Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for IP POOL,1 Your Search: Date/Time of Request: $lient %dentifier: Database: $itation Te.

t: 1ines: Documents: %ma4es: ratification ilo Saturday, September 28, 20 ! 0":2# $entral %& 'S(R 'S(R)D(*%+(D),!! /012 !# 230! 0

The material accompanyin4 this summary is sub5ect to copyri4ht6 'sa4e is 4o7erned by contract 8ith Thomson Reuters, 9est and their affiliates6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 2

: 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !

/on4 0on4 1a8 2ournal 200! >rticle *371 1e4itimate /umanitarian %nter7ention under %nternational 1a8 in the $onte.t of the $urrent /uman Ri4hts and /umanitarian $risis in -urma ?,yanmar@ 2eremy Sar=in A*+a B ,are= &ietschmann A*+aa B $opyri4ht : 200! by S8eet C ,a.8ell >siaD 2eremy Sar=in, ,are= &ietschmann Isolated from the rest of the world, the military junta in Burma continues to rule the country by force and fear. The government has consistently suppressed opposition activities, used extra-judicial killings, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, denial of fair trial rights and more. In addition to restrictions of human rights and freedoms, other factors contribute to a silent emergency in Burma. These include the internal displacement of people, the practice of forced labour, and an c!uired Immune "eficiency #yndrome $ I"#% crisis fuelled by the drug trade. In this context the severity of the humanitarian situation there is examined, as well as whether the human rights and humanitarian situation are deserving of external humanitarian intervention. The very notion of humanitarian intervention is considered against the backdrop of international developments over the last few years. lso scrutinised are the possible legal grounds under international law for humanitarian action, as well as the legal tension that exists between humanitarian relief and political intervention in domestic affairs, in the context of Burma 6 Introdu tion -urma A*+ B is a multicultural country, consistin4 of o7er !0 ethnic 4roups6 A*+2B The -ama comprise more than half the population6 &olitically important minorities li=e the 0aren, the Shan and the ,on are in7ol7ed in armed conflicts *37! 8ith the -urmese military as 8ell as 8ith one another6 A*+!B Some of the armed 4roups belon4 to dru4 lords tryin4 to defend their interests in the hi4hly lucrati7e dru4 trade6 The military 5unta has adopted a policy of toleratin4, not to say supportin4, the dru4 trade in e.chan4e for cease)fire a4reements 8ith the dru4 lords6 %t seems that 4o7ernment officials are acti7ely in7ol7ed in dru4 traffic=in4, one of the main industries in rural -urma6 The dru4 trade has become a threat to the entire re4ion, fuellin4 an alarmin4 >cquired %mmune Deficiency Syndrome ?>%DS@ epidemic and playin4 a part in dri7in4 corruption6 The 5unta continues to oppress opposition acti7ities, to 7iolate human ri4hts on a re4ular basis and to : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e "

refuse to share po8er6 A*+"B %t has not mana4ed to address fundamental problems of the country, namely the de7astatin4 economic situation, on4oin4 ethnic conflicts and dru4 production and traffic=in46 Recent ne4otiations A*+3B bet8een the opposition and 5unta members ha7e not resol7ed the political deadloc=6 This paper focuses on the humanitarian situation in present)day -urma to discern options for e.ternal humanitarian inter7ention6 A*+EB Such inter7ention has to meet specific le4al prerequisites and must be strictly limited in its scope6 A*+#B Thus, the paper substantiates the e.istence of a humanitarian crisis in -urma6 A*+8B To facilitate an understandin4 of the current situation of human ri4hts in the 7arious pro7inces, the paper s=etches the political history of the state, from its independence from the -ritish6 Since FE2, -urma has been ruled by a small military 4roup6 A*+FB *373 >fter presentin4 the political situation of the country, the article 8ill proceed to the illustration of a humanitarian crisis in -urma6 A*+ 0B The article scrutinises the possible le4al 4rounds for humanitarian action6 A*+ B The question of 8hether a ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention e.ists is a source of debate amon4 international la8 scholars, non)4o7ernment or4anisations ?+<;s@ and 4o7ernments6 The le4al issues in7ol7ed 8ill be discussed in this article, and the possible 4rounds for such a ri4ht under international la8 8ill be presented6 The paper also e.amines the <enocide $on7ention, the 'nited +ations ?'+@ $harter and, most importantly, customary international la86 The recent cases of %raq and 0oso7o ha7e lent authority to this position6 A*+ 2B There is a le4al tension, 8hich the paper considers, bet8een humanitarian relief and political inter7ention into domestic affairs6 The focus of e.amination is placed on humanitarian action, as opposed to inter7ention in order to establish democracy6 The use of force 8ith political aims, as employed by the 'S in <renada in F8! or &anama A*+ !B in F8F, A*+ "B that is to say an ideolo4ical inter7ention, is not discussed in this paper6 A*+ 3B *37" >fter e.aminin4 the theory, the paper applies it in the specific conte.t of -urma6 The le4al footin4 of a possible humanitarian operation in -urma is also e.amined6 The article considers the scope of a humanitarian inter7ention and defines its limitations6 > section of the paper is dedicated to the issue of le4itimate action, includin4 the use of armed force6 #$e %urrent &umanitarian Situation %n order to discern the possibilities for humanitarian inter7ention, it has to be sho8n that there is a humanitarian crisis in -urma6 /uman ri4hts abuses ta=e place on a daily basis, committed by the state, 8hich oppresses the opposition, and by soldiers in7ol7ed in the conflict bet8een the 7arious ethnic 4roups6 >lthou4h recent dialo4ue bet8een the opposition, the '+ and the military 5unta has occurred, this has not yet led to any political chan4e6 A*+ EB 9hile in ;ctober 2000 the 4o7ernment decreed to abolish the practice of forced labour, little has resulted6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 3

> re4ression ho8e7er occurred recently6 ;n !0 ,ay 200!, >un4 San Suu 0yi and about # of her supporters, 8ere arrested after bein4 attac=ed by another 4roup 8hile underta=in4 a tour of north and central -urma6 %t is belie7ed that a number of people died in the attac=6 The 4o7ernment has claimed to ha7e ta=en her into protecti7e custody6 ,any, includin4 the '+ Secretary)<eneral, ha7e called for her release6 The recent political past of -urma has led to political deadloc=6 $ontinuin4 political oppression has contributed to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation6 1ar4e parts of the population are sub5ect to arbitrary 7iolence and lac= food, 8ater, medical care and housin46 The 5unta has put bud4etary priority on e.pansion and maintenance of the army6 This has resulted in a decline in spendin4 on social 8elfare and human de7elopment, such as health and education6 A*+ #B The in7ol7ement of senior 4o7ernment officials in dru4 traffic=in4 A*+ 8B has increased dru4 production and trade and has allo8ed the re4ion to become destabilised6 %n con5unction 8ith daily 7iolations of fundamental ri4hts of the population, there are three critical factors that ha7e caused an alarmin4 *37' humanitarian emer4ency6 These are: the internal displacement of ethnic minority 4roupsD the practice of forced labourD and the 4ro8in4 >%DS crisis fuelled, at least in part, by the dru4 trade6 The analysis of a humanitarian crisis in -urma is conducted 8ithout reference to e.amples of other countries6 >ny inter7ention for humanitarian purposes is 5ustified in itself by the se7erity of a 4i7en situation in the respecti7e re4ion6 Selecti7ity in the choice of a people in need is not only inappropriate but is also not permissible in the spirit of international human ri4hts la86 &ow the 'olitical 'ast (nderlies the )urrent Internal #ituation The independence stru44le under <eneral >un4 San led to -urmaGs independence from the -ritish 0in4dom in F"86 A*+ FB 9ith the e.ception of a brief period from F38) FE0, the communist party >*&*1 ?>nti)*ascist &eopleGs *reedom 1ea4ue@ ruled the 'nion of -urma until FE26 Se7eral non)-ama states had be4un to stren4then federal structures in the multi)ethnic country 8hen a military faction of the rulin4 >*&*1 under <eneral +e 9in sta4ed a coup d*+tat6 The ta=in4 of po8er 8as alle4edly to pre7ent secession from the union6 A*+20B The military Tha=ins A*+2 B claimed that ci7ilian leaders 8ere incompetent and that the parliamentary system 8as fla8ed6 > military)socialist re4ime 8as put into place, follo8in4 a doctrine of supposedly synthesised -uddhism and socialism6 A*+22B The coup leaders claimed the inheritance of >un4san, the mytholo4ised leader of the -urmese independence stru44le and father of >un4 San Suu 0yi, the head of the +ational 1ea4ue for Democracy ?+1D@6 A*+2!B The ne8 re4ime consisted of the 1anHin &arty, promotin4 the -urmese 9ay to Socialism, and or4ans of the parliamentary state that soon became superfluous6 &olitical acti7ities outside the 1anHin &arty 8ere prohibited6 The 1anHin &arty 8as composed of members 8ho 8ere loyal to <eneral +e 9in, but the main po8er lay 8ith a handful of military personnel around +e 9in6

: 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e E

*37( &olitics in -urma, therefore, de7eloped into a patrimonial dictatorship, supported by an efficient net8or= of secret a4ents and spies6 A*+2"B The military)socialist re4ime outla8ed any pri7ate economic acti7ities and branded offenders as Ieconomic insur4entsJ6 A*+23B > flourishin4 blac= mar=et emer4ed, 8hich allo8ed many to sur7i7e in a country that approached economic collapse6 A*+2EB The stateGs bureaucracy became the lar4est employer, the press 8as nationalised and membership of the partyGs youth or4anisation became necessary for any career aspirations6 A*+2#B Deterioratin4 social conditions and state repression by police and military intelli4ence resulted in student protests that in F88 led to nation8ide rallies6 The Ipeople po8erJ uprisin4 8as put do8n by the army 8ith the use of li7e ammunition that resulted in a massacre6 /o8e7er, the uprisin4 4ained such 8idespread support that the military reacted and sta4ed a coup to Isa7e -urmaJ6 ;n 8 September F88, <eneral Sa8 ,aun4 installed himself as head of the State 1a8 and ;rder Restoration $ouncil ?S1;R$@ and martial la8 8as introduced6 A*+28B The ne8 military 5unta dropped the official socialist doctrine, but could not hide that the ne8 re4ime 8as 5ust a reshuffle of the members of the old order6 A*+2FB See=in4 support from the -urmese people, the 5unta scheduled 4eneral elections that too= place in FF06 Despite intimidation campai4ns aimed at the opposition parties, includin4 the imposition of house arrest on +1D leader >un4 San Suu 0yi, the +1D 8on a landslide 7ictory6 A*+!0B S1;R$, ho8e7er, i4nored the outcome of the elections and continued de7elopin4 a repressi7e military re4ime6 >ny important positions in the e.ecuti7e ha7e been held by members of the tatmadaw, A*+! B 8ho are mostly ill)equipped and incompetent to perform their tas=s6 9hile <eneral +e 9in resi4ned as a political office)bearer, it is 8ell =no8n that he remains a =ey player behind the scenes6 A*+!2B Recently ho8e7er, his influence has been 8ea=ened6 +e 9inGs son)in)la8 >ye Ka8 9in and three 4randsons 8ere sentenced to death by han4in4 for plottin4 to o7erthro8 the military 4o7ernment6 The sentence for hi4h treason follo8ed con7ictions of more than 80 soldiers from +e 9inGs security detail6 The <eneral himself has been under house *377 arrest6 Some analysts say that the 5unta is intent on crushin4 Sandar 9in, 8ho has built up a si4nificant business empire6 %t is supposed that an internal fi4ht for po8er has be4un 8ith senior military members loosin4 their impact on the State &eace and De7elopment council ?S&D$@6 A*+!!B ,egular &uman ,ights -iolations by 'ublic .fficials The rulin4 S&D$ A*+!"B has not ta=en steps to impro7e its disastrous human ri4hts record6 A*+!3B %t pursues a strate4y of suppressin4 democratic opposition throu4h the detention of political acti7ists, intimidation and the restrictin4 of ci7il liberties6 *reedom of e.pression, association, assembly and mo7ement are se7erely curtailed6 A*+!EB ;pposition members are monitored by state a4ents, arbitrarily arrested and detained on fabricated char4es6 A*+!#B $itiHens are pre7ented from accessin4 any media other than state)controlled sources6 &olice routinely infrin4e the ri4ht to pri7acy, searchin4 houses 8ithout 8arrant and screenin4 correspondence and telephone con7ersations6 A*+!8B ,any political acti7ists ha7e fled and are in e.ile6 ,ilitary intelli4ence and the army routinely apprehend persons for interro4ation6 The 8hereabouts of these indi7iduals, includin4 opposition members, often remain un=no8n6 A*+!FB The 5udiciary in -urma lac=s independence from the e.ecuti7e6 A*+"0B The military 5unta appoints or appro7es 5ud4es and promul4ates decrees for cases to be ad5udicated6 The ri4ht to a fair trial by an : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e #

independent and impartial tribunal does not e.ist in political cases6 &risoners are ill)treated, beaten and tortured6 Some detainees are denied medical care, causin4 death and serious diseases6 <enerally, prison conditions are harsh and life)threatenin46 A*+" B The 5unta in -urma denies its citiHens the ri4ht to choose their o8n 4o7ernment and suppresses political resistance6 9hile the list of human ri4hts abuses by the 4o7ernment is comprehensi7e and dire, it is doubtful 8hether *37) 7iolations of ci7il and political ri4hts alone, thou4h entailin4 physical hardship and e7en death in the case of disappearances, amount to a humanitarian crisis that 8ould 5ustify e.ternal inter7ention as defined abo7e6 >dmittedly, there are no 8ell)dra8n lines bet8een Idomestic affairsJ, implyin4 human ri4hts abuses committed by a 4o7ernment a4ainst its o8n people, on the one hand, and a humanitarian emer4ency situation 8ith an imminent threat to life and physical inte4rity of the population in a 4i7en state, on the other6 The uni7ersality of human ri4hts beyond domestic 5urisdiction has been 5ealously 4uarded by the international community and 8as reaffirmed durin4 the Lienna 9orld $onference on /uman Ri4hts in FF!6 A*+"2B /uman ri4hts ha7e increased in importance on the international le7el especially durin4 the FF0s6 A*+"!B The fe8 precedent cases 8hen humanitarian ends 8ere in7o=ed by inter7enin4 states 8ill be discussed belo86 %n none of them did states satisfy themsel7es by simply referrin4 to repeated 4ross 7iolations of ci7il liberties6 ;ne has to bear in mind that state so7erei4nty is amon4 the 4uidin4 principles of international la86 %f it is to be restricted, necessity and le4itimacy must be 8ell founded6 A*+""B *or these reasons, it 8ill be sho8n that the humanitarian situation in -urma lies beyond only patterns of systematic ci7il ri4hts 7iolations6 %n fact, lar4e parts of the population lac= basic needs, namely food and physical safety6 >part from the described 7iolations of political and ci7il ri4hts, the 5unta denies socio) economic ri4hts to the ma5ority6 The Special Rapporteur of the 'nited +ations /i4h $ommissioner for /uman Ri4hts ?'+/$/R@ has stated that despite -urmaGs rich resources and economic potential, the country is Itrapped in 666 po7ertyJ6 A*+"3B The health performance by the 4o7ernment is poor and -urma ran=ed second last in a country study by the 9orld /ealth ;r4anisation ?9/;@6 A*+"EB <enerally, food security does not e.ist in the countryD three out of 0 children under the a4e of three suffer from 8astin4 and one in 0 is se7erely malnourished6 A*+"#B >dditionally, in ci7il 8ar areas people ha7e to 4i7e their food quotas to the army and rebel mo7ements, causin4 serious food scarcity6 A*+"8B The state of education in -urma is alarmin46 *e8 obtain education beyond primary school le7el6 9hile uni7ersities ha7e been partly reopened after a *37* decade of closure, access is e.tremely limited and then strictly controlled by the state6 A*+"FB ,ore decisi7ely, comin4 bac= to the definition of humanitarian inter7ention abo7e, the li7es of -urmese nationals are threatened by acts and omissions of 4o7ernment officials6 *orced relocation e.poses people to star7ation, compels them to flee and to sur7i7e under appallin4 conditions in the 5un4le6 Detainees at relocation camps are sub5ected to physical abuse, ran4in4 from beatin4s to =illin4s6 *orced labour practices in7ol7e arbitrary detention, rape, assault and =illin4s of ci7ilians, especially in areas of ci7il unrest6 ,ean8hile, an /%L ?/uman %mmunodeficiency Lirus@ / >%DS crisis 8ith shoc=in4 numbers of infections is supported by a thri7in4 dru4 trade in the re4ion bet8een -urma, 1aos and Thailand6 +ot only : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 8

does the 4o7ernmentGs i4norance to8ards the /%L / >%DS epidemic lead to ne8 infections e7ery day, it lea7es thousands of people dead due to a lac= of medical care and pre7ention6 The in7ol7ement of 4o7ernment a4ents in the dru4 industry mi4ht amount to a threat to the re4ionGs political stability6 This could incite the Security $ouncil to ta=e action under $hapter L%% of the '+ $harter6 (ach of the factors scrutinised belo8 contain threats to human li7es and represents 4ross 7iolations of fundamental human ri4hts6 /o8e7er, they cannot be considered separately, as strate4ies of forced relocation and forced labour are rooted in systematic breaches of ci7il and political ri4hts6 Ta=en as a 8hole, human ri4hts abuses, forced relocation and forced labour practices collecti7ely create a humanitarian situation 5ustifyin4 an inter7ention6 The /%L / >%DS crisis also contributes to the silent emer4ency pre7ailin4 in -urma and 8ill be e.amined in the li4ht of possible Security $ouncil action6 Internally Displa ed Persons and Refu+ees Internally "isplaced 'ersons $I"'% A*+30B *or decades the military 4o7ernments of -urma ha7e applied a policy of forced relocation a4ainst ethnic 4roups see=in4 autonomy6 The strate4y is directed at counterin4 insur4ency in territories contested by the 7arious parties to armed conflicts6 A*+3 B ,embers of the armed forces dri7e 7illa4ers out of their homes or *3), force them to flee6 (specially alon4 the Thai border, 0aren and Shan people are affected and stru44le to sur7i7e in the forests, 8ithout sanitation, drin=in4 8ater and adequate food6 A*+32B %t has been reported that members of the tatmadaw and allied insur4ent 4roups li=e the Democratic 0aren -uddhist >rmy ?D0->@ enter 7illa4es and demand money and food6 9hen the inhabitants deny them this, the soldiers assault, =ill and rape the ci7ilians6 A*+3!B The 4o7ernment has pursued plans to eliminate 7illa4es in ethnic minority areas, such as in the 0aren State6 A*+3"B %n areas of armed rebellion, the tatmadaw ha7e established forced relocation camps and ha7e implemented strict curfe8s for ethnic minorities li7in4 in and outside the camps6 A*+33B Refu4ees ha7e reported that 7illa4ers are forbidden to remain on the streets bet8een dus= and da8n, and that this is sometimes coupled 8ith a ban a4ainst spea=in46 A*+3EB >t the relocation sites, detainees are sub5ected to up to 3 days a month of forced labour, 8hile army members loot and burn their 7illa4es6 A*+3#B &eople at the relocation sites are used by the S&D$ troops as porters for carryin4 military supplies as 8ell as buildin4 and maintainin4 army camps6 A*+38B 9omen of ethnic minorities are especially 7ulnerable to army 7iolence and often become 7ictims of rape6 A*+3FB %t is reported that relocated people searchin4 for food outside their relocation areas ha7e been =illed, especially in the 0aren State6 A*+E0B The increased implementation of forced relocation tar4etin4 7illa4ers suspected of supportin4 insur4ents is mainly to be obser7ed in the southern Shan State, 0arenni State, 0aren State and Tenasserim di7ision6 %n all these territories, formerly concluded cease)fires or peace ne4otiations ha7e collapsed since : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e F

