MINIMUM OPERATING SECURITY STANDARDS (MOSS) INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION GENERAL Introduction MOSS is a fundamental policy document for

all UN field operations. It was developed in response to the United Nations requirement to ensure that minimal essential security practices are established and maintained in the delivery of security support to United Nations staff. MOSS is a system-wide initiative that is managed by UNS !OO"#. $hese instructions provide detailed guidance for the development and implementation of a country-specific MOSS. Bas !in MOSS % &'aseline MOSS( document )attached as %nne* %+ has been developed through discussion and coordination between UNS !OO"#, #esignated Officials and representatives of United Nations %gencies, -rogrammes, .unds and other organisations. $his &baseline MOSS( is a generic document that sets the minimum operating security standards for United Nations field operations globally. In accordance with United Nations Security Management policy, all #esignated Officials and their Security Management $eams, regardless of the e*tant security -hase within their countries, are required to develop and implement a countryspecific MOSS, using the &baseline MOSS(. Pur"os $he purpose of MOSS is to establish standard field based criteria for minimum security arrangements to enhance staff security and reduce ris/ to enable UN field operations. Accounta#i!it$ 0ith reference to the "eport of the Secretary-1eneral, 23 %ugust 2442, &Inter-organi5ational security measures6 framewor/ for accountability for the United Nations field security management system(, MOSS is a defined responsibility for senior managers in the field and at agency headquarters. %s such it is sub7ect to accountability. %ariations to Bas !in MOSS It is to be stressed that MOSS has been developed to ensure the absolute minimum standards of equipment, structures and procedures required at each field duty station. $he &baseline MOSS( indicates, 8what you must have9 and not, 8what you would li/e to have9 in order to reduce ris/ and safely conduct operations within your country. :arying circumstances and environments may require !ountry $eams to increase the requirements of &baseline MOSS( when developing their own country-specific MOSS. $his is a decision by the !ountry $eam and is funded by the !ountry $eam. Similarly, and on an exceptional basis only, !ountry $eams may request to go below &baseline MOSS. If this

e*traordinary measure is necessary, a detailed 7ustification is required to be forwarded to UNS !OO"# for consideration. For&at &'aseline MOSS( is presented at %nne* % in a tabular format. It commences with the requirements for countries in &no phase(, and then the five separate security -hases of the United Nations Security -lan. $he tables are cumulative, with those requirements starting at &no phase( being implicit to all other -hases; e.g. the requirements of MOSS under -hase $hree include a!! the requirements of &no phase(, -hases One and $wo. 0hen changing from one -hase up to a higher -hase )e.g. -hase One to -hase $wo+ the increased measures for the new phase are required to be implemented as soon as possible. $ypically full implementation is e*pected to be completed within <4 days from declaration of the -hase change. Financia! I&"!ications MOSS implementation has certain financial and resource implications at the country level and funding for this remains the responsibility of the !ountry $eam; UNS !OO"# does not have funds for MOSS implementation. %ny financial implications will have two aspects6 =. $he inter-agency, or common system, requirement for 7oint funding. 2. $he single-agency requirement for %gency equipment. *ample6 $he country-specific MOSS requires a 2> hour?@ days per wee/ communications centre, plus :A. handsets for all international staff and selected national staff, plus blast protective film for all UN offices. !ommon system costs will include the communications centre, however single-agency costs of the same MOSS will include :A. radios for that %gency(s staff and for the required blast protective film for that %gency(s offices only. Ma!icious Acts Insuranc Po!ic$ $he underwriters of the Malicious %cts Insurance -olicy )M%I-+ have aligned the United Nation(s compliance to MOSS with the cost of premiums. .urther, non-compliance of MOSS measures may be used by the policy underwriters as 7ustification for denying or reducing compensation in the event of an incident involving United Nations staff. D ' !o"& nt $he development of each country-specific MOSS must be preceded by a detailed and thorough $hreat %ssessment conducted by a &competent authority( in accordance with the UNS !OO"# guidance as reflected in the Security Operations Manual. .or the development of a formal $hreat %ssessment, &competent authorities( are considered to be; UNS !OO"# Security !oordination Officers, .ield Security !oordination Officers ).S!O+, Security Officers )SO+ from United Nations %gencies, #-BO !hief Security Officers )!SO+ or any other person specifically approved by UNS !OO"# for that purpose.

