amounts and at present has the ability to pay the purge amounts.
In the Contempt Order, Judge Lando – through Mother’s counsel – made the conclusory
finding that Sibley “at all times from May, 2000 had the present financial ability to pay”, the required
“recital of facts” simply does not support such a finding. Indeed, the recited facts inexorably point
to just the opposite conclusion. Hence, upon what factual basis Judge Lando relied in order to make
that conclusion is a proper subject of discovery of her by Sibley.
As for year 2002, Judge Lando finds that Sibley’s gross income is $37,500 annually from his
employment as general manager of his Sibley’s company which translates to gross income of
$3,125/month – far in excess of the $4000/month that Judge Lando finds Sibley has had the present
49
ability to pay since May 2000 just under the Support Order. Indeed, even taking the out of context
statement that Sibley’s Law Practice has taken in $17,000 so far this year31 , that amount still if
added to the other income of Sibley’s would not permit payment of $4,000/month and leave Sibley
with funds upon which to live and support his fourth child. Accord: Bickett v. Bickett, 579 So. 2d
149 (3rd DCA 1991)(Court must assure that husband has funds remaining on which to live.)
As for the years 2000 and 2001, Judge Lando makes no “recital of facts” that Sibley had the
ability to pay $4,000/month during those years. Simply stated, the Support Contempt Order is
devoid of any such “recital of facts” in that regard and hence Judge Lando’s conclusion to that end
must be examined for a basis in fact prior to its acceptance as a basis for sanctioning Sibley.
Moreover, in the Contempt Order, Judge Lando fails to make the requisite “separate
affirmative finding that the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the purge and the
factual basis for that finding.” Again, faced with the proof of a negative, Sibley can now only point
to the Contempt Order and ask Judge Lando: where is the factual basis for the finding of present
ability to pay? Where is the recitation of assets or income that Sibley possesses that could be used
to pay the $100,000 in support arrearage and the $4,000/month traveling forward? Simply stated,
there was none. Indeed, as stated above, Sibley’s income did not begin to be available to meet such
past and future obligations. Hence, Sibley’s income cannot be used as a basis for a finding based
on the record that he has the “ability to pay”such amounts and thus Sibley did “willfully refuse” to
pay a child support obligation as required by Rule 4-8.4(h).
Alternatively, such a factual finding could be premised upon assets owned by Sibley. Here
again, no such finding of assets presently held by Sibley that could be used to pay the past and future
31
That testimony was that Sibley had received $16,000 and that money was a cost and fee
retainer for a matter through a potentially expensive trial.
50
support obligations is recited in the order: indeed, the only findings in this regard show a consistent
negative net worth of Sibley throughout this matter’s long history. Accordingly, Judge Lando must
be questioned upon what factual basis she relied upon to determine that Sibley had assets from which
he could pay the $100,000 in child support.
In sum, the Support Contempt Order is facially deficient of both the requisite findings of fact
that (i) Sibley had had at all material times the ability to pay the support of $4,000/month and (ii) that
he presently has the ability to pay both the ordered arrearage of $100,000 and the monthly support
figure of $4,000 going forward.
B. THE NOVEMBER 22, 2002 CONTEMPT ORDER WAS NOT BASED

UPON RECORD EVIDENCE
Last, Judge Lando entered on November 22, 2002, the Commitment Order which first
concludes by incorporating “those previous factual and legal findings” that Sibley “has wilfully
refused to pay any child support . . .”.
Then, Judge Lando continues that Sibley has “substantial personal assets, jointly held with
his present wife, which are easily liquidated into cash . . . these include sterling silver and art, which
could have been sold and have not been. The Court notes that Mr. Sibley has retained private
counsel, ordered and paid for court reporters and transcripts, transportation and other litigation costs,
including litigation that has been termed frivolous in Federal Court.”32 Plainly, such a conclusion
has no basis in the record.
As such, Sibley did not “wilfully refuse to pay child support” in violation of Rule 4-8.4(h).
32
This last assertion of “frivolousness” is so patently false as to raise the question of whether
indeed Sibley received anything like due process from the courts of this state.
51
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ERROR S – RULE 4-3.1
As for Count II, Complainant claims that as a result of the opinion in Sibley v. Sibley, 885
So.2d 980 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2004)( a copy of which is attached to the Complaint) serves as a basis for
alleging a violation of Rules 4-3.1 which states “A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.”
A. SIBLEY FILED NO FRIVOLOUS MATTERS
What is barred is the bringing of a proceeding which is “frivolous”. Noteworthy, the
Comments to Rule 4-3.1 state in part: “The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable
either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”
Here, a review of the decision in Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So.2d 980 reveals that the word
“frivolous” is never employed by that court as it relates to Sibley. Indeed, the court on four
occasions uses the word “frivolous” in four cited cases to describe the sort of pleading that warrant
sanctions. Hence, the failure of the Third District Court of Appeal to describe – as honestly that
court could not – Sibley’s pleadings as “frivolous”, precludes a finding that Sibley violated Rules
4-3.1.
The sum total of facts recited by Judges Cope, Gersten and Green in Sibley v. Sibley, 885
So.2d 980 to justify the sanction imposed upon Sibley was grounded in three areas.
First, an un-cited, undated, out of context quote attributed to Sibley in a letter to his former
wife. Besides the lack of notice of utilization of such quote as discussed infra, the ad hominem
52
attempt by the panel to impute an improper motive to Sibley is irrelevant to considerations here.
Regardless of the subjective intent of a litigant in pursuing litigation, it can only be the objective
consideration of the frivolousness of the pleadings that must be utilized to determine whether
sanctions should be imposed. To hold otherwise opens the door for a court to subjectively impute
to a litigant mala fides and, notwithstanding objectively non-frivolous pleadings, make the
determination that such intent justifies barring the courthouse door to a litigant.
Second, after listing Sibley’s twenty-five matters filed in that Court, the panel simply
concludes – without citation to any of the decisions in those matters – that “the former husband's
subsequent pro se proceedings in this court have been found to have no merit. As is shown by this
appeal, the former husband has repeatedly tried to re-litigate matters decided in earlier proceedings,
without any legitimate basis to do so.”
As to the first statement, merit is not a criteria for denying access to the court. If it were, then
every litigant who does not prevail on an appeal would be subject to denial of access to the court.
Moreover, the basis for the denial in every single instance in that court was upon a decision
on the merits and not a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for frivolous filings. Perforce, a review
of those twenty-five matters reveals that in all but three of them, the decision of the panels were per
curiam without written opinion. Hence for this panel to speculate upon the “merits” of those appeals
is an ex post facto exercise undertaken towards a conclusion where no conclusion can be made.33
Additionally, Judges Cope, Gersten and Green failed to note that in not one of the twenty-five
33
Indeed, as one court has noted, “In rendering the decree for the plaintiff, the chancellor stated
that he relied on the per curiam decision of Hoffman v. Drennen, Fla.1956, 88 So.2d 624. This was
a decision without opinion affirming a decree. We are of the view that such a decision does not
establish any point of law; and there is no presumption that the affirmance was on the merits.”
Schooley v. Judd, 149 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1963)(Emphasis added).
53
appeals were sanctions imposed upon Sibley by the various panels under Rules of Florida Appellate
Procedure, Rule 9.410 which authorizes the court to “impose sanctions for any violation of these
rules, or for the filing of any proceeding, motion, brief, or other paper that is frivolous or in bad
faith.” Ipso facto, none of the twenty-five appellate matters of Sibley were “frivolous or in bad
faith”. If the judges of this court had any reason to make such a finding in any of Sibley’s twenty-
five matters, they most certainly would have. This, they never did.
Noteworthy is that counsel for Sibley’s ex-wife, likewise authorized under Rule 9.410 to
make such a motion, realizing the prima facie good faith and basis for the twenty-five matters, never
made such a motion in any of the twenty-five matters.
As to the second statement – “As is shown by this appeal, the former husband has repeatedly
tried to re-litigate matters decided in earlier proceedings, without any legitimate basis to do so” – the
panel’s conclusory statement is simply wrong. In fact, in the panel’s decision of November 3, 2004,
there is only one reference to an attempt by Sibley to “re-litigate matters decided in earlier
proceedings”– the March 4, 2003, order of the circuit court – calling into question this panel’s
reckless use of the plural “matters” when accuracy demands that the singular “matter” be utilized.34
Finally, the twelve actions in federal court cited by the panel were of no moment in Judges
Cope, Gersten and Green’s determination of the sanction imposed by them. First, noteworthy is that
– with one exception – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 sanctions were not imposed on
Sibley by the federal courts which heard these matters resulting in the obvious conclusion that these
34
Even accepting Judges Cope, Gersten and Green’s conclusions of the res judicata effect of
the prior appeal, neither Sibley’s ex-wife’s counsel nor Judges Cope, Gersten and Green found
Sibley’s attempt to invoke the exception to res judicata under State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287 (Fla.
2003) to be frivolous or in bad faith as no sua sponte motion for sanctions under Rule 9.410 was
made in this matter.
54
matters were not frivolous.
Indeed, in two of them Sibley made significant federal law.35 Moreover, as noted by Judges
Cope, Gersten and Green, all but one of the remaining nine federal suits were dismissed as an act
of abstention discretion by the federal courts under Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrine
principals. When a litigant seeks discretionary relief from a federal court which relief is denied and
no Rule 11 sanctions are ordered, such a pattern of litigation can not serve as the basis for sanctions
in Florida State court. Do so hold would impinge on Sibley’s right to access federal courts
recognized in Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) where the court stated:
Petitioners being properly in the federal court had a right granted by