FFE6 A*+E B The pre7alent reason for the on4oin4 fi4htin4 is access to strate4ic resources in the -order States6 A*+E2B %t is su44ested that the total number of %D& in the border states Shan, ,on, 0aren and 0arenni e.ceeds million, some sources estimatin4 them to be at least o7er E00,0006 A*+E!B *3)1 ,efugees in Thailand, India and Bangladesh -ecause of political persecution, hundreds of ethnic minority people from the 0aren, 0arenni and Shan states are enterin4 Thailand e7ery month6 >t the end of 2000, appro.imately 00,000 Shan refu4ees 8ere a8aitin4 humanitarian assistance in Thailand6 A*+E"B Tens of thousands of people from rural areas in eastern -urma remain displaced in the forests6 A*+E3B 1ac= of physical security is a main problem facin4 both %D& in hidin4 and those in relocation camps6 Liolence by the armed forces compels people to either see= shelter in the 8oods or cross the border to Thailand or -an4ladesh6 1andmines in the border areas add to the ris=s6 A*+EEB %n FF and FF2, some 230,000 ,uslim Rohin4ya fled from northern >ra=an State 8here they e.perienced discrimination, forced labour and confiscation of their property by 5unta officials6 A*+E#B The Rohin4ya are denied citiHenship in -urma and education beyond primary school le7el6 A*+E8B The refu4ees sou4ht protection in -an4ladesh, but ha7e been considered by the -an4ladeshi 4o7ernment to be ille4al economic immi4rants6 'nder a 'nited +ations /i4h $ommissioner for Refu4ees ?'+/$R@ repatriation pro4ramme most of the Rohin4ya ha7e returned to -urma, 8here they continue to face se7ere human ri4hts abuses6 >bout 22,000 refu4ees still remain in camps in -an4ladesh6 A*+EFB The refu4ees in -an4ladeshi camps are sub5ected to physical abuses and to coercion by camp administrators6 A*+#0B /uman Ri4hts 9atch has e.pressed concerns about repatriation of Rohin4ya in -urma, as their safety and physical inte4rity cannot be 4uaranteed6 A*+# B &ersecution and human ri4hts abuses ha7e caused many people to flee the country6 ,ost people ha7e fled to the nearest nei4hbourin4 country ?ie %ndia, -an4ladesh or Thailand6 %t is estimated that there are about million mi4rant 8or=ers in Thailand@6 A*+#2B >t least 230,000 -urmese refu4ees are found in these countries today, sufferin4 limited health, food and sanitation ser7ices, as 8ell as ill)treatment by local camp officials6 A*+#!B The e.tent of the refu4ee influ. into -an4ladesh, %ndia and Thailand and the lac= of physical safety and basic needs call for e.ternal support6 The refu4ee problem has already destabilised the re4ion politically6 *3)! -or ed La.our >ddin4 to the catastrophic situation of %D& and refu4ees, the practice of forced labour must be considered6 The 4o7ernment continues to employ forced labour, directed in particular a4ainst ethnic minorities6 A*+#"B Lilla4ers are forced to participate in the construction of roads, brid4es and army camps6 *orced 8or=ers ha7e to do errands for members of the tatmadaw, and are at their unlimited disposal6 %n : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

many cases, people are abused as porters for patrols and military operations6 A*+#3B The %nternational 1abour ;r4aniHation ? ILO@ $ommission of %nquiry on *orced 1abour in ,yanmar Report FF8 A*+#EB re7ealed Ia sa4a of untold misery and sufferin4, oppression and e.ploitation of lar4e sections of the population by the 4o7ernment, military and other public officersJ6 A*+##B Since F88, ethnic minorities in Shan State, 0achin, 0aren and >ra=an ha7e been e.ploited as unpaid labour, at the disposal of the military and other public officials6 9or=ers are 4uarded by soldiers and ill)treated, beaten and e7en =illed6 A*+#8B %n the case of female labourers, rape is used as a se.ual ser7ice rendered to army members6 9omen are sub5ected to se.ual 7iolence, youn4 8omen are at times abducted and only released after bein4 4an4 raped and assaulted6 A*+#FB 9omen of ethnic minorities in 4eneral, and Rohin4yas in particular, are lured by traffic=ers into becomin4 se. 8or=ers6 A*+80B 1ittle has been done about the practice of forced labour6 A*+8 B Some 4roups of insur4ents ha7e adopted similar strate4ies, 7iolatin4 humanitarian la86 A*+82B The ILO $ommission of %nquiry in FF8 stated that the 5unta 8as I4uilty of an international crime that is also, if committed in a 8idespread or systematic manner, a crime a4ainst humanityJ6 A*+8!B %t is reported that since F88 the 5unta has used forced labour for the de7elopment of culti7ated land6 I1abour 7illa4esJ are sometimes erected to house forced 8or=ers on de7elopment pro5ects6 A*+8"B Recruitin4 methods comprise the *3)3 issuin4 of orders to attend meetin4s at military camps, orderin4 ci7ilian authorities to supply the military 8ith Iser7antsJ or I7olunteer 8or=ersJ and the arbitrary arrest of youn4 men in order to turn them into forced 8or=ers6 A*+83B The 5unta, despite international pressure from the ILO and 7arious 9estern countries, has failed to disclose the real e.tent of the practice of forced labour throu4hout the countryGs armed conflict areas6 Resolutions adopted by the ILO ha7e been disre4arded and i4nored6 A*+8EB The 4o7ernment repeatedly describes the practice of 7olunteer 8or= as a part of -urmese -uddhist culture and thereby 5ustifies 8idespread abuse thereof6 A*+8#B %n FFF, the S&D$ issued an order directin4 local authorities Inot to e.ercise the po8ers conferred on themJ under the Lilla4e >ct ? F0#@ or the To8ns >ct ? F0#@, both of 8hich pro7ide for the e.action of 8or= ser7ices upon requisition by police or 4o7ernment6 A*+88B *ailure to comply 8ith these la8s is punishable 8ith imprisonment6 A*+8FB The 5unta has, ho8e7er, made no commitment to discontinue forced labour practices6 The FFF order, as 8ell as a Supplementary ;rder issued in ;ctober 2000, is limited in scope and the stipulations in the penal code prohibitin4 the imposition of forced labour ha7e not been applied6 A*+F0B *orced labour 7iolates international obli4ations, specifically the *orced 1abour $on7ention, 8hich -urma acceded to and ratified in F336 A*+F B The re4ime has not complied 8ith ILO resolutions demandin4 effecti7e measures stoppin4 forced labour practices6 A*+F2B 9hile condemnin4 ILO reports as sources of I8ron4 information sent by runa8ays, insur4ent or4anisations and 4roups of elements opposed to the <o7ernmentJ, -urmese officials attempt to distract international concerns6 A*+F!B $redible e7idence of on4oin4 forced labour practices remains6 A*+F"B *3)" #$e &I/ 0 1IDS %risis : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

The re4ime has seriously ne4lected the public health care sector6 This has led to a sharp decline in the use of public hospitals6 A*+F3B >bout million children are reportedly malnourished6 A*+FEB 9hat threatens the health of the -urmese population e7en more, ho8e7er, is the /%L / >%DS epidemic6 '+>%DS estimated that there 8ere around ""0,000 infected people in FF#6 A*+F#B >ccordin4 to the 9orld -an=, there 8ere o7er million cases of /%L / >%DS in 20006 A*+F8B ;ther sources spea= of " per cent to 3 per cent of the population bein4 /%L)positi7e, more than e7en in Thailand6 A*+FFB Spreadin4 from -urmaGs northeast, it is fuelled by a flourishin4 narcotics trade6 Decades of opium production in the remote mountains of -urma ha7e 4enerated a culture of dru4 8arlords oustin4 each other in the trade 8ith narcotics6 The 5untaGs cease)fire a4reements 8ith some ethnic 4roups 4i7e 8arlords a free hand in production and tradin4 of heroin6 A*+ 00B -urmaGs border areas are a8ash 8ith cheap supplies of the dru4, 8hich is also plentiful in the countryGs lar4est cities, Ran4oon A*+ 0 B and ,andalay6 A*+ 02B /eroin is far cheaper than syrin4es, and addicts routinely share needles6 >ccordin4 to the '+ Dru4 $ontrol &ro4ramme and some +<;s, there mi4ht be as many as 300,000 heroin addicts in -urma6 A*+ 0!B %n the border areas, the /%L scour4e has de7astated small communities6 %n parts of the 0achin State, intra7enous infection amon4st dru4 users is as hi4h as F0 per cent6 A*+ 0"B $ommunity leaders in northern -urma mention dru4 abuse and >%DS as the most important social problems that 7illa4es and to8ns are facin46 A*+ 03B ,embers of the army, includin4 the hi4hest ran=s in the cabinet, are in7ol7ed in the dru4 trade6 A*+ 0EB %t 8as predicted that around 30 laboratories in -urma 8ould produce E00 million synthetic dru4s tablets in 200 6 A*+ 0#B The *3)' S&D$ co)operates 8ith dru4 lords, and corruption has reached e7ery le7el of the tatmadaw6 %mportant dru4 syndicates are 8ell or4anised and ha7e close ties to the tatmadaw6 A*+ 08B The 4o7ernment usually collects 0 per cent of the dru4s or their 7alue in cash6 The money accumulated 7ia the dru4 trade is presumably rein7ested in the buildin4 up of the armed forces and represents -urmaGs most important e.port currency6 A*+ 0FB +arcotics are the basis for a sli4ht boom in the -urmese economy o7er recent years6 A*+ 0B ,oney made in the production and distribution of heroin, no8 also methamphetamines and ecstasy, is laundered throu4h hotels, restaurants and shops6 A*+ B The e.tent of the dru4 trade and abuse by addicts has come to threaten the security of the 8hole re4ion6 The <olden Trian4le A*+ 2B 4enerates enormous assets that are laundered in 4amblin4 acti7ities and a se. industry equipped 8ith se. 8or=ers from Thailand6 Strip bars and brothels at Sai 1inGs headquarters recei7e up to 300,000 $hinese 7isitors per year6 A*+ !B $hina has barred se7eral -urmese politicians from entry because of their personal in7ol7ement in the dru4 trade6 A*+ "B The &eopleGs Republic no8 officially has 300,000 dru4 users, 8hile other sources estimate at least 63 million6 A*+ 3B $hina has put pressure on the -urmese 5unta to ta=e action a4ainst the dru4 economy6 A*+ EB Thailand reportedly considered launchin4 a co7ert military operation to destroy amphetamine laboratories located in -urma6 A*+ #B Such action, thou4h unli=ely to be carried out, does not foster 4ood relations and does not au4er 8ell for re4ional stability6 %ndia is li=e8ise affected by the dru4 trade and dru4 use6 %t is belie7ed that there 8ere bet8een # million and 8 million dru4 addicts in %ndia in FF2, many of them /%L)positi7e6 A*+ 8B /eroin from -urma is readily a7ailable in %ndia 7ia the $hin State6 A*+ FB %nterestin4ly, all refinin4 of heroin : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

no8adays ta=es place in northern -urma, as there are no refineries in re4ional dru4)producin4 countries li=e 1aos, Thailand, Lietnam, $hina or $ambodia6 A*+ 20B The /%L / >%DS crisis in -urma is 4ro8in4 and spreadin4 across the borders6 The military 5unta has failed to ta=e necessary measures to educate the population, pro7ide medical help to addicts and infected persons, pre7ent *3)( dru4 abuse and se.ual transmission of >%DS and to fi4ht the dru4 trade6 +<;s ha7e been refused entry into -urma and the >%DS crisis has been played do8n by the 4o7ernment6 The re4ime has pro7ed un8illin4 to safe4uard the social ri4hts of the people, namely the ri4ht to physical inte4rity and access to health care6 Thus, the dru4 industry represents a ma5or problem for the political stability of the re4ion6 %n fact, the situation mi4ht amount to a Ithreat to the peaceJ under >rticle !F of the '+ $harter6 A*+ 2 B Such determination 8ould allo8 the Security $ouncil to ta=e action under $hapter L%%6 The $ouncil could impose economic sanctions on the military 5unta6 %f need be, sanctions could be replaced by military coercion under >rticle "26 %n FF2, the $ouncil authorised military inter7ention in Somalia to pro7ide humanitarian assistance to about million people facin4 star7ation6 A*+ 22B %n Resolution #F", the Security $ouncil determined a Ithreat to international peace and securityJ and, actin4 Iunder $hapter L%%J, called upon member states to Iuse all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure en7ironment for humanitarian relief operationsJ6 A*+ 2!B %n September FFF, the Security $ouncil determined the humanitarian situation in (ast Timor to be a Ithreat to peace and securityJ6 A*+ 2"B 'pon request by the %ndonesian 4o7ernment, the $ouncil in Resolution 2E" established a multinational force 8ith the mandate to restore peace and order and Ifacilitate humanitarian assistance operationsJ6 A*+ 23B The Somali mission did not achie7e 7ery positi7e results because of the on4oin4 ci7il 8ar6 The Security $ouncil reacted by passin4 Resolution 8 ", 8hich set up '+;S;, %% 8ith the mandate to ta=e enforcement action, includin4 the disarmament of all local factions6 The Somali case pro7ides an important precedent for '+ action in a ci7il 8ar situation in the absence of 4o7ernment consent6 The Security $ouncil 8ould be in position to deem the cross)border dru4 industry in the <olden Trian4le, resultin4 in an alarmin4 /%L / >%DS crisis, *3)7 a threat to international peace and security in the re4ion6 >lthou4h it has ne7er adopted a resolution relatin4 to the /%L / >%DS pandemic in a country as threatenin4 international peace, the Security $ouncil has e.pressed the theoretical option for such resolution6 A*+ 2EB %n 2uly 2000, the $ouncil for the first time ac=no8led4ed the threat to international Istability and securityJ posed by /%L / >%DS, stressin4 Iits possible 4ro8in4 impact on social instability and emer4ency situationsJ6 The council, furthermore, reco4nised that the pandemic is Ie.acerbated by conditions of 7iolence and instabilityJ, causin4 refu4ee mo7ements that increase the e.posure to the disease and reduce medical care6 A*+ 2#B Thus, the Security $ouncil has 4i7en itself the option of 7otin4 on a : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

resolution that 8ould lin= the threat to international security not only to a 4eneral humanitarian crisis in a 4i7en country, namely -urma, but to the /%L / >%DS pandemic in particular6 The Security $ouncil could authorise member states of the '+ to inter7ene in order to channel humanitarian relief6 Such military operation mi4ht be directed at the destruction of dru4 laboratories, plantations and refineries6 %n order to 4enerate lon4)lastin4 effects, military action 8ould ha7e to include the disarmament of insur4ent 4roups in7ol7ed in the dru4 trade6 The monitorin4 of disarmament, as 8ell as the sur7eillance of military intelli4ence, mi4ht require the deployment of troops under '+ command6 1 Silent 2mer+en y The illustrated factors mi4ht in themsel7es not amount to a humanitarian crisis conduci7e to e.ternal military action6 /o8e7er, 8hen the problems of %D&, practices of forced labour and the >%DS crisis are coupled to4ether 8ith consistent human ri4hts abuses, committed mainly by members of the armed forces, this must amount to a humanitarian crisis6 ,assi7e and persistent 7iolations of fundamental ri4hts by members of the military re4ime increase the sufferin4 of the ethnic 4roups as 8ell as the population in 4eneral6 1ar4e se4ments of the -urmese populace are affected by malnutrition and star7ation, not8ithstandin4 the haHards to life and physical inte4rity caused by 7iolent persecution and arbitrary =illin46 >s mentioned abo7e, the human ri4hts abuse record lists 7iolations of political, ci7il, social, economic and cultural ri4hts of the -urmese6 The 5unta not only denies its citiHens freedom of e.pression, association, assembly and *3)) mo7ement, it detains people arbitrarily, =eeps 7illa4ers in Irelocation campsJ, and tortures and =ills people6 A*+ 28B %n terms of humanitarian needs, the 4o7ernment ne4lects to impro7e social standards of health, food and sanitation, especially in the border areas 8here armed conflicts persist6 The e.pansion of the armed forces has caused a decline in spendin4 on social 8elfare and human de7elopment6 A*+ 2FB The tatmadaw e.acerbate the situation by pilla4in4, confiscatin4 food and cash and recruitin4 forced labourers6 *armers are mistreated and e.ploited throu4h quotas on rice or other foods, 8hich are set by the 4o7ernment and enforced by the army6 A*+ !0B >part from the e.tremely difficult situation of food, health and security, members of the 4o7ernment armed forces, as 8ell as some insur4ent 4roups, continue to 7iolate international humanitarian la86 -urma ratified the <ene7a $on7entions in FF2, A*+ ! B and althou4h the 5unta did not adhere to the ;ptional &rotocols, $ommon >rticle ! applies in situations of internal armed conflict6 The state is bound by all four $on7entions and continuously breaches them in tar4etin4 ci7ilians, rapin4 8omen, =illin4 ci7ilians, beatin4 them, throu4h abduction, ensla7ement, torture and other acts6 ,embers of the army appear to commit 8ar crimes and crimes a4ainst humanity6 Soldiers also =eep 7iolatin4 the $on7ention a4ainst Discrimination of 9omen, ratified in FF#, the *orced 1abour $on7ention and the $on7ention on the Ri4hts of the $hild, ratified in F33 and FF respecti7ely6 A*+ !2B > report by the 9/; recently placed -urma as F0th in o7erall health system performance of F : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