.or those countries that have different security -hases within the country, separate MOSS documents may be required. .or e*ample, the !apital city and the surrounding areas may be at -hase One whilst the outer areas of the country may be at -hases $hree or .our C each with varying requirements for security measures. $he five steps required in the development of country-specific MOSS are as follows6 St " () !onduct a $hreat %ssessment and determine the level of "is/. !onfirm Security -hases. St " *) !ompare the United Nation(s current, e*tant security measures in each security -hase against those required in the baseline MOSS, and determine shortfalls. St " +) Identify what additional measures are required above the requirements of baseline MOSS, if any. St " ,) Once all MOSS requirements have been considered and documented, the table should be completed in the format of %nne* %. $he SM$ then concur to the countryspecific MOSS and forward it to UNS !OO"# for review. St " -) UNS !OO"# will authorise the country-specific MOSS. $he MOSS is implemented at the country level with equipment obtained and installed, with training underta/en and structures put in place. I&"! & ntation $he implementation of MOSS should be conducted as rapidly as possible when -hases are changed - hence the need for pre-planning is paramount. % country in -hase One MUS$ have a contingency for the implementation and procurement of assets and resources necessary to move to -hase $wo. $he MOSS is designed to ensure, as far as possible, a logical and smooth transition from a lower to higher phase with minimal increase in actual resources. $he following e*planations provide clarity to some of the concepts and terminology used in the baseline MOSS document. =. $elecommunications !S. $he concept of an mergency !ommunications System ) !S+ allows for reliable communications between those United Nations staff appointed with security and safety responsibilities )i.e. #O, .S!O, SM$ members, 0ardens, %S!s and selected staff+. $he !S is a structural and procedural element of MOSS that is reinforced by radios at -hase One. It has two elements; )=+ the ability for the security officials to communicate within the country, and )2+ the ability for senior security officials to communicate to UNS !OO"# and other organisations outside the country. No -hase. Under conditions of &No -hase( the !S is based on &appropriate and available means( to ensure reliable security?safety communications between the SM$ members, 0ardens and %S!s. $his may be a combination of cellular telephones, landlines telephones,

email and radios as appropriate. Mobile satellite telephones are required to enable the .S!O and #O to maintain communications with UNS !OO"# and others. -hase One. In -hase One the !S is reinforced with a fully operational independent radio networ/. $here is the MOSS further requirement that !S communications are &monitored( on a 2>-hour basis - this ensures that emergency calls can be effectively serviced. % simple system of identifying a &duty officer( or using the UN compound Security 1uard-Aouse would be appropriate )assuming, of course that the guards were trained and authorised to answer a radio call and then telephone a security official+. In this way security lin/age is made between all security officials at the duty station. Dastly, there is a requirement to equip and establish an mergency !oordination !entre ) !!+. $here is no requirement to have this manned 2>-hours a day, but it must have all the necessary resources to ensure that should it be necessary, it can be operated on a 2>-hour basis. -hase $wo. -hase $wo is typically considered as an interim Security -hase during which the SM$ considers whether the security environment is li/ely to deteriorate further )perhaps to -hase $hree+ or to improve )return to -hase One+. %s per the .ield Security Aandboo/, &essential staff( are identified and provided with :A.?UA. radios. $he dedicated radio?communications room )with operators+ are required to maintain 2>?@ communications operations. $his will li/ely include email, fa* and satellite telephone operations. 2. :ehicles No -hase. %ll UN vehicles may be utilised throughout all areas of the country not under any Security -hase. %ll UN drivers must have appropriate driving documentation )National driving licenses and?or relevant UN certification+. UN vehicles must be able to be identified as UN vehicles at all times, and must be correctly registered and insured in the country. -hase One. Under -hase One the #O becomes responsible to be aware of the location of all UN staff at all times and an effective and reliable system to monitor their whereabouts is required. .urther, all vehicles are to have an &effective and reliable( means of communications C this may be achieved by proven reliable, cellular telephone system with wide area coverage. $his allows the implementation of the necessary system of movement control )or trac/ing+ of UN vehicles so that the #O can fulfil his responsibilities. In addition, &.ield :ehicles( need to be identified and equipped. $hese are vehicles equipped with radio communications for field mission outside of the !apital area?region C these are typically >*> &landcruiser( type vehicles. -hase $wo. %ll vehicles operating in a -hase $wo environment are to be equipped with radios. -hase $hree. %ll drivers are to be provided with :A.?UA., handheld radios. Specialised equipment may be identified and procured for these &.ield :ehicles( as appropriate )e.g. e*tra spare tyres, spare fuel, emergency lights, ballistic blan/ets, etc+. E. $raining %ll -hases. %ll UN staff are required to complete the basic Security %wareness( !#-"OM. In addition, throughout the process of MOSS development and implementation, security managers must be aware of the need to provide training and briefings for the general staff and

