C2013 Persons and Family Relations Compiled Digests

C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF.
KATRINA LEGARDA | 1
NCC1-18
Revised Administrative Code (RAC) Secs. 18-24 [1987]

NCC2

Pesigan v. Angeles
129 SCRA 174

Nature: Petition to review the order of the Caloocan
City RTC

Facts:
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the
evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a
calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their
destination. They were provided with three
certificates: 1) a health certificate from the provincial
veterinarian, 2) permit to transfer/transport from the
provincial commander; and 3) three certificates of
inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were
confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the
town's police station commander while passing
through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on
EO No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of
carabaos & carabeef from one province to another.

Issue:
WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation
and forfeiture by the government of carabaos
transported from one province to another, dated
October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in
the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982

Held:
No. The said order isn't enforceable against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because it's a penal
regulation published more than 2 mos. later in the
OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in A2 of the CC & 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The word "laws in article 2
includes circulars & regulations which prescribe
penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of the regulations & make the
said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all
Presidential EOs having general applicability should
be published in the OG. t provides that "every order
or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
deemed to have general applicability and legal effect.
This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because
its confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction
makes it a penal statute. It results that they have
cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The
summary confiscation wasn't in order. The recipients
of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans.
However, they cannot transport the carabaos to
Batangas because they are now bound by the said
executive order. Neither can they recover damages.
Doctor Miranda & Zenerosa acted in good faith in
ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.

Judgment:
Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of
the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents
to restore carabaos, with the requisite documents, to
petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot,
Camarines Sur. No costs.

Important point:
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of the regulations & make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice &
fairness dictate that the public must be informed of
that provision by means of the publication on the
Gazette.

Taada v. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27

FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is
required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be
the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 2
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads:
there shall be published in the Official Gazette.. The
word "shall therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no
force and effect.

Farinas vs. the Executive Secretary
417 SCRA 503

In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the
Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the
ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates
against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed
Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in
respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election
Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso
facto resigned from their respective offices upon their
filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since
Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on
appointive officials continues to be operative they
are deemed resigned when they file their certificates
of candidacy.

The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal
protection challenge against Section 14, with the end
in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions
"apply equally to both elected and appointive
officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy
created by the Legislature is a reasonable
classification, as there are material and significant
distinctions between the two classes of officials.
Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the
Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, failed muster.
We ruled:

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials
as against the appointive ones and violates the equal
protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.

The equal protection of the law clause in the
Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection
guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and
may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto
by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets
of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in
the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging
in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any
election except to vote. Under the same provision,
elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to
take part in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it
proper to treat these two classes of officials differently
with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office
of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any
position other than those occupied by them. Again, it
is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or
look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the
same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.

MRCA v. Court of Appeals
180 SCRA 344

National Electrification Administration vs. Gonzaga
G.R. No. 158761 (December 4, 2007)

Not in OG or newspaper of general circulation
Electric Coop Election Code
Of general interest because everyone consumes electricity

Garcilliano vs. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 170338 (December 23, 2008)

The SC declared invalid for lack of compliance with
the publication requirement the previous Senate
inquiry in aid of legislation on the "Hello Garci tapes.
"However, the Senate may now call for a new inquiry
on the same following the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure in two major dailies last October
2008.

The Court cited sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution which mandates the publication of the
rules of procedure of either the Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees before it may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.

The SC reiterated its ruling in Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations that the phrase "duly published rules of
procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in
aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct
from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of
the Senate's membership, the composition of the
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it
may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of
Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.

The Court said that the respondents cannot justify
their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication requirement by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and that they are
published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
and accessible to the public at the Senate's internet
web page. "The absence of any amendment to the
rules cannot justify the Senate's defiance of the clear
and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution.The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom,
practice or tradition followed by the Senate, it said. t
added that the respondents' invocation of the
provisions of RA 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet was incorrect, stressing that "the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence of
electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents but such "does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

NCC3

Kasilag vs. Rodriguez
69 PHIL 217

F: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and
heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio,
commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner
the possession of the land and its improvements
granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio
(EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as homestead to
secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000
plus interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that
EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest
thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not have
any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax
on the land and its improvements, during the
existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the
owner of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted
that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the
owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of
Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled
and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the
provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed
that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the
stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an
absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the
mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the
loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was
stipulated that in case the motion to be presented
under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-
Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would
automatically become void and the mortgage would
subsist in all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it
came to pass that EA was unable to pay the
stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and
its improvements. For this reason, she and the
petitioner entered into another verbal contract
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of
the land on condition that the latter would not collect
the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment
of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land,
and would introduce improvements thereon.

HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his
receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as
integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are
illegal and void agreements, bec. the such contract is
a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116
of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that
petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land
bec. he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an
absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell
the land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he
knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner
of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated.
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner
should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he was
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the
flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as
found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume
that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition, aside from the
prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the
case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon
ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not
be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be
such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It
is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the
laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the
mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the
well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In
taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits
are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that
the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus,
as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of
sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF.
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may
elect to have the improvements introduced by the
petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof,
P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have
the land where the improvements or plants are found,
by paying them its market value to be fixed by the
court of origin, upon hearing the parties.

Elegado v. Court of Appeals
173 SCRA 285

Foreigners cannot be any less bound by our laws in our own country
Elegado was a Filipino lawyer representing the foreign company shows ignorance of the law.

Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1339 (March 8, 2001)

Facts:
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David
Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children.
However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted
another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was
also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David,
had, prior to the solemnization, issued an affidavit
stating that they were both married; however due to
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and
they no longer communicated with them. They lived
together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed
to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of
gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez.

Issue:
WON Payao and David's marriage is valid.

Held/Ratio:
No. Although the couple had lived together for seven
years (as the affidavit shows and which the Judge
relied on in crafting his decision), Article 34 of the FC
also requires that there must be no legal impediment
to marry each other. Also in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were "separated. The judge
ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage
(regardless of the couple being separated) is a
diriment impediment which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. And besides, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least
five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage.

NCC 4, cf. NCC 2252 - 2269
Revised Penal Code (RPC) 22
Family Code (FC) 256

Frivaldo vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996)

Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-
elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January
1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October
1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who
was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's
election and proclamation on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted
that he was naturalized in the United States as
alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship
only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon
himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents
abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title
should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto
petition that should have been filed within 10 days
from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253
of the Omhibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January
1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held: The Commission on Elections has the primary
jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Congress and
elective provincial and city officials. However, the
decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been
made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the
Solicitor General, who categorically claims that
Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitor's stance is
assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation
with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore
represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that
the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of
candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss
of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1983 per the certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in
the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and
some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did
not find it necessary nor do they claim to have
been coerced to abandon their cherished status as
Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his
American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He
failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a
person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country
cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications
is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of
Sorsogon.

Gregorio vs. CA
G.R. No. L-22802 (November 29, 1968)

Retroactive effect of procedural law; General Rule: exception
The retroactive effect of a procedural law is not violative of any right of a party who may feel that he is adversely
affected.

Aruego vs CA
254 SCRA 711

Facts:
! Jose M. Aruego, a married man, was alleged
to have an amorous relationship with Luz
Fabian in 1969 until his death in 1982. Out of
this relationship came two daughters,
respondents Antonia and Evelyn Aruego.
! Complaint for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights
! Main basis: Continuous possession of status
of illegitimate children through the following:
! Regular support and educational
expenses
! Use of father's surname
! Payment of maternal bills
! Taking to restaurants and dept.
stores at times of family rejoicing
! Attendance to school problems
! Calling and allowing to his office
! Introducing them as children to
family friends.
! LC held that Antonia is illegitimate daughter
while Evelyn is not
! Respondent invoked A285 of CC, while
petitioners contend that FC is applicable
because the case was decided after its
effectivity

Issue: WON the FC (where action for compulsory
recognition of illegitimate children prescribes upon
death of parent) can be applied in the case

Held: NO. The case was filed prior to the effectivity of
FC. Its retroactive application will impair vested rights
of respondent to have case decided under A285 of
CC. Private respondent was a minor when it was filed,
an exception provided in A285.

Cang vs CA
296 SCRA 128

A256 of the FC provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or actual rights in
accordance to the CC and other laws.
FC August 3, 1988: A188; consent of adoption: (1) person to be adopted (if 10 <); (2) parents by nature

Francisco vs CA
299 SCRA 188

Facts:

Petitioner Teresita Francisco is the wife of respondent
Eusebio Franciso. Eusebio's children by the first
marriage are also respondents in the case. The
spouses have acquired a sari-sari store, a residential
house and lot, an apartment house, and an additional
house and lot, which were all administered by
Eusebio until he was invalidated by tuberculosis,
heart disease, and cancer. Eusebio's children by the
first marriage succeeded in securing a general power
of attorney from their father which authorized
Conchita (one of the children) to administer the house
and lot and the apartment. Petitioner filed a case for
the annulment of the general power of attorney and to
be declared administratix of the properties. Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents, saying that petitioner failed to prove that
the properties were acquired during the marriage. CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that the properties are
not conjugal but capital

Held: NO. The party who invokes A160 must prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition during overture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal partnership. This
presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, and
convincing evidence. Petitioner, however, admitted
that Eusebio brought the land into their marriage, and
evidence showed that he inherited it from his parents.
The property should be regarded as his own
exclusively pursuant to A148 of CC. Essentially,
property owned by a spouse prior to the marriage,
and brought to the marriage, is considered as his/her
separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title are
properties acquired gratuitously by inheritance,
devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it was
acquired during the marriage, is it is Eusebio's
exclusive property by virtue of lucrative title. Also, the
fact that the land was registered in the name of
"Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, is
no proof that the property was acquired during the
spouses' covered to. t is merely descriptive of the
civil status of Eusebio. Finally, Eusebio was not
suffering from serious illness to impair his fitness to
administer his property.

NCC6

PEFTOK Integrated Services vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 124841 (July 31, 1998)

Quitclaims were prepared and readied by PEFTOK and employees were forced to sign the same for fear that they
would not be given their salary on pay day, and worse, their services would be terminated if they did not sign the said
quitclaims under controversy.
NO VOLUNTARINESS

Valderama vs. Macaide
470 SCRA 168

The contention of the petitioners that the respondents had waived their right of first refusal is not supported by
evidence. (requirements of waiver)

1. He must actually have the right which he renounces.
2. He must have the capacity to make the renunciation.
3. The renunciation must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner.

DM Consunji vs. CA
G.R. No. 137873 (April 20, 2001)

The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the
Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at
bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her
claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

NCC7
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3

Mecano vs. COA
G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992)

NO implied repeal. Two categories of implied repel:
where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent
of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal.
if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law. Both are not applicable to the RAC and the Administrative Code of 1987.

Solangon vs. Salazar
G.R. No. 125944 (June 29, 2001)

Rationale of CA: Upon the repeal of the Usury Law by Central Bank Circular No. 905 on 22 December 1982, there is
no more interest ceiling or maximum rate of interest, and the rate will just depend on the mutual agreement of the
parties.
nterest at 6% per month, or 72% per annum is iniquitous or unconscionable, and hence, contrary to morals ('contra
bonos mores'), if not against the law.
It is more consonant with justice that the said interest rate be reduced equitably.
An interest of 12% per annum is deemed fair and reasonable.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the interest rate of
72% per annum is ordered reduced to 12 % per annum

Thornton vs. Thornton
(August 16, 2004)

SC holds that the Family Code Act of 1997 did not empower the family courts to exclusively issue writs of habeas
corpus and it did not revoke the capacity of SC and CA to issue writs of habeas corpus. In relation to the word
"exclusive, although it is assumed that the language of the laws should follow common understanding, the spirit of
the law and intention of the lawmakers come first than legal technicalities.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

NCC8

De Roy vs. CA
157 SCRA 757

Non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the OG
There is no law requiring the the publication of SC decisions in the OG before they can be binding
Duty of lawyer in active la practice to keep abreast of SC decisions particularly where issuances have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advanced reports of GRs and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals.

Pesca vs. Pesca
G.R. No. 136921 (April 17, 2001)

The interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law (legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet)
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. citing the Canon Law

NCC9
RPC5

NCC 10-12
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XII Sec. 5
Rules of Court Rule 129 (2), (3)

Martinez v.Van Buskirk
18 Phil. 79

Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in
by society for so long a time has to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and
that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in
unloading his wagon.

Alonzo vs Padua
150 SCRA 379

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the
petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their
co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.

NCC13
cf. Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 22
RAC Sec. 31

Armigos v. CA
179 SCRA 1

NCC13 (last paragraph) is similar, but not identical, to 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "unless
otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by
excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded.

Namarco v. Tecson
29 SCRA 70

Years defined as 365 days, months are of 30 days not the "natural or "solar months unless they are designated by
name. (Spanish Code)
Change in legislation should be done by the congress re: NCC13

Go v. Dizon
214 SCRA 41
[Concurring Opinion, J. Regalado]

23 of the nterim Rules and Guidelines promulgated by this Court to implement BP129 clearly states: "Perfection of
Appeal in cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to
appeal by any party.

Quiqui v. Boncaros
11 SCRA 416

Their Motion for Reconsideration, although dated August 16, 1979, was filed with the trial court on August 17, 1979 or
one day beyond the 30-day reglementary period prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 41.
SEC. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court
within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.
The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37

NCC15
cf. FC26par.2

Barreto v. Gonzales
58 Phil 67

Matrimonial residence of the couple has always been the Philippines (both Filipinos), the residence acquired in the
State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not
confere jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.

Tenchavez v. Escao
15 SCRA 355

Nature: Direct appeal from decision of court of first instance
Facts:
! Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret
marriage before Catholic chaplain, Lt Moises
Lavares. After their marriage was revealed,
they were separated as Tenchavez went
back to Manila to work while Escano stayed
in Cebu then Misamis
! In Misamis, Escano asked for petition to
annul her marriage but this was dismissed
because of her non-appearance at hearing.
Afterwards, she went to the US without
informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce
on grounds of extreme cruelty and mental in
character in Nevada.
! Respondent then married again to Russell
Moran, had children and became a US
Citizen
! On July 30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the
procedings for legal separation and
damages against wife and parents in law
ISSUE: WON divorce in Nevada was legal
HELD: NO, divorce and 2
nd
marriage are not
recognized as valid
! As stated in Art 15, since marriage was
contracted by Filipinos in Philippines, only
competent civil court can annul it, thus
remaining valid
! Civil code does not admit absolute divorce
and is not even part of the code, instead of
divorce, legal separation is used, wherein
marriage is still recognized.
! To recognize decree of divorce of foreign
courts would be violation on public policy
and article 17 of civil code
! Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their
acts, or property and those
which have for their object
public order, policy, and
good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments
promulgated, or by
determinations or
conventions agreed upon
in foreign country.
! Would also discriminate in favor of
wealthy persons who can get
divorced elsewhere.
! Would not make difference if Tenchavez was
also in court of Nevada when divorce was
filed since mere appearance can't confer
jurisdiction on court which had none.
! Tenchavez now has grounds to divorce
respondent since she had intercourse with
someone other than her husband, entitling
him to ask for legal separation under basis of
adultery
! Result: Petitioner has grounds to file for legal
separation, recover 25,000 by way of moral
damages and fees

Board of Commissioners vs. de la Rama
197 SCRA 853

There being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there rises a presumption that it is the same as that of
Philippine law..Santiago (grandfather) was not pressed by the CID to prove the laws of China relating to marriage,
having been content with his testimony that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of China.

NCC17

German vs. Donaldson
1 Phil 63

! Held that a power of attorney executed in Germany, should be tested as to its formal validity by the laws of that
country and not by the provisions of the CC.
! Government v Frank contract was entered into in Illinois by a minor in the Philippines but had the capacity in
Illinois.

NCC19-22

People v. Ritter
194 SCRA 690

Moral and exemplary damages are awarded to the victim's heirs despite acquittal of accused on grounds of
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Doctrin (Urbano v IAC) a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.

De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society
112 SCRA 243

The provisions of the NCC oh Human Relations are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal
provisions and definite contractual stipulations. The Code of By-laws of the Society contains specific provisions
governing the term of office of petitioner.

LLorente vs. Sandiganbayan
202 SCRA 309

Carpio vs. Valmonte
G.R. No. 151866 (September 9, 2004)

To find the existence of a abuse of right, the following elements must be present:
i. There is a legal right or duty;
ii. Which is exercised in bad faith;
iii. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Reyes
G R No 154259 (February 28, 2005)

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.

These standards are the following: act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.

NCC37-39
NCC4O-41
1987 Constitution, Art II Sec 12
P D 603 [Child and Youth Welfare Code], Art 5
FC 164
RPCArts.256-259

Roe v Wade
41OUS 113, 93SCt 705, 35Led 2d147

3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a child's PERSONALTY
In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines

Geluz v. CA
2 SCRA 801

a. Dead child has no right
b. Against the 1987 Constitution and PD603
c. Legal capacity e.g. inheritance
d. LIFE at BIRTH: absolute precedent of rights

Quimiging v. Icao
34 SCRA 134

Nature: Appeal from order of the Zamboanga del
Norte CFI. Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
Facts: Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex
with Quimiguing several times by force and
intimidation and without her consent (rape!); as a
result Quimiguing became pregnant, despite efforts
and drugs supplied by Icao. Quimiguing claims
support at Php 120.00/month, damages and
attorney's fees. cao moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of cause of action since complainant did not
allege that the child had indeed been born; trial judge
sustained defendant's motion. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON the case merits the protection of Art. 40
NCC and if so then does the child have the rights,
through the mother, to claim support.
Held: YES.
Ratio: Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers
that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given
birth to a baby girl. The SC says that since, as
provided in Article 40 NCC (the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes favorable to it,
provided, it be born later with the conditions specified
in following article), petitioner Quimiguing's child,
since time of conception, and as having fulfilled the
requirement of having been born later, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee.
Disposition: Orders of the lower court reversed and
set aside and case remanded to lower court for
further proceedings.

De Jesus v. Syquia
58 Phil 866

Facts: Antonia de Jesus went to court for the purpose
of recovering damages from Cesar Syquia stemming
from a breach of a promise to marry and to compel
the defendant to recognize and support her two
children. Cesar Syquia had an affair with Antonia de
Jesus which resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a
baby boy on June 17, 1931. For a year or so, Syquia
supported de Jesus and his child. He, however, lost
interest in the relationship when De Jesus became
pregnant with their second child. Syquia left and
eventually married another woman. De Jesus now
claims that Syquia broke his promise to marry her.

Issue: Whether de Jesus can claim damages for
breach of promise to marry

Held: The trial court did not grant damages to de
Jesus for supposed breach of contract. Action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil
law. At any rate, such promise was not satisfactorily
proven by De Jesus. During the course of their
relationship, defendant never expressed anything to
that effect.

NCC 42

Limjoco v Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante
80 Phil 776

Estate continues personality
The state or the mass of property, rights and assts left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, become vested
and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. Under the present legal system, rights and
obligations which survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.

Dumlao v. Quality Plastics
70 SCRA 472

Service of summons on a dead person is void. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.

Eugenio v. Velez
185 SCRA 425

A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally "married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
Right to bury a dead person does not include a common law husband who is still married.

Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 (October 27, 1989)

Death of Mr. Marcos has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased.

NCC 43
ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj) - (kk)(1989 Rev. Rules on Evidence)

Joaquin v. Navarro
93 Phil 257

Nature:
Three proceedings instituted in CFI Manila were
heard jointly and were given a single decision. This
was appealed to the CA, whose decision modified the
former. A subsequent appeal to the SC ensued.

Facts:
Feb. 6, 1946 While the battle for the liberation of
Manila was raging, the spouses of JN, Sr. and AJ
(mother of petitioner), together with their three
daughters P, C, and N, and their son JN, Jr. and the
latter's wife, AC, sought refuge in the ground floor of
the building known as the German Club, at the corner
of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of the city.
Building was packed with refugees, shells were
exploding around, the Club was set on fire, and the
Japanese were shooting those who tried to escape.
Three daughters were shot and died. JN, Sr. and son
decided to abandon the premises to seek safer
haven. AJ remained. Upon attempting to escape, JN,
Jr. was shot and died. Minutes later, the Club, already
on fire, collapsed. JN, Sr. and daughter-in-law died
three days later. Friend and former neighbor FL who
escaped with JN, Sr. from the building, survived to
narrate the story.

The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of
petitioner Joaquin, survived the son; the son dying
first before the mother. CA claimed the reverse. If the
son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of
succession. If the mother died first, the respondent
Antonio, son of JN, Jr. by his first marriage, would
inherit.

Decision was reviewed by the SC.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123
of the Rules of Court having repealed Art. 43 of the
CC or not is relevant to the case at bar.

No. Neither of the two provisions is applicable. Both
provisions, as their language implies, are intended as
a substitute for facts, and so are not to be available
when there are facts.1

(2) WON the mother died before the son or vice
versa.

No. The son died first. The facts are adequate to
solve the problem of survivorship without the need for
statutory presumptions. The presumption that AJ, the
mother, died first is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures without any sure
foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory is
deduced from established facts which, weighed with
common experience, engender the inference as a
very strong probability.

1 Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court
reads:"Whentwopersonsperishinthesamecalamity,such
aswreck,battle,orconflagration,anditisnot(1)shownwho
diedfirst,andthereareno(2)particularcircumstancesfrom
which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from
the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the
sexesaccordingtothefollowingrules.
Article 43 of the CC is of the following tenor: "Whenever a

doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or
more persons who would inherit one from the other, the
person who alleges the prior death of either must prove the
allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be
thattheydiedatthesametime,andnotransmissionofrights
fromonetotheothershalltakeplace.

NCC 44-47
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (Corp. Code), Secs. 2, 4, 17
NCC 1767-1768

Barlin v. Ramirez
7 Phil 41

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of
Camarines. Willard, J.:
Facts: Ramirez, having been appointed parish priest
by the plaintiff Barlin, took possession of the Church
in 1901 until a successor had been appointed in 1902.
Defendant Ramirez refused to surrender the Church
and Barlin filed a suit; the municipality of Lagonoy
joined Ramirez as defendants, claiming possession
and ownership of the Church and contesting Barlin's
authority and capacity to order that Ramirez be
replaced and surrender the Church to the appointed
successor.
Issue: WON the Catholic Church is the rightful owner
of the Church?
Held: Yes.
Ratio: The Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity
in the Philippine Islands, and under Article 46 of the
Civil Code, Juridical persons may acquire and
possess property of all kinds as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their
organization.
Disposition: Judgment of the Lower Court affirmed.

Camid vs. Office of the President
G.R. No. 161414 (January 17, 2005)

It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.

Catalan vs. Basa
G.R. No. 159567 (July 31, 2007)

a. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his
property
b. n order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's capacity to give consent at the time of
the donation.

NCC38-39
R.A. 6809
A.M. NO: 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship
Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution {cf. Sangguniang Kabataan]
Marriage, FC 5; cf. R.A. 6809
NCC 1327
NCC 1390 (par. 1)
NCC 1403 (par. 3)
NCC 1397
NCC 1399
NCC 1489
NCC 1426 - 1427

Mercado v. Espiritu
37 Phil 215

Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole heirs,
along with their two sisters, to a 48 hectare tract of
land which belonged to their mother the sister of the
defendant. The defendant cajoled, induced, and
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell
their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its original
value. The plaintiffs demand the annulment of the
sale, the return of the land, and the remuneration of
the thing benefited by the defendant.
According to the Defendant, the plaintiff's mother had
sold a portion of the original land to the defendant for
a sum. (instrument exhibit 1)The plaintiff's father
subsequently, mortgaged the remaining parcel to the
defendant for a sum to cover his children's welfare
after his wife's death. (Pacto de retro; instrument
exhibit 2) The plaintiffs had alleged themselves of
legal age and ratified the absolute and perpetual sale
of the land in consideration of the P400 (instrument
exhibit 3). Cross-complaint filed for damages due to
the malicious and unfounded complaint by the plaintiffs.

Bambalan v. Maramba
51 Phil 417

Facts:
-Petitioner Isidro Bambalan, a minor, owned a piece
of land
-Isidro was forced by his mother Paula Prado to sell
the land to Genovena Muerong, since she was
threatening Paula of imprisonment due to the load
Genoveva gave Paula.
-To have the document of the sale acknowledged, the
respondent even purchased the cedula of the
petitioner
-sidro didn't try to conceal his age; in fact the
respondent was well aware that Isidro was a minor.
-Decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannot be used
since the petitioner didn't try to hide his age
*The land in question wasn't even registered in the
Register of Deeds; the sale of the land cannot be
executed without registration as provided in section
50 of Act. 496
Issue: Was the sale of the land valid or void, since
Isidro was a minor at the execution of the alleged
sale?
Held: The sale of the land is void. 1.) because Isidro
is incapacitated to enter into such contracts, 2.)
because the land wasn't even registered and hence,
cannot be sold.
Ratio:
Art. 1390 NCC: The following contracts are voidable
or annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent to a contract...
Art. 38 NCC: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state
of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction
are mere restrictions on capacity to act (aptitude for
the exercise of rights), and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as
when the latter arise from his acts or from property
relations, such as easements.
Art. 1397 NCC: The action for the annulment of
contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby
obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons
who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those
with whom they contracted; nor can those who
exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or
employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action
upon these flaws of the contract. (1302a)

Suan Chian v. Alcantara
85 Phil 669

Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu, herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of
legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid
consideration.
The circumstance that about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appeallants of
his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from
disavowing the contract.

Braganza v. Villa-Abrille
105 Phil 456

Facts: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from
De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in
consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him
P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war.
Because they have no paid, Abrille is sued them in
March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA
held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the
contract they signed.The family petitioned to review
the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to
solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest,
praying for consideration of the minority of the
Braganza sons when they signed the contract.
Issue: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18
respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan
they have signed.
Held: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to
pay her share in the contract because they minority of
her sons does not release her from liability. She is
ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision
of the CA which found them similarly liable due to their
failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained
previous sources in Jurisprudence "in order to hold
the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not
constructive. It has been held that his mere silence
when making a contract as to his age does not
constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an
action of deceit.
The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the
contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they
have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that
even if the written contract is unenforceable because
of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the
extent that they may have profited by the money
received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is
P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine
money is equivalent to P1,166.67.

RPC 12(2)-(3)
Republic Act No. 9344, Juvenile Justi~ and Welfare Law
RPC13(2)
PD 603 Sees. 189 - 204
Also see: Rule 3, Section 5 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
FC 45 (2)
NCC 1327 (1), 1328
RPC 12(1)
Rule 101, Rules of Court

US v. Vaquilar
27 Phil 88

Facts: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his
wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other
persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses testified that the
defendant appeared to be insane prior to the
commission of the crimes. They also testified that the
appellant was complaining of pains in his head and
stomach prior to the killing. The witnesses' evidence
for insanity include:
! "appellants eyes were very big and red with
his sight penetrating at the time he was
killing his wife.
! "he looked at me he was crazy because if he
was not, he wouldn't have killed his family
! at the moment of cutting those people, "he
looked like a madman; crazy because he
would cut anybody at random
! sister said, ".then he pursued me..he
must have been crazy because he cut me
Issue: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are
sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore
exempt from criminal liability.
Held: The evidence is insufficient to declare him
insane. The appellant's conduct was consistent with
the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with
an unsound mind at the time he committed the
crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not
conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of
"crazy is not synonymous with the legal terms
"insane. The conduct of the appellant after he was
confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a
sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out
loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after
the commission of the crime.
The court further held that mere mental depravity, or
moral insanity which results not from any disease of
the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral
system where the person is mentally sane, does not
exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the
absence of proof that the defendant had lost his
reason or became demented after a few moments
prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is
presumed that he was in a normal state of mind.

People v. Rafanan
204 SCRA 65

Standard of Legal insanity by People v Formigones (2 distinguishable tests):
i. Test of cognition complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act.
ii. Test of violation that there be a total deprivation of the will
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative
allegation of insanity.
Standard Oil v. Arenas

Facts: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment,
including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted
as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of
execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared
and alleged that her husband was declared insane on
July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was
authorized by the court as guardian to institute the
proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several
bonds given by her husband while in a state of
insanity.
Issues: (1)Whether or not suffering from monomania
of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the
person does not have capacity to act. (2) Whether or
not the appellant, was incapable of entering into
contract at the time the bond was executed on
December 15, 1908.
Held: The court affirmed the trial court decision that
Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The SC
held that there is no evidence to warrant the
conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person
suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane
and therefore is deranged and incapable of binding
himself in a contract. From the testimony of his wife,
it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever
he wished, that he had property of his own and was
not deprived of its management, as well as the fact
that he had never squandered any large sum of
money.
As for the 2
nd
issue, there was no direct proof that
showed that at the date of the giving of the bond,
December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of
acting because of insanity. The witnesses who as
physicians, testified that they observed insane periods
in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but
none at the time of the execution of the said bond on
December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife
never before sought to legally deprive her husband
management over his estate knowing full well that he
was insane.

NCC 1327 (2), 807 & 820

ROC Rule 92 Sec. 2

RPC 31,41
FC 150-15; cfFC 87
NCC 1490
NCC 2035
cf. NCC 963-967
cf. Art. IV, Sees. 1-5, 1987 Constitution
NCC381-396
NCC 1381, 1491, 2236

Villanueva vs CA
GR No 114870 (May 26, 1995)

PRODGAL = "gambler, away from home, slightly incompetent
Husband and wife cannot sell or donate to each other
Affinity by blood
! Always start from self
! Parents 1
st
degree
! Brothers/Sisters 2
nd

! Cousins 4
th

! Grandparents 2
nd

! Aunts/Uncles 3
rd

! Your brother's wife is not your relative! (by blood or affinity)

Art. II, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution; cf. NCC 403
See also: Rule 3 Section 4, 1997 Rules Of Civil Procedure

NCC5O
cf. FC 55, 101, 149, 152, 101

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
248 SCRA 300

Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor.

March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and
candidate for the same position, filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC,
alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency
requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the
COMELEC's head office in ntramuros claiming that
her error in the first certificate was the result of an
"honest misrepresentation and that she has always
"maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence.

April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a
vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found
Montejo's petition for disqualification meritorious,
Marcos' corrected certificate of candidacy void, and
her original certificate cancelled.

May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted
on April 24.

May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution
allowing Marcos' proclamation to the office should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes. However, this was reversed
and instead directed that the proclamation would be
suspended even if she did win.

May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos
declared that she was the winner of the said
Congressional election.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency
required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first
district of Leyte.

Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitution's residency qualification requirement
(as intended by the framer's of the constitution)2. The
confusion of the "honest mistake made when filed
her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the
fact that the entry for residence is immediately
followed by the entry for the number of years and
months in the residence where the candidate seeks to
hold office immediately after the elections. This
honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the
fact of residence in the First District. The instances
(i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after
marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to
disqualify Marcos were only actual residences
incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was
required to change residences and apply for voter's
registration in these cited locations. When she got
married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that
she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further
contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is
the husband's right to transfer residences to wherever
he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation
does not mean or intend to lose the wife's domicile of
origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of
domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she
wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to
rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and
their farm in Olot, Leyte.

(2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in
disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby
transmitting jurisdiction to the House of
Representatives.

Yes. The mischief in petitioner's contention lies in the
fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies
would then refuse to render judgments merely on the
ground of having failed to reach a decision within a
given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6

2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987
Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs.
Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE
1987CONSTlTUTlONALCONVETlONJuly22,1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
courtmayexemptthewifefromlivingwiththehusbandifhe
shouldliveabroadunlessintheserviceoftheRepublic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
andsupport.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881,
it is evident that the respondent Commission does not
lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.
(3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of
the petitioner's qualifications after the elections.

No. The HRET's jurisdiction of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of members
of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives.

Puno, J. (Concurring):
All her life, Marcos' domicile of origin was Tacloban.
When she married the former dictator, her domicile
became subject to change by law and the right to
change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has
been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa
since August 1994. Both places are within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.

Francisco, J. (Concurring):
Residence for election purposes means domicile.
Marcos has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has
lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are
within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Romero, J. (Separate):
Women's rights as per choosing her domicile after
husband's death is evident in this case. Marcos' living
in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency
requirement.

Vitug, J. (Separate):
It seems unsound to vote for someone who has
already been declared disqualified. The Court refrain
from any undue encroachment on the ultimate
exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on
matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat,
are explicitly within their exclusive domain. Voted for
dismissal.

Mendoza, J. (Concurring):
The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the
power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they
lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be
elected. It has none and the qualifications of
candidates may be questioned only in the event they
are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an
election protest in an appropriate forum (not
necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET).

Padilla, J. (Dissenting):
Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to.
The controversy should not be blurred by academic
disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified. And
the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for
a disqualified candidate shall not be counted.

Regalado, J. (Dissenting):
A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets
married. The death of her husband does not
automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original.
Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of
law.

Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):
A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a
government branch or agency has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELEC's resolutions
are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular
agency's powers. In agreement with Regalado, re:
woman's domicile.
THE FAMILY CODE

E.O, 29, as amended by E.O. 227, R.A. 8609, R.A. 7160
FC 255, cf. FC 36 in rd. to 39, FC 105, FC 162, FC 257
FC 253, 255

Lupo Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes
243 SCRA 32

Facts:
Atienza, visiting his house in Makati wherein he has
two children with De Castro, saw the respondent
Judge Brillantes sleeping in his bed. The houseboy
claimed that the judge had been cohabiting with De
Castro. Atienza files charges on the judge on the
ground that the respondent is already married and
has five children. Judge denies the claim of being
married stating that the alleged union wasn't valid
because it lacked a marriage license. Although upon
the request of the woman's parents they held another
marriage ceremony later that year, they still didn't
apply for a marriage license. The woman abandoned
the Judge nineteen years ago leaving their children to
his care. He claims that Article 40 of the Family Code
does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was thus governed
by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage on 1991, governed by the Family Code.

Issue:
WON the judge can contract a second marriage
without a judicial declaration of nullity.

Held/Ratio:
No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered
into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Article 256 of the FC, said Article is given
"retroactive effect since it does not prejudice or
impair any vested right. His failure to secure a
marriage license on two possible occasions betrays
his sinister motives and bad faith as a lawyer and
judge.

Dismissed from service.

Bernabe vs. Alejo
374 SCRA 180

The right of children to seek recognition granted by the NCC to illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the FC took effect cannot be impaired. NCC185 allows an illegitimate child to file for recognition within 4 years
of attaining age of majority, thus gave child a vested right which the FC cannot impair.

FC1

FC 1 cf. NCC 52, FC 149
Art II Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution
Art. XV Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
FC 1 cf. Rule 131 Sec. 3, 1989 Rules on Evidence
NCC 220
Muslim Code, (P.D. 1083) Sec. 14

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
35 Phils 252

Facts:
! Jan 7, 1915 parties were legally married
but after a month woman left because of
gross acts by her husband
! Marriage a contract in so far as civil effects
are concerned requiring consent of parties
! After marriage ceremony, a
conjugal partnership is formed
between the 2
! Reciprocal rights arise and legal
existence becomes one
! Termination of it should result in
some relief
SSUE: WON art 149 is absolute and therefore can't
grant wife any support since she was the one who left
home
! Person obliged to give support can either
pay the pension fixed or receive and
maintain in his home the person.
HELD: NO
! Separation is different from support given to
wife as agreed upon in the contract they
entered into when they got married when
husband promised to support wife.
! Wife is still part of conjugal domicile even if
she doesn't live in house anymore
RESULT: should pay support

Sermonia v. CA
233 SCRA 155

Prescription period for the filing of a Bigamy case starts at the discovery of the subsequent marriage.
Constructive notice does not apply to bigamous marriages since the essence of such marriages is to conceal the
first marriage and deceive the first spouse.

Perido v. Perido
63 SCRA 97

A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take place.
In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and
wife are presumed married.

People v. Malabago
G.R. No. 115686 (December 2, 1996)

Parricide case, need to establish marital relationship in order to prosecute the crime of parricide. The best
proof of marriage is a marriage certificate. To prove a marriage in the absence of a marriage certificate, oral
evidence will suffice as long as it is not objected.

Go vs. Court of Appeals
272 SCRA 752

A wife is solely liable for the damages caused by a contract she entered individually, since under FC 73 wives can
work without the consent of husband.

Trinidad vs CA
G.R. No. 118904 (April 20, 1998)

The absence of a marriage certificate does not mean that the marriage did not take place.
Evidence of marriage:
1.) marriage certificate
2.) witness to ceremony
3.) public and open cohabitation
baptismal certificates indicating the marital relationship

De Jacob vs CA
312SCRA772

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the
offeror establishes its due execution and subsequent loss. The fact of a marriage may be shown by extrinsic
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Due execution and loss of marriage certificate constitutes a condition
sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents

Silverio vs Republic
(October 22, 2007)

For marriage purposes (and everything else for that matter) a male is defined as the sex that bears spermatozoa,
while the female is the sex that bears ova. A medical sex change does not change the these physical attributes.

FC1 cf. NCC221

Panganiban v. Borromeo
58 Phil 367

A notarized contract that permits concubinage and adultery, barring the opposition of a spouse is not judicially
recognizable. Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes, the acts are still
contrary to customs, good morals and against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.

In re Santiago
70 Phil 66

Facts: Respondent lawyer prepared for a married
couple (who had bee separated for 9 years) a
document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia, that
they authorize each other to marry again, at the same
time renouncing whatever right of action one might
have against the other. When the husband inquired if
there could be no trouble, respondent lawyer pointed
to his diploma which was hanging on the wall and
said, " would tear that off if this document turns out
not to be valid. The husband remarried.
Issue: Whether Santiago should be disbarred from the
practice of law
Held: The respondent was suspended from practice
of law for one year for having been ignorant of the law
or being careless for giving legal advice by trying to
beak the marriage through a private contract. The
document is contrary to law, good morals and public
order. Marriage is an inviolable social institution that
cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the
parties.