Congress to have the court decide the issues they resented, and to
appeal to the Court of Appeals from the District Court's dismissal.
They have been punished both for prosecuting their federal-court case
and for appealing it. They dismissed their appeal because of threats
to punish them more if they did not do so. The legal effect of such a
coerced dismissal on their appeal is not now before us, but the
propriety of a state court's punishment of a federal-court litigant for
pursuing his right to federal-court remedies is. That right was
granted by Congress and cannot be taken away by the State. The
Texas courts were without power to take away this federal right
by contempt proceedings or otherwise. (Emphasis added).
As such, Judges Cope, Gersten and Green’s conclusion that “The former husband has served
35
In Sibley v. Schwartz, Case No.: 01-3746-Civ-King, affirmed, No. 01-16571 (11th Cir. 2001),
contrary to Judge King’s holding that Defendant Judge Lando enjoyed absolute judicial immunity,
the Eleventh Circuit held for the first time in this circuit that “[a]lthough absolute judicial immunity
shields state court judges from suits seeking damages for acts taken in their judicial capacity,
‘judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief' in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits against
judicial officers acting in their judicial capacity. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984).”
Additionally, in Sibley v. Lando, Case No.: 03-21885-Civ-Huck, rev. No. 03-14910 (11th Cir.
2004), the 11th Circuit, reversed the dismissal of the lawsuit Sibley brought against Judge Lando for
her unlawful imprisonment of him and reinstated the matter holding “For the foregoing reasons we
find that the district court (1) erred when it applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a jurisdictional
bar to Sibley's claims; (2) abused its discretion when it abstained from hearing Sibley's claims under
the Younger doctrine.”
55
as an unending source of vexatious and meritless litigation” is without basis in fact. Moreover, even
if true, neither of these conclusion have been recognized by any court as being the basis for limiting
access to court by a litigant for redress of grievances.
Accordingly, the conclusions of Judges Cope, Gersten and Green that the standards of Lussy
and Safir are met simply ignores the attached facts and the law to obtain a conclusion which is
logically indefensible.
As such, Judges Cope, Gersten and Green plainly (i) misstated the facts and (ii) found
Sibley’s appeal “meritless” in cases in which they did not sit or of which they had no knowledge.
Last, the idea of “mertilessness” as a basis for sanction is both novel and absurd. In in
BE&K Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd. 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), the Court
addressed the concept of “merit” stating:
Nor does the text of the First Amendment speak in terms of

successful petitioning—it speaks simply of “the right of the people .
. . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Second,
even unsuccessful but reasonably based suits advance some First
Amendment interests. Like successful suits, unsuccessful suits allow
the “‘public airing of disputed facts,’” Bill Johnson’s, supra, at 743
(quoting Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Law, 29 Buffalo
L. Rev. 39, 60 (1980)), and raise matters of public concern. They also
promote the evolution of the law by supporting the development of
legal theories that may not gain acceptance the first time around.
Moreover, the ability to lawfully prosecute even unsuccessful suits
adds legitimacy to the court system as a designated alternative to
force. See Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 Ohio St. L. J.
557, 656 (1999) (noting the potential for avoiding violence by the
filing of unsuccessful claims). Finally, while baseless suits can be
seen as analogous to false statements, that analogy does not directly
extend to suits that are unsuccessful but reasonably based. For even
if a suit could be seen as a kind of provable statement, the fact that it
loses does not mean it is false. At most it means the plaintiff did not
meet its burden of proving its truth. That does not mean the defendant
has proved—or could prove—the contrary.
56
Plainly, there is no factual basis to sanction Sibley for his legal actions cited by the Florida
Third District Court of Appeal.
B. THE BIAS OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
The Third District Court of Appeal bias against Sibley precludes them – and every order
issued from that Court – from being relied on to establish anything.
On April 23, 2004, pursuant to Florida Bar Rules, Sibley was given Course Credit Approval
to teach “Disqualifying State and Federal Trial and Appellate Judges and Suing them Personally”
(“the Program”) for three general Continuing Legal Education Requirement credits and assigned
course number 4036 by the Florida Bar.
On or about August 13, 2004, – prior to the issuance of the opinion in Sibley v. Sibley on
November 3, 2004 – Joanne Sargent, attorney for the Florida Third District Court of Appeals – after
conversations with staff members of Florida Bar – wrote the Executive Director of the Florida Bar
– John F. Harkness, Jr. – objecting to the approval of the Program for continuing legal education
credit. The letter references orders in lawsuits between Sibley and judges of the Florida Third
District Court of Appeal. Without reference to the merits of the Program, solely upon an ad
hominem attack on Sibley and notably on behalf of the Florida Third District Court of Appeal, Ms.
Sargent concluded that “A review of the enclosed orders in Mr. Sibley’s cases will convince you,
I believe, that the proposed course should not be approved for C.L.E. credit.” A copy of that letter
is attached hereto as Exhibit “B”. As a result, on or about November 1, 2004, without prior notice
or an opportunity to be heard given to Sibley, the Florida Bar Rules and Policy Committee met
rescinded the Program credit.
Additionally, the bias of the Third District Court judges and the true genesis of their sanction
57
of Sibley comes on the heels of four members of the Third District Court of Appeals disqualifying
themselves from matters in which Sibley is a party based upon motions to disqualify which alleged
unethical behavior by those four judges – two of which sua sponte disqualified themselves when
no motion for disqualification was pending, and follows the admission by Third District Court
of appeal Judges Levy and Ramirez to an ex parte meeting they had with Sibley’s ex-wife’s
counsel on March 9, 2004, immediately prior to oral argument in Sibley’s case.
Accordingly, upon Substantive Due Process grounds, Sibley cannot be sanctioned by this
Court for the Florida Bar Complaint allegations as the proof was so insufficient that this Court,
consistent with its duty, could not accept as final the conclusion of the other court that the attorney
engaged in such misconduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The failure to take the loyalty oaths, the mis-handling below by the Florida Bar, Referees,
and the Florida Supreme Court’s failure to intervene though repeatedly requested by Sibley to do so,
has resulted in a proceeding so divorced from fundamental concepts of due process and the right to
confront one’s accusers as to prohibit this Court from signing its name to any order tacitly approving
the proceedings below by suspending Sibley here.
Moreover, even if the procedural flaws could be ignored, the merits of the two counts of the
Complaint fail under real analysis to stand. First, Sibley never wilfully failed to pay child support.
Second, Sibley’s repeated petitioning never crossed the line into frivolousness and as such this Court
cannot silence one of the few attorneys who will take on a judiciary which has permitted the travesty
which is the Florida Family Court system to continue its primary profit making purpose in this state
as it destroys families in its wake.
58
WHEREFORE, Sibley requests that (i) due to the extraordinary circumstances described
herein the temporary stay be vacated and (ii) that no reciprocal suspension be imposed.
I SWEAR that all statements made herein, including those made in attachments which are
incorporated herein by reference, are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and
belief.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that: a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was served by this Court’s
CM/ECF system upon Paul Alan Levy, Public Citizen Litigation Group, 1600 20th Street,
NW, Washington, DC 20009, Ray Beckerman, Vandenberg & Feliu LLP, 110 East 42 St.,
New York, NY 10017 and James R. Klimaski, Klimaski & Associates, P.C., 1625 Massachusetts
Avenue NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20036-2245, this June 14, 2008.
MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY

Counsel for Plaintiff
1629 K Street, Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20006
202-508-3699
202-478-0371 Fax
By: /s/ Montgomery Blair Sibley

Montgomery Blair Sibley
D.C. Bar #464488
59
APPENDIX
The Failure to Take Loyalty Oath Exhibits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit “1"
The Florida Bar Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit “A”
The letter from Joanne E. Sargent which demonstrates the hostility and bias of the Third District
Court of Appeals to Sibley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit “B”
The “Notice Setting Final Hearing” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit “C”
The Order denying the Motion to Continue Final Hearing” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit “D”
The Referee’s Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit “E”
The March 7, 2008 Order Suspending Sibley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibit “F”
60
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

(Before a Referee)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Supreme Court Case

No. SC06-1387
Complainant,
vs.
MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY The Florida Bar File

Nos. 2003-00,597(2B) and
Respondent. 2005-00,557(2B)
___________________________________/
REPORT OF REFEREE
I. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS:
Pursuant to the undersigned being duly appointed as Referee for the Supreme
Court of Florida to conduct disciplinary proceedings as provided for by Rule 3-7.6 of the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, trial of this cause was undertaken on April 16, 2007.
All of the pleadings, notices, motions, orders, and exhibits are forwarded with this report
and the foregoing constitute the record in this case.
The following individuals appeared as for the parties:
On Behalf of The Florida Bar: Barnaby L. Min

The Florida Bar
444 Brickell Avenue
Suite M-100
Miami, Florida 33131
On Behalf of the Respondent: None. Mr. Sibley, representing himself, failed

to appear after properly being notice to appear.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT:
1
Exhibit "1"
A. Jurisdictional Statement:
The Respondent is, and was at all times material herein, a member of The Florida
Bar, and subject to the jurisdiction and disciplinary rules of the Supreme Court of Florida.
B. Narrative Summary of Cases:
The undersigned attempted to schedule a mutually convenient time for the final
hearing and left messages for the Respondent to determine what his schedule was. As of
the filing of this report, none of those messages have been returned. Accordingly, on
March 28, 2007, the undersigned sent out a Notice of Final Hearing and scheduled the
final hearing for April 16, 2007. On April 11, 2007, the Respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss or, Alternatively, Fifth Affidavit and Motion to Disqualify, or, Alternatively,
Motion to Continue Hearing which was denied. On the final hearing date of April 16,
2007, the Respondent failed to appear. The Respondent failed to contact the
undersigned’s chambers or counsel for The Florida Bar to indicate that he was
unavailable or would not be appearing for the final hearing. The undersigned notes that in
his motion filed on April 11, 2007, the Respondent stated that he would be available by
telephone. Yet, as noted, the Respondent failed to contact either the undersigned or
counsel for The Florida Bar by telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail.
Accordingly, the final hearing proceeded without the Respondent being present. See The
Florida Bar v. Catalano, 685 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1996).
COUNT I
The Florida Bar File No. 2003-00,597(2B)
2
By order dated August 5, 2002, Judge Maxine Cohen Lando of the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit found the Respondent in contempt of court for willfully failing to pay child
support. In that order, Judge Lando determined that the Respondent owed child support
in the amount of $100,000.00. Judge Lando further determined that the Respondent had
the present financial ability to pay the child support but willfully failed to do so and,
accordingly, willfully violated the trial court’s order. Because the Respondent was in
contempt of court for willfully failing to pay child support, Judge Lando sentenced the
Respondent to 90 days in jail unless the Respondent paid the outstanding child support.
Judge Lando further set a payment plan for the Respondent to pay his outstanding child
support.
By order dated October 18, 2002, Judge Lando amended her contempt order to
increase the incarceration period to an indefinite period of time until the Respondent fully
paid the outstanding child support. As of November 22, 2002, the Respondent failed to
pay any of the outstanding child support and failed to comply with Judge Lando’s
payment plan. Accordingly, on November 22, 2002, Judge Lando issued an Order of
Contempt and Commitment to the Miami-Dade County Corrections Department.
Respondent sought review of Judge Lando’s various orders of contempt and they were
upheld on appeal.
COUNT II
3
On November 3, 2004, the Third District Court of Appeal filed an opinion in the
matter of Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2004) affirming the lower
court’s child support and contempt orders, and directing that the Respondent was
precluded from further self-representation in that court. In that opinion, the Third District
Court of Appeal found that the Respondent had initiated 25 self-represented appellate
proceedings (24 of which were found to be of no merit); filed at least 12 federal court
actions against various judges assigned to his case, the court system, and his former wife
(all of which were dismissed); and had filed a federal action in Delaware against his
former wife (which was dismissed). The Third District Court of Appeal also found that
the Respondent “has served as an unending source of vexatious and meritless litigation”,
and agreed that his appeals were without merit. (emphasis added). The Respondent
sought review of the Third District’s opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida, which was
denied at Sibley v. Sibley, 901 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2005).
III. RECOMMENDATION AS TO GUILT:
Based on the foregoing, I find that The Florida Bar has presented clear and
convincing evidence of guilt to this Court and I make the following recommendations:
4
AS TO CASE NUMBER 2003-00,597(2B)
I recommend that the Respondent be found guilty of violating Rule 4-8.4(h) (A
lawyer shall not willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, to
timely pay a child support obligation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
AS TO CASE NUMBER 2004-70,036(11F)
I recommend that the Respondent be found guilty of violating Rule 4-3.1
(Meritorious Claims and Contentions) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
IV. RECOMMENDATION AS TO DISCIPLINARY MEASURES TO BE