"

countries sur7eyed6 The re4ime spends o7er 200 per cent more on military e.penditures than on health and education combined6 A*+ !!B >ccordin4 to a 9orld -an= study in FFF, -urma is one of the poorest countries in the 8orld6 >cute po7erty e.ists in lar4e parts of the population, 8hich subsists on a one)meal) per)day basis6 A*+ !"B %n FF0, "0 per cent of the -urmese li7ed belo8 the po7erty line6 *orty per cent of the population did not ha7e access to health ser7ices and safe drin=in4 8ater in FFE6 *ifty)se7en per cent did not ha7e proper sanitation6 A*+ !3B 1ife e.pectancy is *3)* belo8 E0 years of a4e, and infant mortality is double the rate of the rest of >sia6 $hild malnutrition rates are hi4h enou4h to spea= of a Isilent emer4encyJ in -urma6 A*+ !EB %D& in the 5un4le li7e in the most dire health situations, 8ith 8idespread malnutrition, chronic insecurity and hi4h e.posure to forest diseases, includin4 malaria and diarrhoea6 ,ortality rates are 7ery hi4h6 A*+ !#B The most critical emer4ency is the shorta4e of food6 *ood scarcity is a ma5or problem in -urma6 This is a44ra7ated by the army, 8hich re4ularly ta=es food from people in areas of armed conflict6 A*+ !8B The >sian /uman Ri4hts $ommission has indicated ho8 the ci7il 8ar creates food shorta4es6 %t identified si. factors: direct attac=s on ci7ilians and food, lootin4 of food and possessions, displacin4 people, restrictions on trade and tra7el, ecolo4ical dama4e and poor health6 A*+ !FB The army imposes rice rationin4 on 7illa4ers and sometimes forces them to abandon their land6 Soldiers 8arn 7illa4ers that anyone 8ho refuses to mo7e 8ill be treated as an insur4ent and shot on si4ht6 *orced relocation and forced labour are strate4ies that render people in areas of ci7il 8ar dependent on the armed forces6 -ecause of malnutrition in the relocation camps, these practices increase star7ation6 A*+ "0B ;utside the 8ar Hones, people suffer from hun4er throu4h a4ricultural mismana4ement, rampant corruption, forced labour, arbitrary fees and land confiscation6 The >sian /uman Ri4hts $ommission found that the militarisation of -urma has led to food scarcity6 A*+ " B *armers are pre7ented from culti7atin4 their land and from usin4 8ater and natural resources to pro7ide sufficient food6 They are pre7ented from de7otin4 their o8n labour to farmin46 Re4ardless of their economic situation, people are required to satisfy the armyGs needs firstD food security only comes second6 A*+ "2B The humanitarian situation demands that measures be ta=en by the international community6 %mminent threats to the life of internally displaced people, forced labour, detainees and rural people facin4 star7ation 5ustify an inter7ention of states in order to pro7ide humanitarian relief and protection6 >s detailed belo8, access for international or4anisations must be secured and troops deployed in order to monitor the human ri4hts situation and ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches its destination6 *3*, &umanitarian 1 ess The 4o7ernment impedes all efforts to collect information or in7esti4ate human ri4hts abuses6 %t does not allo8 domestic human ri4hts or4anisations to e.ist6 The only assistance the internally displaced 4et is 8hat can be deli7ered to them by the ethnic 4roups6 A*+ "!B >lthou4h the %$R$ ?%nternational $ommittee of the Red $ross@ 8as allo8ed to commence prison 7isits, the 4o7ernment continued to impose restrictions on access to the country by international human ri4hts or4anisations and forei4n 5ournalists6 A*+ ""B $itiHens 8ith contacts to forei4ners are interro4ated and at times arrested6 '+ staff members ha7e been denied free mo7ement inside the country6 The only +<; to be 4ranted access to the 0arenni State has been : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

the %$R$6 A*+ "3B Reports of abuses, especially those committed in prisons or ethnic minority areas, often emer4e months or years after the abuses alle4edly 8ere committed and seldom can be 7erified6 A*+ "EB Sanctions imposed by the ILO in 2000 because of forced labour resulted in the 5unta endin4 co)operation 8ith the or4anisation6 A*+ "#B The '+/$R has operated in -urma since FF" in reinte4ratin4 2!0,000 ,uslim returnees from -an4ladesh into +orthern Ra=hine State6 The a4ency has also been in7ol7ed in health assistance pro5ects since FF3 as 8ell as a4ricultural trainin4 pro5ects6 %t has tried to curtail forced labour practices throu4h its presence and ad7ocacy in the field6 A*+ "8B 3r+ent 4eeds The se7erity of the humanitarian situation in -urma is appallin46 /umanitarian relief has to include the follo8in4 7arious measures, 8hich address merely the most ur4ent needs that ha7e to be met6 >ll parties to conflicts in -urma must reco4nise the ur4ency of food scarcity6 ,easures must be ta=en in order to achie7e food security, as laid out in >rticle of the %nternational $o7enant on (conomic, Social and $ultural Ri4hts6 The '+ and indi7idual states ha7e to stri7e to realise the principles declared in >rticle ?2@ of the $o7enant6 A*+ "FB This implies the 4uarantee that *3*1 farmers may possess and use arable farmland and produce a4ricultural products6 The -urmese authorities must be pre7ented from interferin4 in the subsistence of people by pursuin4 practices of forced labour and relocation6 %D& and refu4ees must be able to return to their ori4inal land and resume food production6 The physical security of people in 8ar Hones must be assured6 To this end, the lootin4 bandits in the Shan and 0aren States ha7e to be placed under military control6 ,ore importantly, 4o7ernment forces ha7e to be =ept at bay6 %D& in the 5un4le must be pro7ided 8ith food and health care, and be allo8ed to resettle in their former 7illa4es6 The repatriation of refu4ees from Thailand can only ta=e place if the security of the returnees, especially Shan people, is 4uaranteed6 $amps ha7e to be set up to pro7ide shelter, food and health care for the refu4ees6 &rotection and monitorin4 of camps located in -an4ladesh and >ra=an State in -urma are necessary in order to assure security and subsistence of Rohin4ya refu4ees6 %nternational protection should pre7ail until refu4ees can be repatriated 7oluntarily6 >nother option 8ould be the local inte4ration of Rohin4ya into $hitta4onian society6 >s happened durin4 the last decade, Rohin4ya ha7e mana4ed to obtain positions in -an4ladeshi society that allo8 them to play a role in the community6 A*+ 30B Repatriation and protection of refu4ees must be monitored by independent bodies6 #$e Ri+$t to &umanitarian Intervention A*+ 3 B under International Law %f the facts presented abo7e call upon the moral conscience of the international community to act, any remedy pro7idin4 humanitarian relief must comply 8ith international la86 A*+ 32B The ob5ecti7e of : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

inter7ention on the territory of a so7erei4n state is to meet basic needs and 4rant protection for human ri4hts6 /o8e7er, it is also aimed at the enforcement of the rule of la8 and the *3*! stren4thenin4 of respect for fundamental and uni7ersal human ri4hts6 %n order to be credible and authoritati7e, inter7ention 8ith armed force must abide by the letter and principles of international la86 The different prerequisites for the application of the so)called ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention are the follo8in4: use of armed force by a state or a 4roup of states, absence of request from the 4o7ernment of the tar4et state, persistin4 4ross human ri4hts abuses, sound le4al footin4 of the ri4ht to inter7ene and the in7o=in4 of the ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention by the inter7enin4 states6 A*+ 3!B >ny inter7ention in -urma 8ould entail the use of armed force in order to halt the e.istin4 human ri4ht 7iolations and brin4 about an alle7iation of humanitarian sufferin46 The inter7enin4 states 8ould in7o=e a ri4ht to inter7ene and 8ould certainly lac= an appro7al or request of the military 5unta in -urma6 The only problematic issue, therefore, is the le4al footin4 of the ri4ht to inter7ene6 %n the case of -urma, an inter7ention sponsored by the '+ 8ill be hampered by the 7eto of a permanent member, $hina6 Thus, such a resolution 8ill in all li=elihood not be a7ailable6 Thus, it 8ill need to be established 8hether states ha7e a ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention outside of the '+ frame8or=6 The possible le4al 4rounds 8ill be e.amined, namely treaty la8 ?the <enocide $on7ention and the '+ $harter@ and international customary la86 #ecurity )ouncil ction /ikely to be -etoed The Security $ouncil 8ould be competent to ta=e measures under the '+ $harter in order to maintain international peace and security ?>rticle 2" ? @@6 The humanitarian situation of refu4ees in the camps of -an4ladesh and Thailand, as 8ell as in the relocation camps inside -urma, 5ustifies measures of peaceful dispute settlement under $hapter L%6 The council could authorise re4ional and international a4encies to step in and halt a humanitarian catastrophe6 >S(>+ ?>ssociation of Southeast >sian +ations@, as a re4ional arran4ement under >rticle 3!, could pro7ide the necessary =no8led4e and lo4istical means6 The council may not ho8e7er 4et the support of >S(>+ as >S(>+ has not been 8illin4 to ta=e a stron4 stand on the country in the past but ha7e recently been 8illin4 to put some pressure on the country6 A*+ 3"B The Security $ouncil could also determine the e.istence of a threat to the peace in the re4ion, accordin4 to >rticle !F of the $harter6 > threat to the peace mi4ht be seen in the dru4 trade 8ithin the <olden Trian4le, 8hich *3*3 in con5unction 8ith the /%L / >%DS crisis destabilises the political relations bet8een -urma, Thailand, 1aos and %ndia6 Such determination 8ould allo8 measures under $hapter L%% of the $harter, includin4 the use of armed force6 /o8e7er, any attempt by the Security $ouncil to handle the matter of human ri4hts abuses or humanitarian crisis is li=ely to be 7etoed by $hina6 $hina is an important trade partner, deli7ers lar4e amounts of arms and assists politically to stren4then the 5unta in po8er6 $hina dominates parts of the : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

-urmese economy and has a 7ital interest in not 5eopardisin4 its close relationship 8ith -urma6 A*+ 33B Therefore, any action ta=en by the Security $ouncil 8ould certainly meet 8ith $hinese resistance6 ;b7iously, consent 8ould be one routeD but an inter7ention 8ith the consent of the -urmese 4o7ernment is completely unrealistic6 The military 5unta refuses to e7en reco4nise the need for e.ternal assistance and has repeatedly re5ected outside interference6 %t has also remained suspicious of international concerns6 A*+ 3EB ,ight to &umanitarian Intervention (nder the 0enocide )onvention %n the li4ht of the aforementioned, a ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention must be found in either international treaty or customary la86 The first possible 4round for a le4itimate ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention could be pro7ided by the <enocide $on7ention6 A*+ 3#B %n its preamble, the $on7ention declares 4enocide to be a crime under international la8, contrary to the spirit and aims of the '+6 >rticle %, imposin4 an obli4ation upon states to halt 4enocide, pro7ides that I4enocide, 8hether committed in time of peace or in time of 8ar, is a crime under international la8 8hich they underta=e to pre7ent and punishJ6 <enocide as a crime is defined in >rticles %% and %%%, 8hich correspond to the 8ordin4 of >rticle ! of the %nternational $riminal Tribunal for R8anda Statute6 /o8e7er, the crucial clause in the $on7ention is >rticle L, 8hich pro7ides for the enactment of le4islation necessary to 4i7e effect to the $on7ention and to punish perpetrators of 4enocide6 The $on7ention further en7isa4es perpetrators of 4enocide bein4 tried in the states 8here they commit the offence or by an international penal tribunal ?>rticle L%@6 >rticle L% has 4i7en rise to criticism as to a lac= of uni7ersal 5urisdiction6 -ecause 4enocide may only be prosecuted by states 8here it occurs or by an international tribunal, other states ha7e no 5urisdiction o7er the crime6 /o8e7er, international 5urisprudence has clarified that 4enocide represents not only a treaty *3*" crime under the <enocide $on7ention, but also a core crime under customary international la86 A*+ 38B %n F3 , the %nternational $ourt of 2ustice ?%$2@ held that ci7ilised nations ac=no8led4e the <enocide $on7ention as bindin4 on states, e7en in the absence of a con7entional obli4ation6 The court considered that the <enocide $on7ention 8as intended to be uni7ersal in scope6 A*+ 3FB Thereby, the %$2 reco4nised the customary character of the obli4ations deri7in4 from the <enocide $on7ention6 The $on7ention, ratified by more than 30 states, pro7ides for uni7ersal 5urisdiction for the crime of 4enocide6 The %$2 8ent further and held that the prohibition of 4enocide has attained the le7el of ius cogens6 A*+ E0B Durin4 the armed conflict in former Yu4osla7ia, on 20 ,arch FF!, -osnia)/erHe4o7ina requested the %$2 to 4rant pro7isional measures puttin4 an end to alle4ed acts of 4enocide committed by forces supported and directed by Yu4osla7ia in -osnia6 A*+ E B %n findin4 for -osnia)/erHe4o7ina as the >pplicant State, the court stated that Ithe duty of states to pre7ent 4enocide 8as not limited to the e.ercise of criminal 5urisdiction o7er indi7iduals only, but e.tended to a duty of pre7ention at inter)state le7elJ6 A*+ E2B This implies that duties placed upon member states 8ith re4ard to the pre7ention and punishment of 4enocide are obli4ations erga omnes6 A*+ E!B >s part of ius cogens, no dero4ation may be permitted from the principle of the prohibition of 4enocide6 A*+ E"B Subsequently, 4enocide has been specified as a core crime in statutes for the ad hoc tribunals and in the international criminal draft codes edited by the : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# %nternational 1a8 $ommission6 A*+ E3B

&a4e

%n ele7atin4 the duties of the <enocide $on7ention to the sphere of ius cogens, states are obli4ed to pre7ent the commission of 4enocide in a forei4n so7erei4n territory, as required by >rticle % of the $on7ention6 This obli4ation binds any state re4ardless of its ratifi ation of the $on7ention6 The ri4ht to inter7ene in a so7erei4n state can be deduced from the duty to pre7ent and halt acts of 4enocide6 The <enocide $on7ention, and particularly its customary obli4ations, supply a le4al 5ustification for humanitarian inter7ention6 *3*' %t could be in7o=ed in the -urma situation, pro7ided that acts of 4enocide are bein4 committed by the 4o7ernment ?see belo8@6 ,ight to &umanitarian Intervention (nder the (1 )harter > second 4round for humanitarian inter7ention can be found in the '+ $harter6 ;ne of the determined aims of the '+ is to 4uarantee and protect the fundamental ri4hts and freedoms of all people6 ,ember states commit their faith in human ri4hts and resol7e to combine their efforts to achie7e these ob5ecti7es6 A*+ EEB Se7en sections of the $harter deal 8ith the issue of human ri4hts6 A*+ E#B The first article of the $harter, as a multilateral uni7ersal treaty, sets out the purposes and principles of the '+6 ;ne of the purposes proclaimed in >rticle ?!@ is to Iachie7e international co)operation in sol7in4 international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promotin4 and encoura4in4 respect for human ri4hts and fundamental freedoms for allJ6 %t could, therefore, be concluded that humanitarian assistance on the territory of a so7erei4n state 8ithout consent is not only 5ustified under international treaty la8, but falls 8ithin the essence of the '+Gs foundation6 >n e.ternal humanitarian inter7ention in7ol7in4 armed force challen4es the fundamental principles of so7erei4nty and non)inter7ention6 Specific norms ha7e enshrined these principles6 >rticle 2?"@ of the $harter prohibits states from usin4 force in their mutual relations6 This section imposes an obli4ation on member states to Irefrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force a4ainst the territorial inte4rity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 8ith the &urposes of the 'nited +ationsJ6 This pro7ision has become one of the most contro7ersial stipulations in the history of the or4anisation6 >rticle 2?"@ has been held to be part of ius cogens6 A*+ E8B Despite this status, the prohibition of the use of force is not absolute, as it allo8s certain e.ceptions6 A*+ EFB %n fact, the use of force does not automatically fall 8ithin the realm of >rticle 2?"@6 *orce is only unla8ful if it is directed to8ards the Iterritorial inte4rity or political independenceJ of another state6 To be problematic, the use of force has to be Iinconsistent 8ith the purposes of the 'nited +ationsJ6 This means that force remains la8ful if it conforms to any principle or purpose of the '+ as laid out in >rticle 6 >s to the infrin4ement of territorial *3*( inte4rity or political independence, these conditions for ille4itimate force ha7e been interpreted accordin4 to the 4i7en interests of parties to a conflict6 *or instance, the %sraeli 4o7ernment denied 7iolation of >rticle 2?"@ after bombin4 a nuclear reactor in %raq in F8 , ar4uin4 that %raqi territorial inte4rity remained intact and that political independence vis-2-vis other states 8as not diminished6 A*+ #0B >lthou4h the %sraeli position in the ;sira= case seems e.cessi7e, there is a need for fle.ible interpretation of >rticle 2?"@, because a Imechanical interpretation may entail far)reachin4 social : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e