Selanova v. Mendoza
64 SCRA 69

FACTS: The case stems from a document prepared
and ratified by Judge Alejandro Mendoza which
extrajudicially divided the assets of the Selanova
couple, effectively authorized the spouses to commit
marital infidelity and ratified their personal separation
without the express and prior approval of the court.

ISSUE: WON the private contract is valid.

HELD: No. Even before the enactment of the New
Civil Code, the law prohibits extrajudicial dissolution
of conjugal partnership without court approval.
Mendoza, in his defense, claimed that he ratified the
document on the pretext that Saturnino Selanova and
his wife Avelina Ceniza would later seek the approval
of the courts. The law requires, however, that prior
approval of the court be sought by the parties seeking
the dissolution of conjugal partnership during the
marriage in order for it to have the effect and force of
law. Clearly, Judge Martinez erred in ratifying this
arrangement. The contract as it stands is not
judicially recognizable and is therefore void.

Lichauco-de Leon v. CA
186 SCRA 345

The issue in this case is whether or not a letter pardoning one spouse is valid. In this case it wasn't since the
consent of de Leon was vitiated as the girl threatened to file cases against the guy, scandalizing their entire family.

NCC 19 - 21; NCC 2176; NCC 1403 2(c)
MC22

Domalagan v. Bolifer
33 Phil 471

Facts:
! In November 1909, Jorge Domalagan and
Carlos Bolifer entered into a conrtract by
virtue of the terms of which Domalagan was
to pay Bolifer P500 upon the marriage of his
son Cipriano to Bolifer's daughter, Bonifacia.
! In August 1910, Domalagan completed his
obligation by paying Bolifer P500 plus P16
as token of future marriage.
! Bonifacia Boliger joined in lawful wedlock to
Laureano Sisi in Agusut 1910
! Upon learning the marriage, Domalagan
demanded the return of P516 plus interest
and damages (he was obliged to sell real
property belonging to him in order to raise
P500)
! CFI ruled in favor of Domalagan and
concluded that he delivered to Bolifer the
sum of P516 and that Carlos Bolifer
received and did not return said amount
! Bolifer appealed to the SC

Issue:

WON the verbal contract entered into in regard to the
delivery of the money by reason of a prospective
marriage valid and effective?

Held:
Yes. Par. 3 Sec 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil
Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A
contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of the said
section, that parties will be unable to prove it. Said
section simply provides the method by which the
contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does
not declare that said contracts are invalid. A contract
may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not
clothed with the necessary form. If the parties to an
action make no objection to the admissibility of oral
evidence to support contracts like the one in question
and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
other than in writing, it will just be as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

Cabague v. Auxilio
92 Phil 294

The verbal agreement to marry must be proven by the proper party: the person involved in the agreement
(one of the people getting married)

Hermosisima v. CA
109 Phil 629

Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing apart from right to recover money or property
advanced upon faith of such promise. Damages can be claim if seduction was involved though, in this case the
dude being 10 years younger than the girl, seduction could not have been present says the SC.

Wassmer v. Velez
12 SCRA 648

FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer
applied for a Marriage License on August 23, 1954.
The wedding was to take place on September 4,
1954. As expected, all the necessary preparations
were undertaken for the said event. However, two
days before the wedding, Francisco Velez left a note
for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not
push through because his mother opposed the union.
The following day, he sent her another note stating
that the wedding will push through as planned.
Francisco Velez never showed up and has not been
heard since then. Beatriz subsequently filed suit for
damages.

ISSUE: WON Beatriz Wassmer has a right to file for
damages for breach of promise to marry?

HELD: Yes. Beatriz Wassmer can claim for
damages. Under Art. 21 of the Civil Code, Beatriz
can claim damages for the actions of Francisco Velez.
While it is true that breach of promise to marry is not
actionable per se, the court reasoned that what Velez
committed could hardly be described as a simple
breach of promise to marry. To leave the bride two
days before the wedding, after making all the
necessary preparations, with no justifiable reason, is
morally reprehensible. His behavior is verily against
society's concept of good morals and customs.
Beatriz Wassmer can collect compensation for
damages arising from Velez' reckless, oppressive and
malevolent actions.

Tanjanco v. CA
18 SCRA 994

FACTS: Araceli Santos filed suit against Apolonio
Tanjanco for breach of promise to marry. Santos
claims that she began living with Tanjanco in
December 1957 and consented to having sexual
relations with him only because of his protestations of
love and promise of marriage. Santos' sexual
relations with Tanjanco lasted until December 1959
when Santos became pregnant. Consequently,
Santos filed suit against Tanjanco for emotional
distress, mental anguish and humiliation arising from
Tanjanco's breach of promise to marry her
compounded by the embarrassment she suffered
when she resigned from her job. Action was
premised by the Court of Appeals on Art.21of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: WON the acts of Tanjanco constitute a
violation of Art. 21 specifically as it pertains to the
crime of seduction.

HELD: No. The essential feature of Art. 21 is
seduction based on the memorandum submitted by
the Code Commission. In law seduction is more than
sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry. It
carries with it the idea of deceit, enticement, or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded. The facts as it stands shows that
Santos, a woman of adult age, voluntarily carried on
and maintained intimate sexual relations and mutual
passion with the defendant. Plainly, such an
arrangement is incompatible with the notion of
seduction. Santos was not a victim of deceit. A
relationship that has persisted for one year cannot be
anchored on mere artful persuasion. Hence no case
is made under Art. 21.

Baksh v, CA
219 SCRA 115

FACTS:
" Characters
! (Private Respondent) Marilou Gonzales:
Filipina, working iat Mabuhay
Luncheonette in Dagupan City
Pangasinan, 22 years old
! (Petitioner) Gashem Shookat Baksh:
Iranian, student of Medicine in thr Lyceum
of Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
" Gasham and Marilou met at the Mabuhay
Luncheonette in Dagupan City where Marilou
is working and Gasham frequently eats.
" Gasham courted Marilou and promised to
marry her (end of semester October 1987).
Gasham even went to Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to meet Marilou's parents and
family.
" Marilou lived with Gasham in the Lozano
Apartments in Dagupan City.
" Respondent
! Because of Gasham's promise to marry
Marilou, she consented to sexual
congress.
! After a week, Gasham started maltreating
her, and she decided to leave.
! During an intervention conducted by a
representative of the Barangay Captain
Gasham said that he was not going to
marry Marilou anymore and that he was
married to someone in Bacolod City
already.
! In his appeal: he is not familiar with
Filipino customs, not accustomed to
Christian or Catholic rites, common-law
wife is now his legal wife, and the mere
breach of promise to marry is not
actionable.
" Petitioner
! He never proposed marriage to or agreed
to be married to Marilou and did not seek
the consent and approval of her parents.
! He did not maltreat her, and he asked her
to stop going to his apartment because
she was stealing money and passport.
! No confrontation with a representative of
the Barangay Captain took place.
" Trial Court favored Marilou, using Article 21 of
the Civil Code as basis and ordered Gasham
to pay damages to Marilou
! Parties were lovers
! Marilou was not a woman of loose morals
or questionable virtue who readily submits
to sexual advances
! Gasham through deceit, machinations and
false pretenses promised to marry Marilou.
! Marilou because of Gasham's promise to
marry her agreed to have sex with
Gasham
! Because of the promise, Marilou's parents
made preparations for the wedding
! Gasham did not fulfill his promise to marry
Marilou
! Gasham has abused Filipino hospitality,
offended our sense of morality, good
customs, culture and tradition
! Marilou would not have the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her
honor and reputation to public scrutiny and
ridicule if her claim was false.
" Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court's decision
! Marilou not a woman of loose morals, a
virgin, barrio lass not used and
accustomed to modern urban life
! Marilou would not have allowed herself to
be 'deflowered' by Gasham if not for the
persuasive promise to marry her
! Gasham not a man of good moral
character: admitted having a common-law
wife in Bacolod City
! Acts of Gasham are palpably and
undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, derogatory and
insulting of our women
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a
breach of promise to marry on the basis if Article 21 of
the Civil Code

HELD/DECISION:
Yes. If applied in a breach of promise to marry where
the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Petition
denied!

RATIO:
" The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. It was
deliberately eliminated in the New Civil Code
because it is prone to abuse. Art. 21 was
instead put in place that would put into place a
legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to provide for specifically in the statutes.
" Quasi-delict (Spanish culpa aquiliana): limited
to negligent acts that causes damage to
another
" Torts (American): includes negligent acts and
also intentional criminal acts, assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
" Sec. 2176 of the Civil Code is limited to Quasi-
delicts
" Intentional and malicious acts with certain
exemptions shall be governed by the Revised
Penal Code, while negligent acts or omissions
shall be covered by Art. 2176 of the Civil Code.
" Sec. 21, together with Sec. 19 and 20
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs
" A man's promise to marry is the cause of the
acceptance of love by a woman, and it is the
reason why the woman consented to a sexual
congress, and when there is proof that he had
no intention of fulfilling the promise, and it was
a mere deception to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, can justify the award for damages
under Sec. 21, not because of the breach of
promise but because of the intent and deceit
involved, provided that such injury should have
been committed in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs, and public policy.
" Gasham's condescending remarks regarding
Marilou's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty, and dishonorable
employment reiterates his intention to merely
fool or deceit Marilou into sexual congress by
proposing to her.
Blatant disregard to Art. 19 which directs every
person to act with justice, giver everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his obligations.

FC 2-3; FC 5; FC 45 cf. NCC 53
RPC 350-351

De Mijares vs Villaluz
274 SCRA 1

Promise to marry case. Seduction is more than a promise to marry for sex, it involves deceit, enticement, abuse of
confidence in order to get laid. Since the parties have been having sex regularly for 2 years, seduction cannot apply
since the regularity of the act shows voluntariness and mutual passion. Thus girl cannot recover for damages.

Mallion vs Alcantara
506 SCRA 336

Sought annulment on the grounds of psych incapacity, the case was dismissed. Filed again for annulment on the
grounds of lack of marriage license. The court said that since both cases involved the same issue and the same
remedy its Res Judicata. (note: ma'am says this decision is wrong, Morigo is correct with respect to this
issue).

FC2(1) cf. FC 148

Silverio vs Republic (supra)

FC 5; FC 35 (1); R.A. 6809 cf. FC 21
NCC54&80(1)
RPC344
cf. DOJ Opinion 145 S.1991 (Oct. 1991)

Garcia vs. Recio
365 SCRA 437

Facts:
A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of
divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was
issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio
became an Australian citizen and married a Filipina
(Garcia) in Cabanatuan City. The application for
marriage license showed that Recio was "single and
"Filipino. Late 1995, couple started living separately.
On May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in
accordance with Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to nullify
the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that
Recio had a subsisting marriage when they were
married and that she only became aware of this on
November of the preceding year. Recio says
otherwise and claims that his first marriage was
dissolved by the Australian divorce decree, was
legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was
aware of this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years
after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in
Australia. RTC declared the marriage dissolved
because the Australian divorce had ended the
marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the divorce between Recio and Samson was
proven

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility,
but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.

(2) WON Recio was legally capacitated to marry
Garcia

No. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected. The
legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by
the national law of the party concerned. Since he is
an Australian, none of the records he produced do not
absolutely prove that he has legal capacity to marry
on January 12, 1994.

However, Garcia's prayer to declare the marriage null
and void based on bigamy cannot be granted
because it may turn out that Recio did, in fact, have
capacity to marry. Hence, the SC believes that the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the
trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of
the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there
being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates.

Te vs. Choa
G.R. No. 149530 (October 22, 2001)

Outcome of annulment case had no bearing on the determination of Arthur's innocence or guilt in bigamy case.
Ground for annulment cited by petitioner was for voidable marriage. Therefore, at the time he committed the
crime of bigamy, marriage was still valid and subsisting.

FC 14, FC 45 cf NCC 61 & 95 (1)

Anaya vs Palaroan
(November 26, 1970)

Facts:
After one month of marriage to Anaya, Fernando
Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground
that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. Complaint was dismissed. However,
during the negotiation of the amount from Anaya's
counterclaim, Fernando allegedly divulged that
several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-
marital relationships with a close relative. Anaya filed
suit to annul on the ground that the marriage
solemnized between them constituted fraud in
obtained her consent. Fernando denied the allegation
and counter claimed for damages for the malicious
filing of the suit; he did not pray for a dismissal of the
complaint but its dismissal "with respect to the alleged
moral damages. Aurora replied stating that Fernando
had no intention of performing his marital duties and
obligations since the marriage was contracted as a
means for him to escape marrying the close relative
that was intimated above.

Issue:
WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of
his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.

Held/Ratio:
No. Fraud is explicitly defined by Article 86 of the CC.
And also states that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit. shall constitute fraud that will give grounds
for the annulment of marriage.

Villanueva vs CA
505 Scra 564

Force and intimidation is no moment since he was a security guard. n the light of appellant's admission that he had a
sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his faiIure to attribute the Iatter's pregnancy to any other
man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
FC 35: The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other

FC 35 (5); NCC 86 (1)
FC 45 (2)
FC45(3);FC46,NCC1338-1344
FC45(4);NCC1335-1337
FC 45 (5)
FC45(6)

Jimenez v. Caizares
109 Phil 27
Facts:
! Aug 3, 1950 Joel Jimenez and Remedios
Canizares wed
! 7 June 1955 the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a
decree annulling his marriage in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga. This was because her
vagina was too small for his member and thus
they couldn't copulate and thus she is impotent
! 14 June 1955 - wife was summoned and served
a copy of the complaint. She did not file an
answer
! 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order
requiring the defendant to submit to a physical
examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation
! 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree
annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and
the defendant since plaintiff had no response
whatsoever
! 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for
reconsideration since impotency was never really
established. Rather than nullifying marriage Court
should have compelled her to undergo and
examination
ISSUE: WON marriage may be annulled on sole
testimony of husband that his wife is impotent
HELD: NO
! law specifically enumerates the legal grounds,
that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage.
! Not proven in this case since wife has
been unresponsive. Court says that it
may not so much be indifference as it is
that she is shy and embarrassed about
the situation
! RESULT: presumption is in favor of potency.
Case is thus remanded to lower court for further
proceedings.

Republic v. CA
236 SCRA 257

The duty of the civil registrar is to keep record of all applications for marriages. Thus, its certification is valuable. Their
marriage was "secret, thus there is failure to offer other witnesses to corroborate her testimony. Also, Edwin failed to
answer and was declared in default.

Cosca v. Palaypayan
237 SCRA 249

Illegal Solemnization of marriage: He solemnized marriage without the requisite of marriage license. He did not
sign their marriage contracts.

Sy vs. CA
G.R. No. 127263 (April 12, 2000)

Filipina did not expressly state in her petition the incongruity between the date of issuance of marriage license and
date of marriage ceremony. License was issued a year after marriage ceremony. Thus, marriage was contracted
without marriage license. Thus under Art 80 of NCC, marriage is void.

Alcantara vs. Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746 (Aug. 28, 2007)

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a
marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The
certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued. Issuance of
a marriage license where none of the parties is resident, is just an irregularity.
marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties

FC9-10
PC 11

FC 12-14; FC 21 cf. NCC 84

Sevilla vs Cardenas
497 SCRA 429

FACTS:
" Jaime O. Sevilla claims that he and
Carmelita N. Cardenas appeared before
Rev. Cirilio Gonzales at the Makati City Hall
where they executed a marriage contract.
" Marriage license number 2770792 from San
Juan, Rizal was indicated in the contract,
which Jaime never applied for
" A church ceremony was conducted on May
31, 1969 before Monsignor Juan Veloso at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish using the
same license.
" They lived as husband and wife; went to
Spain for Jaime's medical education
supported by Jaime's parents.
" When in Spain their marriage turned bad
since Jaime was having a hard time
balancing marriage and medical studies;
obsession of Jaime with Carmelita's knees,
infemural sex and Jaime's drug addiction.
" Upon return to the Philippines, they started
to live separately but were attending family
counseling until 1976
" They separated in 1978.
" Jaime went to the US to get a divorce in
1981 and a judicial separation in 1983
" He was also married to another woman while
in the US
" 3 certifications from the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan states that the marriage license
with that number cannot be found
" The parish where they were wed presented
a Certified copy of a Marriage certificate
dated April 11, 1994
" RTC: marriage is null due to lack of
marriage license
" CA: reversed RTC's decision; marriage
license was probably issued but cannot be
located (through Perlita Mercader's
testimony); no diligent search

ISSUE:
Whether marriage is valid or not

HELD/DECISION:
Valid. Decision of the CA affirmed

RATIO:
" Marriage license is an essential requisite for
the validity of marriage
" Despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that
a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register
" Civil registrar could not exert its best efforts
to locate and determine the existence of
license #2770792 due to its loaded work
" Absence of logbook is not a conclusive proof
of non-existence of license.
" EVERY INTENDMENT OF THE LAW OR
FACT LEANS TOWARD THE VALIDITY OF
THE MARRIAGE, THE INDISSOLUBILITY
OF THE MARRIAGE BONDS
" Constitution: policy of strengthening the
family; marriage not a mere contract but a
social institution, protected by the State
" Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married
ALWAYS PRESUME MARRIAGE

cf. DOJ Opinion 50 S. 1991 (April 30, 1991)
DOJ Opinion 146 S. 1991 (Oct. 17, 1991)

FC 15- 19
P.D. 965
FC2O

FC 24-25

Alcantara vs Alcantara (supra)

FC 27-34, cf. NCC 76, P.D. 1083

Leda v. Tabang
206 SCRA 395

Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez

Facts:
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David
Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children.
However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted
another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was
also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David,
had, prior to the solemnization, issued an affidavit
stating that they were both married; however due to
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and
they no longer communicated with them. They lived
together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed
to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of
gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez.

Issue:
WON Payao and David's marriage is valid.

Held/Ratio:
No. Although the couple had lived together for seven
years (as the affidavit shows and which the Judge
relied on in crafting his decision), Article 34 of the FC
also requires that there must be no legal impediment
to marry each other. Also in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were "separated. The judge
ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage
(regardless of the couple being separated) is a
diriment impediment which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. And besides, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least
five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage.

De Castro vs. De Castro
G.R. 160172 (February 13, 2008)

validity of marriage can be collaterally attacked even in an action for support. Such will determine the
legitimacy/illegitimacy of the child

Republic vs Dayot
G.R. No. 175581 (March 28, 2008)

FC7,10,31&32
NCC 56, 74, 76
R.A. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code), Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii), 445 (b)(1)(xviii)
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007
Guidelines On The Solemnization Of Marriage
By The Members Of The Judiciary

Aranes vs Occiano
380 SCRA 402

Facts:
Araes filed charges against Judge Occiano of for
Gross gnorance of Law. Occiano solemnized Araes'
marriage without the requisite marriage license in
latter's house which is outside judge's jurisdiction.
Araes was not able to claim her right to inherit his
deceased husband's property and she was deprived
of receiving her husband's pension. Occiano avers
that the ceremony took place in Araes' house
because the groom had a difficulty walking & he
couldn't stand traveling. Judge was aware that there
was no marriage license but due to the pleas of the
couple and everything was prepared already and the
visitors were there, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage. He reminded them that marriage won't be
valid without the license. They promised to give it
within the day but they never did. Araes desisted
and said that she had filed the case in a fit of rage but
Court still decided the case.

Issue:
WON the marriage was valid with regards to the lack
of a marriage license and the lack of the judge's
jurisdiction.

Held/Ratio:
No. Judges can only solemnize marriage within their
territorial jurisdiction. Marriage license is a requisite
for marriage and without it, marriage is void. It is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. And since there
was no license, Occiano didn't have the authority to
officiate the ceremony

Navarro v. Domagtoy
S.C. A.M. MTJ-96-1088 (July 19, 1996)

Facts:
Dapa, Surigao del Norte Municipal Mayor Navarro
filed charges against Judge Domagtoy for gross
misconduct and inefficiency in office and ignorance of
the law. He solemnized the wedding of a couple
despite knowing that the groom was merely separated
from his wife. He presumed that man's first wife was
already dead because the would-be groom has not
seen her for seven years. Presumption was made
without the requisite summary proceeding. Second
instance was when he performed another marriage
ceremony in Dapa, which is outside his jurisdiction.

Issue:
WON judge acted with gross misconduct.

Held/Ratio:
Yes. The first marriage was bigamous. Presumption
of death for purposes of marriage requires a summary
proceeding (Art. 41 FC). Affidavits claiming that a
person has not been heard of for more than seven
years are not sufficient proof of the person's death.
The second marriage, on the other hand, is beyond
judge's jurisdiction. Marriage can only be held outside
a judge's chamber or courtroom if: (a) at the point of
death (b) in remote places (c) request of both parties
in writing & sworn statement (Art. 8 FC). The second
couple was not under any of these conditions. Only
appellate and SC justices have jurisdiction over entire
country. Judges with specific jurisdictions can only
officiate within those areas.

FC 7 (2) cf. NCC 92-96

Villar v. Paraiso
96 Phil 659

Paraiso was disqualified when he ran for mayor while he was still holding a religious position granting him the
power to solemnize marriages

FC 4; FC 35 (2)
RPC 352
cf.
Tenchavez v. Escao(supra)

FC23-24
FC4
FC3(3);FC6cf.FC33,FC8

Martinez v. Tan
12 Phil 731

Facts:
Rosalia Martinez was visiting her brother in
Palompon, Leyte. She met Angel Tan there and they
were married by a Justice of Peace. Tan and Martinez
first submitted a petition requesting the Justice to
solemnize their marriage. Upon arriving at the office
of the justice, they signed another document to ratify
their petition under oath. Then the marriage was
solemnized and a marriage certificate was signed by
Tan, Martinez, Ballori and witnesses Esmero and
Pacita Ballori. The couple did not live together and
when Martinez went home to Ormoc, her relatives
convinced her to file charges claiming that the
marriage was not valid since she signed the
document in her own home thinking that it was a
paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her
parents to the marriage.

Issue:
WON the marriage is valid.

Held/Ratio:
Yes. They were married since there was an
expression of mutual consent and both of them
appeared before the justice of the peace. Court ruled
that General Orders No. 68 Sec. 6 states: "No
particular form for the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties must declare in the presence
solemnizing the marriage that they take each other as
husband and wife. Letters of Martinez to Tan
regarding the marriage and asking for her parents
consent are proof that marriage took place and is
valid. Parties ratified their petition under oath. They
both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents
of the document they were signing.

FC 8; FC 28-29; FC 32-33

FC6;FC22

Madridejo v. De Leon
55 Phil 1

Facts:
Flaviana Perez, a widow from a previous marriage to
de Leon, lived with Pedro Madridejo and a son named
Melecio was born to them. Three years later, the
couple got married under circumstances of articulo
mortis. The priest who solemnized the marriage failed
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the marriage can be considered valid.

Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the
marriage certificate does not affect the validity of their
marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal
requisite.

(2) WON the marriage legitimized Melecio Madridejo.

No. To be legitimized by a subsequent marriage of
one's parents, a natural child must be acknowledged
before or after the celebration of the said marriage.
Plaintiff in this case did not meet these requirements
and is thus void of legitimacy.

People v. Borromeo
133 SCRA 106

Facts:
Elias Borromeo was convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide after killing his wife.
There were witnesses and police officers who testified
against him. He claims that he cannot be charged
with parricide (and thus, only homicide) since he was
never legally married to the victim because (a)
officiating priest testified against it and (b) no
marriage contract was executed.

Issue:
WON Borromeo can be considered married to the
victim.

Held/Ratio:
Yes. Mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in
the marriage registry does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present.
People living together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
constant violation of decency and law.

NCC 17
NCC15&17

FC 26; FC 21, FC 10

Yao Kee v Sy-Gonzales
167 SCRA 786

Aside from failure to show the documents of marriage, Chinese customs on marriage were not proven by Yao
Kee.

Republic vs. Orbecido III
G.R. No. 154380 (October 5, 2005)

Facts:
Orbecido married Villanueva in the Philippines and
had two children. Villanueva, wife, left for the US, was
naturalized and eventually remarried. Orbecido
petitioned for authority to remarry using Par. 2 of
Article 26, FC. No opposition. OSG's motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal
stating: that the questioned provision only applies to
valid mixed marriages between Filipinos and aliens;
that the remedy is annulment or legal separation; and
that there is no law that governs respondent's
situation.

Issue:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,
where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise
remarry under Philippine law?

Held/Ratio:
Taking into consideration legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Par. 2 Art 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
degree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.

The reckoning point in the provision is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

FC26inrelation to:
FC 35(1), 35(4), 35(5), 36, 37 & 38
cf. NCC 71
DOJ Opinion No. 11 S. 1990 (Jan. 17, 1990)
FC 147,cf.RPC 350
Rule 131 Sec. 3, 1989 Rules on Evidence cf.NCC 220
FC 26 par. I
NCC Book II, Title III (484-50 1)

Lesaca v. Lesaca
91 Phil 135

Baldomero sold properties before the second marriage but bought it again after the said marriage. There was no
proof that the money spent was from the CPG.

Yaptinchay v. Torres
28 SCRA 489

Common-law wife was not able to prove that they jointly bought the property in Forbes Park so it belonged to the
legal marriage.

Eugenio v. Velez (supra)

FC4
cf. VII (D) of Outline
FC35cf. FC234, RA6809
FC 35(4), 39, 40, 41,44
RPC 344, 349

Mercado vs Tan
337 SCRA 122

Ty vs. CA
G.R. No.127406 (November 27, 2000)

FACTS:
" March and August 1977: Edgardo Reyes
married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva
" August 1980: marriage was declared null
and void for lack of marriage license (civil),
null and void ab ignition for lack of consent of
the parties (church)
" April 1979 (before declaration of nullity):
Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty; April 1982
church wedding
" January 1991: Edgardo filed a Civil case
praying for the declaration of his marriage
with Ofelia null and void due to lack of
marriage license and because he was still
married to Anna Maria
" Ofelia submitted their marriage license and
the certification that Edgardo's marriage with
Anna Maria is declared null and void
" RTC: marriage to Ofelia null and void ab
initio
" CA: affirmed trial court's decision

ISSUES:
Whether the decree of nullity of the 1
st
marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be
entered into validly

HELD/DECISION:
If marriage is contracted before the Family Code no, if
after the Family Code yes. Petition granted

RATIO:
" Both marriages governed by the Civil Code
hence, no judicial declaration is necessary
" Art. 83: Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime
of the 1
st
spouse of such person with any
person other than such 1
st
spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or
(2) The 1
st
spouse had been absent for 7
consecutive years at the time of the 2
nd

marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than 7 years, is
generally considered as dead and
before any person believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage,
or if the marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the 3 cases until declared
null and void by a competent court.
The sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage

Morigo vs Morigo
422 SCRA

Morigo is not guilty of bigamy even if he did not get a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. First
marriage was void ab initio due to lack of ceremony and solemnizing officer so it does not bear any legal effect.

Tenebro vs. CA
G.R. No. 150758 (February 18, 2004) [concurring opinion, Justice Vitug]

REASONS:
1) Nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to
the date of the celebration of the marriage
(Phil penal laws are concerned)
2) Individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of
the second marriage as void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity
3) April 10, 1990: petitioner Veronico Tenebro
contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas; wed by Judge Alfredo Perez
of the City trial Court of Lapu Lapu city
4) Lived together without interruption until 1991
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986
5) Petitioner left the conjugal wedding with
Ancajas and cohabited with Villareyes
6) January 25, 1993: petitioner contracted
another marriageNida villegas before
Judge German Lee Jr. RTC Cebu City br 15
7) Ancajas heard of third marriageconfirmed
with VillareyesVillareyes confirmed
through letter that she was married with
petitioner
8) Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner (Criminal Case: 013095-L)
PETTONER's CLAMS
1) He cohabited with villareyes from 1984-1988
sired two children but denied valid marriage
ceremony to solemnize marriage (said he
only signed contract for his allotment as a
seaman
2) Verified by brother if a marriage exist (Civil
Register Manila)no record of said marriage
DECISION OF TRIAL COURT: November 10, 1997
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of bigamy under art 349 of the RPC.
Sentencing him to 4 years and 2 months prison
correccional as minimum to 8 years and day of
prision mayor as maximum

CA: Affirmed decision of the trial court and petition for
reconsideration was denied
Hence this instant petition: assigned errors:
1) When it affirmed decision of RTC despite
non existence of the first marriage and
insufficiency of evidence
2) Finding him guilty despite clear proof that
marriage between the accused and private
complainant had been declared null and void
ab initio and without legal force and effect
DECISION OF SC: 3
rd
and 4
th
requisites for crime of
bigamy are presentaffirm the judgment of the CA;
Petition for review is DENIED; assailed decision of CA
convicting tenebro of the crime of bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four years and two months of prison correccional as
minimum and 8 years and one day of prison mayor as
maximum
REASONS;
1) Art 349 elements of bigamy:
a) Offender has been legally married
b) First marriage has not been legally
dissolved or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the CC
c) That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage and
d) That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity
! Denies existence of marriage and argues the
declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity (lacks essential requisites of
validityretroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated)
! Hence argues that four elements of the
crime of bigamy are absent and prays for
acquittal
But Court said I fails on two accounts:
1) Prosecution presented sufficient evidence,
both documentary and oral to prove the
existence of the first marriage (marriage
contract Manila City solemnized November
10, 1986 before Rev. Julieto Torres,
handwritten letter of Villareyes to Ancajas
dated July 12, 1994) petitioner presented
documents (certification issued by NSO Oct
7, 1995 and City Civil Registry of Manila Feb
3, 1997have no records of the said
marriage)
2) Public documents applicable to all
marriage contractSec 7 Rule 130 of the
Rules of Courtoriginal public document is
admissible evidence
3) Documents presented by Tenebro only said
office have no record of such marriage
absence of a record is different from
documentary evidence as to absence of a
marriage ceremonydocuments
(certifications) given after marriage with
second wife)
4) On the issue of nullity due to psychological
incapacity: retroacts?= so since marriage
with Ancajas was void ab initio bigamy was
therefore not committed==== aS second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of first marriage, petitioner's
marriage with Ancajas would be null and
void from the very beginning completely
regardless of the petitioner's psychological
incapacity or capacitybut this does not
however presents an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability
5) Art 349 of the RPC criminalizes any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has
been dissolved legally or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in
proper proceedings
6) As soon as the 2
nd
marriage was contracted
April 10, 1990the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated
7) The declaration of the nullity of a second
marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is NOT an indicator that
petitioner's marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validityrequisites
are essential and formal requisitesin this
case requisites of marriage were satisfied
by petitioner and ANcajas
8) Third marriage contracted while two past
marriages are still subsistingdeliberate
disregard for sanctity of marriage

SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.
! Would the absolute nullity of either first or
second marriage prior to its judicial
declaration as being void, constitute a valid
defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
! Yes. Except for a void marriage on account
of psychological incapacityvoid marriages
are inexistent from the very beginning, and
no judicial decree is required to establish
their nullity
! The complete nullity of a previously
contracted marriage being void ab initio and
legally inexistent can outrightly be a defense
in an indictment for bigamy
! Strong reservation on the ruling that bigamy
is still committed though marriage is ab initio
null and void (if marriage is contracted
before th judicial declaration of its nullity)
! Canon law-reconcile grounds for nullity of
marriage
! Reasons why except those due to
psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the
formal requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively
easy demonstration, psychological
incapacity however, being a mental
state may not be so readily evident
c) It remains valid and binding until
declared judicially as void
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.

CALLEJO, Sr. J.
! Vote to grant pro hac vice the petition
Since second marriage is null and void ab initio, such
marriage in in contemplation of criminal law never
existed and for that reason, one of the essential
elements of bigamy has disappeared

Mallion vs Alcantara (supra)

FC 41 in relation to FC 42-44
NCC 390-39 1, PC 55 (9), FC 101

Republic vs. Nolasco
220 SCRA 20, March 17, 1993

Nolasco cannot declare that his English wife was presumptively dead as he did not diligently look for her in
Liverpool.

Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals
237 SCRA 676 (October 24, 1994)

Facts:
! Deceased Aurelio Camacho
married Luisita Camacho while still
married to Consejo Velasco. He
then had another relationship with
Nenita Bienvenido with whom he
bought a house on Delgado St
where they have been leaving for
the past 14 years
! Upon death of Aurelio Camacho,
Luisita is contending that house
belongs to her since it is conjugal
property.
ISSUE: WON Luisita has rights to property
HELD: NO
! Art 83 of Civil Code provides that
if person has been absent for seven
years the absent spouse is
presumed to be dead
! However cannot be
invoked in this case since
it was Aurelio who actually
left Luisita.
! First exception
refers to
subsequent
marriage of
abandoned
spouse and not
remarriage of
deserting spouse
! Art. 739(1) of the Civil Code declares
donations made between persons who are
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation to be void
! can only be brought by the
innocent spouse, perhaps in this
case by the first wife, but certainly
not by Luisita whose marriage to
Aurelio is itself void. The last
paragraph of Art. 739 clearly
provides:
! In the case referred to in
No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullify may
be brought by the spouse
of the donor or donee; and
the guilt of the donor and
donee may be proved by
preponderance of
evidence in the same
action.
! until otherwise shown in an appropriate
action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed. Petitioner's ownership is
evidenced by a deed of absolute sale
7
. It
was error for the Court of Appeals to annul
petitioner's title at the instance of one whose
marriage to the seller is void.
!
RESULT: property belongs to Nenita Bienvenido who
properly showed she paid for house with Aurelio.

Armas vs Calisterio
330 SCRA 201 (April 6, 2000)

Facts:
1) April 24, 1992: Teodorico Calisterio died
intestate leaving several parcels of land
(value: P604,750.00)
2) He was survived by his wife (respondent-
Marietta Calisterio)
3) Teodorico was second husband of
Mariettamarried previously to James
William Bound (jan 13, 1946)
4) James Bound disappeared w/o trace on
February 11, 1947
5) 11 years later Marietta and teodorico were
married (may 8, 1958) w/o Marietta having
secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead
6) Oct 9, 1992: petitioner, surviving sister of
teodorico filed with RTC of QC a petition
entitled "n the Matter of ntestate Estate of
the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, petitioner
claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the
deceased- marriage between Marietta and
Teodorico as bigamous thereby null and void
7) Prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas Jr.
be appointed administrator w/o bond of the
estate of the deceased and that the
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the
obligations of the estate would have been
settled
8) mArietta opposed the petitionfirst marriage
w/ Bound had been dissolved due to his
absence, whereabouts being unknown
contends to be the surviving spouse of
teodorico and sought priority in the
administration of the estate of the decedent

RTC: issued order appointing Sinfroniano C.
Armas Jr and respondent Marietta
administrator and administratix of the
intestate estate of teodorico
9) Marietta appealed the decision to CA
CA: decision appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
a) mArietta Calisterio's marriage with
teodorico remains valid
b) house and lot situated as 32 Batangas
St San Francisco del Monte QC belong
to conjugal partnership property
c) marrieta Calisterio being teodorico's
compulsory heir is entitled to one half of
husband's estate and sister of
Teodorico the other half
d) ordered TC to determine competence of
MArrieta Calisterio to act as
administrator of Teodorico's estate
! CA denied motion for reconsideration

SC DECISION: Assailed judgment of the CA is
AFFIRMED except in so far only as it decreed in par
of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of
petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her to the
other half of the inheritance in lieu of which it is
DECLARED that said one-half share of the
decedent's estate pertains solely to the petitioner to
the exclusion of her children

REASONS:
1) Marriage happened in 1958law in force at
that time was the Civil Code not the family
code
2) Art 83 of the new Civil Coderetroactive
only when it would not prejudice ort impair
vested acquired rights in accordance wit Civil
code and other laws
3) A judicial declaration of absence of the
absentee spouse is not necessary as long as
the prescribed period of absence is met. It is
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit
mandate of Art 83 to be deemed valid "until
declared null and void by a competent
courtthe burden of proof would be, in
these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage
4) Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds had been absent or had
disappeared for than eleven years before
she entered into second marriagesecond
marriage having been contracted during the
regime of the Civl Code, should thus be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence
of judicial declaration of presumptive death
of james Bounds
5) Conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta
pertains to them in commonupon its
dissolution, the property should rightly be
divided in two equal portionsone portion
going to surviving spouse and the other to
the estate of the deceased spouse
Appellate court erred in granting to petitioner's
children, along with their mother Antonia who herself
is invoking successional rights over the estate of
deceased brother

Republic vs. Bermudez - Lorino
449 SCRA 57 (January 19, 2005)

Gloria abandoned husband who was a violent alcoholic. They were separated for 9 years. The trial court's ruling
that the husband was presumptively dead is final.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals
458 SCRA 200 (May 6, 2005)

Apolinaria filed for presumptive death of her husband Clemente Jomoc after being absent for 9 years. Such
declaration is under a summary proceeding.

Manuel vs. People
476 SCRA 461 (November 26, 2005)

Manuel was guilty of bigamy since he did not get a declaration of presumptive death of his first wife who BTW
was only in prison.

477 SCRA'277 (December 9, 2005)

Alegro did not diligently search for his missing wife. He only reported to the NBI that his wife was missing after
the OSG's appeal to the declaration.

