Republic of tbe

Qtourt
J(anila
SECOND DIVISION
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME
CORPORATION and/or
WESTFAL-LARSEN AND CO.,
A/S,
Petitioners,
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, First Division, and
WILSON G. CAPOY,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 191903
Present:
CARPIO, J Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
JUN 1 9 2013
X-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari
1
assailing the
decision
2
dated December 18, 2009 and the resolution
3
dated April 19, 2010
of the Court of Appeals ( CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104859.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner manning agency, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, in
behalf of its foreign principal, co-petitioner Westfal-Larsen and Co., A/S,
Rollo, pp. 42-83; filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
!d. at 13-34; penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Mario L. Guarifia Jll and lane Aurora C. Lantion
3
ld. at 36-40.
Decision G.R. No. 191903 2
hired respondent Wilson G. Capoy as Fitter on board the vessel M/S Star
Geiranger for nine months, with a monthly salary of US$666.00.
4


Sometime in J uly 2005, while he was at work, Capoy allegedly fell
down a ladder from a height of about two meters. He claimed that he
immediatetly felt numbness in his fingertips that gradually extended to his
hands and elbows. Despite the incident, he continued performing his work.
On August 15, 2005, while climbing a flight of stairs, he again fell from a
height of one meter. He claimed that he could not tightly hold to the railings
of the stairs due to the numbness of his fingers and that he felt electricity-
like sensation in his body, legs and hands.

After being first examined by Dr. Dietmar E. Raudzus in Vancouver,
Canada, Capoy was referred to Dr. Charles Tai, also in Vancouver. Dr. Tai
assessed Capoy to be suffering from C-spine disease with bilateral sensory
symptoms and upper neuron disorder. Dr. Tai expressed concern that Capoy
had a central cord problem requiring an urgent magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI). He found Capoy unfit to work and advised him not to return to work
until the examination was complete.
5
Subsequently, Capoy was referred to
Dr. J . Clement of the CML Health Care, still in Vancouver, for further
examination. Dr. Clements impression
6
of Capoys condition substantially
confirmed Dr. Tais assessment.

On August 31, 2005, Capoy was medically repatriated. The following
day, he reported to the company-designated physician, Dr. Sussanah Ong-
Salvador of the Sachly International Health Partners, Inc. (SHIP). Dr.
Salvador required him to undergo physical and neurological examinations.
7

Dr. Salvador initially diagnosed Capoys condition as spinal stenosis,
cervical.
8
On September 16, 2005, Capoy underwent an MRI. On
September 20, 2005, Dr. Salvador reported that the orthopedic surgeon who
examined the MRI results recommended that Capoy undergo a multilevel
laminectomy, C3 to C6 spine, to relieve him of his pain.
9
The estimated cost
of the surgical procedure was P280,000.00, which the petitioners later on
shouldered.

Capoy was hesitant to submit to a laminectomy, suggesting that he
would just undergo physiotherapy, but he eventually agreed to the procedure
which took place on October 24, 2005. His post-surgery condition was
diagnosed as Herniated Nucleous Pulpusos C3-C4; Chronic bilateral C6

4
Id. at 137; Contract of Employment dated March 30, 2005.
5
CA rollo, pp. 67-68.

6
Id. at 70.

7
Id. at 72.

8
Ibid.

9
Rollo, p. 143.

Decision G.R. No. 191903 3
Radiculopathies; S/P Laminoplasty of the C3-C5. He was seen and
evaluated by SHIPS specialists and was cleared for discharge. He remained
under the care of the specialists for therapy sessions
10
which continued until
March 17, 2006. He was to return on April 6, 2006 for re-evaluation by the
orthopedic surgeon.
11


In the interim (i.e., on J anuary 19, 2006 or while still undergoing
treatment by the company doctors), Capoy filed a complaint for disability
benefits, maintenance allowance, damages and attorneys fees against the
petitioners.
12
He argued that after the lapse of 120 days without being
declared fit to work, he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) his union, the
Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP), had with his employer.

Capoy presented in compulsory arbitration two documents to support
his claim. He first introduced a one-page paper, purportedly a part of the
AMOSUP/TCCC Collective Agreement for 2004-2005.
13
Under this
document, the compensation for a 100% degree of disability for Ratings
was US$75,000.00. Thereafter, Capoy presented a second document,
supposedly the CBA for J anuary 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005 between the
Norwegian Shipowners Association (NSA), on the one hand, and the
AMOSUP and the Norwegian Seamens Union (NSU), on the other hand.
14

It provides for a Ratings compensation of $70,000.00 for a l00% degree of
disability.

