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.

MSCyPT-R-69-13
b

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N A T I O N A L A E R O N A U T I C s A N D SPACE A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

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APOLLO 9 30-DAY FA1LURE AND ANOMALY LISTING REPORT

30 DAY - . i: F A I L U R E AND A N O f i A L Y L I S T X I G REPORT (NASA) :: 43 p

APOLLO 9:

N74-72469

i.

Unclas
00/99

16728

DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING

T h i s paper i s not suitable far general distribution or referencing. I t may be referenced only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations.
i .

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

* *

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.D

HOIJSTON.TEXAS

APRIL 1969

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M S C-PT-RL 69-i 3

APOLLO 9 30-DAY FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING REPORT

PREPARED BY

Mission Evaluation Team

APPROVED BY

G o r g e M. Low Manager, Apollo S p a c e c r a f t Program

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

HOUSTON, TEXAS
April

1969

INTRODUCTION
T h i s r e p o r t c o n t a i n s a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s i g n i f i c a n t anomalies n o t e d d u r i n g t h e Apollo 9 mission. The d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s e items is d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e major areas: command and s e r v i c e modules , l u n a r module, and government-furnished equipment. The s t a t u s of t h e open anomalies w i l l b e maintained i n t h e Anomaly S t a t u s Report. COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES PROPELLANT I S O L A T I O N VALVE CLOSURES Following s e p a r a t i o n from t h e S-IVB, t h e crew r e p o r t e d a c o n t r o l problem which had lasted f o r about 1 2 minutes d u r i n g t h e t r a n s p o s i t i o n p e r i o d . The crew f i r s t n o t i c e d a l a c k of c a p a b i l i t y f o r t r a n s l a t i o n t o t h e l e f t . The p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t o r f l a g s f o r t h e quad C primary and second a r y p r o p e l l a n t i s o l a t i o n v a l v e s and t h e quad D secondary valves were i n t h e "barber p o l e " o r c l o s e d p o s i t i o n ( f i g . 1). The v a l v e s were opened and t h e system performed normally t h e r e a f t e r . These v a l v e s had been opened d u r i n g f i n a l checks p r i o r t o launch and were v e r i f i e d t o be open by t h e crew j u s t p r i o r t o s e p a r a t i o n from t h e S-IVB. P r o p e l l a n t usage and quad temperature data showed t h a t all f o u r quad C valves were c l o s e d and t h a t quad D w a s performing normally b e f o r e t h e crew opened t h e p r o p e l l a n t i s o l a t i o n valves, P r o p e l l a n t may be supp l i e d from e i t h e r t h e primary or secondary t a n k s and only t h e secondary t a n k v a l v e s were c l o s e d on quad D. Angular rate d a t a t r a n s m i t t e d s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e v a l v e s were opened v e r i f i e d normal o p e r a t i o n of quad C. The f o l l o w i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s e x p l a i n t h e v a l v e c l o s u r e s :
1. Momentary, i n a d v e r t e n t switch a c t u a t i o n by t h e crew This i s not v e r y l i k e l y , as both t h e Commander and t h e Command Module P i l o t made a c u r s o r y check of t h e p a n e l a f t e r t h e y exchanged seats, and n e i t h e r n o t e d any d i s c r e p a n c i e s .
2. Momentary s w i t c h c l o s u r e caused by contamination l a t e contamination was found i n t h e s w i t c h e s .

No particu-

3. E l e c t r i c a l t r a n s i e n t s t h e power r e q u i r e d .

- This

has been d i s c o u n t e d because of

4. Reduced l a t c h i n g f o r c e - T h e p r o p e l l a n t i s o l a t i o n v a l v e s i n t h e command module r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l s y s t e m a r e i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e i n t h e s e r v i c e module system. To determine whether t h e magnetic l a t c h i n g f o r c e of

..d

t h e v a l v e s could have been d e t e r i o r a t e d , t h e v a l v e s on command modules 103 and 1 0 4 and t h o s e from s e v e r a l ground t e s t s were checked. R e s u l t s compared favorably with o r i g i n a l acceptance t e s t d a t a on t h o s e p a r t i c u lar v a l v e s .

5 . Valve c l o s u r e caused by mechanical shock a t s e p a r a t i o n of t h e command and s e r v i c e modules from t h e a d a p t e r - Shock t e s t s were run on a s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system v a l v e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e l e v e l of shock t h a t would be n e c e s s a r y t o cause a normal valve t o c l o s e . A c r o s s s e c t i o n a l view o f t h e v a l v e i s shown i n f i g u r e 2 . R e s u l t s o f t h e t e s t i n d i c a t e t h a t a shock of about 80g could cause a v a l v e t o c l o s e . The shock r e s u l t i n g from t h e p y r o t e c h n i c charges used t o s e p a r a t e t h e command and s e r v i c e modules from t h e a d a p t e r m a y have been between 40 and lOOg (analyses t o r e f i n e t h e s e values a r e i n p r o g r e s s ) .
The m o s t probable c a u s e o f t h e i n a d v e r t e n t c l o s u r e w a s t h e shock a t s e p a r a t i o n from t h e a d a p t e r . Apparently, t h e shock i s of s u f f i c i e n t magn i t u d e , d i r e c t i o n , and l o c a t i o n t h a t i t c o u l d have caused t h e s e v a l v e s t o c l o s e . The p a r t i c u l a r v a l v e s t h a t might c l o s e a r e a f u n c t i o n of t h e norm a l l a t c h f o r c e of t h e v a l v e s i n q u e s t i o n and t h e a t t e n u a t i o n and d i r e c t i o n of t h e shock from t h e s e p a r a t i o n at t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e valve. The Apollo Operations Handbook (AOH) w i l l b e changed t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e crew check t h e p r o p e l l a n t i s o l a t i o n v a l v e s immediately a f t e r separat i o n and t h a t t h e y reopen any v a l v e s which m a y have c l o s e d . T h i s anomaly i s open.
S C A N N I N G TELESCOPE SHAFT DRIVE PROBLEM

The "degrees" drums of t h e t e l e s c o p e s h a f t angle c o u n t e r on t h e opt i c s c o n t r o l p a n e l f r o z e at 64 degrees on t h e f i r s t day of t h e m i s s i o n . The "tenths" drum continued t o r o t a t e ( f i g . 3). During an alignment o f t h e i n e r t i a l measurement unit on t h e second day, t h e s h a f t d r i v e mechani s m stopped i n t e r m i t t e n t l y . I n some c a s e s , t h e u n i v e r s a l t o o l had t o b e used t o operate t h e o p t i c s manual. a d j u s t screw t o f r e e t h e mechanism. The d r i v e mechanism p e r s i s t e d i n jarmning i n t e r m i t t e n t l y u n t i l t h e f i f ' t h day, a f t e r which t h e problem disappeared. The o p t i c a l u n i t assembly w a s removed from t h e s p a c e c r a f t , and e l e c t r i c a l d r i v e t e s t s showed t h a t t h e d r i v e mechanism w a s f r e e . When t h e u n i t w a s disassembled, t h e p i n from t h e " t e n t h s " drum of t h e c o u n t e r gene v a mechanism d r i v e ( f i g . 4) w a s found wedged i n a s p l i t g e a r on t h e d r i v e s h a f t of t h e one speed r e s o l v e r i n t h e t e l e s c o p e g e a r box. The problem r e s u l t e d from an o u t - o f - t o l e r a n c e c o n d i t i o n on t h e h o l e i n t o which t h e p i n w a s p r e s s - f i t . The c o u n t e r s f o r command modules 106