for those with security responsibilities. $he .S!O is required to underta/e such training and UNS !OO"# can provide additional resources as appropriate. -hase $hree. Specialised training provided top selected staff on protective equipment?facilities, etc, as appropriate. >. quipment

No -hase. mergency power supply means an independent and reliable source of electrical generation to ensure communications equipment is operative, security lighting is available at all times, essential business functions can be conducted even after the loss of &city supplied( power. In certain locations, electricity or other power supplies may be critical for basic warmth )e.g. Mongolia+. mergency fuel is required for these facilities in all instances. -hase $wo. !ontingency plans required for the procurement and installation of appropriate Specialised quipment )see paragraph < below+. -hase $hree. Specialised protective equipment as described in %nne* %, medical trauma /its, emergency supplies of fuel and foods. F. Security -lan No -hase. % functional Security -lan, based on a formal $hreat %ssessment, is required for all UN duty stations as described in the .ield Security Aandboo/ ).SA+ to include an operational 0arden system and the appointment of %S!s as appropriate. In addition each !ountry $eam must establish local security Standard Operating -rocedures )SO-(s+ for various emergency scenarios. %ll buildings are to have a .ire -lan in place. Staff should be fully briefed on the contents of these documents and have access to all relevant UN policy and operational security documents. -hase One. Security clearance procedures )in accordance with the .SA and Security #irective G>+ are to be established and implemented. $his includes country-specific travel clearance procedures. %n mergency !oordination !entre ) !!+ is to be identified and usable in an emergency or crisis. SM$s are required to meet at least monthly. <. Specialised quipment .S!O quipment. $he .S!O is provided with certain standard equipment by UNS !OO"#. %dditionally, the .S!O security budget provides for specialised field /it. $his will be purchased by the .SO?UNS !OO"# from the UNS !OO"# supplied .SO budget. -rotective quipment. 'un/ers, body armour, and blast resistant film )-hase $hree+ are required only if the country?area threat assessment performed substantiates a threat from a bomb and?or war environment and when endorsed by a competent authority. $rauma Bit. % trauma /it is required in -hase $wo. It is an advanced first aid /it with appropriate medical equipment to treat ma7or trauma in7uries. Normally this requires the attendance of a qualified paramedic, nurse or doctor. %t least one UN staff member should be trained in the capabilities of this equipment.

- - Bit. - - /its are provided and managed by 0AO. %t the field level the - -s are typically held under the care of the 0AO representative. $hey are designed for use under the supervision of a medical doctor but can be initiated without such Conc!usion $he MOSS baseline is an enabling document that provides a minimum level of security preparedness necessary for United Nations operations globally.