The petitioners responded to the complaint by denying liability. They
argued that Capoy was not entitled to permanent disability benefits as his
claim was premature since no disability assessment has yet been made by the
company-designated physician. The petitioners further argued that the
injury which caused Capoys disability was self-inflicted due to his failure to
follow the recommended medical treatment. Additionally, they disputed
Capoys claim that he suffered a fall twice on board the vessel, in J uly and
August 2005, pointing out that the vessels logbook had no record of the
incidents. They presented the affidavit of the vessel M/S Star Geirangers
Master, Tomas Littaua, on the absence of reports regarding the incidents.
15

10
Id. at 148.

11
Id. at 150; Medical Progress Report.

12
CA rollo, pp. 84-85.

13
Id. at 187.

14
Id. at 205-220.

15
Id. at 193; Littauas Affidavit.
Decision G.R. No. 191903 4
Before the complaint could be resolved (or on April 28, 2006), Capoy
had himself examined by a physician of his choice, Dr. Raul F. Sabado, who
declared him [u]nfit to any kind of work permanently.
16


The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

On J une 26, 2006, Labor Arbiter (LA) Teresista D. Castillon-Lora
rendered a decision finding merit in the complaint.
17
She awarded Capoy
permanent total disability benefits of US$70,000.00, pursuant to the
NSA/AMOSUP-NSU CBA. Citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,
18

LA Lora held that Capoy suffered from permanent total disability as the
medical records showed that he was unable to perform work or earn a living
in the same kind of work for more than 120 days from his repatriation.

The petitioners appealed. In its decision of March 28, 2008,
19
the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denied the appeal and
affirmed with modification LA Loras award by absolving Eduardo U.
Menese, the President of the manning agency, from liability. The NLRC
likewise denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration,
20
prompting
them to elevate the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA Decision

On December 18, 2009, the CA denied the petition for lack of merit
and upheld the NLRC rulings.
21
It sustained the application by the labor
authorities of the NSA/AMOSUP-NSU CBA for 2004-2005
22
as basis for
Capoys claim to disability benefits, in relation to Article 20(B) of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC).
23
The CA pointed out that the petitioners failed to
disprove the authenticity of the CBA.

The CA brushed aside the petitioners contention that Capoy failed to
show proof that his injury was work-connected. It stressed that according to
jurisprudence, probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test
of proof in compensation proceedings.
24
It thus declared that Capoys

16
Id. at 185; Medical Certificate dated April 28, 2006.

17
Id. at 221-243.

18
510 Phil. 332 (2005).
19
CA Rollo, pp. 55-60.
20
Id. at 61-62; Resolution dated J une 10, 2008.

21
Supra note 2
22
Supra note 14.

23
DOLE Department Order No. 4, series of 2000.

24
NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 466, 474 (l997).

Decision G.R. No. 191903 5
repatriation due to medical reasons raises no other logical conclusion but
that, he was injured while on board the vessel.
25


With respect to the degree of Capoys disability, the CA took note of
the compulsory arbitration finding that Capoy could not perform his work as
a fitter for more than one hundred twenty (120) days l97 days to be exact
counted from the date of his last Medical Progress Report.
26
It added that
Dr. Salvador, the company-designated physician, failed to assess Capoys
condition, by way of either a disability grading or a fit-to-work declaration.

The CA gave no credit to the petitioners submission that Capoy is not
entitled to disability benefits because he willfully and deliberately
discontinued his medical treatment under the supervision of the company-
designated physician. In any event, it emphasized that Capoy remained
under Dr. Salvadors care until March 17, 2007 or for more than 120 days, as
above mentioned. In this light, it concluded that there is merit in Capoys
claim for permanent total disability benefits. The petitioners moved for
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of April 19,
2010. Hence, this petition.
27


The Petition

The petitioners seek a reversal of the CA rulings under the following
arguments:

1. The appellate court committed a serious error of law when it failed
to consider that Capoys abandonment of his medication and therapy with
the company-designated physician is a criminal act or a willful or intentional
breach of duty, resulting in an injury, incapacity or disability attributable to
him. They submit that for this reason, they cannot be held liable under
Section 20(D) of the POEA-SEC, which provides as follows:


No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any
injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his
willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided,
however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity,
disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.