Cb

and subsequent and l u n a r modules 5 and subsequent w i l l b e r e p l a c e d w i t h u n i t s which have been s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s p e c t e d f o r t h i s c o n d i t i o n . T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

LOSS OF AUTOMATIC CRYOGENIC HYDROGEN PRESSURE CONTROL

During t h e f l i g h t , t h e automatic p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l system i n t h e hydrogen t a n k s f a i l e d . The l o g i c of t h e c o n t r o l system ( f i g . 5 ) i s such t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e s w i t c h e s i n b o t h t a n k s must c l o s e i n o r d e r f o r t h e h e a t e r s t o be a c t i v a t e d ; however, opening o f only one p r e s s u r e s w i t c h w i l l d e a c t i v a t e t h e h e a t e r s . The f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n o f f a i l u r e w a s n o t e d at 93 h o u r s , s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l undocking, when t h e h e a t e r s were n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e d ( f i g . 6 ) . A t approximately t h e t i m e o f t h e f i n a l lunar module undocking, a l l hydrogen t a n k h e a t e r s came on and p r e s s u r i z e d t h e t a n k s t o about 2'70 p s i a , which r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e h e a t e r s be t u r n e d o f f manually.
As a r e s u l t of t h e a u t o m a t i c p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l system f a i l u r e , t h e hydrogen p r e s s u r e w a s c o n t r o l l e d u s i n g t h e manual mode throughout t h e remainder o f t h e m i s s i o n .

S i n c e t h e f i r s t f a i l u r e ( f a i l u r e t o t u r n o n ) would have r e q u i r e d one p r e s s u r e s w i t c h t o f a i l open and t h e second failure ( f a i l u r e t o t u r n o f f ) would have r e q u i r e d t h a t b o t h pressure s w i t c h e s f a i l c l o s e d , t h e s w i t c h e s can b e r u l e d o u t . The most p r o b a b l e cause f o r t h e f a i l u r e s w a s an i n t e r m i t t e n t c o n d i t i o n i n t h e motor or i t s c o n t r o l c i r c u i t ( i n c l u d i n g t h e power l i n e , ground, and t h e t e r m i n a l b o a r d f o r 16-gage p i n s ) r e s u l t i n g from t h e undocking shock (see f i g . 5 ) . Sixteen-gage t e r m i n a l boards have been t h e source of i n t e r n i t t e n t c o n t a c t d u r i n g v e h i c l e ground t e s t s . No c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n w i l l b e t a k e n f o r Apollo 1 0 ; t h e t a n k p r e s s u r e s can b e c o n t r o l l e d manually by e i t h e r t h e h e a t e r s or t h e fans i f t h e automatic system f a i l s .
This anomaly i s c l o s e d .

ERRONEOUS DOCKING PROBE INDICATIONS During i n i t ? . d L undocking, t h e Command Module P i l o t p l a c e d t h e probee x t e n d / r e l e a s e - r e t r a c t switch t o e x t e n d / r e l e a s e , and t h e v e h i c l e s began t o s e p a r a t e , i n d i c a t i n g r e l e a s e o f t h e probe-extend l a t c h . However, t h e v e h i c l e s d i d not physically unlatch L l n t i l t h e t h i r d attempt. Indications &I^^& alc t,lht: b w L l r c I 1 w w u u u held i i i positioii lofig eiio-&i foi- a segai-atiiig force t o effect physical separation.
L L ----.L-l-.
_-^"

bust,

4
The second d i s c r e p a n c y o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h e l u n a r module docking maneuver, when t h e Command Module P i l o t p l a c e d t h e s w i t c h i n t h e r e t r a c t p o s i t i o n i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r docking. I n t h i s p o s i t i o n , t h e d i s p l a y showed "barber p o l e , " i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e probe w a s n o t cocked f o r docki n g . T h i s i s f u r t h e r evidence t h a t t h e e x t e n d / r e l e a s e - r e t r a c t s w i t c h w a s n o t a c t u a t e d f o r a s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o a l l o w t h e docking probe t o f u l l y e x t e n d . Cycling t h e docking mechanism produced t h e p r o p e r gray display indication. The design w i l l a l l o w t h e l a t c h e s n o t t o cock d u r i n g undocking i f t h e r e l e a s e motors a r e n o t e n e r g i z e d s u f f i c i e n t l y l o n g f o r t h e l a t c h e s t o s p r i n g back t o p r o p e r a t t i t u d e for cocking. The system r e t u r n s t o t h e uncocked ( l a t c h e s - l o c k e d ) c o n f i g u r a t i o n which e x i s t s when docked. The Apollo Operations Handbook (AOH) h a s been changed t o i n c l u d e t h e requirement f o r h o l d i n g t h e e x t e n d / r e l e a s e - r e t r a c t s w i t c h i n t h e e x t e n d / release position u n t i l physical separation. T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

MULTIPLE COMMANDS NOT ACCEPTED

A t approximately 109 h o u r s , t h e s p a c e c r a f t would n o t respond t o mult i p l e u p l i n k real-time commands. Ten hours l a t e r , t h e crew c y c l e d t h e power s w i t c h t o t h e command system, r e s t o r i n g normal o p e r a t i o n ( f i g . 7 ) . The f i r s t of m u l t i p l e commands w a s r e c e i v e d by t h e command r e c e i v e r ; howe v e r , a message acceptance p u l s e w a s n o t t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e ground r e c e i v e r , which i n t u r n sends a s i g n a l t o t h e ground t r a n s m i t t e r t o send t h e n e x t command. The ground o v e r r i d e f u n c t i o n w a s used on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t o t r a n s m i t t h e next command; however, t h e s p a c e c r a f t s t i l l d i d n o t respond. The problem e x i s t e d over numerous ground s t a t i o n s and a l s o w a s e x p e r i e n c e d once p r e f l i g h t ; consequently, it h a s been i s o l a t e d t o t h e f l i g h t hardware. A s y e t , no c o n c l u s i o n c a n b e drawn as t o t h e cause of t h e discrepancy. T e s t i n g of t h e s p a c e c r a f t hardware i s t o be completed by A p r i l 2 5 . However, no c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s a n t i c i p a t e d for spacec r a f t 106.
T h i s anomaly i s open.
ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM FAILURE

The e n t r y monitor system s t y l u s d i d n o t c o n t i n u o u s l y c u t t h r o u g h t h e emulsion on t h e s c r o l l assembly. The a c c e l e r o m e t e r o u t p u t of t h e e n t r y monitor d r i v e s t h e s t y l u s t o s c r i b e t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n ( g ) h i s t o r y

5
v e r s u s v e l o c i t y . The emulsion on t h e mlar s c r o l l f i l m i s c u r e d and k e p t i n a dry atmosphere by e n c l o s i n g t h e s c r o l l assernbly i n s i d e a s e a l e d c a s e under one atmosphere of dry neon gas t o m a i n t a i n t h e p r o p e r c o n s i s t e n c y of t h e emulsion ( s e e f i g . 8 ) . The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e emulsion change i f m o i s t u r e i s absorbed, causing t h e s u b s t a n c e t o h a r d e n .
A l e a k w a s found i n t h e scroll assembly p o s t f l i g h t ; t h e leak would allow t h e case t o b r e a t h e m o i s t u r e i n s i d e . A l e a k - t e s t e d s c r o l l assemb l y , w i t h a f i n e r s t y l u s p o i n t which w i l l p e n e t r a t e h a r d e r e m u l s i o n s , and s e v e r a l o t h e r minor m o d i f i c a t i o n s w i l l b e i n s t a l l e d i n Apollo 1 0 .