and economic chan4es and 4ra7e depri7ations of human ri4hts for substantial numbers of people6J A*+ # B %t follo8s from the abo7e that use of force can be compliant 8ith >rticle 2?"@6 The protection of fundamental human ri4hts of residents on the territory of a so7erei4n state by another state 8ould comply 8ith international la8 e7en if it in7ol7es the use of armed force6 Such inter7ention 8ould not be contrary to the spirit and the purposes of the '+6 >nother obstacle to humanitarian inter7ention is the sound principle in international la8 of non) inter7ention6 This principle has been firmly upheld by states and 8as found to ha7e become part of customary international la8, albeit frequently breached6 A*+ #2B Durin4 the FE0s and F#0s, the '+ <eneral >ssembly passed se7eral resolutions outla8in4 inter7ention in domestic affairs6 A*+ #!B ,oreo7er, >rticle 2?#@ prohibits the '+ from inter7enin4 in matters that are essentially 8ithin the domestic 5urisdiction of member states6 /o8e7er, >rticle 2?#@ does not preclude inter7ention carried out as part of enforcement action under $hapter L%% of the $harter6 The <eneral >ssembly, itself, may ma=e recommendations re4ardin4 any internal situation in a 4i7en state, 8hich is li=ely to result in a 7iolation of the pro7isions or principles and purposes of the $harter6 A*+ #"B 9ith the continued pre)eminence of international human ri4hts and humanitarian la8, states ha7e been hard put to assert that a serious 7iolation of the ri4hts of their nationals falls strictly 8ithin their domestic 5urisdiction6 *3*7 Throu4h the uni7ersality of human ri4hts, humanitarian inter7ention is able to pre7ail o7er state so7erei4nty and can lead to a restricted application of the principle of non)inter7ention6 +>T; members in the 0oso7o crisis countered the ar4ument that human ri4hts abuses constitute purely internal matters6 Durin4 +>T;Gs FFF aerial inter7ention in 0oso7o, on the territory of the *ederal Republic of Yu4osla7ia, -el4ium ar4ued that such force 8as used purely for humanitarian purposes and 8as, therefore, compatible 8ith >rticle 2?"@6 A*+ #3B The then 'S &resident $linton told the '+ <eneral >ssembly in September FFF that Iby actin4 as 8e did, 8e helped to 7indicate the principles and purposes of the '+ $harterJ6 A*+ #EB This line of ar4ument seems to be supported by the rulin4 of the %$2 in the landmar= +icara4ua decision6 The court found that the fundin4 and trainin4 of the IcontrasJ in +icara4ua by the 'S 4o7ernment 8as ille4al inter7ention6 A*+ ##B /o8e7er, not all assistance 4i7en by the 'S 8as deemed unla8ful6 The %$2 stated that Ithere can be no doubt that the pro7ision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, 8hate7er their political affiliations or ob5ecti7es, cannot be re4arded as unla8ful inter7ention, or as in any other 8ay contrary to international la8J6 A*+ #8B >dmittedly, this clear authorisation of humanitarian aid to persons in a so7erei4n state has to be 7ie8ed in the conte.t of this case6 IThe use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure 666 respect for human ri4htsJ6 A*+ #FB The la8fulness of humanitarian assistance depends on the Isteps ta=enJ, 8hich in the case of the 'S in +icara4ua 8ere found to be incompatible 8ith the claimed ob5ecti7es ?the 'S had laid mines, destroyed oil installations and armed and trained rebels@6 A*+ 80B The intention of the %$2 8as to pre7ent states from escapin4 condemnation for unla8ful inter7ention in the internal affairs of another state6 A*+ 8 B %t set prerequisites for le4itimate humanitarian assistance, namely the non)discriminatory nature of the support 4ranted, and pursuance of the purposes hallo8ed in the practices of the Red $ross6 A*+ 82B %f : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 20

humanitarian relief is 4i7en to persons re4ardless of their public function, political affiliation or adherence to a party in an armed conflict, it appears to be in conformity 8ith international la8, includin4 >rticle 2?"@ and the principle of non)inter7ention6 *3*) Thus, one strate4y to reconcile the use of armed force in terms of humanitarian inter7ention is to interpret it as not 7iolatin4 >rticle 2?"@ of the '+ $harter6 Ta=in4 it further, the ob5ecti7es of the 'nited +ations laid out in >rticle ?!@ the $harter enshrine the ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention and, accordin4ly, pro7ide a le4al basis therefore6 > humanitarian inter7ention in -urma, respectin4 the limitations of a purely humanitarian scope, 8ould be 5ustified by the '+ $harter and 8ould find the appro7al of the %$26 ,ight to Intervention (nder )ustomary International /aw The most discussed le4al footin4 of the ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention is based on customary international la86 /umanitarian inter7ention has been described as Ithe protection by a state or a 4roup of states of fundamental human ri4hts, in particular the ri4ht of life, of nationals of, and residin4 in, the territory of other states, in7ol7in4 the use or threat of force, such protection ta=in4 place neither upon authorisation by the rele7ant or4ans of the 'nited +ations nor upon in7itation by the le4itimate 4o7ernment of the tar4et stateJ6 A*+ 8!B %n the +icara4ua case A*+ 8"B the %$2 considered 8hether there mi4ht be a 4eneral ri4ht for states to inter7ene in another state ?for instance, to stop the commission of serious 7iolations of humanitarian la8@ 8ith or 8ithout armed force6 A*+ 83B >lthou4h the court found that no such 4eneral ri4ht e.isted at the time, it held that such a ri4ht may come into bein4, if shared in principle by other states, A*+ 8EB fundamentally modifyin4 the customary la8 norm of non)inter7ention6 A*+ 8#B The prerequisites for the emer4ence of a rule of customary international la8 imply a concordant practice by a number of states 8ith reference to a specific situation in international relations6 This practice must be continued o7er a considerable period of time and 4enerally be appro7ed by other states6 1astly, the states must percei7e the practice as consistent 8ith international la8 ?opinio iuris sive necessitatis@6 A*+ 88B 'nder the current state of international la8, these conditions no8 appear to be met, for the follo8in4 reasons6 Durin4 and after the $old 9ar period, there ha7e been precedent cases of humanitarian inter7ention6 %ndia inter7ened in -an4ladesh in F# for humanitarian reasons, so did TanHania in '4anda ? F#F@ and Lietnam in *3** 0ampuchea ?$ambodia, F#8@6 A*+ 8FB /o8e7er, in none of these cases did the actin4 state in7o=e a ri4ht to inter7ene6 A*+ F0B Thus, althou4h the incidents mi4ht ser7e as illustrations of state practice, an opinio iuris cannot be concluded, due to a lac= of Ireference to a ne8 ri4ht of inter7ention or a ne8 e.ception to the principle of its prohibitionJ6 A*+ F B > 4eneral belief by states in the e.istence of a ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention has been supported by three inter7entions durin4 the FF0s6 The (conomic $ommunity of 9est >frican States ?($;9>S@ used : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 2

armed force in 1iberia in FF0 in order to halt a humanitarian crisis6 A*+ F2B >llied forces established a no)fly Hone o7er %raq after the <ulf 9ar in FF and stopped the brutal repression of 0urdish people by the %raqi armed forces, 8hich had caused a ma5or refu4ee afflu. into nei4hbourin4 countries6 %n FFF, +>T; carried out air stri=es a4ainst Serbian armed forces that pursued a policy of ethnic persecution tar4etin4 ,uslims in 0oso7o6 %n each of these cases, a mandate of the Security $ouncil for the use of armed force 8as not a7ailable6 Durin4 the 1iberian crisis, the Security $ouncil failed to act, o7erloaded by the situation in 0u8ait in >u4ust FF06 >fter the ;peration Desert Storm, the allied po8ers too= control o7er 0u8ait on 2E *ebruary FF 6 Defeat of the %raqi armed forces 4a7e 0urds the hope that Saddam /usseinGs re4ime 8ould fall, so they rebelled6 %raq responded 8ith particular 7iolence, ma=in4 free use of chemical 8eapons6 ,ore than 2 million 0urds 8ere forced to flee their homes6 The Security $ouncil passed Resolution E88, A*+ F!B determinin4 the repression of 0urds as representin4 a threat to international peace in the re4ion6 /o8e7er, no authorisation 8as e.plicitly 4i7en to states for the use of armed force in %raq6 +e7ertheless, the allied forces set up safe ha7ens for the 0urdish population and occupied around 0,000 =m 2 of %raqi territory6 A*+ F"B Resolution E#8 had been passed prior to ;peration &ro7ide $omfort and 8as solely aimed at the use of armed force 8ith the ob5ecti7e of an %raqi 8ithdra8al from 0u8aiti territory6 %n the absence of a clear authorisation by the *",, Security $ouncil, the allied forces had to 5ustify their action by referrin4 to a customary norm of humanitarian inter7ention6 %n the 0oso7o crisis, +>T; acted 8ithout any Security $ouncil appro7al6 %t is note8orthy that the resolutions passed by the Security $ouncil defined the situation in 0oso7o as a possible threat to peace and security in the re4ion, but did not call upon member states to use armed force to redress the situation6 A*+ F3B The reason for the paralysis of the $ouncil once a4ain 8as the threat of 7eto by permanent members, namely $hina and the Russian *ederation6 These precedents pro7ide a state practice that has stretched o7er a considerable amount of time6 The actin4 states in7o=ed their customary ri4ht to inter7ene in order to halt 4ross human ri4hts 7iolations committed by state a4ents on their o8n territory a4ainst their o8n nationals6 >fter the establishment of safe ha7ens for 0urds throu4h military force, then -ritish *orei4n Secretary, Dou4las /urd stated that the deployment of armed forces 8as not only entirely consistent 8ith the ob5ecti7es of the Security $ouncil Resolution but 8as 5ustified in the li4ht of Ie.treme humanitarian needJ6 A*+ FEB 9hen +>T; members used armed force a4ainst Yu4osla7ia, because of its continued atrocities in 0oso7o, they cited the ri4ht of humanitarian inter7ention in customary international la8 as a le4al 5ustification6 The 'nited States and the 'nited 0in4dom claimed that +>T; action 8as necessary to a7ert a humanitarian catastrophe, A*+ F#B 8hile -el4ium ar4ued that the use of armed force 8as purely for humanitarian purposes6 A*+ F8B The states, i4norin4 the principle of non)inter7ention, acted in the belief that their actions 8ere consistent 8ith international customary la86

: 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 22

The remainin4 question is 8hether the continued state practice of the FF0s has found 4eneral appro7al of the international community6 >t the '+, debates on the la8fulness of military humanitarian inter7ention a4ainst so7erei4n states 8ithout Security $ouncil authorisation ha7e reflected international disa4reement6 Some 4o7ernments ha7e held that respect for human ri4hts can pre7ail o7er respect for state so7erei4nty6 They ar4ue that states should be able to inter7ene in the absence of Security $ouncil appro7al6 ;ther member states e.press the 7ie8 that a ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention is contrary to the '+ $harter6 These states stress the dan4er of le4itimate 4o7ernments bein4 o7erthro8n and the domestic constitutional *",1 order in question destroyed6 A*+ FFB > third line of ar4ument recalls the spirit of the $harter, demandin4 a specific '+ mandate for inter7ention in the internal matters of a so7erei4n state6 This opinion is dri7en by a fear of precedents set by certain states throu4h the creation of faits accomplis6 A*+200B > uni7ersal a4reement on the ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention as part and parcel of international la8 cannot therefore, be detected in international relations6 /o8e7er, 8ith re4ard to the specific inter7entions in 1iberia, %raq and 0oso7o, an appreciation of the respecti7e international responses re7eals that, despite the criticism of some states, fe8 4o7ernments considered the inter7entions unla8ful6 %ndeed, in most cases opposin4 states had other reasons for disappro7al6 A*+20 B %n the 0oso7o case, for instance, RussiaGs &resident at the time, -oris Yeltsin, 8arned of an escalation of armed conflict as a result of the use of armed force6 A*+202B >ustria ob5ected to openin4 its airspace for +>T; aircraft because its neutrality 8as at sta=e6 A*+20!B %t mi4ht, thus, be possible to deduce a 4ro8in4 opinio iuris amon4st members of the international community6 &rima facie, no stron4 opposition emer4ed durin4 the inter7ention of ($;9>S in 1iberia in >u4ust FF06 The little reaction by the international community seemed to e.press acquiescence6 %ndeed, the Security $ouncil ?much later, in +o7ember FF2@ endorsed the armed inter7ention in Resolution #886 A*+20"B Durin4 the establishment of safe ha7ens for the 0urds, the main problem for states appeared to be ho8 to interpret Resolutions E8# and E88, in order to use them separately or in con5unction as a le4al 5ustification for the military occupation of %raqi territory6 %nternational criticism of the humanitarian protection of the 0urds in FF2 8as muted6 A*+203B The same occurred durin4 ;peration >llied *orce in 0oso7o6 Russia and $hina, as permanent members of the Security $ouncil, ob5ected to the inter7ention, incitin4 countries, such as %ndia, %raq and, of course, the *ederal Republic of Yu4osla7ia, to bac= them6 $hina used stron4 8ords to denounce a Ifla4rant 7iolation of international la8J6 A*+20EB /o8e7er, Ino stron4 opposition emer4ed in the ma5ority of member states of the 'nited +ationsJ to8ards the +>T; operation6 A*+20#B The inter7ention 8as 8elcomed not only *",! by +>T; member states, but found support from 4o7ernments in states from (astern (urope li=e -ul4aria, Romania, Slo7enia, &oland and the $Hech Republic6 A*+208B %n the %slamic 8orld, %raq 8as the only country to question the la8fulness of the operation6 A*+20FB ,ore importantly, a draft resolution condemnin4 ;peration >llied *orce as unla8ful, sponsored by the Russian *ederation, : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 2!

-elarus and %ndia, 8as dismissed by the Security $ouncil on 23 ,arch FFF 8ith a 7ote of 2 to three6 The siHeable re5ection of the resolution su44ests that the inter7ention in 0oso7o found broad support amon4st '+ members, 8ho thereby e.pressed a collecti7e opinio iuris sive necessitatis6 +>T; not only escaped the censure of the '+ but 8as also stron4ly bac=ed by the Secretary <eneral of the '+, 0ofi >nnan6 A*+2 0B %t should be noted that neither '+ resolution adopted after the commencement of the +>T; operation 8as aimed at its la8fulness as such6 A*+2 B +>T; ar4ued that it had done nothin4 more than to endorse the policy of the Security $ouncil6 A*+2 2B %n the li4ht of the re5ected condemnation of the inter7ention, this submission can be sustained6 +>T; 8as fillin4 a 4ap in the $harter, in a situation 8here an e.ception to the prohibition of armed force 8as not at hand6 The inter7ention for humanitarian purposes 8as consistent 8ith the aims of the $harter, laid do8n in >rticle 6 A*+2 !B Thus, returnin4 to the point of departure, namely the question of appro7al by the international community, it must be stated that the 0oso7o crisis represents an illustration of a 4eneral belief amon4 states6 >dmittedly, the main moti7ation of the +>T; action 8as a call upon the moral duty of the 8orld community not to stand by 8atchin4 4ross 7iolations of human ri4hts happenin4 in (urope6 /o8e7er, the +>T; stri=es in 0oso7o 8ere accompanied by current trends in international la8 8hich underline a common appro7al 8ithin the international community of a ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention in the absence of a Security $ouncil mandate6 Such ri4ht has been in7o=ed repeatedly by inter7enin4 states and constitutes a departure from state practice durin4 the $old 9ar period, 8here a ri4ht to inter7ene for humanitarian purposes 8as seldom claimed, e7en in the most appropriate circumstances6 A*+2 "B ;b5ectin4 states ha7e raised policy concerns su44estin4 that humanitarian inter7ention 8ould 4enerate a hi4h ris= of abuse, a 4reat propensity for selecti7e application and lac= of clear moti7es by inter7enin4 states6 A*+2 3B *",3 /o8e7er le4itimate such fears are, adequate safe4uards can be ensured, such as e.aminin4 the purposes for 8hich the action is ta=en, the necessity and the proportionate amount of force used6 %t is true that some aerial operations durin4 +>T; raids on Serbian troops 4a7e rise to alle4ations of 7iolations of humanitarian la86 A*+2 EB %ndeed, certain actions of ;peration >llied *orce led to loss of ci7ilian life and prompted in7esti4ations by the &rosecutor of the %nternational $riminal Tribunal for the former Yu4osla7ia6 A*+2 #B $riticised acts of +>T; included the bombardment of a ci7ilian passen4er train at <redlica on 2 >pril FFF, the attac= on state)o8ned Serbian Radio and TL Station, RTS, in -el4rade on 2! >pril FFF and the bombin4 of the $hinese (mbassy in -el4rade on # ,ay FFF6 (ach of these incidents caused Icollateral dama4esJ, 8hich mi4ht as 8ell be described as unla8ful =illin4s, 7iolatin4 the &rinciples of Distinction, A*+2 8B &roportionality A*+2 FB and the Respect of &recautionary ,easures6 A*+220B Since such e.cesses in the pursuance of humanitarian inter7ention must be ta=en into account, any inter7ention 8ould need to be benchmar=ed a4ainst specific parameters6 These limitations demand that armed force is e.clusi7ely used for the limited purpose of stoppin4 atrocities and restorin4 respect for human ri4hts6 ,ilitary inter7ention must be sub5ect to independent obser7ation as to the proportionality and la8fulness of its performance6 ;nce the serious 7iolations of humanitarian la8 ha7e been contained, the inter7enin4 states are necessarily obli4ed to pull their forces out of the territory6 The role of preser7in4 peace and settin4 mechanisms for the punishment of perpetrators must then be consi4ned to the 'nited : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# +ations6

&a4e 2"