The petitioners stress that despite Capoys failure to faithfully comply
with his physical therapy, his condition was improving. In fact, the
company-designated physiatrist already cleared Capoy from a physiatrist

25
Supra note 2, at 16.

26
CA rollo, p. 83.
27
Supra note 3.
Decision G.R. No. 191903 6
standpoint;
28
Capoy could have already been considered fit to work had he
not totally abandoned his medication and physical treatment.

2. The CA gravely erred in awarding Capoy permanent total disability
benefits absent the company-designated physicians assessment of his
disability. Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC recognizes only the
disability grading provided by the company-designated physician. The
petitioners contend that the absence of the company-designated physicians
medical opinion on Capoys case renders any subsequent medical findings
unacceptable and without basis.

3. The CA gravely erred in applying the 120-day rule to justify the
award of permanent total disability compensation to Capoy. The rule has
already been modified in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.
29

where the Court held that the company doctor, overseeing a seafarers
treatment, is given a maximum of 240 days to assess the seafarers disability
or declare him fit to work. It is only after the lapse of the 240-day period
and the company doctor fails to give a final assessment of the seafarers
medical condition may the seafarer be considered permanently and totally
disabled.

4. The CA likewise gravely erred in applying the NSA/AMOSUP-
NSU CBA in this case, despite the lack of substantial evidence on the
occurrence of an accident on board the vessel. Their implied admission of
the existence of the CBA cannot automatically be deemed admission of its
application as there are rules to be applied before it is given effect.

5. It was also grave error on the part of the CA to award Capoy
attorneys fees because the petitioners are not guilty of fraud or bad faith in
denying his claim as it was based on just, reasonable and valid grounds.

The Case for Capoy

In his Comment dated August 4, 2010,
30
Capoy prays that the petition
be denied for lack of merit. He contends that the CA acted in accordance
with law and applicable jurisprudence, and that it did not commit any patent
error or grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC decision, it being
supported by substantial evidence. He insists that after 120 days from his
repatriation that he was unable to work, he became entitled to permanent
total disability compensation.

28
Supra note 11.

29
G.R. No. 172933, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 610.

30
Rollo, pp. 154-166.

Decision G.R. No. 191903 7
Capoy assails the petitioners reliance on Vergara in denying his
claim, contending that it is not Vergara but the CBA between the parties and
the POEA-SEC that are applicable in his case. He argues that under the
POEA-SEC, a seafarer in his situation shall be subjected to medical
treatment, but for a period not to exceed 120 days, after which the seafarer
shall be assessed by the company-designated physician as to whether he is
fit to work or not. If the company doctor fails to make the assessment, he is
considered to have suffered from permanent total disability.

The Courts Ruling

The issues

Based on the nature of this case a Rule 45 review of a Rule 65 ruling
of the CA as well as the submissions of the parties, submitted for our
resolution is the question of whether the CA correctly found no grave abuse
of discretion in the NLRCs ruling and thus denied the companys petition.
The question of fact the CA faced was whether Capoy sustained a work-
related injury on board the vessel M/S Star Geiranger. The question of law
involved, on the other hand was on the question of whether the resulting
disability entitles him to permanent total disability benefits, assuming that he
did indeed sustain a work-related injury.

We find that the CA properly found factual basis in the conclusion that
Capoys injury was work-related. However, it grossly misappreciated and
misapplied the law in ruling on Capoys entitlement to permanent total
disability.

Is Capoys injury work-related?

The records show that Capoy suffered an injury while at work on
board the vessel M/S Star Geiranger, which injury resulted in his disability.
While the petitioners argue that Capoy could not have fallen on deck twice
to cause his injury, the evidence shows that Capoy had been examined by
three doctors in Vancouver. Two of these doctors, Dr. Tai and Dr. Clement,
reported that Capoy was suffering from C-spine injury.
31
The vessel M/S
Star Geirangers Master at the time, Rodolfo Casipe (not Tomas Littaua as
the petitioners claimed) confirmed Capoys condition, even if only for the
initial consultation and examination.
32

31
Supra notes 5 and 6.

32
Rollo, p. 138.

Decision G.R. No. 191903 8
Moreover, it is undisputed that Capoy was medically repatriated on
August 31, 2005. He reported to Dr. Salvador, the company-designated
physician, who subjected him to physical and neurological examinations. Dr.
Salvadors initial diagnosis spinal stenosis, cervical confirmed the
findings of Dr. Tai and Dr. Clement in Vancouver. Capoy was subsequently
examined by an orthopedic surgeon. He also underwent an MRI and later,
he went through surgery. These examinations, treatments and procedures
duly established that Capoy suffered from a work-related injury while on
board M/S Star Geiranger.

