'THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO

KOREAN A I R LINES FLIGHT 007

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y of t h e U.S. Army Comrnand and General S t a f f College i n p a r t i a l f i i l f i l l m e n t : of t h e requirements for . t h e degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
E3.A.,

JERALD J JORDAN I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y , 3.973

Ft.

Leavenworth, Kansas

1985

Approved Eor p u b l i c r e l e a s e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s unlirnitecl.

H5-3352

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate:
T i t l e of t h e s i s :

M r . J e r a l d J. J o r d a n
'rhe S o v i e t Response t o Korean A i r L i n e s F l i g h t 007

c j C L L i r / f . I.. - 4 1 LTC G a r r e t . t R . Fonda. M.A.?

,
I

T h e s i s C o m m i t t e e Cha rman

,
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, '
I I ,
. . I

Member, G r a d u a t e E'ac

!I

/,., ,

I.

Member, C o n s u l t i n q F i i c u l t y

COL Max G F i a n w a & g ,

, .' \
' \

Ph.D.

Accepted t h i s 7 t h day\of June 1 9 8 5 by:

Philip

& 3.- J

13rookes, Ph.D.

__

Director I Gradue,tir. Degree

Programs

The o p i n i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n are t i o s e of t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e views o f t h e U . S . Army Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e 3r any should o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l agency. ( R e f e r e n c e s t o t h i s s t u k .include t h e foregoing s t a t e m e n t . )

ABSTRACT
THE SOVIET RESI?ONSE TO KOREAN A I R LINES FLIGHT 0 0 7 :
An

a n a l y s i s of selected e v e n t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e i n c i d e n t , by M r . J e r a l d J . J o r d a n , 1 1 6 p a g e s . T h i s s t u d y i s a n h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f !soviet a c t i c n s , v e r b a l and a c t u a l , Eollowing t h e v i o l a t i o n of USSR a i r s p a c e by Korean A i r L i n e s F l i g h t KE-007 on t h e morning o f 1 September 1983. S o v i e t and Western p r i m a r y s o u r c e s , a;:, w e l l as o t h e r l i t e r a t u r e , are examined t o d e t e r m i n e t h e rati:,re of t h e S o v i e t r e s p o n s e : t h e i r a c t i o n s t a k e n d u r i n g t h e two and one h a l f h o u r s p r i o r t o t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e f l i g h t , t h e a b i l i t y of S o v i e t commanders t o i d e n t i f y t h e Korean a i r l i n e r , t h e l e v e l a t which t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n was made, and any a d v e r s e a c t i o n t a k e n by a u t h o r i t i e s a g a i n s t S o v i e t s invo:tved i n the operation.
The s t u d y b e g i n s w i t h an e x a m i n a t i o n of v i e w s e x p r e s s e d by t h e S o v i e t C h i e f of t.he G e n e r a l S t a f f , Marshal N i k o l a j V . Ogarkov, at. a 9 September 1983 p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , them

a n a l y z e s a r t i c l e s p u b l i s h e d i n t h e S o v i e t and Western press c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n c i d e n t . R e a c t i o n t o an e a r l i e r Xoi:ean commercial a i r l i n e r which o v e r f l e w S o v i e t Karelia aiid was s u b s e q u e n t l y f o r c e d clown i n 1 9 7 8 i s used f o r compar:.son.
T h e e x a m i n a t i o n t o u c h e s on v a r i o u s aspects contrik,ui:inq t h e r e s p o n s e , incl.uding t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of Soviet. Air

to

Defense F o r c e s , d e c i s i o n making a t b o t h c i v i l i a n a x 1 m i l i t a r y l e v e l s , d i s i n f o r m n t i o n , and s t r a t e g i c d e c e p t i o n (nia:;kirovka) . T h e o r i e s on t h e r e l . a t i o n s h i p between t h e Korean A i r L i n e s i n c i d e n t and t h e di.smissa1 o f Marshal Nikola] V. Ogarkov a r e considered. The a n a l y s i s f i n d s t h a t d e s p i t e i n i t i a l c o n f u s i o n a s t . h e Korean j e t e n t e r e d S o v i e t a i r s p a c e , t h e m i l i t a r y i:eepc~nse went g e n e m l l y a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n . Although t h e Soviet.s may have been ,aware t h a t t h e a i r l i n e r was a commercia:. 7 4 7 , t h e y were u n s u r e of i t s m i s s i o n and t h e r e f o r e assumed t h e w o r s t . The f i n a l d e c i s i o n was s t r i c t l y a m i l i t a r y o n e , made by t h e t h e a t e r a i r d e f e n s e commander. There i s no h a r d e v i d e n c e of punishment h a v i n g been meted o u t t o t h o s e i n v o l v e d , b u t punishment i s st.il:L a p o s s i b l i t y . The s t u d y c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e S o v i e t s c o n t i n u e t o liand:.e b o r d e r v i o l a t i o n s by f o l l o w i n g e s t a b l i s h e d m i l i t a r y p r o c e d u r e . T h i s method f a v o r s t h e u s e o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e o v e r c t h e r ways o f r e s o l v i n g t h e problem and l i m i t s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e outcome. 3i.sinfonae t i o n and d e c e p t i o n have bcen r e f i n e d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t , i n t h i s c a s e , t h e y were an i n t e g r a l and n e c e s s a r y p a r t of t h e respoi-:se. iii

ACKNOlaEDGMENT

This work would have been much more difficult without the help of several people, including my thesis committee. I especially want to thank QY committee chairman,

LTC Fonda, for his help in suggesting leads to follow and

general improvements in the thesis organization. I would also like to express my gratitude to my sister, Cindy Jordan,
for the considerable time and effort she spent typing the

final copy of this work. --Jerald Jordan

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. . . . . . . . . . . .1 . . . . . . .2 . . . . . . . . . . . .3 . . . . . . . . . . . .4 . . . . . . . . . . . .5 ........... 8 ........... 9 CHAPTER TWO. RESEAKCH METHODS and SURVEY OF LITERATURE . . 1 0 Methods and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 Survey of L i t e r a t u r e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The S o v i e t P r e s s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 The Western P r e s s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 P r o f e s s i o n a l J o u r n a l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 CHAPTER THREE. THE FINAL MINUTES OF KAL-007 . . . . . . . . 2 4 D e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e Three Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 The S o v i e t View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Stage One: Kamchatka A n Analysis of t h e Four Options . . . . . . . . . .3 1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Stage Two: The Sea of Okhotsk A n Ana1ysi.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 4 7 Stage Three: Sakhalin I s l a n d and t h e Sea of JaF'an . . 47 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 CHAPTER FOUR. THE OTHER QUESTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 S e c t i o n One: I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e I n t r u d e r The Soviet Story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 A n Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 S e c t i o n Two: Who Made t h e Decision? 1nt;roducti.on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5 8 Level One: The P o l i t b u r o . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9 Level Two: The N a t i o n a l M i l i t a r y Comand . . . .6 4 Level Three: The T h e a t e r M i l i t a r y Command.ei: . . . 7 0 Level FoL~I:: The P i l o t . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 Coriclusiori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 S e c t i o n Three: The People Involved Y u r i j Vladimirovich Andropov . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4 D m f i t r i j Fedorovich Ustinov . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5 Nilcolnj Vasi:tievich Ogarkov . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5
CHAPTER ONE. 1NTROI)LICTION Problem Statement and Research Questions L i m i t a t i o n s and D e l i m i t a t i o n s Importance of 'This Study F o r e c a s t of Chaapters Summary Endnotes
V

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. ............

General Vladimir L . Govorov . . . . . . . . . . . Marshal of Aviation Petr Kirsanov . Chief Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr Ivanovich Koldunov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Georgij Kornienko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chief Marshal of Aviation Pave1 Stepanovich Kutakhov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colonel General Semen Ronanov . . . . . . . . . . Major Vasilij Konstantinovich Kazmin . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lessons Learned & Suggestions for Further Study Soviet Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . Soviet Tactical Decision Making . . . . . . . . Disinformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maskirovka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 78 . . . . . . . .78
.79 .80

. .. 8 0 80 . ..81 81
.84

.86
.87 .89 .91 .93

. .

.94 .95

APPENDICES Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transliteration Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . I11 List of Appreviations. Acronyms. and Foreign Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV Chronology of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . V Initial Distribution List

I1

. . . . . . . . . . . . 109

. . .96 . . 102 . . 103 . . 105

vi

CHARTS AND MAPS

Figure 1 .Nethodology Flow Chart Figure Figure Map

. . . . . . . 2 . The Three Stages of Flight KAL..OO7 . 3 . The Soviet Version of Events . . . . I. . Ogarkovs Circuitous Route . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. -14 . .26 . .28 . .32

M a p 2 . fie Great Circle Route Figure 4 . b e Evcrit.s, As They

. . . . . . . . . . . . .4 4 Probably Occurred . . . . .49

. . . . . . .60 . . . . . . .71

Figure 5 . The Four Levels of Decision Making Figure 6 . Chain of Command, Soviet Far E:ast

vi i

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

I c a n n o t f o r e c a s t t o you t h e a c t i o n of Russia. I t i s a r i d d l e wrapped i n a

mystery i n s i d e an enigma. --Winston C h u r c h i l l , i n a b r o a d c a s t , 1 October 1939 I n t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s of 1 September 1!)83, Major

V a s i l i j Kcinstantinovich Kazmin made a l a s t - m i n u t e pre.Elight

check of h i s Su-15 i n t e r c e p t o r , a s h e had done many times before.

1

H i s t h o u g h t s were w i t h h i s d a u g h t e r and .:he lesson

h e would be d e l i v e r i n g t o h e r c l a s s a t s c h o o l .

H e was t o

t e l l them a b o u t h i s 1 3 y e a r s a s a p i l o t i n one of :he Soviet

Unions most e l i t e f o r c e s . given.

But t h i s lesson was riot

t(3

be

S h o r t l y , h e would be a s k e d t o do something e l s e ,

something which would change n o t j u s t h i s f u t u r e , , cut t h a t of t h e world. When h e f i r e d t h e missiles t h a t s h o t d,,wn a

c i v i l i a n i i i r l i n e r en r o u t e from Anchorage, A l a s k a , t o S e o u l ,

Korea, h e c o u l d n o t h a v e known t h a t h e had j u s t be3un a

s e r i e s of e v e n t s t h a t would p o l a r i z e t h e w o r l d and s n u f f o u t
t h e careers of mimy p e o p l e and t h e l i v e s of many mare.
2

The shoot-down of Korean A i r L i n e s f l i g h t KAL-007, t r a g i c as it was, p r e s e n t s a u n i q u e o p p o r t u n i t y .or examining

s o v i e t r e a c t i o n s to i n t r u s i o n s of i t s airspace.

Unique, n o t

b e c a u s e i t s t h e o n l y t i m e a n i n t r u d e r h a s been ~desti:oyed, f o r it i s n t . Un:ique, n o t b e c a u s e t h e i n c i d e n t w a s

<I

mistake,

for it probably wasn't.

But unique because world reaction

to it was so strong that the Soviet Union took extraordinary measures in her own defense.

PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS The purpose of this thesis is to examine statements and actions taken by the Soviets in response to the KAL disaster, analyze them, and suggest what actually happened, why it happened, and whether it can happen again. As the

task is enormous and dwarfs the time and resources available, the scope has been narrowed by taking a few critical portions of the incident and examining data associated with them. These data may then indicate logical conclusions. Specifically, four sections of the event have been chosen for scrutiny:
1.
2.

3.
4.

The 150 minutes of inaction before XAL-007 was shot down The identification of the intruder Who made the decision to shoot The fate of the Soviets involved

The reasons for the selection of these particular sections are included in chapter two. After all evidence concerning these four areas is compiled, each statement and action is carefully examined, using the following three questions:

1.
2.

3.

Does it conform to accepted facts or not? If not, what is different? Was it reasonable under the circumstances? If not, why not? If a statement, was it later modified, contradicted, or in some other way changed? If so, what can be learned from this?
2

Once t h i s methodology h a s been completed, c o n c l u s i o n s

can be drawn w i t h a r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e of c o n f i d e n c e

3s t o

what happened on the morning o f 1 September, why it nappened, and under w h a t circuinstances it c o u l d be r e p e a t e d .

LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

The scope 01:

t h i s study i s limited t o t h e Soviet

r e a c t i o n t o t h e b o r d e r v i o l a t i o n of Korean A i r L i n e s f l i g h t

0 0 7 , i t s s u b s e q u e n t d e s t r u c t i o n , and t h e conseyuenc:e:s f a r t h e
S o v i e t Union. However

, to

a n a l y z e t h i s e v e n t thorouqh1.y ,

p r e v i o u s border: v i o l a t i o n s and S o v i e t r e a c t i o n s t o them must a l s o be a d d r e s s e d , when t h e y a r e p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s s.:udy. E s s a y s on S o v i e t d e c i s i o n making a r e used t c i . i n t e r p r e t t h e s i g n i f i c : a n c e of some e f f e c t s and t o s u g g e s t poss.ibla3 c a u s e s , b u t t h i s i s n o t i n i t s e l f a p a p e r on t h e Scwiet decision-making p r o c e s s .

Nor d o e s t h e p a p e r f o c u s oil why

t h e Korean p l a n e w a s f l y i n g o v e r S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y , n o r i n v e s t i g a t e whether: it w a s on a s p y m i s s i o n f o r t h e 1J.S. government. F i n a l l y , t h i s s t u d y i s l i m i t e d by t i m e . y ear h as passed s i n c e t h e i n c i d e n t occurred. J u s t over a

Some fiict:j have

j u s t r e c e n t l y come t o l i g h t w h i l e o t h e r s w i l l n o t t m e known

f o r some y e a r s t o c:oine, i f e v e r .

The b u l k of t h e Eoiirces a r e

p r i m a r y , m o s t w r i t t e n between September 1 9 8 3 and Sep1:emlxr 1984.

While i t would, no d o u b t , b e c o n v e n i e n t t o l i r l i t t h e

t i m e c o v e r e d by t h i s p a p e r t o t h a t one-year p e r i o d , :.t c o u l d

r e s u l t i n a s s e r t i o n s b a s e d on i n c o m p l e t e d a t a .
3

Thfrcfore,

some data published after thac period are drawn upon when they contribute to the general understanding.

IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY The primary value of this study is to provide an historical account describing how and why the Soviets took military action in this case and under what circumstances they would do it again. This account is meant for use by

--

national-level authorities as an aid in preventing future conflicts of this sort. But the rewards of research need

not be limited to the narrow area of predicting reactions to border violations. Rarely has an event forced the Soviets into taking public-relations measures as extraordinary as those taken following the destruction of the Korean airliner. Few times

in the past has the Soviet Union found itself receiving almost universal condemnation, from the Western Block and Third World alike. Seldom have Soviet leaders felt it

necessary to take such pains to justify military action. Hardly ever have so many Soviet bureaucrats and military officers been used to defend their country's policies before the world press. Because this study deals with an event that cannot be neatly defined as affecting only military interests, it may provide general information on a wide range of topics pertinent to Soviet decision making.
For example, some

findings may contribute to the knowledge about Soviet 4

responses t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure.

The S o v i e t s responded
1 : o

i n some ways which c o u l d be c o n s t r u e d a s attempts

shi.ft

t h e g u i l t of t h e i r a c t i o n s from t h e m s e l v e s t o o t h e r s , p r i m a r i l y t h e United S t a t e s . O t h e r r e s p o n s e s coulcl 3e

i n t e r p r e t e d a s a n iipp:Lication o f p r e s s u r e on o t h e r n s t i o n s t o s u p p o r t t h e S o v i e t s i n t h i s matter. I f it i s fourid t h a t t h e b o r d e r v i o l a t i o n wa:j not. e x p e c t e d by t h c S o v i e t s and t h a t t h e y misjudged t h e 3.eqI:ee of world r e a c t i o n t o ~LI:, t h e n t h i s s t u d y c o u l d c o n t r i l m t e t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f S o v i e t h a n d l i n g of c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s .
On

t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e s t u d y c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e Sovist:; not only expected t h i s i n c i d e n t t o occur, b u t c a r r i e d o u t t.heir deadly mission e x a c t l y according t o p l a n , r e s e a r c h d a t a h e r e i n c o u l d bc: used t o examine t h e e f f e c : t i v e n e s s of S o v i e t p l a n n i n g , warning, and e x e c u t i o n . Other areas tha.: can

b e n e f i t froin t h i s p a p e r a r e s t u d i e s of S o v i e t d e c e p t i o n (maskirovka) , p r o p a j a n d a , d i s i n f o r m a t i o n , f o r e i g n ]?olic:y, and leadership. Although t h e i n t e n t i o n i s t o f o c u s on t h e m.ilit;iry r e s p o n s e , i t would be i m p o s s i b l e n o t t o t o u c h on t h e m a t t e r s mentioned above. V a l u a b l e knowledge and new i n f o r i n a t i o n a r e

n o t p a r o c h i a l , f o r -they can b e n e f i t a l l areas o f s.tudy..

FORECAST OF . CHAPTERS

T o c o v e r all above-mentioned a r e a s of t h e KAL-007

i n c i d e n t , t h i s t h e s i s i s organized i n t o f i v e Chapters. C h a p t e r one contain:; t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n and p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e

problem statement, and the value of the study. Chapter two addresses the preparation of this thesis. The chapter combines a survey of literature with a short discussion of methods and procedures used to research and present the findings. The first part of the chapter, methods and procedures, covers the research questions, why they were chosen, and how they were used. It also addresses the reliability and, in

come cases, the predictability of both the Soviet and American press. It describes how to exploit anomalies in order to

confirm certain actions and infer others. The purpose of the survey of literature, chapter two, part two, is to summarize and critique much of the material covered during research. While not a bibliography, the survey

briefly lists the major works, a critical analysis of some of them, and their relevancy to this thesis. Included are

articles found during research which were not used because they were inappropriate to the subject. They are listed for

the benefit of future researchers of the Korean Air Lines incident, so that they may save time in their own work. Chapter three sets the scene. It presents the first

research question: what took place during the two and a half hours between the time Korean Air Lines 007 first entered Soviet airspace and the time the flight was terminated over the Sea of Japan. The examination includes an analysis of

statements made by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, during and after the 9 September press conference.

The c h a p t e r i n t r o d u c e s t h e Korean p i l o t and c o p i l o t and d i s c u s s e s t:heir p o s s i b l e responses t o t h e Soviet a c t i o n . Chapter t h r e e summarizes t h e information unccivei-ed and p r e s e n t s f o u r p o s s i b l e s c e n a r i o s of a c t i o n during tt.e key time period.. The c h a p t e r ends with a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e most

l i k e l y a c t i o n s t h a t took p l a c e , thus answering t h e i.esearch question. Chapter f o u r p r e s e n t s t h e f i n d i n g s f o r t h e remaining t h r e e r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s - - t h e q u e s t i o n of who could have given t h e f i n a l o r d e r t o d e s t r o y t h e p l a n e , t h e co>trovcl:sy over Soviet ident:ifi.cation of t h e a i r c r a f t , and t h 2 f a r e of t h e S o v i e t s invo1,veil. Included a r e an a n a l y s i s of t h e Soviet

s t a t e m e n t s , an examination of o t h e r accepted t h e o r i e s , and a s e l e c t i o n of t h e most l i k e l y answer t o each of t h e q u e s t i o n s posed. Chapter f i v e c o n t a i n s t h e c o n c l u s i o n s , l e s s o n s l e a r n e d , and t h e e f f e c t t h i s i n c i d e n t has on U.S. d e c i s i o n maker.:: i n the future. Chapter Eive a l s o c o n t a i n s recommendatims f o r

f u r t h e r study on t:he Korean A i r Lines i n c i d e n t . Following c h a p t e r f i v e a r e appendi.ces containing the bibliography,

R

guide t o t h e t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n system . i s e d i n

t h i s t h e s i s , a lisr: of a b b r e v i a t i o n s , acronyms, and foreign

w o r d s , and a sequence of events containing n o t only exa,it

times of events during t h e shoot-down, b u t a l s o a s h o r t chronology of major v i o l a t i o n s of Soviet a i r s p a c e s.iiice

: [ . World War I

Winston Churchill's statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter applies to the Soviet Union today as much as it did in 1939. It is imperative that our primary adversary not be a mystery to us, that we be able to understand any action taken by the Soviet Union and her motives for doing
so.

If, as in this case, the Soviet Union uses military

force against non-combatant civilians in time of peace, the need to understand exactly what happened and why becomes ever more crucial.
In this light, whether the reader agrees with the

conclusion of this study or not, it will still serve to document this singularly important event for use by future researchers. This documentation, along with any new theories presented for consideration, the examination of known facts, and the explanation of previously confusing motives for Soviet actions, will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the Soviet Union and eventually solving the riddle, clearing up the mystery, and removing the enigma.