This anomaly i s closed.

INDICATED SERVICE PROPULSION PROPELLANT UNBALANCE During t h e t h i r d f i r i n g of t h e s e r v i c e p r o p u l s i o n e n g i n e , t h e r e were e i g h t master alarms from t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n and gaging system i n d i c a t i n g an e x c e s s i v e p r o p e l l a n t unbal.ance ( f i g . 9 ) .
A l l t h e m a s t e r alarms a r e e x p l a i n a b l e . The f i r s t & a r m was caused by p r o p e l l a n t l e v e l i n t h e c a p a c i t i v e measuring t u b e n o t r e a c h i n g t h e s e t t l e d l e v e l s m n enough after s t a r t - u p . The next f i v e alarms, shown i n f i g u r e 9 , r e s u l t e d from an e l e c t r i c a l z e r o b i a s i n t h e o x i d i z e r measu r i n g c i r c u i t after s t o r a g e t a n k d e p l e t i o n . Thus, continuous alarms on t h e primary gaging system caused t h e crew t o s w i t c h t o t h e auxiliary s y s t e m , which employs p o i n t sensors at d i s c r e t e l e v e l s i n t h e t a n k s . A l e g i t i m a t e unbalance caused an alarm d u r i n g t h e a u x i l i a r y system o p e r a t i o n , as noted. Also, s w i t c h i n g back t o t h e primary system r e s u l t e d i n a n o t h e r l e g i t i m a t e a l a r m , even though t h e zero b i a s e x i s t e d .

Master alarms and c a u t i o n and warning i n d i c a t i o n s from t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n and gaging system a r e n o t r e q u i r e d . Consequently, t h e s e f'unctions have been c u t from t h e system f o r s p a c e c r a f t 106 and s u b s e q u e n t , as shown i n f i g u r e 1 0 .
A c a l i b r a t i o n and a p p r o p r i a t e adjustment w i l l b e made d u r i n g p r e f l i g h t s e r v i c i n g t o compensate for t h e z e r o b i a s a t t a n k crossover. Add i t i o n a l l y , procedures have been changed for t h e crew t o i g n o r e t h e unbalance d u r i n g t h e f i r s t 25 seconds of a f i r i n g t o allow s u f f i c i e n t t i m e for p r o p e l l a n t s e t t l i n g .

This anomaly i s closed.

6
MASTER A L A R M DURING DOCKING

A master alarm without a c a u t i o n and warning a n n u n c i a t o r o c c u r r e d c o i n c i d e n t with docking. No i n p u t w a s i d e n t i f i e d as b e i n g i n t h e range o f t h e c a u t i o n and warning system at t h a t t i m e . The f a c t t h a t t h e alarm d i d n o t occur a t p h p i c a l c o n t a c t b u t d u r i n g t h e h a r d docking r u l e s out s t a t i c discharge between t h e two v e h i c l e s and i n d i c a t e s a s h o c k - s e n s i t i v e c o n d i t i o n . The m a s t e r alarm system i s very s e n s i t i v e t o t r i g g e r s i g n a l s and r e q u i r e s only a 5-microsecond p u l s e t o i n i t i a t e an alarm. The caut i o n and warning l i g h t s r e q u i r e a continuous i n p u t t o i l l u m i n a t e . A s h o c k - s e n s i t i v e i n t e r m i t t e n t c o n d i t i o n i n one of about 60 i n p u t s c o u l d trigger the alarm.

The c a u t i o n and warning system has been removed for t e s t i n g t o d e t e r mine whether any of t h e components are s h o c k - s e n s i t i v e or whether any out-of-tolerance c o n d i t i o n e x i s t s

During docking t e s t s a t t h e launch s i t e , t h r e e unexplained master alarms were experienced on s p a c e c r a f t 106. One w a s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h act u a l c o n t a c t o f t h e l u n a r module w i t h t h e command and s e r v i c e modules. T h e r e f o r e , a r e c u r r e n c e i s l i k e l y d u r i n g t h e Apollo 10 m i s s i o n . No corr e c t i v e a c t i o n i s a n t i c i p a t e d f o r Apollo 10 at t h i s t i m e . This anomaly i s open.

FUEL CELL 2 CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE

The condenser e x i t t e m p e r a t u r e f o r f u e l c e l l 2 w a s o u t s i d e t h e norm a l range (155' t o 165O F ) on numerous o c c a s i o n s . This c o n d i t i o n w a s similar t o t h a t observed on Apollo 7. Analysis shows t h a t t h e t r a v e l of t h e secondary c o o l a n t r e g e n e r a t o r bypass v a l v e ( f i g . 11) w a s r e s t r i c t e d between approximately 4 and 10 p e r c e n t bypass between 88 and 191 h o u r s . The condenser e x i t t e m p e r a t u r e remained w i t h i n normal o p e r a t i n g l i m i t s at all l o a d s a f t e r 191 h o u r s . The l o a d s a f t e r t h a t t i m e were r e l a t i v e l y h i g h , r e q u i r i n g normal bypass v a l v e modulation between 8 and 19 p e r c e n t . Previous ground t e s t s and a n a l y s i s of c o o l a n t d r a i n e d from v i b r a t i o n and f l u s h i n g o p e r a t i o n s of o t h e r s p a c e c r a f t show t h a t c o o l a n t l o o p cont,miination buildup i n t h e v a l v e caused t h e r e s t r i c t e d t r a v e l o f t h e byp a s s v a l v e . This contamination i s p r e s e n t i n t h e form of g e l a t i n o u s phosphates and/or s o l i d p a r t i c l e s . For Apollo 1 0 , t h e r a d i a t o r s w i l l b e v i b r a t e d and a volume exchange made 30 t o 45 days p r i o r t o launch ( t h e Apollo 9 s p a c e c r a f t h a d only a volume exchange 45 days p r i o r t o l a u n c h ) . A n i n - l i n e change t o u s e t h e

7
block I bypass valve, which i s less s u s c e p t i b l e t o contaminants, h a s b e e n made. T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

DOCKING SPOTLIGHT FAILED The Command Module P i l o t r e p o r t e d d u r i n g t h e l i g h t i n g check p r i o r t o rendezvous t h a t t h e docking ( e x t e r i o r ) s p o t l i g h t on t h e s e r v i c e modu l e d i d not o p e r a t e . Photographs of t h e v e h i c l e d u r i n g rendezvous showed t h a t t h e l i g h t d i d n o t deploy. The c i r c u i t b r e a k e r f o r deploying t h e l i g h t w a s open at l a u n c h , as s p e c i f i e d , t o p r e v e n t i n a d v e r t e n t deployment, and t h e b r e a k e r had n o t been c l o s e d p r i o r t o t h ? a t t e m p t t o deploy t h e l i g h t ( t h e crew c h e c k l i s t d i d not i n c l u d e c l o s u r e o f t h e b r e a k e r ) . Other c i r c u i t s powered t h r o u g h t h i s b r e a k e r were e i t h e r redundant or were not used u n t i l l a t e r i n t h e mission. L a t e r , t h e b r e a k e r w a s c l o s e d f o r o p e r a t i o n o f t h e right-hand crewman o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t , and t h e s i g h t i n s t a l l a t i o n operated properly. The crew c h e c k l i s t has been changed t o i n c l u d e c l o s i n g o f t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r p r i o r t o s p o t l i g h t deployment. T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

INTERNAL FLOODLIGHT MALFUNCTIONS

The crew r e p o r t e d t h a t t h r e e of t h e s i x i n t e r n a l f l o o d l i g h t s m a l f u n c t i o n e d d u r i n g t h e m i s s i o n . One became extremely h o t and e m i t t e d an odor. P o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e primary lamp i n t h e r i g h t lower equipment bay f a i l e d . The primary lamp cathode had completely d i s i n t e g r a t e d , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e lamp h a d b e e n o p e r a t e d e x c e s s i v e l y between full dim and full b r i g h t , which g r e a t l y reduces t h e lamp l i f e and c a u s e s a diode t o f a i l . Because of a broken w i r e , t h e secondary lamp on t h e l e f t - h a n d couch would n o t o p e r a t e . The lamp on t h e right-hand couch was r e p o r t e d t o be extremely hot. and e m i t t e d an odor. There w a s touch-up p a i n t on t h e lamp, and d u r i n g p o s t f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n , t h e touch-up p a i n t d i d emit an odor. The h e a t e m i t t a n c e w i l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d by t e s t s i n p r o g r e s s . Se7"rernl l s q s k;Z."T been che2?2g:ei! e2 1\.>e11c 1 ! ! becsLlse cf ' s e Seycnd a 100-hour l i m i t f o r t e s t and checkout. Lamp o p e r a t i o n has been r e s t r i c t e d i n t h e Test and Criteria Document t o t h e dim 2 p o s i t i o n . T h i s anomaly i s open pending completion o f t h e heat t e s t s .

a
COMPUTER RESPOPJSE TO D S K Y ENTRIES

The crew r e p o r t e d two o c c a s i o n s i n which t h e computer d i d n o t rec e i v e and a c t upon d a t a e n t e r e d through t h e d i s p l a y and keyboard assembly (DSKY). The f i r s t c a s e i n v o l v e d a d i g i t a l a u t o p i l o t c o n f i g u r a t i o n change b e f o r e t h e s i x t h s e r v i c e p r o p u l s i o n maneuver. The d a t a r e q u i r e d t o i n S K Y and observed on t h e c o r p o r a t e t h e i n t e n d e d change were keyed i n t o t h e D D S K Y d i s p l a y . Depression of t h e ENTER key w a s r e p o r t e d , b u t t h e autop i l o t c o n f i g u r a t i o n d i d n o t change. The second c a s e o c c u r r e d d u r i n g a s p a c e c r a f t power-down p e r i o d when Verb 46 ENTER, which d e a c t i v a t e s t h e a u t o p i l o t , was u n s u c c e s s f u l . The two occurrences are d i f f e r e n t i n t h a t d i f f e r e n t f a i l u r e or p r o c e d u r a l e r r o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s would b e r e q u i r e d t o produce t h e r e p o r t e d symptoms. A d e p r e s s i o n of t h e ENTER key t r a n s mits a ? - b i t keycode t o t h e computer, which t h e n t a k e s a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n corresponding t o t h e d a t a p r e v i o u s l y keyed i n t o and d i s p l a y e d on t h e DSKY. A t t h e same t i m e , t h e computer causes t h e D S K Y t o b l a n k or change t o t h e n e x t d i s p l a y i f under program c o n t r o l . Depression of t h e ENTER key w i l l n o t b l a n k t h e DSkT u n l e s s t h e p r o p e r keycode i s r e c e i v e d by t h e computer. Depression of o t h e r keys may b l a n k a l l o r p a r t of t h e DSKY, depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n ( i. e . , a CLEAR key b l a n k s t h e d a t a r e g i s t e r s , a VERB key b l a n k s t h e verb d i s p l a y , and a PROCEED key w i l l b l a n k o r change t o t h e n e x t d i s p l a y ) . All r e q u i r e p r o p e r r e c e i p t o f i n f o r m a t i o n and a c t i o n by t h e computer. I n t h e f i r s t c a s e , t h e d e p r e s s i o n o f t h e PROCEED key i n s t e a d of an ENTER would have caused t h e symptoms and r e s u l t s r e p o r t e d . I n t h e second c a s e , i f a Verb 46 w a s keyed i n , only a n o t h e r VERB key d e p r e s s i o n would have blanked t h e D S K Y without e n t e r i n g t h e d a t a . Another p o s s i b i l i t y would be e n t r y of a verb which causes n o a c t i o n a t all o r an a c t i o n which i s u n d e t e c t a b l e . P o s s i b l e verbs which f i t t h i s c a t e g o r y are V45E, V47E, V56E, V66E, v 7 6 ~ ,and V86E. No hardware o r s o f t w a r e f a i l u r e s t h a t c o u l d have caused t h e s e condit i o n s have been i d e n t i f i e d . Procedural. e r r o r s of t h e t y p e d i s c u s s e d could have caused t h e f a i l u r e c o n d i t i o n s . However, t h e crew c o n s i d e r s it ml i k e l y t h a t such e r r o r s were made. T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d . SURGE TANK SHUTOFF V A L V E The r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f t h e surge t a n k r e q u i r e d an e x c e s s i v e l e n g t h o f t i m e . Nominal r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n w a s achieved when t h e crew r e p o s i t i o n e d t h e t a n k s h u t o f f v a l v e . During t h e systems d e b r i e f i n g , t h e crew s t a t e d t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e d no mechanical problems e x i s t e d w i t h t h e v a l v e b u t t h a t

9
the. d e c a l marking w a s misaligned with t h e valve d e t e n t p o s i t i o n . P o s t f l i g h t , t h e v a l v e p o s i t i o n s were checked and found t o b e m i s a l i g n e d by 30 d e g r e e s . S p a c e c r a f t 106 has been checked for p r o p e r alignment. T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

DOCKING RING SEPARATION CHARGE HOLDER One docking r i n g s e p a r a t i o n charge h o l d e r w a s deformed and out of i t s c h a n n e l , e x t e n d i n g s e v e r a l i n c h e s beyond t h e p e r i p h e r y o f t h e e x t e r n a l t u n n e l s t r u c t u r e ( f i g . 1 2 ) . Such a c o n f i g u r a t i o n might foul or c u t t h e nylon r i s e r l i n e s d u r i n g p a r a c h u t e deployment. The charge h o l d e r s are two s e m i c i r c u l a r s t e e l r i n g s a t t a c h e d at one end w i t h t h e o t h e r end f r e e . They normally remain i n a channel about an i n c h deep on t o p of t h e remaining t u n n e l s t r u c t u r e . During ground t e s t s , t h e f r e e end of t h e s e h o l d e r s o c c a s i o n a l l y came o u t o f t h e channel but n e v e r deformed t o t h e e x t e n t experienced on Apollo 9 . It i s n o t known whether t h e deformation o c c u r r e d during d e s c e n t or d u r i n g recovery operations.
A r e t a i n e r s p r i n g design ( f i g . 13) has demonstrated t h a t d u r i n g sepa r a t i o n , it w i l l r e t a i n t h e charge h o l d e r w i t h o u t t h e lunar module a t t a c h e d . This design w i l l be i n c o r p o r a t e d on s p a c e c r a f t 106.

This anomaly i s c l o s e d .

LUNAR MODULE
DESCENT PROPULSION REGULATOR MANIFOLD PRESSURE D R O P During t h e f i r s t 30 seconds of t h e f i r s t d e s c e n t e n g i n e f i r i n g , t h e d e s c e n t p r o p u l s i o n helium r e g u l a t o r manifold p r e s s u r e decayed t o 180 p s i and r e c o v e r e d t o a normal v a l u e of 240 p s i a . All t e m p e r a t u r e , p r e s s u r e , and flow i n d i c a t i o n s s u b s t a n t i a t e a plugged h e a t exchanger i n t h e superc r i t i c a l helium system ( s e e f i g . 1 4 ) ; t h e p l u g g i n g c l e a r e d d u r i n g t h e f i r i n g (see f i g . 15), as i n d i c a t e d by t h e p r e s s u r e r i s e i n t h e s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium t a n k and t h e r e t u r n t o normal r e g u l a t e d p r e s s u r e .

After t h e s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium s e r v i c i n g at t h e launch complex, t h e t a n k f i l l and v e n t quick-disconnects are purged w i t h helium t o i n s u r e

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i s s u p p l i e d from t h e same r e g u l a t o r t h a t i s supposed t o m a i n t a i n t h e m a n i f o l d p r e s s u r e above 5 p s i g .

10
During t h e LM-3 s e r v i c i n g , t h e p r e s s u r e must have dropped t o z e r o , a l l o w i n g a i r t o b e drawn i n t o t h e manifold by condensing out t h e incomi n g a i r i n t h e s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium t a n k h e a t exchanger. T e s t s have shown t h a t dropping t h e manifold p r e s s u r e t o z e r o f o r about 30 minutes w i l l allow air t o be "cryo-pumped" i n t o t h e manifold t o t h e t a n k h e a t exchanger, where i t will f r e e z e and b l o c k t h e h e a t exchanger. The f r e e z i n g p r o c e s s t r a n s f e r s heat i n t o t h e s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium t a n k , c a u s i n g a p r e s s u r e r i s e of about 90 p s i , very similar t o what o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e LM-3 t o p - o f f ( s e e f i g . 1 6 ) . If no a i r were i n t r o d u c e d , t h e t a n k p r e s s u r e would b e exp e c t e d t o r i s e 1 0 p s i or l e s s . The ground support equipment has been m o d i f i e d f o r Apollo 10 and subsequent t o i s o l a t e t h e purge system from t h e m a n i f o l d p r e s s u r e cont r o l system. F u r t h e r y continuous p r e s s u r e r e c o r d i n g w i t h p r o p e r s c a l i n g w i l l be employed on t h e manifold. A d d i t i o n a l equipment may b e s u p p l i e d t o p r o v i d e t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o t e s t f o r blockage of t h e t a n k h e a t exchanger. S e r v i c i n g procedures u s i n g t h e new ground s u p p o r t equipment c o n f i g u r a t i o n will be demonstrated. The new equipment and s e r v i c i n g procedures w i l l t h e n b e shipped t o t h e launch s i t e f o r Apollo 1 0 . T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

SUPERCRITICAL HELIUM PRESSURE DECAY The p r e s s u r e i n t h e s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium t a n k f o r t h e d e s c e n t prop u l s i o n system began decaying at 2.9 p s i / h r immediately a f t e r shutdown of t h e f i r s t descent engine f i r i n g and c o n t i n u e d t o decay u n t i l s t a g i n g . Because of heat t r a n s f e r i n t o t h e t a n k , t h e p r e s s u r e s h o u l d a l w a y s i n c r e a s e under no-flow c o n d i t i o n s ( f i g . 1 7 ) . The p r e s s u r e decay i s i n d i c a t i v e of a leak of about 0 . 1 l b / h r from t h e helium system. A n a l y s i s of t h e d a t a i n d i c a t e t h e l e a k w a s upstream o f t h e s o l e n o i d valve and probably upstream of t h e s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium t a n k h e a t exchanger. The f l i g h t c o n f i g u r a t i o n of helium t a n k , s q u i b valve , b i m e t a l l i c f i t t i n g , and a s s o c i a t e d plumbing has n o t been t e s t e d t o g e t h e r f o r r e s p o n s e t o s q u i b valve f i r i n g shock ( f i g . 1 8 ) o t h e r t h a n t h e LM-1 f l i g h t , which showed no sign of l e a k a g e . A t e s t i s b e i n g run on t h e LM-4 f l i g h t conf i g u r a t i o n t o determine whether o r n o t t h e components from t h e t a n k t o t h e f u e l h e a t exchanger have s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h margin f o r t h e r m a l v i b r a t i o n , and s q u i b valve f i r i n g shock. The LM-3 s q u i b v a l v e d i f f e r e d from t h e LM-4 c o n f i g u r a t i o n i n t h a t t h e LM-3 valve f i t t i n g s were i n t e r n a l l y b r a z e d , p r e v e n t i n g p r o p e r i n s p e c t i o n of t h e j o i n t . The LM-4 f i t t i n g s are e x t e r n a l l y b r a z e d ( f i g . 19).

11
T e s t i n g on t h e LM-4 c o n f i g u r a t i o n w i l l be completed about A p r i l 13. I f a f a i l u r e occurs or measured stress l e v e l s are e x c e s s i v e , modificat i o n s w i l l be i n c o r p o r a t e d on a second specimen. T h i s t e s t s h o u l d be completed about A p r i l 1 9 . T h i s anomaly i s open.

TRACKING LIGHT FAILURE

The t r a c k i n g l i g h t became i n o p e r a t i v e s h o r t l y a f t e r s t a g i n g . Poss i b l e causes are v o l t a g e breakdown i n t h e f l a s h head assembly, breakdown i n t h e high-voltage c a b l e , component f a i l u r e i n t h e e l e c t r o n i c s package, or v o l t a g e breakdown i n t h e pulse-forming network. Based on f a i l u r e h i s t o r y , breakdown i n t h e pulse-forming network i s c o n s i d e r e d t h e most l i k e l y cause o f t h e f a i l u r e . T e s t s a r e i n p r o g r e s s on a LM-4 t r a c k i n g l i g h t t o determine whether t h a t c o n f i g u r a t i o n can s t a n d v i b r a t i o n , shock, vacuum, and t h e r m a l stress of t h e LM-4 mission. If t h e u n i t f a i l s t h e m i s s i o n s i m u l a t i o n , a t r a c k i n g l i g h t w i t h a modified pulse-forming n e t work now b e i n g manufactured w i l l be i n s t a l l e d i n LM-4. The modified u n i t has improvements which s h o u l d e l i m i n a t e v o l t a g e breakdown under t h e f l i g h t environment. T h i s anomaly i s open. PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCHES INOPERATIVE

The Lunar Module P i l o t ' s push-to-talk s w i t c h e s , l o c a t e d on t h e umb i l i c a l and on t h e a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l l e r , were i n o p e r a t i v e a t about 89 h o u r s . The Lunar Module P i l o t used t h e VOX mode f o r t r a n s m i t t i n g for t h e remaind e r of l u n a r module o p e r a t i o n s . F a i l u r e of b o t h s w i t c h e s i s n o t p r o b a b l e . The common p a t h on e i t h e r s i d e o f t h e s w i t c h e s i n c l u d e s s w i t c h c o n t a c t s on t h e audio s e c t i o n , c o n n e c t o r s , and diodes i n t h e s i g n a l p r o c e s s o r assembly. The problem w a s probably caused by a d i s c o n t i n u i t y ( b r o k e n w i r e ) i n t h e common w i r e t o t h e p a r a l l e l push-to-talk s w i t c h e s . The push-to-talk mode of communication i s i s o l a t e d from t h e VOX mode o f communication. I n a d d i t i o n , switching t h e backup push-to-talk mode w i l l bypass most of t h e common w i r i n g where t h e f a i l u r e may have occurred.
A change f o r t h e Apollo Operations Handbook w i l l i n c l u d e malfunction t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g procedures t o b e used i f t h e problem r e c u r s .

ABORT GUIDANCE WARNING LIGHT

During t h e t h i r d manning, a c a u t i o n and warning alarm o c c u r r e d at a c t i v a t i o n of t h e a b o r t guidance system. The c a u t i o n and warning i n d i c a t i o n means t h a t one of t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s i s p r e s e n t :
1.
2.

The 12-V dc power supply v o l t a g e i s out of l i m i t s . The 28-v dc power supply v o l t a g e i s o u t o f limits. The ac power supply v o l t a g e i s out o f l i m i t s . The a b o r t e l e c t r o n i c s f a i l s a s e l f - t e s t . A n overtemperature e x i s t s i n t h e a b o r t e l e c t r o n i c s .

3.

4.
5.

6. One of t h e monitoring c i r c u i t s ( i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n ) of t h e f i v e previous items has malfunctioned.

'The s p e c i f i c a t i o n l i m i t s f o r alarms and t h e o p e r a t i n g s p e c i f i c a t i o n l i m i t s o f t h e parameters have s u f f i c i e n t s p r e a d t h a t an o u t - o f - s p e c i f i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n would have caused a malfunction of t h e a b o r t guidance system. The most l i k e l y c a u s e of t h e anomaly w a s e i t h e r a s h o r t e d o r broken w i r e between t h e a b o r t e l e c t r o n i c s assembly and t h e s i g n a l c o n d i t i o n i n g e l e c t r o n i c s assembly (26 gage wires w i t h seven s p l i c e s ) , a f a i l u r e w i t h i n a s i g n a l c o n d i t i o n i n g e l e c t r o n i c s assembly, or a f a i l u r e i n t h e c a u t i o n and warning system. The f i v e a b o r t guidance warning parameters i n LM-4 were measured and v e r i f i e d t o b e w i t h i n s p e c i f i c a t i o n l i m i t s , w i t h s u f f i c i e n t separat i o n between t h e o p e r a t i n g l i m i t s and t h e c a u t i o n and warning limits.
T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

NO I N D I C A T I O N OF TAPE RECORDER OPEMTING

The Lunar Module P i l o t r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e t a p e r e c o r d e r ( d a t a s t o r age e l e c t r o n i c s assembly) w a s n o t o p e r a t i n g p r o p e r l y w i t h t h e Lunar Modu l e P i l o t i n t h e VOX mode. Analysis of t h e t a p e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e Commander's audio c e n t e r w a s c o n f i g u r e d f o r intercommunications ( "hot" microphone), and t h e t a p e r e c o r d e r w a s running c o n t i n u o u s l y , as it s h o u l d have been. Review of t h e v o i c e recorded i n d i c a t e s t h a t no anomaly e x i s t e d .

13
A gray i n d i c a t i o n on t h e f l a g i s a p r o p e r o p e r a t i o n i n d i c a t i o n o n l y f o r t r a c k 1 of t h e f o u r t r a c k t a p e . If no modulation i s p r e s e n t on t r a c k 1, t h e f l a g w i l l b e " b a r b e r pole" w h i l e r e c o r d i n g on t h e o t h e r three tracks.

The Apollo Operations Handbook has been changed t o c l e a r l y d e s c r i b e t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e f l a g i n d i c a t o r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e f o u r v o i c e t r a c k s . This anomaly i s c l o s e d .

B I N D I N G OF FORWARD HATCH AND FAILURF GF DOOR STOP The crew r e p o r t e d t h a t when vehicular a c t i v i t y , i t tended t o ward t o open it. Also, t h e door t h e p o t e n t i a l hatch interference ing. t h e forward h a t c h w a s opened f o r extrab i n d on t o p and had t o b e pushed downwould n o t s t a y open. Figure 20 shows p o i n t s t h a t c o u l d have caused t h e bind-

I n s p e c t i o n on LM-5 showed t h a t t h e v e h i c l e f r o n t f a c e b l a n k e t above and around t h e h a t c h opening p r o t r u d e s below t h e v e h i c l e f i x e d s t r u c t u r e s h i e l d i n g ( i n an area where 0.250-inch c l e a r a n c e s h o u l d e x i s t ) . T h i s prot r u s i o n i s i n t h e p a t h of and i n t e r f e r e s w i t h t h e h a t c h s h i e l d l i p . LM-4 w i l l be i n s p e c t e d f o r similar c o n d i t i o n s . C o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n w i l l b e t o run a s t r i p o f t a p e between t h e v e h i c l e s t r u c t u r e and s h i e l d t o r e t a i n t h e b l a n k e t and p r e v e n t i t from sagging i n t o t h e h a t c h opening. The door s t o p ( s n u b b e r ) i s a t t a c h e d t o t h e door and i s designed t o r i d e a g a i n s t a Velcro p a t c h on t h e f l o o r , t h e r e b y h o l d i n g t h e door open. The door s t o p d i d n o t work i n f l i g h t . F l o o r s h i f t r e l a t i v e t o t h e door s t o p i n zero-g i s b e i n g s t u d i e d t o determine whether t h e door s t o p can p r o p e r l y r i d e on t h e Velcro p a t c h . This anomaly i s open.
HIGH CABIN NOISE LEVEL

The n o i s e l e v e l i n t h e c a b i n w a s t o o h i g h . The primary n o i s e s o u r c e s were t h e c a b i n f a n s , g l y c o l pumps, and suit compressors. Noise measurements were made on LM-8 w i t h t h e g l y c o l pumps and s u i t compressors o p e r a t i n g . The w o r s t s o u r c e w a s found t o be t h e g l y c o l pumps. The pumps couple a c o u s t i c energy i n t o t h e g l y c o l l i n e s and t h e n t o t h e p r e s s u r e vessel a t p e n e t r a t i o n p o i n t s . The p r e s s u r e v e s s e l t h e n a m p l i f i e s t h i s e n e r g y .

14
F l e x i b l e couplings a r e b e i n g s t u d i e d as a means of minimizing acoust i c coupling between t h e pumps and l i n e s . Tests w i l l be performed i n L M 8 t o determine t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s . A change t o t h e Apollo O p e r a t i o n s Handbook has been made t o u s e o n l y one c a b i n f a n and t h e n only when c o o l i n g i s required. No hardware change w i l l b e made f o r Apollo 1 0 , as most of t h e m i s s i o n i s conducted with helmets on. Hardware changes are b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d f o r Apollo 1 1 , as t h e crew w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o s l e e p w h i l e on t h e lunar surface. This anomaly i s open.

H U T D O W N STRUCTURAL CONTACT AT S-IC S Data i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e l a t e r a l l o a d s i n t r o d u c e d at S-IC shutdown caused t h e helium d i f f u s e r f l a n g e on t h e d e s c e n t p r o p e l l a n t t a n k t o cont a c t t h e s h e e t metal f l a n g e of t h e upper deck ( s e e f i g . 2 1 ) . Analysis has shown t h a t t h e c o n t a c t would n o t damage e i t h e r t h e upper deck s h e e t m e t a l f l a n g e o r t h e heavy d i f f u s e r f l a n g e or t a n k b o s s . Analysis a l s o shows t h a t t h e t a n k and plumbing are n o t o v e r - s t r e s s e d under t h i s cond i t i o n . The lower weight of LM-4, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e s-IC e x p e c t e d shutdown c o n d i t i o n s , w i l l produce l e s s d e f l e c t i o n f o r Apollo 1 0 t h a n w a s e x p e r i e n c e d on Apollo 9. F u r t h e r s t u d i e s are underway f o r Apollo 1 1 weights and shutdown t r a n s i e n t s . This anomaly i s c l o s e d f o r Apollo 1 0 .

DATA ENTRY AND DISPLAY ASSEMBLY OPERATOR ERROR LIGHT

The d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly o p e r a t o r e r r o r l i g h t was i l l u m i n a t e d f r e q u e n t l y d u r i n g t h e m i s s i o n and had t o b e e x t i n g u i s h e d by depress i o n of t h e CLEAR pushbutton. The d e p r e s s i o n of t h e b u t t o n would b l a n k t h e d i s p l a y . The o p e r a t o r e r r o r l i g h t would go o u t b u t would r e t u r n upon r e l e a s e o f t h e CLEXR b u t t o n . Four or f i v e d e p r e s s i o n s of t h e b u t t o n would be r e q u i r e d t o e x t i n g u i s h t h e l i g h t . The most l i k e l y cause of t h e c o n d i t i o n w a s a f a i l u r e of a c o n t a c t o f one o f t h e two s w i t c h e s i n t h e CLEAR pushbutton. A f a i l u r e o f t h e no. 1 c o n t a c t t o c l o s e would p r e v e n t t h e a b o r t e l e c t r o n i c s assembly from r e c e i v i n g a CLEAR d i s c r e t e , w h i l e t h e no. 2 c o n t a c t would f u n c t i o n norm a l l y , causing t h e d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly t o perform CLEAR operat i o n s , t h a t i s , blank d i s p l a y s , r e s e t o p e r a t o r e r r o r l o g i c , e t c . The above c o n d i t i o n s result i n t h e computer remaining i n t h e r e a d o u t mode

15

and, consequently, s e n d i n g SHIFT d i s c r e t e s t o t h e data e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly. The sending of SHIFT d i s c r e t e s w h i l e t h e assembly i s i n t h e CLEAR mode w i l l cause t h e o p e r a t o r error l i g h t t o b e i l l u m i n a t e d . The two s w i t c h e s a s s o c i a t e d with t h e p a r t i c u l a r CLEAR b u t t o n had a p r e f l i g h t h i s t o r y of problems. The problems c o n s i s t e d of t h e two s w i t c h e s n o t c l o s i n g s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a n d / o r t h e pushbutton n o t d e p r e s s i n g f u l l y . The c o n d i t i o n s involved w i t h t h e p r e f l i g h t d i s c r e p a n c i e s w i l l b e e x p l o r e d f u r t h e r . However, no change w i l l be made t o LM-4. T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

ASCENT PROPULSION HELIUM PRESSURE

At t h e s t a r t of t h e second ascent p r o p u l s i o n f i r i n g , t h e helium p r e s s u r e t o t h e p r o p e l l a n t t a n k s r e g u l a t e d a t about 177 p s i a i n s t e a d of t h e e x p e c t e d v a l u e of 185 p s i a . A t 290 seconds i n t o t h e f i r i n g , t h e press u r e i n c r e a s e d from 176 t o 180 p s i a .
Four a s p e c t s of t h e problem must b e c o n s i d e r e d :
1. The lockup p r e s s u r e w a s about 190 p s i a b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e f i r ing This s a t i s f i e s t h e normal lockup of t h e primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t l e g I had a t least some flow c a p a b i l i t y .

2 . The l e v e l of r e g u l a t i o n during flow w a s about 177 p s i a up t o This r e g u l a t e d p r e s s u r e could have been c o n t r o l l e d about 300 seconds by e i t h e r t h e primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I1 or t h e primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I if t h a t r e g u l a t o r down-shifted around 8 p s i under flow c o n d i t i o n s .

3. During t h e r e g u l a t e d flow p e r i o d , t h e r e g u l a t e d p r e s s u r e dropped about 1 p s i over 300 seconds - The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r e g u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e s d e c r e a s e w i t h a d e c r e a s e i n supply p r e s s u r e f o r t h e primary l e g I regul a t o r . I n 300 seconds, about a 1 - p s i p r e s s u r e drop would be e x p e c t e d for t h i s regulator. O n t h e o t h e r hand, t h e primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I1 had i n c r e a s i n g r e g u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e s with a d e c r e a s i n g supply p r e s s u r e o f about 1 p s i i n 300 seconds. These f a c t s s u g g e s t t h a t t h e primary regul a t o r i n l e g I w a s c o n t r o l l i n g t h e flow up t o about 300 seconds.

4 p s i - This s u g g e s t s a t l e a s t one of f o u r c o n d i t i o n s :

4.

A t about 300 seconds, t h e r e g u l a t e d p r e s s u r e i n c r e a s e d 3 t o

a. The primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I w a s c o n t r o l l i n g ( w i t h a downdownshift i n r e g u l a t i o n ) , and t h e down-shift w a s p a r t i a l l y c o r r e c t e d .

b . The primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I1 w a s c o n t r o l l i n g and had a n u p s h i f t i n r e g u l a t i o n . This i n d i c a t e s a m a l f u n c t i o n i n t h e primary regulator. c . The primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I1 w a s c o n t r o l l i n g , and t h e primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I s t a r t e d t o c o n t r o l b u t under down-shifted conditions. d. The primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I w a s c o n t r o l l i n g under downs h i f t e d r e g u l a t i o n . The primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I1 a l s o s t a r t e d t o supply flow because of t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e two r e g u l a t o r s r e a c h i n g t h e same c o n t r o l p r e s s u r e . Tests have shown t h a t under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , a r i s e i n r e g u l a t e d p r e s s u r e can b e e x p e c t e d . Any o f t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p o i n t out a f a i l u r e i n t h e primary regul a t o r of l e g I t o m a i n t a i n expected r e g u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e s . I t e m 4b can b e r u l e d o u t i f two f a i l u r e s of d i f f e r e n t t y p e s i n each of t h e primary regul a t o r s can b e i g n o r e d . The a s p e c t s of items 1 t h r o u g h 4 i s o l a t e t h e problem t o t h e primary r e g u l a t o r i n l e g I , c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a down-shift i n r e g u l a t i o n which may or may n o t have p a r t i a l l y c o r r e c t e d d u r i n g t h e f i r i n g . S e v e r a l p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e s w i t h i n t h e r e g u l a t o r c o u l d have caused a down-shift. These will b e s i m u l a t e d on a r e g u l a t o r t o determine t h e act u a l e f f e c t on t h e r e g u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e . These r e s u l t s a r e e x p e c t e d by A p r i l 1 9 . The p r e s e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d t y p e s of f a i l u r e which can cause a down-shift i n r e g u l a t i o n a r e n o t d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e asc e n t p r o p u l s i o n system. Consequently, no hardware changes a r e a n t i c i p a t e d f o r Apollo 1 0 . This anomaly i s open.

ROUGH DESCENT ENGINE THROTTLING

During t h e second d e s c e n t e n g i n e f i r i n g , t h e e n g i n e w a s rough a t about 27 p e r c e n t t h r o t t l e f o r a few seconds, t h e n s e t t l e d o u t and o p e r a t e d smoothiy during t h e remainder of t h e f i r i n g . The d a t a d u r i n g t h e rough p e r i o d showed a r i s e i n t h e o x i d i z e r i n t e r f a c e p r e s s u r e , followed by a r i s e i n t h e f u e l i n t e r f a c e p r e s s u r e , and b o t h s u b s e q u e n t l y r e t u r n i n g t o t h e normal p r e s s u r e . During t h i s t i m e p e r i o d , t h e e n g i n e chamber p r e s s u r e f l u c t u a t e d , c a u s i n g t h e roughness. T e s t s have shown t h a t w i t h helium d e l i b e r a t e l y i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e l i n e , t h e i n t e r f a c e p r e s s u r e s i n c r e a s e as t h e gas p a s s e s t h e t h r o t t l e

17

assembly. The t h r o t t l e d a r e a operates at c a v i t a t i n g p r e s s u r e s , g i v i n g r i s e t o a p r e s s u r e i n c r e a s e as t h e helium p a s s e s through t h e a r e a . The v a r i a t i o n of i n t e r f a c e p r e s s u r e s and t h e b l e e d i n g of helium i n t o t h e i n j e c t o r r e s u l t i n f l u c t u a t i o n i n t h e engine chamber p r e s s u r e . These t e s t r e s u l t s match very c l o s e l y t h e f l i g h t d a t a d u r i n g t h e engine roughness. The helium i n t h e p r o p e l l a n t tanks could e n t e r t h e p r o p e l l a n t l i n e s under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s of a c c e l e r a t i o n . However, a "zero-g" cup over t h e l i n e s i n s i d e t h e p r o p e l l a n t tank g r e a t l y reduces t h e l i k e l i h o o d of helium g e t t i n g i n t o t h e f e e d l i n e s . I n any e v e n t , t e s t s have demonstrated t h a t i n g e s t i o n of helium i n t o t h e engine i n t h i s manner has no d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t on t h e system. Howe v e r , i f helium s h o u l d g e t i n t o t h e l i n e , t h e engine may f i r e roughly sometime d u r i n g t h e f i r s t s e v e r a l seconds of a f i r i n g . This anomaly i s c l o s e d .

GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT

A I R BUBBLES I N LIQUID COOLED GARMENT

A f t e r t h e Lunar Module P i l o t removed h i s l i q u i d cooled garment on e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y day, he noted many a i r bubbles e n t r a i n e d i n t h e l i q u i d tubes.

The p r e f l i g h t charging procedure f o r t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e support system h a s been reexamined f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a i r i n c l u s i o n i n t o t h e system during c h a r g i n g , and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y w a s e l i m i n a t e d . The a i r most probably e n t e r e d t h e system during connection o f t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e supp o r t system t o t h e l i q u i d cooled garment i n t h e p r e s s u r i z e d l u n a r module c a b i n . Because of t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e c o o l a n t make-up l i n e f o r t h e port a b l e l i f e support system, when t h e t o t a l p r e s s u r e i n t h e l i q u i d cooled garment i s l e s s t h a n t h a t i n t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e support system, a i r i s i n g e s t e d through t h e sublimator i n t o t h e c o o l a n t l o o p . A d e s i g n change t o t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e support system t o e l i m i n a t e t h i s problem i s i n process and w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e Apollo 1 1 hardware ( s e e f i g . 2 2 ) . This change w i l l r e l o c a t e t h e make-up l i n e t o t h e upstream s i d e of t h e w a t e r s h u t o f f and r e l i e f v a l v e . Any p r e s s u r e make-up w i l l b e r e p l e n i s h e d w i t h w a t e r i n s t e a d of gas. This anomaly i s c l o s e d .

S T O W A G E OF OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM PALLET The crew could n o t i n s e r t t h e l o c k i n g p i n through t h e l u n a r module bulkhead s t r u c t u r e i n t o t h e oxygen purge system p a l l e t when restowing t h e purge system and p a l l e t . The l o c a t i o n of t h e h o l e i n t h e bulkhead b r a c k e t a d j a c e n t s t r u c t u r e , l i g h t i n g , and a n g l e of i n s e r t i o n caused d i f f i c u l t y i n a l i g n i n g and i n s e r t i n g t h e p i n . This mission w a s t h e only one on which t h i s k i n d o f p a l l e t w i l l he u s e d and t h e o n l y m i s s i o n on which t h e oxygen purge system w i l l b e stowed i n t h i s l o c a t i o n . The same t y p e p i n w i l l b e used on LM-4 and LM-5 t o h o l d t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e s u p p o r t system by t h e recharge s t a t i o n , where t h e l i g h t i n g and alignment a c c e s s a r e good. This anomaly i s c l o s e d .

LIGHTING FOR CREWMXV OPTICAL ALIGNICENT SIGHT

C r e w comments i n d i c a t e d t h a t d u r i n g docking a t 99 h o u r s , t h e b r i g h t n e s s of t h e background and t h e s u n l i t command module "washed out'' t h e r e t i c l e image i n t h e l u n a r module crewman o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t . T h i s problem w a s caused by t h e n e u t r a l d e n s i t y f i l t e r , which w a s housed i n t h e b a r r e l assembly t o l i m i t b r i g h t n e s s o f t h e r e t i c l e p a t t e r n . T h i s f i l t e r w i l l b e r e p l a c e d with a d i f f u s e r g l a s s , and an e x t e r n a l snap-on f i l t e r w i l l be provided f o r attachment over t h e forward end of t h e b a r r e l . With t h e f i l t e r removed, t h e b r i g h t n e s s of t h e r e t i c l e p a t t e r n i s i n c r e a s e d t o a l l o w t h e r e t i c l e image t o b e v i s i b l e a g a i n s t a 10 000 t o 1 6 000 f o o t lambert g l a r e background. This change w i l l b e implemented on Apollo 1 0 .

This anomaly i s c l o s e d .

OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM LIGHT

The checkout l i g h t on t h e Commander's oxygen purge system became e r r a t i c during t h e f l i g h t and f a i l e d t o come on d u r i n g p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r rendezvous. An examination o f a l l p o s s i b l e c o n d i t i o n s which c o u l d have caused t h e checkout l i g h t t o f a i l i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e main power s w i t c h a c t u a t o r mechanism d i d not c l o s e t h e s w i t c h . Changes i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e a c t u a t o r mechanism for Apollo 10 and subsequent are:
1.

Change t y p e of T e f l o n i n s e r t material i n t h e f l e x i b l e c a b l e

2 . Change t o a s w i v e l j o i n t i n t h e f l e x i b l e c a b l e at t h e oxygen purge system i n t e r f a c e

19
3.
I n c r e a s e cam r i s e on switch a c t u a t o r cam Bond s w i t c h a c t u a t o r cam t o s l i d e Bond s w i t c h i n p l a c e a f t e r a d j u s t m e n t .

4.
5.

T h i s anomaly i s c l o s e d .

20

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Figure 2.-

Cross section of reaction control system isolation valve.

22

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