FC44

FC36
FC 36, 39, 68-73
R.A. 8533

Lim v. CA
214 SCRA 237

alleged schizophrenic wife's psychiatrist's testimony admissible in court, not a breach in patient-physician
relationship; during trial, use hypothetical questions

Salita v. Magtolis
233 SCRA 100

Bill of Particulars stating wife' inability to understand the demands of husband's profession (doctor) is enough ultimate
cause thus there is a cause of action

Krohn v. CA
233 SCRA 146

husband may use wife's confidentiaI report/ medical record to show psychological incapacity

Santos V. CA
240 SCRA 20

psychological incapacity must refer to mental (not physical) incapacity to comprehend basic mental covenants
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability, existing at the time of the marriage

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA
G.R. No. 119190 (January 16, 1997)

Facts:
1) RTC QC Br 89 which decreed the annulment
of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity
2) Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial
court to CA (42758) which affirmed the RTC
decision (Nov 29, 1994)
3) Denied motion for reconsideration (February
14, 1995)
4) May 22, 1988 plaintiff married defendant at
Manila cathedral, Intramuros manila
marriage contact-evidence
5) Wedding reception South Villa Makati
house of defendant's mother
6) No making love on the first nyt after
marriagesame with second, third and
fourth nights
7) Baguio cityfirst week as husband and
wifewith mother, uncle, his mother and
nephew of defendantn sexual intercourse
within the 4-day stay
8) May 22, 1988- March 15, 1989but during
this period no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them, not even saw husband's
private parts
9) Submitted themselves to medical
examinationCGH- January 20, 1989
10) She was healthy, still a virgin; her husband's
results were kept confidentialgiven
medication but confidentialasked to return
but never did
11) Impotent husband, closet homosexual,
defendant married her a Filipino citizen to
acquire and maintain residency status
CLAIM OF DEFENDANT: if marriage will be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, it will be fault of
the wife
He did not want marriage to be annulled due to:
a) He loves her so much
b) He has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable
c) The relationship is till young and differences
can still be reconciled\
d) Defect can be cured with medical technology
! Admitted that no sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989
blames wife
! Two reasons given by him: 1) she is
afraid that she will return jewelry ofher
mother (forced) ; 2) that her husband
will consummate the marriage
! He insists on the validity of the marriage

12) Submitted himself to examinationDr.
Sergio Atleza Jr said he has no signs of
impotency and capable of erection

DECISION OF TRIAL COURT: declared Void
marriage . let copy be furnished the local civil registrar
of QC and of Manila
CA: affirmed TC's decision
DECISION OF SUPREME COURT: petition to be
bereft of merit; assailed decision of the CA dated Nov
29, 1994 AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
REASONS:
1) Private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaintno
independent evidence to prove the alleged
non-coitus between husband and wifeonly
basis is admission of petitioner
2) Need to prevent collusion between parties
CC provides that no judgment annulling
marriage shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgments
3) But since petitioner did not want marriage to
be annulled then no collusion between
parties
4) Issue that failure to have sexual intercourse
meant psychological incapacity of both
other reasons may existthe court said the
fact that no coitus happened between
themno need to determine who did not
want to have sex with whom
5) Wanted to have sex but refusesmaybe
because of pain?== no attempt to discover
what the problem with his wife could be
6) One of the essential marital obligations
under the FC is to procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriageif one although
physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and
constanteven canon Law attribute the
cause to psychological incapacity
7) Court find the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital
obligations can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate
court

Republic v. Olaviano Molina
(1997)

Facts:
1) Petition for review on certiorari under the
Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
decision of CA affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the RTC of La Trinidad
Benguet which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio on the ground
of "psychological capacity under Article 36
of the Family Code
2) Case filed August 16, 1990 (nullity of
marriage)
3) April 14, 1985: marriage of Roridel and
Reynaldo, san Agustin Church
4) Son: Andre Molina
5) After a year of marriage:
! Showed signs of immaturity
! Preferred to stay with peers and friends
squandering his money
! Depended on parents for aid and
assistance
! Never honest with wife about finances

6) February 1986: relieved from work
7) October 1986: intense quarrel
8) March 1987: Roridel resigned from job in
Manila and went to live with parents in
Baguio City
9) Few weeks later: Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child and abandoned them
10) Reynaldo psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations

REYNALDO's CLAMS
1) Filed August 28, 1989: contended that
misunderstandings were due to:
a) Roridels's strange behavior of insisting
on maintaining her friends even after
marriage
b) Her refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals
c) Roridel's failure to run the household
and handle their finances
THE FOLLOWING WERE STIPULATED:
1) Petitioner is not asking for support for her
child and her
2) Respondent is not asking for damages
3) Parties are separated in fact for three years
4) Common child of the parties is in custody of
the petitioner's wife
WFE's WTNESSES: Friends: Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla; Ruth
Lalas a social worker and Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison (psychiatrist of BGH)

TRAL COURT'S DECSON: May 14, 1991:
declaring marriage null and void
CA: denied appeal of petitioner and affirmed
in toto the RTC' decision

SOLICITOR GENERAL: insists that the CA
made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase "psychological
incapacity. He said that appealed decision
tended to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world

! Solicitor's appeal was deniedRTC
relying on the fact that marriage
between parties broke up because of
their opposing and conflicting
personalities.
! SG argued that "opposing and
conflicting personalities is not equivalent
to psychological capacity
! PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY: is not
simply neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and
duties but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities
and duties
SC RULING: Petition is meritorious
REASONS:
1) Justice Vitug: psychological incapacity refers
to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage; this condition
must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated
2) It should be characterized by: a) gravity, b)
juridical antecedence and c) incurability
3) In the present case:
! There is no clear showing that the
psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacitybut merely a "difficulty if not
outright "refusal or "neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations
! Mere showing of irreconcible differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity
! It is essential to show that the parties
are incapable of meeting their marital
responsibilities and not mere failure
! No gravity in the problem, neither
juridical antecedence nor incurability
4) Court invited two amici curiae (Most rev
Oscar Cruz and Justice Ricardo Puno: their
guidance:
a) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage belongs to the plaintiff- any
doubt should be resolved in -- favor of
the validity and continuation of the
marriagepermanence, solidarity and
inviolability of marriage
b) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be 1) medically or
clinically identified; 2) alleged in the
complaint; 3) sufficiently proven by
experts and 4) clearly explained in the
decisionthe evidence must convince
the court that the parties or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming
or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof.
c) The incapacity must be proven existing
during the time of the celebration of the
marriage
d) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or
incurableincapacity must be relevant
to assumption of marriage obligations
not necessarily those not related to
marriage like exercise of profession
e) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage- illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability and not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty much less
ill will
f) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Arts 68-71 of
family code (to husband and wife) and
ARTs 220, 221 and 225 (parents and
their children)
g) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines while
not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courtsArt
36 taken from the Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law (1983)- what
is decreed to be canonically void be also
civilly void
h) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor general to appear as counsel
for the state
DECISION OF SC: petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano and Reynaldo
Molina subsists and remains valid.

SEPARATE STATEMENT:
PADILLA, J
! Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own
factsthe facts in this case does not support
conclusion of psychological incapacity

SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.
! Not mere refusal and neglect or difficulty
! Neither should the incapacity be the result of
mental illness. For if it were due to insanity
or defects in the mental faculties short of
insanity, there is the resultant defect of vice
of consent, thus rendering the marriage
annullable (Art 45 family Code)
! Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent, it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage
! Psychological incapacity is insanity of a
lesser degree
! Remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry
! Bases for determining void marriages:
a) Lack of one or more of the essential
requisites of marriage as contract
b) Reasons of public policy
c) Special cases and special situations
(includes psychological incapacity)
! Canon Law- valid and void marriage only
! n the case "conflicting and opposing
personalities of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological
incapacity
! Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity (Chi
Ming Tsoi vs CA)
! Concurs that this marriage remains
subsisting and valid

CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.
! Should give much value to Canon Law
jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment
! Marriage void ab initio, Art 45- merely
voidable, Art 55- legal separation
! The term psychological incapacity to be
ground for the nullity of the marriage under
Art 36 of the FC must pass the following
tests:
a) Incapacity must be psychological or
mental not physical in nature
b) Psychological incapacity must relate to
the inability, not mere refusal to
understand, assume and discharge the
basic marital obligations of living
together, observing love and respect
and fidelity and rendering mutual help
and support
c) Psychology condition must exist at the
time the marriage is contracted although
its overt manifestations may occur only
thereafter and
d) The mental disorder must be grave or
serious and incurable
Section 2 Art. XV (marriage as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State) , Section 12, Art II ( The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution), Section 1, Article XV ( The State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development) of the
Constitution show how the state regard marriage and
the family

Republic vs. Dagdag
351 SCRA 425

Nature:
Petition for a review on certiorari of a decision of the
CA.

Facts:
Erlinda Matias (16) married Avelino Dagdag (20),
Sept. 1, 1975 and had two children. A week after the
wedding, husband would oftentimes disappear for
months, indulge in drinking sprees, would return
home drunk and force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse with him. If she did not comply, she was
beaten. The last time Erlinda saw him was on Oct.
1993. She later learned that he was imprisoned but
escaped from jail and was now a fugitive. A certificate
issued by the Jail Warden on Feb. 14, 1990 declared
that he was still at-large.

July 3, 1990 Erlina filed with the RTC Olangapo City
a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Dec. 17, 1990 RTC issued an Order giving the
investigating prosecutor until Jan. 2, 1991 to present
controverting evidence. Although he found that there
was no collusion, he intended to intervene in the case
to avoid fabrication of evidence.

Dec. 27, 1990 RTC rendered a decision declaring
the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article
36 of the Family Code.

Jan. 29, 1991 Investigating prosecutor filed a
Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was
given till January 2, 1991 to present controverting
evidence. The OSG likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration but the RTC denied it in Order dated
Aug. 21, 1991 stating that "the fact that Avelino failed
to support his family is a violation of essential
marriage obligation in Art. 68 of the Family Code. "
The OSG then appealed to the CA which
consequently affirmed the decision of the RTC (April
22, 1993). OSG petitioned for review to the SC.

Issues:
WON the husband qualifies as being psychologically
incapacitated on the basis of the provision in Art. 36
of the Family Code.

Held/Ratio:
No. Erlinda failed to comply with the evidentiary
requirements5: particularly guideline no. 2 which
requires the root cause of psychological incapacity to
be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical
doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation
that her husband is a fugitive was not sufficiently
proven.

Petition by OSG is granted. Assailed decision by the
CA is reversed and set aside.

Notes:
The guidelines governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity do not
require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated what is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological
condition.

5 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, interpreting Art.
36oftheFamilyCodewithitssetofguidelines.

Choa vs. Choa
392 SCRA 641

Facts:
1) petitioner and respondent were married on
March 15, 1981
2) two children: Cheryl Lynne and Albryan
3) October 27, 1993: respondent filed before
RTC Negross Occidental Br 51 complaint for
annulment of his marriage to petitioner (Civil
Case no. 93-8098)
4) Filed amended complaint dated Nov 8, 1993-
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her psychological
incapacity
5) Instead of offering any objection to it,
petitioner filed MOTION TO DISMISS
(Demurrer to Evidence) dated May 11, 1998

RTC: Dec 2, 1998 Order: denying petitioner's
Demurrer to Evidence; held that respondent
established a quantum of evidence that the
petitioner must controvert; motion for
reconsideration was denied in mArch 22, 1990
order; petitioner elevated to CA

CA: petition DISMISSED (CA GR SP NO. 53100);
denial of demurrer was only interlocutory hence,
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not
available
- Proper remedy was for defense to present
evidence and to take appeal if decision is
unfavorable
- Propriety of granting or denying a demurrer
to evidence rests on the sound exercise of
the trial court's decision
- Petitioner failed to show that issues in the
court had been resolved arbitrarily or w/o
basis

ISSUES:
1) upon denial of demurrer of evidence, is
petitioner under obligation to present her
evidence and just appeal after if decision is
unfavorable (Rule 33 of 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) (is certiorari available to correct
an order denying a demurrer to evidence?)
2) in upholding lower court's denial of
petitioner's demurrer to evidence, did CA
violate, ignore or disregard in whimsical
manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this
court in Molina and Santos (in its denial, did
the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
by violating or ignoring the applicable law
and jurisprudence?)

DECISION OF SC: Petition is MERITORIOUS. The
petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of CA
REVERSED and SET ASDE. Respondent's
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED and the case for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged
psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED.

FIRST ISSUE: Resort to certiorari
! weakness and gross insufficiency of
respondent's evidence
! she was entitle to the immediate recourse of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
! in general, interlocutory orders are neither
appealable nor subject to certiorari
proceedings but this is not absolutein this
instant where judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65
! a denial of demurrer that is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari

SECOND ISSUE: Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
! DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE: an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action
at law, to the effect that the evidence which
his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law (whether true or not) to make out his
case or situation the issuethis challenges
the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a
verdict
! Evidence against respondentis grossly
insufficient to support any finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant
a declaration of nullity of the parties'
marriage
! First: petitioner claims that the filing of
petitioner of a series of charges against him
are proof of latter's psychological incapacity
to complu with essential obligations of
marriageabnormal for wife who instead of
protecting name of husband had acted to
contrary
- documents presented by respondent during
trial do not show alleged incapacity of his
wife
- to rule that filings are sufficient to establish
her psychological incapacity is not only
erroneous but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity
! Second: neither is the testimony of
respondent taken by itself or in conjunction
w/ his documentary offerings sufficient to
prove petitioner's alleged incapacity
-testimony of respondent: 1) lack of attention to
children; 2) immaturity; 3) lack of intention of
procreative sexualitynone of these constituent
* Third: insufficiency, if not incompetency of the
supposed expert testimony presented by
respondent (Dr. Antonio M./ Gauzon), failed to
identify and prove root cause of alleged
incapacity no meical or clinical proof of
incurability if there was true incapacity nor was it
grave enough
- assessment of petitioner by dr. Gauzon was
based merely on descriptions communicated to
him by respondentnever conducted any
p[psychological examinations

NOTE; definitions of psychological incapacity
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties (Art 68 FC)
- mere neglect, difficulty or refusal in the
performance of marital obligations and mere
showing of irreconcilable differences or
conflicting personalities in no wise

! In case at bar, respondent merely shows
that he and his wife could not get along
with each other-no showing of the
gravity and juridical antecedent or
incurability of problems besetting their
marital union
! TC should have carefully studied and
assessed the evidence presented by
respondent and taken into account the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter-
concluded that it was useless to proceed
further with the tedious process of
hearing contravening proof
It was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to
deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this
court's rulings in point-continuing the process
of litigation would have been a total; waste of time
and money for the parties and an unwelcome
imposition on trial court's docket

RP vs. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498 (May 20, 2004)

Japanese husband's abandonment # not psychological incapacity

Dedel vs.CA
G.R. No. 151867 (January 29, 2004)

wife's infideIity which (didn't exist prior the marriage); her abandonment; that she had sexual affairs with several
men # not psychological incapacity

Antonio vs.Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 (March 10,2005)

FACTS:
" December 1990: Leonilo Antonio and Marie
Ivonne Reyes were married
" March 1993: Leonilo filed a petition for
declaration of nullity on the grounds of psych
incapacity
" Marie was psych incapacitated
! She concealed the fact that she
previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son and instead
introduced the boy to Leonilo as the
adopted child of her family
! She fabricated a story that her
brother-in-law, Edwin David
attempted to rape and kill her when
in fact no such incident happened
! She misrepresented herself as a
psychiatrist to her obstetrician Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner
! She claimed to be a singer or a
free-lance voice teacher affiliated
with Blackgold Recording
Company; and that a luncheon
show was held at the Philippine
Village Hotel in her honor
! She invented friends named Babes
Santos and Via Marques and sent
lengthy letters to Leonilo claiming
they are from Blackgold and touting
Marie as the number 1
moneymaker in the commercial
industry
! She represented herself as a
person of greater means, she
altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher
income
! She exhibited insecurities and
jealousies over him to the extent of
calling up his officemates to monitor
his whereabouts
! Experts: Marie was a persistent and
constant liar and pathologically
extremely jealous
" Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila rendered the marriage void
" RTC: declared marriage null and void
" CA: reversed judgment

ISSUES:
Whether or not Marie was psychologically
incapacitated

HELD/DECISION:
Yes. Petition granted-marriage null and void

RATIO:
" It is settled principle of civil procedure that
the conclusions of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while
giving testimony which may indicate their
candor or lck thereof
" The Court of Appeals did not dipute the
veracity of the evidence presented
" Intent of the FC: case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, in the finding of experts and
researchers in psych disciplines, and by the
decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law
" Molina guidelines were satisfied
! Sufficiently provided evidence
! Root cause has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court's decision
! Psych incapacity existed at the time
of and even before the celebration
of marriage
! Gravity is sufficient to prove
disability. Leonilo couldn't tolerate
Marie for a year. Failure of Marie to
distinguish truth from fiction or at
least abide by the truth. A person
unable to distinguish between
fantasy and reality would similarly
be unable to comprehend the legal
nature of the marital bond, mush
less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached
to marriage, including parenting.
! Obligations complies with Art 68 to
live together observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support
! CA failed to recognize that the
Catholic Church annulled the
marriage
Incurable; psychosis is quite grave and a cure thereof
a remarkable feat

Ferraris vs. Ferraris
G.R. No, 162368 (July 17, 2006)

Facts:
1) Reconsideration of the resolution dated June
9, 2004 denying petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of CA

RTC: denying petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris
! Suffering from epilepsy does not amount
to psychological incapacity and
evidence on record were insufficient to
prove infidelity
CA: affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court
! Evidence did not establish proof of
psychological incapacity not shown that
his defects were incurable and already
present at the inception of marriage
! Dr. dayan's testimony failed to establish
how she arrived at the conclusion that
the respondent has mixed personality
disorder and failed to show that there
was a natal or supervening disabling
factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting and
complying w/ essential marital
obligations

DECISION OF SC: motion for reconsideration is
DENIED; motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on
certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the CA committed any reversible error is
DENIED WITH FINALITY
REASONS:
1) Issue of WON psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment
of marriage depends crucially on the facts of
the case
2) Psychological incapacity- refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage;
malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of marital bond one is about
to assume; most serious cases of personality
disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to a marriage
3) During the relatively short period of time,
petitioner was happy and contented with her
life in the company of respondent
4) Problems began when petitioner started
doubting respondent's infidelity
5) Respondent's alleged mixed personality
disorder, the "leaving the house attitude
whenever they quarreled, violent tendencies
during epileptic attacks, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and lack of support and his
preference to spend more time with his
bandmates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but
a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage
6) Psychological defects spoken here were
more of a "difficulty if not "outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations and that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute
7) It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons, it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological not physical
illness
8) Sanctity of marriage stated in Constitution
protected by the state
Art 36 should not be confused with divorce law nor
equated with legal separation

Paras vs. Paras
G.R. No. 147824 (August 2, 2007)

unfitness of a lawyer to practice profession is not equal to unfitness as a husband

268 SCRA 198 (February 13, 1997)

FACTS:
" April 14, 1985: Roridel O. Molina was
married to Reynaldo Molina; son: Andre O.
Molina
" After a year of marriage Reynaldo showed
signs or immaturity and irresponsibility
! Spend more time with friends
! Squandered money
! Depended on his parents for aid
and assistance
! Lied to Roridel about their finances
! February 1986: Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila
! March 1987: Roridel resigned from
her work in Manila and lived with
her parents in Baguio City
! Shortly after Reynaldo left Roridel
and Andre
! Roridel: psychologically incapable
of complying with the essential
marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually
quarrelsome individual who thought
of himself as a king to be served;
presented witnesses
! Reynaldo: Roridel's insisting on
maintaining her friends even after
marriage; Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking meals; Failure to
run the household and handle
finances, were the reasons for their
frequent quarrels
! RTC: marriage void
! CA: marriage void; denied appeal of
Reynaldo
! SolGen: CA made an erroneous
mistake in the interpretation of
psych incapacity and established
the most liberal divorce procedure
in the world which is anathema to
our culture
! SolGen: marriage broke up
because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities

ISSUES:
Whether or not the behavior of Reynaldo constitutes

HELD/DECISION:
No.

RATIO:
" Psych incapacity (Vitug in Santos): no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity. and
that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psych incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to
marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated
" Dr. Gerardo Veloso (Judge Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila): gravity, juridical
antecedence, incurability
" Mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitute psych incapacity. It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.
" Art. 36 guidelines
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity
(2) The root cause of the psych incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the marriage
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68-71 of
the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation/s
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. What
is decreed canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state.

SEPARATE STATEMENT (PADILLA):
" As to whether or not psych incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of
marriage, depends crucially, more than in
any field of law, on the facts of the case
" In the field of psych incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on "all fours with another
case.

SEPARATE OPINION (ROMERO):
" Incapacity should not be a result of mental
illness. For if it were due to insanity or
defects of the mental faculties short of
insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage
annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code
" Lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation; psych incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
" Bases for determining void marriages: (a)
lack of one or more of the essential
requisites of marriage as contract, (b)
reasons of public policy and (c) special
cases and special situations
" Lack of due discretion means that the person
did not have the ability to give valid consent
at the time of the wedding and therefore the
union in invalid.
" Lack of due competence means that the
person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made
during the marriage ceremony
" The professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in
such cases
" It could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The
ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment
are now considered a necessary prerequisite
ti valid matrimonial consent.

CONCURRING OPINION (VITUG):
" Tests:
(1) Incapacity must be psychological or
mental, not physical
(2) The psych incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume and discharge the
basic marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering mutual help and
support
(3) The psycholigic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations may
occur only thereafter
Mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable

Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals
320 SCRA 76 (December 08, 1999)

Facts:
1) CA affirming the decision of RTC which
dismissed the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner
2) January 1, 1981: petitioner and private
respondent married (Silang Catholic Parich
Church, Cavite)
3) Three children born: Maie (may 3, 1982);
Lyra (May 22, 1985) and Marian (June 15,
1989)
4) July 10, 1992: filed complaint RTC Br 18
tagaytay City annulment of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity
5) ALLEGATIONS
! Private respondent failed to perform his
obligation to support family and
contribute to management of household
! Devoting most of time engaging in
drinking sprees w/ friends
! Cohabited with other women though
married with whom he had illegitimate
children
! Because of his promiscuity private
respondent endangered her health by
infecting her with sexually transmitted
disease
! PR irresponsible. Immature and
unprepared for duties of married life
! Ordered to give support to their three
children P9000 every month; she be
awarded custody of their children and
she be adjudged sole owner of parcel of
land (Don Gregorio Subd, BUcal
dasmarinas Cavite) as well as jeep
which private respondent took with him
when he left conjugal home on June 12,
1992
! Not close to their children
6) Met in 1977 at Phil Christian University
(petitioner 5 years older than respondent-
teacher and student)
! Respondent continued studies after
marriage supported by parents and
petitioner
! Aside form her salary augmented their
income by doing sideline businesses
! Respondent left but received again by
the petitioner to save their marriage
! Smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse
! Once beaten by husband when she
confronted her about Tess confined at
De LA sale University Medical Center
(cerebral concussion)
! Oct 1992; petitioner learned that
respondent left for middle east and
since then whereabouts had been
unknown

RTC DECISION: dismissing the petition
for annulment of marriage
! What were mentioned were not ground
for annulment but for legal separation
(art 55 of FC)

CA: affirmed decision of RTC (January
30, 1996) quoted Santos vs CA
! Acts and attitudes complained
happened after the marriage and there
is no proof that the same have already
existed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage to constitute psychological
incapacity under Art 36 of FC

DECISION OF SC: Petition is DENIED, decision of
CA AFFIRMED.
REASONS:
1) Differentiated Voidable (Art 46) , Void
marriage and legal separation (Art 55)
2) Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at
the time of the marriage respondent was
suffering from a psychological defect which
in fact deprived him of the ability to assume
the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities
3) Quoted Republic vs CA: root cause of
psychological incapacity..
4) Expert testimony should have been
presented
Separate proceeding for other contentions (custody,
support etc)

Marcos vs. Marcos
343 SCRA 755 (October 19, 2000)

ailure to give support, physical abuse, abandonment # not psychological incapacity so need to undergo
psychological exam

Malcampo-Sin vs. Sin
355 SCRA 285 (March 26, 2001)

Facts:
Florence and Phillip Sin were married Jan. 4, 1987.
Florence filed a complaint in RTC Pasig for
declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity on Sept. 20., 1994 which consequently
dismissed the petition on the basis of insufficiency of
evidence. Florence then filed an appeal to the CA
which reaffirmed the trial court's decision. She filed a
motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it as
well. The SC noted that during the proceedings, the
State did not participate except for the manifestation
issued by the fiscal stating that there was no collusion
between the parties.

Issue:
WON the RTC and CA erred in dismissing the
petitions without due participation of the State in the
proceedings.

Held/Ratio:
Yes. It is important for the State to participate in the
proceedings as exemplified in Republic v. Dagdag
wherein the decision of the trial court was said to be
prematurely rendered since the investigating
prosecutor was not given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Factual disputes of the case
will not be heard since this falls within the province of
the trial court.

Remanded to the RTC for proper trial.

Pesca vs. Pesca
356 SCRA 588 (April 17, 2001)

Guidelines set in Molina/Santos mandatory; emotional immaturity and irresponsibility # not psychological
incapacity

Choa vs. Choa
392 SCRA 641 (November 26, 2002)

Facts:
6) petitioner and respondent were married on
March 15, 1981
7) two children: Cheryl Lynne and Albryan
8) October 27, 1993: respondent filed before
RTC Negross Occidental Br 51 complaint for
annulment of his marriage to petitioner (Civil
Case no. 93-8098)
9) Filed amended complaint dated Nov 8, 1993-
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her psychological
incapacity
10) Instead of offering any objection to it,
petitioner filed MOTION TO DISMISS
(Demurrer to Evidence) dated May 11, 1998

RTC: Dec 2, 1998 Order: denying petitioner's
Demurrer to Evidence; held that respondent
established a quantum of evidence that the
petitioner must controvert; motion for
reconsideration was denied in mArch 22, 1990
order; petitioner elevated to CA

CA: petition DISMISSED (CA GR SP NO. 53100);
denial of demurrer was only interlocutory hence,
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not
available
- Proper remedy was for defense to present
evidence and to take appeal if decision is
unfavorable
- Propriety of granting or denying a demurrer
to evidence rests on the sound exercise of
the trial court's decision
- Petitioner failed to show that issues in the
court had been resolved arbitrarily or w/o
basis

ISSUES:
3) upon denial of demurrer of evidence, is
petitioner under obligation to present her
evidence and just appeal after if decision is
unfavorable (Rule 33 of 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) (is certiorari available to correct
an order denying a demurrer to evidence?)
4) in upholding lower court's denial of
petitioner's demurrer to evidence, did CA
violate, ignore or disregard in whimsical
manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this
court in Molina and Santos (in its denial, did
the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
by violating or ignoring the applicable law
and jurisprudence?)

DECISION OF SC: Petition is MERITORIOUS. The
petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of CA
REVERSED and SET ASDE. Respondent's
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED and the case for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged
psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED.

FIRST ISSUE: Resort to certiorari
! weakness and gross insufficiency of
respondent's evidence
! she was entitle to the immediate recourse of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
! in general, interlocutory orders are neither
appealable nor subject to certiorari
proceedings but this is not absolutein this
instant where judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65
! a denial of demurrer that is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari

SECOND ISSUE: Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
! DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE: an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action
at law, to the effect that the evidence which
his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law (whether true or not) to make out his
case or situation the issuethis challenges
the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a
verdict
! Evidence against respondentis grossly
insufficient to support any finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant
a declaration of nullity of the parties'
marriage
! First: petitioner claims that the filing of
petitioner of a series of charges against him
are proof of latter's psychological incapacity
to complu with essential obligations of
marriageabnormal for wife who instead of
protecting name of husband had acted to
contrary
- documents presented by respondent during
trial do not show alleged incapacity of his
wife
- to rule that filings are sufficient to establish
her psychological incapacity is not only
erroneous but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity
! Second: neither is the testimony of
respondent taken by itself or in conjunction
w/ his documentary offerings sufficient to
prove petitioner's alleged incapacity
-testimony of respondent: 1) lack of attention to
children; 2) immaturity; 3) lack of intention of
procreative sexualitynone of these constituent
* Third: insufficiency, if not incompetency of the
supposed expert testimony presented by
respondent (Dr. Antonio M./ Gauzon), failed to
identify and prove root cause of alleged
incapacity no meical or clinical proof of
incurability if there was true incapacity nor was it
grave enough
- assessment of petitioner by dr. Gauzon was
based merely on descriptions communicated to
him by respondentnever conducted any
p[psychological examinations

NOTE; definitions of psychological incapacity
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties (Art 68 FC)
- mere neglect, difficulty or refusal in the
performance of marital obligations and mere
showing of irreconcilable differences or
conflicting personalities in no wise

! In case at bar, respondent merely shows
that he and his wife could not get along
with each other-no showing of the
gravity and juridical antecedent or
incurability of problems besetting their
marital union
! TC should have carefully studied and
assessed the evidence presented by
respondent and taken into account the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter-
concluded that it was useless to proceed
further with the tedious process of
hearing contravening proof
It was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to
deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this
court's rulings in point-continuing the process
of litigation would have been a total; waste of time
and money for the parties and an unwelcome
imposition on trial court's docket

Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals
412 SCRA 41 (September 24, 2003)

Facts:
! respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were
legally married union begot five children
! On 29 March 1995, private respondent
Tadeo R. Bengzon ("respondent Tadeo)
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona
("petitioner Diana).
! Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana
was psychologically incapacitated at the time
of the celebration of their marriage to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage
and such incapacity subsists up to the
present time. The petition alleged the non-
complied marital obligations:
! During their marriage, they had
frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. Respondent, coming
from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She
would go to her sister's house or
would play tennis the whole day
! When the family had crisis due to
several miscarriages suffered by
respondent and the sickness of a
child, respondent withdrew to
herself and eventually refused to
speak to her husband
! On November 1977, the
respondent, who was five months
pregnant with Cristina Maria and on
the pretext of re-evaluating her
feelings with petitioner, requested
the latter to temporarily leave their
conjugal dwelling.
! In his desire to keep peace in the
family and to safeguard the
respondent's pregnancy, the
petitioner was compelled to leave
their conjugal dwelling
! The respondent at the time of the
celebration of their marriage was
psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligation
of marriage and such incapacity
subsisted up to and until the
present time. Such incapacity was
conclusively found in the
psychological examination
conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and the
respondent
! Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the
guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no
cause for action
!
! ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action
against Diana
! HELD: YES , since petition stated legal right of
Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her
act or omission as seen in facts (cause of action
46)
- FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND
GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS
- Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage petition does not need to show
(NOT) root cause since only experts can
determine it b the physical manifestations of
physical incapacity
RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE
OF ACTION
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

Siayngco vs. Siayngco
441 SCRA 422 (October 27, 2004)

Inability to conceive and domineering attitude # not psychological incapacity.

Republic vs. Iyoy
470 SCRA 508 (September 21, 2005)

Hot-tempered and extravagant wife left husband then married an American # not psychological incapacity

Yu vs. Yu
484 SCRA 485 (March 10, 2006)

procedural: a series of motions, habeas corpus and custody petitions
-SC has not yet ruled whether either/both spouses are psychologically incapacitated.

Catalan vs. Court of Appeals
514 SCRA 607 (February 6, 2007)

Facts:
1) CA reversed decision of RTC of dagupan
City declaring the marriage between
respondents Orlando B. catalan and Merope
Braganza void on the ground of bigamy and
the denied motion for reconsideration
2) June 4, 1950: mabini, Pangasinan; married
3) Migrated to the US and allegedly became
naturalized citizens of US
4) After 38 years of marriage, divorced in Aril
1988
5) June 16, 1988: Orlando married Merope in
calasiao, pangasinan
6) Contending that said marriage was
bigamous; Merope has subsisting marriage
with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan
7) Respondents filed motion to dismiss but
denied
RTC: judgment in favor or petitioner; subsequent
marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando catalan is
declared null and void
Defendants jointly pay moral damages (P300,000)
and exemplary damages (P200,000) and attorney' s
fees (P50,000) including cost of suit; donation in
consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the
property donated is ordered awarded to the heirs of
Juliana Branganza

CA: GRANT the appeal and REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the appealed decision, civil case DISMISSED;
motion for reconsideration denied
ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioner has the required standing
in court to question the nullity of the marriage
between respondents
2) Whether the failure of the court of appeals to
declare the questioned marriage void
constitutes reversible error

DECISION OF SC: Case is REMANDED to the trial
court for its proper disposition
a) If it is proven that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow
respondent's remarriage, then the TC should
declare respondent's marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduce the amount of
moral damages from P300,000 to P50,000
and exemplary damages from P200,000 to
P25,000
b) If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Amor-Catalan lacks
legal personality to file the same

REASONS:
1) Need to ascertain the allegations that they
were naturalized in the US and whether they
had actually been judicially granted a divorce
decree
2) If these are proven, then this case is not
dealing with Filipino citizens whose marital
status is governed by the FC and our CC but
with American citizens who secured their
divorce in the US and who are considered by
their national law to be free to contract
another marriage
3) Two kinds of divorce: a) absolute divorce or
a vinculo matrimonii- terminates the
marriage; and b) limited divorce or a mensa
et thoro- suspends and leaves the bond in
full force
4) A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner
5) Need to present divorce evidence and
foreign law for deciding on this matterto
know if she has personality or standing in
this case
6) One with Proper interest to file a casea
petition to declare the nullity of marriage like
any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in
interest and mist be based on a cause of
action (Sec 2a of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages)
Petitioner's personality to file petition cannot be
ascertained because of absence of divorce decree
and foreign law allowing itto know if respondent is
allowed to remarry after a divorce or not

Zamora vs. Court of Appeals
(February 7, 2007)

Facts:
1) CA affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage
2) June 4, 1970: married in Cebu City
3) Union did not produce a child
4) 1972: private respondent left for US to work
as nurse, and later became a citizen (1989)
5) Returned in the pHils once in a while
6) Petitioner filed complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged
psychological incapacity of private
respondent
7) Alleged that wife is horrified by the mere
thought of having children as evidenced by
the fact that she had not born a petitioner a
child; alleged she abandoned petitioner and
lived in the US; lived together only for not
more than three years
8) Respondent denied allegations:
! She do not refuse to have a child
! She loves children
! Petitioner is unfaithful to herhad two
affairs with different women and he
begot atleast three children with them
RTC: June 22, 1995: nothing in the evidence showed
respondent is suffering from psychological
incapacityComplaint DISMISSED

CA: August 5, 1999: affirming the ruling of the trial
court (Santos vs CA and Republic vs CA and Molina);
denied motion for reconsideration

DECISION OF SC: petition is DENIED. The decision
and resolution of CA dated August 5, 1999 and
January 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED.

REASONS:
1) It is true that in Santos vs CA no specific
mention of presentation of expert opinion
but it is important is the presence (Marcos vs
Marcos) of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition.
If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be
resorted to
Sec 2(d) of AM No 01-11-10 SC: Rule on declaration
of Absolute nullity of Void Marriages and ANnulment
of Voidable Marriages"what to allegethe
complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration
of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged

Republic vs. Tanyag-San Jose
517 SCRA 123 (February 6,2007)

Being jobless, a drug-user, and having anti-social personality # not psychological incapacity.

Navarro vs. Navarro
GR No. 162049 (April 13, 2007)

Person who had depression/escapism; Person who is always jealous # not psychologically incapacitated

Paras vs. Paras (supra)

Almelor vs RTC-Las Pinas
GR No. 179620 (August 26, 2008)

Homosexuality (which was not proven that it was concealed before the marriage # not psychological incapacity.

Laurena vs CA
GR No. 159220 (September 22, 2008)

Homosexuality, infidelity, insensitivity # not psychological incapacity

Te vs Te
GR No. 161793 (February 13, 2009)

Husband - psychologically incapacitated - has personality disorder and unready to commit.
Wife - psychologically incapacitated - has antisocial personality disorder, aggressive and rebellious.

Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio
G.R. No. 171042 (June 30, 2008)

Mama's boy # not psychological incapacity

FC 37 cf. NCC 963-967
FC 38, compare FC 38(6) with NCC 80(6)
RPC 246
NCC 80(7), 82
NCC 963-967
FC53
FC 36, PC 39, FC 40
Sec. 2, A.M. No. 02-1 1-10-SC. March 4, 2003

Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli
G.R. No. 173614 (September 28, 2007)

Dispute over land causing heirs/children go to court claiming that the marriage was null and void for lack of
marriage license, SC applies the current rule of AM 02-11-10-SC (2003) - which says that petition for nullity may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, and that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and solely belongs to
them
What the heirs should've done is file for a declaration of nullity VIA a "proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse"

FC 39; FC 36 par. 2 in relation to~ FC 255;
FC42,par.2
FC 237 in rel to R.A. 6809
VII (E)( 1 0)(b) above
FC48

Ancheta vs Ancheta
424 SCRA 725

Petitioner files for dissolution of conjugal partnership, and then respondent files for nullity on grounds of psych
incapacity. TC grants nullity coz of PI. Later on respondent marries again, petitioner files for against the decision on
grounds of PI but is denied. SC: Grants the petition stating the declaration of nullity was w/o a state appointed
attorney to prevent collusion hence, the case is remanded.

FC 48; cf. NCC 2035
A.M. No. 02-1 1-10-SC. March 4, 2003

Jocson v Robles
22 SCRA 521

Petitioner files for annulment of marriage, and respondent supports the claim that he was only forced into the
marriage through a joint affidavit executed by him, his father and brother. SC: annulment denied on grounds that
judgment rendering a marriage annulled cannot be made upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment
(confession here being that the respondent himself admitted to being forced into the marriage) - NCC - 88 and 101
prohibit this.

Tolentino v Villanueva
56 SCRA 1

Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be allowed even if the sermons were not served to the respondent.
SC: denied because in accordance with NCC - 88, 101, in case of non-appearance of defendant, court shall order a
prosecuting attorney to inquire w/n collusion exists, and if not, the attorney shall intervene to make sure that
evidence is not fabricated and no collusion is in place.

Salcedo-Ortanez v CA
235 SCRA 111

Respondent files for annulment for lack of marriage license and/or psych incapacity and provides 3 taped telephone
conversations of the petitioner as evidence. Petitioner challenges the use of tapes as evidence but is dismissed by
the CA. SC: the tapes are obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping law, CA decision is set aside.