Is Capoy entitled to permanent
total disability benefits?


Although Capoy sustained a work-related injury, the CA did not
properly appreciate that Capoy is not entitled to permanent total disability
compensation based on the applicable contract, rules and laws. The CA
failed to appreciate the grave abuse of discretion that the NLRC committed,
as discussed below.

First. There was no assessment of the extent of Capoys disability by
the company-designated physician, as required by Section 20(B)(3) of the
POEA-SEC, which provides:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

x x x x

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third
doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The
third doctors decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
[underscore ours]


Considering that Capoy was still undergoing medical treatment,
particularly through therapy sessions under the care of the company-
designated specialists, Dr. Salvador (the lead company doctor) cannot be
faulted for not issuing an assessment of Capoys disability or fitness for
work at that time. In fact, as Dr. Salvadors progress report of March 17,
2006
33
showed that Capoy was expected to return on April 6, 2006 for re-
evaluation by the orthopedic surgeon. This aspect of the POEA-SEC and
Capoys compliance totally escaped the labor tribunals and the CA.

33
Supra note 11.

Decision G.R. No. 191903 9

Second. The conclusions of the LA, the NLRC and the CA that
Capoy is entitled to permanent total disability benefits because his disability
lasted for more than 120 days, without need for an assessment from Dr.
Salvador, must be viewed in the context of the established facts and the
applicable Philippine law. The law in this jurisdiction must be determined in
the context of the disagreement on Capoys claim between the foreign
employer, represented by the manning agency, and Capoy whose
employment relationship is governed by the POEA-SEC and supplemented
by the parties CBA. As explained in Vergara, under Section 31 of the
POEA-SEC, in case of any unresolved dispute, claim or grievance arising
out of or in connection with the contract, the matter shall be governed by
Philippine laws, as well as international conventions, treaties and covenants
where the Philippines is a signatory.
34


This signifies that the terms agreed upon by the parties pursuant to the
POEA-SEC are to be read and understood in accordance with Philippine
laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code and the applicable
implementing rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or
grievance. Article 192(3) of the Labor Code which deals with the period of
disability states that:

The following disabilities shall be deemed total and
permanent:

1. Temporary total disability lasting continuously
for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided for in the Rules[.] [emphases ours]

The rule adverted to is Section 2, Rule X of the Rules and Regulations
implementing Book IV of the Labor Code which provides:

Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. (a) The income benefit shall be
paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or
sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120
days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case
benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the
System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120
days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the
degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as
detemined by the System[.] [emphasis ours; underscore ours]

34
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 30, at 626-627.


Decision G.R. No. 191903 10
The above provisions must be read together with Section 20(B)(3) of
the POEA-SEC which states as follows:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.


The Vergara ruling, heretofore mentioned, gives us a clear picture of how
the provisions of the law, the rules and the POEA-SEC operate, thus -

[T]he seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120
days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit
to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws.
If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made
because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the
temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of
240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period
that a partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course
also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his
medical condition.
35
(italics supplied; citations omitted)

As applied to Capoys situation based on the records, we cannot see
how the award of permanent total disability compensation in his favor can
be justified. As pointed out, Capoy reported to the company-designated
physician, Dr. Salvador, the day after his repatriation on August 31, 2005.
Dr. Salvadors initial diagnosis of Capoys condition
36
confirmed the
findings of the doctors who examined and treated Capoy in Vancouver.
Thereafter, he went through specialized medical procedures an MRI, as
suggested by Dr. Tai of Vancouver, and a laminectomy, as recommended by
the company orthopedic surgeon who examined the MRI results. As part of
his intensive treatment, he was subjected to continuous therapy sessions
before and after his operation.

The therapy sessions appeared to be yielding positive results. Dr.
Salvadors progress report of J anuary l2, 2006
37
showed that Capoys vital
signs were improving and that the orthopedic surgeon observed that he was
responding well to therapy, as evidenced by the improved sensation of both

35
Id. at 628.
36
Supra note 8.

37
Rollo, p. 148
Decision G.R. No. 191903 11
his lower extremities. The surgeon recommended that Capoy continue the
therapy sessions. But, for reasons known only to him, Capoy became non-
compliant to therapy, as reported by the company doctor, which is why there
was slow progress in his condition, although the repeat EMG-NCV
procedure showed that his nerve injury was healing; thus, he was cleared
from the physiatrist standpoint. He failed to return on April 6, 2006 for
re-evaluation by the orthopedic surgeon.