CHAPTER 1
ENDNOTES

'Only oncc has t h e p i l o t ' s name ever appeareci i r i p r i n t , i n an a r t i c l e f o r A:i.r Force Magazine by Yossef Bodansky ("Death By t h e BooE," December 1983 , p . 3 7 ) . Mr. Bodansky does n o t r e v e a l h i s source of t h i s information. 'Colonel V . ITilatov, "A Plane Took Off from Pnchorage," Krasnaya Zvezda 13 September 1983, p.3.
- 9

CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH METHODS and a SURVEY OF LITERATURE

You know my methods, Watson. --Sherlock Holmes, The Crooked Man

In order to make this thesis as valuable for you, the reader, as it has been for me, the researcher, we must begin with a common understanding; you must know my methods. Chapter one has given you my research topic and its value as
I see it.

In this chapter I outline how Ive prepared the

study. If you understand the methods and sources used in reaching the final product as well as the ones discounted along the way, you will better understand (though not necessarily agree with) the conclusions reached. Specifically, in this chapter the research methods and a survey of literature are introduced--two topics which are inseparable, that is, one logically follows from the other. For example, the historical method used in this thesis is only appropriate when literature is available. An analytic method must be used when few references exist.

- PROCEDURES METHODS AND

Secrecy permeates all official matters in the Soviet
10

Union.

When Soviet o f f i c i a l d o m i s s i l e n t , t h i s sec::ecy

is

extremely clifficu1.t t o p e n e t r a t e .

When a u t h o r i t i e s begin t o

t a l k , however, w e ' r e given n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e trc4.e s t o r y but t a n t a l i z i n g b i t s of information t h a t can l e a d u:; t o i t .

I chose t o w r i t e about t h e KAL-007 i n c i d e n t because
i t was important; I chose t o w r i t e about i t because i t was

i n t e r e s t i n g ; b u t most: of a l l , I chose t o w r i t e about t h i s event because t h e S o v i e t s chose t o speak about i t . Whether

they spoke from confusion o r from being pressured i!; unimportant:; what i s important i s t h a t they spoke. t h e r e i n l i e s my mcthod f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t h e s e c r e c y . Verbiage provides t h e rock t o be mined f o r nuggets of iiruth.
A s t:his inc:ident has many a s p e c t s , an induc t:.ve

And

approach i s used:

: ; e l e c t f o u r elements of t h e event:,

analyze them i n d e t a i l , and draw conclusions which t:ou:Ld be a p p l i e d t o t h e ent:ire i n c i d e n t . These f o u r - - t h e 15(1 minute

period b e f o r e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e f l i g h t , the i d e n t i l i i c a t i o n

of t h e t a r g e t , t h e d e c i s i o n , and t h e subsequent f a t i : of the

S o v i e t s involved--,can provide s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l t o riake those conc%usions arid t o provide a foundation f o r fiirtlier research. A f t e r KAL-007 e n t e r e d Soviet a i r s p a c e over Kamcliatka another two and one h a l f hours would pass b e f o r e i t would be destroyed.

This f a c t i s i n t r i g u i n g .

Had t h e consitleriible
Wa:; t h i s

Soviet a i r defense machinery been s e t i n t o motion?

l e n g t h of time necessary t o complete t h e sequence of e v e n t s ?

O r was t h i s a conscious d e c i s i o n t o l e t t h e f l i g h t coni:inue?

11

Why would the Soviets allow the flight to exit their airspace safely, only to destroy it later as it was leaving
a

second time? Could the Soviets not have known about the

intrusion or not have been able to find the plane if they

did know? Whatever the answers to these questions, it's

clear that to be valid any synopsis of Soviet responses to the events of 1 September should include details on this time period. Likewise, Soviet intentions toward the Korean plane can only be understood if it can be determined whether or not they were aware it was a civilian airliner. There is no shortage of speculation, charges, and countercharges concerning the identification controversy, but what are the facts? Thirdly, the eventual fate of the Soviets embroiled in this issue should be examined. Studies of the previous

Soviet shoot-down of a Korean Air Lines jet over Kamchatka in 1978 (discussed in chapter three) found that the official version differed considerably from an unofficial and probably more accurate one based upon accounts of the fate of the Chief of Soviet Air Defense Forces (PVO) and other key people. This emphasizes the need to study the fate of people involved in the latest situation. Finally and possibly most importantly, is the decision itself. A Soviet government statement indicated that the decision was made by a local air defense commander.1 If this is true, the implications concerning Soviet air
12

defense response i n a c r i s i s , such a s t h i s one, a r e d i f f e r e n t from those i f t h e n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y o r po1it:ical establishments had been c a l l e d i n t o t h e a f f a i r . Buried i n

t h e l i t e r a t u r e concerning t h e s e f o u r a r e a s a r e p a c t e r n s and i n c o n g r u i t i e s , many s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o merit inten:;ive exami.nation. Whether stnt:ements made by Soviet sources
832:

information taken from t h e Western p r e s s , a l l d a t a a r e measured against: a s e t of q u e s t i o n s ( f i g u r e 1 ) . Soviet

As

p o s i t i o n s can be examined f o r consistency over time.

e a r l y as 5 September, PVO Chief of S t a f f Colonel General Romanov iniplied chat t h e S o v i e t s thought they were d e a l i n g w i t h an American RC-135 reconnaissance a i r c r a f t . end o f September, t h e s t o r y had been changed t o one c a r e f u l l y d e t a i l i n g a commercial a i r c r a f t on a reconnaissance O n t h e f a c e oE i t , t h i s comsiletely

By the

changed th.e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e a c t i o n .
A l s o , v a l i d information can come n o t j u s t fr,om chose

t h i n g s tha.t a r e d i f f e r e n t o r e v e n t u a l l y changed, but from thosc! t h a t never change.

.itlso

A p o s i t i o n taken durinj; an

exchange of a c c u s a t i o n s and n o t l a t e r modified must: b e accepted n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a s c o r r e c t , but a s having been confirmed a s a w i s e p o s i t i o n t o t a k e . I n a d d i t i o n , one

must be c a r e f u l t:o avoid r e j e c t i n g good information s i m p l y

because a v e r s i o n of t h e s t o r y has been changed f r o m one day t o t h e n e x t . Often t h i s change r e s u l t s n o t f'rom motive,

b u t simply from l a c k of communication and exchanp;e of

13

I SOVIET EXPLANATION I I OTHER EXPLANATIONS 1 I CONSISTENT OVER TIME? I

DOES IT CONFORM TO KNOWN FACTS'?

R E E
C

<
<
I

TES
IS IT REASONABLE?
I I

NO

TES
\L/

ACCEPT SELECT THE MOST

FIGURE I--METHODOLOGYFLOW CHART

14

information between a u t h o r i t i e s . Next, which statements a r e c o n t r a d i c t e d by known

For i n s t a n c e , t h e Soviet statement t h a t KAL-007 d i d 4 n o t have i t s a e r i a l n a v i g a t i o n l i g h t s on was c o n c r a d i c t e d

facts?
by t h e t r a n s c r i p t : of t h e i n t e r c e p t where t h e figh1:er p i l o t
This confl.ict f o r c e s on(! t o reported j u s t the ~ p p o s i t e . ~

r e e v a l u a t e t h e f a c t s and e i t h e r d i s c a r d them, o r :search f o r t h e reason f o r t h e discrepancy. Then t h e responses a r e weighed a g a i n s t reason.

Is i t

reasonable t o assume, f o r example, t h a t a l o c a l a i r defense commander woulcl make t h e d e c i s i o n t o shoot down an i n t r u d e r ?

Of c o u r s e , what: i s reasonable can only be determined a f t e r

carefully researchhg the past. Once all frnvalid e x p l a n a t i o n s ( S o v i e t and Westcrn) have been r e j e c t e d , t h e remaining c r e d i b l e ones a'ce ranked i n order of most 1:i.kely t o have occurred. T h i s , then, i s

t h e methodology, t h e t o o l used t o p i e c e t o g e t h e r the puzzle.

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

Equally a s i.mportant t o r e s e a r c h a r e t h e r e f e r e n c e s .

In t h e c a s e o.E t h e downing of t h e Korean a i r l i n e r a paradox

exists: there is
; I

wealth of opinion b u t a d e a r t h of f a c t s .

N e v e r t h e l e s s , many a r t i c l e s a r e extremely h e l p f u l i n building a case.

F i r s t , however, t h e r e a r e problems using mater:ial

published i n the p r e s s .

Most of t h e a r t i c l e s concem:ing

t h e KAL incident: wpre w r i t t e n i n newspapers, magazine:?, o r

15

technical journals, both Soviet and Western.

Each source

contributes a different kind of information, the most helpful being the technical journals of both countries and the least helpful being the Western newspapers. The Soviet Press Most of the information appearing in the Soviet press was published in the two main national newspapers, Pravda and Izvestiya. Generally speaking, the articles in Izvestiya had been published in Pravda the day before. A

third newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, published by the Ministry of Defense, also carried quite a few stories on the incident One can accept the reports in these newspapers as valid indicators of the official Soviet position; at least there is no reason to believe otherwise. Although the first article in Pravda didn't appear until 2 September, a full day after Western press reports had been published, the Soviet newspapers carried regular accounts after that date. The reports at first were simply announcements describing the Soviet version of events, but by 4 September editorial comment had appeared. The editorials themselves quickly developed from merely support of the Soviet position to attacks on the American version. Some editorials also

summarized accounts in the foreign press sympathetic to the Soviet position. After the appearance of the 5 September article by Colonel General Romanov, who answered American accusations and made some of his own,6 several articles on the incident written by other prominent Soviets appeared.
16

There i s Less information t o be found I n Soviet SovLet magazines, but a r t i c l e s d i d appear i n i s s u e s of ---. M i l i t a r y Review and New Times concerning t h e KAL i n - i d e n t . One of t h e most i n t e r e s t i n g of t h e s e i s by P r o f e s s o r Nikolaj

-* Yakovlev i n New Ilfimes

e n t i t l e d "Cold War Kamakazes. ,I7

In

t h e a r t i c l e , Yakovlev comments on t h e h i s t o r y of 1JS overfLights of Soviet t e r r i t o r y , providi.ng a good accciunt of t h e Soviet v e r s i o n oE t h e s e f l i g h t s . Unfortunately, his

a r t i c l e adds l i t t l e t o t h e information on t h e KAL-007. A f t e r December 1983 few r e f e r e n c e s were made t o the i n c i d e n t , the l a s t ones being on t h e a n n i v e r s a r y o f the f l i g h t , i n September 1984. Soviet p e r i o d i c a l s continue t o

provide information on i n d i v i d u a l s who were prominent i n t h e a f f a i r ; f o r i n s t a n c e , i n May 1984 Krasnaya Zvezda report:ed 8 t h e o b i t u a r y of Colonel General Romanov. The Western - Press
A s can reasonably be expected, t h e Western F r e s s

provides probably the most r e l i a b l e accounts of t h c si:ory, b u t perhaps l e s s p r e d i c t a b l y i t a l s o c a r r i e s t h e l c a s r reliable. Unlike t h e Soviet p r e s s , i n which one can

l o g i c a l l y assume t h a t a s t a t e m e n t , even i f f a l s e , i s iiiore o r l e s s supported by t h e government, information i n t t . e Ides t e r n p r e s s i s r i d d l e d w i t h misleading information, contx,adi.ctions, and falsehoods t h a t a c t u a l l y prove t o be nothing more than poor journalism. Newspaper r e p o r t s o f t h e f l i g h t , e s p e c i a l l y

those w r i t t e n s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t , can many times be discounted because of t h e s e i n a c c u r a c i e s .

An example of a

17

misleading account, published just after the Soviet action, can be found in the London Sunday Times, in an article of 4 September entitled "Shortcut to Disaster." Said to be based

on "expert observers ," "gossip in Tokyo," and "British pilots," much of the information it reports as factual is highly suspect.' Still, it makes interesting reading,

presents some valid points, and includes a very good map outlining one possible sequence of events of the morning of
1 September.

Professional Journals By far the most useful sources of information are the technical and professional journals. A good place to start any research on the KAL disaster is in the 12 September issue of Aviation Week & Space Technolopy, which has a transcript (in English) of the pilot's transmissions during the interception.l o Other articles which contribute interesting data on the subject include:

1.

"Deadly Guardians of Soviet Airspace" by Harriet

Fast Scott;" a short history of the Soviet Air Defense Forces and some interesting comments on the PVO Commander in Chief.
2.

"Soviet Pilots: How Do They Measure Up?" by

Edward J. Bavaro,12 and "Closing the Tactics Gap" by Capt. Rana J. Pennington;l 3 both articles provide information on the training and capabilities of Soviet fighter pilots.
3.

"What Really Happened to Flight 007" by Viktor

Belenko.l 4 Belenko is the Soviet fighter pilot who defected

18

t o t h e United S t a t e s a f t e r f l y i n g t h e Mi(;-25 from h i s hase i n t h e Soviet Far East t o a c i v i l i a n airport: i n Japan.

The

a r t i c l e i s p r e t t y much a r e p e a t of information i n .:he book about h i s d e f e c t i o n , M i G P i l o t , but i s st:ill i n t e r e s t i n g reading. Unfortunately, t h i s a r t i c l e appears only i n t:he

Canadian e d i t i o n of t h e Readers D i g e s t .

4.
Tarasulo.

"Is Soviet Radar Really That Had?" by D r . Yitzhak

This i s a f a s c i n a t i n g a r t i c l e by a former

Soviet r a d a r techn.ic:ian who served i n t h e Soviet Far E a s t . Doctor Tarasulo maintains t h a t t h e t r a i n i n g of r a d a r tec:hnicians, the f r e q u e n t RC-135 f l i g h t s i n t h e Soviet Far E a s t , and t h e obvious d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e RC-135 and t h e Boeing 7 4 7 make i t h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t t:he Soviet:3 zot: t h e two planes confused.. He d e s c r i b e s t h e t r a i n i n g of S3vi.et

p i l o t s and e x p l a i n s what probably happened i n the gr3urtd s t a t i o n when t h e i n t r u d e r was discovered. 5. Changes: 'Two a r t i c l e s , "MOSCOW Prepares f o r S t r a t e z y
KA-007 i s t h e Watershed,

and "Why Did t l e d e a l w i t h t h e Soviet

S o v i e t s Attack t h e K.orean A i r l i n e r ,

decision-making process and suggest reasons why nati3na.l.l e v e l i n t e r e s t s could have provided t h e motive f o r s i o o t i n g t h e plane down.

6.

"Reassessing t h e Sakhalin Incident" by 1'. 2 .

Mann18 i s an anonymous ( t h e name i s a pseudonym) ti:eiti.se i n a r e s p e c t e d B r i t i s h j o u r n a l arguing t h a t t h e KAL-007 was on a s p y mission o r the U.S. and p r e s e n t s evidence i n support of t h i s pos-ition.
I t does n o t b e a r d i r e c t l y on

19

this thesis, but is well written and is probably of great interest to anyone studying Soviet disinformation.
7.

19 Massacre 7 4 7 by Canadian Maj-Gen Richard Rohmer.

i : : the only book written s o far on the journey of KAL-007 and

is required reading for anyone studying the incident. General Rohmer addresses most of the major questions concerning the flight, including the possible reasons the Korean airliner was over Soviet airspace in the first place and whether or not the plane was on a spy mission. Although

he touches on many of the same topics as this thesis, most of his conclusions differ from the ones presented here. To sum up, technical and professional journals are the most lucrative sources of information published in the West concerning the KAL incident for in-depth analysis and educated opinion. Newspapers, while often unreliable, are sometimes helpful in establishing the sequence of events. Soviet publications can be relied upon to support the party line, which is of itself an important source of study. For those who do not read Russian but would like to examine articles from the Soviet newspapers, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press publishes translations o f the most substantial articles.

In this chapter I've presented the method of analysis

being used in this thesis. Soviet responses involving the four major elements of the KAL incident are compared with
20

accept:ed f a c t s , compared w i t h what i s r e a s o n a b l e , aad compared over time i n o r d e r t o determine what could ha.ve l o g i c a l l y taken p:tace. We've gone over some of the sclurces

of i n t e r e s r and i d e n t i f i e d which a r e t h e most v a l u a D l t , which a r e :suspect: and why. Now, "you know my methois,

Watson. "

21

CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

'"Soviet Government Statement , ' I Pravda, 7 September 1983, p.1. 2Colonel General S. Romanov, "A Political Provocation with a Far-Reaching Aim," Pravda, 5 September 1983, p.5. 3Marshal of Aviation Kirsanov, 'The Facts Expose Washington," Pravda, 20 September 1983, p.4. 4Romanov, "Political Provocation." 5t'US Intercepts Soviet Fighter Transmissions," Aviation Week & Space Technolopy, 12 September 1983, pp.2223. 6Romanov, "Politician Provocation." 'Professor Nikolaj Yakovlev, "Cold War Kamikazes , I ' New Times, September 1983, p.26. 8110bituary," Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 May 1984, p.4. 9"Shortcut to Disaster," The Sunday Times, 4 September 1983. lotlUSIntercepts Soviet .Fighter Transmissions." "Harriet Fast Scott, "Deadly Guardians of Soviet Airspace," Air Force Magazine, March 1984, pp.74-82. I2Edward J. Bavaro, "Soviet Pilots: How Do They Measure Up?," US Army Aviation Digest, August 1983, pp.32-35. I3Capt. Rana J. Pennington, "Closing the Tactics Gap," Air Force Magazine, March 1984, pp.83-88. 14Viktor Belenko, W h a t Really Happened to Flight 007?," Readers Digest (Canadian), January 1984, pp.25-27. I5Dr. Yitzhak Tarasulo, "Is Soviet Radar Really That Bad?," Armed Forces Journal, February 1984, pp.70-74. I6Gregory R. Copley, "MOSCOW Prepares for Strategy Changes: KA-007 is the Watershed," Defense & Foreign 22

A f f a i rs , November 1983, pp.35-38. I7Steven J. Cimbala, "Why Did t h e S o v i e t s A t t m k t h e Korean A i r l i n e r ? , " National . Defense, MayIJune 1984, p p . 7 7 - 7 9 , 268.
l 8 P . Q . Mann Defence Att.ache,

"Reassessing t h e Sakhalin I n c i d e n t ," (1984): p p . 4 1 - 5 6 .

On 28 November 1984, t h e Daily News Digest r e p o r t e d t h a t Korean A i r L i n e s won a l i b e l s u i t brought a g a i n s t Defence Attache because of t h i s a r t i c l e . Defence Attache was f o r c e d t o admit t h a t t h e r e was no foundation fZ?Kiiii's charges. "Maj -Gen Richard Rohmer, Massacre 747 (Markbarn, Ontario: PaperJacks, 1984).

23

CHAPTER 3 THE FINAL MINUTES OF KOREAN AIR LINES FLIGHT 007

TASS Report: During the night of 31 August to 1 September an aircraft of undetermined origin entered the airspace of the Soviet Union from the Pacific Ocean over the Kamchatka peninsula, then violated USSR airspace for a second time over Sakhalin Island. The aircraft was flying without air navigation lights, did not respond to inquiries, and did not get in touch with the radio-dispatcher service. Air Defense fighters sent up to meet the intruding aircraft tried to render assistance and escort it to the closest airfield. However, the intruding aircraft did not respond to the signals and warnings sent by Soviet fighters and continued its flight towards the Sea of Japan." --Pravda, 2 September 1983l

This chapter examines the veracity of Soviet and Western accounts during the final two and one half hours of Korean Air Lines flight 007. This period can be broken down into three stages:
(1) KAL's movements over Kamchatka, (2)

the flight over the Sea of Okhotsk, and ( 3 ) the final minutes over Sakhalin Island and the Sea of Japan. Once the Soviet

side has been presented, the first stage is analyzed, theories and explanations examined according to the methodology set down in chapter two, and conclusions drawn. The process is then repeated-forthe two remaining stages. The chapter concludes with a summary of the entire two and
24

one h a l f hours of f l i g h t 007, based on t h e most l i k e l y e v e n t s chosen from each s t a g e .

DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE STAGES

It h a s been g e n e r a l l y accepted by all s i d e s involved

t h a t KAL-007 d i v e r t e d from i t s proposed f l i g h t r o u t e scimetime af t:er l e a v i n g Anchorage, e n t e r e d S o v i e t a i r s p a c e over t h e s o u t h e a s t e r n c o a s t of t h e Kamchatka p e n i n s u l a and, a f t e r f l y i n g over a Soviet m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n , continued f r o m Kamchatka t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l w a t e r s over t h e Sea of 0khot:sk. The p l a n e then r e c n ~ e r e dS o v i e t a i r s p a c e , overflew t h e i s l a n d of Sakhnlin and, as i t was approaching i n t e r n a t i o n a l w a t e r s over t h e Sea o f Japan, was s h o t down by a Su(Khoj)-15 interceptor using a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s . acc:eptoti f a c t s , views d i v e r g e . Probably t h e most p u z z l i n g a s p e c t of t h e S o v i s t response t o t h i s i n t r u s i o n i s n o t t h a t t h e S o v i e t s f i.na.1.I.y brought: t h e plane down, b u t t h a t they d i d n o t do so 2 a r l i e r . What was going on :in t h e S o v i e t Union a s t h e p l a n e over Kamchatka dur:irig s t a g e one of t h e f l i g h t ?
W ~ Sf l y i n g

Beyond t h e s e few

(see figure 2)

Although many d e t a i l s may be exami.ned, many a s s e r t i o n s c h a l l e n g e d , t h e S o v i e t response i n s t a g e one can be z l a s s i f i e d i n one of two ways: e i t h e r they chose n o t t o destimy t h e I f they c:hm,se n o t t o they w x n e d t h e

plane or they were unable t o d e s t r o y i t .

d e s t r o y i t , a f u r t h e r breakdown can be made:

int:rudsr, but allowed t h e f l i g h t t o conti.nue even A 2 n t h e s e

25

STAGE ONE

CHOOSE NOT TO DESTROY OVER KAMCHATKA

GIVE WARNING, BUT LET PLANE GO

TAKE NO ACTION AT ALL ARE UNAWARE OF OVERFLIGHT

ARE UNABLE 10 DESTROY AWARE. BUT UNABLE TO RESPOND

STAGE TWO

OVER THE SEA OF OKHOTSK

A DIRECT FLIGHT
INDIRECT FLIGHT WITH MUCH MANEUVEREING

STAGE THREE
OVER SAKHALIN ISLAND THE SOVIETS REACT CHOOSE TO DESTROY THE PLANE

FIGURE 2--THE THREE STAGES OF FLIGHT KAL-007 AND POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO EACH

26

warnings were ignored; o r they took no a c t i o n a t a l l t o s t o p the plane. I f , on the o t h e r hand, t h e S o v i e t s were unable t o

d e s t r o y KAL-007, i t : would have been due t o one of two possible reasons. E i t h e r they were unaware of t h e o v e r f l i g h t

o r they could n o t r e a c t q u i c k l y enough t o do anythin!; about

it.

These a r e t h e q u e s t i o n s t h a t a r e c o n s i d e r e d ir. :itage one. A f t e r KAL-007 l e f t Kamchatka, i t e n t e r e d i n t e i m a ~ : i o n a l

a i r s p a c e over t h e Sea of Okhotsk.

There i s l i t t l e evidence

a s t o t h e pl.ane's p r o g r e s s d u r i n g t h i s , t h e penulti.m;ite s t a g e of i t s f l i g h t . The s i m p l e s t r o u t e would have been t o f.Ly

d i r e c t l y t o Sakha1i.n I s l a n d , b u t t h e S o v i e t s have put forward a n o t h e r expLanation of t h e p l a n e ' s a c t i o n s d u r i n g th::s :second stage. The t h i r d arid f i n a l s t a g e of t h e journey of f:.ight 0 0 7

was a g a i n i n Soviet: a i r s p a c e , f i r s t over Sakhalin I s:.anci,

t h e n above t h e Sea o f Japan. The t a p e r e c o r d i n g s made p u b l i c

by t h e US government a t a s e s s i o n of t h e United Nations

General Assembly i n September 1983, have precluded much disagreement: between t h e S o v i e t s and t h e West on t h e a c m a l events. However, d i f f e r e n c e s s t i l l remain on some s ] ) e c : i f i c

i s s u e s , such a s whcther t h e S o v i e t f i g h t e r p i l o t warned t h e Korean p l a n e b e f o r e f i r i n g and whether o r n o t KAL-OO?'s n a v i g a t i o n l i g h t s were t u r n e d on. air

THE SOVIET . - -VIEW The S o v i e t v e r s i o n of e v e n t s i n t h e t h r e e st.ai;es i s summari.zed :in F i g u r e 3 . During s t a g e one, t h e Sovi.ei:s sake
27

STAGE ONE

OVER KAMCHATKA

- .-

CHOOSE NOT TO DESTROY

TAKE NO ACTION AT ALL ARE UNAWARE OF OVERFLIGHT

-ARE UNABLE

STAGE TWO
OVER THE SEA

OF OKHOTSK

OVER SAKHALIN ISLAND

THE SOVIETS REACT

'

CHOOSE TO DESTROY THE PLANE

FIGURE 3--THE SOVIET VERSION OF EVENTS AS THEY OCCURRED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1983

28

t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t they r e a c t e d t o KAL-007's o v e r f l i g h t of Kamchatka and ordered i t t o l a n d , but when i t d i d n c t !:hey chose n o t t o end the f l i g h t , but i n s t e a d t o allow t h e plane t o continue o u t over i n t e r n a t i o n a l w a t e r s .
A s t h e plane flew

over t h e Sea oE Okhotsk, i t took evasive a c t i o n , the most obvious maneuver being a sharp t u r n toward Sakhalin p r i o r t o r e e n t e r i n g Soviet: ai.rspace.

All of t h i s maneuvering seemed

t o r e i n f o r c e t h e Soviet A i r Defense commander's b e l i e f t h a t

KAL-007 was a reconnaissance a i r c r a f t , so t h a t when i t

r e f u s e d t o acknowledge warnings given a f i n a l time over Sakhalin I s l a n d , t h e S o v i e t s had no choice b u t t o 1:eminate 2 the f l i g h t . Most of t h e d e t a i l s were given by Marshal Ogarkciv i n h i s news conference: The Korean a i r l i n e r was f i r s t : detected

( b y t h e Sov.Lets) f:Lying on a course f o r t h e Kamchatks peninsula approximat:ely 800 k i l o m e t e r s n o r t h e a s t of

Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskij and about 500 k i l o m e t e r s o E f the

international flight: route.
A t 4 : 51 A.M.

(Kamchatka t h e )

KAL-007 rendezvoused w i t h an American RC-135 reconnaisssnce

plane. They flew t o g e t h e r f o r approximately t e n mi.nute:j

b e f o r e p a r t i n g , t h e RC-135 r e t u r n i n g t o Alaska while tho Korean f l i g h t continued on towards Petropavlovsk. 0);arlcov

commented, "It was n a t u r a l t h a t t h e S o v i e t A i r Defense command p o s t s reached t h e conclusion t h a t a reconnai:isance a i r c r a f t was approaching t h e a i r s p a c e of t h e USSR. ,,3 Ogarkov cont:inued, "By 5 :30 t h e plane was approaching Kamchatka, heading d i r e c t l y f o r one of t h e USSR's mor;t
29

important strategic nuclear force bases. ' I 4

The Soviet ground

stations tried contacting the intruder on 121.5 megahertz

(mhz), the international emergency frequency, as did the

fighter-interceptors sent up in reaction, but this was all to no avail--KAL-007 did not answer. KAL-007 continued on course, flying out over the Sea of Okhotsk.5

In stage two the intruder's actions became defiant to

the Soviets i.e., changing direction, altitude, and speed-all at the same time--and sharply banking away from the PVO fighters. At 6 : 0 2 A.M. it sharply changed course, avoiding anti-aircraft weapons and taking a heading toward important military objectives in the southern part of Sakhalin Island.

"NO doubt remained--the plane in the air was a reconnaissance

aircraft .116 During stage three the plane flew over the southwestern portion of the island and was again warned to land at an airport. At 6:20 A.M. a Soviet interceptor made a final warning, this time firing 1 2 0 rounds of cannon fire. Instead

of responding, KAL-007 changed course once more, now toward

Vladivostok. At 6 : 2 4 A.M. the interceptor pilot received the order to interrupt the flight with rockets, which he did.7 At the press conference Ogarkov referred to a prepared map of Kamchatka, the Sea of Okhotsk, and Sakhalin Island with the normal track of the international air routes on it, and what was called the flight route of KAL-007. The map showed the plane entering Soviet airspace at Kronotskij Point and flying on a heading of approximately 230 degrees
30

u n t i l l e a v i n g Kamchatka n e a r t h e town of Oktyabr'ski:i, never

passing over: t h e c i t y of Petropavlovsk i t s e l f .

The ~ ) l a i i e

continued on a heatling of 230 degrees u n t i l j u s t nclr1:he;ist of t h e c i t y of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on Sakhalin I s l a n d , where i t made a sharp westcr7.y turn ( a t 6:lO A . M . , according :o

Ogarkov) then continued s o u t h , f l y i n g over Sakhaliri I s l a n d . The map shows t h a t i f t h i s t u r n had n o t been made, K9L-007 would have a c t u a l l y flown between t h e K u r i l ' I s l a n d s arid S a k h a l i n , event:unl ly coming t o t h e n o r t h e r n Japanese bland of Hokkaido. (map 1) Other Sovi.ct accounts of t h e f l i g h t a r e s i m i l a r t o t h e one given by Ognrkov. I n t e r v i e w s w i t h t h e A i r Defense

f i g h t e r p i l o t s who f l e w i n r e a c t i o n , both on Kamchatka and over Sakhalin, s t r e s s t h e i r p a t r i o t i s m and devotion t o duty. 8 Some Soviet a r t i c l e s concentrate on t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e i n t r u d e r - - c o v e r e d i n c h a p t e r f o u r of t h i s t h e s i s - - a r . d .add support t o v a r i o u s S o v i e t p o s i t i o n s , such as whether or n o t

KAL-007 hail i t s ai.r n a v i g a t i o n beacons turned on.

STAGE ONE: KAFlCHATKA --

An Anaw; -of . -t h e Four Options -.

1.

They chose n o t t o d e s t r o y t h e p l a n e , even a f t e r warning

it: t o land.

The S o v i e t s maintain t h a t t h e i r r e a c t i o n over

Kamchatka was measured and r e s p o n s i b l e ; t h a t they knew

KAL-007 was i n t:hei.r a i r s p a c e and (though they gave i t : o f f e r s

31

U.S.S.R.

Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskij

MAP 1

OGARKOV'S CIRCUITOUS ROUTE

as shown in press conference in Moscow, 9 September

1983

32

of a s s i s t a n c e and warnings t o l a n d ) chose n o t t o d e s t r o y i t (even a f t e r t h e s e warnings were i g n o r e d ) . I n order: t o b e l i e v e t h e S o v i e t v e r s i o n of t h e i n c i d e n t , two c r u c i a l assumptions must be accepted:

(1) thai: the

Soviet Union warned U L - 0 0 7 and attempted t o f o r c e i t t:o l a n d at: one of t h e i r a i r b a s e s , and ( 2 ) t h a t , having r e c e i v e d t h e s e warni.ngs, t h e Korean p i l o t ignored them.

The evidence

very s t r o n g l y discourages acceptance of e i t h e r assumption.

Did t h e S o v i e t s a t t e m p t t o warn KAL-007 and f o r c e i t t o land a t one of t h e i r a i r f i e l d s ? The Sovi.ets sa:y b o t h

t h e i r ground s t a t i o n s and t h e i r i n t e r c e p t o r s t r i e d t o c o n t a c t t h e Ko-rean plane on 1 2 1 . 5 megahertz (mhz), t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l emergency frequency. Several Western sources postulate t h a t ,

c o n t r a r y t o Soviet c l a i m s , r a d i o s on Sov.iet f i g h t e r a i x r a f t a r e n o t a b l e t o t r a n s m i t o r r e c e i v e on 1 2 1 . 5 megahertz (mhz). 9 By making r a d i o c o n t a c t between S o v i e t p i l o t s and i n t e r n a t i o n . a l flight: crews impossible, t h e S o v i e t s nieaxi t o discourage d e f e c t i o n of t h e i r p i l o t s . Maj-Gen Rich:.rd Rohmer,

former Chief of Reserves of t h e Canadian Armed Forces tind i n v e s t i g a t o r i.nto t h e Korean A i r Lines f l i g h t , suppcfrtr; t h i s assertion. "The Soviet f i g h t e r s t h a t i n t e r c e p t e d t h e Korean

j e t used ari emergency guard channel i n a very high. frequency

t h a t i.s p r e s e t on t.he ground and cannot be tuned tly t h e p i l o t once h i s a i r c r a f t i.s a i r b o r n e .

This frequency i s n o t

compatible w i t:h t h e 1 2 1 . 5 [megahertz] o r 243.0 megacycles guard

channels used by commercial and m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t o E t h e w e s t . This i s t o preclude d e f e c t i o n b y Soviet p i l o t s . , , l o 33

Describing the defection of Viktor Belenko, the Soviet pilot who flew his MiG-25 from a Soviet airbase to Japan in the mid-seventies, John Barron writes, "To prevent MiG-25 pilots from talking with foreign pilots, the radios were restricted to a very narrow frequency band that permitted communications only with other MiGs and Ground Control. . Thus [Belenko] would be unable to tell the Japanese of his intentions or to ask their guidance.
Be 1enko

himself asserts that not even ground controllers have this capability. "In my time, there was no 'dispatcher service' or ground-control system on either Kamchatka or Sakhalin capable of communication with foreign aircraft. Belenko then brings up another important point. "Moreover, none of the [other] half-dozen commercial planes in the air or ground monitoring stations heard any warning over the international emergency frequency. Not even the

crew of a second Korean airliner, flight 015, heard any activity on 121.5 mhz. This airliner was flying close behind

(approximately one half hour) on the normal international flight route to Seoul and within radiocommunications range.1 4 Thus, there is no support for the Soviet claim that they attempted to contact the Korean airliner as it flew over Kamchatka. Indeed, there is strong reason to believe that

neither the ground stations nor the Soviet interceptors could have made radio contact with KAL-007 even if they had tried. Radio contact, therefore, is unlikely; the first assumption cannot be proven.
34

Did t h e Korean p i l o t i g n o r e warnings given by t h e

Soviets? This second assumption i s even l e s s 1ikel.y-

Captain Churl Byung I n , 4 5 , b e f o r e p i l o t i n g t h e i l l - f d t e d

KAL-007 f l i g h t , had experience as a p i l o t i n t h e Sou'h Corean

A i r Force arid with Korean A i r L i n e s , w i t h over 600U f l y i n g hours on Boeing 747s.
A s a measure of regard t h e E:o.:eans

h e l d f o r him a s a p i l o t , he was s e l e c t e d i n 1983 t o Ely t h e South Korean P r e s i d a n t and o t h e r d i g n i t a r i e s t o t h e h i ted

H i s c o p i l o t , a l s o an A . i r Force v e t e r a n , had over 3 0 0 0 hours on 747s. 15

Both t h e Korean p i l o t and h i s c o p i l o t were iiwaire of t h e 1978 i n c i d e n t when t h e S o v i e t s s h o t down a Korean A r

S t a t e s on an o f f i c i a l v i s i t .

Lines Boeing 707 a f t e r i t had s t r a y e d over t h e Kola :?en n s u l a .

Although t h e S o v i e t f i g h t e r p i l o t f i r e d on t h i s e a r l i e r Korean f l i g h t (without w a r n i n g ) , t h e Korean p i l o t managed t o land t h e plane s a f e l y on a f r o z e n l a k e e a s t of Leningrad. The S o v i e t s immediat:eLy r e t u r n e d t h e passengers, but k e p t t h e p i l o t and n a v i g a t o r i n i n t e r r o g a t i o n f o r a s h o r t
tj.rn.2

before

r e l e a s i.ng them. l6 ']:he Koreans l e a r n e d from t h i s expzrience t h a t t h e Soviet:s would n o t h e s i t a t e t o f i r e on an unmned c i v i l i a n a i r l i n e r arid t h a t , i f t h e plane managed t o land, a l l passengers and crew would probably e v e n t u a l l y be re1 Zased. I n light: of t h e 1978 experience, Captain Chun could reasonably b e l i e v e t h a t any plane f l y i n g over Soviet a i r s p a c e would be a t r i s k , m y p i l o t ignoring warnings b y SovLet. a u t h o r i t i e s t o land would most a s s u r e d l y be placing: ?is, plane a t r i s k , and t h a t the passengers' chances of s u r v i v a l and

35

safe passage improved markedly once the plane was safely on the ground. Knowing this, it seems highly unlikely that both Captain Chun and his copilot would have ignored Soviet warnings HAD THEY BEEN GIVEN. Put simply, both the Korean pilot and his copilot knew that the risk of destruction to the plane and death to its passengers and crew was far greater by ignoring Soviet warnings and continuing the flight than by acceding to demands and landing the plane at a Soviet airfield. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the second assumption, that the Koreans ignored Soviet warnings. Option number one--the Soviet version--is just not credible. That they warned the intruder over Kamchatka and that, when these warnings were ignored, the Soviets CHOSE to allow the flight to continue has been shown to be highly unlikely. Why then did the flight continue on out to international waters?

2. The Soviets were aware of the flight but chose to do

nothing in response to it. Upon first consideration, this option seems quite improbable. To accept this argument, one must accept that the Soviets would knowingly allow a foreign aircraft over one of their sensitive military installations. However, this option cannot immediately be dismissed; there are two separate theories supporting it. Among the reasons put forward that the Korean airliner was over Soviet airspace in rhe first place, was speculation
36

t h a t Korean p i l o t s f l y i n g from Anchorage would somet:imes d e v i a t e from i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o u t e s and f l y over Sovie.; territory
OTI

what i s known a s t h e "Great C i r c l e Route," t h e Although t h i s has n o t been

most d i r e c t r o u t e t:o Seoul.

proven, Major-General Rohmer p o i n t s o u t t h a t , "It was r e p o r t e d by Associated P r e s s t h a t on F r i d a y , February 1 7 ,

1 9 8 4 , a Korean A i r Lines o f f i c i a l had confirmed--'adriitl;ed'

might be a b e t t e r word--that KAL had s h i f t e d a t least: t e n v e t e r a n p i l o t s t o ground d u t i e s . I ' General Rohmer a d d s irhat

t h i s came a s a r e s u l t of an i n v e s t i g a t i o n following t h e

KAL-007 inci.dent and i n t e n s i f i e d a f t e r a Korean airl:.neir

c o l l i d e d wit:h a pri.vcite plane i n Anchorage s h o r t l y a f t e i v a r d . General Rohmer then a s k s , "Why d i d t h e a i r l i n e take such a h a r s h s t e p i.n groundimg [them]?" He s p e c u l a t e s t h a t f l y i n g

t h e Great Ci.rcle Rout:e could have been t h e reason.

"The

c a s u a l l i n k s between F l i g h t 007's presence over Soviet t e r r i t o r y , t:he i n v e s t i g a t i o n and t h e grounding of the: p i - l o t s a r e d i r e c t and impossi.ble t o i g n o r e . ,119
I t i s e x c e p t i o n a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r s t u d e n t s of Soviet

p o l i c y t o embrace t h i s argument.

I a m n o t aware of m y

circumstance when t h e Soviet Union has t o l e r a t e d thi:, type of o v e r f l i g h t of i t s borders.

D r . Tarasulo a g r e e s t h a t t h i s

theory i s unreasona.bl.e, p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e precedent s e t by t h e downing of t h c Korean a i r l i n e r over t h e Kola peninsula i n 1978 makes r e g u l a r unauthorized o v e r f l i g h t s even niorc u n l i k e l y . 20 However, i f ot:her planes had, indeed, passed over

37

Soviet territory without incident, and if we give the Soviets the benefit of the doubt by assuming they CHOSE not to do anything about these violations (rather than assuming they were UNABLE to do anything about them), then an explanation can be tendered as to why they were tolerated. Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline with commercial flights throughout the world, often deviates from its normal flight routes to pass over Western military bases and other sensitive areas. This happened at least sixteen times in 1981 and 1982, when Aeroflot was flying into Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C. diversions. Other Eastern Bloc airlines make similar

The existence of a gentlemen's agreement

between the Soviets and Americans to leave each other's aircraft alone would explain why the Soviets allow this activity to continue. This "gentlemen's agreement'' theory is refuted by the fact that the United States has gone on record protesting unauthorized overflights by Aeroflot planes. After an incident in 1981 the U.S. even temporarily suspended Aeroflot flights to this country in protest.22 All evidence supporting this position, s o far, is circumstantial. No proof has ever been made public that Korean pilots habitually overflew the Soviet Union or that any type of gentlemen's agreement has ever existed. A second, perhaps more likely reason that the Soviets could have allowed KAL-007 to transgress Kamchatka without incident is postulated by a researcher for the U.S. State 38

Department and fonner t e c h n i c a l e d i t o r of I s r a e l ' s A L . - r Force magazine, Yossef Boclansky.

M r . Bodansky a s s e r t s tha:,

although t h e S o v i e t s had decided t o d e s t r o y t h e i n t r u d e r , they determined that: doing s o over Kamchatka would compromise t h e i r a i r defense c a p a b i l i t i e s over a c l a s s i f i e d a r e a l a t an extremely s e n s i t i v e time.

". . .had

t h e S o v i e t s decided t o

shoot down the KAI. Roeing 7 4 7 above Kamchatka, t h e y would have exposed t h e i r l o c a l r a d i o t e c h n i c a l means and t h e i r modes of o p e r a t i o n . This would have exposed t h e r e l a t i o r s l i i p

between t h e ABM r a d a r s and t h e SA-5s ( s u r f a c e - t o - a i . r m i s s i l e s ) . 23 For whatever reasons t h e S o v i e t s might allow o v e r f l i g h t s of t h e i r t e r r i t o r y , s u f f i c i e n t support f o r ?:his o p t i o n e x i s t s to make i t a c r e d i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n of over Kamchatka on 1 September.
events

3.

The S o v i e t s were unable t o d e s t r o y t h e Korean jet: because

they were unaware of i t s presence. I n p r e s e n t i n g h i s argument a s t o why t h e S o v i e t s could n o t have misi.dentified t h e KAL Boeing 7 4 7 , a former Soviet: r a d a r t e c h n i c i a n now i n t h e West implies t h a t i t goes without q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e S o v i e t s knew t h e i n t r u d e r vas there.
E i s opinion .is t h a t t h e plane should have been

i d e n t i f i e d correct1.y.

This can be expanded t o say t h a t the

plane should have been observed. l 7 Likewise, a l l Ame!rican defense a n a l y s t s interviewed a f t e r t h e occurrence, commmted on t h e q u a l i t y of r e a c t i o n from t h e S o v i e t s , but none suggested t h a t t h e f ' l i g h t may have gone on unobserveci by

39

them.18 There is no reason to believe that the Soviets were unaware of KAL-007s presence on that fateful morning.
4.

The Soviets tried to destroy the Korean flight, but were

unable to do s o . when Western newspapers began reporting the Korean Air Lines disaster, several interviews were made with US dignitaries and defense analysts. Many were of the opinion that Soviet Air Defense reacted to the Korean plane over Kamchatka, but responded so poorly that KAL-007 was already over the Sea OE Okhatsk before anything could be accomplished. The general feeling seemed to be that Soviet fighters sent in reaction were unsuccessful in locating the plane.

US Air

Force Chief of Staff General Gabriel expressed a view shared by others that the Soviet air defense system was quite inept. Ran Corporation analyst Edward Warner supported this view, adding that the Soviet air defense net behaved just exactly the way one would expect it to work, the way it behaves during exercises . I 1 MIT Professor Meyer corroborated this,

saying he was not surprised that the Soviet pilots couldnt find the target, based on their air defense exercises and critical essays in their own literature.2 4 Viktor Belenko, the former Soviet pilot, gives his opinion of what happened:

A secret standing order, issued by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, dictates that once an alien aircraft ventures into Soviet airspace, it must not be allowed to escape. Soviet pilots are supposed to f l y ahead of the foreign plane, attract attention by firing tracers, rocking their wings
40

and, i f i t i s d a r k , by f l a s h i n g t h e i r n a v i g a t i o n l i g h t s . If t h e f o r e i g n p l a n e does n o t s i g n a l w i l l i n g n e s s t o f o l l o w t h e i n t e r c e p t o r s , then Soviet: p i l o t s a r e t o shoot i t down. Thus, as KAL 0 0 7 , now d i s a s t r o u s l y o f f c o u r s e , came w i t h i n 25 k i l o m e t r e s of Kamchatka, l o c a l commanders launched i n t e r c e p t o r s . But t h e S o v i e t f i g h t e r s f a i l e d t o c a t c h I(AL 0 0 7 . They d i d n o t even come c l o s e enough t o warn t h e a i r l i n e r . Perhaps t h e ground commander was slow i n scrambl in)?, h i s p l a n e s . Perhaps ground c o n t r o l l e r s were i n e p t i n v e c t o r i n g them. Whatever, t h e s t a m d i n g order. was u n f u l f i l l e d ; an unauthorized a i r c r a f t had t r a n s g r e s s d S o v i e t a i r s p a c e and had been al1owc.d t o escape. 5 5 O n t h e o t h e r hand, some a n a l y s t s f e l t t h a t t h e time t h e a i . r l i n e r was over Kamchatka was spent by t h e l o c a l commander t r y i n g to g e t a d e c i s i o n from above.

An e d i t o r f o r

-- E l e c t r o n i c s s p e c u l a t e d t h a t th.e flaw i n t h e magazine Defense

r e a c t i o n was due not t o t h e A i r Defense system o r t.hc hardware, b u t t.0 t h c command s t r u c t u r e . 26 Former S e c r e t a r y

of S t a t e Alexander Haig added t h a t S o v i e t handling O F t!iis a f f a i r r a i s e d concerns about both t h e i r m i l i t a r y sps :em and t h e i r command and c o n t r o l . 2 7 Conclusion Four possib:Le s c e n a r i o s of t h e events over Kamchatka have been explored. The S o v i e t e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t t h e i r

f i g h t e r s i n t e r c e p t e d KAL-007 and i n s t r u c t e d i t t o land i s n o t supported by any reasonable argument. There i s a chance t h a t

t h e S o v i e t s knowlingly allowed KAL-007 t o c r o s s t h e i r t e r r i t o r y without i n c i d e n t , e i t h e r because i t was ccmmm

p r a c t i c e f o r Korean p i l o t s t o f l y t h i s r o u t e o r f o r purposes
of masking Soviet a - i r defense c a p a b i l i t i e s , b u t support: f o r
t h i s i s based on a s y e t unproved a s s e r t i o n s .

I f t h i s was t h e

41

case, then a question arises as to why the airliner was ultimately destroyed. The possibility that the overflight

could have occurred without the Soviets being aware of it is

so unlikely that no authoritative support has been put

forward in its favor. The most likely explanation is that Korean Air Lines flight 007 had been reprieved. In the confusion of an

unexpected overflight of their territory, the Soviet Air Defense system, or command and control, or both had been unable to react swiftly enough to capture the intruder over Soviet airspace. The plane continued on out to sea,

beginning stage two of its final voyage.

STAGE TWO:

THE SEA --OF

OKHOTSK

An Analysis

Only two proposals have been put forward as to what happened to KAL-007 over the Sea of Okhotsk: Soviets and one from Major General Rohmer. one from the General Rohmer

suggests that almost from the time the plane took off in Anchorage, it was following a heading of 246 degrees--a course which would take it on the most direct route from Anchorage to Seoul--the Great Circle Route.

By following a

course of 246 degrees, KAL-007 would have entered Kamchatka over the city of Petropavlovsk, or just slightly to the south, and would have left the peninsula at a point near the town of Oktyabr'skij. Continuing without deviation from the

246 degree heading, the Korean jet would fly directly to

42

S a k h a l i n I s l a n d , pass over t h e i s t h m u s near t h e towns r)f D o l i n s k and Sokol, rind p r o c e e d t o an area j u s t west of t h e i s l a n d where i t was d e s t r o y e d . 2 8 ( m a p 2 ) T h i s r o u t e is t h e most d i r e c t r o u t e p o s s i b l e and c a n be used t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e more i n d i : c e c t r o u t e s u g g e s t e d by t.he S o v i e t s . By u s i n q a speed of 475

miles p e r h o u r , t h e speed needed t o make t h e t r i p from

Anchorage t o S e o u l i n t h e s c h e d u l e d s e v e n and one 'half h o u r s f l i g h t time, t h e a p p r o x i m a t e f l i g h t times over S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y can be su.tmised. The 200 m i l e s o v e r t h e Kamchntka
Frcm t h e

p e n i n s u l a can be c o v e r e d i n j u s t under 30 m i n u t e s .

town of O k t y a b r ' s k i j on t h e s o u t h w e s t e r n c o a s t t o t h e p o i n t w e s t of S a k h a 1 . b i s l a n d where t h e a i r l i n e r w a s s h o t down i s

a d i s t a n c e . of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 750 t o 800 m i l e s , a b o u t one hour

35 m i n u t e s t o one I i o u r 45 m i n u t e s f l i g h t t i m e .
Accordi.ng t o t h e t a p e s of t h e f i n a l shoot-down, f l i g h t w a s destroyeci a t 6:24 A.M. on 1 September. the

U5ir.g t h e

most d i r e c t r o u t e p o s s i b l e , t h e G r e a t C i r c l e Route s J g g e s t e d by General. Rohmer, the Korean a i r l i n e r would have h e m o v e r t h e w e s t c o a s t of Uiimchatka a t around 4:45 t o 4:55 A . M . and

over t h e c i t y of P e t r o p a v l o v s k (where t h e n a v a l b a s e i s
l o c a t e d ) a t a b o u t 4:15 t o 4:25 A.M. The S o v i e t v e r s i o n i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . Martih331

Ogarkov p l a c e d t h e Korean j e t o v e r a s t r a t e g i c n a v a l b a s e on Kamchatka (Petropavl.ovsk) a t 15:lO r e p o r t e d i.n Pravda as "5:30." (sic--did h e mean 5: l o ? ) ,

To a c c e p t t h i s argunient would

be t o a c c e p t t1:at the p l a n e c o u l d have flown 9 0 0 t o 050

43

MAP 2

THE GREAT CIRCLE ROUTE

the shortest distance to Seoul

44

miles f r o m P e t r o p a v l o v s k t o t h e p o i n t of i t s d e s t r u c i t i o n i n

less t h a n an hour--twice

i t s normal speed.

As d i f f j c u 1 . t a s

t h i s i s t o b e l i e v e , even t h i s c a l c u l a t i o n u n d e r s t a t e . s .t.he speed needed, f o r i t : assumes a d i r e c t p a t h o n a h e a c i n q of

240 degrees.

Ogarkov, however, claims t h a t t h e route w a s the

n o t d i r e c t , b u t c i r c u i t o u s , i n s i s t i n g t h a t a t 6:02 A.M. p i l o t e x e c u t e d a s h a r p ( 7 0 d e g r e e s ) t u r n toward Sakhal.in island. 29

General Rohmer r e f u t e s t h i s a s s e r t i o n by c a r e f u : ! l y
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h i s would p l a c e KAL-007 on a headinq of 300 d e g r e e s from a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6:03 t o 6:15 A.M. In f a c t

( a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t a p e o f t h e f i g h t e r p i l o t ' s commiiniccitions) G e n e r a l Rohmer c o n t i n u e s , " A t [6:13 A.M.] p i l o t ] s a y s , 'I see it.

[ t h e fighterThis

I ' m l o c k e d on t o t h e t a r g e t . '

means h e i s d i r e c t l y behind t h e 7 4 7 and f o l l o w i n g : i t s same

course. T h i r t y seconds l a t e r , h e r e p o r t s , 'The t a r g e t ' s when, :Ln t h e

c o u r s e i s 2 4 0 d e g r e e s , ' and a t [6:15 A.M.],

Ogarkov s c e n a r i o , t h e 7 4 7 i s s t i l l f l y i n g on t h e 300-degree c o u r s e and a b o u t t o b e g i n i t s t u r n t o t h e l e f t , t h e inan. who was t h e r e i n t h e sky t r a c k i n g t h e 7 4 7 s a y s ,

'The tiirqet's

course i s s t i l l t h e same.. . 2 4 0 .

'

E i t h e r Marshal [PIilcol.sj V. 1

Ogarkov, Chief of t h e S o v i e t G e n e r a l S t a f , w a s d e l . i l ~ e r . 3 t e l y l y i n g , o r he had been t o t a l l y misinformed by h i s s t : a f f . ,130

The e n t . i r e r o u t e miipped o u t by Ogarkov, from Kamchzltlca io

S a k h a l i n , and t h e l:i.mes h e u s e s t o f i x t h e Korean p l m e o v e r

a p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e o f t e r r i t o r y simply do n o t confcirrn t o t h e
i n t e r c e p t o r p i l o t ' s t r a n s m i s s i o n s , n o r t o common a r i t h m e t i c .

45

Maskirovka, the Soviet practice of camoflauge, concealment and deception, could have been the reason for Ogarkov's sophistic explanation. A deliberate muddling, by

Ogarkov at his press conference, of the actual times combined with reporting an incorrect course would help confound analysts trying to discover the Soviet Air Defense forces' true reaction to the overflight. The accurate trace

of 2 4 0 degrees rather than 230 or 300 would not only pinpoint the location of a sensitive military installation, but, more importantly, reveal to Western intelligence vital temporal information that could be combined with data from covert sources to confirm the true nature of the Soviet response. Thus, the Soviets would find it better to use

deception and reveal as little as possible. If Ogarkov's proposed route over the Sea of Okhotsk was a sham, then how valid is the "Great Circle Route" of

246 degrees suggested by General Rohmer?

Of course, if it

can be proven that the Korean pilot, Chun, chose to take the shortest route, then it is unnecessary to look further. shortest route is 246 degrees. The

..

If Captain Chun, on the other hand, was unaware of his true location and believed himself to be much further east on the international air routes, he still would have had no cause to deviate from his accepted heading. Nor did

he ever report changes in course to the international air controllers in Alaska and Japan. Whatever the reason for KAL-007's unfortunate course,
46

d e l i b e r a t e o r n o t , t h e time f a c t o r s t r o n g l y i n d i c a t e s i:hat t h e f l i g h t w a s c o n s t a n t and d i r e c t , from t h e c o a s t of Kamchatka I ; o t h e Sea of Japan--approximately

(246).

2 4 0 deqretis

Conclusion
O g a r k o v ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e f l i g h t o v e r t h e Sea o f Okhotsk i s d e s i g n e d p r i m a r i l y t o d e c e i v e f o r s t r e t e q i c p u r p o s e s and second1.y t o create d o u b t a s t o t h e i n n c . c e n t and i n a d v e r t a n t . n a t u r e of t h e c i v i l i a n f l i g h t . Despite O g x k o v ' s

clumsy a t t e m p t s a t d e c e p t i o n , t h e doomed KAL-007 w.as a p p r o a c h i n g S a k h a l i n I s l a n d and its d e s t r u c t i o n .

STAGE THREE:

SAKHRLIN ISLAND AND THE SEA OF JAPAN

The m a t t e r i s of p u b l i c r e c o r d ; m o s t of t h e a c t - o n s
are c l e a r .

S o v i e t Su-15 f i g h t e r s scramble from DoLinsk-Sokol

A i r b a s e on S a k h a l i n I s l a n d and are v e c t o r e d t o t h e i r t a r g e t ,

a c i v i l i a n a i r l i n e r , by t h e i r ground c o n t r o l l e r s .

T h e Soviet

p i l o t , i d e n t i f i e d s i m p l y as 8 0 5 , closes i n f o r t h e k i l l . :
Time --

Transm __ ission The t a r g e t ' s a l t i t u d e i s 1 0 , 0 0 0 meters (32,1108 f e e t ) From me i t i s l o c a t e d 7 0 d e g r e e s t o t h e 1 2 f t I'm d r o p p i n g back. Now I w i l l t r y a r o c k e t . .

06:23

...

...

06:24
06:25

Roger, I am i n lock-on.
I am c l o s i n q on t h e t a r g e t , a m i n lock-on. Dist.ance t o t a r g e t i s e i g h t K i l o m e t e r s ( f i v e m i l e s ) . . I :lave Z.G. (Missile warhesds a l r e a d y s w i t c h e d it on.. locked o n ) .

06:26

I have e x e c u t e d t h e l a u n c h . . . The t a r g e t i s d e s t r o y e d I am b r e a k i n g o f f t h e a t t a c k . 3 1

...

With t h o s e words t h e f l i g h t of Korean A i r L i n e s 0 0 : ' :>ecarne

47

history.

SUMMARY

By bringing together the conclusions from stages one

and two and adding the information from stage three, a clear scenario unfolds. Korean Air Lines 007 diverts from its

normal Anchorage-Seoul route and enters Soviet airspace. Soviet defense radar sites report the violation, initiating the normal fighter reaction to an intrusion. The local sites begin communications with the next higher echelon, and so forth, until all relevant levels are briefed on the situation. A visual identification, if it comes at all, is based on the reports of fighter pilots who do not approach close enough for the Korean pilot to see them. Before a decision on how to respond can be made, the civilian airliner leaves Soviet airspace. During its flight

over the Sea of Okhotsk, the plane's fate is decided; the interloper over Kamchatka thus becomes the doomed over Sakhalin. There is no longer any need for cautious reaction, only a requirement to carry out military procedure. Fighters

are once again sent in reaction, this time over Sakhalin Island. The mission is clear.

No further identification

need be made.

The order is given and the intruder destroyed.

48

STAGE ONE

CHOOSE NOT TO DESTROY KAMCHATKA

GIVE WARNING, BUT LET PLANE GO

TAKE NO ACTION AT ALL

ARE UNAWARE OF OVERFLIGHT

ARE UNABLE TO DESTROY AWARE, BUT UNABLE TO RE!PIlND

--.

STAGE TWO

A DIRECT FLIGHT
OF OKHOTSK
INDIRECT PLIGHT WITH MUCH MANEUVEREING

ISLAND

THE SOVIETS REACT

THE PLANE

--.

FIGURE 4--THE EVENTS AS THEY PROBABLY OCCURRED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1963

49

CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES

'Translated by researcher. '"Press Conference in MOSCOW," Pravda, 10 September 1983, p.4, translated by researcher. All rendings in text will be from the version of Ogarkov's press conference published in Pravda. Occassionally this differs from the translation published in the New York Times (hereafter identified as "NYT"): these differences will be footnoted. 31bid. NYT calls it an "American aircraft" rather than a reconnaissance aircraft. NYT reports the plane was flying over a 'Ibid. strategic naval base at 1510. Ibid. Ibid. 71bid. According to NYT, the interceptor was ordered to end the flight using heat-tracing missiles. The 8''Soviet Fighter Pilots' Remarks on Television," New York Times, 11 September 1983. ' J i m Bussert, "Soviet Air Defense Systems Show Increasing Sophistication," Defense Electronics, 1615 (May 1984) : 75-86. "Rohmer, "John p. 108. p.80. Avon Books, 1981)

Barron, MiG Pilot (New York:

12Belenko, "What Really Happened. " p. 30. 131bid. I4Rohmer, p.83. 151bid., p.25. 16Steve Lohr, "Pilot in the '78 Incident Recalls His Experience," The New York Times, 9 September 1983.

50

"Tarasdo,

".Is Soviet Radar Really That Bad.?"

18Charles Doe, "Airline Tra edy Shows Soviet Shortcomings , I ' Air Force Times, 2f October 1983, pi). 23-25. "Rohmer,
p p . :?11-212.
3

201nterview w i t h Dr. Tarasulo, as reported in personal letter frcml Dennis Everett, March 1985. 21Rohmer, p.205.
-.. November 1983, p . 23. 22UN Chronicle,

. Fo ece 23Yossef Bodartsky, "Death By the Book," -Air -_ December 1.983. Magazine,

24Doe, "Airline Tragedy Shows Soviet Shortconlings. " 25Belenko, "\hit Really Happened. "
2 6 B i l l Groves, "Charlie and KAL-O07--Charlie Got 'There First," Defense Electronics, _15/11, November 1983, p , l l .

27'rSoviet: Su-15 Shoots Down Korean 747," Avia.t::on Week , 119/10, 5 September 1983, p g T T hereafter referre$ t o as "Transcript.II
& Space Technol.og

28Rohmer. 2911~ressConfcrence.I 1 30Rohmer, p . 87. 3111Transcript.

I,

51

CHAPTER 4 THE OTHER QUESTIONS

"The realities of our anxiety-ridden world crammed with nuclear missiles imperatively demand that each and every spy plane that intrudes in Soviet airspace be destroyed."l --Professor Nikolaj Yakovlev, September 1983

Having established the most probable sequence of events for the morning of 1 September, this thesis now proposes to seek some of the reasons the Soviets decided to destroy KAL-007. Did they believe, as they said, that they Did they know it

were dealing with some type of spy plane?

was a civilian airliner? Would that knowledge have changed the way they responded? Section one of this chapter presents arguments on these questions. Section two examines the decision itself The

and identifies four possible levels of decision making. level of decision making responsible for the act is established. Section three follows the personalities

involved, their roles in the affair and their lives following it.
A synthesis of information derived in this

chapter will provide a reasonable understanding of the tenor of events on the morning in question.

52

SECTION ONE: I D E N T I F I C A T I O N OF THE INTRUDER --

--

Probably t h e f i e r c e s t b a t t l e f o u g h t between 13as t and

West i n t h e war f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t centers on t h e

q u e s t i o n of whom the S o v i e t s t h o u g h t t h e y were f i r i n g upon. The So viet Sto9 The Soviet. v e r s i o n of e v e n t s changed g r e a t l y throughout t h e days following t h e action. The f i r s t o E f i c i a l

acknowledgment: t h a t . something had happened came i r k l'ravda on

2 September and s t a t e d s i m p l y t h a t an " a i r c r a f t of'

undetermined o r i g i n [had] e n t e r e d t h e a i r s p a c e o f tlie :Soviet Union from t h e P a c i f i c Ocean o v e r t h e Kamchatka pen.insiila, t h e n v i o l a t e d USSR a i r s p a c e f o r a second t i m e oveI' S a k h a l i n Island... Japan.
'I2

and [them1 c o n t i n u e d i t s f l i g h t towards tlie :Sea of Although more d e t a i l s were p u b l i s h e d abcNui: the

c o n d u c t of t h e f l j . g h t and t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y react:.on t o i t , t h e o n l y s u g g e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p l a n e ' s i d e n t i t!r implied

t h a t t h e p l a n e must have been p a r t o f a s p y o p e r a t . i o n and t h a t it was probakily a c i v i l i a n a i r l i n e r . On 5 September, C o l o n e l G e n e r a l Romanov's ari:ic L e a p p e a r e d i n Pravda, a r g u i n g t h e S o v i e t case t h a t t.hi!ir p i l o t had n o way of knowing t h a t t h e i n t r u d e r was a civi.l..an aircraft. Romanov added t h a t t h e c o n t o u r s of t h e p:.ane On

"resembled thc! American R C - 1 3 5 r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n e . a t 3

6 September t h e S o v i e t s a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e f l i g h t had been

s t o p p e d by t h e i r A i r Defense F o r c e s and o p e n l y a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e p l a n e had been on a spy m i s s i o n , b u t s t i l l d i d n o t commit t h e m s e l v e s on t h e i d e n t i t y .
4

53

Not until Ogarkov's press conference on 9 September did the complete story, as the Soviets viewed it, emerge. The Soviets now admitted that the plane was a Korean civilian airliner, but asserted that it was on a spy mission for the United States intelligence services. American RC-135 at 5:OO A.M. Its rendezvous with an

for approximately ten minutes

convinced the Soviets that an "American airplane was entering Soviet airspace." The Soviets claimed it ignored all of

their warnings and even transmitted short regular signals while over Kamchatka, confirming to them that it was on a spy mission. 5 Thus, by 9 September, the Soviets had determined what they would tell the world concerning their perception of the plane and its mission, But what did they actually know on

the morning of 1 September?

An Analysis
The Soviet position evolved over a period of days before and immediately after they acknowledged terminating the flight, and therefore portrays a changing view. Because

the version is inconsistent, their official statements will have to be set aside for the moment. The first people to have an opportunity to identify
KAL-007 were the radar technicians on the Pacific coast as

the plane was approaching Soviet territory.

A former radar

technician himself, Dr. Yitzhak Tarasulo, maintains that a radar operator would have taken into account the route of the intruding aircraft and its shape. The flight patterns of

54

reconnaissance pI.anes, T a r a s u l o a r g u e s , are w e l l kncwn t o Soviet o p e r a t o r s .

1:f a plane s u c h a s t h e RC-135 were to

v i o l a t e S o v i e t a i r s p a c e i t c o u l d be e x p e c t e d t o do s o c n l y on
t h e f r i n g e s and t o c:arry o u t c o m p l i c a t e d a v o i d a n c e rcaneuvers. Such w a s n o t t h e c a s e w i t h t h e KAL f l i g h t .

As h a s keen

pointed o u t i n c h a p t e r t h r e e , it f l e w deep i n t o Soviet a i r s p a c e , p r o b a b l y i.n a s t r a i g h t l i n e . With t h e e x c e p t i o n of

one e a r l y change i n a l t i t u d e and one immediately bsforfi b e i n g f i r e d upon , t h e f l i g h t a l s o m a i n t a i n e d a c o n s t a n t . a l t i t u d e . 6

T a r a s u l o i . n s i . s t s t h a t t h e g e o m e t r i c shape and p h y s i c a l s i z e of a Boeing 74'7, l i k e t h e Korean a i r l i n e r , p r o d u c e s a much d i f f e r e n t r a d a r r e f l e c t i o n from that: of a Boeing ? 0 7 , t h e b a s i c RC-135. T h i s r e f l e c t i o n would have been mon:.tored

not: simply by one t e c h n i c i a n , b u t by s e v e r a l from . t h e 5 0 t o 6 0 radar s i t e s a v a i l a b l e a l o n g t h e P a c i f i c coast. I t 1.s

h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t a l l c o u l d have made t h e same Inistake. V i k t o r Belenko a g r e e s w i t h t h i s a s s e s s m e n t , a d d i n g t h a t : r a d a r o p e r a t o r s would rea.lize t h e KAL p l a n e was f l y i n g much f a s t e r ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 2 5 k.nots g r e a t e r ) t h a n c o u l d t h e Ri:-13Ei, heavily laden with electronic gear.
8

Doubt can even be found i n t h e o f f i c i a l Sov.iet statements. When Marshal Ogarkov o u t l i n e d t h e S o v i e t

r e s p o n s e o v e r Kamchatka, he s a i d t h a t t h e f a c t s l e d S o v i e t

a i r d e f e n s e t e c h n i c i a n s t o b e l i e v e t h e p l a n e was American.
The Pravda - t r a n s c r i p t of h i s p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , however, changed t h e word "American" t o " r e c o n n a i s s a n c e .
"

F u r t h e r doubt i s c a s t on t h e S o v i e t v e r s i o n eveii i f

55

it is initially accepted at face value.

If Soviet fighters

escorted the Korean airliner over Kamchatka and were close enough to warn it visually, as asserted by Marshal Ogarkov, then certainly Colonel General Romanov's statement of 5 September that the Soviet pilot over Sakhalin didn't know the plane was commercial and that it had the contours of an RC-135, shows either:

(1) that Romanov was deliberately

lying, ( 2 ) that he simply did not know, or ( 3 ) that Marshal Ogarkov was lying when he stated Soviet fighters had escorted the plane. Both options one and three are probably correct.

On the other hand, evidence exists that, by the time the plane had reached Sakhalin, the Soviets were convinced as
to the mission, if not the identity, of the intruder.

The

transcript of the Soviet interception of KAL-007 reveals no attempt by the Soviet fighter pilot to identify his target, indicating that the fate of the intruder, regardless of identity, had been decided. Belenko, reminding his readers

of the punishment suffered by commanders who allowed the Korean airliner in 1978 to fly over Soviet territory for 90 minutes, speculates, "Now the National Command Center was aware that Soviet air defenses at Kamchatka had failed again.
I suspect the commanders at the center reasoned that the

risks of killing were less than those of embarrassing the Politburo anew. ,110 Thus, a picture emerges. Kamchatka. Confusion reigns over

Perhaps some radar operators correctly identify

the intruder as a civilian airliner, maybe others report it

56

t o be
facts:

ii

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n e , b u t most p r o b a b l y r e p c r t t h e t h a t an u n i d e n t i f i e d p l a n e i s a p p r o a c h i n g Sovitt t F i g h t e r s s e n t i n r e a c t i o n f a i l t o make v i s ~ ~ a l

territory.

c o n t a c t , a s h a s been s u p p o r t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s t h e s i s , and t h e i n t r u d e r f l i e s on. Doubts remain a s t o t h e t y p e 0:: p l a n e

v i o l a t i n g S o v i e t a i r s p a c e , b u t t h e r e are no d o u b t s a b o u t two things: t h e t r e s p a s s i s i l l e g a l and t h e f l i g h t p a t h h a s

t a k e n it over a s e n s i t i v e m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n .

As t h e p l a n e a p p r o a c h e s S a k h a l i n I s l a n d i t s i d e n t i t y
h a s become unimpor-tant. Even t h e d e b a t e , i f t h e r e was o n e ,

of t h e p l a n e ' s m i s s i o n , becomes o f secondary i n t e r e s t . 1mpor.tant now, i s . t h a t t h e S o v i e t d e c i s i o n maker i s a b o u t t o r e c e i v e a second chance t o a c t .

N o f u r t h e r d e l a y :in
M i l i t a r y procxdure

t e r m i n a t i n g t h e 1i g h t c a n b e t o l e r a t e d . is clear. Conclusion KAL-007 must b e s t o p p e d !

As t h e i n t r u c l e r f l e w o v e r Kamchatka the Sov:Lets were

p r o b a b l y p e r p l e x e d a s t o i t s i d e n t i t y , b u t by t h e t i n e t h e o r d e r w a s g i v e n f o x i t s d e s t r u c t i o n , t h e y had i n c o i : r ~ ~ c t . l . y deduced t h a t t h e rn:ission reconnaissance. of t h e a i r c r a f t was p r o b a b l f

Even so, t h e S a k h a l i n p i l o t was gsvmzn no

o r d e r t o i d e n t i f y the p l a n e , b e c a u s e , by t h i s point:,

th.ere

was no need.

Nor was he t o l d what he was i n t e r c e p k i i g , so h e

would n e v e r know t h a t t h e p l a n e may have been m i s i c l e . i t i i e d .

As V i k t o r Belenko s t a t e s , "Throughout h i s c a r e e r , a Soviet

p i l o t is t a u g h t : You may n o t j u d g e . You may n o t t h i n k . You may n o t re,:omend. Your commsnder

You may o n l y e x e c u t e .

57

will think for you. himself: perfectly.

The pilo.t, of course, does think to

I must execute

I must do exactly as I am told.

If not, I and my family will be ruined. ,111

SECTION TWO: WHO MADE THE DECISION? --At some point in his research, everyone putting forth an hypothesis on the Soviet response in this matter must postulate an answer to the question, who made the decision?

All too often this is as futile as tilting at windmills, for

no definitive evidence has yet been published naming the person responsible. A s an unidentified U.S. official put it, [this question] plumbs the depth of U.S. intelligence capabilities, and may never be made public, even if it can be determined.1112 Introduction As the Soviet Union guards its secrets jealously, many of the people involved in the incident have never been revealed. Indeed, skeptics would question whether the man identified as the pilot and interviewed on Soviet television following the incident had ever flown a plane. Could he not

have been a KGB agent brought in for the purpose? Because of this inherent doubt, any answer must be based on position rather than personality.

In the final

analysis, which is more important? That Major Vasilij Konstantinovich Kazmin shot the plane down, or that a Soviet pilot did? That Marshal Petr Kirsanov gave the order, or that the theater commander did? In both cases, of course,
58

t h e l a t t e r i s more i m p o r t a n t . This s e c t i o n examines f o u r l e v e l s of a u t h o r i t y ; a l l i n c l u d e some p e r s o n a l i t i e s . An a t t e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a c t i o n a t one of t h e f o u r l e v e l s w i l l

be made and, i.f p o s s i b l e , an i n d i v i d u a l named.

levels are:

T h e s e !:our

1) t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l l e v e l - - c o m p r i s i n g t h e

c i v i l i a n l e a d e r s of t h e country and a l l members of t h e P o l i t b u r o , i n c l u d i n g General S e c r e t a r y Andropov, Foi.ei,i;n M i n i s t e r Gromyko, and Defense M i n i s t e r Ustinov ( s e e fiz;ure f i v e ) ; 2 ) t h e n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y l e v e l - - t o i n c l u d e any

m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t y a t t h e n a t i o n a l command i n Moscow,

.;IS

well

a s t h e Chief of S o v i e t A i r Defense Troops, Koldunov; h i s Chief of Main S t a f f , Romanov; and Chief of t h e S0vic.t (::enera1 S t a f f , Ogarkov; 3 ) i:he l o c a l a i r defense commander--to i n c l u d e a l l l e v e l s of m i l i t a r y command up through t t e a t . e r ,

b u t n o t t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l ; and 4 ) t h e p i l o t - - t h e S c . - l i p i l o t
who a c t u a l l y f i r e d t h e m i s s i l e s t h a t d e s t r o y e d t h e K.ornr.an jet. Level __ One: The P o l i t b u r o ---

The d e c i s i o n t o shoot was n o t made by t h e P o l i t b u r o . Two c o n j u n c t u r e s s u p p o r t t h i s a s s e r t i o n .

F i r s t , tin.e

c o n s t r a i n t s probab1.y prevented Members of t h e Politkuri:! from l e a r n i n g about t h e e v e n t s of 1 September u n t i l a f t e r they had occurred. Second, w e n i f i t s members had known a b c u t t h e

f l i g h t , a P o l i t b u r o a c t i n g w i t h o u t consensus and w i t h i r . such s t r i c t time c o n s t r a i n t s would have been unable t o dc much more than concur with procedures being followed by t h e

59

THE POLITBURO

N A T I O N A L LEVEL MILITARY

LOCAL OR THEATER COMMANDER

THE PILOT ACTING ALONE

FIGURE

5 -- THE FOUR LEVELS OF DECISIONMAKING

60

military. The amount 01: time a v a i l a b l e f o r key members of t h e

P o l i t b u r o t o l e a r n of t h e i n c i d e n t and make a decisj.on was short--two hours a t t h e most. Given such time const.rai.nts,

information r e c e i v e d by t h e n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y author.itj.es would need t o have been passed immediately t o t h e Moscow-based member:; of t h e P o l i t b u r o f o r a d e c i s i o n t o have been made. the case. That no one in t h e P o l i t b u r o knew about the ewerits u n t i l a f t e r t h e Ea.ct i s borne o u t b y t h e s t r a n g e me1:hoti i n which i n t e r n a t i o n a . 1 q u e r i e s and p r o t e s t s were handled during t h i s time. Usua1l.y a c o n f l i c t , whether a d v e r t a n t
01:

There a r e i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t such was probably nor

i n a d v e r t a n t , between two n a t i o n s a t peace i s handled a!; the diplomatic and Foreign M i n i s t r y l e v e l (U.S. S t a t e Department). When i t involves two governments not having

diplomatic r e l a t i c m s , such a s South Korea and t h e U S S R , a t h i r d n a t i o n a c t s as intermediary. A f t e r t h e disappearance of t h e Korean j e t , t h e 1Jnited S t a t e s , a c t i n g on behalf of Korea, queried t h e Soviet !Jnion through diplomatic channels. The Soviet r e p l y wit:h n e i t h e r

t h e b e l l i g e r e n t a c c u s a t i o n t h a t could be expected i E t h e i n c i d e n t had been intended t o provoke, nor t h e formal statement normally given t h a t i s meant t o e a s e tens ions without acknowledging g u i l t . knew nothing about t h e p l a n e . The S o v i e t s r e p l i e d t h a t they

It appeared t h a t t h e S c v i e t

Foreign K i n i s t r y was unaware of t h e d e t a i l s of thi: inci.dent.

61

At this time the Politburo had probably not been briefed on

the incident by the military. If the Politburo had been kept informed, however, on all events that Sunday night, the lack of time would have made a decision by them very difficult to achieve. Arkady Shevchenko describes the process the Politburo uses to make decisions when not in session.

...emergency issues... are

Central Committee

then handled by ... a poll of the resident Moscow leadership, often excluding the out-of-town members.

couriers bring the papers to the Politburo members and wait while they write out their approval or comments in the margin. For these polled questions a majority of the Moscow members is enough to ensure collective responsibility.,113 Whether military crises are handled in the same way, one can only speculate. "Collective responsibility," however, is probably still considered important. In the KAL incident, an

immediate consensus or even majority required to assure collective responsibility was unlikely. In the days that followed the shoot-down, Soviet public reaction came only from members of the press corps and the military. The Foreign Ministry remained unusually

silent. Foreign Minister Gromyko only commented on the incident when cornered, as when he lashed out at Secretary of State Schultz during their meeting in Madrid shortly afterward. As Arkady Shevchenko noted, "Gromyko could have had very little to do with the decision to shoot down the plane and I am sure he would have had little patience with
62

such a p l a n .

H e i s much t o o shrewd and e x p e r i e n c e d t o make

h i s c o u n t r y t h e b u t t of t h e w o r l d ' s opprobrium by er.couraging b u l l y t a c t i c s . '"" O b j e c t i o n s from a s e n i o r member csf t:he

P o l i t b u r o l i k e Gromyko c o u l d n o t b e i g n o r e d , n o r was i t l i k e l y t h a t h e c o u l d h a v e been d i s u a d e d of h i s o p i n i o n in such a s h o r t span of' t i m e as was a v a i l a b l e . would n o t h a v e been a c h i e v e d i n two h o u r s . The most prominent of P o l i t b u r o members, Genera.[ S e c r e t a r y Andropov, w a s v a c a t i o n i n g i n t h e Caucausus a;: t h e
t i m e of t h e i n c i d e n t . .

The c o p s e n s u s

T h i s f a c t o r adds a n o t h e r u n c e r t a i n t y

t o w h e t h e r t h e n e c e s s a r y d e c i s i o n c o u l d have been r e a c h e d .
I f , d e s p i t e t h i s evi.dence t o t h e c o n t r a r y , a d e c i s i o n was

i n d e e d made, one can turn t o an a c c e p t e d decision-making model t o d e t e r m i n e what s t e p s t h e P o l i t b u r o would have t a k e n . Graham T . A l . l i s o n p r o f f e r s t h r e e f a c t o r s which

(1) r a t i o n a l p o l i c y , , ( 2 ) o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o c e s s , and ( 3 ) b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s . 1.5

i n f l u e n c e S o v i e t d e c i s i o n making: Organizational process involves a c t i o n according t o p r o c e d u r e , which i n t h i s case would b e t a k e n by t h e rnil.itary. B u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i . t i c s demands a g r e a t e r amount of c i n e t h a n a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e f o r a d e c i s i o n t o be made. Rational p 0 1 i . c ~ i n v o l v e s an examination of ;he r i s k s

i n v o l v e d and a comparison of c o s t against: b e n e f i t . Given G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r y Andropov' s i n d i s p o s i t i o n , F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Gromyko' s p r o b a b l e h o s t i l i t y t o t a k i n g such a c t i o n , t h e v e r y s h o r t t i m e needed t o make a d e c i s i o n , and a h o s t of s m a l l e r though no l e s s i m p o r t a n t considerarion::
63

(such

as the fact that this occurred late Sunday evening, Moscow time), rational policy, when applied to the Politburo, would yield one of two decisions: that the plane be allowed to escape or that events should simply take course without Politburo involvement. Ordering the downing of foreign airliner without support from key members of the Politburo would be risky. The consequences would be great and would probably overshadow problems arising from allowing the plane to escape. A far safer decision would be not to decide. A military procedure to deal with such intrusions exist-follow it. The outcome of events on 1 September is known--the plane was shot down. Based on the argument given above, this

indicates that the Politburo made no decision or, if it did, that its decision was not to interfere but to allow events run their course. The conclusion can therefore be drawn that the Politburo made no decision regarding the fate of Korean Air Lines 007 or, if it did, decided not to interfere with the military's handling of events. Level Two: The National Military Command The decision to shoot was probably not made by the national military command. In order to determine the

validity of this statement we must first establish what information was available to military authorities in Moscow and which officers would have been directly involved in the matter. Only then can a conclusion be drawn as to the level
64

of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y command. There i s ample evidence t o show t h a t n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s were aware of t h e e v e n t s as thc:y were taking place.

Based on h i s e x p e r i e n c e a s a S o v i e t r.ad.iir

t e c h n i c i a n , Doctor T a r a s u l o a s s e r t s t h a t an a i r defmsc!
II

r e a d i n e s s one should have been d e c l a r e d by Far E a s t e r n A i r

Defense i n Khabarovsk w i t h i n f i v e minutes of r e c o g n i t i m of a border v i o l a t i o n . Within t h e n e x t f i v e minutes t h e C e n t r a l

Command P o s t oE t h e S o v i e t A i r Defence Forces shoulc hzLve g a t h e r e d enough i n f o r m a t i o n t o b r i n g t h e General S t a f f o f t h e S o v i e t Anny i n t o act:ion. 1 6 L i e u t e n a n t Bcslenko a g r e e s t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l 1evii.L would have been brought i n t o t h e p i c t u r e e a r l y . Whencvcr

r a d a r s c r e e n s reveal an u n i d e n t i f i e d a i r c r a f t w i t h i n 1 Q O k i l o m e t r e s of Soviet. b o r d e r s , i t s p o s i t i o n i s immediatii.1y r e p o r t e d t o t h e N a t i o n a l Command Center a t K a l i n i n , northwest of Moscow.

So long a s t h e a i r c r a f t rema:tns i n t h e

100-kilometre zone, i t s c o u r s e , speed and a l t i t u d e a r e shown on a s c r e e n a t K a l i n i n , where a g e n e r a l o f f i c e r i s a l w a y s on duty. In a d d i t i o n , some d a t a r e l e a s e d b y t h e US Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency r e v e a l t h a t n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s were c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e t h e o r d e r was g i v e n . It i s , therefore,

reasonnble t o conclude t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y powers i n Moscow were aware of t h e o v e r f l i g h t . O f t.he o f f i c e r s who could have been involved i n t h e d e c i s i o n , t h r e e men s t a n d o u t : t h e Chief o f t h e Gener2i:L

65

Staff, Marshal Ogarkov; the Chief of the Air Defense Forces, Marshal Koldunov; and Koldunov's Chief of Staff, Colonel General Romanov. Each made public statements following the

incident and each was assigned a role in the decision by various members of the Western press. Marshal Ogarkov, as Chief of the General Staff, was the only military officer besides the Minister of Defense who had the authority to override a decision by the Theater Commander. (Theater authority and chain of command are

discussed in the next section of this chapter.) The Theater Air Defense Commander was made directly subordinate to the Theater Commander and thence to Marshal Ogarkov in a reorganization completed in December, 1982. This

reorganization removed the Chief of Air Defense Forces, Marshal of Aviation Koldunov, from direct involvement in operational decisions. In other words, Koldunov owned the troops, but the Theater Command directed them. This reorganization not only makes Koldunov's participation in the decision unlikely, but also the participation of his Chief of Staff, Romanov. Therefore, Ogarkov is the most likely person

at national level to have made the decision. Marshal Ogarkov was privy to information not necessarily available to lower echelons. He knew, for instance, that no reconnaissance gear was found aboard the Korean airliner forced to land in 1978. He was also aware that, with the advent of spy satellites, routine photography from aircraft was probably an unnecessary risk. The value of
66

a i r p l a n e s flown over h o s t i l e t e r r i t o r y l a y i n provokink; t h e d e f e n s e network t o respond, and t h i s response over Kamchatka had been n e g l i g i b l e - - t h e had been i t s purpose. f l i g h t was a f a i l u r e i f p r o v o c a t i o n

F i n a l l y , Ogarkov should have known t h a t , unlike

what few a t lower l e v e l s could b e c e r t a i n o f :

t h e Soviet:;, Western governments do n o t u s e t h e i r cj,vi:.ian a i r l i n e r s f o r espionage. Besides t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , Ogarkov would havti a p p r e c i a t e d t h e po1.itical i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e a c t i o r i .

He may

have r e a l i z e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t a d e c i s i o n t o shoot down a f o r e i g n commercial a i r l i n e r could r e s u l t i n embarras:sment f o r t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s of h i s c o u n t r y . H e could a l s o g:iess

t h a t t h e P o l i t b u r o would be d i v i d e d on how t o handlc: t?ie situation.

He s u r e l y r e a l i z e d t h a t i f someone i n a l e s s e r

p o s i t i o n than h i s own made t h e d e c i s i o n t o s h o o t , t t e P o l i t b u r o would v i e w i t as a m i l i t a r y d e c i s i o n . However,

should h e , a s t h e Chief of t h e General S t a f f , make that: same d e c i s i o n , i t could be read a s p o l i t i c a l , a challengc, t o t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e Pol.i.tburo. H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e P o l i t bur0

t a k e s a dim view oE m i l i t a r y c h a l l e n g e s t o i t s authc1rii:y and, h i s t o r i c a l l y , no such c h a l l e n g e has ever succeeded.

H,xd

Ogarkov made a d e c i s i o n on t h e m a t t e r , he would have: taken t h e s e f a c t o r s i n t o account. The time c o n s t r a i n t s and t h e t h r e e p r i n c i p l e : 01' d e c i s i o n making mentioned a s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r t h e Pol.itburo would have a f f e c t e d Ogarkov's a c t i o n s a s w e l l . It
j.s

p o s s i b l e t h a t no i n f o r m a t i o n reached Ogarkov i n t i m e : f o r him

67

to make the decision; he could have learned about the situation afterwards. On the other hand, if he was aware of developments, an attempt can be made to determine his role. Organizational process normally guides the military. In his press conference, Ogarkov stated that the decision was made by a regional commander and that "Soviet Air Defense Forces operated in full contact with the Government's authorities."

(It is interesting to note that Pravda

corrected his comment to read, "Soviet Air Defence acted in accordance with the State Border law of the USSR.") Ogarkov's own words, he needed to do nothing. He could either have observed events and merely noted the conduct of the reaction as it took place, or he could have agreed with decisions already made at lower levels. The principle of rational policy leads to a similar conclusion: it is safest to handle the matter according to established procedures. Moreover, had Ogarkov decided to

In

override the lower commander's decision, the result of events would probably have been different. Given Ogarkov's experience and knowledge of political considerations, least risk would be incurred by forcing the plane down rather than destroying it. Therefore, Ogarkov probably did not make the decision. If he was involved, he probably simply concurred

with the actions of subordinate commanders and did not interfere directly. Nevertheless, two arguments have been presented to indicate that Ogarkov made the decision. Both are flawed.
68

The f i r s t i s t h a t , having made t h e d e c i s i o n , Ogarkov found i t necessary t o conduct t h e p r e s s conference t o g e t hinise1.f off t h e hook and t o j u s t i f y h i s own a c t i o n . The second i s t h a t

he was s t r i p p e d o f h i s p o s i t i o n a s Chief of S t a f f bc:cause h e made t h e d e c i s i o n concerning t h e Korean a i r l i n e r ,

A s regards t h c p r e s s conference, Ogarkov, a s Chief of

S t a f f , would have been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any d e c i s i o n made by m i l i t a . r y a u t h o r i t i e s , n o t merely h i s own. The press

conference could have been c a l l e d s i m p l y t o ease pressr.lre o f f t h e m i l i t a r y insteacl of Marshal Ogarkov, h i m s e l f .

Eis

p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the, p r e s s conference proves nothing concerning t h e KAL d e c i s i o n . Just. a s fau1t.y an argument i s t h a t he was rerrovtrd from o f f i c e because h e made t h e d e c i s i o n t o shoot. Ogarkov Had he

was involved i n many t h i n g s , a s has been noted above. s e r i o u s l y challenged c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t y b y o r d e r i n g thti

downing of KAL-007, punishment would probably have been much harsher.

A s i t was, t h e move was an o r d e r l y trans,:r oi:

p o s i t i o n from h i m t o h i s t r u s t e d l i e u t e n a n t , Marshal Akhromeev. There 'was no o t h e r shake-up involved. Indeed,

when Defense M i n i s t e r Ustinov ( b a s i c a l l y a c i v i l i a n , d e s p i t e h i s ranlc of Marshal) d i e d , t h e P o l i t b u r o replaced h i n w i t h Marshal Sokolov, a c a r e e r m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r . The Korean

a i r l i n e s i n c i d e n t probably had l i t t l e t o do with Ogarkov's f a l l from power. 'En summary, t h e d e c i s i o n was probably n o t made nat:ional m i l i t a r y l e v e l . Marshal Ogarkov, i f involved
69
at:
;it:

the

all, would most likely have accepted the actions of subordinate commanders. Level Three: Theater Military Commander

The decision was probably made at this level. As has been shown, the decision to end the flight of Korean Air Lines 007 was a military one, not a political one. Moreover, when considered in strictly military terms, it was reasonable, given the sensitive missile testing going on at the time

After claiming that the decision had been made by the

II

regional commander," Marshal Ogarkov was asked by a foreign

correspondent if his explanation meant that "the Soviet Union [was] willing to risk war with the United States on the decision of a district commander.'t20 Although this question was most probably intended to provoke Ogarkov, part of the Chief of Staff's reply was very telling. "There's a

strict order of command and responsibility for actions in such situations in the Soviet Union." What is this "strict order of command and responsibility'' 721 The Soviet military establishment has undergone a major reorganization in recent years. Coincident with Marshal Ogarkov's doctrinal changes divesting power to Commanders of the Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) were organizational changes placing the Air Defense Districts of the Air Defense Forces (Vojska PVO, formerly PVO Strany) under the control of Military District (VO) Commanders (themselves under the TVD Commanders). 22
70

FAR EAST THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

DV-TVD. HEADQUARTERS: CHITA COMMANDER OF AVIATION, FAR EAST TVD MARSHAL OF AVIATION PETR KIRSANOV

--

FAR EAST MILITARY DISTRICT

IW-VO, HEADqUARTERS: KHABAROVSK

I
INTERCEPTOR REG I MENT
KAMCHATKA

!
I

-.
INTERCEPTOR RIGGIMENT SAKHALIN ISLAND --.
THE PILor WHO PIRED

ON KAL -00'7 -

FIGlJRE 6--CHAIN OF COMMAND, SOVIET FAR EAST

71

In effect, this delegates control of fighter reaction

from Air Defense Beadquarters in Moscow to the TVD. "The Aviation Commander of the TV3 becomes the direct senior commander for the conduct of Independent Air Operations, both offensive and defensive. He controls/manages the defensive operations in his capacity as the Commander of the Soviet Air Defense Forces of the TVD.tu23 On 1 September 1983 the Commander of Aviation of the Far East Theater of Military Operations was Marshal of Aviation Petr Kirsanov. Kirsanov was kept informed of developments in the situation by local commanders; he was aware of the sensitivity of missile testing in the area; and he
was

fully briefed on all accompanying considerations.

Thus, according to procedure, Kirsanov made a military (vice political) decision, and that decision was to terminate the flight of KAL-007. The Pilot Level Four: The decision to shoot was not made by the pilot. This researcher has found no source, Soviet or Western, asserting that the pilot acted on his own when he fired at the Korean airliner. The evidence to the contrary

overwhelmingly shows that procedure and training in the Soviet Air Defense Forces prevent a pilot from taking such an action. Recent Soviet articles have encouraged pilots to take more risks and limited initiative, but have never suggested that this should be expanded outside strict guidelines. 72

Colonel A . B. Krasriov, a l e a d i n g S o v i e t a i r t a c t i c i a n , complains of a pil.ot who f a i l e d t o complete an att:ack when h i s communicat:ions w i t h t h e ground were i n t e r r u p t e d , Krasnov

a d v i s e s p i l o t s to t a k e c o n t r o l of t h e i n t e r c e p t ins.read of r e l y i n g on grourid s t a t i o n s .

But NOWHERE DOES HE SUGGE:ST THAT

In o t h e r word:;, the

PILOTS I N I T I A T E ACTION ON THEIR OWN.

i n i t i a t i v e and r i s k - t a k i n g r e f e r r e d t o by Colonel K:rasnov a r e l i m i t e d t o ways of c a r r y i n g o u t a m i s s i o n , n o t t o d e c i d i n g what t h a t mission o r i t s r e s u l t s should be. 2 4 The t a p e pl.ayed f o r t h e UN General Assembly provides s u b s t : a n t i a t i o n t:hat t h e p i l o t decided nothing himse:.f

, but

was only following o r d e r s .

The p i l o t r e q u e s t e d in.sl:ructions

from t h e ground s t a t i o n r e g a r d i n g e v e r y t h i n g , from h i s course and a l t i t u d e t o t u r n i n g o f f h i s weapons system. In other

words, t h i s interc!eption was d i r e c t e d completely by t h e ground c o n t r o l . l ~ ! r at: c a l l s i g n "Deputat executed Deput:at:'s commands. 25 One can c o n f i d e n t l y a c c e p t t h a t t h e p i l o t d i d n o t make t h e d e c i s i o n , o r r e a s o n s i n c l u d i n g , "Russian devotion t o [ a ] system that: rewards t h o s e who f o l l o w t h e rultis. ,126 Concl.usion The effec.t o f time c o n s t r a i n t s on t h e S o v i e t decision-making process i s e v i d e n t a t each l e v e l i n v a r y i n g degrees.
A t t h e h i g h e r l e v e l s l a c k of time r e s u l t e t l i n no

."

The p i l o t s i m p l y

subst:antivc dc:ci.si.ori being made which would breach t:he procedures a l r e a d y put i n t o e f f e c t .

In retrospect, rational

po1ic:y might have d i c t a t e d a less d r a s t i c measure than

73

shooting the plane down.

Even this, however, may not have

been so obvious at that moment under the pressures of time. At the lower levels, established procedures were to be followed unless contradicted by orders froin above. These orders never came, so the Korean airliner was destroyed according to the rules already established. The decision to shoot was a military decision, made at the proper level (theater) by a commander of responsible rank (Marshal of Aviation). SECTION THREE: THE PEOPLE INVOLVED Where-are-they-now columns serve to boost a magazine's circulation with interesting vignettes of once-powerful men raising chickens in Palo Alto. This section, however, is

intended to present information on some of the key Soviets involved in the incident and thereby help the reader understand the consequences of their actions.
Yurij Vladimirovich Andropov

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), Full Member of the Politburo, and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (President) was said to have been vacationing in the Caucausus during the Korean Air Lines incident. Andropov was destined to spend his last days hidden from public view, occasionally issuing statements on policy matters, such as the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe. He was rumored to have undergone extensive surgery
74

during t h e months preceeding h i s d e a t h on 9 Februar). 1 9 8 4 . Andropov's p u b l i c r e a c t i o n t o KAL-007 was n o n e x i s t a n t . In

f a c t , he probably had v e r y l i t t l e , i f a n y t h i n g , t o clo with Soviet r e a c t i o n t o t h e o v e r f l i g h t .

h i t r i j Fedorovich IJstinov

Marshal cf t h e Soviet Union, M i n i s t e r of Defmsr!, and F u l l Member of t h e P o l i t b u r o of t h e CC CPSU, Ustino\, made few statements about tho KAL d i s a s t e r . H e remained Mini.stt!r of

Defense i n charge of t h e Soviet Armed Forces u n t i l h i s d e a t h , of pneumonia on 27 December 1984. Nikolaj V a s i l i --e v i c h OParkov Marshal c8.C the Soviet Union, F i r s t Deputy l?iriist:er of Defense, Chief clf t h e General S t a f f , Marshal Ogarko\* w i i s unarguably t h c most v i s i b l e of Soviet p e r s o n a l i t i e s during t h e weeks following t h e i n c i d e n t . Ogarkov had enjoyed a long

and d i s t i n g u i s h e d c a r e e r i n t h e Soviet Army, culminating i n

1977 w i t h h i s appoint:ment a s Chief of t h e General St:aff.

His

work i n modernizing t:he Soviet Armed Forces and f o r n u l i l t i n g Soviet m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e earned him a degree of respect: equal t o t h a t given M;.rshal Zhukov, Hero of S t a l i n g r a d and the Commander who took Berlin i n World War 11. A f t e r j.nt:ei:national p r e s s u r e forced the Sovic!ts i n t o acknowledging t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e Korean A i r Linc:s i n c i d e n t , Marshal Ogarkov gained worldwide recogni t::on b y conducting an unprecedented no-holds-barred p r e s s conference t o conununicatc t h e Soviet p o s i t i o n . Analysts disa.g::ee on t h e

reason f o r t h e press conference, some maintaining tliat i t was

75

merely to present the Soviet case to the world, while others, believing the decision to shoot down the Korean plane to have been Ogarkov's alone, suggesting that he was using the opportunity to extricate himself from an onerous situation. Whatever the reason, all acknowledged his skill in handling the foreign press and agreed that, by any measure, the press conference was a success. On 7 September 1 9 8 4 , Krasnaya Zvezda announced that Ogarkov had been relieved of his duties as Chief of the General Staff and had been transferred to "other work". 27 About a month later, Politburo Member Georgij Romanov, on a visit to Helsinki, confirmed that his "other work" was a position as Commander in Chief of the Western Theater of War. 28 Since that time Sovietologists have speculated on the reasons for Ogarkov's demotion, some even questioning whether
it was, in fact, a demotion.

Those who believe it was a step

down from his previous position point to various possible causes for his removal, including his role in the KAL-007 reaction. Other analysts believe this "diversification" may have been the result of Ogarkov's considerable activity in arms control; and a few believe it was due to a statement he had made earlier that a nuclear was could be won. The former Under Secretary General of the United Nations who defected to the United States in 1978, Arkady Shevchenko, believes Ogarkov was dismissed due to his "insistence on military appropriations which the Politburo
76

considered excessive.

M i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s cou:.d have
1x0

b e e n t h e b a s i s for. ,a d i s a g r e e m e n t Ogarkov was thou.ght

have

had w i t h Defense! M i n i s t e r U s t i n o v o v e r t h e r e a d i n e s : ; of 30 S o v i e t Armed F o r c e s .

Some e x p e r t s c o u n t e r t h a t Ogarkov' s move may have

been a t y p e of promotion ( v i c e demotion) o r , a t l e a t : t , a l a t e r a l s w i t c h t:o a'llow him t o c o n t i n u e h i s work on m i l i t a r y doctrine.

YosscE Bodansky f e e l s t h a t " t h e r e i s a l:irgc!-scale

d i s i n f o r m a t i o n c.ampai.gn l a u n c h e d by t h e S o v i e t s t o I ' r e s e n t Ogarkov's reassignment as .a p o l i t i c a l l y o r i e n t e d deniot:.on." I n f a c t , Bodansky c m t i n u e s , Ogarkov w a s "promoted w i t h f u r t h e r p u r s u i t : of t h e c o u r s e h e f o r m u l a t e d , " n :.ine

.e .

his

c o n t r i b u t i o n t o S o v i e t M i l i t a r y S c i e n c e and t h e A r t of War. 31
In a l l l i k e l i h o o d the m o t i v e was t o remove a s t I-ong

m i l i t a r y p e r s o n a l i t y from t h e c e n t e r of power during; a p o t e n t i a l c r i s i s of command. By September 1984 Genc:ra!.

mart!

S e c r e t a r y Chernenko was r e g u l a r l y e m b a r r a s s i n g t h e

p r o g r e s s i v e Sovi.et b u r e a u c r a t s who d i d n ' t t h i n k a n z . t i o n a l l e a d e r s h o u l d have t o b e j u m p - s t a r t e d e v e r y morning. M i n i s t e r U s t i n o v , h i m s e l f , was a b o u t t o g o o s e - s t e p world beyond. Ogarkov' s d.isagreement w i t h U s t i n o v , which hE.d become more e v i d e n t a f t e r Chernenko t o o k power, might have r e s u l t e d i n an e a r l i e r di,smi:;sal h a d t h e Korean A i r L i n e s i n c i d e n t n o t happened. Defense the

j.nt<)

"In p u t t i n g him o u t f r o n t in Septembc,r 1.983 t o

j u s t i f y t h e shooti.ng down of t h e KAL p l a n e , t h e p o l i . t i c a 1 l e a d e r s h i p may have wanted t o p u t t h e onus f o r t h e z.ctj.on on

77

the Soviet Military, but MOSCOW'S insistence on its innocence and Ogarkov's sterling press conference performance may well have served to consolidate his position for some time thereafter.3 2 Eventually, however, his power waned and he

was transferred.

L. Govorov General Vladimir Govorov was the commander of troops on Sakhalin Island when the plane was shot down. Referred to as "the

guilty General'' in the days following the incident, he soon faded into the background as arguments ensued over the details of the flight. Since then, Govorov's career has continued favorably; in August 1 9 8 4 he was recognized for his role in Soviet-Elongolian joint defense efforts and was presented with the Order of the Red Banner of Combat Glory by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Mongolia. 3 3 Govorov's efforts in "increasing defense readiness of Soviet troops" earned him the order of Hero of the Soviet Union in November 1 9 8 4 . 3 4 General of the Army Govorov is now a Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Defense.35 Marshal of Aviation Petr Kirsanov Kirsanov was Commander of Aviation of the Far East Theater of Military Operations and the person probably responsible for issuing the order to destroy Korean Air Lines flight 0 0 7 . Kirsanov justified his decision in an article

published in Pravda on 20 September 1 9 8 3 , where he asserted that the Korean crew had seen the warnings of the Soviet
78

p i l o t s but ignored them.

I n t h e same a r t i c l e , Marshal

Kirsanov pointed o u t t h e coincidence of t h e Korean. o v e r f l i g h t w i t h American s p y s a t e l l i t e s overhead during S o v i e t m i s s i l e t e s t i n g a c t i v i . t i . e s . 36 Works by Kirsanov and a r t i c l e s about him hs.vc n o t appeared i n any major p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c e December 19113, and h i s whereabouts a r e unknown t o t h i s r e s e a r c h e r . 1'h::s paucity

of information d o e s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n d i c a t e step!; were

taken a g a i n s t hFm a:; a r e s u l t of h i s r o l e i n t h e BAl. i n c i d e n t , but such an hypothesis cannot be r u l e d c'ui:. senior-ranking offii.cer such a s Marshal Kirsanov ca.nnot maintain h i s s t a t u r e without e v e n t u a l l y r e a p p e a r i n g , time w i . 1 1 t e l l what has become of him.
oli -Aviation Alexsandr Ivanovich Kolcluiiov Chief Elarshal -A

Only

---

Koldunov became Commander i n Chief of Sovic,t A i r Defense Forces i n J u l y 1978, when h i s predecessor was removed, probab1.y because of e v e n t s surrounding t h e bocched i n t e r c e p t i o n o f a Korean a i r l i n e r over t h e Kola pc:n:insula. IColdunov, one of t h e top t e n Russian f i g h t e r a c e s i n W W I I , was twice a "Hero of t h e Soviet Union." For t h e nlost ? a r t ,
I

h e stayed i n t h e background during t h e KAL i n c i d e n t

Koldunov' s 60i.h b i r t h d a y f e l l i n September 1983, t:he month of t h e s h o o t i n g , b u t passed unnoticed. The normal.

d e c o r a t i o n s given t:o high-ranking Soviet o f f i c e r s on m j o r b i r t h d a y s were skipped f o r Koldunov t h i s y e a r .

I n February 1984 Koldunov published an a r t k Le,

n "Guarding Peace m c l Socialism" i n t h e magazine S e l . s : 3 .79

--

Zhizn' .37

A Marshal of Aviation during the events of

September 1 9 8 3 , he was promoted to Chief Marshal of Aviation in the Autumn of 1 9 8 4 . 38 Georgij Kornienko First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko represented the Foreign Ministry at the 9 September press conference. One of two first deputies in the ministry, Kornienko is probably Gromyko's No. 2 man. His latest public assignment

was with Gromyko's delegation meeting Secretary of State Schultz in Geneva in January 1 9 8 5 . 39 Chief Marshal of Aviation Pave1 Stepanovich Kutakhov Commander in Chief of Air Forces and Deputy Kinister of Defense from 1 9 6 9 to 1 9 8 4 , a "Hero of the Soviet Union," Kutakhov was Marshal Kirsanov's innnediate administrative supervisor during the KAL incident. Despite this, he probably had little to do with events that night. Kutakhov died 3 December 1 9 8 4 after a severe and prolonged illness.40 Colonel General Semen Romanov Romanov was Chief of the Main Staff of Air Defense Forces during the KAL incident. He was best known as the General who first suggested the Korean 747 had been mistaken for an American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. His article in Pravda led some to suspect that he was embroiled in the controversy concerning events of 1 September, but the extent

of his involvement, if any, was never determined. Romanov

died in May 1 9 8 4 , "in performance of official duties. it41
80

Xajor V a s i l i i --Konstantinovich Kazmin This name was given t o t h e p i l o t (number 805) w h o f i r e d t h e m i s s i l e s t h a t d e s t r o y e d Korean A i r Lines C.07. Whether t h e name i s genuine and whether t h i s i s t h e saiiie marl who appeared on S o v i e t t e l e v i s i o n i s u n c l e a r . The legend

b u i l t up around t h i s mysterious f i g u r e a t t r i b u t e s t o him a flowing r e c o r d of 13 years a s an i n t e r c e p t o r p i l o t j.n t h e S o v i e t Far E a s t , much of i t spent on missions a g a i n r . t American RC-135s. Despite h i s i n i t i a l fame f o l l o w i n g f:he

i n c i d e n t , Kaznin ha:; n o t been noted p u b l i c l y s i n c e .

CONCLUSION
This c h a p t e r h a s attempted t o determine threc: t h i n g s : who t h e S o v i e t s thought they were f i r i n g upon, who oiadc t h e d e c i s i o n , and wh.at i n f o r m a t i o n could be deduced based on t h e f a t e of t h e main p l a y e r s involved. The confusion caused by S o v i e t spokesmen ovei. t h e i r supposed i n a b i l i . t y t o i d e n t i f y t h e Korean a i r l i n e r was probably dc1iber.at.e; f o r , i n t h e end, t h e purpose of' S w i e t o f f i c i a l government and p r e s s s t a t e m e n t s , e s p e c i a l l y during c r i s e s such a s t:hi.s, i s n o t t o inform b u t t o manipul.ate. need only read
i !

One

small sampling of "expert" opinion:: on t h e

i n c i d e n t t o s e e t h a t t h i s manipulation was tremendously successful. The evidence i s c l e a r , however, t h a t by t h e time

t h e d e c i s i o n was made t o d e s t r o y t h e Korean intrud.e::, m y p h y s i c a l ident:ifiic:ation was i r r e l e v a n t . t h e p l a n e was a c i v i l i a n passenger p l a n e ?

Did they kiiow t h a t

Probably ye:;.
Did

81

it matter to the outcome? No--physical appearance is unimportant, the mission of the plane is the key. Did they really believe it was on a spy mission? They were unsure,

but is was probably standard procedure to assume worst case

when in doubt. Time pressure was the driving factor in making the decision to shoot the plane down. Lack of time to make a decision generally causes the decision maker to choose the safe approach. For a political body, such as the Politburo,
it is usually safe to do nothing.

For a highly regimented

entity, such as the military, it is safest to follow procedure. Procedure dictates that the flight be stopped. Could the decision have been made by the Politburo? Without a consensus--highly unlikely. Could KAL's fate have been

decided at the national military level? Yes, but time constraints and the possible political consequences to such a decision argue against it. The decision seems to have been strictly a military one, made at theater level. Little can be learned from an examination of the biographies of the players. Colonel General Romanov's death

under what could seem to be mysterious circumstances tempts one to draw a comparison with the 1978 incident where heads, literally, rolled. The temptation becomes even greater when one adds Marshal Ogarkov's "demotion" to the equation. The possible disappearance of Marshal Kirsanov, who probably made the decision to shoot, almost makes it difficult to ignore. Yielding to this temptation would be a mistake.
a2

Evidence of

Romanov's involvernent w i t h t h e Korean A i . r Lines i n c i d e n t i s circumstantial. Ogarkov's demotion, i f i t was a cleinoti.on,

was probably t h e r e s u l t of many t h i n g s , but mostly 'If a b r i l l i . a n t Chief of S t a f f p r e s s u r i n g t h e d u l l (and m i l i t a r y - p h o b i c ) b u r e a u c r a t s of t h e P o l i t b u r o once zoo o f t e n .

And f i n a l l y , Kirsanov could appear b e f o r e t h e wor1.d a t any

time

.
The most st:riking discovery made i n t h i s c h a p t e r , and

t h e t h r e a d which hinds t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s t o g e t h e r , i s t h a t given a choicc! tiet.ween two t h e o r i e s about Soviet beliavfior, one flamboyant a n d imaginative and t h e o t h e r s t a i d and o r d i n a r y , t h e s e c o n d is more l i k e l y t o resemble t h e t r u e Soviet response. Union " t r u c k s o n . "
In t h e v e r n a c u l a r of today, t h e Soviet

83

CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES

'Yakovlev, "Kamikazes.I' 2'tTass Reports," Pravda, 2 September 1983.

, "Political Provocation.1 1 3~omanov

4John F. Burns, "MOSCOW Concedes a Soviet Fighter Downed Airliner," The New York Times, 7 September 1983, p.1 '~ress Conference.1 1 'Tarasulo 'Ibid. 'Belenko, What Really Happened."

"Is Soviet Radar."

"Belenko, "Ibid.

"What Really Happened."

I2Clarence A. Robinson, Jr. "U.S. Says Soviets Knew Korean Air Lines 747 Was Commercial Flight," Aviation Week & Space Technolopy, 12 September 1983, p.18. I3Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p.179. 141bid., p.158. 15As described by Steven J. Cimbala, "Why Did the Soviets Attack the Korean Airliner?" 16Tarasulo, "Is Soviet Radar." 17Belenko, "What F.eally Happened." 1811Shortcut to Disaster ." 1911~ressConference.
I,

20NYT. Of course, this exchange was completely edited out of the Pravda version of the press conference. a4

211bid.

22'tThe United S t a t e s and t h e Soviet Union," A . i r X'orce Magazine, December 1983, pp.74-75. "30th A i r Army--the Soviet F a r East A i r F o r c e , " J a n e ' s Defence Weekly, -9 March 1985, p . 4 0 6 . 23Bodansky, "Death By t h e Book," p . 38. 24Pennington, "Tactics Gap." 2 5 1 t T r a n s c r i p tI, . 26Groves, "Charlie and KAL-007.''
271fNews Item," Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 September 1584, p . 1 .

28Yossef Bodansky, "Ogarkov Conf inned a s Wes t c r n J a n e ' s Defence Weekly, 27 October 1984, Theatre C-in-C," _p.716. 29Shevchenko, p . 1 6 5 . 30"Possibl e Antecedents and I m p l i c a t i o n s of 0g.arlc:ov ' s Demotion," --Soviet World Outlook, 15 September 1984, p.:3. 31Yossef Bodansky, "The 'Demotion' of Marshal Ogarkov: The F a c t s , " --J a n e ' s Defence Weekly, 2 2 September 1 9 8 4 , ! : ~ . 4 8 7 . 32t1Possible Antecedents and I m p l i c a t i o n s . " 33'1Soviet General Receives Award," .Jane's Defence Weekly, - 18 A u g u s t 1984, p . 2 1 6 . 340'Soviet Commander Honoured, " Janes Defence Weel!:ly, 1 0 November 1 9 8 4 , p.831. 35Krasnaya Zvezda * 2 A p r i l 1985, p . 1 . 36Marshal of Aviation Kirsanov, "The F a c t s Expose Washington," --Pravda, 20 September 1983, p . 4 .

25 3711ArmedEorces Day 1984," J a n e ' s Defence WeeE9, AUguS t 1984 , pp . 2 7 4 - 2 7 6 .

3 8 t t S o v i e t Promotion,'' V . Y . E . O . ,

26 November 1584, p . 1 0 2 .

391'Soviet Negotiators Have Experience," The . - Kmsas C i t y S t a r , 6 January 1 9 8 5 , p.7A. 40''C-in-C of' Soviet A i r Force Dies," J a n e ' s --.Deferice Weekly, 1 5 December 1.984, p.1053. 41''0i>ituary," Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 2 May 1984, p . 4 . 85

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

. . i s incident began From the Soviet perspective, t innocently enough. Border violations, though not

particularly common, can be handled by the routine air defense machinery already in place. However, it soon became

apparent that this was no routine border violation. The intruder took no steps to alter his course; his flight continued in a straight line deep into Soviet territory, passing over, or at least perilously close to, a sensitive military installation. Simply reporting the plane's

movements and reacting locally was no longer appropriate. Guidance from higher exchelons was needed.

At theater level, decision makers knew of the missile

testing scheduled for around that time and in approximately that place. They probably also were aware that the plane was

a civilian airliner. The intelligence personnel at this level could certainly brief the commander that Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline, sometimes carries out intelligence missions, but what Soviet officer would be willing to say that Western airline companies never do?

By now, precious time had passed, but the aircraft,

despite leaving Soviet airspace, could still be considered under Soviet control, for Soviet territory virtually
86

surrounds t h e Sea of Okhotsk. command was n e c e s s a r y .

Guidance from t h e ria.:ional

It i s impossible t o determine Moscow's t r u e ::esponse.

I t i s p o s s i b l e c h a t t h e P o l i t b u r o was n o t aware of' t h e

s i t u a t i o n u n t i l a f t e r i t had been played o u t .

Due

KO

*:he

n a t u r e of resportsc! E i n a l l y t a k e n , t h e Chief of the General S t a f f , Marshal. Clgarkov, was l i k e w i s e p r o b a b l y n o t a c t i v e l y invol.ved. Parti.ci.pat:ion from Moscow, i f t h e r e was a n y , was

probably t h a t of s i m p l y concurring with a c t i o n s taken by t h e

military.
The d e c i s i o n was l e f t t o t h e T h e a t e r . And t h e ';:heater

A i r Commander, Marshal of A v i a t i o n P e t r Kirsanov, m d e k i s

d e c i s i o n by t h e book.

LESSONS LEARNED -AND SUGGESTIONS _ FOR . FURTHER STUDY

S oviet -

C r i s i s Management .This t h e s i s has uncovered one i n s t a n c e when

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r handling a c r i s i s h a s r e v e r t e d t c t h e Soviet m i l i t a r y . Whether t h e p o l i t i c a l 'Leaders of t h e

country d e l - i b e r a t e l y allowed t h e m i l i t a r y t o r e s o l v e the q u e s t i o n o r whether they were unable t o s t o p i t f r m doing

s o , they l e f t t h e p e r s o n a l management of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
problem t o a m i l i t a r y commander. This has s e r i o u s

i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e United S t a t e s and t h e r e s t o f t h e world. I n t h e United S t a t e s , t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of a need

t c i

have t h e ci.vil i.an lc?adership manage c r i s e s brought about. t h e c r e a t i o n of a C r i s i s Action System ( C A S ) . The CAS e x i s t s t o

87

ensure direct control of any crisis by the President and the National Command Authority ( N C A ) . Briefly, CAS allows for

situation monitoring and a phased development of response, during which the NCA explores every option available to it for resolving the problem, including political and diplomatic action. If military action is deemed necessary, the responsibility for it and control of it lies with the civilian leaders.1 The lack of similar safeguards in the Soviet system allows the Politburo to abdicate this responsibility to the military. This thereupon limits the number of ways an issue a military solution. An example of

can be resolved to one:

the depth to which this is anchored in Soviet policy can be seen in the Soviet border law giving local commanders the right to fire upon intruders into their airspace. Viktor Belenko maintains it goes beyond law,
n

...once an alien

aircraft ventures into Soviet airspace it must not be allowed to escape.1IL The KAL-007 incident is only one instance of the Soviet military controlling a crisis. Further research into Soviet responses to other crises may expose additional examples of direct military involvement in the decision-making process. Data taken from these other

incidents may reveal a method for determining when crisis management reverts from civilian authorities to the military.
Is it determined by time constraints?

If

so,

does this mean

the military bears the responsibility for deciding a

88

s u i t a b l e response t o a p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t of incoming m i s s i l e s ? Reaction t i m e i n t h i s c a s e would b e much less than :he two and one h a l f hour:; a v a i l a b l e t o t h e d e c i s i o n makers i n t h e

KAL i n s t a n c e .
Perhaps tihe switchover from c i v i l i a n t o mil.i.:ary c o n t r o l of a c r i s i s i s based on degree of s e v e r i t y . d e s t r u c t i o n of
ii

I the

c i v i l i a n a i r l i n e r and t h e d e a t h s

0:: 269

innocent passengers c o n s t i t u t e t h e l e s s s e v e r e enci of i h e s c a l e , what doe:: i t t a k e t o g e t t h e n a t i o n a l 1eade:r:;hip involved i n a c l - i s i , s l The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y a s decisi.oii makers, on t h e o t h e r harid, may be determined s i m p l y by the 1)re:;ence o r absence of fcn-nial procedures. If t h i s i s the case, i t i s

i n our i n t e r e s t : ; t:o f i n d which e v e n t s have corresgotiding responses formal.iic.ed by procedure and which do n o t . Clearly,

unaut:horized a i r c r a f t f l y i n g over S o v i e t a i r s p a c e a r e handled by procedure. The importance of t h i s t y p e of i n f o r m a t i o n t o American p o l i c y makers cannot be overemphasized. More

in-depth a n a l y s i s of o t h e r S o v i e t r e s p o n s e s , how and at: which l e v e l they were decided, would a i d U . S . decis:.on makers
by allowing them t:o p r e d i c t p o t e n t i a l S o v i e t r e a c t i o n s t o

crises. Decision Making: S o v i e t T a c t i c a l ---

What -i t

Means -for the U.S.

I t i s e s s e n t i a l t o s e p a r a t e t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n s from

s t r a t e g i c ones.

S t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s , such as t h e blockade of

B e r l i n , a r e made according t o s i t u a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l l y , by

a9

Soviet civilian leaders to further national interests. Tactical decisions, on the other hand, like the KAL incident, are made and carried out according to established procedures,
in this case by the military.

By its very nature, a strategic decision can be affected by U.S. policies. Carried out over a period of time, implementation of a strategic decision is controlled by the national leaders. When international pressure threatens the interests for which the decision was made, the decision maker can change direction, modifying or completely changing the original decision. Thus the U.S. response to the Berlin blockade effected a change in position.
A tactical decision, on the other hand, is made at a

lower level following strict guidelines. Although the results of the decision may change (perhaps due to faulty implementation) the same basic decision will be made over again until the procedure or guidelines are changed. In the case of Soviet reaction to violations of its airspace, this change is unlikely to happen. Despite the intensity of international hostility toward the KAL events, the procedure used to deal with it appears to have remained intact. This is not unexpected, if one considers the history of Soviet Air Defense actions since WWII. Indeed, after the

1978 border incursion mentioned earlier, Soviet border law

was actually strengthened. Clearly, actions taken by the United States after the fact stand little chance of forcing
a change in procedure.
90

Of b e n e f i t would be a study to provide information surrounding i n c i d e n t s where g u i d e l i n e s and procedures or t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n s have been changed due t o interrta,:ioiial pressure. The r e s u l t s of such a study could be ana:tyzed f o r

ways t h e U. S . might. i n f l u e n c e a change i n Soviet g;u:ide:lines v i s - a - v i s o v e r f l i g h t s of i t s t e r r i t o r y . U n t i l t h e procedure changes, t h e S o v i e t s w i l : . continue t o respond i n t h e unacceptable f a s h i o n descriljed i n t h e western sayi.ng, "Shoot f i r s t , a s k q u e s t i o n s l a t c ! r . " Perhaps a more a p p r o p r i a t e r e n d i t i o n f o r t h e Soviet:; would b e , "Shoot f i r s t , make excuses l a t e r . " Disinformation Soviet di.si.nformation i s one of t h e g r a v e s t i:hrt?ats t o t h e United S t a t e s and o t h e r modern democracies, where educated opini.on i.s expected t o guide n a t i o n a l po1ic:y. erodes t h e confidence of c i t i z e n s i n t h e i r government.
It
It

causes t h e pub1i.c t o apply p r e s s u r e on t h e i r l e a d e r s i r t ways t h a t b e n e f i t tlhe Soviet Union. between America and h e r a l l i e s .

It can even promote d i v i s i o n

Yet f o r a l l t h i s , t.he word

i s v i r t u a l l y unk.nown t o t h e Western man on t h e s t r e e t .

"Disinformation" d.oes n o t even appear i n Webster's blew World Dictionary. The Russian. word "dezinformatsiya" means, "de.ception,
n

using f a l s e information. I d

This d e s c r i b e s p e r f e c t l ] , much

of t h e campaign wagod by t h e S o v i e t s t o s h i f t t h e blame from themselves t o t b e American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n following t h e KAL incident. The e x t e n t of t h e i r success can be measwed by the

91

large number of people who have allowed themselves to forget the basic issue, "Is it right to destroy a commerical airliner and kill 269 people aboard because that airliner has overflown your country's airspace illegally?" and ask instead about American espionage involvement in the affair. Following the KAL incident, American officials were surprised to find themselves on the defensive at press conferences. The Soviet statement that the Korean airliner was on a spy mission for U.S. Intelligence agencies provided the press with a controversy and an alternative to focusing on the Soviet role in the affair. Western publications had begun to speculate on possible involvement in the flight by the United States. The Soviet response to KAL-007 had been
so

vile that even the successful disinformation campaign had

not removed them totally from the focus of attention, but their statements did force the U.S. to share in the undesirable spotlight of guilt. Disinformation is successful in the West because most Westerners want to be fair and are prepared to examine both sides of an argument before making a decision on which side to support. What many are unwilling to accept is that the Soviet government blatently lies. This thesis has shown many instances of Soviet statements which have been disproven and thus bear no similarity to actual events. Ogarkov's circuitous route is one example. His explanation is arithmetically impossible, yet some people still accept it as fact. Ogarkov's earlier statement that the IUL flight passed
92

over a s e n s i t i v e Soviet naval i n s t a l l a t i o n a t t h e stime time

an American reconnaissance s a t e l l i t e was overhead

fabrication.

i:i

also a

LllC John Reppert, A s s i s t a n t Army Att.ache i n

Moscow a t t h e t h e of t h e KAL i n c i d e n t , has calcu1ai:ed u s i n g Ogarkov's own f i g u r e s t h a t no such coincidence betwcen t h e plane. and t h e s a t e l l i t e s occurred. Ogarkov's l i e s r a i s e

doubt:s about t h e ve.racity of a l l Soviet s t a t e m e n t s , More st:ucly i s needed i n t h e a r e a of disinforriat-ion. The United S t a t e s has found no e f f e c t i v e countermea:;ure t o a s u c c e s s f u l Soviet d i s i n f o r m a t i o n campaign. While some Soviet

e f f o r t s a r e aniat:urish, such a s t h e s e r i e s of 1 e t t e r : i s e n t t o African ath1et.e:; and signed by t h e Ku-Klux Klan (sic:--i:he term i s hyphenated i n Russian but n o t i n English) wiiming them n o t t o at:tencl the L o s Angeles Olympics, most ciimpiiigns r e f l e c t t h e h i g h degree of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i n t h i s f::eld t h a t t h e S o v i e t s have achieved. In-depth s t u d i e s of s p e c i f i c

d i s i n f o r m a t i o n campaigns may y i e l d a p o s s i b l e meth.od f o r count:ering their- i.nfluence. Meanwhile, a s long a s :ire12

people everywhere seek t o formulate independent dec:lsions based on information coming t o them, Comrade Dezinformatsiya
w i l l be only t o o happy t o provide i t .

Maskirovka, --St:r:itcgic - Deception

This st:utly has only touched on s t r a t e g i c ma.slcirovka,

which seems t o havc been e x t e n s i v e l y used d u r i n g a.nd a f t e r the incident. "Naskirovka" ( l i t . masking) r e f e r s t o t h e

Soviet: p r a c t i c e of camoflauge, concealment, and deception intended t o m i . s l e a c 1 t h e enemy and thus achieve t h e :;ur.>rise

93

necessary for victory.

Concealment of strategic weapons and

posturing is referred to as "strategic maskirovka" and has received special emphasis following the establishment of a Chief Directorate of Strategic Maskirovka (GUSM).

GUSM is

commanded by the senior First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, reflecting the importance strategic maskirovka has to the Soviet military. Researchers entertaining ideas about

studying "Maskirovka and KAL-007" would find Yossef Bodansky's article, "Death By the Book," a good place to start.5 IN CONCLUSION Although presented in this paper as an individual, Major Kazmin, the Soviet fighter pilot, is actually a synecdoche for all Soviet military officers. He is proud of his country, patriotic, and willing to carry out any order given him without question. Failing a change in Soviet air defense procedure, the United States will deal with Major Kazmin again, perhaps not this year or next, but eventually. The final words of this thesis are his. that moment.

"It is difficult to talk of my emotions at

I had a specific task assigned me and I tried

to accomplish it as well as possible, a military task, which is the meaning of my life.t i 6

94

CHAPTER 5
ENDNOTES

'Joint pp.7-417-8.

St:aff --- O f f i c e r ' s Guide, AFSC Pub 1, Ju1.y :L984,

"

2Belenko, "That R e a l l y Happened.

I'

3 S l o v a r ' Kusskogo Yazyka, 1968 e d . , I Dezinf o E a t s j . y a .4 Personal. i n t e r v i e w , 30 A p r i l 1985 5Bodansky, "Death By the Book."

S.V.

6t, S o v i e t F i g h t e r P i l o t s ' Remarks on T e l e v i s i o n , " The New York Times, 11. September 1983.

95

APPENDIX I

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.

Periodicals

"American Politicians Are Twisting and Turning,'I Pravda (5 September 1983): 5; Izvestiya (6 September 1983): 4 Andropov, Yurij V. "Statement," Soviet Military Review, 12 Supplement (December 1983): 1-22 "Armed Forces Day 1984," Jane's Defence Weekly (25 August 1984) : 274-276 Bavaro, Edward J. "Soviet Pilots: HOW do they measure up?," US Army Aviation Digest, 29/8 (August 1983): 32-35 Belenko, Viktor. "What Really Happened to Flight 007," Reader's Digest (Canadian), 124 (January 1984): 25-30 Berns, Lennart. "Soviet Intelligence. Soviet and Warsaw Pact Air Incidents," Jane's Defence Weekly (12 January 1985): 5 8 Black, Larry. "XAL Disaster and the Soviet Press," International Perspectives (January/February 1984): 14

11-

Bodansky, Yossef. "Death By the Book," Air Force Magazine (December 1983): 37-41 Bodansky, Yossef. "The 'Demotion' of Marshal Ogarkov: Facts," Jane's Defence Weekly ( 2 2 September 1984): The 407

Bodansky, Yossef. "Ogarkov Confirmed as Western Theatre C-in-C," Jane's Defence Weekly (27 October 1984): 716 Borisov, X., Col. "A Branch of American Intelligence--South Korean Air Lines in the Service of the CIA," Krasnaya Zvezda (16 September 1983): 3 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Tragic Dilemmas of Soviet World Power," Encounter, L X I / 4 (December 1983): 10-17 Burns, John F. "Moscow Concedes a Soviet Fighter Downed Airliner," The New York Times (7 September 1983) : 1

96

Bussert, J i m . "Soviet A i r Defense Systems Show 1ncrea:;ing S o p h i s t i c a t i o n , " Defense E l e c t r o n i c s 16/5(May 1!184:1: 75-86 Cimbala, Steven J. "Why Did t h e S o v i e t s Attack t h e Korean A i r l i n e r ," E1at:ional Defense 68/398 (May/June 19114)

77-79
"C-in-C of Soviet A i r Forces D i e s , " J a n e ' s Defence--. \leek> December 1.984): 1053 "Conrade Y u r i ' s Unlikely Biographer--an I n t e r v i e w with Medvedev," S a n i t y (November 1983) : 7-9 Connell, Jon and Richard Owen and Simon Freeman. "US LJames G u i l t y Sovict General," The Sunday T i m e s 8304 ( L September 1983): 1 Coplev. Gregory R. "MOSCOW Prepares f o r S t r a t e g y Chanr:es: c i 0 0 7 i s the Watershed," Defense & Foreign-Affair:; --.XI/11 (November 1.983) : 35-38
. I

(15

"Cyni.ca1 Fnbrica.ti.cins-- t h e American P r e s i d e n t ' s Specbch ,. " Pravda ( 7 Sept.ember 1983): 5 Doe, Charles. "Ai.r'line Tragedy Shows Soviet Shortcomi:igs ," A i r Force Ti.mes -- 1 4 ( 2 4 October 1983): 23-25 --Ebata, Kensuke. "Japan Conf inns Soviet MiG-31s Ovei' Sakhalin," J a n e ' s Defence Weekly (15 December 1984): 1064 Epishev, A . , Genera.L of t h e Army. " M i l i t a r i s t i c Concepts i n C r i s i s ," Soviet M i l i t a r y Review 1 2 Supplement (I)ect!mber 1983): 1=2-"The F a c t s Expose," Pravda ( 1 2 September 1983):
5

F a m i g l i e t t i , L,eonard. " F i g h t e r s Told Not t o Shoot Air Space A i . r Force Times 1 0 ( 2 6 September 19f83): 2 V i o l a t o r s , " -F i l a t o v , V., Col.. "A Plane Took Off From Anchorage," Krasnaya Zvezda -- (13 September 1983): 3 Groves, B i l l . "Cha-rlie and KAL-O07--Charlie Got There First," Defense E l e c t r o n i c s 15/11 (November 198:s):
11

Hutchinson, Robert:. "Soviet CGS Loses Job i n S u r p r i s e Moscow R e s h u f f l e , " _J a n e ' s Defence Weekly (15 September 1 9 8 4 ) : 435 "In t:he USSR Conmi-ttee f o r ICAO A f f a i r s , " Pravda ( 1 1 A p r i l 1.984): 5

97

Inman, Bobby R. "An Interview with Adm. Bobby R. Inman USN(Ret), Signal 38/2 (October 1983): 12-18 Kirsanov, Marshal of Aviation. ''The Facts Expose Washington," Pravda (20 September 1983): 4 Korionov, Vitalij. "A Policy of Sabotaging Peace," Pravda (6 September 1983): 4 "Kremlin Power Struggle?" F.P.E.O. (17 September 1984): Lohr, Steve. "Pilot in the '78 Incident Recalls His Experience.,''The New York Times (9 September 1983) Lowther, William and David Cox. "Follow up: The Mysteries of KAZ, Flight 007," Maclean's 97/15 (9 April 1984): 8-12 Mann, P.Q. (Anonymous). "Reassessing the Sakhalin Incident,'' Defence Attache 3 (1984): 41-56 "Xore and More New Facts," Pravda (16 September 1983) : News Item, Krasnaya Zvezda (7 September 1984): News Item, Krasnaya Zvezda (2 April 1985): Obituary, Krasnaya Zvezda (22 May 1984): 5
1

Ogarkov, Nikolaj, PIarshal of the Soviet Union. "Teace Must Be Defended Reliably," Soviet Military Review 12 Supplement (December 1983): Pennington, Rana J., Capt. "Closing the Tactics Gap," Air _ . Force Magazine 6713 (March 1984): 83-88 "Possible Antecedents and Implications of Ogarkov's Demotion," Soviet World Outlook (15 September 1984): "Press Conference in MOSCOW," Pravda (10 September 1983): "Provocateurs are Covering Up the Traces," Pravda ( 4 September 1983): 5; Izvestiya (5 Septe-983): 3 3 4

"The ResponsibiLity Lies with the USA," Krasnaya Zvezda ( 2 6 August 1984): 3 Robinson. Clarence A.. Jr. "U.S. Savs Soviets Knew Korean Air Lines 747 Was.Commercia1 Flight," Aviation Week & Space Technology ( 1 2 September 1983): 1 8 Romanov, S., Colonel General. "A Political Provocation with a Far-Reaching Air," Pravda (5 September 1983): 5 Scott, Harriet F. "Deadly Guardians of Soviet Airspace," 98

A i r Force f i w i z i n e 6713 (March 1 9 8 4 ) :

74-82
l9- 3 1

" S e c u r i t y CouncLl," UN Chronicle (November 1983) :

"Shoot F i r s t , A s k Q u e s t i o n s L a t e r , " S a n i t y (Elovembe:: 1983) :

5
It

S h o r t c u t t o D i s a s t . e r I " The Sunday Times ( 4 Septemb(:r 1983)

Shribman, David. "Side E f f e c t : Peek a t US 1 n t e l l i i ; e n c e A b i . l i t i e s , " The N e w York Times ( 2 September 1983) : A7 "Sokolov a t Ceremon.y," J a n e ' s Defence Weekly ( 1 6 March 1 9 8 5 ) : 433
II

S o v i e t Commander Honoured," Jane's Defence Weekly 1:10 November 1 9 6 4 ) : 831

"Sovi.et F i g h t e r P i l o t s ' Remarks on T e l e v i s i o n , " The N e w York Times (11 Sept:ember 1983) ,I

S o v i e t General Rcxeives Award," J a n e ' s Defence W e d 9 (18 August 1 9 8 4 ) : 21.6

"Soviet Government S t a t e m e n t , " Pravda ( 7 September 19811) : I z v e s t i f i ( 8 Sept:ember 1983)-

1;

"Soviet Intellig,enclc. Armed Forces Day 1984," ---. J a n e ' s [)eEence Weekly ( 2 5 August: 1984) : 2 7 4 - 2 7 6 "Soviet N e g o t i a t o r s Have Experience," The Kansas CitES . -t a r ( 6 January 1 9 8 5 ) : 7a
II

S o v i e t P r i o r i t i e s and KAL-007 , I 1 J o u r n a l of Defence h -Diplomacy (October 1983) : 1 7

"Soviet Promotion," F . Y . E . O .

( 2 6 November 1 9 8 4 ) :

1C2

"Soviet SU-15 Shoot:; Down Korean 7 4 7 , " A v i a t i o n Week & TcchnoLogy 1 1 9 / 1 0 ( 5 September 1 9 8 3 ) :

Space
It

T a r a s u l o , Yitzhak, Dr. "Is S o v i e t Radar Really That k d ? Armed J o u r n a l (February 1984): 70-74 - Forces"TASS R e p o r t s , " Pravda ( 2 September 1 9 8 3 ) : September 1 9 m T z 4

5; Izvestiya

"TASS S t a t e m e n t , " Pravda ( 3 September 1 9 8 3 ) :

Taubman, P h i l i p . "Korean J e t Signaled R u s s i a n s , US Sa:/s The New York --Times ( 3 September 1983)

,"

Taubman, P h i l i p . "US Analysts Say A i r l i n e r 14ay H a v e Taken Short Cut," The New York Times ( 4 September 1 9 8 3 ) : 18

99

"30th Air Amy--The Soviet Far East Air Force," Jane's Defence Weekly (9 March 1985): 406 Tolkunov, A. "Provocative Undertaking Fails," Pravda (4 September 1983): 5 Tolkunov, A . "Washington's Immoral Action," Pravda (4 September 1983): 5 "Transcript of Soviet Official's Statement and Excerpts From News Session,'' The New York Times (10 September 1983) "Twisting and Turning, They Begin to Make Some Admissions," Pravda (13 September 1983): 5 "The United States and the Soviet Union," Air Force Mapazine (December 1983): 74-75 "US Intercepts Soviet Fighter Transmissions," Aviation Week h Space Technology (12 September 1983): 2 2 2 3 Ustinov, Dimitrij F., Marshal of the Soviet Union. "To Struggle for Peace, To Strengthen the Defense Capability," Soviet Military Review 12 Supplement (December 1983) Weisman, Steven R. "US Says Spy Plane Was in the Area of Korea Airliner," The New York Times (5 September 1983): Yakovlev, Nikolaj . "Cold War Kamikazes , I 1 New Times (September 1983): 26 Zakharov, V. What Is Behind the Incident," Pravda (6 September 1983): 4 2. Books
1

Adomeit, Xannes. Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982 Barron, John. MiG Pilot. New York: Avon Books, 1981 Rohmer, Richard, Major-General. Massacre 747. Markham, Ontario: Paperjacks, 1984 Shevchenko, Arkady N. Breaking With Moscow. Alfred A . Knopf, 1985 New York:

Yanov, Alexander. Detente after Brezhnev: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy. Berkely: Institute of International Studies, 1977 100

3.

Unpublished A r t i c l e s

E v e r e t t , Dennis. Personal l e t t e r (March 1 9 8 5 ) , conr:aining account of i n t e r v i e w with D r . Yitzhak Tarasulo Tarasulo, Yitzhak, Dr. " F l i g h t 007 and t h e Nonsense B~inanza"

4.

Ki.scel.laneous

National Deferisc U n i v e r s i t y , Armed Forces S t a f f Ccll.iege, J o i n t S t a f f O f f i c e r ' s Guide 1984. AFSC Public:a,:ion No. 1 (July 1981I ) . Reppert:, John, LTC. U.S. Army Command and General. :jtaEf College, I ' t , Imwenworth, Kansas. I n t e r v i e w , 31) A u r i l 1985.

101

APPENDIX I1

TRANSLITERATION CHART

I 3 B

A B

a
E X

v
G D

P C T

Y Q,

S T U F

3 I 4
GI

K J M H
0

E ZH Z I J K L M N 0 P

KH TS CH SH SHCH
)I

Y
I

EH YU YA

102

APPENDIX I11

L I S T OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, -.--

AND FOREIGN WORDS

ABM

AN0
CC

--

A n t i - B a l l i s t i c Missile
A i r N a v i g a t i o n a l Beacons

C e n t r a l Coimittee
Communist: P a r t y o f t h e S o v i e t Union

CPSU

Depu.tat - C a l l s i g n u s e d by t h e ground c o n t r o l l e r wh3 d i r e c t e d t h e S o v i e t i n t e r c e p t o r t o KAL-007

DIA DV

.- Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency

F a r E a s t (11a.L'n.i-j V o s t o k )

DV-TVL)

Var Ea:stei:n

Theater of M i l i t a r y Operations

DV-VO
GUSM

F a r Eastern M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t Upravlenie S t r a t e g i c h e s k o j Maskirovki)

-. Chief D i r e c t o r a t e f o r S t r a t e g i c Maskirovka ((;la-vnoe

IAPVO
ICAO

F i g h t e r A v i a t i o n of t h e A i r Defense ( I s t r e b i t e l ' n a y a Avid t s i ya 1?VO)

-. I n t e r n a t i o n a l C i v i l A v i a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n
KAL-007,

KA-007,
KGB

KE:-007

Korean A i r L i n e s f l i g h t 0117

Committee for S t a t e S e c u r i t y ( K o m i t e t Gosudar:jtvennoj Bezopasnosl: i.)

Maskirovka - Soviet. term f o r camof l a u g e , c o n c e a l m e n t , m d d e c e p t i o n ( l i t . "masking")

PVO

-. A i r Defense

( Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona) : G r : . g i n a l l y PVO Strariy ( A i r Defense of t h e Homeland), noti V o j s k a PVO ( ~ r o o p s o f t h e A i r Defense)

RC

135 U . S . Reconnaissance a i r c r a f t ; m i l i t a r y vf!rs.ion of Boeing 7 0 7

103

SA-5

Surface-to-air missiles based in Xamchatka Sukhoj-15 (NATO "Flagon") ; two-engine interceptor flown in reaction to KAL-007 over Sakhalin Island Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza); the official Soviet news agency

SU-15 TASS

TVD VO

Theater of Military Operations (Teatr Voennykh Dejstvij); echelon above military district Military District (Voennyj Okrug)

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APPENDIX IV CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1950

8 A p r i . 1 - 8-29, f l y i n g photo r e c o n m i s s i o n o v e r S o v i e t B a l t i c p o r t c i t y s h o o t s a t S o v i e t f i g h t e r s r e a c t i n g t:o i t ; "disappears" a f t e r heading out t o sea.

P o l i c y s t a t e d that: S o v i e t p i l o t s a r e d u t y bound t o :iorce v i o l a t o r s t o 1.a.nd a n d , i f n e c e s s a r y , t o open f ' i r e on t:h em.

1958 2 September

EC-1.30 s h o t down o v e r Armenia

1960 1 May - F r a n c i s Gary Powers i n U2 e n r o u t e from P a k i s t a n t o Norway s h o t down o v e r S v e r d l o v s k

5 May
July

S o v i e t s r e p o r t t h e shoot-down
RB-47 s h o t down o v e r Barents Sea

1978 A p r i l - Korean Air L i n e s f l i g h t s h o t down over S0vic.t K a r e l i a ; t h e S o v i e t s s a y i t was " f o r c e d t o l a n d . " KAL p i l o t c l a i m s h e t r i e d t o c o n t a c t t h e S o v i e t s by r a d i o , s i g n a l l e d h i s i n t e n t i o n t o f o l l o w , then was shot down. SOVIET:; FOUND NO REASON TO BELIEVE THIS WAS A SE'Y .?LANE.

1979 A r t i c l e s w r i t t e n by l e a d i n g S o v i e t a i r t a c t i c i a n b e r a t i m g p i l o t s who f a i l t o t a k e r i s k s o r t o t a k e the i n i t i a t i v e . "Quick K i l l " p o l i c y i n t r o d u c e d - - n a t i o n a l PVO HQ pem:is:i:ion i s no l o n g e r needed t o s h o o t down i n t r u d e r s

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1982 Soviet Border Law enacted: article 36 gives Air Defense Forces permission to shoot down border violators.

1983 31 August

- KAL-007 departs Anchorage

(12:45 A.M.) KAL-007, on course, begins to divert (2:45 A.M.) RC-135 first tracked by Soviet radar (according to Soviets) (4:OO A.M.) Soviet fighters begin tracking KAL-007 (4:51 A.M.) Second plane (KAL-007) first appears on Soviet radar screens (according to Soviets) (5:07 A.M.) KAL wrongly reports position over Nippi. fact, it is over Kamchatka

In

(6:12 A.M.) Soviet pilot reports visual contact; Japanese radar notes unidentified aircraft entering Sakhalin air space (6:18 A.M.) KAL radios second incorrect position near Nokka and asks permission for routine ascent (6:20 A.M.) KAL reports ascent complete; Japanese radar notes three fighters now with the plane (6:23 A.M.) Korean aircraft pilot makes last contact with Japanese air controllers
( 6 : 2 6 A.M.) Soviet pilot reports target destroyed

(6:27 A.M.) Final (garbled) transmission from Korean plane (according to the Japanese): "This is KE007 ..." followed by static (6:38 A.M.) KAL-007 disappears from radar (according to US)
2 September - Pravda (page 5) first announces an unidentified aircraft w Z 7 G e r v e d twice entering Soviet airspace; no air navigational lights, no response to fighters actions, no radio communications

3 September - TASS first claims warning shots were fired and the plane "disappeared from radar" over the Sea of Japan 106

4 September - Pravda r e p o r t s f a i l u r e of censure i n IJN s e c u r i t y cEGi6T.T 5 Septembfx - Colonel General Romanov s t a t e s i n Pravda t h a t Soviet p i l o t s t : r i e d t o c o n t a c t KAL-007 on 1 2 T T 3 i : z and ci second emerge'ncy frequency, but go no r e p l y ; : i i g h t e r f i r e d t h r e e warning s h o t s ; says t h a t p i l o t d i d n ' t r e a l i z e plane was c i v i l , it had t h e contours of an RC-135; warns governments t h a t v i o l a t o r s may be Handbook . i n t e r c e p t e d arid compelled t o land ( c i t e s Soviet of A e r i a l Navigation Information) 6 September - Pravda a r t i c l e s t a t e s t h a t f l y i n g witliou;: nav beacons i s X a Y z c t e r i s t i c of American recon platies; s t a t e s Tokyo E'CC r e c e i v e d a msg from t h e plane r e p o r t i n g passing over southern Kamchatka, a l l proceeding noi:rnally; says tapes r e f e r t o p i l o t s mentioning an RC-135
7 September - Pravda announces t h a t t h e Regional PVO command decided KAL-OO-was a recon plane on a s p e c i a l ciission

Pravda announccrnent confirms t h a t 1 2 1 . 5 mhz i s s e t i n Soviet f i g h t e r s

9 September - Unprecedented P r e s s conference i n Moscow r e KAL i n c i d e n t , l e d by Karshal Ogarkov, a t t e n d e d by G<!orgij Kornieriko and Leonid Zam' y a t i n (head of Internat.io.:ial Inf ormat i o n Dept )
1 3 September - Soviet. p i l o t t e l l s all i n a r t i c l e for. Kt-asnaya Zvezda; s a y s h e h a s been chasing RC-135s f o r 1 3 y z i r s ; ZiGi7t: mention a Boeing 7 4 7 1 6 September - I C A O condemns shootdown

1 7 September - r e g u l a r meeting of CPSU P o l i t b u r o : ignore i n c i d e n t , focus on b u s i n e s s a s u s u a l

Iepcirts

2 0 September - Marshal of Aviation Kirsanov p o i n t s c u t coincidence o f Soviet m i s s i l e t e s t s , US s p y s a t e l l i.L:es passing overhead, US recon planes and s h i p s i n t h e a r e a , and t h e KAL f l i g h t

September - Marshal of Aviation Koldunov's 60th birthd.iiy passes without t r a d i t i o n a l g i v i n g of award

24 October - comments of AF Chief of S t a f f , Rand Corporation analyst:, H I T P r o f e s s o r , and o t h e r s t h a t Soviet AD i s so i n e p t , t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y , perhaps p r o b a b i l i t y i s t h a t S o v i e t s r e a l l y d i d m i x KA-007 up w i t h RC-135

107

1984 -

9 February
22 May

President Andropov dies

- Obituary for Colonel General Romanov who died in performance of official duties - Ogarkov is relieved of duties as Chief of the General Staff and is designated CinC of the Western Theatre of War

7 September

3 December

- Commander in Chief of Soviet Air Force, Marshal Kutakhov dies

27 December - Defense Minister Ustinov dies; replaced by Marshal Sokolov

108

APPENDIX V
INITIAL --__

DISTRIBUTION L I S T

1.

Combinei 'rms Research L i b r a r y U . S . A m y Comiand and General S t a f f College F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 I)ef ense Techni.ca1. Information Center Cameron S t a t i o n Alexandria, V i r g i n i a 22314
LTC G a r r e t t R. Fonda U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
LTC L e s l i e E . h g i e U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College Fort: Leavetiworth, Kansas 66027

2.

3.

4.

5.

COL Max G . Mmwnring U . S . Airmy War College Car1is:Le Rarracks, Pennsylvania 17013

109