Malcampo Sin vs Sin
355 SCRA 285

Petitioner files for declaration of nullity due to psych incapacity, and is dismissed. SC: even if the petition is
dismissed, process should be correct - the state did not participate through an appointed fiscal to prevent
collusion hence the case is remanded to the lower court for proper trial.

Pesca vs Pesca
356 SCRA 588

Petitioner files for nullity through psych incapacity. Denied. SC: Petitioner, based on the standards set in Santos and
Molina, has failed to make a case out of psych incapacity. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be
equated to psych incapacity.

Marcos vs Marcos
343 SCRA 755

Petitioner files for psych incapacity which is given by the RTC, but CA reverses on grounds that a psychological
evaluation is needed. SC: Psych evaluations are not needed to settle psych incapacity but regardless there is no
showing that the respondent's defects were present at the inception of the marriage no is it incurable. The illness can
only be traced for a certain period and not during the celebration of marriage. Petition denied.

FC5O-54
But seeFCl47-148

FC4O

Bobis vs. Bobis
G.R. No. 138509 (July 31, 2000)

(Legarda: wrong case - rushed to the supreme court before lower court decides on the nullity)
Respondent contracts a second marriage w/o declaration of void of the first case. Respondent files for declaration of
nullity of second marriage and while ongoing information for bigamy was filed against him. Respondent then files a
motion to suspend the proceedings of bigamy because of the pending nullity case makes it a prejudicial question. TC
Grants. SC: FC - 40 - effective during the 2nd marriage requires a judicial declaration before a party can
remarry, it doesn't erase the fact that he did marry for a second time. Declaration of nullity won't affect the bigamy
case.

Mercado vs.Tan
G.R. No 137110 (August 1, 2000)

Mercado marries Tan, declaring that he is single even if he was still married. Tan files for bigamy. Petitioner files for
declaration of nullity for his first marriage. CA says he is guilty of bigamy. SC: Petitioner contracts 2nd marriage w/o
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Given that bigamy is already consummated, its immaterial that he is now
filing for a declaration of nullity. FC 36 is not a defense to bigamy. VITUG: FC40 applies to VOIDABLE marriages
and FC36 and 53.

Ty vs CA
346 SCRA 327

FACTS:
" March and August 1977: Edgardo Reyes
married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva
" August 1980: marriage was declared null
and void for lack of marriage license (civil),
null and void ab ignition for lack of consent of
the parties (church)
" April 1979 (before declaration of nullity):
Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty; April 1982
church wedding
" January 1991: Edgardo filed a Civil case
praying for the declaration of his marriage
with Ofelia null and void due to lack of
marriage license and because he was still
married to Anna Maria
" Ofelia submitted their marriage license and
the certification that Edgardo's marriage with
Anna Maria is declared null and void
" RTC: marriage to Ofelia null and void ab
initio
" CA: affirmed trial court's decision

ISSUES:
Whether the decree of nullity of the 1
st
marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be
entered into validly

HELD/DECISION:
If marriage is contracted before the Family Code no, if
after the Family Code yes. Petition granted

RATIO:
" Both marriages governed by the Civil Code
hence, no judicial declaration is necessary
" Art. 83: Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime
of the 1
st
spouse of such person with any
person other than such 1
st
spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(3) The first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or
(4) The 1
st
spouse had been absent for 7
consecutive years at the time of the 2
nd

marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than 7 years, is
generally considered as dead and
before any person believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage,
or if the marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the 3 cases until declared
null and void by a competent court.
The sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage

Carino vs Carino
351 SCRA 127

SC: absent a judicial decree declaring the 1st marriage void, it remains valid (pursuant to Art. 140 of the FC) and 2
nd

marriage is bigamous. Resp. gets nothing except what she can prove as her property via individual income by
Art.148 of FC.

Morigo vs Morigo
422 SCRA 376

He was acquitted via the retroactive application of his declaration of nullity w/c rendered his first marriage void
ab initio. Lacking one element of the crime of bigamy (the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead) he was rightfully
acquitted. (addt'I principIe: voidabIe marriages, not defense for bigamy)

FC 50, FC 43(2) cf. FC 102(4)
Compare with FC 147-148

Valdes v. QC-RTC
G.R. No. 122749 (July 31, 1996)

Facts: 1) Petition for review bewails on a question of
law an alleged error committed by RTC
failed to apply correct law that should govern
the disposition of family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared ab
initio because of psychological incapacity on
the part of either or both of the parties of the
contract
2) January 5, 1971: Antonio Valdes and
Consuelo Gomez married
3) 5 children
4) June 22, 1992: valdez sought the declaration
of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Art 36
of the FC
5) RTC declared marriage null and void
6) Consuelo Gomez sought for a clarification of
that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Arts 50, 51 and 52 of the
FC; she asserted that the FC contained no
provisions on the procedure for liquidation of
common property in unions without marriage

RTC: clarification: considering that Art 147 of
the FC explicitly provides that property
acquired by both parties during their union,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their "family home" and
all their other properties for that matter in
equal shares"provisions on co-ownership
will apply
7) Petitioner moved fore reconsideration of the
order (issue regarding family dwelling)
petition denied
8) Appealed

DECISION OF SC: Trial court correctly applied the
law; Questioned orders, dated May 5, 1995 and
October 30, 1995 of the trial court are AFFIRMED.

REASONS:
1) in void marriages, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of art 147 or 148 such as
the case may be, of the Family Code Art 147
is the remake of Art 144 of the CC
2) this peculiar kind of co-ownership applies
when a man and a woman suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively lives together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage
3) under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership.Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property
shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly of said party's
efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family housedhold.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couples' separate property are
not included in the co-ownership
4) the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately a court which had jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed with authority to
resolve the incidental and consequential
matters
it did not commit error in ruling that petitioner and
private respondent own the "family home and all their
common property in equal shares as in concluding
that in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them the provisions on co-
ownership under the CC not Arts 50, 51 and 52 in
relation to arts 102 and 129 of the FC should aptly
prevail--- these are only for valid and voidable
marriages (community and conjugal partnerships)

FC 50-53, FC 51 in rel to NCC 886, 888;
FC176
NCC 908, 1061
Sec. 21, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003

FC 4 cf. 45

Weigel vs. Sempio-Dy
143 SCRA 499

Facts:
Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lilia Oliva on the ground of Lilia's
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion.
Lilia admitted to the previous marriage but claimed
that it was null and void since she was forced to enter
the said union. In the pre-trial that ensued, both
parties agreed that the issue was whether the
previous marriage was void or merely voidable. Lilia
asked the court for an opportunity to present more
evidence but the respondent judge denied the
petition. Lilia appeals to the SC in hopes of modifying
the "agreed facts and to allow her to present
evidence in her favor.

Issue:
WON the prior marriage was void or voidable.

Held/Ratio:
The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to
prove that her marriage was vitiated by force.
Assuming, however that this is so, it would still be
irrelevant since the previous marriage wasn't void but
merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since
no annulment was made, her current marriage is
therefore void.

Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6

Facts:
The man, a lawyer, pursued a woman despite
knowing that she was already married. He convinced
her to marry him and that the first marriage was void
because the woman married her first cousin, and was
thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the
lawyer, it was no longer necessary to go to court to
declare it as such. She agreed to marry him. After the
birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and
contracted a second marriage while claiming that his
marriage to the woman was void from the beginning
since she had already married her first cousin.

Issue:
WON an action for judicial declaration of nullity of the
prior marriage is necessary before entering a
subsequent marriage.

Held/Ratio:
Yes. Even if the first mistake was contracted in good
faith, the lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after
he contracted his second one. It was deemed that the
moral character of the respondent was deeply flawed
and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the
Roll of Attorneys.

FC 4(1), 47(1), R A 6809 cf FC 14
FC 45(2), 47(2)

Lim vs. CA
214 SCRA 237

Not a breach of confidentiality. In the case at bar, the doctor was brought in as a medical expert, and not as
the attending physician of the petitioner. Based on the pleadings from the lower courts and petitioner's failure to
prove otherwise (that the physician blackened the reputation of the petitioner), it shows that Dr. Acampado was there
simply as an expert of psychiatry.

FC 45(3), 46, 47(3)
NCC 1338-1344

Buccat v Buccat
72 Phil 49

Facts:
Couple got married, stayed together for 89 days, but
suddenly, respondent gave birth to a baby boy after 9
months of being pregnant. As a result of this, plaintiff
abandoned respondent and sued her on the basis of
her not being a virgin when they were married and
thus the marriage was obtained by fraud. CFI Baguio,
however, ruled in favor of the respondent.

Issue:
WON the marriage was valid.

Held/Ratio:
The Court upheld the decision of the CFI Baguio in
favor of the respondent because they saw no reason
to reverse it. They got married when the woman was
seven months pregnant. It is an incredible allegation
that the wife's advanced pre-natal state was not
suspected by the husband. There was no fraud
involved.

Aquino v Delizo
108 Phil 21

Facts:
Fernando Aquino claimed that his wife deceived him
before their marriage by concealing the fact that she
was pregnant by another man. The baby was born
four months after the marriage. The lower court and
the appellate court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the child could've been born out of lawful
wedlock between the spouses. Aquino brought new
evidence to the court, chief among which were
affidavits of the plaintiff's brother and the defendant
herself claiming that they were parents of the child
born four months after the marriage.

Issue:
WON the concealment of pregnancy by another man
prior to marriage can be considered fraud and as
such, can it be a ground for annulment.

Held/Ratio:
Yes. Under Article 85, par. 4, it is explicitly declared
as fraud. Using Buccat v. Buccat as a defense in this
case is untenable since in the present case, she was
only four months pregnant during the marriage and at
that stage the court is not prepared to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent.

Anaya v. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97

Facts:
After one month of marriage to Anaya, Fernando
Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground
that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. Complaint was dismissed. However,
during the negotiation of the amount from Anaya's
counterclaim, Fernando allegedly divulged that
several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-
marital relationships with a close relative. Anaya filed
suit to annul on the ground that the marriage
solemnized between them constituted fraud in
obtained her consent. Fernando denied the allegation
and counter claimed for damages for the malicious
filing of the suit; he did not pray for a dismissal of the
complaint but its dismissal "with respect to the alleged
moral damages. Aurora replied stating that Fernando
had no intention of performing his marital duties and
obligations since the marriage was contracted as a
means for him to escape marrying the close relative
that was intimated above.

Issue:
WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of
his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.

Held/Ratio:
No. Fraud is explicitly defined by Article 86 of the CC.
And also states that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit. shall constitute fraud that will give grounds
for the annulment of marriage.

Macarrubo vs Macarrubo
424 SCRA 42

Facts: Atty. Macarrubo married thrice and thrice had reasons for a void marriage: 1
st
marriage: psychological
incapacity, 2
nd
marriage: consent by fraud, 3
rd
marriage: for lack of a marriage license (pending)
Held: Disbarred for lack of good moral character.

Almelor vs. RTC of Las Piflas
G.R. No. 179620 (August 26, 2008)

Homosexuality in itself is not grounds for annulment, but consent vitiated by fraud as manifested in a
concealment of homosexuality is sufficient grounds. However in this case homosexuality before and at the time
of the celebration of the marriage was not proven and thus the petition for annulment is denied.
FC 45(4), 47(4)
NCC 1335-1337
RPC 344, last paragraph
FC 45(5), 47(5)

Jimenez v. Caizares
109 Phil 273

Facts:
! Aug 3, 1950 Joel Jimenez and Remedios
Canizares wed
! 7 June 1955 the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a
decree annulling his marriage in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga. This was because her
vagina was too small for his member and thus
they couldn't copulate and thus she is impotent
! 14 June 1955 - wife was summoned and served
a copy of the complaint. She did not file an
answer
! 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order
requiring the defendant to submit to a physical
examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation
! 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree
annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and
the defendant since plaintiff had no response
whatsoever
! 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for
reconsideration since impotency was never really
established. Rather than nullifying marriage Court
should have compelled her to undergo and
examination
ISSUE: WON marriage may be annulled on sole
testimony of husband that his wife is impotent
HELD: NO
! law specifically enumerates the legal grounds,
that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage.
! Not proven in this case since wife has
been unresponsive. Court says that it
may not so much be indifference as it is
that she is shy and embarrassed about
the situation
RESULT: presumption is in favor of potency. Case is
thus remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

FC (45(6), compare with FC 46(3)
FC47
FC47
Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 02,11-10-SC. March 4, 2003
VII(E)( 13 )(b)-(d)
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003

Barcelona vs. CA
G.R. 130087 (September 24, 2003)

Facts:
! respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were
legally married union begot five children
! On 29 March 1995, private respondent
Tadeo R. Bengzon ("respondent Tadeo)
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona
("petitioner Diana).
! Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana
was psychologically incapacitated at the time
of the celebration of their marriage to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage
and such incapacity subsists up to the
present time. The petition alleged the non-
complied marital obligations:
! During their marriage, they had
frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. Respondent, coming
from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She
would go to her sister's house or
would play tennis the whole day
! When the family had crisis due to
several miscarriages suffered by
respondent and the sickness of a
child, respondent withdrew to
herself and eventually refused to
speak to her husband
! On November 1977, the
respondent, who was five months
pregnant with Cristina Maria and on
the pretext of re-evaluating her
feelings with petitioner, requested
the latter to temporarily leave their
conjugal dwelling.
! In his desire to keep peace in the
family and to safeguard the
respondent's pregnancy, the
petitioner was compelled to leave
their conjugal dwelling
! The respondent at the time of the
celebration of their marriage was
psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligation
of marriage and such incapacity
subsisted up to and until the
present time. Such incapacity was
conclusively found in the
psychological examination
conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and the
respondent
! Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the
guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no
cause for action
!
! ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action
against Diana
! HELD: YES , since petition stated legal right of
Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her
act or omission as seen in facts (cause of action
46)
- FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND
GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS
- Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage petition does not need to show
(NOT) root cause since only experts can
determine it b the physical manifestations of
physical incapacity
RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE
OF ACTION
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

A.M No. 02-11-12-SC. March 4, 2003
FC 49-54

Tuason vs. CA
256 SCRA 158

Facts:
! June 1972 marriage date
! 1989 filed for declaration of nullity of marriage
as pscyh incapacity
! petitioner failed to show up in hearing
thus nullification was granted
ISSUE: WON petitioner can file for relief since he was
in rehab
HELD: NO, counsel's own negligence not to state he
was in rehab
! ntervention of state isn't necessary
since no olds barred contest negates
collusion
RESULT: petition for relief is denied.

FC 50, FC 43(2) ef. FC 102(4)
Compare with FC 147-148
FC 50-53, FC 51 in rd to NCC 886, 888;
FC 176
NCC 908, 1061

FC 4 1-44, compare with NCC 83, 85(2) and 87(2) cf. RPC 349

Jones v. Hortiguela

Facts:
! Dec 1914 Marciana Escano married Arthur
Jomes. On 1918 he left and never came back
! Oct 1919 Escano filed to declare him an
absentee
! granted under art 186 of CC
! order was published in OG and El Ideal
- May 6, 1927 Escano married Hortiguela
- May 9, 1932 Escano died leaving Hortiguela as
judicial administrator of her entire estate. Only he
and Angelita Jones, daughter from first marriage
were her heirs
! Represented by Paz Corominas since
she was a minor
- May 3, 1934 declared that she was the only
heir and her husband should be made
administrator of estate
! Marriage between Escano and
Hortiguela was null and void
! Was a minor and had been assisted by
Hortiguela's same lawyers thus her
rights were impaired.
SSUE: WON Escano and Hortiguela's marriage was
valid.
HELD: YES
- Rules on judicially declaring a person as
absentee are different from estate and marriage
! Estate need to declare someone as
absent for precautions for administration
of estate of absentee
! Not necessary in marriage
! Only need to be absent for 7
years which he was for 9 years
before 2
nd
marriage was made.
! Recognized Hortiguela as her
step-father
RESULT: hortiguela has right to be administrator and
heir to part of estate.

Lukban v. Republic
98 Phil 574

Facts:
- Dec 10, 1933 petitioner married Lourdes
Lukban but left after a fight. Never came back in
20 years.
ISSUE: Won Francisco can be declared
presumptively dead
HELD: No, since it isn't authorized by law and to be
declared a widow is dependent upon the death of her
husband
! State of absence will always remain
disputable
RESULT: petition is denied
Gue v RP presumption of death can't be declared
since you can't be dead.
Pon: Montemayor, J
Nature: appeal from order of Court of First Instance in
Manila
Facts:
-Oct 1944- when they got married
-Jan 1946 husband went to Shanghai , she followed
but came back on 1949
! Afterwards never came back
! ISSUE: WON husband can be declared
presumably dead through Art 390 of CC
! HELD: no cause for action since he will only be
presumed dead and this will never become final.
May however be used to obtain divorce.

Gue v. Republic
107 Phil 381

Facts:
1) Appeal from an order of the CFI Manila
dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue
2) Oct 11, 1944: married to William Gue and
had a child Anthony Gue; another child
Eulogio
3) on January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila
and went to Shanghai China but since then
had not been heard of, neither had he written
to her nor in any way communicated with her
and she failed to locate him despite of her
efforts and diligence
4) they had not acquired any property during
the marriage
5) she asked the court for a declaration of the
presumption of death of William gue (Art 390
of the CC)
CFI: after publication and hearing, issued the order of
dismissal
! no right had been established by the
petitioner upon which a judicial decree may
be predicated and this action is not for
settlement of the estate of the absentee as it
is clear he did not leave any
! * A judicial presumption even if final and
executor, would still be a prima facie
presumption only and it still disputableit is
for this reason that it cannot be a subject of a
judicial pronouncement or declarationproof
of actual death would still have to be
determined
6) Appealed- invoked the provisions of Art 390
of the New Civil Codeabsence of 7
yearsfor succession shall not be presumed
dead till after an absence of 10 years
7) According to appellant with promulgation of
the NCC in 1950, the courts are now
authorized to declare persons presumptively
dead
SOLICITOR GENERAL:opposed to the petition; same
reason as above (*)
SC: the appeal order dismissing the petition is
AFFIRMED

SSS vs. Jarque vda. De Bailon
G.R. No. 165545 (March 24, 2006)

Facts:
! Bailon contracted 3 marriages in his lifetime
! Alice Diaz -1
st
wife was presumed dead
! Elisa Jayona 2
nd
wife
! Teresita Jarque respondent.
! ISSUE: WON 2
nd
marriage is made void by
appearance of first wife who was presumed
dead.
! HELD: NO
! 2
nd
marriage is valid more than 1
st
marriage and
SS had no jurisdiction to say that 1
st
marriage
was the valid marriage
1
st
wife is deemed absent until action for annulment is
filed.

NCC 15, 17

FC26

Benedicto v Dela Rama
(December 8, 1903)

Facts:
1) This is an action for divorce on the ground of
abandonment and adultery
2) The answer charged the plaintiff with
adultery, denied the adultery imputed to
defendant, and asked for divorce
CFI: granted the divorce to plaintiff and 81, 042. 76
pesos as her share of the conjugal property- court
assumed that the provisions of the civil code relating
to divorce contained in title 4 of book1 are still in force
3) Married in July 1891 to august 1892
happily together
4) The defendant suddenly without any
previous warning took his wife to the house
of her parents, left her there and never lived
with her afterwards
5) The plaintiff: complains that husband
committed adultery with one GREGORIA
BERMEJO in 1892
6) Other two charges relate to 1899 and 1901
insufficient evidence
ARGUMENTS;
a) The power of the gov gen, without such
order to suspend the operation of the code
b) The order of suspension is inoperative did
not mention the book of this code in which
the suspended titles 4 and 1q2 were to be
found
c) Title 4: relates to marriage and divorce , title
12: to civil registry (book 1)

SC: this is an error
Ratio:
1) July 31, 1889, the Civil Code as it existed
in the peninsula was extended to the phils
and took effect on dec 8, 1889
2) On dec 31, an order was published
which states that titles 4 and 12 of the
CC are suspended in the archipelago-
no decree can be found published in the
Gaceta
3) The history of Law of Civil Marriage of
1870 is well known. As a consequence
of the religious liberty proclaimed in the
consti of 1869, the whole of the law was
in force in the peninsula. But that basis
was wanting in these islands, and prior
to the promulgation of the CC in 1889,
no part of the law was in force here,
except arts 44 to 78 which were
promulgated in 1883
4) It is claimed that if these are suspended,
the only marriages in the islands would
be canonical and the only courts
competent to declare a divorce would be
ecclesiastical
5) There can be no doubt that the order of
suspension refers to titles 4 and 12 f
book 1 and it has always been
understoodfollows that arts 42-107 of
the CC were not in force here
6) The canon law had not as such any
binding force outside the church-
however, any part of the canon law
which by proper action of the civil
authorities had become a civil law stood
upon same footing as any other law in
spain
7) COUNCIL OF TRENTthese decrees
have in spain the force of a civil law
8) It may be doubted if these decrees,
even if considered as extended to the
phils and in force here, furnish any aid in
the solution of the question
9) CANONISTS: declare adultery to be a
ground for divorcehowever, the
causes for divorce are nowhere
distinctly stated therein
10) The laws of the church which do state
what these causes are have not the
force of civil laws
11) The DECRETAL LAW abolishing in the
peninsula the special jurisdictions was
extended to the phils
12) DECRETAL LAW STATES:
ecclesiastical courts shall continue to
take cognizance of matrimonial and
ellemosynary causes and of
ecclesiastical offenses in accordance
with provisions of canon law and have
jurisdiction over causes of divorce and
annulment of marriage as provided by
the Council of Trentbut incidents with
respect to the deposit of a married
woman, alimony, suit money and other
temporal affairs shall pertain to ordinary
courts
13) PARTIDAS: contain provisions relating
to the subject of divorcestates that
when spouses are separated by law, it
is not then considered that man
separates them, but the written law and
the impediment existing between them
14) Two forms of separation with two
reasons: one is religion and the other
the sin of fornication
15) Religion if on desires to take holy
orders and the other should grant
permissionwith authority of the church
16) Divorce due to adultery or fornication
brought before the judge of the holy
church, includes spiritual fornication
17) In here the spouses are separated but
the marriage still subsists, neither one of
them can contract second marriage at
any time excepting in the case of
separation granted by reason of adultery
in which case the surviving spouse may
remarry after the death of the other
18) No other person but the spouses
themselves can make an accusation for
such a cause and it ought be made
before the bishop or the ecclesiastical
judge either by the parties themselves of
their attorneys
19) This divorce did not annul the marriage
20) That either spouse has been guilty of
adultery is a defense to his or her suit so
is the fact that she has pardoned herif
after a divorce has been granted to the
husband, he commits adultery, there is
a waiver of the judgment

ISSUE: Were these provisions of the
partidas in force in the island prior to 1889?
! The general rule was that laws of the
Peninsula did not rule in the colonies
unless they were expressly extended to
them, as to certain laws, this result was,
however, accomplished in another way
! RECOPILACION de lasLEYES de
INDIASprovision thatand as to all
matters not provided for by the laws of
this compilations, the laws of the
compilations and the PARTIDAS of tese
kingdoms of the Castile shall be
followed in the decisions of causes in
accordance with the following law
! By the operation of this law (TORO),
first enacted in 1530, those laws of the
PARTIDAS herein before referred to
relating to divorce, upon the discovery
and settlement of the Phils became at
once effective thereinthey have
remained in force since all civil laws of
the state as distinguished from laws of
the church
! Being in force on august 13, 1898they
continued to be in force with other laws
of a similar nature
! The PARTIDAS recognized adultery as
a ground for divorcetherefore
according to the civil as well as
canonical law in force in august 13,
1898the commission of the offense
gave the injured party the right to a
divorce
! That provision of the substantive civil
law was not repealed by the change of
sovereignty
! The complete separation of the church
and the state under the American govt
while it changed the tribunal in which
this right should be enforced, could not
affect the right itself
! The fact that ecclesiastical courts no
longer exercise such power is not
important
! The jurisdiction formerly possessed by
them is now vested in CFI by virtue of
ACT no. 136
! The RESULT:
! A) the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to
entertain suit for divorce
! B) that the only ground therefore is
adultery
! C) that the action on that ground can be
maintained by husband and
! D) that the decree does not dissolve the
marriage bond

DECISION: the CFI of Iloilo therefore,
committed no error in assuming the
jurisdiction of this case
! The adultery of the defendant was fully
proved
! Adultery of the plaintiff is however,
plainly and manifestly against the weight
of the evidence (PROOFletter)
! Letter: confession of guilt?
MAIN ISSUE: adultery
1) The lack of evidence destroys the theory
of the court below and of the appellee
that the defendant expelled the plaintiff
from his house because he was tired of
her and desired the company of other
women
2) Not adequate to explain the sudden
termination of their marital relations
3) Testimony of the defendant correctly
explained the theoryhe stated that on
his return from an inspection of one his
estates his wife's maid gave him a letter
in the handwriting of his wife and
directed to her lover, a Spanish corporal
of the civil guard, named ZABAL
4) She admitted the genuineness of the
letter, fell upon her knees and implored
him to pardon herthat same day he
took her to the home of her parents, told
what had occurred and left her there
5) If The plaintiff is guilty the defendant
has condoned the offenseno factual
evidence on this claim

PRINCIPLE:
a) Law 6 , title 9 partida 4, the wife can
defeat the husband's suit for
divorce by proving that he has
pardoned her but no laws in the
partidas which say that the effect of
the pardon would be so far-
reaching as to entitle her to a
divorce against him in a case like
this present one
CONCLUSION:
! Neither of the party is entitled to a
divorceboth committed adultery
! JUDGMENT REVERSED

COOPER, J. DISSENTING
! Immaterial which law governs , since
under each causes for divorce are
substantially the same, one of which is
adultery
! Higher court not to review the findings of
the lower courtsmore competent since
they have the witnesses
! Condonation: offending party is restored
to the same position he or she occupied
before the offense was committed the
only condition being that the offense
must not be repeated
! Not proper to say that just because
plaintiff has once been guilty she would
forever lose her right to a divorce
makes condonation conditionedparty
granting it shall forever have the right to
commit the same offense himself with
impunity
! Condoned offence not being sufficient
as a cause for divorce, is not a bar to
divorce in favor of the plaintiff
condonation restores equality before the
law
! The court has not only reversed the
judgment of the trial court but has
entered a judgment against the plaintiff
! To deprive the plaintiff of the judgment
which she has obtained and make a
final determination of the case here
without giving her an opportunity of
correcting this error, if such exists, is
inequitable and unjust

Arca vs Javier
(July 31, 1954)

Tenchavez v. Escao (supra)

Van Dorn v. Romillo
139 SCRA 139

Facts:
! 1972 Van Dorn a Filipino and Romillo a US
citizen married in Hongkong
! established residence in Phil
! 1982 obtained divorce in Nevada, US
! petitioner remarried in Nevada to
Theodore Van Dorn
! June 8, 1983 Romillo is contesting for his
share in Galleon Shop which he contends is
conjugal property
ISSUE: WON Romillo still has rights on conjugal
property
HELD: NO
! June 11, 1982 already acknowledged in
divorce proceedings in Nevada Court that
the and petitioner had no community
property as of said date.
! US divorce releases Romillo from marriage
under American law where divorce dissolves
marriage thus also relinquished any rights he
may have obtained through marriage
including property
Cannot hold Fil law against petitioner is not valid
since own law would discriminate her.

Somera v. Pilapil
174 SCRA 663

FACTS
! Sept 7, 1979 Imelda Pilapil a Filipino
married Erich Geiling German in Federal
Republic Germany. They later resided in
Malate, Manila
! Jan 1983 asked for divorce which was
obtained on Jan 15 1986
! June 27, 1986 Geiling filed two complaints
of adultery with William Chia and Jesus
Chua
ISSUE: WON he can still file for adultery after
German divorce
HELD: NO
! 344 of RPC only offended spouse may
bring case of adultery to court and should
still be spouse when complaint was filed.
Since he filed it after he divorce was decree
he is now not considered a spouse
! absurd to bring action determined
by his status before or subsequent
to commencement of adultery.
Marriage in his part was already extinguished thus he
cannot sue as spouse anymore

Quita vs CA
300 SCRA 406

Facts: Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan on May 18, 1941 but
had no children. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce
in the US and subsequently remarried. On April 1972,
Arturo died without a will. Blandina Dandan, who was
married to Arturo on April 1947 and had five legitimate
children with the deceased, claimed to be the
surviving spouse. The trial court invoked the ruling in
Tenchavez v. Escano, which held that a foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the Civil Code was not entitled
to recognition was valid in this jurisdiction, and
discarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo. It
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until
the death of Arturo. Blandida's marriage to Arturo was
bigamous since it was contracted on April 1947.
During the proceedings, when asked by Blandida
whether or not Fe was entitled to inherit from
decedent considering their divorce, Fe replied that
Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.

Issue:
WON Fe is entitled to inherit in spite of the divorce
secured in the United States.

Held/Ratio:
No. Her statement in the facts implied that she was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from Arturo.

Llorente vs CA
345 SCRA 592

Facts:
Lorenzo, serviceman of the US Navy, visited his wife
in the Philippines and discovered her pregnant and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother.
Wife, Paula, gave birth to a baby boy whose
certificate stated that the child was illegitimate and the
line of the father's name was left blank. Lorenzo
refused to forgive Paula and the couple drew a written
agreement wherein: (1) support for Paula would be
suspended, (2) marital union would be dissolved in
accordance with judicial proceedings, (3) a separate
agreement would be made re: conjugal property, and
(4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous acts. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed
for divorce; wife was represented by counsel. Divorce
was granted on 1952. He returned to the Philippines
and on 1958 he married Alicia Llorente. Alicia lived in
the same town as Lorenzo's ex-wife but did not know
of the latter's previous relations with her new
husband. Regardless, their 25-year union produced 3
children. On March of 1981, he wrote a will which was
notarized which bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children. On January 1984, the court,
finding that the will was duly executed, admitted the
will to probate. However before the proceedings could
be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula then filed with the
same court a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzo's estate in her favor. Although Alicia filed a
similar petition, RTC issued a joint decision awarding
the testamentary dispositions of the will to Paula
(because Llorenzo's divorce to her was void and
inapplicable in the Philippines) and the illegitimate
children conceived through Alicia. This was later
modified to classify only one child by Alicia as
qualified to be considered illegitimate and Alicia
herself to be declared as co-owner of whatever
properties the couple may have acquired during their
25 years of cohabitation. The latter appealed, was
denied by the CA, and thus the existence of current
petition.

Issue:
WON Alicia is entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo
Llorente.

Held/Ratio:
Yes. The fact that Lorenzo became an American
citizen, procured a divorce from Paula, married Alicia,
executed his will, and then died is duly established
and undisputed. The trial court and the CA
disregarded the will's dispositions in favor of Alicia
because they considered her a mere paramour. But
the divorce should be recognized as a matter of
comity. Now the effect of such a divorce is best
determined by the trial court.

Garcia vs Recio
366 SCRA 437

Facts:
A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of
divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was
issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio
became an Australian citizen and married a Filipina
(Garcia) in Cabanatuan City. The application for
marriage license showed that Recio was "single and
"Filipino. Late 1995, couple started living separately.
On May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in
accordance with Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to nullify
the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that
Recio had a subsisting marriage when they were
married and that she only became aware of this on
November of the preceding year. Recio says
otherwise and claims that his first marriage was
dissolved by the Australian divorce decree, was
legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was
aware of this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years
after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in
Australia. RTC declared the marriage dissolved
because the Australian divorce had ended the
marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the divorce between Recio and Samson was
proven

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility,
but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.

(2) WON Recio was legally capacitated to marry
Garcia

No. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected. The
legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by
the national law of the party concerned. Since he is
an Australian, none of the records he produced do not
absolutely prove that he has legal capacity to marry
on January 12, 1994.

However, Garcia's prayer to declare the marriage null
and void based on bigamy cannot be granted
because it may turn out that Recio did, in fact, have
capacity to marry. Hence, the SC believes that the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the
trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of
the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there
being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates.

Diego vs Castillo
436 SCRA 67

RP vs. Orbecido
G.R.No. 154380 (October 5,2005)

Facts:
Orbecido married Villanueva in the Philippines and
had two children. Villanueva, wife, left for the US, was
naturalized and eventually remarried. Orbecido
petitioned for authority to remarry using Par. 2 of
Article 26, FC. No opposition. OSG's motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal
stating: that the questioned provision only applies to
valid mixed marriages between Filipinos and aliens;
that the remedy is annulment or legal separation; and
that there is no law that governs respondent's
situation.

Issue:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,
where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise
remarry under Philippine law?

Held/Ratio:
Taking into consideration legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Par. 2 Art 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
degree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.

The reckoning point in the provision is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

San Luis vs. San Luis
G.R. 133743 (February 2, 2007)

Facts:
1) Gov. contracted three marriages: a) Virginia
Sulit (March 17, 1942) out of which were
born 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita, and Manuel) in 1963 Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo
2) May 1, 1968: felicisimo married Merry Lee
Cowin (American citizen) with whom he had
a son TobiasMerrly Lee filed complaint for
divorce before the family court of the Court
of First Circuit of Hawaii which issued decree
Granting absolute divorce and awarding
child custody (dec 14, 1973)
3) June 20, 1974: felicisimo married felicidad
San Luis (respondent) in Los Angeles, CA
no childrenlived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on
dec 18, 1992
4) Respondent sought dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and settlement
of felicisimo's estatefiled petition for letters
of administration before the RTC of Makati
5) Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
felicisimo that the decedent's surviving heirs
are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage and son by
second marriageprayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her
6) Feb 4, 1994: petitioner Rodolfo San Luis
child of felicisimo in the first marriage filed
motion to dismissgrounds: improper venue
to state a cause of actionshould have
been filed in the province of laguna because
this was the place f residence of felicisimo
prior to his death; claimed further that
respondent has no legal personality to file
petition since she was only a mistress of
felicisimo since the latter during the time of
his death was still legally married to Merry
Lee
7) Feb 15, 1994: Linda invoked the same
grounds
8) Feb 28, 1994: RTC issued an order denying
the motions
9) Unaware of the denial of motions to dismiss:
respondent filed (Mar 5, 1994) opposition
submitted documentary evidence that
felicisimo regularly went home to their house
in New ALabang, villahe, Alabang MM;
presented absolute divorce decree issued by
court n Hawaii to prove that second marriage
was dissolvedclaims felicisimo has legal
capacity to marry her
10) Petitioners asserted that par 2 art 26 of FC
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent's bigamous marriage with
felicisimo since this would impair vested
rights in derogation of Art 256 of the FC
11) Oct 24, 1994: motion for reconsideration was
dismissedrespondent, as widow of
decedent possessed the legal standing to file
the petition and that the venue was properly
laid
TC: dismissed the petition for letters of administration;
1) Felicisimo was duly elected gov of laguna
petition must have been filed in sta cruz
laguna
2) Because marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous thus void ab initio (divorce
obtained by merry lee not valid in the Phils)
3) Art 26 par 2 cannot be retroactively applied
for it would impair the vested rights of
felicisimo's legitimate children
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE orders of the trial
court
! Said that term residence refers to actual
residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or
domicilesince he actually resided in
Alabang Muntinlupa even though he is
discharging his functions in lagunathus the
petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati
! Held that felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of Art 26 par 2 of
the FC (Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr) and Pilapil
vs. Ibay-Somera)
! Found that marriage between Merry Lee and
felicisimo was validly dissolved by virtue of
decree of absolute divorce (not a bigamous
marriagecourts cannot deny what the law
grants)
ISSUES:
1) Whether venue was properly laid
2) Whether respondent has the legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of
administration

DECISION OF SC: Petition lacks Merit.; Petition is
DENIED. The decision of CA reinstating and affirming
the RTC which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss
and its order which dismissed petitioner's motion for
reconsideration is AFFIMRED.
Case REMANDED to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
felicisimo
! Found that respondent's legal capacity to file
subject petition for letter of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Art 144 of the CC or Art 148 of the FC

REASONS:
1) Section1 Rule 73 of rules of courtpetition
for letters of administration should be filed in
the RTC of the province in which he resides
at the time of his deathrule for determining
residence (Garcia Fule vs CA)
contradistinguised from domicile
2) Residence or residespopular sense,
meaning, the personal actual or physical
habitation of a person, signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay
thereatmeans simply residence, personal
residence not legal residence or domicile
no particular length of time required,
however, residence must be more than
temporary
3) Incorrect for petitioners to argue that
residence is the same as domicile for
purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of felicisimothis is
often used in election laws
4) Since respondent proved that deceased also
maintained a residence in Alabang
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
deathsubject petition was validly filed
before the RTC of Makati
5) LEGAL PERSONALITY: issue: whether the
fil was divorced by his alien spouse abroad
and may validly remarry under the CC
marriage solemnized before the FC took
effectno need to retroactively apply art 26
but use the sufficient jurisprudential basis
affirmativePilapil vs. Ibay-Somera; Quita
vs CA, Van Dorn vs. ROmillo JR.
6) Historical background and legislative intent
behind art 26 par 2
7) Van dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving
a situation where a divorce is valdly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of Art 26 par 2 of the FC thereof
our lawmakers codified the already
established through judicial precedent---
8) the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if
the ends of justice are to be served
9) The law should never be interpreted in such
a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of the intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature is to
RENDER JUSTICE
10) Proof of authenticity and due execution of
documents must be presented --- public
document requirements: a) an official
publication; b) copy attested thereof by the
officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Phils copy
must be: a) accompanied by certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Phil foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is
kept and b) authenticated by the seal of his
office
11) Present; validity of divorce
12) Even if felicisimo is not capacitated to
remarry, respondent still has legal capacity
she may be considered the co-owner of
felicisimo as regards properties that were
acquired through their joint efforts during
their cohabitation

NOTE: IF she proves validity of divorce and capacity
to remarry bu felicisimo but fails to prove that their
marriage was validly performed according to law of
the USconsidered co-owner in Art 144 of the CC-
parties living together without benefit of marriage or
void from the beginningco-ownership
If fails to prove the validity of both divorce and
marriageapplicable art would be Art 148 of FC
regulating property relations of couples living together
as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
remarryregime of limited co-ownership

AMOR-CATALAN vs. CA
G.R. No. 167109 (February 6,2007)

Bayot vs CA
G.R. No. 155635 (Nov. 27, 2008)

FC4,FC16,
NCC84,
RPC351-352
R.A. 6955, "An Act to DecIare UnIawfuI the Practice of Matching FiIipino Women for Marriage to Foreign
NationaIs"
R.A. 9208, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
SEPARATION OF THE SPOUSES

Benedicto v. De la Rama 3 Phil 34

FC 23 8-248
NCC 221 (1)

Albano v. Gapusan
71 SCRA 26.