APPLIED:
Based on the foregoing, I recommend that the Respondent be suspended from the
practice of law in the State of Florida for a period of three (3) years.
My recommendation is based on the facts presented and found and the following
applicable standards from Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:
A. 5.14 Admonishment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other
conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
B. 6.21 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court
order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes
serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party or causes serious or potentially
serious interference with a legal proceeding.
C. 6.22 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court
5
order or rule and causes injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or causes
interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.
D. 7.1 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a
benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
client, the public, or the legal system.
E. 7.2 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential
injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
V. PERSONAL HISTORY, PAST DISCIPLINARY RECORD,

AGGRAVATING FACTORS, AND MITIGATING FATORS:
Prior to recommending discipline pursuant to Rule 3-7.6(m) (1) (C) of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, I considered the following:
A. Personal History of the Respondent:
Age: 50
Date Admitted to Bar: December 7, 1987
Prior disciplinary record: N/A
B. Aggravating Factors:
1. 9.22(b) Dishonest or selfish motive
6
2. 9.22(c) Pattern of misconduct
3. 9.22(d) Multiple offenses
4. 9.22(e) Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by

intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of
the disciplinary agency
5. 9.22(g) Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct
6. 9.22(i) Substantial experience in the practice of law
C. Mitigating Factors: None
VI. STATEMENT OF COSTS AND RECOMMENDATION AS TO THE

MANNER IN WHICH COSTS SHOULD BE TAXED:
I find the following costs were reasonably incurred by The Florida Bar in these
proceedings and should be assessed against the Respondent:
Administrative Fee $1,250.00
Court Reporter (Hearing on 1-23-07) $ 75.00
Court Reporter (At Final Hearing) $ 135.00
Copy Costs $1,176.35
Staff Investigator's Costs $1,354.15
Bar Counsel’s Travel Costs $ 19.86

___________
INTERIM TOTAL $4,010.36
I recommend that the foregoing costs be assessed against the Respondent. It is
further recommended that the execution issue with interest at the statutory rate to accrue
7
on all costs not paid within 30 days of entry of the Supreme Court's final order.
Dated this ________ day of _______________, 2007.
Orlando A. Prescott
ORLANDO A. PRESCOTT
Referee, Circuit Court Judge
Richard E. Gerstein Justice Building
1351 NW 12 Street, Room 713
Copies to:
Barnaby L. Min, Bar Counsel
Montgomery Blair Sibley, Respondent
Kenneth L. Marvin, Staff Counsel
Brian B. Burgoon, Designated Reviewer
8
Supreme Court of Florida

FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 2008
CASE NO.: SC06-1387

Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2003-00,597(2B),
2005-00,557(2B)
THE FLORIDA BAR vs. MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY
___________________________________________________________________
Complainant(s) Respondent(s)
The report of the referee is approved and respondent is suspended from the
practice of law for three years, effective thirty days from the date of this order so
that respondent can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing
clients. If respondent notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing
and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an
order making the suspension effective immediately. Respondent shall accept no
new business from the date this order is filed until he is reinstated.
Respondent is further directed to comply with all other terms and conditions
of the report.
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Montgomery Blair
Sibley in the amount of $4,599.51, for which sum let execution issue.
Not final until time expires to file motion for rehearing, and if filed,
determined. The filing of a motion for rehearing shall not alter the effective date of
this suspension.
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and
BELL, JJ., concur.
A True Copy
Test:
cic
Served:
HON. ORLANDO A. PRESCOTT, JUDGE BARNABY LEE MIN
KENNETH LAWRENCE MARVIN MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY
BRIAN DAVID BURGOON
Florida Supreme Court Case Docket http://jweb.flcourts.org/pls/docket/ds_docket
Florida Supreme Court Docket
Case Docket
Case Number: SC06-1387 - Active
Lower Tribunal Case(s): 2003-00,597(2B), 2005-00,557(2B)
List of Abbreviations Printer Friendly View
Date
Docketed Description Filed By Notes
07/14/2006 COMPLAINT CO The Florida Bar FB BY: WD Arne (O&1)
Carl Vanstrum 865771
07/14/2006 REQUEST-ADMISSIONS CO The Florida Bar FB BY: WD Arne (O&1): (STRICKEN, SEE 07/27/06 ORDER)
07/21/2006 No Fee Required
07/27/2006 ORDER-STRIKE In light of The Florida Bar's filing an Amended
Request for Admissions with this Court on July
27, 2006, the Request for Admissions filed with
this Court on July 14, 2006, is hereby stricken.
07/27/2006 REQUEST-ADMISSIONS CO The Florida Bar FB BY: WD Arne AMENDED (O&1)
07/27/2006 ORDER-REFEREE APPOINTMENT HON. CHARLES A. FRANCIS, C.J., 2ND
(DISCIPLINARY) JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
07/27/2006 NOTICE-FILING PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 REMOVAL OF ACTION FROM STATE
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley COURT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
725730 SUPPORT (08/11/06, FORWARDED TO
REFEREE)
08/02/2006 REFEREE APPOINTED DATED 08/01/06, HON. JOHN E. CRUSOE,
2ND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (RE-ASSIGNED
TO HON. ORLANDO A. PRESCOTT, 11TH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT - SEE ORDER DATED
10/03/06)
08/14/2006 NOTICE-FILING PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 NOTICE OF FILING REMOVAL OF
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley ACTION FROM STATE COURT AND
725730 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT, W/
NOTICE OF REMOVAL ATTACHED
(08/14/06, SENT TO REFEREE)
08/15/2006 NOTICE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 (STYLED IN USDC) NOTICE OF REQUEST
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley FOR COPY OF MAGISTRATE'S REPORT
725730 AND REQUEST FOR ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE WHY STATE COURT
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD NOT BE
ENJOINED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
1441(D): (08/15/06, SENT TO REFEREE)
08/17/2006 RESPONSE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO AMENDED
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS (08/17/06,
725730 SENT TO REFEREE)
08/18/2006 MOTION-RECUSAL/DISQUALIFICATION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 (MOTION IS UNSIGNED) RESPONDENT'S
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION TO
725730 DISQUALIFY (08/18/06, SENT TO THE
REFEREE) (08/22/06, SIGNED
AFFIDAVIT/MOTION FILED) (08/23/06,
SIGNED AFFIDAVIT/MOTION SENT TO
1 of 8 5/31/2008 7:02 AM
Date
REFEREE)
08/21/2006 MISC. DOCKET ENTRY PE Montgomery Blair Sibley - "OBJECTIONS
TO MAGISTRATE-JUDGE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION" (STYLED IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA)
08/21/2006 MOTION-RECUSAL/DISQUALIFICATION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "SECOND AFFIDAVIT AND
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley MOTION TO DISQUALIFY" (08/23/06, SENT
725730 TO REFEREE)
08/22/2006 MISC. DOCKET ENTRY PE Montgomery Blair Sibley - "MOTION FOR
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY JUDGE
JOHN E. CRUSOE SHOULD NOT BE HELD
IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR
VIOLATING 28 U.S.C. § 1441(D)" (STYLED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF FLORIDA) (08/23/06, SENT TO
REFEREE)
09/13/2006 PETITION-PROHIBITION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 & REQUEST FOR STAY OF STATUS
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley CONFERENCE ON 09/14/06 (FILED AS
725730 "VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF
PROHIBITION") (REQUEST FOR STAY IS
DENIED - SEE ORDER DATED 09/13/06)
(PROHIBITION DENIED-SEE ORDER
DATED 10/16/06)
09/13/2006 ORDER-STAY PROCEEDINGS BELOW To the extent Respondent Sibley is seeking a
DY writ of prohibition directing the referee in this
matter not to conduct the status conference
scheduled to take place on Thursday, September
14, 2006, the petition is denied. The remainder
of the petition is still under consideration by the
Court.
09/19/2006 MOTION-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "FIRST REQUEST FOR
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS DUCES
725730 TECUM" (09/20/06, SENT TO REFEREE)
09/19/2006 MOTION-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "FIRST MOTION TO COMPEL"
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley (09/20/06, SENT TO REFEREE)
725730
09/19/2006 MOTION-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "FIRST OMNIBUS MOTION"
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley (09/20/06, SENT TO REFEREE)
725730
09/19/2006 ANSWER PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley DEFENSES / JURY TRIAL DEMAND OR,
725730 ALTERNATIVELY, REQUESTED" (09/20/06,
SENT TO REFEREE)
10/03/2006 ORDER-CIRCUIT COURT GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
CHANGE VENUE DATED 10/03/06, ALONG
WITH MISC. PLEADINGS FILED BEFORE
JUDGE CRUSOE
10/03/2006 MOTION-REHEARING ON MISC ORDER PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS MOTION TO RE-CONSIDER
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S FIRST
725730 REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA
DUCES TECUM
10/04/2006 ORDER-REFEREE APPOINTMENT HON. JOSEPH P. FARINA, C.J., 11TH
(DISCIPLINARY) JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
10/16/2006 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE DY Respondent Sibley's petition for writ of
prohibition is hereby denied.
10/19/2006 REFEREE APPOINTED HON. ORLANDO A. PRESCOTT, 11TH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
12/22/2006 MOTION-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS MOTION TO DISMISS OR
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley ALTERNATIVELY, RESPONDENT'S THIRD
725730 AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY AND MOTION FOR
CONTEMPT
2 of 8 5/31/2008 7:02 AM
Date
01/16/2007 RESPONSE CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Lee Min 385719 OR, ALTERNATIVELY, RESPONDENT'S
THIRD AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION TO
CONTEMPT (COPY)
01/31/2007 RESPONSE George L. Waas 129927 BY: George L. IN OPPOSITION TO THE ISSUANCE OF
Waas 129927 SUBPOENAS TO JUDGES FOR
DISCOVERY PURPOSES (O&7) (CERT. OF
SERVICE DOES NOT REFLECT SERVICE
ON BAR COUNSEL OR THE REFEREE)
02/01/2007 PETITION-PROHIBITION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS SECOND VERIFIED PETITION
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
725730 W/ATTACHMENTS
02/02/2007 ORDER-CIRCUIT COURT DATED 01/04/07, DENYING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR
ALTERNATIVELY, RESPONDENT'S THIRD
AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION TO
CONTEMPT (COPY)
02/08/2007 MOTION-DISMISS CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby RESPONDENT'S SECOND VERIFIED
Lee Min 385719 PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
(FILED AS RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S
SECOND VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT
OF PROHIBITION AND/OR THE FLORIDA
BAR'S MOTION TO DISMISS)
02/26/2007 PETITION-PROHIBITION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS THIRD VERIFIED PETITION FOR
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley WRIT OF PROHIBITION
725730 W/ATTACHMENTS
04/16/2007 MOTION-DISMISS PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS MOTION TO DISMISS OR,
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley ALTERNATIVELY, FIFTH AFFIDAVIT
725730 AND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY, OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO
CONTINUE FINAL HEARING
04/16/2007 MOTION-DISMISS PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS MOTION TO DISMISS AND
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley FIFTH VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF
725730 PROHIBITION
04/16/2007 RESPONSE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS REPLY TO BAR'S MOTION IN
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley LIMINE AND TO RECONSIDER THE
725730 ORDER DENYING DISCOVERY
04/23/2007 NOTICE-ADDRESS CHANGE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 AND NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley FROM 06/25/07 THROUGH 07/05/07, AND
725730 FROM 08/08/07 THROUGH 08/16/07
04/26/2007 RESPONSE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley REFEREE'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT
725730 OF TIME TO FILE REPORT
(W/ATTACHMENTS)
04/26/2007 MISC. DOCKET ENTRY PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 BY: PE
Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730
RESPONDENT'S INITIAL PROPOSED
"REPORT OF REFEREE"
05/07/2007 REFEREES REPORT W/MISC. PLEADINGS & E-MAIL
05/07/2007 AFFIDAVIT/STATEMENT OF COSTS
05/07/2007 MOTION-EXT OF TIME (REFEREE'S Hon. Orlando A. Prescott, Judge 480746
REPORT) BY: Hon. Orlando A. Prescott, Judge
480746
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, RESPONDENT'S THIRD
AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION TO
CONTEMPT
3 of 8 5/31/2008 7:02 AM
Date
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, FIFTH AFFIDAVIT
AND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY, OR,
ALTERNATIVELY MOTION TO
CONTINUE FINAL HEARING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND FIFTH VERIFIED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHIBITION
05/18/2007 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE DY Respondent's Second Verified Petition for Writ
of Prohibition filed with this Court on February
1, 2007, is hereby denied. The Florida Bar's
Response to Respondent's Second Verified
Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or The
Florida Bar's Motion to Dismiss filed with this
Court on February 8, 2007, is hereby denied as
moot. The Respondent's Third Verified Petition
for Writ of Prohibition filed with this Court on
February 26, 2007, is hereby denied.
Respondent's Reply to The Florida Bar's Motion
in Limine and to Reconsider the Order Denying
Discovery filed with this Court on April 16,
2007, is hereby dismissed as unauthorized.
Respondent's Initial Proposed "Report of
Referee" filed with this Court on April 26, 2007,
is hereby dismissed as unauthorized.
05/18/2007 ORDER-ACCEPTANCE AS TIMELY The Referee's Motion for Enlargement of Time
FILED GR (MISC) to File Report has been treated as a motion to
accept the report as timely filed and is hereby
granted. The Report of Referee was filed with
this Court on May 7, 2007.
05/18/2007 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE The order of the referee dated January 4, 2007,
which denied Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
or, Alternatively, Respondent's Third Affidavit
and Motion to Disqualify and Motion for
Contempt, is hereby approved. The order of the
referee dated April 12, 2007, which denied
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss or,
Alternatively, Fifth Affidavit and Motion to
Disqualify, or, Alternatively Motion to Continue
Final Hearing, is hereby approved. The order of
the referee dated April 16, 2007, which denied
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Fifth
Verified Petition for Writ of Prohibition, is
hereby approved.
05/29/2007 NOTICE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 OF NON-RECEIPT OF REFEREE'S REPORT
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley AND REQUEST FOR A COPY (DENIED AS
725730 MOOT, SEE ORDER DATED 07/11/07)
05/31/2007 MOTION-REHEARING ON MISC ORDER PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 ON ORDER DATED 05/18/07 (FILED AS
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley PETITIONER'S RULE 9.330 MOTION FOR
725730 REHEARING)
06/01/2007 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE This Court having issued an order on May 18,
2007, granting the Referee's motion for
enlargement of time for the filing of the report,
that date shall be used as the date for
commencement of the time period for the filing
of any petitions seeking review of that report.
Thus, any petitions for review must be filed on
or before July 23, 2007. NO CONTINUANCES
WILL BE GRANTED.
06/04/2007 LETTER-FLA BAR (WILL NOT PETITION Kenneth Lawrence Marvin 200999 BY:
FOR REVIEW) Kenneth Lawrence Marvin 200999
06/11/2007 MOTION-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS RESPONDENT'S DEMAND FOR
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 3-7.7(c)(1))
725730
4 of 8 5/31/2008 7:02 AM
Date
07/06/2007 MOTION-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 RESPONDENT'S THIRD REQUEST FOR
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
725730
07/11/2007 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE GR Respondent's Demand for Compliance with
Rule 3-7.7(c)(1), filed with this Court on June
11, 2007, is hereby granted and the parties shall
have to and including August 3, 2007, in which
to file a Petition for Review. Included with this
order is a copy of the Report of Referee filed
with this Court on May 7, 2007, which shows
the referee's service of the report to all parties on
April 25, 2007.
07/11/2007 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE DY Upon consideration of respondent's Notice of
Non-Receipt of Referee's Report and Request
for a Copy, filed with this Court on May 29,
2007, it is hereby ordered that respondent's
request for a copy of the referee's report to be
served to respondent is hereby denied as moot.
Respondent's request for tolling of the sixty-day
deadline to file a petition for review until the
report is sent to respondent is hereby denied as
moot.
07/11/2007 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE DY Respondent's motion for rehearing of this
Court's order dated May 18, 2007, is hereby
denied.
07/17/2007 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE DY Respondent's Third Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum, filed with this Court
on July 6, 2007, is hereby denied.
07/31/2007 PETITION-REVIEW PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley
725730
08/06/2007 MOTION-RECUSAL/DISQUALIFICATION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley DISQUALIFICATION OF ALL THE
725730 JUSTICES OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT"
08/20/2007 INITIAL BRIEF-MERITS PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 W/APPENDIX (NOT E-FILED, NO COPIES
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley FILED, EXCEEDS PAGE LIMIT)
725730 (CONTAINS REQUEST FOR ORAL
AGRUMENT AND REQUEST TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD)
08/22/2007 ORDER-BRIEF STRICKEN Respondent's initial brief, which was filed with
(NON-COMPLIANCE) this Court on August 20, 2007, does not comply
with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210
and is hereby stricken. Respondent is hereby
directed, on or before September 11, 2007, to
serve an original and seven copies of an
amended initial brief which does not exceed
fifty pages in length, with the Certificate of
Compliance immediately following the
Certificate of Service. Please be advised that
any additional relief requested from this Court
must be submitted by a separate motion and not
included in the brief. Per this Court's
Administrative Order In Re: Mandatory
Submission of Electronic Copies of Documents,
AOSC04-84, dated September 13, 2004, counsel
are directed to transmit a copy of all briefs in an
electronic format as required by the provisions
of that order.
08/22/2007 MOTION-STRIKE CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby THE FLORIDA BAR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Lee Min 385719 THE RESPONDENT'S INITIAL BRIEF (O&7)
(08/27/07, WITHDRAWN)
08/22/2007 MOTION-TOLL TIME CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby THE FLORIDA BAR'S MOTION TO TOLL
Lee Min 385719 TIME (08/27/07, WITHDRAWN)
5 of 8 5/31/2008 7:02 AM
Date
08/27/2007 NOTICE-WITHDRAWAL CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby THE FLORIDA BAR'S NOTICE OF
Lee Min 385719 WITHDRAWAL OF THE FLORIDA BAR'S
MOTION TO STRIKE THE RESPONDENT'S
INITIAL BRIEF
08/27/2007 NOTICE-WITHDRAWAL CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby THE FLORIDA BAR'S NOTICE OF
Lee Min 385719 WITHDRAWAL OF THE FLORIDA BAR'S
MOTION TO TOLL TIME
08/31/2007 MOTION-BRIEF PAGE ENLARGEMENT PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley VACATE ORDER OF AUGUST 22, 2007, OR,
725730 ALTERNATIVELY, FOR LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF IN EXCESS OF PAGE LIMITATIONS
09/07/2007 INITIAL AMD BRIEF-MERITS PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 W/APPENDIX (O&7 & E-MAIL)
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley (CONCLUSION EXCEEDS 1 PAGE)
725730
09/21/2007 NOTICE-FILING CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT FROM
Lee Min 385719 04/16/07 FINAL HEARING
09/21/2007 RECORD/TRANSCRIPT CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby 1 VOLUME OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT
Lee Min 385719 FROM 04/16/07 HEARING
09/25/2007 ORDER-RECUSAL DY "Respondent's Motion and Affidavit for
Disqualification of All the Justices of the
Florida Supreme Court," filed with this Court on
August 6, 2007, is hereby denied.
09/25/2007 ORDER-BRIEF ENLARGEMENT Upon consideration of "Respondent's Motion to
DY/STRICKEN Vacate Order of August 22, 2007, or,
Alternatively, for Leave to File Brief in Excess
of Page Limitations," filed with this Court on
August 31, 2007, it is ordered that the motion to
vacate is hereby denied. Furthermore,
respondent's motion to file an initial brief on the
merits in excess of page limitations is hereby
denied.
09/25/2007 ORDER-BRIEF STRICKEN "Respondent's Amended Initial Brief," which
(NON-COMPLIANCE) was filed with this Court on September 7, 2007,
does not comply with Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.210 and is hereby stricken.
Respondent is hereby directed, on or before
October 15, 2007, to serve an original and seven
copies of an amended initial brief with a
conclusion, of not more than one page, setting
forth the precise relief sought. Please be advised
that any additional relief requested from this
Court, including a request for oral argument,
must be submitted by a separate document and
not included in the brief. Per this Court's
AOSC04-84, dated September 13, 2004, counsel
are directed to transmit a copy of all briefs in an
electronic format as required by the provisions
of that order.
09/27/2007 NOTICE-FILING CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT FROM
Lee Min 385719 01/23/07 CASE MANAGEMENT CONF.
09/27/2007 RECORD/TRANSCRIPT CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby 1 VOLUME OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT
Lee Min 385719 FROM 01/23/07 HEARING
10/15/2007 INITIAL AMD BRIEF-MERITS PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 W/APPENDIX (O&7 & E-MAIL)
725730
10/15/2007 REQUEST-ORAL ARGUMENT PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley ORAL ARGUMENT AND ALLOCUTION"
725730
10/26/2007 ANSWER BRIEF-MERITS CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby W/APPENDIX (O&7 & E-MAIL)
Lee Min 385719
10/29/2007 MOTION-EXT OF TIME (REPLY PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 W/ATTACHMENTS
BRIEF-MERITS) BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley
725730
6 of 8 5/31/2008 7:02 AM
Date
11/02/2007 ORDER-EXT OF TIME GR (REPLY
BRIEF-MERITS)
11/15/2007 REPLY BRIEF-MERITS PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 (O&7 & E-MAIL)
725730
11/21/2007 ORDER-NO REQ SCHED (MISC) The above case has been submitted to the Court
without oral argument. Per this Court's
AOSC04-84, dated September 13, 2004, if you
have not already done so, counsel are directed to
transmit a copy of all briefs in an electronic
format as required by the provisions of that
order.
11/29/2007 MOTION-RECUSAL/DISQUALIFICATION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "RESPONDENT'S SECOND
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR
725730 DISQUALIFICATION OF ALL THE
JUSTICES OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT" (W/ATTACHMENTS)
11/30/2007 AFFIDAVIT/STATEMENT OF COSTS CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby Lee
Min 385719 AMENDED (O&7)
01/29/2008 ORDER-RECUSAL DY Respondent's Second Motion and Affidavit for
Florida Supreme Court, filed with this Court on
November 29, 2007, is hereby denied.
03/07/2008 DISP-SUSPENDED (CLOSE OUT) SUSPENDED FOR 3 YEARS, EFFECTIVE IN
30 DAYS, AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT
OF $4,599.51
03/10/2008 MOTION-DISMISS PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley DISMISS AND THIRD MOTION AND
725730 AFFIDAVIT FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF
ALL THE JUSTICES OF THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT"
03/24/2008 MOTION-STAY (USSC APPLICATION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
REVIEW) BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley STAY SUSPENSION PENDING UNITED
725730 STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW"
04/11/2008 ORDER-STAY PROCEEDINGS USSC GR Respondent's Motion to Stay Suspension
Pending United States Supreme Court Review is
granted in part. Respondent's suspension is
hereby stayed only to and including May 12,
2008, to allow Respondent to seek review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and obtain
any further stay from that court.
04/17/2008 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE Upon consideration of Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss and Third Motion and Affidavit for
Florida Supreme Court, respondent is advised
the above-styled case is final in this Court and
no action will be taken on the aforementioned
pleading.
04/21/2008 MOTION-STAY (USSC APPLICATION PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "RESPONDENT'S SECOND
REVIEW) BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley MOTION TO STAY SUSPENSION AND
725730 MOTION TO VACATE ORDER OF MARCH
7, 2008" (W/ATTACHMENT)
04/24/2008 ORDER-STAY PROCEEDINGS USSC DY Upon consideration of Respondent's Second
Motion to Stay Suspension and Motion to
Vacate Order of March 7, 2008, the request to
stay is hereby denied. Respondent is further
advised the above-styled case is final in this
Court and no action will be taken on the
remainder of the aforementioned pleading.
04/30/2008 MOTION-STAY (VACATE) CO The Florida Bar FB BY: CO Barnaby FILED AS "THE FLORIDA BAR'S MOTION
Lee Min 385719 TO TERMINATE STAY"
W/ATTACHMENTS
7 of 8 5/31/2008 7:02 AM
Date
05/12/2008 ORDER-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE GR The Florida Bar's Motion to Terminate Stay is
granted, and the stay ordered by this Court dated
April 11, 2008, is hereby terminated.
05/21/2008 RECORD CENTER F00000045743
05/23/2008 MOTION-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley VACATE ORDER OF MARCH 7, 2008 AS
725730 VOID" W/ATTACHMENT
05/30/2008 MOTION-OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PE Montgomery Blair Sibley 725730 FILED AS "RESPONDENT'S SECOND
BY: PE Montgomery Blair Sibley EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE
725730 ORDER OF MARCH 7, 2008 AS VOID AS
REFEREE NEVER TOOK THE LOYALTY
OATH" (W/ATTACHMENT)
List of Abbreviations Printer Friendly View
8 of 8 5/31/2008 7:02 AM
SC06-1387
Exhibit "A"
Case
Case
1:08-cv-00434-HHK
1:03-cv-22106-AJ Document
Document 34
1 Filed
Filed08/06/2003
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Page44
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of 152
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Case
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Case
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Page34
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of 152
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885 So.2d 980 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2004), 3D03-2083, Sibley v. Sibley
Page 980
885 So.2d 980 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2004)
29 Fla. L. Weekly D2449, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D2755
Montgomery Blair SIBLEY, Appellant,
v.
Barbara SIBLEY, Appellee.
No. 3D03-2083.
Florida Court of Appeal, Third District.
November 3, 2004
Order Granting Rehearing in Part Dec. 8, 2004.
Page 981
Montgomery Blair Sibley, in proper person.
Jay M. Levy; Bette E. Quiat, Miami, for appellee.
Before COPE, GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Montgomery Blair Sibley (the former husband) appeals two post-judgment orders entered after
dissolution of marriage. Final judgment in the dissolution action was entered in 1994 and there have
been numerous post-judgment proceedings since that time. In this proceeding, the former husband
appeals orders compelling payment of attorney's fees and tuition. We affirm those orders.
The former wife requests an order precluding the former husband, an attorney, from representing
himself in further appeals in this court. We grant the request.
I.
The former husband appeals an order entered on July 1, 2003 ("the July 1 order") which required
the former husband to pay the former wife, Barbara Sibley, $33,119.70 in attorney's fees within sixty
days. This order enforced earlier attorney's fee awards which had already been entered against the
former husband in prior proceedings.
On this appeal, the former husband argues that one of the underlying attorney's fee orders was
entered in error and that the trial court erred in enforcing it. This argument is without merit.
The underlying attorney's fee order which the former husband is trying to attack was entered on
1 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
March 4, 2003 ("the March 4 order"). [1] The former husband appealed the March 4 order to this court,
arguing procedural error. This court affirmed without opinion. Sibley v. Sibley, 866 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2003) (table), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2909, 159 L.Ed.2d 813 (2004). Since the former
husband already appealed the March 4 order and this court already affirmed it, common sense and
principles of res judicata dictate that the former husband cannot now mount a second appeal of the
March 4 order.
Page 982
The former husband argues that a successive attack on the March 4 order is allowed as a result of
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Florida Department of Transportation v. Juliano, 801 So.2d 101
(Fla.2001). The former husband misunderstands the import of that decision. The Juliano case explains
the law of the case doctrine, where there has been an interlocutory appeal followed by a later appeal
from a final judgment. See id. at 106.
The Juliano decision does not apply here. The March 4 order was a final order awarding attorney's
fees and it was appealed as a final order. The March 4 order is res judicata.
This court has explained that res judicata applies where, as here, there have been multiple final
orders in post-dissolution proceedings.
[I]t does not matter that the issue-preclusive effect of the earlier adjudication is asserted
later in the same case, rather than in separate, subsequent litigation. Probably because res
judicata principles in general apply only to final, appealable determinations, see 33 Fla.
Jur.2d Judgments & Decrees § 173 (1994), and successive final judgments in the same
case are at least unusual, see Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1987), it is true that the principle is often broadly and imprecisely stated as applying in
subsequent "suits" or "actions." See 32 Fla. Jur.2d Judgments and Decrees § 140.
Nevertheless, when there is indeed a final earlier adjudication, its "effect ... as res judicata
is not confined in its operation to subsequent independent proceedings, but also applies to
all collateral proceedings in the same action."
Utterback v. Starkey, 669 So.2d 304, 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (footnotes and citations omitted).
The former husband argues that it would work a manifest injustice for this court to enforce the March
4 order. The Florida Supreme Court "has long recognized that res judicata will not be invoked where it
would defeat the ends of justice." State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla.2003) (citations omitted).
The former husband argues that it would be a manifest injustice to enforce the March 4 order
because the prior panel which affirmed the March 4 order did not write an opinion explaining the panel's
reasoning. In the former husband's view, the prior panel was mistaken and should have written an
opinion to explain the ruling. This is not a legally sufficient showing of manifest injustice. The district
courts of appeal are allowed to issue affirmances without opinion. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Kenyon, 882 So.2d 986 (Fla.2004).
The former husband argues that the claimed procedural errors in the entry of the March 4 order
render the March 4 order void. The former husband moved for relief from judgment under Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.540, with respect to the March 4 order and relief was denied by the successor judge,
Judge Wilson. That order is one of the orders on appeal herein. However, the former husband has not
demonstrated any error in the order denying Rule 1.540 relief.
II.
The former husband next appeals a July 17, 2003 order compelling him to reimburse tuition
expenses for two of the parties' children.
Under the parties' marital settlement agreement, the former husband is responsible for payment of
educational expenses through college. See Sibley v. Sibley, 816 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
The children are also beneficiaries of trusts set up for their benefit. A guardian ad litem currently
serves as the trustee of those trusts. When the former husband
2 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
Page 983
has failed to pay tuition, the trusts have made those payments. However, where that has happened, the
trustee has requested that the trusts be reimbursed. [2]
In February 2003 the former wife filed a motion entitled "Emergency Motion to Permit Payment of
Deposit for Minor Child, Montgomery Blair Sibley, Jr., at Palmer Trinity [School] and Summer School
Tuition for Margaret Harper Sibley and Emergency Motion for Contempt for Failure to Pay Life Insurance
Premium" ("the Emergency Motion").
After conducting hearings on March 10 and April 7, 2003, the trial court granted the tuition-related
requests. The trustee was authorized to pay the tuition amounts. That part of the order is not challenged
on this appeal.
The July 17 order also required former husband to reimburse two of the trusts, in the amounts of
$18,130 and $7,207.50, respectively.
The former husband argues that the trial court should not have heard the motion because at that
time of the hearing the former husband's seventh motion to disqualify the trial judge was pending.
We reject the former husband's argument, as the point has been waived. The former husband
correctly argues that when a motion for disqualification or recusal is pending, it is the court's duty to rule
on that motion before ruling on anything else. See Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So.2d 1063
(Fla.2000). Further, it is not necessary for the movant to request a hearing. See id.
However, disqualification motions cannot be used for "gotcha" litigation tactics. See Salcedo v.
Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In this case, the former husband
and his counsel personally attended the hearing on the Emergency Motion. Nowhere in the transcript did
they object that the hearing could not proceed until the court ruled on the pending motion for
disqualification.
A party cannot go to a hearing knowing that he has filed a motion for disqualification, make no
mention of the pending motion, participate in the hearing, and then after receiving an unfavorable ruling,
argue that the court must start over because there was a pending motion for disqualification.
"The well-settled proposition is that the law 'does not favor the substitution of a Judge or Justice in a
cause after decision which essentially carries a benefit to the successful party.' " Lawson v. Longo, 547
So.2d 1279, 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ( quoting Ball v. Yates, 158 Fla. 521, 29 So.2d 729, 735 (1946)).
In Lawson
the seller waited, having knowledge of the alleged ground for recusal from the second day
of trial, until well after final judgment, which was adverse to him. By doing nothing to
affirmatively promote or protect the issue of the possible recusal, the seller can be said to
have sat on his rocking chair, watching the trial meander by. It is now too late and he has
shown no good cause for delay.
Lawson, 547 So.2d at 1281; see also Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 243 (Fla.1986) ("A motion for
recusal is considered untimely when delayed until after the moving party has suffered an adverse ruling
unless good cause for the delay is shown.")
The former husband relies on Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So.2d 1063 (Fla.2000), but that
case is not on point. In Fuster-Escalona there was never a hearing on the motion for disqualification.
That case addressed how to treat a disqualification motion for purposes of the
Page 984
rule regarding dismissal for lack of prosecution. Id. at 1064-65. It did not involve a situation like the one
now before us, where a party participated in a hearing without objecting that there was a pending
disqualification motion.
3 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
The former husband relies on the thirty-day rule established by Tableau Fine Art Group, Inc. v.
Jacoboni, 853 So.2d 299 (Fla.2003), but reliance on that case is misplaced. In Tableau the Florida
Supreme Court announced that a motion for disqualification must be ruled on by a trial court within thirty
days. Id. at 303. If there is no ruling within thirty days, then disqualification is automatic. See id. at 301.
The former husband argues that his seventh motion for disqualification was pending for more than thirty
days and therefore Judge Lando should have been disqualified. However, the thirty-day rule of Tableau
is prospective only, and came into effect only for motions for disqualification filed on or after August 20,
2003. See City of Hollywood v. Witt, 868 So.2d 1214, 1218 n. 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The seventh
motion for disqualification had been filed prior to that date. Thus, the thirty-day rule is inapplicable to the
former husband's seventh motion for disqualification. [3]
III.
The former husband next argues that the July 17 order erroneously holds him in contempt when no
motion for contempt was made. The former husband is incorrect. He was not held in contempt.
The former wife filed the Emergency Motion described previously. The court authorized (a) the
guardian ad litem, as trustee, to pay the educational expenses for the two children; (b) ordered the
former husband to reimburse the two trusts $18,130 and $7,207.50, respectively; and (c) reserved
jurisdiction on the issues of contempt and attorney's fees for a subsequent hearing.
The reservation of jurisdiction on the issue of contempt apparently refers to the former wife's second
request in her motion, which was never reached by the trial court: her request to hold the former
husband in contempt for failure to pay a life insurance premium. [4]
The former husband complains that he was not provided a copy of the proposed order prior to its
entry. Assuming that is so, that is not a basis for reversal. This order was preceded by at least two
similar orders directing the former husband to reimburse educational expenses for earlier time periods. It
was clear from the court's remarks at the April 7 hearing that the court intended to pattern the July 17
order after the orders entered previously, and the court did so.
IV.
The former husband argues that the trial court erred by refusing to approve
Page 985
a statement of proceedings under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(4). During the pendency
of this appeal, the former husband prepared a proposed statement of the proceedings for the hearing
which took place on August 27, 2002. This is the hearing which resulted in the order of March 4, 2003
awarding attorney's fees to the former wife. The guardian ad litem objected to the proposed statement of
proceedings.
The trial court declined to approve the statement of proceedings. The former husband moved to
compel Judge Lando (who conducted the August 27, 2002 hearing) to settle the statement of
proceedings. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.200(b)(4). This court treated the former husband's motion to compel
as a petition for writ of mandamus and, after receiving a response, denied it. The former husband has
renewed the point in his brief.
As explained earlier in this opinion, the March 4, 2003 order has become final and is not subject to
collateral attack in this appeal. The time to have submitted a statement of proceedings for the August 27,
2002 hearing would have been in connection with the earlier appeal of the March 4, 2003 order, not the
present appeal.
V.
The former wife has filed a Motion for Sanctions in which she seeks to preclude the husband from
any further self-representation in this court without being represented by counsel. The former wife
contends that the husbands appeals have repeatedly been shown to be without merit and have
constituted an abuse of the legal process. Upon consideration of the motion, the former husband's
4 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
response filed January 5, 2004, and after review of this courts files, we agree. [5]
The Florida Supreme Court has said:
Abuse of the legal system is a serious matter, one that requires this Court to exercise its inherent
authority to prevent. As we held in Rivera v. State, 728 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla.1998): "This Court has a
responsibility to ensure every citizen's access to courts. To further that end, this Court has prevented
abusive litigants from continuously filing frivolous petitions, thus enabling the Court to devote its finite
resources to those who have not abused the system."
Although rare, we have not hesitated to sanction petitioners who abuse the legal process by
requiring them to be represented by counsel in future actions. In Jackson v. Florida Department of
Corrections, 790 So.2d 398 (Fla.2001), the sanction of requiring a member of The Florida Bar to sign all
of petitioner's filings with this Court and dismissing all other pending cases was imposed on a litigious
inmate who repeatedly filed frivolous lawsuits that disrupted the Court's proceedings. In Martin v. State,
747 So.2d 386, 389 (Fla.2000), the sanction was imposed against a petitioner who, like Lussy,
repeatedly filed lawsuits that included personal attacks on judges, were "abusive," "malicious,"
"insulting," and demeaning to the judiciary. In Attwood v. Singletary, 661 So.2d 1216 (Fla.1995), the
petitioner was sanctioned for filing numerous frivolous petitions, including one that was filed shortly after
the Court's order to show cause was issued.
Like the individual in Attwood, Lussy has abused the processes of this Court with his constant filings.
Accordingly, a limitation on Lussy's ability to file would further the constitutional right of access because it
would permit this Court to devote its finite resources to the consideration
Page 986
of legitimate claims filed by others. See generally In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109
S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989) (finding that "[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this
Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's
limited resources").
Lussy v. Fourth District Court of Appeal, 828 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla.2002); see Slizyk v. Smilack, 734
So.2d 1166 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So.2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA
1983); Shotkin v. Cohen, 163 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); see also Safir v. United States Lines, Inc.,
792 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.1986).
In Safir the court stated:
[I]n determining whether or not to restrict a litigant's future access to the courts, [a court] should
consider the following factors: (1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g. does
the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented
by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an
unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be
adequate to protect the courts and other parties.
792 F.2d at 24.
The fact that the former husband is an attorney does not insulate him from this analysis. On a proper
showing, an attorney may be barred from self-representation. See Slizyk, 734 So.2d at 1167.
The parties were divorced in 1994. Several years later, post judgment disputes arose, leading to
litigation of increasing intensity. The former husband was eventually incarcerated for civil contempt for
failing to pay child support. See Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So.2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), review denied, 854
So.2d 660 (Fla.2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1074, 124 S.Ct. 1074, 157 L.Ed.2d 895 (2004). In
correspondence between the former husband and the former wife, the former husband stated, "And if
you want to attempt to squeeze me until I am dry, we will litigate until I am disbarred and bankrupt if
necessary for you leave me no other choice."
The former husband, an attorney, has initiated twenty-five appellate proceedings in this court in
5 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
which he has represented himself, and has filed two more in which he was represented by counsel.
These are listed in the Appendix to this opinion. The former husband prevailed in an early appeal to this
court. See Sibley v. Sibley, 710 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). However, the former husband's
subsequent pro se proceedings in this court have been found to have no merit. As is shown by this
appeal, the former husband has repeatedly tried to re-litigate matters decided in earlier proceedings,
without any legitimate basis to do so.
In addition, the former husband has filed at least twelve actions in federal court against judges who
have been assigned to his cases, the court system, and the former wife. In Sibley v. Wilson, No.
04-21000-CIV-MORENO, the federal court catalogued the former husband's federal litigation history as
follows:
The Plaintiff's divorce case from ex-wife Barbara Sibley ... has been ongoing since 1994.
The case appears to have been bitter, as evidenced by Plaintiff's numerous filings of
separate actions related to issues in the divorce proceeding, including:
Page 987
1. Sibley v. Judge Maxine Cohen Lando
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida
Case No. 01-2940-CIV-UNGARO-BENAGES
Summary: allegations of constitutional violations by judge
Outcome: dismissed on basis of Younger abstention [ aff'd, 37 Fed. Appx. 979 (11th
Cir.2002) ].
2. Sibley v. Judges David Gersten, Juan Ramirez, and Joseph Nesbitt
Case No. 00-3665-CIV-MORENO
Summary: allegations of constitutional violations by judges
Outcome: dismissed on basis of judicial immunity, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction [ aff'd,

252 F.3d 443 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 827, 122 S.Ct. 67, 151 L.Ed.2d 34 (2001) ].
3. Sibley v. Mark Martinez
Case No. 02-22931-CIV-HIGHSMITH
Summary: allegations of constitutional violations by Clerk's filing process
Outcome: dismissed for lack of constitutional violation.
4. Sibley v. Judges Alan Schwartz, David Gersten, Mario Goderich, Gerald Cope, Robert Shevin, Maxine
Cohen Lando, Victoria Platzer, and Barbara Sibley
Case No. 01-3746-CIV-KING
Summary: allegations of constitutional violations by judges
Outcome: dismissed on basis of Younger abstention, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Rule 11 sanctions imposed against Plaintiff [ aff'd, 45 Fed. Appx. 878 (11th Cir.2002) ].
5. Sibley v. Sibley
6 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
Case No. 01-2770-CIV-HUCK
Summary: allegations of interference with parent-child relationship by ex-wife
Outcome: dismissed on basis of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction [ aff'd, 34 Fed. Appx. 969
(11th Cir.2002) ].
6. Sibley v. Sibley
Case No. 01-1349-CIV-GOLD
Summary: removal of divorce action from Judge Lando's court
Outcome: remanded on basis of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
7. Sibley v. Spears
Case No. 02-22106-CIV-JORDAN
Summary: petition for habeas corpus regarding contempt orders
Outcome: dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
8. Sibley v. Judge Maxine Cohen Lando
Summary: allegations of violations of right of access to the courts
Outcome: dismissed on basis of Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstentions [ aff'd, 99 Fed.

Appx. 886 (11th Cir.2004) ].
9. Sibley v. Florida Supreme Court, Harry Lee Anstead, Third District Court of Appeal, and Eleventh
Judicial Circuit Court of Dade County
Page 988
Case No. 03-21199-CIV-LENARD
Summary: allegations of equal protection violations in decisions by Florida courts
Outcome: dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
10. Sibley v. Maxine Cohen Lando
Summary: allegations of equal protection violations in divorce proceedings
Outcome: dismissed on basis of Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstentions [ aff'd, 97 Fed.
7 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
Appx. 907 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2885, 159 L.Ed.2d 779 (2004) ].
The Plaintiff has also filed a lawsuit against his wife in federal court in Delaware which was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Case No. 8:00-cv-02997-JFM), and has
filed a number of appeals and/or petitions before Florida state courts as well.
Sibley v. Wilson, No. 04-21000-CIV-MORENO, slip op. at 2-3 (S.D.Fla. July 7, 2004).
In dismissing Sibley v. Wilson, Judge Moreno said that it is "the court's recognized right and duty, in
both Federal and Florida state courts, to protect their jurisdiction from vexatious litigants and abuse of
the judicial system." Id. at 6 (citations omitted). We agree.
The former husband has served as an unending source of vexatious and meritless litigation. This
has caused needless consumption of resources by the court system and needless expense to the former
wife. Awards of attorney's fees have not served as a deterrent, as the former husband has not paid them.
We conclude that the standards of Lussy are met. We have considered the criteria set forth in the
Safir decision and conclude that those are met as well. We therefore prohibit the former husband from
further self-representation in this court.
We direct the clerk of this court to reject any further filings in this court on the former husband's
behalf unless signed by a member of the Florida Bar (other than the former husband). Any other cases
that are pending in this court in which the former husband is representing himself will be dismissed
unless a notice of appearance signed by a member in good standing of the Florida Bar (other than the
former husband) is filed in each case within thirty days of this opinion becoming final. See Lussy, 828
So.2d at 1028.
VI.
For the stated reasons, the orders now under review are affirmed. The former wife's motion for
sanctions is granted. The former husband is precluded from further self-representation in this court.
Affirmed; sanctions granted.
APPENDIX
( Sibley v. Sibley Case No. 3D03-2083)
A. Completed proceedings in which the former husband has represented himself:
1) Sibley v. Sibley, 866 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2909,
159 L.Ed.2d 813 (2004);
2) Sibley v. Sibley, No. 03-1392 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 6, 2003);
3) Law Offices of Rodriguez & Sibley v. Sibley, No. 03-3090 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 12, 2003);
4) Sibley v. Sibley, 835 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (01-3496);
5) Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So.2d 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), reh'g denied, 835 So.2d 1140(Fla. 3d DCA
2002);
Page 989
7) Sibley v. Sibley, 831 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (02-2190), reh'g denied, 835 So.2d 1141 (Fla.
3d DCA 2002);
9) Sibley v. Sibley, 823 So.2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002);
8 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
11) Sibley v. Sibley, 815 So.2d 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), rev. denied, 833 So.2d 774 (Fla.2002);
22) Sibley v. Sibley, 710 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
B. Pending appellate proceedings in which the former husband represents himself:
23) Sibley v. Sibley, Case No. 3D04-294;
24) Sibley v. Sibley, Consolidated Case No. 3D04-1260/3D04-803;
25) Sibley v. Sibley, Case No. 3D04-1466.
C. Completed appellate proceedings in which the former husband was represented by counsel:
26) Sibley v. Spears, 837 So.2d 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) cert denied, 540 U.S. 1016, 124 S.Ct. 567,
157 L.Ed.2d 429 (2003);
27) Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So.2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), review dismissed, 854 So.2d
660(Fla.2003), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2909, 159 L.Ed.2d 813 (2004).
Before COPE, GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ.
On Motion for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
We grant the motion for rehearing in one respect, and deny the remainder of the motion.
The former husband argues that under the terms of this court's opinion dated November 3, he is
precluded from filing a pro se motion to invoke the discretionary review jurisdiction of the Florida
Supreme Court. That is so because this court's opinion directs "the clerk of this court to reject any further
filings in this court on the former husband's behalf unless signed by a member of the Florida Bar (other
than the former husband)." Opinion at 988.
This court has permitted the former husband to file a pro se motion for rehearing and rehearing en
banc in this case. Consistent with that procedure, we modify our opinion of November 3, 2004 to permit
the filing of a pro se notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, should the
former husband choose to do so.
The former husband maintains that this court should not have quoted his correspondence to his
9 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
former wife, arguing that the quoted correspondence is not in the record of this appeal. That point is
without
Page 990
merit. We clearly stated in our opinion of November 3 that for purposes of part V of the opinion, this court
reviewed its files in all of the former husband's prior appellate proceedings. The quoted letter is found in
Sibley v. Sibley, No. 3D02-3171, 833 So.2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), Appendix to Appellee's Answer
Brief.
We deny rehearing on the remaining points without further discussion.
Rehearing granted in part, denied in part.
---------
Notes:
[1]
The order was signed on March 4 and filed on March 6, 2003. The former wife refers to it as the
March 4, 2003 order and the former husband refers to it as the March 6, 2003 order. We will use the
March 4, 2003 date.
[2]
In requesting reimbursement, the guardian ad litem (as trustee) reasons that where the former
husband has undertaken responsibility to pay the educational expenses, the children's trusts should not
be diminished for that purpose.
[3]
For the same reason, the thirty-day rule does not apply to the former husband's subsequent motion to
disqualify Judge Lando filed June 12, 2003. Further, even if that were not so, we would reject the former
husband's argument on authority of Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240 (Fla.1986). The Fischer decision
states, "When a judge has heard the testimony and arguments and rendered an oral ruling in a
proceeding, the judge retains the authority to perform the ministerial act of reducing that ruling to writing."
497 So.2d at 243 (citations omitted). The July 17 order accurately reflects the oral ruling at the April 7
hearing.
[4]
There is a scrivener's error in the title of the July 17 order. The order states that it is an "Order
Granting Former Wife's Ore Tenus and Emergency Motion for Contempt for Failure to Pay Educational
Expenses ...." As the motion did not request the remedy of contempt for failure to pay educational
expenses, the title of the order is incorrect to that extent. The body of the order, however, is correct and
accurately reflects the trial court's ruling. The former husband may request that the trial court correct the
title of the order.
[5]
The former wife requested oral argument of the motion and we granted the request.
---------
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10 of 10 4/19/2008 12:20 PM
Exhibit "B"
Exhibit "C"
Exhibit "D"
Exhibit "D"
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

(Before a Referee)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Supreme Court Case

