SybilDefender: Defend Against Sybil Attacks in Large Social Networks

ABSTRACT
Here the sybil Attacks Distributed systems without trusted identities are particularly Week able to sybil attacks, where an againstars creates multiple Untruth full identities to compromise the running of the system. Here we dedicate SybilDefender, a sybil defense mechanism that leverages the network topologies to defend against sybil attacks in social networks. ased on performing a limited number of random walks within the social graphs, SybilDefender is efficient and scalable to large social networks. !his e"periments on two #,$$$,$$$ node real% world social topologies show that SybilDefender outperforms the state of the art by one to two orders of magnitude in both accuracy and running time. SybilDefender can effectively identify the sybil nodes and detect the sybil community around a sybil node, even when the number of sybil nodes introduced by each attack edge is close to the theoretically detectable lower bound. esides, we propose two approaches to limiting the number of attack edges in online social networks. !he survey results of our &acebook application show that the assumption made by previous work that all the relationships in social networks are trusted does not apply to online social networks, and it is feasible to limit the number of attack edges in online social networks by relationship rating. .

Existing System

'n the past few years, online social networks have gained great popularity and are among the most fre(uently visited sites on the Web. !he large si)es of these networks re(uire that any scheme aiming to defend against sybil attacks in online social networks should be efficient and scalable. Some previous schemes can achieve good performance on a very small network sample but their algorithms are computationally intensive and cannot scale to networks with millions of nodes. &or the schemes that performed evaluation on million%node samples of online social networks, Sybil*uard admits +,-n log n. sybil nodes per attack edge, where n is the number of honest nodes/ Sybil0imit improves over Sybil*uard by accepting +,log n. sybil nodes per attack edge, but it is still away from the theoretical lower bound by a log n factor. esides, both Sybil*uard and Sybil0imit identify one sybil node at a time, and thus to detect the sybil region all the nodes in the social graph need to be e"amined. roblems on existing system: 1. &ake Users 2nters 2asy. 3. !his makes Sybil attacks.

Proposed System
We propose SybilDefender, a centralized sybil defense mechanism. It consists of a sybil identification algorithm to identify the sybil nodes, a sybil community detection algorithm to detect the sybil community surrounding a sybil node, and two approaches to limiting the number of attack edges in online social networks. Our scheme is based on the observation that a sybil

node must go through a small cut in the social graph to reach the honest region. n honest node, on the contrary, is not restricted. !ow if we start from a sybil node to do random walks, the random walks tend to stay within the sybil region. Advantages: 1. 't is Helpful to find Sybil Attacks. 3. 't is Used to &ind &ack User'D. #. 't is feasible to limit the number of attack edges in online social networks by relationship rating.

!m"lementation
'mplementation is the stage of the pro4ect when the theoretical design is turned out into a working system. !hus it can be considered to be the most critical stage in achieving a successful new system and in giving the user, confidence that the new system will work and be effective.

!he implementation stage involves careful planning, investigation of the e"isting system and it5s constraints on implementation, designing of methods to achieve changeover and evaluation of changeover methods. Algorit#m : Sybil!dentification
Sybil'dentification,*, u, tuples from Alg.1. 16 l 7 l$ 36 while l 87 lma" do #6 9erform : random walks with length l originating from u ;6 m 7 the number of nodes whose fre(uency is no smaller than t <6 0et the tuple corresponding to length l in the outputs of Algorithm 1 be hl,mean, stdDeviationi =6 if mean > m ? stdDeviation @ then A6 output u is sybil B6 end the algorithm C6 end if 1$6 l 7 l 3 116 end while 136 output u is honest

Main Modules:-

'mplementation is the stage of the pro4ect when the theoretical design is turned out into a working system. !hus it can be considered to be the most critical stage in achieving a successful new system and in giving the user, confidence that the new system will work and be effective.

!he implementation stage involves careful planning, investigation of the e"isting system and it5s constraints on implementation, designing of methods to achieve changeover and evaluation of changeover methods. Main Modules:-

$% &ser 'od(le:
In this module, "sers are having authentication and security to access the detail which is presented in the ontology system. #efore accessing or searching the details user should have the account in that otherwise they should register first.

)% Sybil Community Detection Algorithm:

After one sybil node is identified, our sybil community detection algorithm can be used to detect the sybil community surrounding it. !he sybil community detection algorithm takes the social graph *,D,2. and a known sybil node s as inputs, and outputs the sybil community around s. !he sybil node s can be identified by our sybil identification algorithm or any previous scheme. We define a sybil community as a subgraph of * consisting of only sybil nodes, and there is no small cut in this subgraph. !he reason why we make this definition is that if a small cut does divide the sybil region into two parts S1 and S3, and the known sybil node s is in S1, then, from the point of view of s, the honest region and S3 are similar, since there is already a small cut between S1 and the honest region and also a small cut between S1 and S3. When there is a small cut in the sybil region, our algorithm can detect the sybil community s belongs to. +ur algorithm relies on

performing partial random walks originating from s. 2ach partial random walk behaves the same as the standard random walks used in the previous subsection, e"cept that it does not traverse the same node more than once.

*% S+B!LDE,ENDER DES!-N:

SybilDefender consists of three components6 a sybil identification algorithm, a sybil community detection algorithm, and two supporting approaches to limiting the number of attack edges. !he three components can be used in con4unction to best mitigate sybil attacks. !he task of the sybil identification algorithm presented to determine whether a suspect node is sybil or not. !hen we show how to fficiently detect the sybil community around a sybil node with our sybil community detection algorithm presented. !he reason why we need the second algorithm is that simply e"amining all the nodes in the social graph to find the sybil community is impractical. &inally, both algorithms are built upon the assumption that the number of attack edges is limited. we propose two approaches to supporting this assumption in online social networks.
.% Evaluation of the Sybil Community Detection:

We test the algorithm on two social topologies, with the sybil region built through two models, respectively. !he number of attack edges is 1$$$, and the si)e of the sybil region depends on how many Sybil nodes are introduced by each attack edge. As the goal of our sybil community detection algorithm is to detect the Sybil community surrounding a known sybil node, when running each e"periment we randomly select a sybil node as the starting node of our algorithm, and we get the percentage of the sybil nodes that can be detected, as well as the number of the honest nodes that are falsely detected.

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