Facts:
! Albano a municipal judge prepared and
notarized a document providing for personal
separation of Valentina Andres and
Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial
liquidation of their conjugal partnership
! if either spouse should commit
adultery or concubinage, as the
case may be, then the other should
refrain from filing an action against
the other.
! Did this since they were separated
for a long time and to forestall
violent incidents between husband
and wife
ISSUE: WON Judge Albano can notarize a personal
separation?
HELD: NO
! law considers as void "any contract for
personal separation between husband and
wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement,
during the marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership
! A notary should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal
partnership
FC 26, Par 2 = Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law

In re: Atty. Rufillo Bucana
72 SCRA 14

! Facts:
! November 10, 1975 notarized an
Agreement executed by the spouses
Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon
wherein the they agreed that "in case
anyone of them will remarry both parties
offer no objection and waive all civil and
criminal actions against them
! Allow them to have concubine,
extra-marital affairs
! Defense: said to have been prepared by his
clerk and he only signed it out of negligence
ISSUE: WON he committed grave act of misconduct
in notarizing agreement
HELD: YES, guilty of malpractice
it is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to
which he intends to certify and to take part in no
illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a
person who has been admitted to the practice of law,
and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary
and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are
led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an
act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral
character may be held to account by the court even to
the extent of disbarment."

FC 26 paragraph 2

Tenchavez v. Escao, supra

Van Dorn v. Romillo (supra)

Somera v, Pilapil, (supra)

Muslim Code 45-5 5

NCC97
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC. March 4, 2003
FC 55(8)
RPC 333 & 334
RPC 247

Goitia v. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252

Facts:
! Jan 7, 1915 parties were legally married
but after a month woman left because of
gross acts by her husband
! Marriage a contract in so far as civil effects
are concerned requiring consent of parties
! After marriage ceremony, a
conjugal partnership is formed
between the 2
! Reciprocal rights arise and legal
existence becomes one
! Termination of it should result in
some relief
SSUE: WON art 149 is absolute and therefore can't
grant wife any support since she was the one who left
home
! Person obliged to give support can either
pay the pension fixed or receive and
maintain in his home the person.
HELD: NO
! Separation is different from support given to
wife as agreed upon in the contract they
entered into when they got married when
husband promised to support wife.
! Wife is still part of conjugal domicile even if
she doesn't live in house anymore
RESULT: should pay support

Gandionco v. Peflaranda
155 SCRA 725

Facts:
! 29 May 1986 - respondent, the legal wife of
the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental complaint against
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground
of concubinage, with a petition for support
and payment of damages
! 13 October 1986 respondent also filed in
Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City a
complaint against petitioner for concubinage,
! 14 November 1986 respondent filed for
support of pendent lite which was granted on
10 December 1986
! Petitioner contends that civil action for legal
separation and its consequences should be
suspended in light of criminal charge of
concubinage under Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure
! After a criminal action has been
commenced the pending civil action
arising from the same offense shall
be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered
ISSUE: WON other actions should be suspended due
to criminal action of concubinage
HELD: NO
! On Separation: civil action for legal
separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because
said civil action is not one "to enforce the
civil liability arising from the offense
! governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule
111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure
! refers to civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the
offense charged. Whereas, the old
Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred
to "Civil action arising from the
offense."
! action for legal separation is not to
recover civil liability, but is aimed at
the conjugal rights of the spouses
and their relations to each other
! decree of legal separation on
ground of concubinage may be
issued without criminal conviction of
concubinage thus no need to wait
! On support
! can be availed of in an action for
legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge
RESULT: petition is dismissed

Ong vs Ong
505 SCRA 76

Facts:
! February 25, 1976 petitioner Imelda Ong
executed in favor of private respondent
Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor, a Quitclaim
Deed transferring ! parcel of land to Sandra
! On November 19, 1980 petitioner then
revoked such quitclaim and donated it to son
Rex Ong Jimenez on Jan 20, 1982
! June 20, 1983 - Sandra Maruzzo, through
her guardian ownership/possession and
nullification of the Deed of Donation
! Petitioners claim that quitclaim is
null and void since she was of no
legal capacity to accept such
donation
! RTC/ CA - held that the Quitclaim Deed is
equivalent to a Deed of Sale and thus
Sandra had a right to it
! March 15, 1985 reached age of majority
and replaced guardian as respondent
ISSUE: WON Sandra has a right to the land through
quitclaim
HELD: YES
! presumption is that there is a sufficient
cause of the contract thus need to prove
otherwise
! Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that
the requirement of the acceptance of the
donation in favor of minor by parents of legal
representatives applies only to onerous and
conditional donations where the donation
may have to assume certain charges or
burdens
! In this case no such burden was
assumed by then minor thus
quitclaim is recognized even
without a guardian
RESULT: CA ruling is affirmed

FCC 55 compare with FC 46(4)
FC 5 5(9), compare with NCC 97(2)
FC 101 par. 3, compare with separation in fact
FC 55, compare with NCC 99
FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99

Lapuz v. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177

August 18, 1953: Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for
legal separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio,
alleging:
September 21, 1934: Civil Marriage
September 30, 1934: Canon Marriage
Lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned
Lapuz
No children
Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok
on or about March 1949
Prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership of profits
Eufemio's answer:
Declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with
Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law
and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok
During pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular
accident (May 31, 1969)
June 9, 1969: Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for
legal separation on 2 grounds:
that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond
the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of
the Civil Code;
and that the death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation.
June 26, 1969: Counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute
the deceased by her father, Macario
July 29, 1969: Court dismissed the case # Carmen
Lapuz's cause of action has not survived
Did not act on the motion for substitution
Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said
counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the
order that dismissed not only the petition for legal
separation but also his counterclaim to declare
the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and
void ab initio.

ISSUE:
WON death of the plaintiff before final decree, in
an action for legal separation, abate the action? If
it does,
WON abatement also applies if the action
involves property rights?
HELD:
(1) YES,
! action for legal separation is purely personal (1)
made by innocent spouse (2) can still stop
proceedings if they reconcile
! the death of one party to the action causes the
death of the action itself
(2) YES
! solely the effect of the decree of legal separation;
hence, they can not survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree
! Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and
disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil
Code article, are vested exclusively in the
persons of the spouses thus cannot be
transferred to anyone after their death
! rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation.
! enumeration of the actions that survive for or
against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of
the Revised Rules of Court do not enumerate
actions for legal separation or for annulment of
marriage
! even actions of bigamy, when one has died all
actions cease.
! the action for annulment should be brought
during the lifetime of any one of the parties
involved
questions of property are now carried out not in
nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate
proceedings.

Matubis v. Praxedes
109 Phil 789

Facts: Socorro MatubisZoilo Praxedes (1/10/43).
But from 5/30/44 they lived separately from each
other. They had an agreement on4/3/48 where:
! They relinquish their rights over each other
as h & w
! That they cannot prosecute each other for
concubinage or adultery (condonation)
! That each is no longer entitled to support
from the other spouse
! Neither can claim anything from each other
On Jan 1955, Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion
Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and recorded
as Zoilo's. they also publicly appeared as h&w.
Socorro then filed on 4/24/56 @CFI CamSur for
legsep and change of surname against husband due
to abandonment and concubinage.
TC declared that Zoilo's acts constitutes
concubinage but dismissed complaint due to:
! CC 102 said action for legsep can only be
filed a year after such grounds have arisen.
Socorro said to have known cohab of Zoilo
since Jan 1955 but action was filed on
4/24/56 which was outside reglementary
period
! CC 100 legsep can be invoked by innocent
spouse, i.e. that there was no condonation.
But agreement b/w Zoilo and Socorro
showed that there was condonation (Exhibit
B of their agreement)
Therefore this petition.
ISSUE: WON TC erred in saying that petitioner filed
her case for legal separation out of time and cannot
claim it since she is not an innocent spouse
HELD: YES
! knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but
only made the complaint on April 24, 1956
! Art 102 of NCC provides for time
one can file for legal separation
! As shown in the agreement she condoned
and consented to (1) living separately (2)
can commit grounds for legal separation ie
concubinage
Condonation and consent are expressed thus cannot
claim to be innocent spouse which law provides for
(NCC 100)

FC 58-60;

Sec 19, RA 9262
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC. March 4, 2003

Araneta vs Concepcion
99 Phil 709

FACTS:
1) Petitioner filed action against his wife for
legal sep ground: adultery
2) Defendant filed an omnibus petition to
secure custody of their three minor children,
a monthly support of P5000 for herself and
said children and the return of her passport
to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings
from harassing and molesting her as well as
pay for attorney's fees
3) Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him
and alleging that defendant has abandoned
the childrenconjugal properties were worth
only P80,000
! contends defendant is not entitled to the
custody of the children as she has
abandoned them and had committed
adultery, that by her conduct she had
become unfit to educate her children,
being unstable in her emotions and
unable to give the children to love,
respect and care of a true mother and
w/o means to educate them

CFI: granted custody of the children to
defendant and a monthly allowance of
P2300 for support for her and the children,
P300 for a house and P2000 as attorney's
fees; reconsideration denied

DECISION OF SC; Writ prayed for is
ISSUED and the respondent judge or
whosoever takes his place is ordered to
proceed on the question of custody and
support pendent elite in accordance with this
opinion. The ocurt's order fixing the alimony
and requiring payment is REVERSED

RATIO:
1) main reason given by judge for refusing
plaintiff's request that evidence be
allowed to be introduced: art 103 of
CC6 months allowancecooling off
period
2) provision of code is mandatorycourt
understands that the introduction of any
evidence, be it on the merits of the case
or on any incident, is prohibitedstatus
quo to be preserved for this time
3) it may be noted that since 6 mos have
elapsed since the filing of the petition
may not be allowedreasons for
granting the preliminary injunction
should be given tat the scope of the art
cited may be explained
4) cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation
5) but this practical expedient, necessary
to carry out legislative policy does not
have the effect of overriding other
provisions such as the determination of
the custody of children and alimony and
support pendent elite according to the
circumstances
6) the law expressly enjoins that these
should be determined by the court
according to the circumstances, if these
are ignored or the courts close their
eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may
be casued
7) allegations of adultery letter of
authenticity as evidenceabandonment
of conjugal abodeevidence of all
these disputed allegations should be
allowed that the discretion of the court
as to the custody and alimony pendent
elite may be lawfully exercised
8) the rule is that all the provisions of the
law even if apparenty contradictory,
should be allowed to stand and given
effect by reconciling them if necessary
9) thus determination of custody and
alimony should be given effect and force
provided it does not go to the extent of
violating the policy of the cooling off
period
evidence not affecting the casue of the separation,
like the actual custody of children, the means
conducive to their welfare and convenience during the
pendency of the case, these should be allowed that
the court may determine which is best for their
custody

Ocampo v Florenciano
107 Phil 35

! 1938 - marriage
! 1951 - plaintiff discovered on several
occasions that his wife maintaining illicit
relations with Jose Arcalas
! June 1951 - sent her to Manila study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year;
! 1952 - defendant had finished studying her
course, she left plaintiff and since then they
had lived separately
! June 18, 1955 - wife in the act of having
illicit relations with another man by the name
of Nelson Orzame; signified his intention of
filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity
provided she is not charged with adultery in
a criminal action
! July 5, 1955 - the complaint for legal
separation was filed
ISSUE: WON husband can file for legal separation
based on adultery when (1) wife confessed to the
adultery (2) did not actively search for wife when she
left conjugal home
HELD: YES on both instances
! 1. what is prohibited is using ONLY the
confession as grounds for legal separation
since this may be evidence of collusion
between the two. However in this case, there
is strong evidence other than the confession
to prove the adultery of the wife
! def of collusion: the agreement
between husband and wife for one
of them to commit, or to appear to
commit, or to be represented in
court as having committed, a
matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the
purpose of enabling the other to
obtain a divorce. This agreement, if
not express, may be implied from
the acts of the parties. It is a ground
for denying the divorce
! merely prohibits a decree of
separation upon a confession of
judgment. Confession of judgment
usually happens when the
defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to
judgment or files a pleading
expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
demand
! 2. not his duty to search for her to bring her
home. Hers was the obligation to return.
! Wife was the one who left the
husband.
! Agreed with CA - his action was not filed
within one year from March 1951 when
plaintiff discovered her infidelity.
But still pushed through with proceedings and
reversed CA's decision

Lapuz vs Eufemio (supra)

Samosa vs Vamenta Jr.
46 SCRA 110

on 6/18/71 petitioner Lucy Samosa filed for legsep for
concubinage and attempt against her life. She also
sought for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for
the return to her of what she claimed to be her
paraphernal and exclusive property (under admin and
management of priv resp). Clemente Ramos (priv
resp) opposed such saying that hearing the pet for
injunction would only make the prospect of
reconciliation dim.
CFI Judge Vamenta Jr granted such motion to
suspend hearing on the injunction. And thus this
certiorari
ISSUE: WON preliminary mandatory injunction
applied for as an ancillary remedy on exclusive
property of wife that is currently being administered by
her husband can be tried in court even before the 6-
month period allotted in cases of legal separation
HELD: YES
! Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute
bar to the hearing motion for preliminary
injunction prior to the expiration of the six-
month period.
! Art 103 provides that in cases where court
deems proper, it can appoint another to
manage property between husband and
wife.
! In this case her paraphernal
property
! Would show that it is not an
aggravating circumstacnce to the
prescribed 6-month period deemed
as the cooling off period
In any case, more than 6 months have already
passed thus court can hear both legal separtion and
mandatory injunction.

Pacete v. Cariaga
231 SCRA 321

Priv Resp Concepcion AlanisPetitioner Enrico
Pacete on 4/30/38 which produced a daughter
(Consuelo). Pacete contracted 2nd marriage in
1948 with Clarita de la Concepcion. She learned
of such marriage only in 8/1/79. She averred that
during their union, Pacete acquired vast
properties (lands, fishponds, several motor
vehicles), that he fraudulently placed several
properties under his name or Clarita's or children
with Clarita's, and other dummies.
On 10/29/79 Alanis filed @ CFI Cotabato for
the dec of nullity of the marriage b/w Enrico and
Clarita dela Concepcion as well s for their legal
separation, accounting and separation of their
properties.
PAcete filed beyond the original period
given. Plaintiff filed for motion to declare PAchete
in default which the court granted.
On 3/17/80 CFI Cotabato I decreed legsep of
enrico and concepcion alanis and held marriage
between clarita and enrico as null and void.

ISSUE: WON petition for certiorari can rightfully
be claimed by petitioner who missed the deadline
for submission of answer.
HELD: YES
! As stated in Art 101, at the non-appearance
of defendant the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or
not a collusion between the parties exists. If
there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff
is not fabricated.
! In this case there was no state
intervention thus petition for
certiorari is granted and
proceedings before it are set aside
! Need for state intervention and
compliance with other statutory
requirements when legal separation
is filed for even when other
remedies such as of land are
attached to it.
petition for certiorari is allowed when the default order
is improperly declared, or even when it is properly
declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended
such declaration

FC58
FC 61 par. 1
FC 61 par. 2

De Ia Via v. Villareal
41 Phil 13

Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance: divorce; partition of the conjugal
property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of
P400/month
1) adultery; husband ejected her from
conjugal home and thus she established her
residence in Iloilo, that she had no means of support
and was only living at the expense of one of her
daughters
2) preliminary injunction restraining her and
prohibiting her husband from conjugal property since
defendant was trying to alienate or encumber said
property

CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent
appealed claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction
since wife should follow his domicile and that the
judge has exceeded his power in granting the
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
1. WON a married woman ever acquire a
residence or domicile separate from that of
her husband during the existence of the
marriage
2. WON the wife may obtain a preliminary
injunction against the husband restraining
and prohibiting him from alienating or
encumbering any part of the conjugal
property during the pendency of the action
HELD:
! 1. YES, when the husband has given
enough reason for her to do so as example,
cause of divorce.
! The law will recognize a wife as having a
separate existence, and separate interests,
and separate rights, in those cases where
the express object of all proceedings is to
show that the relation itself ought to be
dissolved
! The law making the domicile of the husband
that of the wife is applicable only to their
relations with third parties, and has no
application in cases of actual separation and
controversy between themselves as to the
temporary or permanent severance of the
marriage ties by judicial proceedings
2. YES, in protection of her share in the property
! Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:
! A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established, in the manner
hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of
the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded
and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of either for a limited period or
perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is
about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights,
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
- is a logical and necessary incident
of the general powers conferred
upon Courts of First Instance
! law making the husband the sole
administrator of the property of the conjugal
partnership is founded upon necessity and
convenience as well as upon the
presumption that, from the very nature of the
relating between husband and wife, the
former will promote and not injure the
interests of the latter. when that relation
ceases and, in a proper action, the wife
seeks to dissolve the marriage and to
partition the conjugal property, it is just and
proper, in order to protect the interests of the
wife, that the husband's power of
administration be curtailed, during the
pendency of the action, insofar as alienating
or encumbering the conjugal property is
concerned.
! , if the defendant should dispose of all or any
part of the conjugal property during the
pendency of the action for divorce, and
squander or fraudulently conceal the
proceeds, that act "would probably work
injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would
probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's
rights, respecting the subject of the action,
and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual
RESULT: judge acted within his jurisdiction

Sabalones v. CA
230 SCRA 79

! Samson- Remedios married
! Samson Sabalones- member of diplomatic
service left to his wife remedios Sabalones
the administration of some of their conjugal
properties for 15 years
! Oct 5, 1981 Samson-Thelma
! !985 retired as ambassador but didn't go
back to wife and kids
! 1989 filed action for judicial authorization
to sell conjugal property claiming that he is
very sick and living alone without income
! Prayer of Remedios asked to grant legal
separation and liquidation of property
! Appealed in Ca, she prayed for preliminary
injunction which was granted

WON CA can issue a writ of preliminary injunction
against husband on part of his conjugal property
HELD: YES
! Purpose of prelim injunction: preserve the
status quo of the things subject of the action
or the relations between the parties and thus
protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting
these matters during the pendency of the
suit.
! Requirements: (1) existence of a right (2)
actual or threatened violation.
! Art 61 of FC which provides for an
administrator of conjugal assets was already
made when TC denied petitioner any share
on conjugal relations and CA gave
respondent the preliminary injunction
! Allegations: harassing tenant of Forbes park,
having other properties, issuing quit claim on
US conjugal party and all of which was not
contested by petitioner thus just gives more
reason to grant preliminary injunction
RESULT: prelim injunction is granted however this
does not permanently make the respondent the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.

FC 62 cf. FC 49, FC 198

Yangco v. Rhode
1 Phil 404

can't ask for support without necessary evidence
-Complaint filed by Victorina Obin against petitioner
praying she be declared lawful wife of said Yango,
sheb e granted divorce, and allowance of alimony and
attorney's fees
-Luis contested declaration of marriage since there
was not witness to it.
-granted alimony even if there was still doubt as
expressed by judge.

ISSUE: WON judge had jurisdiction to grant
alimony/support to Victorina Obin
HELD: NO
! Need to show documents or circumstances
of relationship that allows one to ask for
support. In this case, evidence should be the
canonical cerificate
! This case, only claimed to be the wife and
judge who issued the support said he issued
it with doubt.
! DISSENT: Should give support to wife, unfair
to her
! Court of First Instance had the
jurisdiction to hear and determine
the issues upon which the right to
alimony depended, and whether the
remedy by an appeal from an
erroneous exercise of this
jurisdiction is a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy that had been
provided, and if cases occur in
which it does not afford adequate
relief it is the default of the
legislative power and it rests with it
to provide additional remedies.
. Article 68 of the Civil Code provides that after a
petition for a nullity of marriage or for a divorce has
been interposed and admitted certain provisions shall
be adopted during the pendency of the suit, among
which is a provision for the support of the wife and
such children as do not remain under the power of the
husband.

De la Via v. Villareal, supra

Araneta v. Concepcion (supra)

Samosa v. Vamenta (supra)

Lerma v. CA
61 SCRA 440

- May 1951 Lerma (P) and Diaz (R )get married
- Aug 1969 P files a complaint for adultery vs. R
and her lover Teodoro Ramirez
- Nov 1969 R files for legal separation and / or
separation of properties, custody of children and
support pendente lite (during pendency of action) for
youngest son, Gregory on the grounds of
concubinage and attempt against her life
! CFI (1970) R is entitled to support pendente lite
from the date of R's filing the complaint, the amount
would be a monthly support of Php 1, 820
- P raised the petition to the CA
! CA (1971) - initially issuing a preliminary injunction
on the decision of the lower court to give the
respondent the opportunity to present evidence to the
lower court, the CA dismissed the petition after the
respondent asked for a reconsideration saying that he
were not asking for a chance to present evidence to
the lower court
! CFI (1972) R and Ramirez are convicted of
adultery, this decision was appealed to the CA
- P files a new case of adultery against R and new
lover, Manila policeman Jose Gochangco
- P raises the petition against the giving support
pendent elite to the SC, claiming, among others, that
R did not ask for the enforcement of the CFI orders
until he filed a second adultery charge against R
ISSUE: WON respondent can still claim for support
even though she has already been convicted of
adultery
HELD: NO
! Adultery is recognized as a defense for
support
! CC Article 303 - obligation to give
support shall cease "when the
recipient, be he a forced heir or not,
has committed some act which
gives rise to disinheritance
! CC 921 - one of the causes for
disinheriting a spouse is "when the
spouse has given cause for legal
separation
! If allowed one would only need to file a case
of legal separation no matter how groundless
in order to get support
Mere filing would not set Art 292 of FC to action. Still
preclude loss of such right in certain cases.

Pacete v. Cariaga supra

FC 56(2); NCC 100

Matubis v. Praxedes, supra

People v. Sansano
50 Phil 73

People v. Schneckenberger
73 Phil 413

FACTS:
1) May 15, 1926: accused Rodolfo married the
complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena
2) After 7 years, agreed for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character to live separately
from each other
3) May 25, 1935: they executed document
agreement
4) June 15, 1935: accused w/o leaving the phils
secured a divorce decree from civil court of
Juarez, bravos dist of Chihuahua mexico
5) May 11, 1936: he contracted another
marriage with co-accused Julia medel in the
justice of peace court of malabon, rizal and
lived together as husband and wife in
manila
6) Because of the nullity of the divorce decree,
complainant herein instituted two actions
against the accused one for bigamy and
another for concubinage
CFI: first culminated in the conviction of
accusedsentenced to a penalty of two months
and one day of arresto mayor

7) on the trial for concubinage, accused
interposed the plea of double jeopardy and
the case was dismissed

CA: the Court held that the dismissal before trial to be
premature and without deciding the question of
double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court
for trial on the merits

TC: accused was convicted of concubinage through
reckless imprudence and sentenced to penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor
-this appeal

DECISION OF SC; Judgment is reversed and the
accused is ACQUITTED

RATIO:
1) plea of double jeopardy, it need only be
observed that the defense of bigamy for
which he was convicted and that of
concubinage for which he stood trial in the
court are two distinct offenses in the law
2) BIGAMY: celebration of second marriage
while the first is still existingoffense
against civil status which may be prosecuted
at the instance of the state
3) CONCUBINAGE: mere cohabitation by the
husband with a woman who is not his wife;
offense against chastity and may be
prosecuted only at the instance of the
offended party
4) DOUBLE JEOPARDY: test is not whether
the defendant has already been tried for the
same act, but whether he has been put in
jeopardy for the same offense
5) the accused should have been acquitted of
the crime of concubinage
6) the document executed by and between the
accused and the complainant in which they
agreed , while illegal for the purpose for
which it was executed , constitutes
nevertheless, a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of sec 344
of the RPC
7) there can be no doubt that by such
agreement, each party clearly intended to
forego the illicit acts of the other
8) consent bars the offended party from
instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of
adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousnessgiven
expressly or impliedly after the crime has
been committed
9) PARDON: refers to the offense after its
commission
10) CONSENT: refer to offense prior to its
commission
11) Both means that offended party has chosen
to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she
becomes unworthy to come to court and
invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong
12) Prior consent is as effective as subsequent
consent to bar the offended aprty from
prosecuting the offense
If these is morally condemnatory in a situation of this
character, the remedy lies not with the court but with
the legislative dept of the govtwhat the law is, not
what it should be, defines the limits of the court's
authority

FC 56(1)

Ginez v. Bugayong
100 Phil 616

FACTS:
August 27, 1949: Bugayong married Ginez
Bugayong # serviceman in the US Navy
Bugayong began receiving letters from his
sister-in-law informing him of alleged
acts of infidelity of his wife
October 1951: Bugayong sought the advice
of Navy chaplain as to the propriety of a
legal separation
August 1952: Bugayong went to Pangasinan
and sought for his wife
Bugayong and Geniz proceeded to the
house of Pedro Bugayong (cousin) and
stayed and lived together for 2 nights
and 1 day as husband and wife.
They repaired Bugayong's house and again
passed the night therein as husband
and wife.
2
nd
day: Bugayong tried to verify from his
wife the truth of the information he
received that she had committed
adultery. Instead of answering, Geniz
packed up and left, which Bugayong
took as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity imputed on her
November 18, 1952: Bugayong filed a
complaint for legal separation against
Geniz
Geniz vehemently denied the averments of
the complaint
Motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) Assuming arguendo the truth of
the allegations of the
commission of "acts of rank
infidelity amounting to
adultery", the cause of action, if
any, is barred by the statute of
limitations;
(2) That under the same
assumption, the act charged
have been condoned by the
plaintiff-husband; and
(3) That the complaint failed to state
a cause of action sufficient for
this court to render a valid
judgment.
Court ordered the dismissal of the case on
the 2
nd
ground (condonation)
Assignment of errors brought to CA:
Premature dismissal of case; In
finding that there were
condonation on Bugayong's
part; and in entertaining
condonation as a ground for
dismissal inasmuch as same
was not raised in the answer or
in a motion to dismiss.
Case lifted to SC # Question of law

ISSUE: WON Act of sleeping with wife for two days
was already a sign of condonation to the infidelity she
allegedly committed
HELD: YES
! definition: conditional forgiveness or
remission, by a husband or wife of a
matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed; forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation
! may be express or implied
! US jurisprudence shows that one
single act of sexual intercourse
implies condonation
! condonation is implied
from sexual intercourse
after knowledge of the
other infidelity. such acts
necessary implied
forgiveness. It is entirely
consonant with reason and
justice that if the wife
freely consents to sexual
intercourse after she has
full knowledge of the
husband's guilt, her
consent should operate as
a pardon of his wrong."
! In this case slept with her for 2 nights and 1
day after almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of infidelity amounting to
adultery.
Thus falls under exemptions in Article 100 of NCC:
The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage

Arroyo v. CA
203 SCRA 753

Facts:
! Nov 2, 1982 Dr Jorge Neri filed criminal
complaint for adultery against wife Ruby Neri
with Eduardo Arroyo
! Witnessed by Jabunan in Baguio
! Motions of reconsideration by accused party
were denied
! Aug 26 1991 Dr Neri prayed case to be
dismissed since he consented to his wife's
infidelity
! Petitioners thus filed motions for
dismissal or grant new trial

ISSUE: WON pardon made by spouse after court
ruled that one is guilty of adultery can enable for a
new trial to commence
1. Whether or not Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance is
sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his credibility;
2. Whether or not Mrs. Neri's constitutional right
against self-incrimination had been violated;
3. Whether or not Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair
precludes him from filing the criminal complaint on the
ground of pari delicto; and
4. Whether or not Dr. Neri's manifestation is sufficient
basis for the granting of a new trial.

HELD: NO
! On self-incrimination
! disregarded when her admission to
her husband in the privacy of their
conjugal home that she had indeed
lain with petitioner Arroyo
! constitutionality of admitting it as
evidence
! The right to counsel
attaches upon the start of
an investigation, i.e., when
the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to
elicit information and/or
confession or admissions
from respondent-accused.
! Does not attach
(1) when not an
investigating
officer as Dr. Neri
is not (2) when it
was spontaneous
confession (3)
! Also, husband is
not precluded
under the Rules
of Court from
testifying against
his wife in
criminal cases for
a crime
committed by one
against the other
! no evidence that they entered into
agreement allowing adultery
! Not all recantations are given new trials
! question whether a new trial shall
be granted on this ground depends
on all the circumstances of the
case, including the testimony of the
witnesses submitted on the motion
for the new trial. Moreover,
recanting testimony is exceedingly
unreliable, and it is the duty of the
court to deny a new trial where it is
not satisfied that such testimony is
true.
! Already had other opportunities to
recant evidence (1) compromise
agreement (2) affidavit
! documents merely stated
that Dr. Neri had pardoned
petitioners 18 and the
complaint was filed out of
"pure misunderstanding"
19 without hinting that Dr.
Neri knew of the
adulterous relations
! attempt to cure
deficiency of two
previous
documents
! PARDON HAS TO BE GIVEN BEFORE
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT HAS BEEN FILED.
once the complaint has been filed, the
control of the case passes to the public
prosecutor.
! In this case given after the trial
court had already rendered its
decision dated 17 December 1987
finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
In protection of family and marriage as inviolable
institution.

FC56(4)
FC6O
FC 5 6(3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 221(3)

Brown v. Yambao
102 Phil 168

FACTS:
July 14, 1955: Brown filed suit for legal
separation from Yambao
Alleged under oath:
While he interned by the Japanese
invaders from 1942 5o 1945 at
UST interment camp, Yambao
engaged in adulterous relations
with one Carlos Field of whom
she begot a baby girl
that Brown learned of his wife's
misconduct only in 1945, upon
his release from internment
that thereafter the spouse lived
separately and later executed a
document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and
assigning certain properties to
the erring wife as her share.
Complaint prayed for confirmation of the
liquidation agreement; for custody of the
children; that the defendant be declared
disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and
for their remedy as might be just and
equitable.
Court directed City Fiscal or his
representatives to investigate (CC101)
Through the City Fiscal's questioning, it was
revealed that after liberation, Brown
lived maritally with another woman and
had begotten children by her
Court denied petition for legal separation
on the ground
that while the wife's adultery was
established, Brown had
incurred in a misconduct of
similar nature that barred his
right of action under CC100
(.Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation
cannot be claimed by either of
them)
that there had been consent and
connivance
Brown's action had prescribed
under CC 102 (An action for
legal separation cannot be filed
within one year from and after
the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause
and within 5 years from and
after date when such cause
occurred.

ISSUE: WON findings of City Fiscal Rafael Jose that
Brown lived with another woman after war and had
children with her can stop him from legal separation
proceedings
HELD: YES
Define collusion: the act of married persons in
procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by
preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial
offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to
defend divorce proceedings"
! legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any
circumstances that could give rise to the
inference that the wife's default was
calculated (emphasis of marriage as more
than mere contract)
! NCC Art 100 now bars him from
filing legal separation since he is
also guilty of concubinage
! NCC Article 102 also bars him
since he filed out of time.
! Brown did not petition for
legal separation
proceedings until ten years
after he learned of his
wife's adultery, which was
upon his release from
internment in 1945
can not be filed except within one (1) year from and
after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and
within five years from and after the date when such
cause occurred

Ocampo v. Florenciano (supra)

FC63
fC 63(3); FC 213
NCC 106(3)
P.D. 603 (CYWC) Art. 17 par. 3

Matute v. Macadaeg
99 Phil 340

Facts:
! Armado Medel filed legal separation form
Rosario Matute after finding out her
relationship with his brother, Ernesto Medel.
Custody of children was granted to him
! When he left for US, he left children to care
of sister. Rosario also lived there too.
! March 1955 children moved to Cebu to live
with Father
! April 1955 Rosario asked for permission to
bring children to Manila to attend her father's
funeral. Armado said okay as long as they
come back after two weeks
! Rosario filed for custody of children and
support for them.
! Court of First Instance denied her
request and ordered her to give
back children
! Asked for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction to to
cease and desist from enforcing in
any way the order of the
respondent Court dated June 19,
1965, and after hearing, to annul
the said Order and to award the
custody of the children to your
petitioner.
ISSUE: WON she can be granted custody of children
HELD: NO
! Reasons given: 1) she is their legitimate
mother and they wish to stay with her, not
their father Armando Medel; (2) three (3) of
the children are over ten (10) years of age,
and, hence, their aforementioned wish must,
pursuant to Rule 100, section 6, of the Rules
of Court, be heeded, unless "the parent so
chosen be unfit to take charge" of them "by
reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity or poverty"; (3) the
act of infidelity of which she had been found
guilty in the decision of November 6, 1952,
does not involve "moral depravity"; (4) in any
event, it is a thing of the past, not a present
reality; (5) respondent Armando Medel is
now unfit to have the children under his care,
for he is living maritally with a woman by the
name of Paz Jesusa Concepcion; and (6)
although he had married the latter, after
securing in the United States a decree of
divorce dissolving his marriage with
petitioner herein, said decree is null and void
and, accordingly, he is guilty of bigamy.
! Custody of children she has now was only
given by Armado thus he is free to ask for
them back. The abuse of discretion given is
not a very grave one and she is poor and as
said living under the charity of her brothers.
! sections 1 and 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, reading:
! "SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions, has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, end adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board, or
officer as the law requires, with costs.
! "SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the
proceedings of any tribunal corporation
board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, are without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant to desist from further proceedings
in the action or matter specified therein, with
costs."
Petition is denied.

Lapuz vs. Eufemio (supra)

Macadangdang vs. CA
108 SCRA 314

Mejias is married to Anahaw
Majias allegedly had intercourse with Macadangdang sometime in March 1967
Due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967
October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a boy (Rolando Macadangdang)
April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against Macadangdang
Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for its dismissal
Court dismissed the complaint
CA reversed the judgment and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth
Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and
Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband,
the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

HELD:
YES
The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the
said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed
spouses. # Art. 255: Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and
Anahaw
Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time
difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such
is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy.
Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child
the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other # same
province
Physical impossibility:
(1) impotence of husband;
inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function
(2) living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and
(3) serious illness of the husband.
NO.
Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy
Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of
her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife
Art. 220

PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

FC 63(2), FC 64
FC 198
NCC 370-372

Laperal v. Republic
116 Phil 672

Facts:
Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are
now legally separated. Elisea wants to resume the
use of her maiden name. Petition was opposed by the
City Attorney on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of
the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. The lower court originally dismissed the
petition but changed its mind and granted it on the
ground that it was merely for a change of name. It
also reasoned that the use of the married name would
give rise to confusion in the woman's finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Issue:
WON a wife can use her maiden name after a decree
of legal separation has been granted.

Held/Ratio:
No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wife's
change of name. Art 372 specifically mandates the
wife to continue using name and surname employed
before the legal separation. Her marriage status is
unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for
a change of name in general) does not prevail over
the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

FC 63(4)
Solo Parents Act
FC 65-67

Lapuz vs. Eufemio (supra

Macadangdang vs. CA (supra)
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

cf.NCC 113-114
FC68
FC 68; FC 72
NCC 92 1(4)
RPC 11(2)
RPC 247

Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng
103 Phil 255

Facts:
! Married on May 1951
! Went to Zamboanga, husband left her with
her parents for a while with her promise that
she would go back to Manila. She didn't
! Sept 30 1953 Atilano filed for support of
200/month against her husband in the
premise that they were living separately
since Oct 1952 due to their bickering
! Husband replied that he preferred
to support her in their own conjugal
home in Manila
! Was awarded 75/month but with the
observation that separation was
due more to in-laws than anything
else and her demand to move to a
different house from them
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to receive support from
her husband when she is the one who left the
conjugal dwelling
HELD: depends on the situation, in this case NO
! ART. 299. The person obliged to give
support may, at his option, fulfill his
obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in his
house the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in this case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto;
! Thus, husband is only obliged to pay for
support if there is moral or legal reason for
him not to provide support in own home.
! In this case, the primary reason for her
leaving are the in-laws and even if this would
be seen as legal basis, the fact that husband
promised that if she came home he would
provide a separate home for them negates
this basis.
RESULT: has option of supporting his wife at
their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the
parents of the husband. Should plaintiff wife
refuse to abide by the terms of this decision, then
the defendant-appellant shall be considered
relieved from the obligation of giving any support
to his wife.
ARROYO v ARROYO must show LEGAL
CRUELTY in order to get support, court can't order
spouse to come back home
Street J.
Facts:
! 1910 Mariano and Dolores married
! July 4, 1920 wife left home to live separate
from husband
! Then moved to ask the court to
grant her relief: (1) a decree of
separation; (2) a liquidation of the
conjugal partnership; (3) and an
allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance.
! Cause: cruelty of husbabd
! Court rules that she live apart form
her husband granting her
400/month
ISSUE: WON husband is entitled to pay wife who left
him for support (2) WON wife can be compelled by
the court to live with her husband
HELD: both NO
(1) Must first show enough reason, LEGAL CRUELTY
for her to leave
! must show BODILY harm with MENTAL
feelings
! shown in this case: wife is very jealous which
caused them to have fights, neither was
unfaithful, cruelty she talked about was
heightened
! Art 142 and 143 of NCC protects wife's
rights for her husband to support her
(2) not within the province of the courts of this country
to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit
with, and render conjugal rights to, the other
Can only give judicial declaration that wife has not
presented sufficient cause for her to leave and it is
her duty to return.

Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, supra

Arroyo v. Vasques-Arroyo
42 Phil 54

Cuaderno v. Cuaderno
12 SCRA 505
! Nov 17, 1956 began living separately
! Due to husband inflicting bodily
injuries $
! Took her to her mother's house
! Aug 14, 1957 Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court ordered husband Angel
Cuaderno to support his wife Lourdes
Cuaderno with 150/month.
! CA: reversed their decision since they may
resume cohabitation which is their duty as
husband and wife
! Acknowledgement of de facto
separation
ISSUE: WON CA can order them to live together as
their duty
HELD: NO
! Cohabitation between them must be due to
spontaneous mutual affection and not a legal
order
! 150/month is reasonable since wife doesn't
have a job and husband is still continuing to
support her
as the separation has been brought about by the
husband and under the circumstances established
during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different
situation between the parties shall take place.

Lacson v. Lacson
24 SCRA 837

Facts:
! feb 14, 1953 (CHEESY!) when they got
married
! Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent)
left home in Bacolod to go to Manila
! March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint
for custody of children as well as support in
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila
! Before it pushed through though
they reached a settlement where
the two eldest kids would go to
petitioner Alfonso and the youngest
would stay with Carmen
! This was affirmed by the CFI
! May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for
the custody of all children be given to her in
JDRC since she said she only entered into
agreement to gain custody of her younger
children and thus should be given custody of
the older ones as well who are all below 7
years old.
! CA: ruled that compromise agreement as
relating to custody of children should be
declared null and void and as such the
execution of said judgment is void too.
ISSUE: WON support should be awarded to the wife
HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time
! NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years
of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure."
! Older children at that time were 5
and 6 so agreement should have
been declared null and void since
no compelling reasons were stated
otherwise
! However the children are now 11
and 10 and thus The 11 year old
may choose which parent they want
to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court, as long as above
ten) already 1968
! Court may also award custody to
who they deem more fit through
evidence.
! Art 356 of the NCC - Every
child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least
elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and
civic training by the parents or
guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an
atmosphere conducive to his
physical, moral and intellectual
development.
! However even if custody should have been
null and void, the rest of the agreement is
valid with respect to the separation of
property of the spouses and the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership since it had
judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation

Ilusorio vs. Bildner
G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000.

Facts:
! March 11, 1999 Erlinda Ilusorio filed for
petition of habeas corpus to have custody of
her husband in consortium (association and
companionship with one's spouse)
! April 5, 1999 CA dismissed it due to lack of
unlawful restraint of one Potenciano Illusorio.
! Oct 11, 1999 filed an appeal in SC
asserting her rights for custody of husband.
This was answered by their children and
husband in a separate case saying that he
never refused to see her
! Sept 20, 2000 set the case in S to
determine physical and medical condition of
Potenciano and if it an issue.
! Jan 31, 2001 court denied Erlinda's motion
that Potenciano be produced before court
and be medically examined
! March 27, 2001 court denied motion of
reconsideration for physical/mental
examination to be conducted.
ISSUE: WON Erlinda can be granted custody of her
husband through consortium
Held: NO
! Illegal restraint had not been proven in CA
Potenciano declared that his children were
not preventing him from seeing anybody,
including his wife.
! Court was also wrong in deciding
to grant wife with visitation rights
since this impugns on the right to
privacy of the husband which is a
constitutional right esp since he is
deemed to be with his full mental
capacity coupled with the right of
choice
! Question of mental capacity has already
been decided by CA who declared that there
wasn't any manifestation for this to be an
issue.
! Quoting Art 12 of 1987 COnsti and Art 68
and 69 of FC which said that spouses are
duty bound to live together and take care of
each other
! Can't apply since they've been
living separately since 1972 which
is evidence of absence of empathy
between
! empathy - shared feeling
between husband and wife
experienced not only by
having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union
is a two-way process.
RESULT: became moot and academic since husband
had passed on June 28, 2001. Motion for
reconsideration is denied.

FC 69 par. 1, compare with NCC 110

Abella v. COMELEC
201 SCRA 335

De la Villa v. Villareal, supra

FC 70-71
FC 73, compare with NCC 117
Art. II Sec. 14 and Art. XIII Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution
cf. NCC 113 compare with ROC Rule 3 Sec. 4
cf. R.A. 7192, "An Act Promoting the Integration of Women as Full & Equal Partners of Men in Development
and Nation BuiIding"
cf. R.A. 8187, "An Act Granting Paternity Leave..."

Yasin v. Shariah Court
241 SCRA (1995)

Facts:
! May 5, 1990 Hatima Yasin, a Muslim,who
was divorced from her husband who married
another asked for her surname to be
changed back to her maiden name
! Court ruled that Rule 103 of Revised rules of
Court, Sec 1 should apply since no person
can change his name or surname without
judicial authority (Art 376 of NCC)
! Must show proper and compelling
reason for change
ISSUE: WON a petition for resumption of maiden
name and surname is also a petition for change of
name.
HELD: NO
! Petitioner doesn't seek to CHANGE her
name but to RESUME use of it
! Divorce is recognized in Muslim law
as one that severs the marriage
bond and where can again contract
another marriage
! Art 370 of NCC woman is only permitted
and not ordered to use husband's surname
after death of husband. Art. 370. A married
woman may use:
! (1) Her maiden first name
and surname and add her
husband's surname, or
! (2) Her maiden first name
and her husband's
surname, or
! (3) Her husband's full
name, but prefixing a word
indicating that she is his
wife, such as "Mrs."
! Art 371 of NCC when one is the innocent
party to an annulment marriage one MAY
still use husband's surname. When guilty,
one SHOULD use her maiden name.
! Thus the use of maiden name is more of an
OPTION than a DUTY.
! Also, no judicial authority to have her name
changed to her husband when she marries
thus no judicial confirmation should be
needed when she changes it back. Only
necessary for civil status.
! Thus rule 103 shouldn't be applied.
! Changed through: prefixing the
word "Mrs." before her husband's
full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden
first name
RESULT: . Petitioner is authorized to resume her
maiden name and surname.
Romero: women should be given equal rights as men
to resume use of their names
! Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of
women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.
! Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the
integration of women as full and equal
partners of men in development and nation
building. . . ."
! the dissolution of the matrimonial bonds
consequent upon the granting of absolute
divorce or the declaration of nullity of
marriage or its annulment, provides legal
ground for the automatic dropping of said
family name and the resumption of the use
of her maiden name
Vitug: showed that before a law allow a married
woman to use her maiden name and surname was
proposed but turned down

Republic Act No. 9262 - Anti-Violence Against Women and Children

SHARICA MART L. GO-TAN vs SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN
G.R. No. 168852, September 30; 2008

Facts:
! April 18, 1999 when Sharica Tan and
Steven Tan got married
! Jan 12, 2005 - petitioner filed a Petition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO)[6] against Steven
and her parents-in-law for verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon
her in violation of the the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004."
! Feb 7, 2005 respondents are arguing that
parents-in-law aren't covered by RA no 9262
WON parents in law can be charged with violence as
co-conspirators
HELD: YES
! RPC is suppletory to RA no 9262 as found in
Sec 47 of RA no 9262 thus conspiracy can
be part of RA 9262
! conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown,
the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent
or modality of participation of each
of them becomes secondary, since
all the conspirators are principals
Sec 5 of RA 9262 also recognizes that violence may
be committed by an offender through another

FC1;FC76
FC 66, 67, 128, 135, 136
FC77
FC81
FC78
FC 79, in rel. to NCC 3 8-39
FC81
FC 80 (2) and (3) in rel. To NCC 16
FC (3) in rel. To NCC 17

FC82

Solis vs Solis
53 Phil 912 [1928]

Facts:
! Juan Lambino and Maria Barroso had three
children Alejo, Eugenio, and Marciana
! June 2, 1919 made a donation of propter
nuptias to Alejo and Fortunata of land due to
their impending marriage
! In case of death of donees, 1/2 of
land donated would revert to donors
while the surviving donee would
retain the other half
! Alejo died followed by Juan, after
death wife got lands again
! Fortunata wants part of her land
ISSUE: WON marriage makes the donation valid
HELD: NO
! The donation propter nuptias is not valid
and did not create any right, since it was not
made in a public instrument
! marriage is a consideration, but not in the
sense of being necessary to give birth to the
obligation
! does not revoke the donation with
presence or without
! marriage in a donation propter
nuptias is rather a resolutory
condition which, as such,
presupposes the existence of the
obligation which may be resolved or
revoked, and it is not a condition
necessary for the birth of the
obligation.
Result; no need to give land
Dissent by Street: believes marriage makes it an
obligation.

FC84
FC 84; NCC 761
FC85
FC8T
FC87

Matabuena v. Cervantes
38 SCRA 284

Facts:
! 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena
executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in
favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time
they were living as husband and wife in a
common law relationship.
! They were later married on 28 March 1962.
Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962.
! Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister
and nearest and nearest relative to Felix,
questioned the validity of the donation
claiming that the ban on donation between
spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship. She had the land
declared on her name and paid the estate
and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her
in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower
court upheld the validity of the donation as it
was made before Cervantes' marriage to the
donor. Hence, the appeal.
! Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil
code apply to donations between live-in
partners.
! Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage, policy
considerations of the most exigent character
as well as the dictates of morality require
that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship, as it is contrary to
public policy. The law prohibits donations in
favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient
law. Whatever omission may be apparent in
an interpretation purely literal of the
language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. It is a
principle of statutory construction that what is
within the spirit of the law is as much a part
of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic
purpose discernible in such codal provision
would not be attained.
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November
1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the
questioned donation void and recognized the rights of
plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the
property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower
court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with
the current decision; without pronouncement as to
costs.

Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals (supra)

Sumbad vs CA
308 CRA 575

Facts:
! 1936 George Tait's wife Agata died
! Afterwards lived with Maria Tait to whom he
donated on April 2, 1974 parcels of land to
! Dec 24, 1977 George died
! 1982-1983 Maria Tait sold lots, some of
which to the private respondents
! July 24, 1989 petitioners Emilie Sumbad
and Beatrice Tait field action to nullify deeds
of sale and to recover the lands in their
name
! Alleged they are children and
compulsory heirs of George and
Agata and that Maria sold lands
without their consent.
! TC and CA both ruled that petition was
without merit
! ISSUE: WON donation was made in violation
of Art. 133 of the Civil Code, now Art. 87 of
the Family Code
HELD: NO
! Art. 133. Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void.
This prohibition does not apply when the
donation takes effect after the death of the
donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to
moderate gifts which the spouses may give
each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing.
! Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to
persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage.
! Record doesn't' show that George married
Maria and if marriage took place. If they
weren't married petitioners shouls show
evidence that at time the time the deed of
donation was executed, their father and
Maria F. Tait were still maintaining
common-law relations
Beatrice Tait's testimony is only to the effect that in
1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother. There is
no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and
Maria F. Tait continuously maintained common-law
relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was
made.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura vs. de Batocael
G.R. No.146683. Nov. 22, 2001

Facts:
! Jan 19, 1956 Francisco Comille and wife
Zosima Montallana were owners of a lot
! Oct 3, 1980 Zosima died leaving the lot to
Francisco
! Jan 24, 1991 Francisco executed deed of
donation intervivos to Cirila, "a helper-slash-
mistress-slash common law wife for her
faithful services over the last 10 years
! Oct 4, 1991 Francisco died with no
children
! Feb 18, 1993 respondents filed petition to
nullify the donation since she was only
common law wife and thus donation is void
under Art 87 of FC
! TC made donation void and was
strengthened by CA decision
ISSUE: WON Cirila is entitled to the lot
HELD: NO
! Sufficiently proved that she was common law
wife thus can't get lot through donation as
found in Art 87
! Cohabitation: repeated sexual intercourse,
public assumption of marital relation,
! Conduct saw that they were more
than just caregiver and patient.
Not given any salary, Francisco told her niece Cirila
was his mistress, Cirila used his surname to sign for
business permits, health cerficates, and death
certificate.

FC 86; NCC 765

Mateo vs Lagua
29 SCRA 864

Facts:
! 1917 Lagua and wife Alejandra donated to
their son and his wife Bonifacia Mateo lots.
! Couple took possession of them but
they were still under donor's name
! 1923 son Alejandro died. His widow and
child came to live with the in-laws who gave
them the owner's share of the harvest of the
land. However in 1926 Cipriano refused to
give them their share so Bonifacia had to
obtain it through JPC
! 1941 Cipriano executed a deed of sale of
the land to their son, Gervasio while still
continuing to give Bonifacia the owner's
share of harvest until stopping on 1956.
! Learned that her brother in law
owned land on 1955 and had it
declared null and void by the Court
of First Instance
! 1957 Gervasio and his wife Sotera
commenced action against Bonifacia for
reimbursement of improvements made by
them and another case to annul the
donations of the two lots since it was
prejudicial to not only Cipriano for his own
support and for his forced heir Gervasio
Lagua
! Nov 1958 Cipriano died
! 1960 court said Gervasio and Sotera were
possessors in bad fatih and not entitled to
reimbursement. Also, action to anul donation
has prescribed since it's been over 41 years
! Appeal to CA which affirmed the court
decision but with the change that Gervasio is
entitled to part of the land since it exceeded
what should be given which should be part of
Cipriano's disposable portion in his will and
should thus be given to Gervasio since it
would be prejudicial to him as the heir.
ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals acted correctly in
ordering the reduction of the donation for being
inofficious and in ordering herein petitioners to
reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an
unidentified 494.75 square-meter portion of the
donated lots.
HELD: NO
- proper nuptias has marriage as the motive of the
donation alone and are without onerous (heavy
obligations) consideration , they remain subject to
reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if
they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.2
! Disposable portion is to computed as such
(Art 908 of NCC): net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting payable
obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time
of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the
partible estate thus determined, the legitimes
of the compulsory heir or heirs can be
established; and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes.
! CA just based it on the area and not
the value of the properties.
! in order that a donation may be reduced for
being inofficious, there must be proof that
the value of the donated property exceeds
that of the disposable free portion plus the
donee's share as legitime in the properties of
the donor.
! CA had no evidence to declare lot
as inofficious
RESULT: CA decision is set aside.

FC 48; 44; 61

FC75
FC88
FC89
FC 89 par. 2
FC 90; of NCC 484-501
FC91
FC as of NCC 164
FC 93 of NCC 160
FC92;FC95
FC94

Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs De Garcia
30 SCRA 111

Facts:
! Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co
executed a surety bond to PNB to guarantee
a crop loan for Ladislao
! Same date, Ladislao with Vicente
Garcia signed indemnity agreement
binding themselves to indemnify
Luzon Surety Co against whatever
it may incur
! April 1956 PNB filed a complaint against
Ladislao And Luzon Surety Co to recover
money
! Aug 1957 third party complaint was
received by Garcia due to the indemnity
agreement
! Sept 1958 lower court condemned Garcia
and Ladislao to pay PNB
! Aug 1960 writ of garnishment (A legal
procedure by which a creditor can collect
what a debtor owes by reaching the debtor's
property when it is in the hands of someone
other than the debtor) was issued by
Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental
levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of
the Garcias,
! Oct 1960 spouses Josefa de Garcia and
Vicente Garcia filed in Court of First Instance
a petition to stop the selling of their sugar
from their conjugal partnership as a writ of
garnishment issued by Court of First
nstance against Vicente since he wasn't
able to pay part of his indemnity to Luzon
Surety Co.
ISSUE: WON conjugal property can be used to pay
for Vicente's indemnity
HELD: NO
! Art 161 of NCC - only obligations incurred by
the husband that are chargeable against the
conjugal property are those incurred in the
legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or
business with the honest belief that he is
doing right for the benefit of the family
! liable only for such "debts and
obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the
! to make a conjugal partnership
respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed
objective of the new Civil Code
! In this case, this is not benefiting his family in
anyway and even if Art 163 says that the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal
property, this is limited to what benefits his
family
! benefit was clearly intended for
third party, Ladislao Chavez
RESULT: conjugal property can't be used

Gelano vs CA
103 SCRA 90

Facts:
! Sept 17, 1945 Insular Sawmill corporation
was organized. For it to carry on, it leased
the paraphernal property of petitioner-wife
Guillermina Gelano. Her husband Carlos
received from the corporation cash advances
on the rentals
! Carlos Gelano however refused to pay his
unpaid balance to Insular Sawmill and
Guillermina also refused to pay since the
amount was for the personal account of
husband and did not benefit their family. This
happened again
! TC rendered decision that ordered Carlos
Gelano anf Guillermina to pay even after the
corporation has ceased to exist
ISSUE: WON obligations by Carlos Gelano were
peronsl al obligations and thus as spouses can't be
held liable
HELD: NO
! Obligation contributed greatly to the benefit
of the family thus the conjugal property is
liable for his debt (Art 116 of NCC/
paragraph 1, Article 1408, Civil Code of
1889).
CA's mistake : Only the conjugal partnership is liable,
not joint and several as erroneously described by the
Court of Appeals, the conjugal partnership being only
a single entity.

G-Tractors, Inc., vs CA
135 SCRA 192

-Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He owns
a logginc company
- Feb 1973 Luis Narciso entered into Contract o
Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors
where G-tractors leased former tractors. Co tract
stipulated payment for rental. However Luis wasn't
able to pay
-Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt, one of
which was conjugal property of land.
ISSUE: WON land that is owned by both spouses can
be sold to pay for Luis' debt
HELD: YES
! all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership "do not require that actual profit
or benefit must accrue to the conjugal
partnership from the husband's transaction",
but it suffices that the transaction should be
one that normally would produce such
benefit for the partnership.
! Debts he accumulated were for the
support of his family and thus can't
be deemed his exclusive and
private debts.
! Wife's name does not need to be in the
information when the conjugal property is the
one being contested in trial since she is not
the recognized administrator. Only
necessary the other way around.
Sec. 4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113
of the Civil Code

cf. FC 100 (3), FC 12 1(5) and FC 94(4)
FC 90, FC 96 in rel. to NCC 206
FC 96; FC 90

Yu Bun Guan vs Ong
36 SCRA 559

Facts:
! April 1961 Yu Bun Guan and Elvira Ong
got married
! Before separation Bun Guan asked Elvira
Ong to do a simulated sale of property she
bought on March 20, 1968 out of her own
personal funds so that she wouldn't be
involved in the obligation. Promised it would
be named to their children after. Never
happened
! 1992 separated and Elvira filed an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim of the land
! Yu Bun Guan contends however
that he just used Elvira as a dummy
to buy property since he was still a
Chinese National that time
(declared false by TC and CA)
ISSUE: WON Elvira Ong can regain her property
HELD: YES
! Provided enough evidence to show it was
paraphernal property (woman's property that
she owned prior to the marriage)
! Evidence: (1) the title had been
issued in her name; (2) petitioner
had categorically admitted that the
property was in her name; (3)
petitioner was estopped from
claiming otherwise, since he had
signed the Deed of Absolute Sale
that stated that she was the
"absolute and registered owner"; (4)
she had paid the real property taxes
! Bu Yun Guan's contention that she used her
income, salaries and savings, which are
conjugal in nature to buy the land made it co-
owned by them was disregarded through the
evidence.
RESULT: land is with Elvira esp since it was void
since it was a simulated sale.

FC96
FC 100(3)
FC 101
FC61
FC 96-98
FC 100; cf. FC 239
FC 104

Delizo v. Delizo
69 SCRA 216

facts:
! April 1891 Dec 1909 first marriage of
Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Vllasfer who died (18
years)
! Oct 1911 May 1957 second marriage to
Dorotea de Ocampo until Nicolas Delizo died
(46 years)
! Petitioners and respondents are fighting over
the land owned by Nicolas whether it
belongs to the conjugal property of the first
or second marriage
! TC first partitioned the land to the first
marriage's heirs since there was no
liquidation of conjugal property of first
marriage thus the co conjugal partnership
was converted into one of co-ownership
between Nicolas Delizo and his children of
the first marriage
! but was appealed by petitioners
from 2
nd
marriage

! CA: ruled that Caanawan lands were
acquired during the first marriage and the
fact that lands were registered under
"Nicolas married to Dorotea is merely
descriptive of his civil status.
! Did not agree with the partition of
TC held that ! of conjugal property
from first marriage is husband's
own separate property when he
remarried again.
! Also held that since it was at the
time of the 2
nd
marriage that the
land was cultivated, it is is entitled
to reimbursement for the increase
in value of the 47 hectares
! Thus ! that is given to the
first marriage's heirs must
be deducted by the
improvements made by
the 2
nd
marriage.
! Declared partition as follows: One-
half of the Caanawan property to
share of Rosa Villafer or 1/6 thereof
for each child of the first marriage;
and 20% of all the other properties
or 1/15 thereof for each such child.
! to Nicolas Delizo descending to
his heirs both in the 1
st
and 2
nd

marriage.
ISSUE: WON partition of lands made by CA is correct
HELD: NO
! Lands acquired in first marriage were from
the homestead act and at the time of the 1
st

marriage, the lands weren't owned by
Nicolas Delizo yet since he did not fulfill the
requirements of the public land law for the
acquisition of such lands.
! Act no 926 - the right of the
homesteader to the patent does not
become absolute until after he has
complied with all the requirements
of the law
! Thus Caanawan lands weren't
conjugal property of first marriage
due to non-compliance
Thus held that land properties should be divided
between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion
to the duration of each partnership since to leave the
heirs from the first marriage out would only enhance
discord and not promote family solidarity.

Belcodero v. CA
227 SCRA 303

Facts:
! Bosing married Oday on 1927
! In 1946, Alayo Bosing left the conjugal home
to live with a certain Josefa.
! In 1949, Alayo purchased land and then in
the deed he presented himself as "married to
Josefa
! In 1959, the lot was transferred to the name
of "Josefa Bosing married to Alayo Bosing
! In 1958, Alayo married Josefa while his prior
marriage with Oday was still subsisting.
! In 1970 Josefa, the common-law spouse,
conveyed to Josephine, her daughter, full
ownership of the property
! Juliana then filed for a reconveyance of the
land to her and her children
Issues: WON the property in question is the conjugal
property of Alayo Bosing and Juliana Oday
Held: Yes
Ratio: Under NCC 160, all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or wife. This was not rebutted at all.
Moreover, the Family Code cannot apply since there
are prior vested rights. Co-ownership is repudiated if
both spouses has an impediment to marry.

Jocson v. CA
170 SCRA 333

Facts:
! Petitioner Moises Jocson and Respondent
Agustina Jocson- Vasquez are the only
surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete.
! Alejandra predeceased her husband without
her intestate estate being settled
! Emilio Jocson conveyed by sale almost all of
his properties to Agustina Jocson, including
his 1/3 share in the estate of his wife.
! Moises says that it should be partitioned
between him and Agustina therefore
declaring the said documents null and void.
! Defendant Moises says that the first
document was signed through fraud and
deceit. Same with the second and third
document.
! Moreover, he said that there could be no
sale between father and daughter on the
same roof, and the unliquidated conjugal
property also cannot be sold.
! Trial Court sided with the petitioner.
! Ca reversed
Issues: WON the property in question is Conjugal.
Held: NO. Before tackling the main issue, it must
considered that Moises said that Agustina didn't have
enough funds, but then Agustina is in a buy and sell
business; and the purchase price was even more than
the assessed price. Lastly, Certificates of Title in
insufficient to prove that a certain property is conjugal,
it does not at all prove that the properties were gained
in the spouses lifetime. Registration and Acquisition of
title are two different acts. In the contrary, it is clear
that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties,
because it was registered in his name alone.

Ansaldo v. Sheriff
64 Phil 115

Facts:
! Upon the express guarantee of the Fidelity
and Surety Company of the Philippine
Islands, the Philippine Trust Company
granted Agcaoili a credit in current account
not to exceed 20,000.
! Angel Ansaldo in turn agreed to indemnify
Fidelity and Surety Company for any losses
and damages from the obligations of
Agacaoili to PTC.
! Agcaoili defaulted hence FSC brought an
action against Ansaldo for the recovery of
19K, and caused the sheriff to levy on the
joint savings account of Ansaldo and his
wife.
! Ansaldo said that they levied on a conjugal
property, hence not liable to Ansaldo's
personal obligations.
! Ansaldo filed action in CFI to declare it null
and void. It was granted by CFI.

Issues: WON joint savings account is liable for the
payment of the personal obligations of the husband.
Held: No.
Ratio: It must be proven that the fruits of the
paraphernal property benefited the family to prove
that it is conjugal. In this case, there was no effort to
prove that the obligations contracted benefited the
family of Ansaldo.

Sps. Estonina v. CA
G.R. No. 111547, Jan. 27, 1997

Facts:
! Lot C is owned by Santiago Garcia who died
on October 2, 1967
! In 1973, Trinidad Estonina was granted the
land TCT No. 1975 by CFI. It was also
mentioned there that Trinidad covered all
rights that Consuela Garcia may have.
! Children of the first wife, Adela, executed a
sale transferring unto Atayan spouses 4/10
of their share in the land TCT T-82229.
! Children of the 2
nd
wife, Consuelo Garcia,
also sold 4/10 of the land to the Atayan
spouses.
! Estrella Garcia (the widow of his son) also
sold 1/10 to Spouses Atayan.
! Estonina then bought the land in a public
auction which was opposed by Consuelo
Garcia.
! TCT 82229 was cancelled and T-99961 was
issued in favor of Trinidad Estonina.
! Spouses Atayan pleaded that the auction be
declared null and void.
! RTC rendered a decision that the said land
was gained by Consuelo and Santiago
during the marriage, hence presumed to be
conjugal.
! CA however said it was not conjugal.
Issues: WON the said land is conjugal property
Held: No.
Ratio: It was acquired during the marriage hence it is
presumed to be conjugal (Santiago and Consuelo).
However, the petitioners failed to prove that the
property in question was gained during the marriage
of Consuelo and Santiago. Registration and
acquisition are different. So, only 1/10 could be given
to Consuelo.

FC, FC 107 cf. FC 88

FC 105(2) of FC 256

Castro vs. Miat
397 SCRA 271

Facts:
! Moises and Miat bought 2 parcels of land
(one in Pque and one in Paco)
! Moises then wanted the Paranaque property
to himself but would leave the 2 properties to
his sons.
! Moises and Concordia bought the property
on installment basis on 1977, and it was only
on 1984 it was finished.
! Alexander agreed to sell the said lot to
Romeo.
! However, Romeo found out that the property
was sold to Castro by Moises.
! Moises bought the property through
mortgage from Castro
! Alexander received 2/3, Moises 1/3, Romeo
NONE
! CA rendered a decision nullifying deed of
sale between Moises and Castro and
ordered them to reconvey the land to Romeo
for 36K

Issues: WON the Paco property is the capital
property of Moises.
Held: No
Ratio: It is conjugal share. Since it was acquired
through join funds. Moises and Concordia bought the
property during the marriage. There was even a letter
from Moises to Romeo conveying the land. Moreover,
Castro is not a buyer in good faith. Since they knew
that there was an adverse claim.

FC 105 of FC 74-74

Malang vs Moson
338 SCRA 393

FC 108 cf. NCC 1767-1768

PNB v. Quintos
46 Phil 370

Facts:
! June 20, 1918 - PNB granted the
defendants a credit to the amount of P31,
284 to which defendants mortgaged stocks
from BPI, Compaia Naviera, Davao
Agriculture and Commercial Company etc.
! In the document, it did not clearly
show that they were husband and
wife, except in their civil statues
! Does not show that they bound
themselves solidarily to the debt
incurred.
! April 2, 1921/ July 22, 1921 complaint was
filed requiring Mr. Ansaldo to pay his debt.
SC First TRIAL
! Defendants claim that their debt is not of a
solidary nature and should thus only bind
one to the extent of their share in the
obligation thus should not be charged to their
conjugal partnership.
! However Art 1408 of NCC provides
all debts incurred by both
husband and wife during the
marriage are chargeable to the
conjugal partnership thus Margarita
Ansaido, the wife, is part of the
obligation as her husband as the
legal manager of the conjugal
partnership is liable for the debt.
! SC first decision: conjugal
partnership should be used to pay
for the debt incurred as well as
private property of each of them
since they are both obligated
SC 2
nd
TRIAL (DECISION UPON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION)
! Reasserts that conjugal property is liable for
the debt they incurred as husband and wife.
! Conjugal partnership begins
existing at celebration of marriage
! Confined to properties
stated in Art 1401 of CC -
(a) Those acquired by
onerous (heavy
obligations) title during the
marriage at the expense of
the common property
whether the acquisition is
made for the community or
for only one of them; (b)
those obtained by the
industry, salary or labor of
the spouses or any of
them; (c) the fruits, rents
or interest received or
accruing during the
marriage, from the
common or the private
property of each of the
spouses.
! Conjugal partnership DOES NOT
merge the properties they acquired
before. The rest of the property that
the spouse acquired before their
marriage is separate from the
! Guaranteed by absolute
separation of capitals
ISSUE: WON they are jointly liable for the debts
incurred through conjugal partnership
HELD: YES
! CC 1698 = partners are not solidarily liable
with respect to the debt of the partnership.
! CC 1137 - solidarity will exist only when it is
expressly determined
! partner cannot be solidarity liable for the
debts of the partnership, because,there is no
legal provision imposing such burden upon
one.
RESULT: properties of the conjugal partnership of the
defendants are liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and
in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the
payment thereof.

Ansaldo vs Sheriff of Manila (supra)

FC 109

Laperal v. Katigbak
10 SCRA 493

Facts:
! Appeal from decision of CFI of Manila
declaring property to be the paraphernal
property of defendant-appelle Evelina Kalwa.
The appellants maintain that it should be
considered as conjugal property
! Laperals sought for recovery of money
evidenced by promissory notes made by
Katigbak and for the recovery of jewelry that
katigbak was supposed to sell.
! Nov 1, 1950 - TC ordered Katigbak to pay
back the Laperals and return the jewelry.
! Dec 1950 Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw filed
for judicial separation of property and
separate administration which was granted.
! Feb 1, 1955 Laperals filed complaint that
the separation of property should be
annulled and should be deemed as conjugal
property
! Dec 27, 1958: SC rendered judgment that
while the conjugal property should be used
to pay the debt of Katigbak, the paraphernal
property of Kalaw shouldn't.
! TC: rendered judgment that Kalaw's property
was indeed paraphenral.
ISSUE: WON property being contested is part of
conjugal property
HELD: NO
! Art 160 of CC- properties acquired during
marriage are deemed conjugal property
unless it is proven that it belongs exclusively
to husband and wife
! Shown through: (1) title is in name
of wife alone (2) husband gave his
marital consent to their being
mortgaged by his wife (3) wife is
financially able to buy proeprty
! In this case, proved that mother of Evelina
bought the contested property for her, it was
under Evelina's name, Ramon Katigbak
issued a manifestation where he stated he
had no interest in the property, husband
could not have afforded to buy it.
RESULT: land is paraphernal and thus can't be
subject to the debts of Katigbak.

Berciles v. GSIS
128 SCRA 53

Facts:
-GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an
acknowledged natural child and other private
respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, mercy
Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate
children of Judge Pascual Berciles with Flor
Fuentebella and thus have rights to his retirement
benefits
- this was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and
their children.
ISSUE: WON GSIS was correct in upholding their
status as a natural child and illegitimate children
HELD: NO
! Art 287 pf NCC illegitimate children other
than natural are entitled to support and such
successional rights are granted in the code,
but for this article to be applicable, there
must be admission or recognition of paternity
of illegitimate child.
! No evidence of admission
! (X)There was no evidence that he
intervened when his name was put
in the birth certificate of Pascual
Berciles, thus his part in the birth
certificate is null and void
! (X) baptismal certificate has no
weight as well
! (X) living together does not prove
filiation
! (X) pictures are not proof of filiation
! their mother was not recognized to
be married to the deceased
! RESULT: retirement benefits are distributed
equally to the five recognized heirs from his
marriage to Iluminda Ponce who is also an
heir.
! Art 966 of NCC if a widow or
widower and legit children or
descendants are left, surviving
spouse has in the succession the
same share as that of each of the
children
Art 980 of NCC children of deceased shall always
inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.

FC 109 (2) of FC 113, FC 115

Veloso v. Martinez
28 Phil 255

Plata v. Yatco
12 SCRA 718

Facts:
! 1954 Amailia Plata purchased land
! 1958 sold the property to Celso Saldana
but he resold it ot her seven months after
when she was already married to Gaudencio
Begosa
! Sept 1958 Amalia mortgaged to Cesarea
Villanueva the property in consideration of a
loan of 3,000. Gaudencio also signed the
deal
! Amalia and Gaudencion failed to pay
mortgage and the land was then sold to
Cesarea and husband Gregorio. They then
sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal
detainer which was granted
! However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting
her from the party since she is claiming that
land was her own paraphernal property and
not conjugal property
ISSUE: WON Amalia is bound by the detainer
judgment against Gaudencio Begosa
HELD: NO
! Sufficiently proved that property contested is
her own exclusive paraphernal property
since she owend it before marriage and even
if Saldana did give it back to her when she
was already married it did not transform it to
conjugal property since there was no prood
that they money paid to Saldana came from
common or conjugal funds.
! Thus since Cesarea and Gregorio were also
aware that property was paraphernal as
clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer
judgment against the husband alone doesn't
affect the paraphernal property of Amalia.
Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment
of eviction against her husband.
RESULT: can't decide at the moment whether
property is validly conveyed to Cesarea and Gregorio.
Up to CFI of QC.

Lim v. Garcia
7 Phil 320

! Facts:
! Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903, with an
estate valued at P50k. It was alleged in the
inventory by the administrator, Luis Lim, that
everything but a house and lot, P10k
(paraphernalia) and P700 (acquired as
payment for the land that he sold) were the
conjugal property of Hilario and his wife,
Isabel Garcia.
! The administrator contends that the said
properties were the separate properties of
Hilario because he allegedly brought them
into the marriage alone. The 3 parcels of
land were only conveyed to Isabel as a gift
or for valuable consideration by Hilario
during the coverture; hence, it is a void
donation. The P700 was the price he had
received for the sale of a certain lot.
!
! Issue: WON the parcels of land were
conjugal property
! Held: No, the evidence show that the
properties were not acquired by Isabel by
conveyance from Hilario but by third parties
by way of exchange for a certain property
she had inherited from her father's estate.
Hence, they are her separate properties
according to Civil Code Art. 1396 (3) since
they were acquired by exchange of her
separate properties. While the RTC held that
they were part of her dowry, the record did
not prove that it was so and evidence
strongly supported the presumption that it
was and continued to be part of her separate
estate.
Regarding the P700 (the balance of the price received
for the lot) and the buildings constructed thereon, SC
held that they were part of the conjugal properties
since the buildings were constructed out of the
conjugal partnership funds. Even if the land sold was
the separate property of Hilario, Civil Code 1404
holds that the buildings, erected during coverture on a
land belonging to one of the spouse, will be
considered as conjugal partnership property, that is
'after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof.'

FC 109(4);ofFC 118-119
FC 110
FC 110 2nd par.;
FC 142, FC 75

Veloso v. Martinez, supra

Manotok Realty v. CA
149 SCRA 372

! Facts:
! Authorized as the special co-administrator of
the testate estate of Clara Tambunting de
Legarda, Vicente Legarda sold 280 sq.m. of
the Legarda Tambunting Subdivision to Dr.
Abelardo Lucero for P30/sq.m., payable on
an instalment basis. Lucero paid the initial
amount of P200 and Legarda issued a
receipt and delivered the property to him.
! Although he was ordered by the CFI to sell
the Subdivision, Legarda failed to execute
the necessary document/s and to submit the
same to the Court for approval as he was
ordered. He did not execute and register a
deed of sale in a public instrument.
! Meanwhile, Lucera subsequently leased the
property on 1953 to six tenants, who paid
monthly rentals and constructed their houses
thereon.
! On July 31, 1956, CFI authorized Philippine
Trust Company as administrator of the
estate to sell the subdivision at the earliest
possible time. Hence, it sold the same
portion of the property to Manotok Realty,
Inc. Although the property was advertised for
sale, Lucera failed to appear in the estate
proceedings. Instead, he waited for Legarda,
who was no longer a special co-
administrator, to send him the formal
contract in order for him to make further
payments.
! In 1957-1958, PTC refused to entertain
Lucero when he finally went to them for
payment of the property because the estate
was then involved in litigation. Consequent
to the litigation, a deed of sale was then
issued to Manotok Realty, Inc. on March 13,
1959; the same was approved by the Court.
On Jan. 1966, Manotok Realty, Inc.
demanded the surrender of the actual and
material possession of the property and on
March 4, 1966, it filed a complaint for
ejectment. Although summonses were
served to Lucero and tenant Sojio, Lucero
instead executed a deed of assignment of
the lot in favour of his lessees.
! When RTC favoured Manotok Realty, Inc.,
Lucero alleged on appeal to CA that the sale
made by Legarda was valid because
Legarda was authorized to do so and hence,
there was no need for the approval of the
probate court.
!
! Issue: WON sale between Legarda and
Lucero was valid
! Held: NO, the Court directed Legarda to sell
the subdivision by executing the necessary
document/s and submitting it to the Court for
approval which Legarda failed to do
especially where the sale was on instalment
basis.
Moreover, the receipt does not conform to the legal
requirements of contracts of sale since it was neither
executed in a public instrument nor registered with the
Registry of Deeds. By virtue of Sec. 1, Rule 73
(Estate of Olave v. Reyes) and Sec. 4, Rule 89 (Vda.
de Gil v. Cancio) of the Rules of Court, the Court as a
probate court is authorized to approve sales of
immovable properties belonging to an estate of a
decedent. Hence, the sale was invalid and
unenforceable (against third parties). Lucero and
Sojio were also found to have acted in bad faith since
the latter waited a long time before going to PTC,
ignored the Court summons, and instead executed a
deed of assignment, while the latter constructed a
house when he was a mere lessee.

Ong vs CA
204 SCRA 297

! Facts:
! Teodora B. Ong and obtained a loan from
Francisco Boix in the course of her own
logging business in CamSur.
! But due to management, she defaulted in
her obligations and Boix consequently filed
for the collection of the sum due.
! CFI declared Teodora and her husband,
Ramon (who was enjoined in the petition for
the payment of interests by Boix), in default
and the Sheriff levied and auctioned the
parcel of land, which was in the name of
Teodora B. Ong in the Tax Declaration. Title
was transferred to Boix as the highest
bidder; the same was registered
! Ramon, however, later contends that the
property was conjugal because Teodora
used his surname 'Ong' in the Tax
Declaration; it was clearly an indication that
she had acquired it during their marriage and
hence, it was conjugal and unenforceable to
Teodora's obligations.
!
! Issue: WON property is conjugal and not
binding to Teodora's obligations
Held: No, the land was paraphernal property since
the Tax Declaration clearly stated only Teodora Ong
as the owner of the land (while Tax Declaration of the
house was made under both their names). The use of
the surname 'Ong' is insufficient to uphold the
presumption of conjugal property especially where
there was no evidence that it was acquired during the
marriage the sine qua non requirement of such
presumption (Maramba v. Lozano). Only the fact that
the Tax Declaration is in the wife's name is presented.
Nonetheless, even if the property was indeed
conjugal, it can still be liable for Teodora's obligations
because she incurred such in the course of her
business which Ramon knew and did not object to.
Since her profits are enjoyed by the conjugal
partnership, it would only be just and equitable if the
conjugal partnership also answer to the obligations.

FC 111-112, of FC 236, amended by RA 6809

Palanca v. Smith-Bell
9 Phil 131

! Facts:
! Emiliano Boncan Yap borrowed P14k from
the International Banking Corporation in
order to construct a house. He then
conveyed the house to his wife, Alejandra
Palanca de Boncan, on Sept. 20, 1904,
which the latter accepted, as a guaranty for
the payment of his debt to IBC. When Smith,
Bell & Co. later obtained a judgment and writ
of execution against Emiliano for the
collection of money and he failed to pay, the
property was levied. Alejandra filed for
declaration that the property was her
exclusive property and demanded its
possession and the dissolution of the levy.
!
! Issue: WON property is Alejandra's
exclusively
Held: NO, because the borrowed P14k of Emiliano
was made upon credit of the property of his wife, the
money became conjugal property by virtue of Civil
Code 1401 (3). The subsequent use of the money to
the construction of the house also made the house
conjugal property and liable to the payment of his
debts by virtue of Civil Code 1408.

Lim Queco V. Cartagena
71 Phil 163

Wong et al. v. IAC
200 SCRA 792

Facts:
! Romarico Henson married Katrina
Pineda on January 6, 1964
! Romarico and Katrina had been
most of the time living separately
! During the marriage or on January
6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787
square-meter parcel of land
! in June 1972, Katrina entered into
an agreement with Anita Chan who
consigned to Katrina pieces of
jewelry for sale valued at 199,895
Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95
! Katrina failed to return the pieces of
jewelry within the 20-day period
agreed upon, Anita Chan
demanded payment of their value
! Anita Chan and her husband Ricky
Wong filed against Katrina and her
husband Romarico Henson, an
action for collection of a sum of
money
! Trial court promulgated a decisions
9
in favor of the Wongs. A writ of
execution was thereafter issued.
Levied upon were four lots in
Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson ... married to
Katrina Henson
! Lots were sold eptember 9, 1977
! August 8, 1 978, Romarico filed an
action for the annulment of the
decision because he was "not given
his day in court
! the court, finding that there was no
basis for holding the conjugal
partnership liable for the personal
indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in
favor of reconveyance

Issue: whether or not the execution of a decision in
an action for collection of a sum of money may be
nullified on the ground that the real properties levied
upon and sold at public auction are the alleged
exclusive properties of a husband who did not
participate in his wife's business transaction from
which said action stemmed
Held:
! Romarico and Katrina had in fact
been separated when Katrina
entered into a business deal with
Anita Wong. Thus, the business
transaction involved the personal
dealings of his estranged wife
! writ of execution cannot be issued
against Romarico since he was not
represented in court
! On the matter of ownership of the
properties involved, having been
acquired during the marriage, they
are still presumed to belong to the
26
even though
Romarico and Katrina had been
living
separately
! Katrina's indebtedness may not be
paid for with them her obligation not
having been shown by the
petitioners to be one of the charges
against the conjugal partnership.
30

In addition to the fact that her rights
over the properties are merely
inchoate prior to the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, the
consent of her husband and her
authority to incur such
indebtedness had not been alleged
in the complaint and proven at the
trial
under the Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family or when she
borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things
necessary for the support of the family if the husband
fails to deliver the proper sum;
32
when the
administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts
33
or by the
husband
34
and when the wife gives moderate
donations for charity.
35
Having failed to establish that
any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may
not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's
personal obligation to them

FC 106
FC 116

Torela v. Torela
3 SCRA 391

Facts:
! son and daughter vs father and
stepmother
! December 21, 1929, Decree No.
440157 was issued in favor of
Felimon Torela, married to
Graciana Gallego, decreeing that
he is the owner of a certain parcel
of land (Lot No. 3770)
! March 5, 1958, Felimon Torela,
filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that
Lot No. 3770 of the Cauayan
Cadastre having been acquired by
him by way of inheritance prior to
his marriage to his first wife. He,
therefore, prayed that the court
order the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental to change his
(movant's) civil status, appearing on
the face of the original certificate of
title, "from Felimon Torela, married
to Graciana Gallego to Felimon
Torela, married to Marciana
Gepanago"
! Court granted the motion
! Felimon, Torela executed a definite
deed of sale whereby, for and in
consideration of P3,000.00, he sold
Lot No. 3770 of the Cadastral
Survey of Cauayan to Marcos P.
Mahilum and Maria Luna Mahilum
! Petitioners (children) claim that the
land was conjugal property and
they were entitled to the proceeds.
They claim that while in their youth
they had seen their father Felimon
and their mother Graciana Gallego
clean the lot in question
! Felimon Torela declared that he
and his first wife Graciana were
married in 1915 and the land in
question was decreed in the name
of Felimon Torela, married to
Graciana Gallego,. According to
Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code,
the following properties belong to
the conjugal partnership:
1. Property acquired for a valuable consideration
during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition is made for the
partnership or for one of the spouses only;
2. Property obtained by the industry, wages or work of
the spouses or of either of them;
3. The fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued
during the marriage, derived from the partnership
property., or from that which belongs separately to
either of the spouses
! Felimon Torela testified that he
inherited the contested property
from his parents

Issue:
Whether or not the parcel of land herein
involved is a conjugal property of the spouses
Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs'
mother)

Held:
! the property in question is not one
of those enumerated in Article 1401
of the Old Civil Code. On the other
hand, as it was inherited by Felimon
from his parents and brought to the
marriage with his first wife, the
same is deemed his separate
property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code).
For these reasons, defendant
Felimon Torela had lawfully
disposed of his property to the
exclusion of his children by his first
marriage

Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals failed to
take into account Article 1407 of the Spanish Civil
Code, which now correspond to Article 160 of the
New Civil Code, and which reads as follows:
Art. 1407, All property of the
spouses shall be deemed
partnership property in the absence
of proof that it belongs exclusively
to the husband or to the wife.
Petitioners claim that since the lot in question was
registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to
Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the
conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that
one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as
their inheritance from their mothe

! While it is true that all property of
the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal, as above stated,
nonetheless the party who invokes
the presumption must first prove
that the property was acquired
during the marriage. This proof is a
condition sine qua non for the
application of the presumption
! there is nothing in the record to
show that the lot in question was
acquired during the marriage of
Felimon Torela and Graciana
Gallego
Decree No. 440157 which confirmed the ownership of
Felimon Torela over the land in question described
him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely
descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot
be taken as proof that the land was acquired during
their coverture. The further circumstance that the land
was registered during their marriage cannot in itself
constitute proof that it was acquired during their
marriage for land registration under Act No. 496, as
amended, does not confer title; it merely confirms a
title already existing and which is registerable

Magallon v. Montejo
146 SCRA 282

FACTS:
Case was instituted against Martin Lucerna to
compel partition of parcel of land in Magsaysay
(homestead)
Respondents claimed to be the common children of
Martin Lucerno and Eustaquia Pichan (who died in
1953)
Respondents asserted right to ! of the land as their
mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin
Martin denied being married to Eustaquia but
admitted living with her without the benefit of marriage
until she allegedly abandoned him
Martin denied the paternity of two of the respondents
who, he claimed, were father by other men

RTC:
Martin and Eustaquia were married
Respondents are their common children
Martin had begun working the homestead, and his
right to a patent to the land accrued, during his
coverture with Eustaquia
Entitled respondents to ! the land

IAC affirmed

Original certificate of land was issued only on Nov.
22, 1978
Certificate of Title issued in the name of "Martin
Lacerna. married to Epifania Magallon
ISSUE:
WON the respondents should be given the
title for ! of the land

HELD:
YES
Parcel of land was part of the
conjugal partnership of Martin
and Eustaquia
Land has been titled through fraud
or mistake # in such a
situation, the property should
be regarded as impressed with
an implied, or constructive trust
for the party rightfully entitled
thereto. (Civil Code Art. 1456)
Magallon, as the trustee of a
constructive trust, has an
obligation to convey to the
respondents that part of the
land in question to which she
now claims ostensible title
Magallon showed no proof of
marriage contract between
herself and Martin
Magallon cannot invoke the
presumption established in Art.
160 of the Civil Code that
property acquired during the
marriage belongs to the
conjugal partnership, there
being no proof of her alleged
marriagne ine to Martin
Presumption doesn't
operate where there is
no showing as to
when the property
alleged to be conjugal
was acquired
Martin could have concurred with
the 3 respondents in the
succession of ! of the land,
each of them taking an equal
share # beyond review
because Marin allowed the
judgment to become final and
executory
RTC ordered to effect the partition

Cuenca v. Cuenca
168 SCRA 335

FACTS:
Respondents
- legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria
Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject
parcels of land
- allege that some of the parcels are paraphernal
property of Maria while all others are conjugal
- allege that Engracia Basadre and Agripino were not
legally married because at the time they lived together
Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar
Petitioners
- Denied legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino
and Maria as well as the legitimacy of the
respondents
- Claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia
Basadre were legally married and that they are the
legitimate children thereof
- Contend that subject parcels of land are conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia
Appellate Court
- Agripino, in his lifetime, expressed in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria
Bangahon proofs that properties in question belong
exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property
-Tax declarations presented by petitioners are not real
evidence to prove ownership or possession
- Petitioners wanted to present new evidence to
prove:
o That Engraciaand Agripino were legally
married
o That other petitioners were the legitimate
children
o That subject parcels of land were conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia

ISSUES:
WON Engracia is entitiled to inherit from Agripino
WON the subject parcels of land were conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia (WON
presumption should hold)

HELD:
Yes
Engracia was entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca
together with the respondents (legit children by Maria)
in accordance with Art. 892 of the NCC
Appellate Court declared Engracia as surviving
spouse no need to prove legality of marriage much
less to prove the legitimacy of the other petitioners
NO
oArt. 160 of NCC: all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife
oPresumption refers only to the property acquired
during marriage and doesn't operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal
was acquired
oDocuments sought to be presented do not show that
the claims to the subject parcles consisting of
homestead lands were perfected during the marriage
of Agripino and Engracia
oPresumption cannot prevail when the title is in the
name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved
Documents show that 5 out of 8 parcels covered are
titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or
Retituto
oPresumption cannot prevail
Petition Dismissed

FC117

Cheesman vs IAC
193 SCRA 93

FACTS:

Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were
married (1970) but separated (1981)
June 4, 1947: Deed of Sale and Transfer of
Possessory rights executed by Armande Alteras in
favor of Criselda Cheesman

Thomas Cheesman was aware of the deed and did
not object to the transfer being made only to his wife

Tax declarations for the property purchased were
issued in the name of Criselda with knowledge of
Thomas and without his objection)
Criselda assumed exclusive management
and administration of property, leasing it
to tenants
July 1, 1981: Criselda sold the property to
Estelita without the knowledge or
consent of Thomas
July 31, 1981: Thomas brought suit against
Criselda and Estelita, praying for the
annulment of the sale on the ground that
the transaction had been executed
without his knowledge and consent
Answer: property was paraphernal,
purchased by Criselda's exclusive funds
RTC: sale was void ab initio
Summary judgment: sale was valid
Evidence on record satisfactorily
overcame the disputable
presumption in Art. 160 of NCC
Property was Criselda's
paraphernal property
Legal presumption could not apply
inasmuch as the husband-
plaintiff is an American citizen
and therefore disqualified
under the consti to acquire and
own real properties

ISSUES:
WON Thomas has rights over the property
WON the residential land is conjugal
property
WON the property would be conjugal
property if Criselda used conjugal funds

HELD:
NO
Constitutional provision (Sec. 14,
Art. XIV of 1973 Consti)
prohibits sale to aliens of
residential land
Thomas acquired no right over the
property by virtue of the land
NO
Thomas had, and has no capacity
or personality to question the
subsequent sale of the same
property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing he is
merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property
If the property were to be declared
conjugal, this would accord the
alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right
over land # against
constitution
NO
Against constitution

Petition Denied

Villanueva vs CA
427 SCRA 439

FACTS:
Oct 7, 1926 - Plaintiff Eusebia is the legal wife of
defendant Nicolas 5 children
During their marriage, they acquired real properties
and all improvements situated in Mandue City and
Consolacion (22 properties)

Nicolas is co-owner of a parcel of land in Mandaue
which he inherited from his parents as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately 8
parcels of land in Mandaue City # earns income
(Nicolas only one to receive)

1945: Nicolas no longer lived with legitimate family
and cohabited with Pacita (1 illegitimate son)

Pacita has no occupation, no properties of her own

1985: Nicolas suffered a stroke

1985-present: Illegitimate child Procopio has been
receiving the income of said properties

Defendants asked for settlement but no such thing
was reached

RTC judgment in favor of respondents (legit family)

Art. 116 (presumption) # Eusebia presented solid
evidence, petitioners failed to meet standard proof
required to maintain their claim that the subject
properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas

Appeal was made

Eusebia died on 1996 # heirs substituted

1996: Pacita and Nicolas married

CA affirmed RTC decision

ISSUES:
WON subject properties are conjugal

HELD:
YES
Family Code provisions on conjugal
partnerships govern the
property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if
they were married before the
effectivity of FC (Art. 105)
Under FC, if the properties are
acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they
are conjugal
Burden of proof # party claiming
that they are not conjugal
Subject properties were acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia
Tax declarations are not sufficient
proof to overcome the
presumption under Art. 116
Whether a property is conjugal or
not is determined by law and
not by the will of one of the
spouses
No unilateral declaration by one
spouse can change the
character of conjugal property
(intent of Nicolas in
misrepresenting himself as
single in deeds of sale was to
exclude Eusebia)
Cohabitation of a spouse with
another person does not sever
the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage

Petition Denied

Zulueta v. Pan-Am
49 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Altercation between Zulueta and Capt. Zentner of
Pan-Am led to the off-loading of Mr. Zulueta, Mrs.
Zulueta, and Miss Zulueta
Plane trip from Wake Islands to Philippines
Mr. Zulueta was 20 to 30 minutes late in boarding
because he had to relieve himself at the beach
(HAHAHA)

Previous decision:
Relying upon Art. 172 of CC, which provides that "the
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent, except in cases provided by law
and it is not claimed that this is one of such cases

SC denied a motion filed by Mrs. Zulueta for the
dismissal of this case, insofar as she is concerned
(she having settled all her differences with the
defendant) without prejudice to this sum (P50,000
awarded to her) being deducted from the award made
in said decision

Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
defendant
PAN-AM maintains that the damages involved are not
among those forming part of conjugal property under
Art. 153 of CC
ISSUES:
WON the damages claimed form part of the

HELD:
YES
Award was made in favor of the
petitioners collectively
Presumption is that the money to
purchase plane tickets had
come from the conjugal funds
Considering that the damages in
question have arisen from a
breach of plaintiff's contract of
carriage with the defendant, for
which the plaintiffs paid their
fare with fund presumably
belonging to the conjugal
partnership, we hold that said
damages fall under paragraph
1 of Art. 153, the right thereto
having been "acquired by
onerous title during the
marriage.
Damages involved do not come
under Chapter 3, Title VI, Book
1 of Civil Code (Paraphernal
Properties)
Hence, the rights accruing from
said contract, including those
resulting from breach thereof
by the defendant are presumed
to belong to the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs.
Zulueta
Defendant insists that the use of
conjugal funds to redeem
property does not make the
property redeemed conjugal if
the right of redemption
pertained to the wife # no
proof that the contract of
carriage with PANAM or the
money paid therefore belongs
to Mrs. Zulueta

Motion Denied

Mendoza v. Reyes
124 SCRA 154

FACTS:
Properties in question were bought under
installment basis from Araneta
Ponciano and Julia had to borrow money to
pay; jointly obtained a loan to "complete the
construction of building and to pay balance on price of
lot
Deed of sale: vendee Julia, with
Ponciano's signature under the phrase "with my
marital consent
Titles of land were named after Julia Reyes,
married to Ponciano Reyes
Spouses failed to pay seasonably their
obligations (loan)
On March , 1961, while Ponciano was
absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold
absolutely the lots in question together with their
improvements to Medozas without the knowledge and
consent of Ponciano Julia and Ponciano were
living separately and were not in speaking terms
Complaint filed by Ponciano Reyes for the
annulment of a deed of sale for 2 parcels of land with
their improvements executed by his wife, Julia De
Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren Mendoza
and Inocencia De Mendoza as vendees
o Ponciano: properties were conjugal
properties; sold without his knowledge and consent
Spouses Mendoza alleged that properties
were paraphernal properties of Julia supported by
Julia
CFI: dismissed complaint; Julia can validly
dispose of properties without the consent of her
husband
CA reversed the decision

ISSUES:
WON the subject properties are paraphernal
in character

HELD:
NO
o Art. 135. (1) that which is acquire by onerous
title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether acquisition be for the
partnership or for only one of the spouses.
No question that disputed property was
acquired by onerous title during marriage
Common fund?
Records: funds from loans obtained by
spouses. Under Art. 161 all debts and obligations
contracted by husband and wife for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership
Julia's testimony is without merit
o The fact that the land is later registered in
the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy
its conjugal nature

Under NCC:
Castillo v. Pasco
11 SCRA 102

FACTS:
October 1931: Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a
widower, married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had
survived 2 previous husbands
Petitioners were children and grandchildren
of Marcelo Castillo, Sr., by his previous marriage
1932: Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, as
co-owners of the litigated fishpond, executed a deed
of sale conveying said property to spouses Marcelo
Castillo and Macaria Pasco (paid in installments)
April 3, 1933; Marcelo died
June 8, 1934: Macaria married her 4th
husband, Luis San Juan
Petitioners filed complaint for partition and
accounting
CA dismissed complaint: fishpond is
Macaria's exclusive paraphernal property because it
was purchased with exclusive funds of the wife (a
woman of means even before marriage to Marcelo)
Payment of installments:
o 1,000 = 600 Gabriel Gonzales owed to
Pasco + 400 cash from proceeds of sale of one of
Macaria's nipa huts
o 2,000 = proceeds of loan from Dr. Nicanor
Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was mortgaged by both
spouses
o 3,000 = loan secured by a mortgage on 2
parcels of land assessed in the name of Macaria and
one of which she had inherited from a former
husband, while the other lot encumbered was
assessed in her exclusive name
Mortgage to Dr. Jacinto paid by Macaria
(Marcelo's estate was inadequate to pay off his debts)

ISSUE:
WON the litigated fishpond is Macaria's

HELD:
PARTLY
o 1932 the applicable law was Spanish Civil
Code of 1889
property acquired for onerous consideration
during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate
property depending on the source of funds employed
for its acquisition
Art. 1369: That bought with money belonging
exclusively to the wife or the husband is separate
property
Art. 1401. To the conjugal property belong
property acquired for valuable consideration during
the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or
for one of the spouses only.
Last clause indicates that the circumstance
of sale of fishpond in question being made by the
original owners in favor of both spouses is indifferent
for the determination of whether the property should
be deemed paraphernal or conjugal
o 1st Installment
petitioners: no express finding that 600 owed
by Gabriel Gonzales came exclusively from private
funds of Macaria
Art. 1416 wife cannot bind her husband
without his consent her private transaction are
presumed to be for her own account
o 2nd and 3rd Installments
Petitioners: money was raised by loans to
both Marcelo and Macaria as joint borrowers
conjugal liabilities
Paid with money from conjugal partnership
o Property belongs to both patrimonies in
common, in proportion to the contributions of each.
1/6 is paraphernal
5/6 is conjugal
o Payment of Macaria of mortgage debt to Dr.
Jacinto does not result in increasing her share in the
property

Dismissal of original complaint is revoked and set
aside and record remanded to court of origin for
further proceedings

FC 119
FC 120

Padilla vs Padilla
74 Phil 377

FACTS:

Liquidation of conjugal property required before
settlement of will of deceased Narciso Padilla

Widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. De Padilla
commenced instant proceedings by filing a petition
wherein she prayed that her paraphernal property be
segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered
to her together with the corresponding
reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given !
of the conjugal partnership property; and that her
usufructuary right over ! of the portion pertaining to
the heir instituted in the will be recognized.

CFI declared certain sums of money to be
paraphernal and ordering the same to be delivered to
the widow # P 50,000.00

Testators mother and instituted heir, Isabel Bibby
Vda. De Padilla appealed

Narciso and Concepcion were married in 1912

Husband (med student then) brought little into the
partnership, while wife contributed a considerable
amount

Practically all the conjugal partnership property came
from fruits of the paraphernal property

Husband left no children and gave whole estate to
mother

Property included in the inventory is appraised at
261,000

ISSUE:
WON the Torrens titles are final and incontrovertible

WON the value of the paraphernal land to be
reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of
the construction of the building or the value at the
time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership

WON the value of the paraphernal buildings which
were demolished to make possible the construction of
new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership
should be reimbursed to the wife

HELD:
NO
There is nothing sacrosanct
(inviolable) and definitive in the
certificate of title when the
conjugal partnership is
liquidated.
The true and real owner may be
shown
Because of feelings of trust existing
between the spouses,
certificates of title are often
secured in the name of both, or
of either, regardless of the true
ownership of the property and
regardless of the source of
money
Upon liquidation, trust should be
recognized and enforced so
that the real ownership of the
property may be established
Torrens title should not be turned
into an instrument for
deprivation of ownership
That prevailing from the time of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership
Art. 1404 of CC.
Mere construction of a building from
common fund does not
automatically convey the
ownership of the wife's land to
the conjugal partnership
Erecting a building is merely a
exercise of the right of usufruct
pertaining to the conjugal
partnership over the wife's land
In consequence of this usufructuary
right, the conjugal partnership
is not bound to pay any rent
during the occupation of the
wife's land because if the lot
were leased to a 3
rd
person,
instead of being occupied by
the new construction from
partnership funds, the rent from
the third person would belong
to the conjugal partnership
YES
The value of the old building at the
time they were torn down
should be paid to the wife

Judgment affirmed

Caltex vs Felias
108 Phil 873

Spouses Juliano and Eulalia Felias donated Lot No.
107 to their daughter, Felisa Felias (Private
Respondent) on March 31, 1928.
March 26, 1941: Trial court held that in a
case against respondent's husband
(Simeon Sawamoto), he had to pay
Texas Company (Phil.) Inc. a sum of
P661.94 plus legal interest and
attorney's fees.
A writ of execution was issued to
the provincial sheriff who levied
upon Lot No. 107 together with
the improvements and a small
parcel of coconut land and sold
these at a public auction to
Texas Company now Caltex
(Phil.) Inc.
Provincial Sherrif executed a final
deed of sale which was duly
recorded on a TCT.
Felisa filed an action, declaring herself the
owner of the 2 parcels of land.
Trial court's decision:
Sale of Lot. No. 107 is null and void
Sale of coconut land is NOT. It
rightfully belongs to Caltex.
Both parties appealed and CA declared that:
Lot. No. 107 belongs to Felisa and
ordered the Register of Deeds
to Cancel the entry of the levy,
the certificate of sale and the
deed of sale by the sheriff.
Caltex is still the exclusive owner of
the small parcel of coconut
land.

Issues:
What is the status and ownership of Lot 107
of the cadastral survey of the City of
Agusan a the time it was levied upon
and later sold by the Sheriff?

Held:
IT EXCLUSIVELY BELONGS TO FELISA
FELIAS.

Ratio:

It was discovered by the CA that it was donated by
her parents to her, it is her paraphernal property.
(exclusively owned by her)

It was sold by the Sheriff who believed it to be
conjugal property as stipulated in Art 1404 of the OCC
and Art. 158 of the new Civil Code (this is a 1960
case!)

Art. 1404 (2): Buildings constructed during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouse shall
also belong to the partnership, but the value of the
land shall be paid to the spouse owning the same.

Art. 158 (2): Buildings constructed at the expense of
the partnership during the marriage on land belonging
to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership,
but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the
spouse who owns the same.
HOWEVER, the building was already there
even before the lot was donated to
Felisa.
Therefore, Art. 1404 should not apply.
Felisa exclusively owns both LAND and the
BUILDING upon it.
This being her own means that it is not
subject to the obligations of her
husband.
Furthermore, the building was destroyed at the time of
the sale by the Sheriff, which means that the said
house included in the deeds executed were no longer
in existence

Vda de Padilla vs Paterno
3 SCRA 678

Facts:
- 1912 Narciso Padilla married Concepcion Paterno
Feb 12 1934- Padilla died leaving his mother as
universal heiress.
-TC: made most of the properties of Padilla conjugal
due to buildings being erected on the once
- Probate court: ruled that paraphernal properties
which were only under the administration of Narciso
Padilla should be given back to Concepcion Paterno
ISSUE:
- WON income of estates that were declared
paraphernal in character only belongs to Concepcion
Paterno
- WON Concepcion can still claim for fruits of her
paraphernal property since probate court already
awarded her no fruits before and thus it would be res
judicata
- WON she is entitled to the improvements of the R.
Hidalgo Propery
HELD:
-(1) YES, ownership of land is retained by wife until
she is paid the value of the lot as result of liquidation
of conjugal partnership. Mere construction of building
from common funds does not automatically make the
land conjugal
- destruction of improvements in paraphernal property
made said property still paraphernal and should be
returned to estate of widow.
- (2) YES, Concepcion is sole owner of all income
from paraphernal property from the time of
administration of deceased Narciso Padilla until their
delivery to the estate of deceased.
- however those that were reimbursed or paid to the
estate of Concepcion and thus have become
conjugal, fruits should be shared since they are now
conjugal.
- belong now to both heir of
husband and estate of Concepcion

Calimlim v. Fortun
129 SCRA 675

Facts:

Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas
were married on Dec. 19, 1962. The land were their
house was on was inherited by him when his father
died.

1978: Fernando abandoned his family and lived with
Corazon Daguines, private respondent.

During the pendency of this appeal, they were
convicted of concubinage.

1980: Fernando sold the subject property with the
house to Corazon for P2000. He described in the
document of sale that the house was also inherited by
him from his parents.

On the same year, Corazon filed a complaint for
quieting of title and damages against Mercedes
because she was unable to take possession of the lot
and the house.

The latter resisted because she and her 5 children
were still living on the land, the coconut trees on the
land were built and planted with conjugal funds. She
also believes that the sale of the land with the house
and improvements was null and void. The objects of
the sale are conjugal properties and she had not
given consent to the sale.

Respondent Court declared that Corazon Daguines is
the lawful owner of the land, she is also entitle to half
of the house on the and.

Upon appeal to the same court, judgment was
modified, stating that the Corazon is true owner of
land and of 10 coconut trees.

The sale of the conjugal house, however, is null and
void and the 3 coconut trees and other crops planted
during the marriage.

Issues:

W/N the construction of a conjugal house on the
exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the
land the character of conjugal property.

W/N the sale of the lot together with the house and its
improvements was valid.

Held:

YES. Both the land and the house belong to the
conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is
INDEBTED to the husband for the VALUE OF THE
LAND.

NO. Contrary to morals and public policy.
Ratio:
Regarding the first issue:
Art. 158 (2) of the Civil Code.
The spouse owning the lot
becomes the CREDITOR of
the conjugal partnership for the
lot because this belonged to
him before the marriage. The
value of the lot will be
reimbursed at the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership. Thus
conjugal property will only
happen when the spouse who
owns the land is reimbursed of
such. And when one is
reimbursed, conversion from
paraphernal to conjugal
retroacts to time conjugal
buildings were first built
Padilla vs. Paterno
Since it is considered conjugal and
Mercedes did not consent to
the sale, it cannot be sold to
Daguines.
Regarding second issue:
Contract of sale of sale is null and
void. The husband sold this in
favor of a concubine after
abandoning his family.
Sale was subversive of the stability
of the family.
Art. 1409 of the Civil Code states
that contracts whose cause,
object or purpose are contrary
to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy are
VOID AND INEXISTENT from
the beginning.
Also, the law also prohibits couples who live together
without the benefit of marriage from selling/donating
to each other since it would be prejudicial to those
who actually are married.

Maramba v. Lozano
20 SCRA 474

Facts:

1948: Plaintiff Maramba files a complaint for the
collection of a sum of money from spouses Nieves
and Pascual Lozano. This was granted by the court.

1960: Not satisfied with the judgment, LOZANO
appealed to the CA who dismissed appeal because it
was not filed on time.

Record of the case was then remanded to the court a
quo and a writ of execution was issued.

Aug. 18, 1960: a levy on a parcel of land in the name
of Nieves Lozano was made. A notice of a sale at a
public auction was also made and scheduled for Sept.
16, 1960.

However, Lozano had made a partial payment by
then and asked for an adjournment of the sale to
October 26.

During this time, her husband died. She then prayed
for a restraining order on the sale of the lot for sale
being her paraphernal property. She also prayed that
her liability be then fixed at ! of the amount awarded
in the judgment.

The sale proceeded anyway.

June 28, 1961: trial court grants the motion of Nieves
Lozano. The sale on her property was allowed to
proceed to satisdy her liability which is only half now
from the original. (from P3,500.07 to P1,750.04)

Issues/Held/Ratio:

W/N the decision of the trial court last 1959 could still
be questioned.

NO. SC states that a decision that is final and
executory can no longer be amended or corrected by
the court except for clerical errors or mistakes.
W/N the judgement was joint or solidary.

JOINT. General rule is that when a judgment does not
order the defendants to pay jointly and severally (as in
this case), none of them may be compelled to satisfy
the judgment in full.

W/N the judgment debt could be satisfied from the
proceeds of the properties sold at the public auction.

It cannot. This is only on properties acquired during
the marriage. In this case, it is established that the
property is paraphernal to the wife alone. The court
has previously stated that the construction of a house
at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one
of the spouses does not automatically make it
conjugal.
The ownership remains the same until the value is
paid but payment can only be demanded in the
liquidation of the partnership. Since there was no
liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves
and Pascual, her exclusive property cannot be made
to answer for the liability of the other defendant. While
they may both use the building constructed in
paraphernal land, ownership is still with her until
liquidation of partnership pays for it.

Embrado v. CA
233 SCRA 335

Facts:

Lot 564 was sold to Lucia Embrado, as can be proven
in a Venta Definitiva by spouses Carpitanos. The
deed was prepared and signed on July 2, 1946,
although it was effective since 1941.

1943: Petitioners got married to each other.

Feb 13, 1948: The sale was registered and Transfer
Certificate No. T-99 was issued in her name alone.
Originally, her status on the Title was single, but it
was changed to "married to Oreste Torregiani by the
CFI of Zamboanga del Norte.

The couple established their home on the lot and in
1958, constructed a residential/commercial building.

1971: Lucia sold for P1000 Lot 564 to her adopted
daughter, Eda Jimenez.

Jimenez proceeded to selling parts of the lot to
Cimafranca and Salimbagat.

Petitioners instituted an action for declaration of nullity
of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and
damages against private respondednts.

Alleging that the initial sale of Lucia to Eda was void
because of lack of consideration and Oreste did not
consent to the sale of the conjugal property.

Lucia was misled into signing the deed of sale. She
thought that the lot was only intended as a security for
a loan of the Jimenez spouses.

They also believe that Cimafranca and Salimbagat
are buyers in bad faith.

CA ruled for the respondents, saying that Lucia does
not need the consent of Oreste because the lot is her
paraphernal property. CA also believes that
Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good faith.

Issues/Held/Ratio:
W/N Lot 564 was paraphernal property of Lucia or
conjugal property.
Conjugal.

First of all, the sale was not completed until the
DELIVERY of the object to the creditor. (Art 1496 of
the Civil Code)
The construction of the building on the lot was done
during the marriage already and according to Art. 158,
the land becomes conjugal upon 2 conditions:

Construction of building was at the expense of the
partnership
Land is owned by one of the spouses.

W/N sale to Jimenez was valid.
Not valid.

Evidence shows that the Jimenez spouses had no
sufficient means of livelihood so it is questionable how
they were able to obtain the money for the property.
Eda never proved also how she obtained the money
to pay.

Also, based on the decision in the first issue, the land
beng conjugal needed the consent of Oreste as well.
The sale is void ab initio being contrary to law. Thus
this also applies to Cimafranc and Salimbagat quod
nullum est, nullum producit effectum

W/N Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good
faith. If this is so, the sale to them is valid.
NO. The relationship of Cimafranca and Salimbagat
to the Jimenez spouses show that it would be
impossible that they did not know of their financial
situation. It is a general rule that a buyer of real
property must be wary before buying property and
invstigate the rights of those in possession of a
certain property. The fact that they looked in the
Register of Deeds to see the title is not an excuse,
especially if they know about the bad financial status
of the Jimenezes.

FC 121

Mariano vs CA
174 SCRA 59

Facts:
1) Respondent Daniel Sanchez's wife (Esther
Sanchez) files an action before the CFI of
Caloocan for the recovery of the value of
ladies dresses allegedly purchased and
delivered to Petitioner Lourdes Mariano.
2) Writ of preliminary attachment is issued upon
the posting of an P11,000 bond by the
nESPONDENT's wife for the seizure of 's
property to the amount of P15,000.
3) After 's motion to discharge attachment
denied, she files for certiorari with CA.
4) CA orders Trial Court to receive evidence on
WON the attachment had been improperly
issued.
5) TC rules that the attachment was improperly
issued. Renders decision in favor of :
- to pay the P15,000
-H to pay Total of P32,500 in damages.
-P11,000 bond used to pay damages w/ the
remainder to be levied on the conjugal property of n
and his wife.
6) Thus n files for annulment of execution w/
CFI as the administrator of the conjugal
partnership reasoning that "conjugal assets
could not validly be made to answer for
obligations exclusively contracted by his wife
7) QC CFI orders hearing orders sheriff to
desist in the auction. motions to dismiss
the action and is DENIED.
8) files w/ the CA a certiorari and is upheld by
the 7
th
div. but is later dismissed by the 8
th

division. Thus she goes to SC.
Issues:
WON the conjugaI partnership of the n is
IiabIe for his wife's IiabiIity in connection with
her business.
Held:
YES, there is no dispute to the fact that the n
consented to the business of his wife and that their
family benefitted from this business. As such this
income was used to maintain their family and is within
the coverage of the liability incurred upon the conjugal
property. (see FC ART 121 par. 2)

Ayala vs CA
286 SCRA 272

Facts:
1) assails the CA decision affirming the RTC
decision holding the Conjugal partnership
of n Ching not liable for the debt's
incurred.
2) Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) takes a
P50,300,000 loan from ADC, n Ching
EVP in said company executes security
agreements for the loan.
3) PBM fails to pay the loan and AIDC sues
4) CF holds PBM and n Ching jointly and
severally liable to pay.
5) Pending appeal CFI issues Writ of execution
upon the putting up of a P8m bond.
6) The sheriff poses a notice of sale on 3 of n
Ching's conjugal properties.
7) H files injunction on with CFI arguing
subject loan did not redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
8) CF rules for n issues TRO on auction and
sale.
9) petitions for certiorari w/ the CA, CA
issues TRO on the CFI decision.
10) Auction of the properties takes place and
are sold to ADC who are the only
bidders. Certificate of sale is issued and
the redemption period expires w/o being
claimed by n.
11) In the meantime while the CA decided that
CFI decision w/ TRO be set aside, the
Civil Case should push through.
12) ADC motions to dismiss the case for
being moot and academic w/ the
consummation of the sale. DENIED by
CFI.
13) TC declares the sale on execution null and
void. appeal DENED.
14) appealed to CA. DENED agreeing with
the n contention that PBM rather than the
conjugal partnership of n Ching was
benefitted by the loan. (FC ART 121 Par.
2) moreover the burden of proof of the fact
that the conjugal partnership benefitted in
this case lies with the creditor party
(ADC) who did not prove this fact of
beneficience sufficiently.
15) On appeal argue that there is no need to
prove the benefit since the mere nature of
the transaction is sufficient to prove liability
of a party.
Issues:
WON a surety agreement entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer incurs
civil liability on the conjugal partnership of
the former.
Held: NOT NECESSARILY, given that the
agreement was entered in to not primarily to
benefit of the family of the husband it cannot
be said that his conjugal partnership is
automatically liable, in any case the burden of
proof to confirm the benefit and subsequently
the liability of the conjugal property rests with
the debtor who in this case did not sufficiently
prove the said fact.
! Art 121 of FC shows that conjugal
partnership shall be liable for all debts and
obligations contracted during marriage by
the designated admin-spouse for benefit of
conjugal partnership of gains
! Read together with Art 161 where
benefit is understood to not actually
accrue but to be the reason for the
admin-spouse to enter into such a
deal
! Difference between one where
husband contracted obligation for
his own business that is for benefit
of his family and where the
husband merely acted as surety ofr
loan contracted by another for the
latter' business (MAN reason for
obligation is not for family)
Benefits contemplated in Art 121 is one resulting
directly from the loan and not just a by-product of it
which the latter example is.