Thus, in conclusion on the e.istence of a ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention under international customary la8, it is appropriate to recall the dictum of the %$2 in F8E, that Ireliance by a State on a no7el ri4ht or an unprecedented e.ception to the principle ?of non)inter7ention@ mi4ht, if shared in principle by other States, tend to8ard a modification of customary international la8J6 A*+22 B %t appears that the response by the international community to the rele7ant precedents in 1iberia in FF0, %raq in FF2 and 0oso7o in FFF has re7ealed an appro7al, tacitly or e.pressly, of the reliance of inter7enin4 states on a customary ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention6 Such ri4ht can be e.ercised 8ithout *"," '+ mandate, but must be accompanied by re4ulatin4 principles6 $ustomary international la8 supplies the third possible 4round and 5ustification for humanitarian action in -urma6 1ppli ation to t$e Situation in 5urma The humanitarian situation in -urma demands e.ternal inter7ention6 > le4al footin4 for such inter7ention can be found in the <enocide $on7ention, the '+ $harter and international customary la86 The follo8in4 section discusses 8hich le4al footin4 could pro7ide the basis for humanitarian action and ho8 operations includin4 the use of armed force 8ould be benchmar=ed and limited to the necessary e.tent6 %n order to comply 8ith international la8, any operation 8ould ha7e to be 8ell)defined in its scope and time frame6 (.ternal military campai4ns must be limited to humanitarian purposes, 8ithout bearin4 any political moti7es or aspirations6 #$e Le+al 5asis for a &umanitarian Operation in 5urma >s seen abo7e, the '+ $harter and international customary la8 ser7e as le4al bases for a ri4ht to inter7ene in -urma 8ith military means6 /umanitarian action could also rest on the <enocide $on7ention and its duty erga omnes to pre7ent acts of 4enocide, pro7ided that state a4ents in -urma committed acts of 4enocide as defined in >rticle %% of the <enocide $on7ention6 The armed forces in -urma ha7e pursued a policy of forced relocation directed at certain ethnic and reli4ious minorities6 %n the course of military actions a4ainst rebel 4roups in the border areas near Thailand and -an4ladesh, ci7ilians ha7e become 7ictims of unla8ful =illin4s, physical abuse and rape6 The -urmese army specifically tar4eted the 0aren people 8ith the apparent aim of eliminatin4 them6 A*+222B State a4ents, thereby, fulfilled the ob5ecti7e elements of 4enocide as spelled out in article %%?a@, I=illin4 members of the 4roupJ, and article %%?b@, Icausin4 serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 4roup6J /o8e7er, it is doubtful 8hether the responsible military units, in fact, acted 8ith the intent to destroy, in 8hole or in part, an ethnic 4roup6 A*+22!B The sub5ecti7e element of 4enocide as an international crime demands a hi4h threshold and must be pro7ed beyond any doubt6 The submitted facts on the persecution and forced relocation of ethnic minorities in -urma do not *",' sufficiently sustain alle4ations of 4enocidal intent6 ,ost of the crimes committed by members of the tatmadaw satisfy a moti7ation to suppress opposition and supply the army 8ith funds and food6 >n intent to destroy the 0aren as an ethnic : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# 4roup 8ould meet serious difficulties of proof6

&a4e 23

There is a more decisi7e ar4ument to re5ect the <enocide $on7ention and its duty erga omnes to pre7ent and punish the crime of 4enocide as a le4al 5ustification for humanitarian inter7entionD that is the limited scope of action that could be ta=en on such a basis6 >n ob5ecti7e to stop acts of 4enocide 8ould be limited to the protection of concerned 4roups li=e the 0aren, requirin4 the disarmament of the responsible units of the -urmese army6 Thus, the ur4ent needs listed abo7e, includin4 the protection of refu4ees, the establishment of safe ha7ens and facilitatin4 access for humanitarian support 8ould fall out of the realm of the le4al 4roundin46 %t stems from practical considerations that the <enocide $on7ention does not offer a comprehensi7e 5ustification for the necessary operations in -urma6 That is 8hy a humanitarian inter7ention in -urma 8ould not rest upon the duty to halt 4enocide but on the '+ $harter and customary international la86 S ope of &umanitarian 1 tion %t is essential for the la8fulness of humanitarian inter7ention, as a trans4ression of the prohibition on the use of force, that the scope of military action is precisely defined6 This section tries to set 4uidelines for a humanitarian mission in -urma accompanied by military force6 > concerted action underta=en by a 4roup of states must be supported by a moti7ation to ease human sufferin4 in -urma6 The focal point must be the protection of life and physical inte4rity as 8ell as the pro7ision of food, housin4, drin=in4 8ater and medical care and the protection of ethnic 4roups6 The presence of armed forces of the -urmese 4o7ernment as 8ell as insur4ent 4roups calls for military action that ensures that humanitarian measures can be affected 8ithout obstruction6 ;f no less importance is the tas= to pre7ent the outbrea= of a ci7il 8ar throu4h disarmament operations and the protection of tar4eted 4roups6 ,ore specifically, the mandate of a united force has to include the tas=s belo8, accordin4 to the ur4ent needs detailed earlier6 A*+22"B 'rotection To achie7e the free access of international humanitarian or4anisations to all *",( re4ions of the country, safe ha7ens must be established in areas of persecution6 The protection of life must be 4i7en priority, in and outside 8ar Hones, and must be directed at %D&, forced labourers, detainees and 7illa4ers affected by military 7iolence6 The establishment of 8ell)defined protected Hones 8ould require the prohibition of any military acti7ity6 This could hardly be achie7ed throu4h the imposition of no)fly Hones, as 8as done in %raq in FF2, because the affected re4ions in the border areas near Thailand, -an4ladesh and 1aos, embracin4 the Shan, >ra=an, 0aren, ,on and 0achin States and the Tenasserim Di7ision, are mostly mountainous and co7ered 8ith tropical forests6 These inaccessible areas 8ould ha7e to be monitored by : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 2E

4round troops of the alliance, if necessary accompanied by aerial support, possibly from aircraft carriers, 8ith sophisticated 8eaponry and ?radar@ instruments of detection6 The safe ha7ens must protect people in the southern Shan, 0arenni and 0aren States and in the Tenasserim Di7ision from bein4 forcibly relocated by the tatmadaw6 ,embers of the armed forces in areas of ci7il unrest, especially in eastern -urma, 8ould thereby be pre7ented from lootin4 7illa4es and from =illin4, rapin4 and assaultin4 people6 0aren and Shan people, momentarily displaced and stru44lin4 in the 5un4le, 8ould fall under the protection of the inter7enin4 states6 The protection of life and physical inte4rity 8ould be achie7ed also by decreasin4 star7ation6 >s soon as the confiscation of food, cash and land by the tatmadaw is stopped, farmers in the safe ha7ens 8ill be able to culti7ate their soil a4ain, 8ithout the interference of the -urmese army6 The protection of ethnic 4roups in the border areas 8ould ser7e to halt 7iolations of international humanitarian la8 committed by the -urmese army and rebel 4roups6 &umanitarian id ;nce safe ha7ens ha7e been established, humanitarian assistance, pro7ided for by international or4anisations, can be channelled to reach the proper destinations6 *ood security has to be ensured in the protected Hones6 *or this '+ a4encies and +<;s could play a role6 They certainly ha7e more e.pertise in this area6 The ;ffice of the '+/$R could assist in co)ordinatin4 the import, administration and distribution of nutrition, seeds and fertilisers6 *armers must be able to re4ain their plots and to culti7ate arable land 8ith rice and other subsistence a4ricultural products6 >ccess to drin=in4 8ater must be pro7ided for by layin4 8ater pipes, installin4 pumps and 4enerators and de7elopin4 natural 8ater sources6 Sanitation facilities ha7e to be built if necessary6 >4ricultural trainin4 pro4rammes, already in place and run by the '+/$/R, should be continued and 8idened6 /ealth pro4rammes in the border areas of 1aos and Thailand should be launched and should pro7ide medical care for dru4 users6 The pre7ention of /%L infections could also fall 8ithin such pro4rammes6 These tas=s *",7 could be performed by specialists from +<;s as 8ell as '+ a4encies li=e the '+/$/R, '+)%& and '+D&6 $onsiderable lo4istical efforts 8ill ha7e to be underta=en and mana4ed by independent, preferably non)4o7ernmental and non)commercial bodies6 "isarmament To ensure that humanitarian assistance can reach its recipients, any armed factions must be =ept at bay, ie out of the protected Hones6 > mandate for the alliance of inter7enin4 states must include a prohibition of any forei4n military assistance to the tatmadaw or rebel mo7ements in these areas6 A*+223B *urthermore, pro7incial sections of the -urmese armed forces could become the ob5ect of restructurin4 measures, in order to ensure the safety of refu4ees and the rural population6 A*+22EB %f necessary, rebel 4roups and units of the tatmadaw must be disarmed6 A*+22#B The alliance must be equipped 8ith sophisticated military means necessary to impose and enforce a 4eneral cease)fire in the safe ha7ens6 The troops need the competence to acti7ely defend themsel7es a4ainst possible attac=s by rebel 4roups and the tatmadaw6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 2#

,oreo7er, the mandate must enable them to ta=e effecti7e measures of disarmament, 8ith or 8ithout the consent of concerned armed 4roups6 The 4round troops 8ould also ha7e to monitor the transport and distribution of humanitarian aid items, and ascertain the physical security of all ci7ilian 8or=ers in7ol7ed in the operation6 ,esettlement >nother part of the operation must concern the resettlement of %D& and refu4ees6 +aturally, the 4eo4raphical scope of the military operation must be 8ell)defined and limited e.clusi7ely to protected Hones6 %n the course of resettlement, ho8e7er, the refu4ee issue must be tac=led comprehensi7ely6 > resettlement pro4ramme could be launched by a '+ a4ency, for instance the '+/$R, and military protection pro7ided throu4h the alliance6 >round 30,000 refu4ees from %ndia and -an4ladesh ha7e to be resettled in their former 7illa4es6 %n Thailand, 00,000 Shan people are in e.ile6 This process should be scheduled o7er a period of se7eral years and be accompanied by a comprehensi7e housin4 pro4ramme6 $amps must be erected in order to shelter the arri7als and to pro7ide food, medical aid and sanitation6 The troops of the alliance ha7e to be responsible for the sur7eillance of the resettlement *",) process6 > mandate must co7er the protection of the affected people, transport de7ices and camp areas and must commence at the present refu4ee camps outside -urma6 The Rohin4ya refu4ees remainin4 in -an4ladeshi camps require special protection in the tar4et area of resettlement, >ra=an State6 The refu4eesG resettlement pro4rammes ha7e to be conducted in a concerted and consensual 8ay 8ith the Thai, the -an4ladeshi and the %ndian 4o7ernments6 The resettlement of %D& 8ill pro7e less problematic, but 8ill require similar protection pro4rammes for 0aren and Shan people presently see=in4 shelter in the forests near the Thai border6 >bout E00,000 to million displaced people in Shan, ,on, and 0aren States 8ill ha7e to be included in the resettlement pro4rammes6 3orced "issolution of ,elocation )amps and /abour -illages > selected unit of the alliance troops must assume competence for the dissolution of forced labour camps and labour 7illa4es in Shan, 0achin, 0aren and >ra=an States6 *orced dissolution must also be the fate of all relocation camps set up by the tatmadaw in rural areas 8ithin the safe ha7ens6 The mandate of the inter7enin4 troops must ensure the abolition of curfe8s placed upon people in the protected Hones6 The tas=s that the inter7ention must fulfil ha7e to be precisely specified by military e.perts6 %n 4eneral, all humanitarian assistance should be carried out by ci7il or4anisations, 8hile troops should bear responsibility for the physical safety of all persons6 %n addition, the alliance could or4anise fund)raisin4 acti7ities in order to equip international or4anisations 8ith the means to fulfil their humanitarian mission6 >ny mandate 4i7en to an alliance of states to inter7ene in -urma must rest upon a moti7ation to sponsor humanitarian relief in the country6 The purity of moti7es is the central limitation to the scope of : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# military action to be ta=en by the participants in the operation6 Limitations

&a4e 28

>s any military action 8ill impede upon the so7erei4nty of -urma as a state, the mandate of the armed forces sent by participatin4 states must be as limited as possible6 /umanitarian inter7ention is the ultima ratio in a process of efforts directed at decreasin4 the humanitarian crisis in -urma6 A*+228B This implies that throu4hout any military inter7ention, all political channels of ne4otiation must remain open and diplomatic tal=s 8ith the -urmese authorities ha7e to be initiated and pursued6 *",* %f >rticle 2?"@ of the '+ $harter is interpreted as not bein4 7iolated, the territorial inte4rity of -urma can only suffer as much as is required to obtain the desired result6 This means that any deployment of military personnel on -urmese soil has to be necessary and proportional6 %t also means that troops must be 8ithdra8n as soon as the purpose of the mandate is attained6 Remo7al in parts can become mandatory if the respecti7e units ha7e completed their tas=s or in the e7ent that no armed resistance is met, so that continuity of the military mission pro7es disproportional6 9hile the territorial inte4rity of -urma 8ill necessarily be impaired, the political independence of the country as such must not be tempered 8ith6 %t is important to display a politically neutral mission 8ithout political moti7ation capable of redefinin4 the course of action6 *orei4n affairs policies 8ill naturally be based on strate4ic considerations, nursed by the interests of the respecti7e 4o7ernments in po8er6 /o8e7er, if no altruistic aspirations are to be e.pected, the fundamental moti7ation to act has to be placed upon the moral duty and le4al ri4ht to inter7ene in an internal situation in order to halt atrocities and ease a humanitarian emer4ency6 ;ther moti7es and interests of inter7enin4 states must ta=e a bac= seat6 The line bet8een humanitarian relief measures and interference in domestic affairs is delicate6 Therefore, any trespass on essential competences must be pre7ented6 %n 4eneral terms, immediate relief should be pursued, as opposed to measures of a political nature ta=en to unfold effects in a medium or lon4 term6 This consideration e.cludes any political inter7ention into le4islati7e competences6 The inter7ention cannot ta=e the initiati7e to ad5ust a4ricultural mismana4ement, corruption or administrati7e land confiscation as factors of food scarcity6 The alliance 8ill ha7e no ri4ht to a7ail itself of the competence to le4islate, be it in order to 4uarantee farmers the possession and use of arable land or to abolish rice quotas throu4hout the country6 This is an important distinction from a political inter7ention, 8hich 8ould question the credibility of the inter7ention because it 8ould rest upon a different le4al footin46 9hat should be tar4eted are practices of forced labour as imminent acts of human ri4hts 7iolations ?direct attac=s a4ainst ci7ilians@6 They can be stopped as they 7iolate both international and -urmese la86 A*+22FB 1i=e8ise, the termination of forced labour and the closure of forced relocation camps does not infrin4e on domestic affairs, because the uni7ersality of the ri4hts to life, physical inte4rity and the freedom of mo7ement pre7ail o7er the principle of non)inter7ention6

: 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e 2F

*"1, >s far as fundin4 is concerned, any financial assistance 4i7en to or4anisations operatin4 on -urmese territory must satisfy humanitarian purposes, in order not to amount to ille4itimate inter7ention6 A*+2!0B The eminence of the principle of non)inter7ention in international la8 has to be rela.ed 8ith re4ards to measures combatin4 the dru4)trade, althou4h this depends on comprehensi7e humanitarian action6 %n fact, the flourishin4 dru4 trade increases /%L infections, the trade of se. 8or=ers and, most importantly, enables mi4hty armed 4roups to terrorise sections of the population6 ,ilitary operations a4ainst dru4 refineries, plantations and laboratories 8ould need to be carried out in the areas of dru4 production6 /o8e7er, such military action 8ould fall into the realm of domestic affairs and 5ustifiably attract accusations of bein4 politically moti7ated6 The fi4ht a4ainst 4o7ernment)in7ol7ed trade in narcotics in -urma only indirectly promotes the aim of brin4in4 about humanitarian relief6 Since the operation 8ould not be sponsored by any '+ mandate, it cannot co7er the pre7ention of political destabilisation throu4h dru4 production and trade in the <olden Trian4le6 There are other and more con7incin4 reasons 8hy the 4o7ernment)related dru4 trade cannot be easily halted and should not appear on the schedule of the operation6 &olitically, cease)fire a4reements 8ith se7eral insur4ent 4roups ha7e relie7ed the 5unta from pressure6 %f the 5unta 8ere to mo7e a4ainst any dru4) lord army no8, a rene8ed ci7il 8ar 8ould be 7ery li=ely6 $orruption throu4hout the army also entails personal bonds bet8een dru4 traders and the administration, 8hich leads to mutual trust and dependence bet8een =ey fi4ures of the dru4 economy6 ,ore importantly, the boomin4 dru4 trade in -urma has made the domestic economy dependent on income from illicit narcotics6 %n fact, the lionGs share of e.port income, althou4h officially not ac=no8led4ed, deri7es from the dru4 industry6 A*+2! B This dependence 8as increased by the >sian currency crisis in the late FF0s6 > 3! per cent drop in forei4n direct in7estments in FF8 can be attributed to the financial crisis in South >sia6 Since then, more forei4n companies ha7e pulled out of -urma6 Today -urma is the first state in >sia that sur7i7es on the e.port of illicit dru4s6 A*+2!2B >ny attempt to 8ipe it out 8ould cause the collapse of the -urmese economy6 T8o =ey factors 8ill be crucial for the credibility and authority of the operation6 ;ne is transparency of measures6 >ll actions ta=en by the alliance must be monitored by an independent body that is not part of the operation6 The mandate mi4ht en7isa4e a body comparable to the '+ inspectors in %raq, responsible for the monitorin4 of military pro4rammes and arms reduction6 *"11 Such a body must constantly reflect the e7ents and report on the le4ality of the operation6 Transparency of action does not mean that all military plannin4 must be made public6 +or does it mean that the sur7eillance body consists of the 8orld press6 Rather, transparency demands the on4oin4 le4al scrutiny of e7ery sin4le military action6 &roportionality, necessity and conformity 8ith international humanitarian la8 must be assured at all times6 %n order to pre7ent the shortcomin4s of the 0oso7o precedent, 8here 7iolations of the <ene7a $on7entions occurred and caused loss of ci7ilian li7es, the military command of the operation must be sub5ected to a system of Ichec= and reactJ6 %n the e7ent that military action becomes e.cessi7e, unnecessary or falls short of remainin4 le4itimate, the monitorin4 body must ha7e the po8er to impose rectifyin4 conditions6 ;bli4ations to render the operation le4al ha7e to include the remo7al of sin4le units, : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !0