As matters stood on March 17, 2006, when Dr. Salvador issued her
last progress report, 197 days from Capoys repatriation on August 31, 2005,
Capoy was legally under temporary total disability since the 240-day period
under Section 2, Rule X of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book
IV of the Labor Code had not yet lapsed. The LA, the NLRC and the CA,
therefore, grossly misappreciated the facts and the applicable law when
they ruled that because Capoy was unable to perform his work as a
fitter for more than 120 days, he became entitled to permanent total
disability benefits. The CA cited in support of its challenged ruling Dr.
Salvadors failure to make a disabability assessment or a fit-to-work
declaration for Capoy after 197 days from his repatriation. This is a
misappreciation of the underlying reason for the absence of Dr. Salvadors
assessment. There was no assessment yet because Capoy was still
undergoing treatment and evaluation by the company doctors, especially the
orthopedic surgeon, within the 240-day maximum period provided under the
above-cited rule. To reiterate, Capoy was supposed to see the orthopedic
surgeon for re-evaluation, but he did not honor the appointment.

We cannot, under these circumstances, blame the petitioners for
claiming that Capoy abandoned his treatment. Worse, he could even be
dealing with the company doctors in bad faith while he was still undergoing
treatment. For instance, he never offered any explanation for his failure to
report to the orthopedic surgeon. The reason for this could be that he was
just going through the motions of undergoing treatment with the company
doctors. This is supported by the fact that while he still had schedules with
the company doctors and without waiting for Dr. Salvadors assessment of
his condition, he filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits on
J anuary 19, 2006.
38
Even before his claim could be resolved, he had himself
examined by Dr. Sabado who declared him [u]nfit to any kind of work
permanently.
39

Dr. Sabados declaration would not alter the fact that Capoys claim
for permanent total disability benefits was premature. Considering that
Capoy was still under treatment by the company doctors even after the
lapse of 120 days but within the 240-day extended period allowed by the
rules, he was under temporary total disability and entitled to

38
Supra note 12.

39
Supra note 16.

Decision G.R. No. 191903 12
temporary total disability benefits under the same rules. Moreover, with
respect to Capoys failure to comply with the procedure under the POEA-
SEC vis-a-vis Dr. Sabados certification, we find the following Court
pronouncement in C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok
40
most
applicable, thus:

Indeed, a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors under
Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC but this is on the presumption that the
company-designated physician had already issued a certification as to his
fitness or disability and he finds this disagreeable. Under the same
provision, it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with
the task of assessing a seafarers disablity and there is a procedure to
contest his findings. It is patent from the records that Taok submitted these
medical certificates during the pendency of his appeal before the NLRC.
More importantly, Taok prevented the company-designated physician
from determining his fitness or unfitness for sea duty when he did not
return on October 18, 2006 for re-evaluation. Thus, Taoks attempt to
convince this Court to put weight on the findings of his doctors-of-choice
will not prosper given his failure to comply with the procedure prescribed
by the POEA-SEC.
41
(emphasis ours)

Very obviously, Capoys case suffers from the same infirmities
committed by Taok in the cited case, when he presented Dr. Sabados
certification to the LA without going through the procedure under the
POEA-SEC. Capoy, needless to say, prevented Dr. Salvador from
determining his fitness or unfitness for sea duty when he did not return
on April 6, 2006 for re-evaluation.

For grossly misappreciating the facts, the clear import of the law
and the rules, as well as recent jurisprudence on maritime compensation
claims, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in sustaining the award
of permanent total disability benefits to Capoy. For upholding the
NLRC ruling, the CA itself committed a reversible error of judgment.

In light of these considerations, Capoys claim for permanent total
disabilty benefits must necessarily fail. However, since it is undisputed that
Capoy still needed medical treatment beyond the initial 120 days from his

40
G.R. No. 193679, J uly 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 296.

41
Id. at 316-317.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 191903
repatriation - it lasted for 197 days as found by the CA - he is entitled,
under the rules,
42
to the income benefit for temporary total disability during
the extended period or for one hundred ninety-seven ( 197) days. This
benefit must be paid to him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petltwn is GRANTED.
The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals awarding
permanent total disability benefits to Wilson G. Capoy are SET ASIDE.
The petitioners, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and Westfal-Larsen and
Co., A/S are ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay Wilson G. Capoy
income benefit for one hundred ninety-seven (197) days. The complaint is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
42
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
AA fA J (t;if/
ESTELA 1\tl: PlRLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code, Section 2, Rule X.
. ..
Decision
14 GR. No. 191903
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
. ..
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice