The Thomist 69 (2005): 371-406

AN ABSOLUTELY SIMPLE GOD? FRAMEWORKS FOR READING PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE(1)

John D. Jones
Marquette University Milwaukee, Wisconsin

ALTHOUGH LARGELY NEGLECTED in the West during recent centuries as formative for philosophy and theology, the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, the Corpus Dionysiacum (CD), exercised substantial influence during the Western Christian medieval and Renaissance periods. John Scotus Eriugena, John Sarracen, Robert Grosseteste, and Marsilio Ficino produced some of the major Latin translations of the corpus. Albert the Great wrote commentaries on all the major works of Dionysius; Robert Grosseteste wrote commentaries on several of them. Aquinas wrote a commentary on the Divine Names and in addition refers directly to Dionysius in nearly 2200 texts--more references than to any other authors except Aristotle and Augustine. Dionysius's influence continued to be felt through the Renaissance period among thinkers such as Marsilio Ficino, Nicholas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart, and Dante. The writings of Dionysius have enjoyed an enduring formative status in the Eastern Orthodox Church. Dionysius's writings are central to the Byzantine tradition that runs through the Cappadocian fathers, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, Gregory Palamas, and into the twentieth century among thinkers such as Vladimir Lossky and Christoph Yannaras. A stichera or verse for vespers for the feast day of St. Dionysius Areopagite (Oct. 3) reflects the honor still accorded these writings and their author.(2)
As a friend of wisdom to the point of coming to resemble God as closely as possible, O blessed Dionysius, you mystically explained the divine names. Initiated as you were by union with God in the mysteries that surpass all understanding, you taught them to the ends of the earth.

Moreover, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the dependence of the CD on Neoplatonic authors such as Proclus was firmly established, a number of scholars came to view the CD as fundamentally Neoplatonic in spirit: in some cases compatible with the Christian teachings it contained, while in other cases using the Christian teachings as a "front" to promulgate a Neoplatonic view of the world.(3)
In this paper I will sketch three frameworks for reading the texts of Dionysius: Neoplatonic, Scholastic,(4) and Byzantine. Of course, each of the historical traditions associated with these

frameworks is complex, diverse, and multifaceted. It would be historically nave and inaccurate to reduce any of these traditions to specific thinkers such as Plato, Plotinus, Damascius Diadochus, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Palamas, Aristotle, or Aquinas. However, in the context of this paper I shall in fact focus on these thinkers as representative of their traditions as I try to sharpen what seem to be three rather distinctive approaches relative to one another and relative to reading Dionysius.(5) My aim in elaborating these frameworks is more systematic than strictly historical.

I am particularly interested in the problem of whether there is a distinction between the divine essence(6) and energies,(7) an issue that characteristically divides Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic thinkers.(8) This problem is closely related to a host of other problems including the character of God's incomprehensibility and simplicity; the relation between the persons or hypostases(9) of the Trinity, the divine essence, and divine energy;(10) the relation between God and finite beings; and the nature of our ultimate union with God. In the first part of the paper, I will lay out the three frameworks with attention to these problems. In the second, I will consider the interpretation of Dionysius in terms of these frameworks and with reference to two general topics: first, how to interpret Dionysius's characterization of God as hyperousios ousia (beyond-being being) and, second, whether and in what sense Dionysius makes a distinction between the divine being (essence) and energy. In relation to these issues, I do not think Dionysius fits neatly or completely into any of these frameworks. On balance, though, his writings are best read in terms of the Byzantine framework and they are at odds in fundamental ways with the Neoplatonic and, especially, the Scholastic frameworks. As the reader will note, I have spent considerably more time laying out and providing secondary references to Byzantine authors than either Neoplatonic or Scholastic authors. (11) The latter frameworks, so far as I develop them for this paper, are rather well known among philosophers in general. However, while the essence-energy distinction that it at the heart of the Byzantine framework has received a good deal of discussion among professional theologians, it has been virtually ignored by professional philosophers. This is because most philosophers are less likely than theologians to be familiar with authors in the Byzantine tradition. A) The Neoplatonic Framework(12) For Plato and Aristotle, things are what they are in virtue of their form. Knowledge of a being's form provides our most fundamental knowledge of it--'what it is'. Subsistent forms are what really are for Plato, or the prime instances of being as being (on h on) for Aristotle. However, they are definite beings that, as such, are limited or finite. Despite his insistence on the onto-logical primacy of form, Plato posits an unlimited principle that in some sense transcends form: for example, the good beyond being (epeikena ts ousias). In light of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, the Neoplatonists understand this unlimited first principle as the One. As is well known, in the first hypothesis of that dialogue, Parmenides posits a one in no way many. After showing that nothing can be predicated of such a one without making it many, Parmenides concludes:
There is no manner in which the one has being [ousia]. Therefore, the one in no manner is [on]. It cannot then be even to the extent of being one. Rather if we can trust such an argument as this, it

appears that the one neither is one nor is at all . . . you cannot say that it has anything or that there is anything of it. Consequently, it cannot have a name or be spoken of, nor can there be any knowledge or perception or opinion of it. It is not named or spoken of, nor a matter of opinion or knowledge or perception for any being.(13)

For the Neoplatonists, accordingly, the One as the unlimited first principle is radically simple: it is in no way many and admits of no distinction or differentiation. More properly, it is neither one nor many, neither united nor differentiated. Hence, to refer to the One as absolutely simple is to assert nothing positive about it at all, as if it were the most simple being among the totality of all beings. Rather, the One is beyond all beings and all entitative determinations.(14) Although properly ineffable, the One is the ultimate productive power (dynamis) or cause of all things. Hence, it can be named 'good' and 'one'. Of course, these names, or any other names we might give to the One, do not imply differentiation or distinction in it. They are causal designations that 'name' the One in relation to what comes forth from it. Conversely, otherness and differentiation, as well as sameness and union, emerge in the overflow or superabundance of the One. For Plotinus, otherness is the first "moment" of the procession of thinking (nous) and being since otherness is the condition for any thing to exist at all, while sameness is established in the reversion of being and thinking to the One.(15) Hence, for Plotinus, thinking and being do not pertain to the One since both thinking and being essentially involve multiplicity and, thus, differentiation.(16) Consequently, when Plotinus describes the radical reversion of the soul to the One, in which the soul goes beyond nous, closes the eye of nous as one might say, there is no longer a basis for sameness and difference between the soul qua nous and the One.(17) So, Plotinus writes:
So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish and does not imagine two. But it is as if he had become someone else and he is not himself and does not count as his own there, but has come to belong to that and so is one, having joined, as it were center to center. For, there too, when the centers have come together they are one, but there is duality when they are separate. This is also how we now speak of another.(18)

This view of the One ultimately denies the primacy of an 'analogy of being' between the One and beings since the One is utterly inexpressible and incomprehensible. To be sure, an analogy arises in our attempt to understand the one as cause of beings, but in that connection Plotinus writes: "To say that it is the cause is not to predicate something incidental of it but of us, because we have something from it while that One is in itself. But speaking precisely neither 'that' nor 'is' should be said."(19) Plotinus himself, however, seems somewhat ambiguous and ambivalent on this matter. There are texts (most notably the last part of Enneads 6.8) in which Plotinus develops what various scholars have suggested is at bottom a kind 'theistic' understanding of the One.(20) That ambiguity and ambivalence, however, seems decisively resolved by Damascius Diadochus, the last head of the Academy and, probably, one of the most neglected of the great Neoplatonists. Damascius begins his work Concerning the First Principle with the question: "Whether what is called the one principle of all is beyond the all [to pan] or something of the all as the summit of all those that proceed from it. Do we say that the all is with it, or after it

and from it?"(21) Since for Damascius, "the all" is properly that from which nothing is absent(22) and not just "those things that subsist in multiplicity and differentiation,"(23) the One as the ultimately simple cause is connected even in its transcendence with what it is to transcend. Accordingly, the One is known through the negation of an eminent denial: the One beyond the all--as the undifferentiated, transcendent first principle of all--is superior to the all and unknowable to all intellect and sensation just as the intelligible itself is unknown to sensation.(24) Damascius, however, writes that "Our soul conjectures a principle of all, however conceived, to be beyond the all, unconnected with the all. Therefore, it must be named neither principle, nor cause, nor first, nor before the all, nor beyond the all. Therefore, much less is it to be hymned as the all. Nor in general [is it] to be hymned, conceived or conjectured."(25) In this case, we have a more radical negation that neither affirms nor denies the One since it neither has a nature and is utterly unknown. Indeed, "we do not know it either as known or unknown."(26) Elsewhere, Damascius writes: "We do not affirm anything of [the ineffable] at all. Therefore, these are not the nature of it: nothing, beyond all, beyond cause, and the uncoordinated with all, but only the denial of those after it."(27) In this connection, Sara Rappe correctly observes:
The "Ineffable" is a term that does not possess a meaning in the ordinary sense, since it has no semantic function. It is not a term so that its deployment in language conveys nothing at all to the reader or listener. That this word forms the basis of Damascius' philosophical activity inevitably leads to a self-conscious meditation on the status of his own language, which Damascius often refers to as a radical reversal, or peritrope of language.(28)

B) The Scholastic Framework For Aristotle, form, ousia, and actuality (energeia) are the primary, and ultimately equivalent, expressions of being as being; it is with reference to them that everything else is and is said to be. Subsistent forms (viz., the unmoved movers) are the first among beings, which as pure actualities, are finite or determinate. For Aristotle, however, there is no actually infinite being since anything infinite is as such always potential. Given this, how is it that later Christian thinkers can use an Aristotelian framework to claim that God is a purely actual infinite being? Aquinas provides a typical yet elegant solution to this problem in the Summa Theologiae I, questions 2-4. In the third argument for the existence of God (q. 2, a. 3), Aquinas argues that subsistent forms--in this case the angels--do not account for themselves since their essence does not involve be-ing (esse). They are relatively necessary but not necessary without qualification. To account for their existence, they require a being that is necessary without qualification and whose essence is identical to its be-ing (esse). Indeed, it must be identical to its essence and be-ing (q. 3, a. 4). This being, God, is be-ing itself subsisting in itself (ipsum esse per se subsistens) (q. 4, a. 2). This being is completely simple without any potentiality or composition. This entails that nothing is predicated of God; rather, God is whatever is said of him.