the e.chan4e of commandin4 officers and the transfer of specific tas=s to ci7ilian or4anisations6 %f need be, the monitorin4 body should be enabled to halt the operation as a 8hole6 The establishment of a sufficiently independent and impartial body 8ill increase the international acceptance and le4ality of the inter7ention6 The other pi7otal factor for the authority of the inter7ention is the limitation to the sole purpose of stoppin4 human ri4hts abuses and restorin4 respect for fundamental ri4hts6 $onsequently, the use of force must be discontinued as soon as this purpose is satisfied6 A*+2!!B *orei4n troops must be 8ithdra8n from -urmese territory and the tas=s initiated transferred to ci7ilian bodies6 ,ilitary enforcement of human ri4hts must be replaced, in time, by ci7ilian mechanisms under the umbrella of '+ a4encies M '+/$/R, '+)%& and '+D&6 %nternational or4anisations 8ill also be responsible for the monitorin4 of the human ri4hts situation after the military operation is completed6 $riminal procedure measures concernin4 the punishment of perpetrators of international crimes must not reside 8ith those in7ol7ed in the operation6 %n7esti4ations into crimes a4ainst humanity for acts causin4 food scarcity should be insti4ated by the rele7ant -urmese authorities6 This is unli=ely to happen at the moment, but mi4ht become part of a process of dealin4 8ith past in5ustice in a future democratic -urma6 A*+2!"B The success of the inter7ention, as 8ell as its continuity throu4h the 8or= of '+ a4encies and non) 4o7ernmental or4anisations, 8ill depend on the responsible =ey fi4ures headin4 the respecti7e bodies6 The persons in char4e, 7ested 8ith responsibility for humanitarian relief pro4rammes, for resettlement, *"1! protection pro4rammes, administration and distribution of food and medical aid, 8ater supply, etc, must try to 4ain personal acceptance 8ithin the se4ment of population 8ith 8hom they 8or=6 This is decisi7e, since fe8 cultures attach 4reater importance to po8er as a 7alue than the -urmese6 $onsiderations of po8er and status permeate e7en social relationships and tend to politicise ordinary life6 A*+2!3B &o8er is seen as finite, 8hich means that the dele4ation of po8er becomes more delicate6 %nstead of dependin4 on ideolo4ical or institutional relationships, po8er and loyalty appear hi4hly personalised6 9hen po8er becomes personalised, patron)client relationships pre7ail, and factionalism is created6 Social hierarchy depends on personal loyalty to po8er)bearers6 %nterestin4ly, opposition is not concei7ed as ideolo4ical but as a breach of loyalty6 A*+2!EB $ompromises become problematic, and a deep mutual social distrust builds up6 A*+2!#B Responsible =ey fi4ures must deal 8ith these social issues, bearin4 in mind the lon4 history of militarisation that -urma has 4one throu4h in the last four decades6 The discussed limitations do not intend to arbitrarily bind the hands of actors 8ho are un8illin4 to stand by 8atchin4 a humanitarian emer4ency 8orsenin46 The illustrated aspects constitute prerequisites for the le4ality of the entire operation6 %f respected the inter7ention 8ill attain its purpose to pro7ide humanitarian relief and halt 4ross human ri4hts abuses6 %on lusion The analysis of the current situation in -urma re7eals a political reality of 4ross and systematic : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !

7iolations of international human ri4hts and humanitarian la8 by members of the rulin4 military apparatus6 Repression of political opposition, persecution of ethnic minorities, their forced displacement and acts of unla8ful 7iolence threatenin4 life and health of ci7ilians ha7e caused an alarmin4 humanitarian emer4ency6 &ersistin4 insurrections and ci7il 8ar cause atrocities directed at -urmese citiHens6 This has created a climate that is unconduci7e to physical safety, 8hile promotin4 food scarcity in the border areas as 8ell as in nei4hbourin4 countries6 %ndia, -an4ladesh and Thailand are increasin4ly affected by refu4ee influ., cross)border dru4 trade and /%L / >%DS6 The situation of refu4ees in and outside -urma, li7in4 in camps or hidin4 in forests, is more than critical, 8ith a serious shorta4e of food, 8ater and medical aid6 The se7erity of the silent humanitarian emer4ency in -urma *"13 has surpassed the threshold of internal affairs6 Recent de7elopments ha7e not impro7ed the political situation in -urma6 9hen, in ;ctober 2000, the 5unta resumed dialo4ue 8ith the +1D and >un4 San Suu 0yi, some 8ere e.pectin4 the political deadloc= that has obstructed political chan4e durin4 the last decade to be resol7ed6 The '+ en7oy RaHali %smail, from ,alaysia ?a country that stron4ly supported -urmaGs admission into >S(>+ in FF#@ has mana4ed to initiate tal=s bet8een >un4 San Suu 0yi and <eneral 0hin +yunt6 A*+2!8B %n 200 , the 5unta released about 200 political prisoners and 4ranted the +1D permission to reopen 2! offices throu4hout the country6 The re4ime also resumed cooperation 8ith the ILO and allo8ed the '+ Special Rapporteur, Ser4io &inheiro, to 7isit the country t8ice6 A*+2!FB %n September 2002 it e.tended another in7itation to &rof6 &inheiro to ma=e another official 7isit6 A*+2"0B /o8e7er, these measures ha7e to be 7ie8ed 8ith suspicion as they mi4ht first and foremost appear to be aimed at the 8ithdra8al of international economic sanctions6 %n this conte.t, the (uropean 'nion did not see reasons to re7ie8 the sanctions imposed upon the country6 A*+2" B ;n ! ;ctober 200 , the $ouncil of ,inisters e.tended the ban on 8eapons sales and the restriction of all but humanitarian aid for another si. months6 A*+2"2B 9hile >un4 San Suu 0yi and some other political prisoners 8ere released in 2002, she 8as rearrested in ,ay 200!, and a number of political prisoners remain detained6 9hile the +1D 8as able to reopen offices, any political acti7ities in these offices are prohibited and opposition members continue to be harassed and intimidated6 The opposition confirms that there has been no impro7ement of the political situation in -urma6 A*+2"!B The military 5unta has pro7ed un8illin4 to halt acts of 7iolence a4ainst ci7ilians and insur4ents, 7iolatin4 international human ri4hts and humanitarian la86 %nstead, the tatmadaw ha7e increased their 4rip on po8er, mo7in4 closer to $hina, 8hich pro7ides lar4e quantities of arms6 The refu4ee situation destabilises the political balance of the re4ion, but there is no serious hope for a Security $ouncil resolution that mi4ht address humanitarian issues or determine a threat to international peace and security6 9ithout bein4 measured a4ainst other countries, -urma satisfies all conditions for a humanitarian inter7ention 8ith armed force6 There are 4ross and persistin4 human ri4hts abuses, a 4o7ernment causin4 and reluctant to *"1" ease humanitarian sufferin4, and the absence of a '+ mandate or an in7itation by the 4o7ernment6 >n international operation 8ith a humanitarian mandate has to be launched by a 4roup of states 8illin4 to put an end to a dramatic emer4ency situation in -urma6 The inter7ention must carry out an e.actly defined mandate6 The states ha7e to deploy troops that 8ill : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !2

pursue the protection of ci7ilians6 The establishment of safe ha7ens 8ould 4rant access to humanitarian +<;s and prohibit any military acti7ities by the -urmese tatmadaw or insur4ent 4roups6 The physical safety of %D&, refu4ees, detainees and members of ethnic minorities in the protected areas 8ould be focused on, enablin4 -urmese citiHens to halt star7ation6 The alliance 8ould ha7e to be sufficiently equipped to disarm military factions of the tatmadaw and rebel 4roups, in order to 4ain control o7er the safe ha7ens and ensure the functionin4 of humanitarian assistance6 The pro7ision of food, 8ater, a4ricultural and health pro4rammes 8ould be the initial tas= of the alliance, in co)operation 8ith ci7ilian and independent international or4anisations6 >nother e.ercise of the operation 8ould consist of the dissolution of forced labour and relocation camps6 The su44ested operation 8ould be transformed into a more permanent ci7ilian initiati7e of humanitarian assistance, realised by international or4anisations under the umbrella of branches of the '+6 These tas=s demand a hi4h de4ree of lo4istical and military plannin4 and co)operation6 ,ore decisi7ely, ho8e7er, such an operation has to abide by international la8 and must stren4then the supremacy of the rule of la8, in order to be credible and to create lon4)lastin4 effects in -urmese society6 A*+2""B $redibility of the operation 8ould rest upon its le4itimacy and transparency6 The alliance of inter7enin4 states, therefore, must at all times be super7ised and obser7ed by a body independent of any political authority in7ol7ed in the operation6 %n order not to breach international la8 and the prohibition of the use of force as 8ell as the principle of non)inter7ention, the operation needs to in7o=e a le4itimate 5ustification and be sub5ected to precise limitations6 %nternational la8 pro7ides a possible le4al basis that is t8ofold6 ;ne le4al foundation of the ri4ht of the alliance to inter7ene in -urma for humanitarian purposes deri7es from the '+ $harter, pro7ided that a military operation respects the political independence of the -urmese state6 %f a concerted operation of a 4roup of states fulfils a mandate of pro7idin4 humanitarian assistance and haltin4 7iolations of international human ri4hts and humanitarian la8, it appears to be consistent 8ith the purposes of the '+6 %nternational 5urisprudence deems >rticle 2?"@ of the '+ $harter not to be 7iolated in the e7ent that humanitarian aid is 4i7en in pursuance of the *"1' practice of the %$R$6 This means the actors ha7e to remain impartial, independent and neutral6 $ompliance 8ith the $harter demands, in addition, a strict limitation in timeD military action must stop as soon as the humanitarian aims clearly defined in the mandate of the operation ha7e been attained6 > more crucial reason for the ri4ht to inter7ene in -urma has its roots in international customary la86 The analysis of state practice and their opinio iuris has pro7ed the sound e.istence of a ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention in international la86 %n fact, the precedents of 1iberia, %raq and 0oso7o, in con5unction 8ith the reaction of the international community thereafter, ha7e created a ne8 rule of international customary la86 The so)called ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention can be claimed by the alliance in conformity 8ith international la86 /o8e7er, the limitations abo7e also apply here6 ,ost importantly, the actin4 states ha7e to abstain from any politically moti7ated actions that mi4ht fundamentally question the humanitarian character of the mission6 States can a7oid accusations of actin4 unla8fully if they strictly uphold a clear distinction bet8een domestic affairs and acts necessary to halt atrocities6 The monitorin4 body 8ould pre7ent any act crossin4 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !!

the red line of interference in internal matters6 The mandate 8ould diminish this ris= by layin4 do8n competences for immediate humanitarian relief measures only6 These include the pro7ision of people 8ith food items and the or4anisation of transport, administration and distribution of 4oods, en4ineerin4 ser7ices, medical assistance and the ma=in4 a7ailable of shelter6 ;nly imminent 7iolations of the most important ri4hts to life and physical inte4rity demand action ta=en by the alliance6 The operation 8ould not be competent to enact la8s in -urma, as this 8ould breach the stateGs so7erei4nty and political independence6 9hile the proposed operation mi4ht appear, at times, to be close to interference in domestic affairs, 8ith a super7isin4 body and a precise mandate, the customary ri4ht to humanitarian inter7ention 8ill de7elop another precedent6 >s a le4al safe4uard for the la8fulness of the military action it must ser7e the principles of necessity and proportionality, out8ei4hin4 the some8hat anta4onistic interests of so7erei4nty and protection of life6 The inter7ention must be construed as a catalyst for the enforcement of basic ri4hts and needs6 %f carried out under the true claim of humanitarian assistance, 8ithin the 4uidelines set out by the codified and other rules of international la8 concernin4 the use of force and the so7erei4nty of states, the inter7ention has a 4ood chance of 4ainin4 international acceptance6 %t 8ill, thus, affirm the e.istence of a customary ri4ht of states to inter7ene in another state in order to put an end to crimes committed by a 4o7ernment a4ainst its o8n people6 A*+a B6 Senior &rofessor of 1a8, 1a8 *aculty, 'ni7ersity of the 9estern $ape, South >fricaD >ttorney of the /i4h $ourt of South >fricaD >ttorney at la8 in the State of +e8 Yor=, 'S>6 A*+aa B6 >rticled $ler=, 1icenciN en droit ?&aris O)+anterre@, *irst State (.am ?/umboldt 'ni7ersity of -erlin@, 11, ?'ni7ersity of the 9estern $ape@6 A*+ B6 %n FF#, the military re4ime chan4ed the name of the country to ,yanmar6 This name refers to the -ama ma5ority and is ) contrary to the reasonin4 put for8ard by the 4o7ernment ) not inclusi7e as to represent the multi)ethnic character of the -urmese society6 A*+2B6 Smith, ,6, Burma4 Insurgency and the 'olitics of 5thnicity ?1ondon: Ked -oo=s 1td, FF!@6 #ee also the re7ised edition: Smith, ,6, Burma4 Insurgency and the 'olitics of 5thnicity ?Dha=a: 'ni7ersity &ress, FFF@ and Sar=in, 2eremy, I(.aminin4 the $ompetin4 $onstitutional &rocesses in -urma/,yanmar from a $omparati7e and %nternational Democratic and /uman Ri4hts &erspecti7eJ ?200 @ 2 sia-'acific 6ournal on &uman ,ights and the /aw "26 A*+!B6 *or a complete understandin4 of the insur4ency, see Smith, ,6, Burma ?note 2 abo7e@6 A*+"B6 Sar=in, 2eremy, IDealin4 9ith &ast /uman Ri4hts >buses: &romotin4 Reconciliation in a *uture Democratic -urmaJ ?2000@ # /egal Issues on Burma 6ournal 6 A*+3B6 Sar=in, 2eremy, ?note 2 abo7e@6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !"

A*+EB6 >n inter7ention on the territory of a so7erei4n state can be defined as the protection by a state or 4roup of states of fundamental human ri4hts, in particular the ri4ht to life, of nationals of, and residin4 in, the territory of other states, in7ol7in4 the use or threat of force, such protection ta=in4 place neither upon the authorisation by the rele7ant or4ans of the '+ nor upon in7itation by the le4itimate 4o7ernment of the tar4et state, D6 0ritsiotis, IReappraisin4 &olicy ;b5ections to /umanitarian %nter7entionJ ? FF8@ 7ichigan 6ournal of International /aw 0036 #ee also ,6 $6 -assiouni, IThe +ormati7e *rame8or= of %nternational /umanitarian 1a8: ;7erlaps, <aps and >mbi4uitiesJ ? FF8@ 8 Transnational /aw and )ontemporary 'roblems FF6 A*+#B6 T6 /adden and $6 /ar7ey, IThe 1a8 of %nternal $risis and $onflict: >n ;utline &rospectus for ,er4er of %nternational /uman Ri4hts 1a8, the 1a8 of >rmed $onflict, Refu4ee 1a8, and the 1a8 on /umanitarian %nter7entionJ ? FFF@ 8 ?8!!@ International ,eview of the ,ed )ross F6 A*+8B6 ;thers ha7e also noted the need for humanitarian inter7ention in -urma6 &etersen for e.ample lists a 8hole host of reasons 8hy inter7ention should occur in -urma but notes that: I%f humanitarian concerns 8ere pre)eminent, action 8ould most li=ely ha7e been ta=en in 666 -urma, yet human ri4hts abuses continue6J *rederic= 26 &etersen IThe *acade of /umanitarian %nter7ention for /uman Ri4hts in a $ommunity of So7erei4n +ationsJ ? FF8@ ri8ona 6ournal of International and )omparative /aw 8# 6 A*+FB6 ,6 >li 0han, The Burmese 9ay4 To 9here: ,eport of a 7ission to 7yanmar $Burma% ?<ene7a: %nternational $ommission of 2urists, FF @ p "6 A*+ 0B6 The paper illustrates the se7erity of the humanitarian situation by e.aminin4 a ran4e of issues that impact on that state of affairs6 A*+ B6 Simon $hesterman, 6ust 9ar or 6ust 'eace: &umanitarian Intervention and International /aw ?;.ford, +e8 Yor=: ;.ford 'ni7ersity &ress, 200 @6 A*+ 2B6 ;n %raq see 1ouis Rene -eres, I%raqi $rimes Durin4 and >fter the <ulf 9ar: The %mperati7e Response of %nternational 1a8J ? FF!@ 3 /oyola of /os ngeles International ; )omparative /aw 6ournal E2F6 #ee also Led +anda, ITra4edies in +orthern %raq, 1iberia, Yu4osla7ia and /aiti ) Re7isitin4 the Lalidity of /umanitarian %nter7ention 'nder %nternational 1a8 ) &art %J ? FF2@ 20 "enver 6ournal of International /aw and 'olicy !03 and Led &6 +anda, Thomas *6 ,uther, 2r6, >my (6 (c=ert ITra4edies %n Somalia, Yu4osla7ia, /aiti, R8anda >nd 1iberia ) Re7isitin4 The Lalidity ;f /umanitarian %nter7ention 'nder %nternational 1a8 ) &art %%J ? FF8@ "enver 6ournal of International /aw and 'olicy 82#6 ;n 0oso7o there is a 8ealth of literature, see, for e.ample, -runo Simma, I+>T;, the '+ and the 'se of *orce: 1e4al >spectsJ ? FFF@ 0 5uropean 6ournal of International /aw D Richard >6 *al=, I+>T;Gs 0oso7o %nter7ention: 0oso7o, 9orld ;rder, and the *uture of %nternational 1a8J ? FFF@ F! merican 6ournal of International /aw 8"#, 83!D Ser4io -alanHino, I+>T;Gs >ctions to 'phold /uman Ri4hts and Democratic Lalues in 0oso7o: > Test $ase for a +e8 >llianceJ ? FFF@ 2! 3ordham International /aw 6ournal !E"D : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !3

2onathan $harney, I>nticipatory /umanitarian %nter7ention in 0oso7oJ ? FFF@ F! merican 6ournal of International /aw 8!"D $hristine ,6 $hin=in, I+>T;Gs 0oso7o %nter7ention: > P<oodQ or P-adQ 9arRJ ? FFF@ F! merican 6ournal of International /aw 8" D 0linton 96 >le.ander, I+>T;Gs %nter7ention in 0oso7o: The 1e4al $ase for Liolatin4 Yu4osla7iaGs +ational So7erei4nty in the >bsence of Security $ouncil >ppro7alJ ?2000@ 22 &ouston 6ournal of International /aw "0!, ""8D -artram S6 -ro8n, I/umanitarian %nter7ention and 0oso7o: /umanitarian %nter7ention at a $rossroadsJ ?2000@ " 9illiam and 7ary /aw ,eview E8!6 A*+ !B6 ;n the issues around &anama, see >nthony DG>mato, IThe %n7asion of &anama 9as a 1a8ful Response to TyrannyJ ? FF0@ 8" merican 6ournal of International /aw 3 ED >braham Sofaer, IThe 1e4ality of 'nited States >ction in &anamaJ ? FF @ 2F )olumbia 6ournal of Transnational /aw 28 D 2ulie ,ertus, I1e4itimiHin4 the 'se of *orce in 0oso7oJ ?200 @ 3 5thics and International ffairs !!6 A*+ "B6 Summarised in D6 26 /arris, )ases and 7aterials on International /aw ?1ondon: S8eet and ,a.8ell, 3th edn, FF8@, pp 8F0)8F"6 A*+ 3B6 ;n the use of force see also -arry ,6 -en5amin, I'nilateral /umanitarian %nter7ention: 1e4aliHin4 the 'se of *orce to &re7ent /uman Ri4hts >trocitiesJ ? FF2) FF!@ E 3ordham International /aw 6ournal 20D ,ary (llen ;G$onnell, IRe4ulatin4 the 'se of *orce in the 2 st $entury: The $ontinuin4 %mportance of State >utonomyJ ? FF#@ !E )olumbia 6ournal of Transnational /aw "#!6 A*+ EB6 2eremy Sar=in, ?note 2 abo7e@6 A*+ #B6 #ee the Report of the Special Rapporteur of the 'nited +ations /i4h $ommissioner for /uman Ri4hts ?'+/$/R@, (/$+6"/2000/!8, 2" 2an 2000, p 26 A*+ 8B6 D6 -all, Burma and drugs4 The ,egime*s )omplicity in the 0lobal "rug Trade ?$anberra: Strate4ic Studies $entre, >ustralian +ational 'ni7ersity, FFF@6 A*+ FB6 2eremy Sar=in, ?note 2 abo7e@6 A*+20B6 The truth is that the federal mo7ement of non)-ama states ?includin4 Shan and 0aren rebels@ ne7er planned a secession from the union, see $6 T6 Ya8n4h8e, I-urma, The De)&oliticiHation of the &oliticalJ in ,6 >la4appa, ?ed@, 'olitical /egitimacy in #outheast sia, The <uest for 7oral uthority ?Stanford: Stanford 'ni7ersity &ress, FF3@ p 8"6 A*+2 B6 Tha=in means ImasterJ and referred in colonial times to 8hite people6 *reedom fi4hters attached the term to their names since the F!0s6 #ee also Ya8n4h8e, ?note 20 abo7e@, p !E8, ?note ""@6 A*+22B6 The core doctrine 8as =no8n as ISystem of correlation of man and his en7ironmentJ6 /o8e7er, the real commitment of the military leadership is reflected in the comment of a former member: I+e 9in : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !E

8ill be a socialist 8hen ,ao Tse)Tun4 learns to play 4olfJ6 #ee D6 %6 Steinber4, IThe State, &o8er and $i7il Society in -urma),yanmar: The Status and &rospects for &luralismJ in ,orton -6 &edersen, (mily Rudland, R6 26 ,ay ?eds@, Burma-7yanmar4 #trong ,egime, 9eak #tateR ?>delaide: $ra8ford /ouse &ublishin4, 2000@ p FF, ?note 3@6 A*+2!B6 #ee Ya8n4h8e ?note 20 abo7e@, p 836 A*+2"B6 Ibid., p 8# ?note A*+23B6 Ibid., p 886 A*+2EB6 *or a detailed illustration of -urmaGs economic decline see ,6 ,aun4, The Burma ,oad to 'overty ?-oston: &rae4er &ublishers, FF @, pp #) "!, # )2! 6 A*+2#B6 #ee Steinber4 ?note 22 abo7e@, p 0#6 A*+28B6 2osef Sil7erstein, IThe (7olution and Salience of -urmaGs +ational &olitical $ultureJ in: Robert %6 Rotber4 ?ed@, Burma - 'rospects for a "emocratic 3uture ?9ashin4ton D6$6: -roo=in4s %nstitute &ress, FF8@ #6 A*+2FB6 #ee Ya8n4h8e ?note 20 abo7e@, p 8F6 A*+!0B6 The +1D 8on !F2 of "83 constituencies6 #ee -urma 1a8yersG $ouncil, I-urmaGs (lection and $onstitutional /istory: > SnapshotJ ?Dec 2000@ # /egal Issues on Burma p #06 A*+! B6 > -urmese 8ord meanin4 members of the armed forces6 #ee >ndre8 Seth, Burma*s 3orces4 'ower 9ithout 0lory ?+or8al=, $T: (ast-rid4e 2002@6 A*+!2B6 #ee Ya8n4h8e ?note 20 abo7e@, p 8F6 A*+!!B6 Reported on the --$ on 2E Sept 2002, a7ailable at http:// 8886ne8s6bbc6co6u=6 A*+!"B6 The State &eace and De7elopment $ouncil, formerly called S1;R$, but restructured in +o7 FF# in order to 4ain international reco4nition6 S&D$ and tatmadaw are terms used interchan4eably by the 5unta6 #ee 26 Saffin, I1a8),a=in4 and 1a8 (nforcement in -urma: The ,ilitary 2untaGs *ailure in Re4ard to *orced 1abourJ in: -urma 1a8yersG $ouncil ?Dec 2000@ # /egal Issues on Burma 6ournal "26 A*+!3B6 Robert /6 Taylor, I,yanmar: ,ilitary &olitics and the &rospects for DemocratisationJ ?*eb FF8@ 2F sian ffairs 6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6 rmed @6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# A*+!EB6 /uman Ri4hts 9atch 9orld Report 200 6

&a4e !#

A*+!#B6 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the 'nited +ations /i4h $ommissioner for /uman Ri4hts, ?note # abo7e@, para #6 A*+!8B6 '6S6 Department of State, $ountry Report on /uman Ri4hts &ractices 2000, *eb 200 6 #ee also earlier reports6 #ee 4enerally the reports of the ;ffice of the '+/$/R, Special Rapporteur of the $ommission on /uman Ri4hts on the Situation of /uman Ri4hts in ,yanmar6 A*+!FB6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 #ee also the earlier reports of this department and the 7arious reports of >mnesty %nternational6 A*+"0B6 ,yint, Kan, I2udicial %ndependence in -urma: +o ,arch -ac=8ards To8ards the &ast >sian) &acificJ ?*eb 2000@ /aw ; 'olicy 6ournal 6 A*+" B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+"2B6 #ee /arris ?note " abo7e@, p E2#6 A*+"!B6 ,anifestin4 itself in increased international collaboration, such as throu4h the ad hoc tribunals, and the implementation of the %$$, not to mention military missions underta=en in %raq, Somalia and 0oso7o in7ol7in4 the protection of nationals6 A*+""B6 >ntonio $assesse I(. %nuria %us ;ritur: >re 9e ,o7in4 To8ards %nternational 1e4itimation of *orcible /umanitarian $ountermeasures in the 9orld $ommunityRJ ? FFF@ 0 5uropean 6ournal of International /aw 2!6 A*+"3B6 #ee Special Rapporteur ?note # abo7e@, para !26 A*+"EB6 9/;, 9orld /ealth Report 20006 A*+"#B6 #ee Special Rapporteur ?note # abo7e@, para !E6 A*+"8B6 #ee Report 200 ?note !E abo7e@6 A*+"FB6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+30B6 #ee the issues relatin4 to %D& from a humanitarian point of 7ie8 in &eter Salama, &aul Spie4el and Richard -rennan, I+o 1ess Lulnerable: the %nternally Displaced in /umanitarian (mer4enciesJ !3# The /ancet ,"!06 #ee also Internally "isplaced 'ersons /ack 5ffective 'rotection , Report of the '6S6 <eneral : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# >ccountin4 ;ffice ?<>;@, >u4 200 6 A*+3 B6 #ee /uman Ri4hts 9atch, ?note !E abo7e@6 A*+32B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+3!B6 The -urma &ro5ect, a7ailable at http://8886soros6or4/burma6

&a4e !8

A*+3"B6 0aren /uman Ri4hts <roup, a7ailable at http://8886db6id ppro5ect6or4 I&atterns of displacement in ,yanmarJ6 A*+33B6 #ee /uman Ri4hts 9atch, ?note !E abo7e@6 A*+3EB6 Ibid. A*+3#B6 Ibid. A*+38B6 >t http://8886db6idppro5ect6or4 I&rotection concernsJ6 A*+3FB6 +or8e4ian Refu4ee $ouncil, ! 2une 200 , a7ailable 8886relief8eb6int/8/r8S/FEcf "Fa" #aEbcec 23EaEb00!2dbbaR;penDocument6 A*+E0B6 The -urma &ro5ect, a7ailable at http://8886soros6or4/burma6 A*+E B6 /uman Ri4hts 9atch 9orld Report FFF6 A*+E2B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+E!B6 +or8e4ian Refu4ee $ouncil, --$, '6S6 Department http://8886db6idppro5ect6or4 I%D&s in ,yanmar ?-urma@J6 A*+E"B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+E3B6 Ibid. A*+EEB6 The -urma &ro5ect, a7ailable at http://8886soros6or4/burma6 A*+E#B6 /uman Ri4hts 9atch, !0 ,ay 2000, 8886freeburmacoalition6or4/2000/03/28/burmeserefu4eesban4ladesh6html6 a7ailable at http:// of the State, a7ailable at at http://

: 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e !F

A*+E8B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+EFB6 Ibid. A*+#0B6 Ibid. A*+# B6 /uman Ri4hts 9atch, ,ay 2000, a7ailable at http:// 8886hr86or4/reports/2000/burma6 A*+#2B6 The -urma &ro5ect, -urma 8886soros6or4/burma/burmadebate/fallFFbtm6html6 A*+#!B6 -urma: $ountry in $risis, 8886soros6or4/burma/$R%S%S/health6html6 /ealth Debate, a7ailable at http://

and

(ducation,

a7ailable

at

http://

A*+#"B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+#3B6 ILO <-6280/E, para E36 A*+#EB6 *orced 1abour in ,yanmar ?-urma@: Report of the $ommission of %nquiry appointed under >rticle 2E of the $onstitution of the %nternational 1abour ;r4aniHation to e.amine the obser7ance by ,yanmar of the *orced 1abour $on7ention, F!0 ?+o62F@6 #ee %nternational 1abour ;ffice, <o7ernin4 -ody ?<-6280/E@, 280th Session ?,arch 200 @, "evelopments concerning the !uestion of the observance by the 0overnment of 7yanmar of the 3orced /abour )onvention, =>?@ $1o.A>%6 A*+##B6 ILO &ress Release, ILO/F8/!2, 8886ilo6or4/public/en4lish/bureau/inf/pr/ FF8/!26htm6 A*+#8B6 #ee ILO/F8/!2, ?note ## abo7e@6 A*+#FB6 Ibid. #ee also Special Rapporteur ?note # abo7e@, p !6 A*+80B6 #ee Special Rapporteur ?note # abo7e@, p "6 A*+8 B6 Ibid. A*+82B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+8!B6 ILO &ress Release, ?note ## abo7e@6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6 2 2uly FF86 >7ailable at http://

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e "0

A*+8"B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+83B6 ILO <-6280/E, paras E3, EE6 A*+8EB6 #ee ILO <-6280/E ?note 83 abo7e@, para E26 A*+8#B6 &olitical Situation information6net/political/en4lish6pdf6 of ,yanmar, a7ailable at http://8886myanmar)

A*+88B6 ;rder no6 /FF, 8886ibiblio6or4/obl/re46burma/archi7es/ FFF03/ms4003F86html6 A*+8FB6 #ee ILO <-6280/E ?note 83 abo7e@, >ppendi. 86 A*+F0B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6

a7ailable

at

http://

A*+F B6 ILO I*orced 1abour in ,yanmar ?-urma@: Report of the $ommission of %nquiry >ppointed under >rticle 2E of the $onstitution of the %nternational 1abour ;r4aniHation to (.amine the ;bser7ance by ,yanmar of the *orced 1abour $on7ention, F!0 ?+o62F@J6 #ee also R6 1ayton, I*orced 1abour in -urma: > Summary of the %nternational 1abour ;r4anisation Report C Subsequent De7elopmentsJ ?2000@ " #outhern )ross (niversity /aw ,eview "86 A*+F2B6 > deadline set by the ILO in +o7 2000 8as i4nored by the 4o7ernment, 8hich surprisin4ly 4ranted an ILO dele4ation access to the country6 #ee /uman Ri4hts 9atch, a7ailable at http://8886hr86or4/8r2= /asia/burma6html6 A*+F!B6 Statement by /is (.cellency ' ,ay Than, leader of the ,yanmar ;bser7er Dele4ation at the &lenary of the 2#Fth session of the ILO <o7ernin4 -ody, after the adoption of the decision on the situation of forced labour in -urma, <ene7a, E +o7 2000, ILO <- 280/E, >ppendi. 6 A*+F"B6 #ee 26 Saffin ?note !" abo7e@, p !F6 A*+F3B6 #ee Special Rapporteur ?note # abo7e@, p A*+FEB6 Ibid. A*+F#B6 Ibid. A*+F8B6 Ibid. : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6 6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e "

A*+FFB6 #ee Steinber4 ?note 22 abo7e@, p

F6 -urma, E ;ct 2000, a7ailable at

A*+ 00B6 ' +e ;o, member of the +<; *ree http://8886physics6adelaide6edu6au/Tuneoo/a E 0006html6 A*+ 0 B6 The capital Ran4oon has been renamed Yan4on6

A*+ 02B6 The -urma &ro5ect, a7ailable at http://8886soros6or4/burma6 A*+ 0!B6 Ibid. A*+ 0"B6 -6 1intner, IDru4s and (conomic <ro8th in -urma TodayJ in ,6 -6 &edersen ?ed@, BurmaB7yanmar, #trong ,egime, 9eak #tate R ?>delaide: $ra8ford /ouse &ublishin4, 2000@ p 8"6 #ee also -ertil 1intner, Burma in ,evolt4 .pium and Insurgency #ince =>CD ?$hian4 ,ai, Thailand: Sil=8orm -oo=s, 2nd edn, FFF@6 A*+ 03B6 The /%L epidemic is also spreadin4 throu4h se.ual contact6 ,any youn4 8omen from -urmaGs di7erse hill community ha7e been forced or lured into prostitution in Thailand6 >s many as "0,000 may be in the trade at any 4i7en time6 Tra4ically, a lar4e percenta4e become /%L)positi7e 8ithin a short time6 The -urmese military has, at best, ta=en no action to pre7ent the traffic=in4 of 8omen into prostitution, and local commanders are accused of abettin4 the trade6 #ee The -urma &ro5ect, a7ailable at http://8886soros6or4/burma6 A*+ 0EB6 #ee 1intner ?note 0" abo7e@, p 8E6 A*+ 0#B6 #ee report ?note 00 8886physics6adelaide6edu6au/Tuneoo/a E 0006html6 A*+ 08B6 #ee 1intner ?note 0" abo7e@, p #86 A*+ 0FB6 Ibid., p 8E) 8#6 A*+ 0B6 Ibid., p #F6 A*+ B6 Ibid., p #E6 abo7e@, a7ailable at http://

A*+ 2B6 Re4ion of dru4 production ?mostly heroin@ and dru4 trade bet8een -urma, 1aos and Thailand6 A*+ !B6 Ibid., p #F6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e "2

A*+ "B6 Ibid., p #!6 A*+ 3B6 Yan4 estimated " million hard dru4 addicts in FF!6 #ee D6 Yan4, I%lle4al Dru4s, &olicy $han4e and State &o8er: The $ase of $ontemporary $hinaJ ? FF!@ The 6ournal of )ontemporary )hina !"6 A*+ EB6 #ee 1intner ?note 0" abo7e@, p #36 A*+ #B6 3ar 5astern 5conomic ,eview, A*+ 8B6 %ndia Today, !0 +o7 FF26 A*+ FB6 #ee 1intner ?note 0" abo7e@, p ##6 A*+ 20B6 Ibid., p #86 A*+ 2 B6 The Security $ouncil has the political discretion to decide upon such resolution6 (7en thou4h there mi4ht be other re4ions, especially in sub)Saharan >frica, 8here /%L / >%DS threatens the peace, the $ouncil is empo8ered and called to act accordin4 to the pro7isions of the '+ $harter ?>rt ? @, 2")2E, "0) "2@6 A*+ 22B6 Ruth (6 <ordon, I%nter7ention -y The 'nited +ations: %raq, Somalia, >nd /aitiJ ? FFE@ ! Texas International /aw 6ournal "!D +eal /i44ins, I%nter7ention in Somalia, in (thics and &olitics: $ases and $ommentsJ ! ?>my <utmann C Dennis Thompson ?eds@, FF#@D and >le. de 9aal and Ra=iya ;maar, I$an ,ilitary %nter7ention -e P/umanitarianQRJ ? FF"@ 2" ,iddle (ast Report !6 A*+ 2!B6 Security $ouncil Res #F", Dec FF2, reprinted in &6 >lston and /6 Steiner, International &uman ,ights in )ontext ?;.ford: ;.ford 'ni7ersity &ress, 2000@, p F2!6 A*+ 2"B6 ,ar= Rothert, I'6+6 %nter7ention in (ast TimorJ ?2000@ !F )olumbia 6ournal of Transnational /aw 23#6 A*+ 23B6 Security $ouncil Res 2E", 3 Sept FFF6 A*+ 2EB6 >n increased focus on the issue by the '+ can be seen in its establishment of a 4lobal fund to deal 8ith /%L / >%DS6 A*+ 2#B6 Security $ouncil Res !08, # 2uly 2000, concernin4 7oluntary testin4 and counsellin4 for peace=eepin4 personnel, a7ailable at http:// 8886un6or4/Docs/scres/2000/res !08e6pdf6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6 2une 20006

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e "!

A*+ 28B6 /uman Ri4hts 9atch Report 200 , a7ailable at http:// 8886hr86or4/8r2= /asia/burma6html6 ,ary Robinson put it drastically: I$ount up the results of 30 years of human ri4hts mechanisms, this is a failure of implementation in a scale that shames us allJD see -6 06 Sen, IThe $ase for /umanitarian %nter7entionJ in -urma 1a8yersG $ouncil, ?Dec 2000@ # /egal Issues on Burma 6ournal 36 A*+ 2FB6 #ee Special Rapporteur, ?note !# abo7e@, para 26 A*+ !0B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+ ! B6 ,edecins sans frontieres, a7ailable at http://8886paris6msf6or4 Idroit humanitaireJ6 A*+ !2B6 Ibid. A*+ !!B6 9/;, 9orld /ealth Report 20006 A*+ !"B6 *reeburma6or4, a7ailable at http://8886freeburma6or46 A*+ !3B6 #ee the statistics in ,6 Than, IRecent De7elopments in ,yanmar: %mpacts and %mplications of >S(>+ ,embership and >sian $risisJ in ,6 -6 &edersen ?ed@, BurmaB7yanmar4 #trong ,egime, 9eak #tateR ?>delaide: $ra8ford /ouse &ublishin4, 2000@ p 306 A*+ !EB6 *reeburma6or4 ?note !" abo7e@6 A*+ !#B6 #ee ?note #2 abo7e@, a7ailable at http:// 8886soros6or4/burma/burmadebate/fallFFbttm6html6 A*+ !8B6 %n FFE the army announced fines and punishments statin4: I%f insur4ents ta=e tatmada8 equipment or food, the nearest 7illa4e pays to replace it6 >ny 7illa4e 8here a battle ta=es place or 8here insur4ent supporters are e.posed 8ill be burned to the 4round6J #ee ?note #2 abo7e@, a7ailable at http://8886soros6or4/burma/burmadebate/fallFFbttm6html6 A*+ !FB6 #ee ?note 02 abo7e@, a7ailable at http://8886soros6or4/burma6 A*+ "0B6 Ibid. A*+ " B6 Ibid. A*+ "2B6 Ibid. A*+ "!B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# A*+ ""B6 '+%$(* and 9/; ha7e had operations in the country as 8ell as a fe8 +<;s6 A*+ "3B6 '6S6 Department of State, ?note !8 abo7e@6 A*+ "EB6 Ibid. A*+ "#B6 #ee ILO <-6280/E ?note 83 abo7e@, >ppendices and E6

&a4e ""

A*+ "8B6 #ee note on '+/$RGs acti7ities in ,yanmar and compulsory labour, 2 Dec 2000, >ppendi. F, <-6 280/E)>ppendices6 A*+ "FB6 >rt ?2@ reads: I>ll peoples may, for their ends, freely dispose of their natural 8ealth and resources 8ithout pre5udice to any obli4ations arisin4 out of international economic co)operation, based on the principle of mutual benefit, and international la86 %n no case may a people be depri7ed of its o8n means of subsistence6J >lthou4h not si4ned and ratified by -urma, the $o7enant is part of ius cogens and therefore sets out uni7ersal human ri4hts6 A*+ 30B6 See ?note # abo7e@, a7ailable at http:// 8886hr86or4/reports/2000/burma6 A*+ 3 B6 ,any different definitions for humanitarian inter7ention e.ist6 #ee, for e.ample, Da7id 26 Scheffer, ITo8ard a ,odern Doctrine of /umanitarian %nter7entionJ ? FF2@ 2! (niversity of Toledo /aw ,eview 23!, 2E"D ;li7er Ramsbotham and Tom 9oodhouse, &umanitarian Intervention in )ontemporary )onflict4 ,econceptuali8ation ?$ambrid4e, ,assachusetts: &olity &ress, FFE@D *ernando R6 TesUn, &umanitarian Intervention4 n In!uiry into /aw and 7orality ?%r7in4ton);n)/udson, +6Y6: Transnational &ress, 2nd edn, FF#@D >le=sandar 2o=ic ?ed@, &umanitarian Intervention4 7oral and 'hilosophical Issues ?&eterborou4h, ;ntario: -road7ie8 &ress, 200!@6 Sean ,urphy uses the follo8in4 8or=in4 definition of humanitarian inter7ention: I/umanitarian inter7ention is the threat or use of force by a state, 4roup of states, or international or4aniHation primarily for the purpose of protectin4 the nationals of the tar4et state from 8idespread depri7ations of internationally reco4niHed human ri4hts6J #ee Sean ,urphy, &umanitarian Intervention4 The (nited 1ations in an 5volving 9orld .rder ?&hiladelphia: 'ni7ersity of &ennsyl7ania &ress, FFE@ p ) 26 A*+ 32B6 Stephen >6 <arrett, "oing 0ood nd "oing 9ell4 n 5xamination .f &umanitarian Intervention "F ? FFF@6 A*+ 3!B6 >6 $assese, I(. %n5uria %us ;ritur: >re 9e ,o7in4 to8ards 1e4itimation of *orcible /umanitarian $ountermeasures in the 9orld $ommunityRJ ? FFF@ 0 5uropean 6ournal of International /aw 2E6 A*+ 3"B6 -ertil 1intner I-urma: +o ne8s is bad ne8sJ ?2 >u4 200 @ 3ar 5astern 5conomic ,eview6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e "3

A*+ 33B6 ,6 ,ali=, I-urmaGs Role in Re4ional SecurityJ in ,6 -6 &edersen ?ed@, BurmaB7yanmar, #trong ,egime, 9eak #tateRJ ?>delaide: $ra8ford /ouse &ublishin4, 2000@, p 2#!6 A*+ 3EB6 &olitical Situation of ,yanmar, a7ailable at http:// 8886myanmar6com6 A*+ 3#B6 $on7ention on the &re7ention and &unishment of the $rime of <enocide, adopted by the <eneral >ssembly in Resolution 2E0)> ?%%%@ of F Dec F"8 and entered into force on 2 2an F3 6 A*+ 38B6 Dieter 0astrup, I*rom +urember4 to Rome and -eyond: The *i4ht >4ainst <enocide, 9ar $rimes, and $rimes >4ainst /umanityJ ? FFF@ 2! 3ordham International /aw 6ournal "0"6 A*+ 3FB6 %$2, Reser7ations to the $on7ention on <enocide case, F3 , 8 International /aw ,eports, p !#06 A*+ E0B6 $ase concernin4 the application of the $on7ention on <enocide ? Bosnia and &er8egovina v Eugoslavia@, FF!, F3 %nternational 1a8 Reports p 6 A*+ E B6 Roman 9ierusHe8s=i, I%nternational Response to the /uman Ri4hts Liolations in the Territory of the former Yu4osla7iaJ ? FF )2002@ F 'olish Eearbook of International /aw 20!6 A*+ E2B6 %$2, <enocide case, p6 E6 A*+ E!B6 -arcelona Traction, 1i4ht and &o8er $o6 $ase, ? F#0@, I)6 ,eports !, para !!)!"6 Reproduced in /arris ?note " abo7e@, p E036 A*+ E"B6 >rt 3! of the Lienna $on7ention on the 1a8 of Treaties6 A*+ E3B6 >rt " %6T6*6Y6 StatuteD >rt 2 %6$6T6R6 StatuteD >rt # Draft $ode of $rimes a4ainst the &eace and Security of ,an=ind FFE6 A*+ EEB6 &reamble of the $harter6 A*+ E#B6 >rticles , !, 33, 3E, E2, E8 and #E6 A*+ E8B6 ,ilitary and para)military acti7ities in and a4ainst +icara4ua ? 1icaragua v (# , the 1icaragua case@, F8E, 23 %1, 022, para F06 A*+ EFB6 (.ceptions include the use of force under $hapter L%% of the $harter for enforcement action by the '+, the use of force in indi7idual and collecti7e self)defence ?>rt 3 @ and the use of force a4ainst a : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# former enemy state ?>rt 3!@6 #ee also para F! of the +icara4ua case6

&a4e "E

A*+ #0B6 >6 DG>mato, I%sraelGs >ir Stri=e 'pon the %raqi +uclear ReactorJ ? F8!@ ## merican 6ournal of International /aw 3836 A*+ # B6 ,6 Reisman, I$oercion and Self)Determination: $onstruin4 $harter >rticle 2?"@J ? F8"@ #8 merican 6ournal of International /aw #86 A*+ #2B6 %$2, +icara4ua case, para 2026 A*+ #!B6 Resolution 2 ! of FE3, Declaration on the %nadmissibility of %nter7ention in the Domestic >ffairs of States and the &rotection of their %ndependence and So7erei4nty, adopted by the <eneral >ssembly on 2 Dec FE36 The F#0 Declaration of &rinciples of %nternational 1a8 $oncernin4 *riendly Relations and $o)operation >mon4 States in >ccordance 8ith the $harter of the 'nited +ations ?adopted by the <eneral >ssembly in Resolution 2E23 durin4 its 23th session on 2" ;ct F#0@ also prohibited all forms of inter7ention6 A*+ #"B6 >rt " of the '+ $harter6 A*+ #3B6 D6 0ritsiotis, IThe 0oso7o $risis and +>T;Gs >pplication of >rmed *orce >4ainst the *ederal Republic of Yu4osla7iaJ ?2000@ "F International and )omparative /aw <uarterly !!06 A*+ #EB6 Remar=s by &resident $linton, a7ailable at http:// 8886un6int/usa/FFV03F6html6 A*+ ##B6 #ee %$2, +icara4ua case ?note #2 abo7e@, para 2286 A*+ #8B6 Ibid., para 2"26 A*+ #FB6 Ibid., para 2E86 A*+ 80B6 Ibid. A*+ 8 B6 #ee %$2, +icara4ua case ?note #2 abo7e@, para 2"!6 A*+ 82B6 Ibid., para 2"!6 The aims of the Red $ross bein4 Ito pre7ent and alle7iate human sufferin4J and Ito protect life and health and to ensure respect for human bein4sJ6 A*+ 8!B6 #ee 0ritsiotis ?note E abo7e@, 0036 A*+ 8"B6 #ee %$2, +icara4ua case ?note #2 abo7e@6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !#

&a4e "#

A*+ 83B6 Ibid., para 20E6 A*+ 8EB6 Ibid., para 20#6 A*+ 8#B6 Ibid., para 20E6 A*+ 88B6 *6 16 0ir4is, I$ustom on a Slidin4 ScaleJ ? F8#@ merican 6ournal of International /aw "E6 A*+ 8FB6 #ee IThe ,ohon= $riteria for /umanitarian >ssistance in $omple. (mer4enciesJ ? FF3@ # &uman ,ights <uarterly F2D &6 0urth, I/umanitarian %nter7ention: 1essons from the &ast DecadeJ ?200 @ "3 .rbis FG>H &umanitarian Intervention4 "efinitions and )riteria , $entre for Strate4ic Studies ) Strate4ic -riefin4 &apers, 2une 20006 A*+ F0B6 #ee 0ritsiotis ?note E abo7e@, 0 "6 A*+ F B6 #ee %$2, +icara4ua case ?note #2 abo7e@, para 20#6 A*+ F2B6 #ee Led &6 +anda, ITra4edies in +orthern %raq, 1iberia, Yu4osla7ia and /aiti)Re7isitin4 the Lalidity of /umanitarian %nter7ention under %nternational 1a8 ) &art %J ? FF2@ 20 "enver 6ournal of International /aw ; 'olicy !03 and Led &6 +anda, Thomas *6 ,uther, 2r6, >my (6 (c=ert, ITra4edies %n Somalia, Yu4osla7ia, /aiti, R8anda >nd 1iberia ) Re7isitin4 The Lalidity ;f /umanitarian %nter7ention 'nder %nternational 1a8 ) &art %%J ?9inter FF8@ 2E "enver 6ournal .f International /aw nd 'olicy 82#6 A*+ F!B6 #ee /arris ?note " abo7e@, p F F6 A*+ F"B6 Ibid., p F206 A*+ F3B6 Resolutions FF and 20! of FF8, adopted by the Security $ouncil on 2! Sept FF8, a7ailable at http://8886un6or4/Docs/scres/ FF8/sres FF6htm6 A*+ FEB6 #ee 0ritsiotis ?note E abo7e@6 A*+ F#B6 #ee 0ritsiotis ?note #3 abo7e@, !"26 A*+ F8B6 Ibid. A*+ FFB6 #ee the debate in the <eneral >ssembly, Statement by the &resident of the <eneral >ssembly, '+ &ress Release <>/S,/ 03, 2 ;ct FFF6 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# A*+200B6 Ibid. A*+20 B6 #ee 0ritsiotis ?note #3 abo7e@, !"26 A*+202B6 #ee The 0uardian, 1ondon, 23 ,ar FFF, p !6 A*+20!B6 Ibid., p 6 A*+20"B6 #ee 0ritsiotis ?note #3 abo7e@, !3"6

&a4e "8

A*+203B6 26 <reen8ood, I+e8 9orld ;rder or ;ldR The %n7asion of 0u8ait and the Rule of 1a8J ? FF2@ 33 7odern /aw ,eview #E6 A*+20EB6 #ee The Times, 1ondon, 2E ,ar FFF, p E6 A*+20#B6 #ee $assese ?note "" abo7e@, 2"6 A*+208B6 #ee 0ritsiotis ?note #3 abo7e@, !"E6 A*+20FB6 #ee The Times, 1ondon, E >pr FFF, p 36 A*+2 0B6 #ee The Times, 1ondon, 2F 2an FFF, p #D 3inancial Times, 1ondon, 2E ,ay FFF, p 26 A*+2 B6 Resolution 2!F of " ,ay FFF re4ulated the 8or= of humanitarian or4anisations, Resolution 2"" ? 0 2une FFF@ established S*;R protection for the ci7il population after the hostilities6 A*+2 2B6 #ee Simma ?note 2 abo7e@, 26 A*+2 !B6 Ibid., 2E6 A*+2 "B6 Ibid. A*+2 3B6 #ee 0ritsiotis ?note E abo7e@, 00#6 A*+2 EB6 >mnesty %nternational, I$ollateral Dama4e or 'nla8ful =illin4sR: Liolations of the 1a8s of 9ar by +>T; Durin4 ;peration >llied *orce # ,ay 2000J, a7ailable at http://8886amnesty6or4/ailib/intcam/=oso7o/docs/natorepV all6doc6 A*+2 #B6 *inal Report to the &rosecutor by the $ommittee (stablished to Re7ie8 the +>T; -ombin4 : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# $ampai4n >4ainst the *ederal Republic http://8886un6or4/icty/pressreal/nato0E !006htm6 of Yu4osla7ia, ! 2une 2000, a7ailable

&a4e "F

at

A*+2 8B6 (nshrined in >rt 3 ?2@ and 32?2@ of the $on7entions6 A*+2 FB6 The 4eneral principle of ius in bello6

F## *irst >dditional &rotocol to the <ene7a

A*+220B6 (nshrined in >rt 3#, especially >rt 3#?2@?a@?ii@ of the F## *irst >dditional &rotocol to the <ene7a $on7entions6 A*+22 B6 #ee %$2, +icara4ua case ?note #2 abo7e@, para 20#6 A*+222B6 #ee 0aren /uman Ri4hts <roup, I&atterns of displacement in ,yanmarJ, a7ailable at http://8886db6idppro5ect6or46 A*+22!B6 >rt %% of the <enocide $on7ention6 A*+22"B6 #ee Steinber4 ?note 22 abo7e@, pp 2 )226 A*+223B6 Such a mandate 8as 4i7en to the '+ operation in +icara4ua, /onduras and (l Sal7ador in F8F) FF06 #ee >6 &ellet, "roit International 'ublic ?&aris: 1ibrairie <enerale de Droit et de 2urisprudence, Eth edn, FFF@ p F# 6 A*+22EB6 To the same end, the pro7isional authority mission of the '+ in $ambodia undertoo= measures of re4roupin4 the 8arrin4 factions under Security $ouncil Resolution #"3 in FF26 Ibid. A*+22#B6 1i=e8ise, '+;S;, 8as char4ed 8ith the disarmament of Somali military clans under Security $ouncil Resolution 8 " ? FF!@6 Ibid. A*+228B6 #ee /uman Ri4hts 9atch, 9orld Report 20006 A*+22FB6 #ee the -urmese $riminal $ode6 A*+2!0B6 #ee /arris ?note " abo7e@, p 88E6 A*+2! B6 #ee 1intner ?note 0" abo7e@, p 8F6 A*+2!2B6 Ibid. : 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6

!! /012 !# !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# A*+2!!B6 #ee $assese ?note "" abo7e@, 2#6

&a4e 30

A*+2!"B6 #ee 2eremy Sar=in, IDealin4 8ith &ast /uman Ri4hts >buses and &romotin4 Reconciliation in a *uture Democratic -urmaJ ?Dec 2000@ # /egal Issues on Burma 6 A*+2!3B6 #ee 16 96 &ye, 'olitics, 'ersonality, and 1ation Building4 Burma*s #earch for Identity ?+e8 /a7en: Yale 'ni7ersity &ress, FE2@ p "E6 A*+2!EB6 #ee Steinber4 ?note 22 abo7e@, p F"6 A*+2!#B6 Ibid., p 036 A*+2!8B6 1eue Iuercher Ieitung, Saturday " >pr 200 6 A*+2!FB6 %n >pr and ;ct 200 , includin4 meetin4s 8ith >un4 San Suu 0yi6 A*+2"0B6 Oinhua +e8s Ser7ice, 2# Sept 2002, a7ailable at http:// 8886ne8s6.inhuanet6com6 A*+2" B6 These sanctions are enormously important in the conte.t of the country and are particularly important in the conte.t of a debate about 8hether the international community may la8fully ?and should@ inter7ene6 A*+2"2B6 The -urma &ro5ect, a7ailable at http://8886burmapro5ect6or46 A*+2"!B6 Ibid. A*+2""B6 ;n the need to reconcile and de7elop the rule of la8, see 2eremy Sar=in IDealin4 8ith &ast /uman Ri4hts >buses and &romotin4 Reconciliation in a *uture Democratic -urmaJ ?Dec 2000@ # /egal Issues on Burma 6 !! /on4 0on4 16 26 !# (+D ;* D;$',(+T

: 20 ! Thomson Reuters6 +o $laim to ;ri46 'S <o76 9or=s6