No. SC06-1387
Complainant, Florida Bar File Nos. 2003-00,597(2B)

and 2005-00,557(2B)
vs.
MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY The
Respondent.
___________________________________/
REPORT OF REFEREE
I. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS:
Pursuant to the undersigned being duly appointed as Referee for the Supreme
Court of Florida to conduct disciplinary proceedings as provided for by Rule 3-7.6 of the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, trial of this cause was undertaken on April 16, 2007.
All of the pleadings, notices, motions, orders, and exhibits are forwarded with this
report and the foregoing constitute the record in this case. The following individuals
appeared as for the parties: On Behalf of The Florida Bar: Barnaby L. Min, The Florida
Bar, 444 Brickell Avenue, Suite —100, Miami, Florida 33131
On Behalf of the Respondent: None. Mr. Sibley, representing himself, failed to

appear after properly being notice to appear.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT:
A. Jurisdictional Statement:
The Respondent is, and was at all times material herein, a member of The Florida
Bar, and subject to the jurisdiction and disciplinary rules of the Supreme Court of Florida.
B. Narrative Summary of Cases:
The undersigned attempted to schedule a mutually convenient time for the final
hearing and left messages for the Respondent to determine what his schedule was. As of
the filing of this report, none of those messages have been returned. Accordingly, on March
28, 2007, the undersigned sent out a Notice of Final Hearing and scheduled the final
hearing for April 16, 2007. On April 11, 2007, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
Exhibit "E"
or, Alternatively, Fifth Affidavit and Motion to Disqualify, or, Alternatively, Motion to
Continue Hearing which was denied. On the final hearing date of April 16, 2007, the
Respondent failed to appear. The Respondent failed to contact the undersigned’s chambers
or counsel for The Florida Bar to indicate that he was unavailable or would not be
appearing for the final hearing. The undersigned notes that in his motion filed on April 11,
2007, the Respondent stated that he would be available by telephone. Yet, as noted, the
Respondent failed to contact either the undersigned or counsel for The Florida Bar by
telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail.
Accordingly, the final hearing proceeded without the Respondent being present. See
The Florida Bar v. Catalano, 685 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1996).
COUNT I
By order dated August 5, 2002, Judge Maxine Cohen Lando of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit found the Respondent in contempt of court for willfully failing to pay child support.
In that order, Judge Lando determined that the Respondent owed child support in the
amount of $100,000.00. Judge Lando further determined that the Respondent had the
present financial ability to pay the child support but willfully failed to do so and,
accordingly, willfully violated the trial court’s order. Because the Respondent was in
contempt of court for willfully failing to pay child support, Judge Lando sentenced the
Respondent to 90 days in jail unless the Respondent paid the outstanding child support.
Judge Lando further set a payment plan for the Respondent to pay his outstanding child
support.
By order dated October 18, 2002, Judge Lando amended her contempt order to
increase the incarceration period to an indefinite period of time until the Respondent fully
paid the outstanding child support. As of November 22, 2002, the Respondent failed to pay
any of the outstanding child support and failed to comply with Judge Lando’s payment
plan. Accordingly, on November 22, 2002, Judge Lando issued an Order of Contempt and
Commitment to the Miami-Dade County Corrections Department. Respondent sought
review of Judge Lando’s various orders of contempt and they were upheld on appeal.
COUNT II
On November 3, 2004, the Third District Court of Appeal filed an opinion in the
matter of Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2004) affirming the lower court’s
child support and contempt orders, and directing that the Respondent was precluded from
further self-representation in that court. In that opinion, the Third District Court of Appeal
found that the Respondent had initiated 25 self-represented appellate proceedings (24 of
which were found to be of no merit); filed at least 12 federal court actions against various
judges assigned to his case, the court system, and his former wife (all of which were
dismissed); and had filed a federal action in Delaware against his former wife (which was
dismissed). The Third District Court of Appeal also found that the Respondent “has served
as an unending source of vexatious and meritless litigation”, and agreed that his appeals
were without merit. (emphasis added). The Respondent sought review of the Third
District’s opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida, which was denied at Sibley v. Sibley,
901 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2005).
III. RECOMMENDATION AS TO GUILT:
Based on the foregoing, I find that The Florida Bar has presented clear and
convincing evidence of guilt to this Court and I make the following recommendations:
AS TO CASE NUMBER 2003-00,597(2B)
I recommend that the Respondent be found guilty of violating Rule 4-8.4(h) (A

lawyer shall not willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, to
timely pay a child support obligation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
AS TO CASE NUMBER 2004-70,036(11F)
I recommend that the Respondent be found guilty of violating Rule 4-3.1

(Meritorious Claims and Contentions) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
IV. RECOMMENDATION AS TO DISCIPLINARY MEASURES TO BE APPLIED:
Based on the foregoing, I recommend that the Respondent be suspended from the
practice of law in the State of Florida for a period of three (3) years. My recommendation
is based on the facts presented and found and the following applicable standards from
Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:
A. 5.14 Admonishment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other conduct

that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
B. 6.21 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order

or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious
injury or potentially serious injury to a party or causes serious or potentially serious
interference with a legal proceeding.
C. 6.22 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order

or rule and causes injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or causes interference
or potential interference with a legal proceeding.
D. 7.1 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct

that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the
lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public,
or the legal system.
E. 7.2 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that

is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a
client, the public, or the legal system.
V. PERSONAL HISTORY, PAST DISCIPLINARY RECORD, AGGRAVATING

FACTORS, AND MITIGATING FACTORS:
Prior to recommending discipline pursuant to Rule 3-7.6(m) (1) (C) of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, I considered the following:
A. Personal History of the Respondent:
Age: 50
Date Admitted to Bar: December 7, 1987
Prior disciplinary record: N/A
B. Aggravating Factors:
1. 9.22(b) Dishonest or selfish motive

2. 9.22(c) Pattern of misconduct
3. 9.22(d) Multiple offenses
4. 9.22(e) Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency
5. 9.22(g) Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct
6. 9.22(i) Substantial experience in the practice of law
C. Mitigating Factors: None
VI. STATEMENT OF COSTS AND RECOMMENDATION AS TO THE MANNER IN

WHICH COSTS SHOULD BE TAXED:
I find the following costs were reasonably incurred by The Florida Bar in these
proceedings and should be assessed against the Respondent:
Administrative Fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,250.00
Court Reporter (Hearing on 1-23-07) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $75.00
Court Reporter (At Final Hearing) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $135.00
Copy Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,176.35
Staff Investigator's Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,354.15
Bar Counsel’s Travel Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $19.86
___________
INTERIM TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,010.36
I recommend that the foregoing costs be assessed against the Respondent. It is

further recommended that the execution issue with interest at the statutory rate to accrue
on all costs not paid within 30 days of entry of the Supreme Court's final order.
Dated this 28 day of June, 2007.
/s/ Orlando A. Prescott

ORLANDO A. PRESCOTT
Referee, Circuit Court Judge
Richard E. Gerstein Justice Building
1351 NW 12 Street, Room 713
Copies to:
Barnaby L. Min, Bar Counsel

Montgomery Blair Sibley, Respondent
Kenneth L. Marvin, Staff Counsel
Brian B. Burgoon, Designated Reviewer
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 2008
CASE NO.: SC06-1387
Lower Tribunal No(s).: 2003-00,597(2B),
2005-00,557(2B)

___________________________________________________________________
Complainant(s) Respondent(s)
The report of the referee is approved and respondent is suspended from the practice
of law for three years, effective thirty days from the date of this order so that respondent
can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients. If respondent notifies
this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to
protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the suspension effective
immediately. Respondent shall accept no new business from the date this order is filed
until he is reinstated.
Respondent is further directed to comply with all other terms and conditions of the report.
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee,
Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Montgomery Blair Sibley in the amount of
$4,599.51, for which sum let execution issue.
Not final until time expires to file motion for rehearing, and if filed, determined.
The filing of a motion for rehearing shall not alter the effective date of this suspension.
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ.,
concur.
A True Copy
Thomas D. Hall
Clerk of the Supreme Court
Served:
HON. ORLANDO A. PRESCOTT, JUDGE

BARNABY LEE MIN
KENNETH LAWRENCE MARVIN
MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY
BRIAN DAVID BURGOON
Exhibit "F"

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Case 1:08-cv-00434-HHK Document 34 Filed 06/14/2008 Page 1 of 133

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

Motion For Hearing on Temporary Suspension, and states:

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

such an argument would provide to a fair resolution of the issues herein.

SUMM ARY OF ARGUMENT

magnitude that reciprocal suspension is constitutionally impermissible. As this Court is obligated

the United States Supreme Court concluded by expressly holding:

Thus defining what is open to our consideration, we think we ought

I. THE PROCEDURE USED TO MAKE SUCH DETERMINATION WAS SO LACKING AN

Second, as the practice of law is unquestionably a "fundamental right", Florida's radical

departure from constitutionally-mandated procedures for suspending that "fundamental right" as

thus denied Sibley such a tribunal.

breach of fundamental procedural due process.

Florida Supreme Court’s order.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS

by counsel for Barbara Sibley, the former wife in that action.

had no basis in the record to justify the affirmation.

at its apparently pre-ordained conclusion.

custodian” of the minor children.

written notice prior to removing the children from Miami-Dade County.

financial circumstances warranting a modification. Significantly, though part of the subsequent

adjourned by Judge Lando to October 8, 2001.

of facts and law.

proposed order submitted by Sibley’s Ex-Wife’s Counsel.

circumstances at that time.

obligations under the Marital Settlement Agreement.

Sibley’s proposed finds and fact and law in toto.

assigned Case No.: 3D02-2308 by the Third District Court of Appeal.

and his four year old son’s upcoming December birthday.

! Sibley was employed in a family-owned start up business which has yet to

from its Complaint.

portion of the opinion in that matter which held in pertinent part:

panel was unable and/or refused to so do.

III. COURSE O F PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. THE DISCIPLINARY COMM ITTEE HEARINGS

00,557(2B) alleging failure to pay child support.

from TFB File No. 2003-00,597(2B).

B. THE LEON COUNTY REFEREE

which solely the Florida Bar sought discipline.4

to compel production of documents previously requested from the Florida Bar.

C. THE MIAMI-DADE COUNTY REFEREE

Bar’s proposed order without prior comment by Sibley on that order.

December 10, 2006.

issuance of subpoenas for the afore-mentioned judges.

(i) Denying Sibley’s Motion to Compel production;

(ii) Denying Sibley’s Motion for More Definite

(iii) Granting the Florida Bar’s Motion for Summary

to disclose the sum and substance of that ex parte communication.

more than has been disclosed.

and Motion to Disqualify”.

Request for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum9.

stamp and thus is of uncertain mailing date.

for that hearing on April 16, 2007..

client in Washington, D.C., during the last two weeks of April.

failure to return them.

D. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS

1. Sibley was Denied A Fair and Impartial Judiciary;