In the Neoplatonic and Scholastic frameworks, the first cause is absolutely simple. In the former framework, as is evidenced by Plotinus and Damascius, the One is radically beyond essence/being (hyperousios) such that nothing is properly predicated of it, including 'simple' and 'one'. In the latter framework, however, God is understood to be an infinite, rational, subsisting being identical to his essence, existence, goodness, will, knowledge, love, etc. Whatever is said of God is identical to the divine essence; whatever is not identical with the divine essence is created--otherwise God would be subject to accidents and, thus, divine simplicity would be compromised. Despite the radical difference between God and all finite beings, that difference in the Scholastic framework is still entitative in character as a difference between two orders of beings: God as the uncreated being and all other beings as created.(29) That is, God is understood with reference to the same metaphysical categories that apply to beings. To be sure, some of these categories do not apply (e.g., materiality, potentiality, etc.). But there is a metaphysical and epistemological continuity between God and beings that is rooted in the analogy of being (ens) and extends to essence. Indeed, in the absence of such an analogical continuity, there would be no possibility of a science about God and, thus, no possibility of providing a rational grounding of beings in God as the first cause. Accordingly, the human quest for happiness that is rooted in our nature as rational beings would be frustrated. As Aquinas says:
There resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. Hence, it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.(30)

I wish to note two obvious points of contrast between the Neoplatonic and Scholastic frameworks. First, despite the strictly rational requirement that God be utterly simple, the Christian God is the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. While Aquinas identifies the persons of the Trinity with the divine essence, nevertheless, the persons are different from and thus in some sense other than one another.(31) The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Holy Spirit, etc. The Neoplatonic framework obviously rejects the Trinity since all otherness and differentiation is extrinsic to the One.(32) Second, in the Neoplatonic framework, radical union with the One involves a transnoetic experience that transcends sameness and difference between the individual and the One. According to the Scholastic framework, there is an intellectual vision of God's essence for the blessed in the next life which, although it never comprehends God as God does since the created intellect never loses its created status, nevertheless in some way directly intuits the divine essence. C) The Byzantine Framework "His divine power has granted to us all things that pertain to life and godliness . . . that through them [we] may become partakers of the divine nature."(33) Commenting on this text, Gregory Palamas writes, "the divine nature must be called at the same time incommunicable and, in a sense, communicable; we attain participation in the nature of

God and yet he remains totally inaccessible. We must affirm both things at one and must preserve the antinomy as the criterion of piety."(34) Elsewhere, Palamas elaborates on this matter as follows:
Further, that which participates in something according to essence [ousia] must possess a common essence with that in which it participates and be identical with it in some respect. Who then has even heard of there being one essence shared by God and us in any respect? Basil the Great says: "The energies of God come down to us but his essence remains inaccessible." And the divine Maximus affirms, "The man divinized by grace will be everything that God is, apart from identity of essence." Thus it is not possible to participate in the divine essence, not even for those divinized by grace, but it is possible to participate in the divine energy.(35)

It is worth noting that a primary motivation for the distinction between the divine essence and the divine energy is existentially based in deification; as Maximus the Confessor says, we become so united to God that "all that God is, save for an identity in essence, we become when deified by grace."(36) In deification, we are transformed, drawn into a personal communion with the Trinity in its light and glory, in which we experience God "face to face"-- proposon ad proposon or person to person--and, thus, as he is while the 'essence' of God remains utterly inaccessible to us.(37) Indeed, while for Aquinas we never see God face to face in this life, Byzantine authors assert the possibility of this as evidenced by, for example, the apostles' vision of the uncreated glory of God on Mount Tabor at the transfiguration.(38) The following text from John Damascene well represents the impossibility of knowing the divine essence:
"No one has seen God at any time; the Only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him" (John 1:18). The deity, therefore, is ineffable and incomprehensible. . . . Moreover, after the first and blessed nature no one, not of men only, but even of supramundane powers, and the Cherubim, I say, and Seraphim themselves, has ever known God, save him to whom He revealed Himself . . . we neither know, nor can we tell, what the essence of God is, or how it is at all.(39)

The incomprehensibility of the divine essence is not just a function of our limitations in this life that are overcome in the next life. As Palamas writes: "there is no name for the divine essence either in this life or in the next--for any created beings."(40) Moreover, the apophatism underlying Damascene's text is not the via negativa as this is traditionally understood in the West, which primarily serves to correct the true affirmations said of God: essence is truly said of God but we must deny that the divine essence is anything like a created essence to which our term 'essence' refers. In contrast, the more radical apophatism in the Eastern tradition means that in a proper sense neither essence or nature are said of God. So, in commenting on Divine Names 5.1 "we do not intend to hymn [hymneo] the hyperousios ousia,"(41) the scholia on this text notes that "Dionysius does not present what the essence of God is for 'essence' is not properly predicated of God insofar as he is beyond being."(42) Gregory Palamas puts the matter directly as follows: "Every nature is utterly removed and absolutely estranged from the divine nature [physis]. For if God is nature, other things are not nature, but if each of the other things is

nature, he is not nature; just as he is not a being [on], if the other are beings [onta]. And if he is a being, the others are not beings."(43) Properly, then, there is no name for "whatever God is"; the name most befitting God's incomprehensibility is that God is beyond all names. Yet, God reveals himself to us as the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit who are present to us in their knowledge, will, light, glory, etc. Indeed, the affirmative names given to God are not said of the essence of God but what is around the essence or nature of God (peri tn ousian or physin). As Damascene says: "God then is infinite and incomprehensible and all that is comprehensible about him is his infinity and incomprehensibility. But all that we can affirm concerning God does not show forth God's nature, but only those that are around his nature,"(44) that is, his "energy." The energy is the natural going forth (exodos) of the divine essence as directed toward creation. While this energy can be referred to in the singular, one also observes the distinctions between various energies: for example, God's will is distinct from God's knowledge. Hence, the Byzantine framework recognizes a set of distinctions in God that are not simply nominal or a function of the deficient signification of our language: between the divine essence (nature) and the hypostases or persons of the Trinity, between the divine essence and the divine energy, between the persons of the Trinity and the energy, and between the various energies that 'comprise' the divine energy.(45) Yet the persons of the Trinity are "one in essence and undivided"(46) from each other and from the essence. The same is true for the energy/energies. All of them are fully and completely God. None is a 'part' of God, nor do any of these distinctions introduce any confusion or division in God. The distinction between ousia, hypostasis, and energeia is foundational to the Byzantine framework. Damascene offers this concise exposition of the difference between them:
But observe that energy [energeia] and capacity for energy [energtikon], and the product of energy [energtma], and the agent of energy [energn] are all different. Energy is the efficient and essential activity of nature. The capacity for energy is the nature from which the energy proceeds. The product of energy is that which is effected by energy. And the agent of energy is the person or subsistence [hypostasis] that employs the energy.(47)

While the earliest writers in the Greek Patristic tradition tend to use ousia and hypostasis interchangeably, the Cappadocian Fathers tend to distinguish them in terms of the distinction between the universal or common and the particular/individual.(48) So, Peter, Paul, and Barnabas all exist and are all homoousios (of one essence/substance) with one another so far as they share the common ousia of humanity. In like manner, the Father, Son, and Spirit are homoousios since they share the same ousia or nature. It is the individual (hypostasis) that gives existence to--that is, manifests--the ousia.(49) In this framework, the hypostasis receives the ontological weight for it is the hypostasis that subsists in the proper sense and not the ousia.(50) Although the hypostases of the Trinity are one in essence, they are nevertheless distinct not only from one another but from the essence. This framework also distinguishes the essence or nature from the energy/energies that naturally flow from it. The energy is around the nature but is not the nature. God's

energies are fully and completely divine, fully and completely eternal, uncreated, etc. While they are distinct from the persons and the divine essence, they are inseparable from both. They manifest the divine essence in creation and are that in which we participate and to which we are united in deification. Moreover, the energies that flow from the essence are used by the hypostasis (person or subsistent individual) that gives existence to or manifests the essence. Hence, the distinction between essence and energy goes hand in hand with the distinction between essence and person. So Palamas notes it is not man in general--or the essence common to all humans--that thinks, wills, loves, makes decisions, etc. If it is said that "God does not have a natural energy distinct from his essence" one says that "God does not possess individual subsistence and [this] completely deprives the trihypostatic Lord of real subsistence."(51) Palamas notes two problems if these distinctions are not observed. First, the distinction between human persons and the persons of the Trinity would collapse if there is no distinction between the divine ousia and energy since if any created beings participated in the ousia of God they would be homousios with the persons of the Trinity. God would be multihypostatic and not trihypostatic.(52) Second, this first problem is part of a more generalized problem that the distinction between creation and generation would be abolished since what flows from the essence does so naturally, yet creation is a free act of God's will. Palamas quotes Cyril of Alexandria for support of this criticism: "begetting be-longs to the divine nature but creating to his divine energy. . . . Nature and energy are not identical."(53) So, if we were to grant with Aquinas that God is called good not simply as cause of goodness but as goodness itself, then God's goodness would be identical to the divine essence and necessary to God. But it is difficult to see how God can be called creator or cause in the same sense, since while God is necessarily good, God need not be a creator or cause.(54) In the Scholastic framework, whatever is said of God is identical to his essence; whatever is not identical to the essence must be created since otherwise there would be accidents in God. Palamas presents a striking contrast to this view which seems to undergird the Byzantine framework.
God also has what is not essence. Yet this does not mean that it is an accident. For that which not only does not pass away but also admits or effects no increase or diminution whatever could not possibly be numbered among accidents. Neither is it true that, because this is neither an accident or essence, it belongs among totally nonexistent things: rather, it exists and exists truly. Since the hypostatic properties and the hypostases are neither an essence or an accident in God, are they each on this account ranked among nonexistent things? Certainly not. Thus, in the same way, the divine energy of God is neither an essence nor an accident nor is it classed among nonexistent things.(55)

Accordingly, one must note a significant difference between these two frameworks. Both stress God's infinity: that God can in no manner be properly encompassed by the categories employed to understand finite beings. In the Scholastic framework, however, despite the manner in which all the intelligible names that apply to God must be corrected, still, these names truly apply to God. In particular, whatever the divine essence might be, we truly say that there is a divine essence and existence even if we do not know

what it is. So too, the simplicity of God requires that we correct the distinctions implied in our use of terms regarding finite beings. While the difference in meaning between knowledge and will corresponds to a 'real'(56) distinction in finite rational beings, when these terms are applied to God, they must be viewed as referring to an entity in whom knowledge and will are identical with each other since they are identical with the divine essence. In other words, with reference to God (the Trinity), we have these sorts of simultaneously true propositions: God is God's essence; God is God's knowledge; God is God's will; God is the Father; God is the Son, etc.; God's essence is God's knowledge; God's knowledge is God's will; God the Father is God's knowledge. The only nonidentity statements are of this sort: God the Father is not God the Son, God the Holy Spirit is not God the Son. Moreover, the nonidentity statements between Father, Son, and Spirit do not imply that Father, Son, and Spirit are not identical to the divine essence. In the Byzantine framework, the situation is quite different. God (the Trinity) is not just his essence, yet there are no accidents in God. While we may use the term 'essence' of God, properly it does not apply except as a causal designation. Moreover, while God is completely simple as undivided or noncomposite, there are nevertheless distinctions or differentiations in God. These eternal distinctions are eternally united without division. So we have a set of simultaneously true propositions such as: God is God's essence; God is the Father, God is the Son, God is the Spirit; God is God's energies. That is, God is fully and completely his essence, each of the persons of the Trinity, and his energy/ energies. But God's energies are not God's essence; God the Father is not God's essence; God the Father is not God's energies. Among the energies: God is God's knowledge; God is God's will; God's knowledge is not God's will. However, the Father, Son, and Spirit are one in essence, knowledge, will, etc. The Father's knowledge is the Son's knowledge, etc. Hence, while the logic of identity, that if A = B and A = C, B = C, is maintained regarding God in the Scholastic framework and in the Western tradition generally,(57) it breaks down in the Byzantine framework. It is not surprising, then, that the Byzantine framework is described in terms of paradoxical or antinomical thinking.(58) Moreover, if the logic of identity governs and is governed by thinking about beings, then in the Byzantine framework we can say that God properly is not regarded as a being.(59) II A) The Sense of "hyperousios ousia" for Dionysius In this section of the paper, I will consider two fundamental and related matters in Dionysius relative to these frameworks: the incomprehensibility of God and the distinction between ousia and energies.
It is not the intention of our discourse to manifest the beyond-being being [hyperousios ousia] as beyond-being, for this is ineffable, and unknown and completely unable to be manifest and surpasses unity itself, but to hymn the being-producing [ousiopoios] procession of the divine source of being into all beings.(60)

Aquinas's only comment on this text is found in his Commentary on the Divine Names.
It is not Dionysius's present intention that the essence of God be manifest through which all things are given essence insofar as it is in itself, but that the procession of beings from the divine principle into all existents might be praised. For some procession of some perfection from God in existents is manifested by each divine name.

While Dionysius refers the divine names to the processions of God, Aquinas makes it clear elsewhere that when we call God being, life, or good, we are not merely naming some procession of being or life from God but we are naming the source of the procession, which, given divine simplicity, is identical to the divine essence.(61) Aquinas certainly thinks that Dionysius holds this view.(62) Albert the Great interprets the above text to say that Dionysius does not intend to say that we cannot know the divine essence, but only that we cannot know it perfectly. While we do not know what God is "still the divine essence is known insofar as we come to it after all effects and after all the simplicity of creatures . . . namely, we know the divine essence through the removal from all effects" and accordingly we are able to name it.(63) Gregory Palamas offers a strikingly different analysis based upon this text:
The nature beyond being, and beyond life and beyond god, and beyond good as beyond good, etc, is neither conceived nor contemplated in any way at all because it is apart from all things and more than unknowable and established beyond the super-celestial minds by an incomprehensible power and is always utterly unable to be grasped and ineffable to all. For it has no name in the present age nor does it receive one in the age to come. . . . Anyone who has knowledge of the truth beyond all truth, if he is to name it correctly cannot legitimately name it ousia or nature. But on the other hand, since it is cause of all . . . its name must be drawn from things but not in a proper sense. Thus, it must be called ousia and nature, but properly the ousia-bestowing procession and energy of God.(64)

How, then, should we understand the phrase hyperousios ousia? Grammatically, of course, ousia is a noun modified by hyperousious. The ousia in this case is the divine ousia which, when considered as hyperousios, is considered in itself and, thus, as ineffable to all created beings. This is the way in which Aquinas and Albert understand the text. But Palamas draws on Dionysius to support a view that properly neither ousia nor nature are said of God except in the sense that God is productive of ousia and nature in things. On this view, despite the grammatical form of hyperousios ousia, ousia is not a noun referring to a divine 'essence' characterized as hyperousios in one sense and as ousiopoios (being producing) in another. Rather, hyperousios "indicates" the Godhead as uncoordinated with all and, thus, beyond all names whatsoever; ousia, however, refers to God as manifested, as we shall see, in the divine energy.(65) It is striking how like the texts of Damascius quoted above is this text of Palamas: all names referring to the ultimate cause of all name it in reference to beings, while 'the principle uncoordinated with all' 'is' beyond nature, beyond essence, etc.(66) Both the

Byzantine and the Neoplatonic frameworks, then, note a double sense of hyperousios: the transcendent cause of all is hyperousios as beyond all finite ousiai. As being-producing prin-ciple of all things, it can be regarded as hyperousios or 'superessential'. That is, ousia can be said of this being-producing principle but in a manner that transcends all finite ousiai. But, as in Dionysius's text above, hyperousios stands in contrast not to finite ousiai, but God as the being-producing cause of all beings--that is, in the Byzantine framework, God as the divine energy. It is unfortunate that translations of Byzantine and Neoplatonic texts often tend to follow the Latin rendering of hyperousios as supersubstantiale or superessentiale. For while super can carry the same ambiguity in Latin as is found in hyper, the predominance in the West of a broadly entitative understanding of God that is grounded in an analogy of being inevitably flattens the double sense of hyper that we have noted.(67) That is, the reference to the divine ousia as hyperousios is ultimately unnecessary and serves at best a kind of heuristic value. For, since the noun ousia refers to the divine ousia and the adjective ousios in hyperousios refers to the finite essence beyond which (hyper-) the divine essence is supereminently founded, then hyperousios ousia can be recast as divine "essence beyond essence" (ousia hyper tn ousian). Hence, hyperousios ousia can be rendered either as "essence beyond essence" or "supersessential essence." But given what is involved in predicating "essence" of God, the phrase "divine essence" implicitly contains "superessential" within it as a preeminent denial that the divine essence is like any finite essence. Hence, one can equivalently say "divine essence" or "divine superessential essence." On this view, one can see why Aquinas observes that Dionysius often uses many words in a manner that seems to be superfluous.(68) It is not at all surprising, then, that terms like super-subtantiale, superessentiale, superesse, superdeus, superbonum, which are so prominent in the Latin translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, are virtually absent from Aquinas's own vocabulary. Rather, such terms appear for the most part in Aquinas's works in the context of quoting or interpreting Dionysius. On this matter, I believe that Dionysius is fundamentally misread within the Scholastic framework and more broadly within the philosophical theology that is predominant in the West. Still one must note a significant difference--at least in emphasis-- between Dionysius and the Byzantine framework. For despite the text quoted above by Palamas and similar texts in other writers in the Eastern tradition, one finds that these authors regularly use the terms ousia (essence) and physis (nature) in reference to God. After all, Christian thinkers, both Eastern and Western, confess the Father, Son and Spirit as of one essence (homoousios). In this case, ousia refers not to the being-producing energies of God, but to the divine essence or transcendent nature of the Trinity 'in itself'. In contrast, however, Dionysius rarely uses either ousia or physis to refer to the divinity. Three texts refer to a divine nature (physis) twice referring to an ineffable nature;(69) four refer to the divine hyperousiots ('beyond beingness' or 'superessentiality' in the Latin translation).(70) Dionysius never refers to a consideration of the divinity kat' ousian (according to essence). So far as I can tell, Dionysius never explicitly employs the standard distinction between knowing what God is (ti estin - quod est) and knowing that

he is (hoti estin - quia est). To be sure, one finds the phrase ho ti pote estin used in several places.(71) Given the Latin translation of this phrase as quodcumque est, Albert takes Diony-sius to refer to what God is per essentiam or definitionem.(72) But the Greek phrase probably has the much looser meaning of "what-ever in the world it is." That is, the phrase is an expression of 'throwing-up-one's-hands" in the face of what is simply unutter-able. Similarly, Dionysius never refers to the Godhead in its separation as 'existing kath auto (per se)'. Hence, even if we grant that in some sense Dionysius concedes that there is a divine 'essence' or 'nature', one finds a real inversion in his very infrequent use of this language compared with its very frequent use by authors in both East and West. It should be noted that in referring to the utter separation of God from beings, Dionysius uses the term kryphiots ('hiddenness', 'secrecy', or 'mystery'). While one finds frequent use of the term kryphios ('hidden') by both Christian and Neo-platonic authors prior to Dionysius, Dionysius seems to be the first to use the substantive kryphiots with reference to divine 'transcendence'.(73) There are two key texts that are worth quoting:
If we name the thearchic hiddenness God, or life, or being, or light, or logos, we understand nothing other than the power brought forth from it into us, whether deifying, being producing, lifegiving, or wisdom-producing.(74)

The second, and perhaps more radical, text is:

It immediately follows this text as its couplet:

The 'tension' here is between a hiddenness or mystery at the core of 'reality' which 'is' utterly unmanifest, unknowable, and unutterable at least to any finite being, and a procession out of the hiddenness of the 'deity' which involves manifestation in some sense. Does this include the Trinity itself--the three-person manifestation of the fecundity beyond-being(77)--as well as, of course, the divine powers to which the intelligible divine names refer? The limitations of this article do not allow for a detailed treatment of Dionysius's understanding of the Trinity.(78) In brief, the Father is the sole source of deity; the Son and Holy Spirit are uncaused(79) differentiations within the deity. Each person of the Trinity is differentiated from the others: as ungenerated, the Father is the sole source of deity; the Son is generated from the Father, while the Holy Spirit proceeds (ekporeuetai) from the Father.(80) Although Dionysius notes that affirmative theology shows how the 'divine and good nature'(81) is one and three, he never employs any language that refers to the unity of the Trinity as a unity in ousia.(82) It seems to me that there is a real ambiguity in

Dionysius in terms of the 'ultimacy' of the Trinity in God. The first issue has to do with whether unity and Trinity are ultimately primary for Dionysius or whether there is a primacy of unity over Trinity. Writers in the Byzantine tradition take the former view: God is essentially one-in-three. So, Gregory of Nazianzen writes: "As soon as I begin to contemplate the Unity, the Trinity bathes me in its splendor. As soon as I begin to think of the Trinity, I am seized by the Unity."(83) But Andrew Louth rightly argues that Dionysius is ambiguous on this point.(84) The more fundamental issue, however, is whether for Dionysius the divine hiddenness is beyond both unity and Trinity. The texts we have already considered from Divine Names 5.1 and 13.3 both suggest this. In Divine Names 5.1, Dionysius notes that 'as' hyperousios, the divinity surpasses unity itself (hyperairon autn tn hensin). Albert takes this unity to refer to the unity of the created intellect, while Aquinas refers it to the unity of the intellects of the blessed.(85) But it is just as, indeed far more, likely that Dionysius has in mind Divine Names 1.5, where the affir-mations of God include monad (unity) and Trinity, etc. Moreover, it seems incorrect to me to argue that in Divine Names 13.3 Dionysius is simply referring to the sort of unity, trinity, etc. that are found among beings. In other words, I suggest that the phrase "something else among beings" is meant to add "what is found or known among beings" to what does not bring down the hiddenness beyond being. It does not extend that 'class' as if unity, trinity, etc. were its first members. If so, as Louth notes, it is not inconsistent to read these texts in light of Eckhart's conception of the God beyond God. (86) Certainly, this sort of reading is ruled out within the Byzantine framework as well as the Scholastic framework. Louth observes that one of Dionysius's impacts upon the Byzantine tradition is to deepen "the apophatic stress of Cappadocian theology."(87) The texts from Divine Names 2.7 and 13.3 express what might be called Dionysius's deep apophatism that, I believe, can profitably be understood in terms of Damascius's notion of a peritrope of speech. That is, neither hiddeness or beyond-being 'signify' 'something'. Rather, discourse and thinking/ intellection cancel itself in the cessation of intellection (noesis).(88)

B) The Distinction between Essence and Energies for Dionysius The next question is whether Dionysius distinguishes between the divine energy/ energies(89) and ousia. The intelligible names we apply to God refer to the beingproducing processions of the Godhead into beings. Dionysius elaborates on this matter in three key texts in Divine Names 2:
The beneficent procession is a divine differentiation of the divine unity which, in a super-unitary manner, multiplies and makes itself many through goodness.(90) We call the divine differentiation the beneficent processions of the Thearchy. For in being given to beings and abundantly pouring forth the participations of all good things, it is differentiated in it a unitary manner, multiplied in a singular manner, and made many without wandering from one.(91)

These common and united differentiations--or rather, these beneficent processions--of the whole Godhead we will try to praise to the best of our abilities.(92) But what proceeds? Aquinas notes two senses of 'procession': The first is that "in terms of which one person proceeds from another and by this the divine persons are multiplied and distinguished." The other sense, though, is that of procession "in terms of which creatures proceed from God according to which the multitude and distinction of creatures comes to be from God."(93) Accordingly, when Dionysius talks about the processions of God into creatures, he is referring to the processions of creatures from God.(94) Aquinas and Albert the Great(95) allow for a procession of God into creatures only in the sense of exemplary causality: the divine essence, which is the likeness of all creatures, is communicated to creatures through a created likeness So Aquinas writes that:
The divine essence is not communicated to the creatures that proceed, but it remains uncommunicated and unparticipated; but his likeness, by which he gives to creatures, is propagated and multiplied. In a certain way, the divinity through its likeness and not through essence proceeds into creatures and is in a certain way multiplied in them. In this way, the procession of creatures can be called a divine differentiation.(96)

On this view, Dionysius does not refer to a differentiation or procession of God in the strict sense, that is, a procession in God that is fully God since that sort of procession only refers to the procession (proodos)(97) of the Son and the Spirit from the Father. For Palamas, however, this differentiation or procession is the divine energy that is distinct both from the hypostases of the Trinity as well as from the divine essence. It is by this energy, and its differentiation into many energies, that the divinity--the Trinity--creates and is present to creation.(98) So for Palamas, there are two processions in God: the processions of the hypostases of the Trinity and the procession of the divine energies around God. The divine energy can be named and known from created beings but is itself beyond being.(99) That is, the divine energy is not some created being or effect of God, but rather God as present to beings. The Scholastic framework for reading these texts inevitably refers the differentiations or processions of God to created effects: that is, to processions of creatures from God while the source of the processions--the likeness of creatures in God--is identical to the divine essence. The Neoplatonic framework likewise reduces the differentiations to finite processions. Of course, Dionysius allows for the existence of created powers that proceed from God: so there is a difference between the divine power of being and life that is creative of beings and the finite powers of being and life in which beings participate in order to exist, live, etc.(100) Both of these frameworks misread Dionysius on this score. They both rest on an a priori assumption of unqualified or absolute simplicity that requires that any differentiation or otherness be extrinsic to the One or to God. Yet if the above texts of Dionysius are read in a 'straightforward' manner--that is, to mean what they say--then the differentiations to

which the divine names refer are differentiations of the divinity which are the divinity.(101) It is precisely these differentiations that are said of the persons of the Trinity in a unitary manner. Accordingly, there is a threefold sense of procession (proodos) for Dionysius: the procession of the Son and Spirit from the Father, the procession of the divine energy of the Trinity in its production of and presence to beings, and the processions of beings from the divinity. This is exactly the manner in which these texts are read in the Byzantine framework. However, Dionysius's teaching on this matter is, or at least seems to be, somewhat different from and possibly at odds with this framework in certain respects. In the Byzantine framework, one of the frequent considera-tions used to distinguish essence from energy is that every essence naturally gives forth energies by which it is expressed but which are different from it.(102) But Dionysius never uses this sort of argument to support the distinction between the being-producing divine powers and the divine hiddenness or ousia. Given Dionysius's extreme reluctance even to talk about a divine ousia, this is not too surprising. This principle seems to require a certain ontological continuity between God and beings that Dionysius does not appear to accept. The reason is that the principle that every essence naturally gives forth energies, which express it but are different from it, must view this relation between essence and energy as a formal characteristic or property of essence and energy so that it applies to all essences. But then it seems that there must be enough similarity between the divine essence and all other essences that this formal characteristic applies to the divine essence. Christoph Yannaras claims that the radical incompre-hensibility and transcendence of the divine 'essence' means that there is no analogy between beings and the divine 'ousia' but only between the beings and the divine energies.(103) In the same vein, as we have seen, Palamas claims that if God is or has essence, then beings do not and vice versa. It is hard to see how the above principle, which is invoked to distinguish the divine essence from the divine energies, does not run afoul of these claims. It seems to require that there be at least some analogy between divine and finite essences. Indeed, Dionysius never really offers a 'justification' for the difference between the divine powers and the hiddenness except that the divine hiddenness is beyond all names whatever and that, as we saw above in the texts from Divine Names 2.7 and 13.3, any name said of the divinity must refer to a manifestation, and thus a differentiated and united procession of the divine hiddenness: 'within' (ad intra) God in the manifestation of the Trinity and divine powers, 'outside' (ad extra) God in finite beings. Another principal reason for distinguishing essence and ener-gies in God is that there without it would be no creation under-stood as God's free production of beings. The reason is that whatever 'flows' from the essence of God does so naturally. In the Byzantine framework, will is differentiated but not inseparable from the divine essence precisely to account for the freedom with which God creates.(104) Thinkers in both the Scholastic and Byzantine traditions affirm that that God freely creates beings by an act of will and not by emanation or a simple 'necessary' overflowing of God into beings. Of course, for Plotinus the production of beings by the One is not

necessary or compelled since the One is in no sense constrained by anything external to itself.(105) Conversely, if we take creation simply in the sense of unconditioned causality-creation ex nihilo--then there is no incompatibility between creation and emanation. Hence, the key issue here is not whether the pro-duction of beings is ex nihilo--the Neoplatonic and Christian traditions both agree on this--but whether the production of beings is free in the sense that God need not have willed the production of beings.(106) But it is not clear to me that Dionysius holds to a theory of creation as a free production of beings by God.(107) To be sure, Dionysius refers to the divine paradigms or exemplars as the divine wills (thelemata); he also asserts that the production of beings is guided by divine providence.(108) But such texts in and of themselves do not require a theory of creation. In the latter part of the sixth Enneads (6.8), Plotinus attributes will to the One; elsewhere he writes about the providential ordering of things.(109) Yet it is clear that Plotinus does not hold to a theory of creation in the sense that the One need not have willed to produce beings. There are at least two keys texts that seem to argue against the view that for Dionysius God creates beings in the sense that he need not have willed them:
For by be-ing, the good (as 'essential' good) extends goodness into all beings. Now just as our sun--neither by choosing nor by calculating but by its being--illuminates each of those that partake of its light according to the capacity of each logos, just so the good--beyond the sun as the elevated archetype is beyond its obscure image--by its existence [hyparxis] analogically sends forth the rays of its whole goodness to all beings.(110) For since as the existence [hyparxis] of goodness, it is the cause of all beings by its be-ing, it is suitable to hymn the good-source providence of the thearchy from all its effects.(111)

The first text, from Divine Names 4.1, regularly appears in objections Aquinas raises to the view that God freely creates the world.(112) Over the course of his career, Aquinas always gave a similar response. By likening the flowing forth of beings from the good by its being to the production of the rays of the sun by its being, Aquinas argues that Dionysius did not intend to deny creation but to affirm that the good (God) produces by its nature as does the sun. But since the good by nature is rational and a rational being produces freely by will, then the good (God) produces by its will. Albert gives a similar analysis of the same text.(113) But these texts are just as easily read in light of the Neoplatonic principle that what is complete produces things by its nature so that 'providence' does not imply a volitional concern by an agent for its effects.(114) If we take these texts and the reference to 'divine wills' as evidence that Dionysius holds to a theory of creation, then it must be noted that Dionysius never discusses a divine name of will (thelma). Indeed, in his writings, thelma explicitly occurs in reference to God only in the text cited above from Divine Names 5.8. The term boulsis does not occur in Dionysius's writings. Dionysius uses ktsis (creation) and its related verb only four times, and then only in citations from Scripture.(115) In other words, the reference to a divine will in terms of which Eastern and Western authors constantly stress the free character of the production of beings is virtually absent from Dionysius. If this is so and we grant that Dionysius holds to a version of the essence-energy distinction in relation to God, then not only does he not defend a distinction between the divine energy and ousia

to account for creation as a free production of beings by God, it is also not clear that he holds to a theory of creation in this sense.

CONCLUSION Simplicity, understood as unity without distinction, funda-mentally regulates the Scholastic understanding of God.(116) Yet even in the West, this notion of simplicity is not unchallenged. Richard Cross notes that Scotus's position about the formal distinction of the persons of the Trinity and of the divine attributes from the divine essence and from one another means that Scotus develops a "weak concept of simplicity": God, for Scotus, "is far less simple than Aquinas's God."(117) This is also the case, it seems, in the Byzantine framework, although the notion of 'complex unity' is perhaps a better characterization of God's simplicity. Basil Krivocheine notes that Gregory of Nyssa regularly speaks of the simplicity of the divine nature or essence rather than the simplicity of God,(118) while God, the Trinity, 'names' the essence, the persons of the Trinity, and the divine energies.(119) God's simplicity, or perhaps better 'unity', does not mean that God is without distinction or differentiation but that he is without division and contradiction.(120) So, as is chanted in Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, we worship "the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit: the Trinity, one in essence and undivided." And for Dionysius? The great refrain in his writings is: "The divinity is all things as cause of all, but nothing apart from all." So, the divinity 'is' beyond-being being: radically hidden and utterly unknown, yet manifest in the Triadic unity of Father, Son, and Sprit, and present to created beings in the uncreated powers or energies that belong to the Father, Son, and Spirit in a unitary manner. Put another way: The divinity is beyondbeing (hyperousios)--utterly beyond unity and differentiation--yet being (ousia), hence, differentiated in its unity while united in its differentiations.(121) 1. A version of this paper was read at Saint Louis University in April 2005 as part of the Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. I want to
thank David Twetten, Richard Taylor, James South, David Bradshaw, and Bogdan Bucur for reading and commenting on various drafts of the paper. 2. This is the feast day for the St. Dionysius who is believed to have been the actual disciple of Paul. But it is the anonymous author of the Corpus Dionysiacum that is celebrated in this verse. A kontakian for the same feast reads: "As a disciple of the apostle caught up to the third heaven, you spiritually entered the gate of heaven, Dionysius. You were enriched with understanding of ineffable mysteries and enlightened those who sat in the darkness of ignorance." 3. Alexander Golitzin, Et introibo ad altare dei: The Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita (Thessalonika, 1994), 29-37 gives a very good summary of modern interpretations of Dionysius along these lines. Of course, the view that Dionysius is more Platonist than Christian has a long history going back, for example, to Luther: "Dionysius is most pernicious; he platonizes more than he Christianizes" (Martin Luther, "Babylonian Captivity of the Church" [in D. Martin Luther's Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: H. Bhlaus Nachfolger, 1912-), 6:562]). 4. While 'Scholastic' narrowly signifies the type of thought found among Latin thinkers such as Aquinas and Albert the Great, the Scholastic framework has a long lineage extending back at least to Augustine and Boethius and includes thinkers in the Islamic and Jewish traditions. 5. Certainly none of these traditions can be strictly identified with any of these thinkers. After all, various propositions of Aquinas were condemned in 1277. Duns Scotus and Aquinas have differing views of the relation of divine attributes to the divine essence. But all of the

thinkers I will discuss in this paper are representative of their respective traditions in terms of a general method of doing philosophy, metaphysical framework, etc--at least sufficiently so for the purposes of this paper. 6. Essence' is often used to translate ousia. However, both Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), 137-54; and Christopher Stead, Divine Substance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 1-25 provide general discussions about translating ousia in light of its multivalent meanings as well as about problems with translating ousia by 'essence'. Stead makes this point particularly in reference to Greek Patristic authors. But given the widespread practice of translating ousia as 'essence' in translations of Greek texts and in secondary works that discuss the ousia-energeia distinction, I will use the term. For Dionysius, however, I prefer rendering ousia simply as 'being' especially since, when applied to God, ousia properly names the divine power of 'beingproducing' (ousiopoios) and not the 'whatness' or 'quiddity' of God. 7. In the Byzantine framework, the divine energy (energeia) is the natural going forth (exodos) of the divine essence directed toward creation. As Damascene observes, it is the persons of the Trinity who employ the divine energy (On the Orthodox Faith 3.15 [59], in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 2, ed. the Byzantinischen Institut der Abeti Scheyern [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973]; citations to this work are by book, chapter, and the paragraph number from the critical edition). The energy can be understood in the singular as the activity common to the persons of the Trinity; yet it is distinguished in various ways: divine knowledge, will, glory, light, etc. We know of and participate in God only in terms to his energies. See, e.g., Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976), 67-89; and Gregory Palamas, Capita physica, theologica, moralia et practica, in R. E. Sinkewicz, trans. and ed., Saint Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, Studies and Texts 83 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1988), 82-256. References to the Capita are by chapter numbers: in this case, 72. 8. And often divides them in rather sharply polemical fashion. See A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-27 for a good discussion of the controversy on this matter. 9. Properly, hypostasis is translated by 'individual subsistence' rather than 'person', which translates proposon. But I will follow convention and use 'person'. It should be noted, however, that authors in the Byzantine tradition typically do not understand the inner life of the Trinity in terms of 'psychological' categories as is done in the West, especially since Augustine. For a good discussion of the differences between Eastern and Western ways of thinking about the Trinity, see Michael Fahey and John Meyendorff, Trinitarian Theology East and West: St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Gregory Palamas (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Press, 1977). 10. 'Energy' is not the most facile translation of energeia; 'activity' is clearly a superior translation. Nevertheless, I will use 'energy/energies' since this is the standard English translation of energeia as it appears in Byzantine texts and in the debate concerning the ousia--energeia distinction with reference to God. 11. In addition to the secondary works cited elsewhere in this article regarding Byzantine authors, the interested reader will find the following helpful: Georges Barrois, "Palamism Revisited," St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 19 (1975): 211-31; David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Coffey, "The Palamite Doctrine of God: A New Perspective," St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 32 (1988): 329-58; George Habra, "The Source of the Doctrine of Gregory Palamas on the Divine Energies," Eastern Churches Quarterly 22 (1957): 244-52; Andrew Louth, St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); George Maloney, A Theology of Uncreated Energies (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1976); John Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas (Wing Road, Bedfordshire: The Faith Press, 1974 [1964]), translated from the French Introduction l'tude de Grgoire Palama (Editions du Seuil, 1959); Kallistos Ware, "God Hidden and Revealed: The Apophatic Way and the Essence-Energies Distinction," Eastern Churches Review 7 (1975): 125-36; Kallistos Ware, "The Debate about Palamism," Eastern Churches Review 9 (1977): 45-63; and Ronald D. Zimany, "The Divine Energies in Orthodox Theology," Diakonia 11 (1976): 281-85. 12. An expanded and more detailed version of this section is included in my article "Mystical Union and Beatific Vision," Proceedings of the 11th International Congress on Medieval Philosophy, held in Porto, Portugal, August, 2002, forthcoming. 13. Plato, Parmenides 141D-142E. 14. Cf. Enneads 5.3.13 and 6.9.3. 15. Enneads 2.4.5. 16. Cf. Enneads 5.1.4. 17. The limitations of this paper and the complexity of the topic do not allow me to examine Dionysius's view on the nature of our ultimate union with God relative to the Neoplatonic, Scholastic and Byzantine frameworks. But I want to mention this matter in setting forth each of these frameworks as a way of highlighting the differences among them. 18. Enneads 6.9.10. 19. Enneads 6.9.4. 20. John Rist, Plotinus: The Road To Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 25-26, claims that in some sense Plotinus ultimately attributes (infinite) being/actuality and thinking to the one. This theistic version tempers the more radical strand of Neoplatonism that I am describing. To that extent, this tempered version is, in the long run, basically congruent with the Scholastic framework--at least insofar as the One is understood ultimately as the first being that is the rational and good cause of all other beings. 21. Damascius, Aporiai kai luseis peri tn protn archn (Doubts and Solutions Concerning the First Principle), trans. J. Combes (text by L. G. Westernink), 3 vols. (Paris, 1986-91), 1.1.4-7. All references to Damascius are to this edition, and include volume, page, and line numbers. For this paper, I have found most useful the excellent discussion of Damascius by Sara Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 197-214. There are good historical reasons for considering Damascius relative to interpreting Dionysius. In the introduction to his translation of Dionysius's letters, Ronald Hathaway concluded a long introductory discussion of the authorship of the Corpus Dionysiacum with a conjecture that the writings were influenced not just by Proclus (which was well known) but also by Damascius Diadochus, the last head of the Platonic Academy (Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969], 25-29). Subsequently, Salvatore Lilla, in his article "Pseudo-Dionysius l'Areopagite, Prophyre et Damascius,"

convincingly showed the influence of Damascius on the Corpus Dionysiacum (in Denys l'Aropagite et sa posterit en orient et en occident: Actes du colloque international, Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994, ed. Ysabel de Andia [Paris: Institut d'tudes augustiniennes, 1997], 135-52). 22. Combes, trans., 1.1.9. 23. Ibid., 1.30.19-20. 24. Ibid., 1.17.24-18.2 25. Ibid., 1.4.13-18. 26. Ibid., 1.18.4-10. 27. Ibid., 1.13.16-24. 28. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 209. 29. Some scholars have argued that Aquinas, at least in some texts, does not understand God as a being. Gerald Phelan provides the classic statement of this view in light of a distinction between ens as id quod est and ens as habens esse: "There is a sense, however, in which ens means habens esse. Ens dicitur quasi esse habens (De potentia VII, 2.res). In this sense, God cannot be called ens. God does not 'have' esse. God 'is' Esse. However, when ens is taken to mean 'quod est,' God is 'maxime ens,' since 'what' He is is Ipsum Esse. . . . But when ens means habens esse, it cannot be said of God" ("The Being of Creatures" in G.B. Phelan: Selected Papers, ed. Arthur Kirn [Toronto: Pontifical Instituted of Mediaeval Studies Press, 1967], 90). As Phelan notes, this means that "essence is not . . . some positive thing but simply that 'by which' (quo), or the mode . . . in which the act, esse, is exercised" (ibid., 91). Essence, then, as William Carlo argued, is a negative or limiting principle that is reducible to esse (The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence in Existential Metaphysics [The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1966]). This understanding of the relation between esse and essentia has a great many merits on strictly philosophical grounds. Certainly, it would bring Aquinas into closer proximity with the Neoplatonic nonentitative understanding of the One. Without gainsaying texts that support this reading of Aquinas (see Phelan, "The Being of Creatures," 89-91, for some relevant texts from Aquinas), it is not clear to me that it is Aquinas's own, or at least his predominant, position. The limitations of this paper preclude any detailed investigation of this matter. But if Aquinas held to a nonentitative/nonessentialistic understanding of God one would, for example, expect him to draw on Dionysius's use of hyperousios (supersubstantiale in Sarracen's translation) to support it. But Aquinas's implicit understanding of Dionysius's use of this language, as far as I can tell, is not that Dionysius denies that God has an essence but that his essence transcends any finite essence (see Aquinas, In De Divinis nominibus 1.1, 1.3, 3.6, 5.1, etc. See below, p. 393, for further discussion of this matter). Moreover, in STh I, q. 3, a. 4, Aquinas distinguishes God, who is his esse, from things that have esse as the first being (primum ens) from all other beings (entia). For a detailed investigation of this theory and its critical reception by other Thomistic scholars, see Chris Curry, Reconnoitering the Role of Essence in Light of Esse: The Existential Thesis of Phelan, Clarke, and Carlo (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1992). 30. STh I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 1. 31. STh I, q. 39, a. 1. 32. See Lilla, "Pseudo-Dionysius L'Areopagite, Prophyre et Damascius," 121-22. 33. 2 Pet 1:4. 34. Theophanes PG 150:932D. 35. Capita 111. See Triads 3.2.5-10 for a discussion of the distinction between the divine essence and energy as well as the distinctions among the energies: Pro hesychastis. J. Meyendorff, ed., Grgoire Palamas: Dfense des saints hsychastes, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense. tudes et documents 30 (Louvain, 1973), 5-727; selections in Nicholas Gendele, trans., The Triads (New York: Paulist Press, 1983). 36. Maximus the Confessor, De ambigua PG91:1380B. See also Leonidas Contos, "The promise of the Secunda Petri . . . is realized as that mystical encounter which the whole Palamite theology purposes to explain: In its uncreated energies the divine nature, without loss or compromise of its divinity, and the nature of man, without change from its creaturlieness, come together in a union of grace" ("EssenceEnergies Structure of St. Gregory Palamas," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 12 [1967]: 294). 37. Cf. Maximus the Confessor, Questions to Thalassius 60 (PG 90:621C-D). 38. Capita 146-50. Archbishop Basil Krivocheine, "The Ascetic and Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas," Eastern Churches Quarterly 3 (1938): 193-214 has a very good discussion about this. See also, Gregory Palamas, Triads 3.1.9-12ff. 39. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.1 and 2 (1and 2). One finds variants on this text throughout this entire Byzantine tradition: from the Cappadocian fathers, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas to contemporary Orthodox thinkers such as Christoph Yannaras and Vladimir Lossky. 40. Capita 106. 41. See below, the beginning of part II, for a further discussion of this text. 42. PG 4 308D. See also 229C. The Scholia are traditionally attributed to Maximus the Confessor but many at least were written by John of Scythopolis. See also Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), 77. 43. Capita 78. 44. On the Orthodox Faith 1.4 (4). 45. This distinction is perhaps analogous to Scotus's view that there is a formal distinction among the persons of the Trinity, among the divine attributes, between the persons of the Trinity, and between the attributes and the essence. Soctus does acknowledge that formal distinctions have an ontological foundation. I expect that some Orthodox would view the above distinctions as 'real' whereas Scotus does not (e.g., see John Romanidies, "Notes on the Palamite Controversy and Related Topics, The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 6 [1960-61]: 2:190.). But this is likely a verbal difference given Scotus's rather specialized sense of 'real distinction' as pertaining to things that are separable from one another. It is also worth noting that the text of Palamas quoted above--if God is nature, then beings are not nature, etc.--seems analogous to the univocal

notion of being. Richard Cross makes the observation that Scotus's view of formal distinctions in God is bound up with his view of the univocal notion of being (Duns Scotus [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], 43-35 as well as 69-71). But I do not want to push the possible similarity too far since Scotus and Byzantine writers seem to be working in rather different ontological frameworks. 46. From the Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom. 47. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.15 (59). 48. Lucian Turcescu, "The Concept of Divine Persons in Gregory of Nyssa's To His Brother Peter, on the Difference Between Ousia and Hypostasis," Greek Orthodox Theological Review 42 (1997): 64-66. Cf. Henry A. Wilson, "[Gregory of Nyssa's] Teaching on the Holy Trinity" in Select Writings and Letters of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 5, ed. William Moore and H. A. Wilson (Eerdmans, 1890), 24-25; Basil, Ep 38.1, 214.4; Gregory of Nyssa, "On Not Three Gods." 49. Duncan Reid, Energies of the Spirit: Trinitarian Models in Eastern Orthodox and Western Theology (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 86; and Palamas, Capita 136. See also John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 40-41. 50. This is important in the Byzantine framework since our relation to and experience of God is fundamentally personal in nature. This primacy is accentuated, it seems to me, when one recalls the strong apophatism in this tradition--that properly ousia does not apply to God except in the causal sense of being-producing (ousiopoios). 51. However, the energies do not subsist on their own; they are enhypostatic rather than hypostatic (Capita 136). See M. Edmund Hussey, "The Persons-Energy Structure in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas," St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 18 (1974): 25-29 for a general discussion of the divine energies as enhypostatic and dependent upon person or hypostasis for their existence. Palamas Triads 3.1.9-10 offers this definition of enhypostaton: "This, then, is properly an enhypostaton: something that is contemplated, not in itself, not in an essence, but in a person (hypostasis)." 52. Capita 99 and 109. 53. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus 18 (PG 75:312C). Cf. Reid, Energies of the Spirit, 36-38. Capita 96-103. 54. See, Aquinas STh I, q. 19, a. 3. 55. Capita 135. Cf. Capita 75 and 134. 56. Real' distinction here means a distinction that has an ontological foundation apart from our reason. I am not using 'real' to refer only to distinctions among things that are separable from one another. 57. But see Dale Tuggy, "The Triniarian Dilemma" in The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, ed. Melville Stewart (Dordecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 29. He uses the principle of identity precisely to show that it is inconsistent to maintain that if the Father, Son and Spirit are God, then they are somehow distinct from one another. 58. See, e.g., Krivocheine, "The Ascetic and Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas," 151; Lossky, Mystical Thology, 43; A. de. Halleux, "Palamisme et Scolastique," Revue thologique de Louvain 4 (1973): 418-22. 59. Although the Neoplatonic understanding of the One differs significantly from the Byzantine understanding of God, since the former does not admit any distinction in the One while the latter affirms multiple distinctions in God, nevertheless both move beyond an entitative understanding of the One or of God. See, e.g., John D. Jones, "The Ontological Difference for St. Thomas and Pseudo-Dionysius," Dionysius 4 (1980): 119-32. 60. DN 5.1.816B. 61. STh I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2, which is a direct response to the objection that according to Dionysius the intelligible divine names only refer to processions and not the essence of God. 62. IV Sent., d. 50, q. 2, a. 4, qcla. 3, expos.; STh III, q. 20, a. 1; III, q. 13, a. 1. 63. Super de divinis nominibus 5, ed. P. Simon (Aschendorff, 1972), 304. It should be noted that Sarracen translates the Greek text pantels anekphanton ('completely unable to be manifest') as perfecte non manifestabile. However, in noting that we cannot know God through an interpretation that arises through definitions or divisions or demonstrations, Albert remarks that Dionysius says that God is non perfecte manifestabile ("not perfectly able to be manifest"). It is worth noting that Grosseteste translates the phrase as omnino immanifestabile while Eriugena translates it as uniuersaliter inexplanabile. Albert did not have access to Grossetestes's translation. 64. Capita 106. 65. A similar point is made by John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith I.12b, although in the critical edition this section is regarded as a later addition. 66. Of course, in the Byzantine framework, God's manifestation to us is strictly due to God's, the Trinity's, own self-revelation to us. 67. So, G. Kapriev argues that Dionysius should be understood in terms of the Eastern view that the divine essence is unknowable and inaccessible while we participate in the divine energies ("Bemerkungen ber den Kommentar des Thomas von Aquin zu 'De divinis nominibus' des Dionysius Areopagita, Liber IV, lectio 1," Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 3 (1966): 20-32). He notes that this Eastern way of understanding Dionysius is completely lost in the Scholastic interpretation of Dionysius (ibid., 32 n. 91). See Andreas Speer for a critique of Kapriev on this point ("Lichtkausalitt: Zum Verhltnis von dionysischer Licht-theologies und Metaphysick bei Albertus Magnus and Thomas von Aquin," in Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter, ed. Tzotcho Boiadjiev, G. Kapriev, and A. Speer (Brepols, 2000), 368-72. 68. In De Divinis nominibus, proemium. 69. DN 13.3.981A; EH 1.4.376B; MT 3.1032D. 70. DN 1.1.588A; 1.5.593C; 2.4.641A; EP 4.1072B. The term hyperousiots more likely has the sense of 'what is beyond all beingness' rather than 'supreme beingness'.

71. DN 1.2.588C; 1.5.593C; 2.1.636C. 72. Albert, Super de divinis nominibus 11 (Simon, ed., 414), Aquinas, In De Divinis nominibus 2.1 notes the phrase one time and seems to catch the meaning Dionysius intends. 73. Based upon a search using the online Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. 74. DN 2.7.645A. 75. DN 13.3.981A. 76. DN 13.3.980D-981A. I am writing 'trinity' in lower case letters throughout these two texts. It is not uncommon in various translations and in Dionysiaca to see the term placed in capital letters when affirmed and in lower case letters when denied. But that editing decision seems to beg, or at least already make a determination about, the issue I am about to discuss. 77. DN 1.4.589D. 78. For some representative discussions of Dionysius's understanding of the Trinity, see Golitzin, Et introibo, 51-54; Ysabel de Andia, L'Union Dieu chez Denys l'Aropagite (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 29-64; Werner Beierwaltes, "Unity and Trinity in East and West" in Eriugena: East and West, ed. Bernard McGinn and Willemien Otten (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 209-32; Bernhard Brons, Gott und dei Seienden: Untersuchungen zum Verhltnis von neuplatonischer Metaphysik und christlicher Tradition bei Dionysius Areopagita (Gttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1976), 98-129; and Salvatore Lilla, "Terminologia trinitaria nello Pseudo-Dionigi l'Areopagita. Suoi antecedenti e sua influenza sugli scritorri successive," Augustinianum 13 (1973): 609-23. 79. Dionysius restricts the notion of cause to God's production of finite beings. Many other Byzantine authors speak of the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father in terms of 'causality' although they note that the Son and Spirit are not 'effects' of the Father in the sense of inferior or subordinate realities. 80. Cf. DN 2.4-5.640Dff. 81. 81 MT 3.1032D. 82. This might be expected given that the author is trying to establish the work as written by a disciple of Paul. On the other hand, he regularly and self-consciously uses much language that derives from the Cappadocian Fathers and from Neoplatonists such as Proclus. However, at DN 1.5.593B he does refer to the Triadic henad (triadikn henad) as homotheos and homoagathos. 83. Oratio 41, In sancto baptisma 41 (PG 36:417C). By way of contrast, writers in the Byzantine tradition often view the Scholastic tradition as one that gives primacy to unity over Trinity in light of a distinction between "on the one hand, De Deo Uno, 'On the One God' (including the divine essence and attributes or energies), and, on the other hand, De Deo Trino, which concerns the mystery of the Trinity as such. This approach is basically philosophical or 'essentialist.' It assumes the right to speak of the divine essence itself, prior to or apart from the Hypostases or Persons of the Trinity. Thereby, it juxtaposes and implicitly separates these two aspects of the divine mystery" (Boris Bobrinsky, The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition [Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir Seminary Press, 1999], 1). 84. Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (Wilton, Conn.: Morehouse-Barlow, 1989), 88-90. 85. Albert, Super de divinis nominibus 5 (Simon, ed., 304), Aquinas, In De Divinis nominibus 5.1. 86. Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 90. See Eckhart, "Sermon 48," in Die Deutschen Werke, vol. 2, ed. Josef Quint and George Steer (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1971), p. 420, ll. 1-10. 87. Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 115. Georgi Kapriev has a very interesting essay on apophatic theology in Dionysius and the Eastern tradition. In particular, he notes that Palamas does not view apophatic theology, understood in a solely negative manner as the silencing of reason in unknowing, to be ultimate ("Die antiapophatische Deutung des Dionyius bei Gregorios Palamas" in Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter, 123-55). If apophatic theology in this sense is taken as ultimate, as Barlaam took it, then Palamas argues for an 'antiapophatic' "spiritual vision of the eternal energies of God that is realized beyond intellectual activity" (ibid., 155). 88. A similar consideration would apply to be-ing (esse or to einai) when said of God. Dionysius cites Exod 3:14 twice in the Divine Names: 1.6.596 and 2.1.637A. In both cases, it is included among the affirmative names that designate a divine power. So too, Dionysius refers to the Godhead as n hyperousis ('be-ing beyond every manner of being' or 'superessentially be-ing') (DN 2.11.649B). But this phrase also occurs in the context of an affirmative name of God that again refers to causality. 89. Dionysius more often says that the divine names refer to the divine powers (dunameis). 90. DN 2.5.641D-644A. 91. DN 2.11.649B. See Istvn Perczel, "Denys et les Hnades de Proclus," Diotima 23 (1995): 71-76 for a concise discussion of Dionysius's distinction between the divine union--God as 'transcendent'--and the divine differentiation--God's activity in the world. The divine names refer to powers that are united in the divine differentiation since they are common to the persons of the Trinity. Perczel notes that Dionysius follows the Cappadocian distinction between essence and energies (ibid., 72). He also shows how Dionysius's terminology for 'union' and 'differentiation' was influenced by Proclus. 92. DN 2.11.652A. 93. Aquinas, In De Divinis nominibus 2.3 See also I Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 1. 94. See also O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius, 13. 95. Aquinas, In De Divinis nominibus 2.3; Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super de diviniis nominibus 2 (Simon, ed., 74). 96. Aquinas, In De Divinis nominibus 2.3, Albert, Super de divinis nominibus, 2 (Simon, ed., 72).

97. This is a broader sense of 'procession' (proodos) in the sense of any forward movement. It is narrower than the specialized sense of 'procession' (ekporeusis) which, in the Orthodox Church, refers only to the 'coming forth' of the Holy Sprit from the Father in contrast to the generation of the Son from the Father. In the Catholic and Protestant Churches, 'procession' (prodoos/processio) is applied equally to the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father and from the Son. Of course, in both East and West, 'procession' (proodos) is used in a variety of non-Trinitarian senses. See "The Filioque: A Church-Dividing Issue: An Agreed Statement of the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation," Saint Paul's College, Washington, DC October 25, 2003 (http://www.usccb.org/ seia/filioque.htm). Section 3.1, "Terminology," gives a good discussion of the terminological issues that divide Eastern and Western thought about the Trinity. 98. Capita 85. 99. Capita 87-88. 100. See DN 11.6 and EP 2 where Dionysius distinguishes between the source of the processions, the uncreated processions, and the finite effects of those processions. 101. See Golitzin, Et introibo, 49-60 who argues for the essence-energy distinction in Dionysius. However, Adolph Ritter maintains that while Dionysius belongs to the tradition in which essence and energy are distinguished in God, this distinction is not directly derived from his theology ("Gregor Palamas als Leser des Dionysius Ps.-Areopagita," Denys l'Aropagite et sa posterit en orient et en occident: Actes du colloque international, Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994, ed. Ysabel de Andia [Paris: Institut d'tudes augustiniennes, 1997], 574). Otto Semmelroth argued that the powers (dunameis) "were not a relationship between God and the world, but a reality in God, in some way different from the essence" ("Gottes ausstrahlendes Licht: Zur Schpfungs--und Offenbarungslehre des Pseudo-Dionyius Areopagita," Scholastik 28 [1953]: 482). See also, Semmelroth, "Gottes geeinte Vielheit: Zur Gotteslehre des Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita," Scholastik 25 (1950): 394 for a similar claim. Golitzin, Et introibo, 55 favorably cites the latter text. But see Walter Neidl, Thearchia: Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Gott bei Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und Thomas von Aquin (Regensburg: Habbel, 1976), 456-57; and Walther Vlker, Kontemplation und Ekstase bei Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1958), 153-54 for critical assessments of this claim. For some scholars who reject the essence-energy distinction in Dionysius see E. Corsine, Il tratto DE DIVINIBUS NOMINIBUS dell Pseudo-Dionigi e i commenit Neo-Platonici al Parmenide (Turin, 1962), 101; Brons, Gott und dei Seienden, 176-83; Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 156-66; and Ysabel de Andia, "Transfiguration et thologie ngative chez Maxime le Confessur et Denys l'Aeropagite," in de Andia, ed., Denys l'Aropagite et sa posterit en orient et en occident, 313-15, 325. See also Ysabel de Andia, L'union Dieu chez Denys l'Aropagite (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 65-75. 102. Cf. Gregory Nazianaen, Oratio 31.16; John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, 3.15 (59); Palamas, Capita 129. 103. Christoph Yannaras, De l'abscence et de l'inconnaissance de Dieu d'aprs les crits aropagitiques et Martin Heidegger (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1971), 82. 104. Moreover, in virtue of the free character of creation, Lossky denies that the energies can be viewed merely in causal terms as the divine presence to creation: "The energy is not a divine function which exists on account of creatures. . . . Even if creatures did not exist, God would none the less manifest Himself beyond His essence; just as the rays of the sun would shine out from the solar disk whether or not there were any beings capable of receiving their light" (Mystical Theology, 74). 105. This is a major conclusion of Enneads 6.9.4. 106. See Aquinas STh I, q. 19, a. 3. "Since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change." 107. Golitzin, Et introibo, 77-86 argues that Dionysius holds to a theory of creation, yet notes that "Dionysius' creationism represents perhaps the most ambiguous features of this thought" (78). Golitzin's interpretation seems to depend on viewing the divine logos as the divine will (86ff.). 108. Cf. DN 4.33.733A-C; and 5.2.693A-696B. 109. Enneads 3.1 and 2. 110. DN 4.1.693B. Sarracen translates hyparxis as essentia. 111. DN 1.5.593D. Sarracen translates hyparxis as essentia. 112. This text is discussed twenty-four times in Aquinas's writings ranging from I Sent., d. 34, q. 2, a. 1 to STh III, q. 117, a. 6. 113. Albert, Super de divinis nominibus 4 (Simon, ed., 118). 114. Proclus, Elements of Theology 23. 115. DN 2.1.637B (twice); 4.4.700C; 9.3.912A. 116. Simplicity also fundamentally regulates Neoplatonic thinking about the One, although it must be remembered that, for the Neoplatonists, the One is properly neither one nor many. 117. Cross, Duns Scotus, 43, 45 respectively. This weak simplicity, according to Cross, stems from Scotus's notion of univocity. 118. Basil Krivocheine, "Simplicity of the Divine Nature and the Distinctions in God, according to St. Gregory of Nyssa," St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 21 (1977): 76. 119. More precisely even the names 'God' and 'divinity' are names for divine processions and energy since there is no name for the divine 'essence' (ibid., 86, 89). 120. Ibid., 103-4. 121. Cf. Jens Halfwassen, "Sur la limitation du principe de contradiction chez Denys," Diotima 23 (1995): 46-50.