Ching vs CA
423 SCRA 356

1) Same Chings in Ayala vs. CA properties
wrongfully levied. Same deal another loan
not paid and conjugal partnership not held
liable.
2) PBMCI (Philippine Blooming Mills Company,
inc.) takes a P9m loan from Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC) Ching signs a
promissory note.
3) As added security Ching w/ Tanedo and Kiat
Hua executed a continuing guarantee w/
ABC binding them to guarantee the
payment of all PBMCI obligations
amounting to P38m (w/ subsequent loans
of 12m and 13m).
4) PBMCI fails to pay. ABC files the complaint
to recover the unpaid loans with a
preliminary attachment against PBMCI
and sureties Ching, Tanedo and Kiat Hua.
5) RTC initially denies preliminary attachment
later agreeing after a bond was posted on
the argument by private n that the
defendants were disposing of their
properties w/ intent to defraud their
creditors.
6) On July 26, 1983 the deputy sheriff of the
trial court seizes 100,000 common shares
of Citycorp stocks belonging to Alfredo
Ching.
7) On Nov 16, 1993. Encarnacion Ching (the
wife) files a motion to set aside the levy on
the attachment alleging that the 100,000
shares of stocks levied were from her
conjugal funds and that the debt incurred
by her husband due to suretyship to
PBMCI through the unpaid loan did not
redound to their family.
8) ABC files motion to Quash
9) Trial Court rules for ordering the return of
the stocks.
10) CA on appeal by private n ABC nullifies
the TC order citing that was a third party
claimant w/o legal personality in the matter
and that art 160 of the CC does not apply
here where spouses failed to prove the
source of the money (whether from the
wife or the husband as a means of
establishing ownership) used to acquire
the stock and that they belonged
exclusively to Alfredo.
11) spouses file for instant petition claiming
that the source of the funds used in
acquiring the stock is of no moment to the
claim under art. 160 of the CC given that
the conjugal partnership and such
ownership of the shares is presumed even
if the stocks are under the name of only
one spouse.
12) H contends that CA was correct in ruling
so since the debt incurred by Alfonso
through his suretyship was in pursuit of his
profession and thus incurs liability on his
Issues:
1) WON the wife of the husband indebted
has standing to oppose the attachment
of property while being a third party to
a suit.
2) WON incurring debt in pursuit of one's
career as an executive via suretyship
incurs civiI IiabiIity on one's conjugaI
partnership.
1) YES, when the sheriff wrongfully levies on
attachment and seizes the property of a
third person in which said sheriff holds no
right the authority of the court which
authorized the levy may be invoked by the
third party to determine whether the levy
was proper or improper.
NO, no presumption can be inferred from the fact that
the husband enters in to suretyship that the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefitted. Even
arguing that such involvement in a suretyship would
thus further the husband's career in a corporation or
in this case sustain the corporation and perpetuate his
income thus translating to earnings for his family,
such a cause would still be indirect and not privy to
the conditions set by ART 161 of the NCC which
contemplates direct benefits to the family. (similar to
121 of FC) Moreover being that the loan was issued
PBMCI the private respondents had the burden of
proof to establish the liability of spouses conjugal
partnership to the debt.

Homeowners Savings and Loan vs. Dailo
G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005

Facts:
1) H Miguela and her husband deceased
Marcelino Dailo were married on Aug 8,
1967.
2) D
uring their marriage they purchased a
house and lot in San Pablo city from
Sandra Dalida the deed of absolute sale is
issued to Marcelino.
3) On Dec 1, 93' Marcelino authorizes a special
power of attorney (SPA) in favor of a
Lilibeth Gesmundo authorizing her to
obtain a loan from bank to be secured
by the spouses house and lot. The loan of
P300,000 is obtainedmortgaging the n
property to bank.
4) All these transactions were enacted w/o the
n knowledge and consent.
5) Upon maturity of the loan foreclosed the
property and bought the said property in
auction and consolidated ownership on
June 6, 96.
6) Marcelino dies in Dec 20, 1995. In a visit to
the property n Miguela discovers that a
caretaker is already residing in her house
and that her car w/c was parked in the
property was razed by a boy under the
caretakers watch.
7) Claiming her ignorance of the mortgage and
sale of the property and being that it was
conjugal in nature she filed a case for the
nullity of real estate mortgage and
certificate of sale affidavit of consolidation
of ownership, deed of sale, reconveyance
w/ a prayer for preliminary injunction and
damages against.
8) prayed to dismiss citing the fact that
Marcelino was the exclusive owner.
9) TC sides w/ n and grants all prayers w/
damages.
10) CA affirms TC
Issues:
WON the conjugal Partnership is liable for
the payment of the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo the same having redounded
to the benefit of the family.
Held: Not Necessarily, the adherence to Art.
121 par. 3 which the use to incur liability on
the n property places the burden of proving the
benefit given to the family of the debtee on the
the debtor alleging such a benefit. In the
instant case this fact was not sufficiently
proven. The sweeping conclusion furnished by
the that the loan Marcelino acquired was
utilized to construct housing units to the benefit
of his family, is unfounded in the absence of
proof of the matter. Moreover the matter of
benefit to the family was only raised on appeal
and is thus not well founded and even less
proven.
Also discussed here is the lack of consent where
consent of both parties is necessary when one is
selling land (art 124 of FC)

Javier v. Osmea
34 Phil 336

FACTS:
! Florentino Collantes, husband of Petrona
Javier, became indebted to the estate of
Tomas Osmena
! Sheriff executed judgment of debt by selling
at public auction all the right, title, interest or
share which the Collates had or might have
in 2 parcels of improved real estate and
especially the usufructuary interest therein of
Pascuala Santos, the surviving widow of
Felix Javier, which interest was acquired by
Petrona Javier (wife)
! Land inherited by Petrona from her
parents
! Usufructuary right acquired from
Petrona's father's 2
nd
wife for the
sum of P3,000 (amount was
borrowed giving as security for the
loan an mortgage on the property
she had inherited)
! Successful bidder: Osmena estate
! Petrona Javier claimed that Collantes had no
rights in said properties or in the
usufructuary interest # filed for annulment of
sale
! Osmena estate: admitted exclusive right of
ownership; claimed that the money which
which said usufructuary interest was
purchased belonged to the conjugal
partnership and therefore the right of
usufruct belonged to said conjugal
partnership
! CFI: annulled only the sale of 2 properties

ISSUE: WON fruits of paraphernal property should
be used to pay off the debt incurred by the husband
HELD: YES
! Art 1401 of Civil Code fruits, revenue, or
interest collected during marriage coming
from partnership property of from that which
belongs to either of the spouses is
community property
! Thus fruits of paraphernal property
form part of assets of conjugal
partnership and are liable for
payment of marriage expenses
! Wife manages paraphernal property but the
fruits of such are managed by the husband
as the administrator of conjugal property.
Debt he incurred in this case was to meet the
obligations of the conjugal partnership and were for
the benefit of the family in his exercise of profession
or industry. Thus conjugal partnership can be used to
pay it off

Vda. De Sta. Romana v. PCIB
118 SCRA 330

FACTS:
! PCIB Administrator of the estate of the
deceased C.N. Hodges
! PCIB filed for the recovery of a parcel of land
(Lot 1258-G) purchased by Ramon Sta.
Romana from C.N. Hodges
! Sheriff levied on the rights and interests of
Ramon Sta. Romana over Lot 1258-F and
improvements, also purchased from C.N.
Hodges
! Third party claim was filed by Emilio Sta.
Romana who claimed that Lot 1258-F and its
improvements had been sold to him
! RTC: rescinded Contract and ordered return
of possession of Lot 1258-G
! CA affirmed decision
! Trial judge issued a writ of execution #
Sheriff issued a notice of sale at public
auction of the rights and interests of Ramon
Sta. Romana over over Lot 1258-F
! Ramon Romana died intestate
! Petitioner Socorro L. Vda. De Sta. Romana,
surviving spouse, filed a motion to quest the
writ of execution
! Petitioner prayed that the writ of execution
and levy on execution made on Lot 1258-F
and the improvements existing theron be
annulled insofar as her ! share in the said
properties
! Respondent moved to dismiss on ground of
res judicata
! CFI: granted motion to dismiss

ISSUE: WON wife should get ! of property of
husband who died when the land in question is used
to pay off debt
HELD: NO
! As long as conjugal partnership subsists,
there can be no ! share of husband or wife.
Only when conjugal partnership is dissolved
between husband and wife can they claim it.
Any levy on conjugal partnership property to
satisty monety judgment against husband is
null and void
! in this case, the auction was made before
the conjugal property was dissolved thus
wife can't claim it. Also showed that the debt
was for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership
non-inclusion of wife in suit to enforce obligation is
immaterial. Need not be joined by wife in suit against
conjugal partnership (section 4, rule 3of rules of court
and Art 113 of CC)

G-Tractors v. CA (supra)

DBP v. Adil
161 SCRA 307

FACTS:
! Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita
Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from
the DBP in the sum of P2,000.00 in a
promissory note whereby they bound
themselves jointly and severally to pay the
account in ten (10) equal yearly
amortizations
! Obligation remained outstanding and unpaid
! Confesor, who was by then a member of the
Congress of the Philippines, executed a
second promissory note on April 11, 1961
expressly acknowledging said loan and
promising to pay the same on or before June
15, 1961
! Defaulted in payment # DBP filed complaint
! Inferior court ordered payment
! CFI of Iloilo reversed order

Issue: WON conjugal partnership may be used to pay
debt in promissory note when husband was the only
one who signed it
HELD: YES
! Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is
the administrator of the conjugal partnership.
All debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second
promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable
for this obligation.

Mariano v. CA (supra)

Wong et al. v. CA (supra) 200 SCRA 792

Ong V. CA (supra) 204 SCRA 297

Ayala Investment vs. CA
(February 12, 1998)

Facts:
16) assails the CA decision affirming the
RTC decision holding the Conjugal
partnership of n Ching not liable for the
debt's incurred.
17) Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) takes a
P50,300,000 loan from ADC, n Ching
EVP in said company executes security
agreements for the loan.
18) PBM fails to pay the loan and ADC sues
19) CF holds PBM and n Ching jointly and
severally liable to pay.
20) Pending appeal CFI issues Writ of
execution upon the putting up of a P8m
bond.
21) The sheriff poses a notice of sale on 3 of n
Ching's conjugal properties.
22) H files injunction on with CF arguing
subject loan did not redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
23) CF rules for n issues TRO on auction and
sale.
24) petitions for certiorari w/ the CA, CA
issues TRO on the CFI decision.
25) Auction of the properties takes place and
are sold to ADC who are the only
bidders. Certificate of sale is issued and
the redemption period expires w/o being
claimed by n.
26) In the meantime while the CA decided that
CFI decision w/ TRO be set aside, the
Civil Case should push through.
27) ADC motions to dismiss the case for
being moot and academic w/ the
consummation of the sale. DENIED by
CFI.
28) TC declares the sale on execution null and
void. appeal DENED.
29) appealed to CA. DENED agreeing with
the n contention that PBM rather than the
conjugal partnership of n Ching was
benefitted by the loan. (FC ART 121 Par.
2) moreover the burden of proof of the fact
that the conjugal partnership benefitted in
this case lies with the creditor party
(ADC) who did not prove this fact of
beneficience sufficiently.
30) On appeal argue that there is no need to
prove the benefit since the mere nature of
the transaction is sufficient to prove liability
of a party.
Issues:
WON a surety agreement entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer incurs
civil liability on the conjugal partnership of
the former.
Held: NOT NECESSARILY, given that the
agreement was entered in to not primarily to
benefit of the family of the husband it cannot
be said that his conjugal partnership is
automatically liable, in any case the burden of
proof to confirm the benefit and subsequently
the liability of the conjugal property rests with
the debtor who in this case did not sufficiently
prove the said fact.
! Art 121 of FC shows that conjugal
partnership shall be liable for all debts and
obligations contracted during marriage by
the designated admin-spouse for benefit of
conjugal partnership of gains
! Read together with Art 161 where
benefit is understood to not actually
accrue but to be the reason for the
admin-spouse to enter into such a
deal
! Difference between one where
husband contracted obligation for
his own business that is for benefit
of his family and where the
husband merely acted as surety ofr
loan contracted by another for the
latter' business (MAIN reason for
obligation is not for family)
Benefits contemplated in Art 121 is one resulting
directly from the loan and not just a by-product of it
which the latter example is.

Security Bank vs Mar Tiera Corp
G R No 143382, Nov 29, 2006

Facts:
! May 7, 1980 respondent Mar Tiera Corp,
through Pres, Wilfredo Martinez applied for
credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company. It was
secured with an indemnity agreement made
by Wilfredo Martinez et al.
! 1994- however business failed and they
weren't able to pay Security Bank who then
filed in RTC-Makati a writ of attachment on
all real and personal properties of
Respondent Corporation and respondent
Martinez. Part of this property was the
conjugal house and lot of Wilfrido and
Josefina Martinez
! Luckily, RTC and CA found that the
obligation contracted by Martinez did not
redound to the benefit of his family, thus they
ordered the lifting of the attachment on the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses.
ISSUE: WON conjugal partnership may be held liable
for an indemnity agreement enters into by husband
for a 3
rd
party
HELD: NO
! Art 161 of CC conjugal partnership is liable
for all debts and obligations contracted by
husband for the BENEFIT of the conjugal
partnership.
! To protect solidarity and well-being
of family as a unit thus limiting the
liability of conjugal partnership.
! Acting as a surety for the benefit of another
person or entity and not the family is not part
of the debts and obligations under Art 161
since it is for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not the surety or his family.
Only when one contracts it as the principal obligor in
the contract and is the direct recipient of the money
and services can Art 161 apply

Ramones vs Agbayani
137808, Sept 30, 2005

Facts:
! May 23, 1979 Santos Ramones, without
knowledge of his wife Aldegonda Ramones,
sold part of the lot that is part of their
conjugal property to Aurora Agbayani
! March 7, 1980 Santos Ramones died and
afterwards Aldegonda built a septic tank and
restroom in the land that was sold to
Agbayani. Thus Agbayani filed a complaint
! RTC: ruled that Deed of Sale is void since it
was without the consent of Aldegonda
! CA: reversed RTC ruling since while Art 166
prohibits the selling of property by the
husband without the consent of his wife, the
wife may only question such transaction
within 10 years and have it annulled as
found in Art 173 of CC. Aldegonda did no
such action.
ISSUE: WON sale of real property belonging to
conjugal partnership of husband without his wife's
consent is void.
HELD: NO
! Art 166 read with Art 173 merely makes it
voidable.
FC cannot be retroactively applied so Civil Code is
law that governs. Deed of Sale was also governed
under CC.

Luzon Surety v De Garcia (supra)

BA Finance v CA
161 SCRA 608

Facts:
! May Augusto abandoned his wife and
children
! July 1, 1975 Augusto Yulo secured loan
from BA finance corp as evidenced by a
promissory note he signed in own behalf and
as representative of A&L industries which is
managed by his wife, Lily Rulo whom he said
gave him authority to procure loan and sign
the promissory note.
! Augusto failed to pay loan. Thus BA
Finance filed a complaint against the
spouses.
! Lily Yulo contended thought that they were
already separated when promissory note
was executed, that her signature was forged,
and she was the sole proprietor of A&L and
never gave Augusto any authority to sign the
promissory note and said business already
closed.
! Both TC and CA dismissed petitioner's
complaint and ordered them to pay Lily
damages.
ISSUE: WON A&L can be made answerable for
obligations since it is part of the conjugal partnership
of spouses
HELD: NO
! While A&L is part of conjugal property, it
can't be made liable since the obligation
contracted by Augusto is not for the benefit
of the conjugal partnerships (Art 161 of CC)
! Evidenced by his abandonment two
months prior to when he contracted
the promissory note.
Made it appear that wife gave him authority to procure
such loan.

Costuna vs. Domondon
180 SCRA 333

Sps. Amadeo and Estela Costuna bought 3 parcels of
land during their marriage and registered the same in
the name of Amadeo. Amadeo was later hospitalized
(on different dates) for 3
rd
degree burns on his legs.
While already ill due to old age, he went to his
relatives in Samar to settle his property documents.
Because of his failure to return, Estela refused to give
her consent to the action of partition of their conjugal
partnership and the deed of sale allegedly filed by
Amadeo in Samar for the purpose of financing his
medical needs. Hence, Amadeo executed the
mentioned deed of sale, which sold his !
indeterminate share on the 3-parcel property, in
favour of Laureana Domondon. When Amadeo died,
Estela sought the execution of Amadeo's will,
executed prior to his trip to Samar, which named her
as sole. Laureana opposed the motion, claimed her !
share in the property and sought to have Estela give
consent to the deed of sale.

CA:
! husband may not sell real estate without
consent unless (1) sale of personal
properties (2) real properties acquired before
NCC (3) real properties acquired after NCC
but wife is in a leprosarium, declared
spendthrift or under civil interdiction, (4)
purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (5)
purpose is to secure future of children or
finishing a career.
! Support of spouse by conjugal property is
not relieved when they do not live on the
same roof.
ISSUE:
! (1) WON deed of sale should be nullified
since it waas without the consent of the wife
! (2) WON conjugal partnership should be
made liable for payment of hospital and
medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly
abandoned conjugal home and wife
HELD:
(1) NO
! Amadeo sought the petitoner's consent but
petitioner withheld it. However when deed of
sale was made, she did nothing to impugn it
and assailed it for the first time when
Respondent filed a case in RTC-QC.
! Amadeo only sold his ! share of community
property. Her share in the property is intact.
! When consent is unreasonably withheld, one
should consider law as falling within the
recognized exceptions
! (2) YES
it falls under the obligations protected by Art 161 of
CC since it gives a discernible advantage or good to
the conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. Health
would obviously benefit their conjugal partnership

Carlos vs. Abelardo
380 SCRA 361

On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio Carlos issued a check
worth $25k, in the name of Pura Vallejo, against his
personal account in Banker's Trust. t was allegedly a
loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband
Manuel Abelardo for the purchadse of a house and lot
from Vallejo in order to help them in their married life.
Vallejo issued an acknowledgement receipt. The
failure of the spouses to pay led Honorio to formally
demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged
their debt to her father but claimed that it was payable
on a staggered basis. Despite this acknowledgement
and the evidence of Honorio's Bank's Trust Check
(the one paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand,
Manuel denied the nature of the money as a loan. He
claimed, instead, that the amount given was his share
in income from Honorio's business, H. L. Carlos
Construction. He even presented 10 BPI checks
against the account of HLCC to prove that he had
been receiving profit from HLCC. However, he is not
included in HLCC's Articles of ncorporation or
Organizational Profile as stockholder, officer,
employee, or agent. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that
a check of $25k had been issued to Vallejo against
the personal account of Honorio and that the same
was received by the spouses and given to Vallejo for
payment of a house and lot that became their
conjugal dwelling.

! ISSUE: WON conjugal property should pay
for the loan of 25, 000 even when
acknowledgement was not signed by
husband
! HELD: YES
! Art 121 of FCC conjugal partnership is
liable for (1) debts and obligations that
benefit the conjugal partnership of gains
made by both the spouses or one of them
but with the consent of the other (2) debts
and obligations that are without consent f
one of the spouse but their family has
benefited
Evidence here shows that family did benefit since
they used the loan to buy the house which became
their conjugal home.

FC122

People v. Lagrimas
29 SCRA 153

Facts:
1) October11, 1962 Judgment finding Froilan
Lagrimas guilty of murder becomes final.
2) Writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity
in the case was issued and 11 parcels of
land in the name of the accused were
scheduled for auction on Jan. 5, 1965
3) December 29, 1964 the wife of Lagrimas
files a motion to quash the writs of
attachment and execution on the properties
citing that they belong to the spouses'
conjugal property and thus could not be held
liable for the husband's individual indemnity.
4) LC grants the petition which is later reversed
by a second judge of the same court only to
be reaffirmed by a third judge ruling for the
wife of the accused on March 5, 1960.
5) LC rules that indemnities may be imposed
on the conjugal properties of the accused
only after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and the liquidation of the assets
thereof pursuant to ART 161 of the NCC.
Issues: WON civil indemnities may be taken
from the offender's conjugaI properties even
before the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and the liquidation of its assets.
Held: YES, the Civil Code provides that indemnities
may be imposed on the conjugal property of an
offender when the offender's exclusive properties are
insufficient to cover the cost his indemnity. In this the
law does not contemplate that the conjugal
partnership must be dissolved and its assets
liquidated before the indemnity is to be drawn. It
merely requires that the offending spouse repay the
liabilities taken from the conjugal partnership when
such partnership is to be dissolved. However it is a
condition in the article that the indemnities collectible
from the CPG must not eat in to the funds for the
maintenance of the family and the education of the
children as it would lead to injustice.

Go vs Yamane
489 SCRA 107

Facts:
1) Wife of n Yamane is involved in a suit entitled
Florence Pucay De Gomez et al. v. Cypress
Corporation for this she hires a certain Atty.
Guillermo De Guzman.
2) Atty. De Guzman files for writ of execution on
a property of the wife of n as payment for
attorney's fees awarded in the
aforementioned suit amounting to P10,000
the auction of the property is scheduled on
Aug 11, 1981.
3) On Aug. 8, 1981, the n files a third party claim
on the property claiming that it is conjugal in
nature and thus not liable for the wife's
personal obligations
4) Sheriff however proceeds w/ the auction and
the property is sold to spouses Go. One
year later the sale becomes final as no
redemption is filed and the deed of certificate
of sale is issued to the on Aug 26, 1982.
5) Sept. 4, 1984. H files for annulment and
cancellation of the auction sale on same
grounds as before (3)
6) answer contending res judiccata, no cause
of action, lack of lawful remedy, and absence
of irregularity in the sale. H on the other hand
file a complaint for damages contending fraud
and misrepresentation for selling a P200,000
property to pay P10,000 in attorney's fees.
7) RTC decides in favor of stating n had no
cause of action since the property was
deemed not conjugal as it was registered in
his wife's name.
8) CA reverses RTC decision: presumption of
conjugality attaches to property acquired
during the marriage, unless proof that
exclusive funds were used in purchase are
adduced. (TCT and deed of absolute sale
indicate owner married to n Yamane) do not
prove this in instant case thus decision in
favor of n. Auction and sale annulled.

ISSUES: WON property is conjugal and can pay for
the debts of the wife and here sisters
HELD: Yes, property is conjugal but CANNOT pay for
debt
! Property as conjugal:
! (X) Unilateral declaration of wife
that property is paraphernal -
property is determined by law and
not will of one spouse
! (X) deed and title are only under
name of one spouse mere
registration is not sufficient to
establish its paraphernal nature.
Property acquired during marriage
is presumed to be conjugal property
thus stronger evidence should be
given ie purchased with exclusive
money
! (X) non-redemption of sale
redeeming it would have been
estopped him from later impugning
its validity
! lien between sisters and Atty De Guzman
can't be charged with conjugal property
since it wasn't for the benefit of the family.
Same with indebtedness because her
obligation has not been shown to be one of
the charges against conjugal partnership.
! Right are merely inchoate prior to
liquidation of conjugal partnership.
Can't answer to personal obligation when there is no
evidence that it was for support of the family, or
administration of conjugal partnership was transferred
to wife by courts of when wife gives moderate
donations for charity.

FC 123
FC 124

Guiang vs CA
291 SCRA 372

Facts:
1) H Gilda Corpuz marries Judie Corpux Dec 24,
1968. In Feb 14, 1983 they buy Koronadal lot
(lot in contention) for P14,735 from Manuel
Callejo.
2) Apr 22, 1988 Corpuz spouses sell half of the
property to spouses Guiang. build their
house and live next to neighbors, the
Corpuzes.
3) n 1989, w/ consent from her husband, n
Gilda left for Manila to secure work abroad,
became victim of illegal recruiter but stayed in
Manila till Mar 11, 1990 when she went back
to Koronadal.
4) n Jan 1990 n daughter learns of her fathers
plans to sell the family home in Koronadal to
the owner of the adjoining lot (the
Guiang)and writes to her mother about it who
replies objecting to the sale.
5) The daughter gives her mothers reply to their
neighbor Luzviminda Guiang for thte latter
to advise her father accordingly.
6) In the absence and w/o the consent of his
wife the sale pushes through. Judie Corpuz
sells to Luzviminda Guiang . for P30,000.
7) 4 days later to cure the defect of the previous
contract Luzviminda Guiang goes to the
widow of the previous owner of the lot
(Callejo) and signs an agreement for the sale
of the lot
8) March 11, 1990 n comes home finds kids
living separately in different places and
husband is nowhere to be found. He is said to
have found another wife. H and kids stay in
the family home in Koronadal (already sold).
9) file complaint to the barangay of the area
for trespassing against the n and her kids. On
Mar 16, parties sign amicable settlement: n
and kids to leave by Apr. 7,1990. H rebuts
amicable settlement.
10) file motion of execution on the amicable
settlement w/ MTC of Koronadal.
11) May 28, 1990, n files complaint against her
husband and for the nullity of deed of sale
on their property for being sold w/o her
consent.
12) RTC and CA rule in favor of n Gilda Corpuz.

ISSUE: WON contract without the consent of wife is
void
HELD: YES
! Contract elements: (1) cause (2) object (3)
consent
! FC 124 specifically states that without
consent, the contract is VOID, different from
NCC where it was just voidable
! Also can't be ratified by the amicable
settlement since a contract which is the
direct result of a previous illegal contract is
also void (Art 1422 of CC)
Plus settlement does not mention continuing offer to
sell property or acceptance of such continuing offer.

Heirs vs Mijares
410 SCRA 97

Lot 4349-B-2 is a 396 m
2
covered by TCT 205445 in
Balintawak QC registered under Spouses Vicente and
Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, purchased using conjugal
funds during converture (inc. apartments in the CPG).
Vicente married Ignacia in 1960 but were de
facto separated since 1974. In 1984, Ignacia learned
that on 3/1/83 Vicente sold 4349-B-2 to Mijares
spouses (resps) for 40k and therefore new TCT
306087 was issued. She also found out that Vicente
filed for admin and appointment as guardian of their 5
minor children @MTC QC XXI where he misrep that
Ignacia died on 3/22/82 and that he and the 5 kids are
the sole heirs.
Vicente was appointed guardian on 9/29/83
+ authorized on 10/14/83 to sell estate of Ignacia. On
8/9/84 she wrote Mijares spouses to return ! shares
in lot. Thereafter she filed for annulment of sale.
Mijares spouses claimed to be good faith buyers and
that the sale was valid due to the court's approval.
Vicente also contended that what he sold was only !
(his share) and left intact her share, that he never
misrep her.
On 2/15/90 TC declared sale as null and
void wrt share of Ignacia. That purchase price was
110k and ordered Vicente to return 55k to Mijares
couple.
Ignacia filed for Motion for modification that
sale be declared viod in its entirety and that Mijares
reimburse to her the rentals from 3/1/83. TC granted
on 5/31/90 and said that the sale was void in entirety,
ordered Vicente to reimburse the full 110k. TC on
6/29/90 amended the previous order and directed the
Register of Deeds to issue new TCT in the name of
Ignacia and Vicente+Vicente paying 50k to Ignacia for
damages. Pending appeal, Ignacia died thus was
substituted by compulsory heirs, they were
contending that rentals should be reimbursed.
On 1/26/2000 CA reversed TC, upholding
that the Mijares were in good faith thus the sale was
valid.

ISSUE: WON voidable deed of sale of property due to
lack of consent pertains to only wife's share
HELD: NO, whole property
! Governing rules Art 166 and 173 of CC
! 166 husband can't alienate real
property of conjugal partnership
unless wife has been declared a
spendthrift, or under civil
interdiction or in a leprosarium
! 167 wife may annul said contract
within ten years from transaction
questioned
! both laws were complied with
! Nov 25, 1978 entered into
contract
! June 4, 1986 sale was filed
! March 1, 1983 action to annul
! Alienation must be annulled in its entirety
and not only in so far as the sahre of wife in
the conjugal property is concerned
! Limitation of "contract shall
prejudice wife was not spelled out
in statute
Conjugal partnership is liable for many things when it
is existing thus husband has to be stopped from
disposing it without consent of wife.

Roxas v. CA
198 SCRA 541

Melania (pet) is married to Antonio Roxas but is now
living separately . Melania then found out that
estranged husband Antonio Roxas entered into a
contract of lease w/ Cayetano on 3/30/87 involving
CPG in Nova QC TCT 378197.
Melania planned to a flea market w/ 20 stalls
for grocery and dry goods in said area and invested
135k for the prep and construction. Mayor's permit
and Municipal license was already issued for 1986 but
when she attempted to renew for said year, it was
blocked by Antonio Cayetano. She therefore seek
redress saying that there was unlawful deprivation
from her operating her business as conjugal owner.
On 7/31/89 Cayetano moved to dismiss
saying that there was no cause of action. TC
dismissed said complaint and CA affirmed TC.

ISSUE: WON a lease is an encumberance and/or
alienation within scope of Art 166 of NCC
HELD: YES
! Defintions:
! Lease Art 1643 of NCC one of
the parties binds himself to give to
another the enjoyment or use of a
thing for a price certain, and for a
period which may be definite or
indefinite. However no lease for
more than 99 years shall be valid.
! Grant of use and
possession.
! Encumberance includes not only
liens but also attachment, LEASES,
and other restrictions
! Lessor transfers right of
use in favor of lessee.
Thus his right is impaired
and may even be ejected
by lessee if lessor uses
the leased realty. Thus it is
a burden and
encumberance on the land
! Alienation when lessee becomes
the owner of the thing affected by
the lease
! Thus consent of wife is necessary if lease is
for more than one year since it is now
considered as a conveyance and
encumberance within the provisions of the
CC by which real property is conveyed or
encumbered.
Art 173 of CC remedy of wife to annul the contract.

Ysasi v. Fernandez
23 SCRA 1079

Facts: Juan Ysasi (pet) married Maria Aldecoa de
Ysasi (resp). Juan conceded that Hacienda Manucao-
A is CPG. Since 1948 spouse have been shuttling
back and forth from PI to Spain (where they also own
real estate) but Juan travels more frequently.
Hacienda Manucao-A is managed by
Valentin Bilbao (1952-1965) but Juan is overall
admin. In 1965 Jon (son) took over as manager.
1966, Juan told younger son Jose Mari to assist Jon
but Jon refused to let Jose Mari act as cashier,
dissension thus developed.
Such prompted wife to leave Spain (May
1967) to fix problem. She brought letter from Juan to
sons and a list of matter that she was to ascertain and
report to husband. Husband then contends that she
never made any report.
June 1967, jon resigned which was accepted
by Juan who designated Valentin to take over. But
upon Valentin's arrial in P on 8/19/67, Jon refused to
hand over hacienda saying that his mother took
possession as admin.
Wife filed pet on 9/5/67 @CFI Negros
Occidental where she sought admin of CPG or
separation of property, praying that she be appointed
receiver litis pendentia on the grounds that
! Juan is not in the position to manage since
he is already of old age (77 yrs old) and has
a blind left eye
! Abandonment without just cause
Husband moved to set aside order
appointing wife as receiver but she opposed. On
9/22/67 she further prayed that a disinterested person
(BPI) be assigned as receiver if dispute continues.
Resp judge on 10/7/67 turned aside 9/5
orders appointing her as admin.
Juan moved for a writ of prelim mandatory
and preventive injunction to compel wife and son to
turn over hacienda to Valentin, but wife and son
opposed.
Repsondent Judge denied petition for
mandatory injunction on 12/22/67. Thus petition
where husband prays for prelim mandatory injunction
to compel wife and son to hand over hacienda.

ISSUE: WON husband may be deprived of conjugal
partnership of properties upon allegations of fraud
and abuse of such powers
HELD: NO
! Code recognizes authority of husband to be
administrator of conjugal property and mere
allegations of fraud may not take this right
away from him.
! The CA's resolution of putting hacienda into
receivership of BPI would destroy the
husband's rights when it should be used to
preserve and secure them.
RESULT: respondents are directed to turn over
authority to petitioner

Docena vs. Lapesura
355 SCRA 658

Facts:
! Casiano filed for recovery of land against his
lesees, petitioner-spouses
! Petitioners claimed ownership of the land based
on occupation since time immemorial
! TC initially rules for petitioners, but REVERSES
on appeal, ordering petitioners to vacate the land
and to pay rent
! May 22, 1995 - Casiano files Motion for
Execution, Sheriff issues an alias Write of
Demolition
! Petitioners file for Certiorari and Prohibition with
the CA, denied on grounds of it is beyond the 60
days, and the certificate of non forum shopping
was only signed by one of the petitioners
(Antonio)

ISSUE: WON certificate of non-forum shopping may
only be signed by one of the spouses
HELD: YES
! While the general rule is that certificate of
non-forum shopping should be signed by all
petitioners the signing for conjugal property
does not make it insufficient.
! Since the husband is recognized as the
administrator of the conjugal property the
husband may defend the conjugal
partnership in a suit or action without being
joined by his wife.
! While administration of conjugal property is
joint, it does not require the spouses to
always act together. Each may validily
exercise their full power to manage alone as
limited by FC ART 124.
Court presumes that husband has personal
knowledge of wife's filing, and is clearly intended for
benefit of family.

Homeowners Savings Loan Bank vs Dailo (supra)

Alinas vs Alinas
GR No 158040, April 14, 2008

Facts:
! Petitioners separated in 1982 leaving behind two
lots:
! Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega (LOT A)
! Lot 896-B-9-B with the petitioners' house
(LOT B) (This is the Lot which talks about
conjugal partnership of gains)
! Petitioners entrusted both properties to
Respondents with the agreement that any
income from rentals should be remitted to the
SSS and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City
(RBO) as the rentals would be for payment of
petitioners' loans.
! Sometime in 1993, petitioners find out that both
lots were titled in respondents' name
! Apparently both LOTS were foreclosed, and
reacquired by respondents
! Furthermore, records show that Onesiforo
executed Absolute Deed of Sale, dated March 10
1989, selling LOT B to Victor.
! Petitioners file for recovery of lots
! RTC renders decision: Lot A is respondents'. The
sale of LOT B, is null and void, since Onesiforo
sold w/o wife's consent
! Respondents file with CA
! CA renders decision: Lot A is respondents'. LOT
B's sale in so far as Rosario's share of 1/2 is
concerned is of no force and effect.

! ISSUE: WON sale conducted by husband
without consent of wife to whom he is
separated with is void
HELD: YES
! Art 124 of FC says that the absence of
authority or consent of wife shall make the
disposition or encumberance void.
! Respondent spouses who bought land (1)
knew that it was conjugal property (2) knew
that the wife did not know of the selling since
they were separated (3) sale documents do
not bear the wife's signature, thus they are
seen as buyers of bad faith
However, petitioners are still ordered by court to
reimburse them with interest.

FC 124

Uy vs. CA
346 SCRA 246

Facts:
! Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffers a stroke on March
25, 1991
! A piece of property was planned on being sold
! Upon knowledge of the planned selling, Teodoro
(Ernesto's son) files for petition praying for a
court appointed guardian to administer the
property given the present physical and mental
incapacity of Ernesto
! Gilda (Ernesto's wife) files for petition praying for
sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties and authorization to sell the same
! Alleging that the her husband's medical
treatment's bills needed to be paid, hence the
need to sell
! RTC awards petition to Gilda, pursuant to FC Art.
124 and governed by the rules on summary
proceedings of Art. 253
! Teodoro files for Motion of Reconsideration
! While above case was pending, Gilda sells the
property to Jose and Glenda Uy
! Teodoro files opposition to the motion for
approval of the deed of sale
! TC approves sale / CA reverses the decision
ordering the TC to dismiss the proceedings to
approve the deed of sale

ISSUE: WON Gilda Jardelez may assume sole
powers of administration of conjugal property and sell
land since her husband is incapacitated with a stroke
to do so.
HELD: NO
! Art 124 contemplates a situation where
spouse is absent, separated, or abandoned
the other or where consent is withheld of
cannot be obtained. Such rules don't apply
to cases where non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated.
! Rule 93 of 1964 Revised Rules of Court is
the proper remedy in judicial guardianship
proceedings. Also, FC also recognizes that
for the wife to assume power of
administration it has the same powers and
duties as a guardian under rules of court
! THUS, they must still observe rules
of sale of ward's estate required of
judicial guardians under Rule 95,
1964 Revised Rules of Court, not
the summary proceedings
In this case, TC did not comply with procedure in
Revised Rules of Court and did not serve notice of
petition to incapacitated spouse and require him to
show

FC 100(3)
FC1O1
FC61

Sabalones v. CA (supra)

FC 124-125

Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon
120 SCRA 628

Cheeseman v. IAC 193 SCRA 93 (supra)

Frenzel vs. Catito
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003

! Facts:
! Alfred (Australian, German descent)
pilot with New Guinea airlines. Started
business in Philippines in 1974 and married
Teresita Santos (Fil). They separated without
divorce in 1981.
! 1983 He met Ederlina Catito (Fil) a
masseuse in Australia. Unknown to him she is
married to Klaus Muller (German) and lived in
Germany for a while. She is fluent in German
and Alfred enjoyed talking to her.
! Alfred offered Ederlina to
stay in Phil and engage in business. She put
up a beauty parlor. Alfred decided to stay in the
Philippines for good and live with Ederlina.
They acquired properties in the name of
Ederlina which Alfred consented to since he
plans on marrying Ederlina. Klaus wrote Alfred
about his marriage with Ederlina and begged
Alfred to return Ederlina. When Alfred
confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and
Klaus were married but she assured Alfred that
she would divorce Klaus. He agreed to
continue the amorous relationship and wait for
the outcome of Ederlina's petition for divorce.
Alfred hired the lawyer. Alfred acquired more
properties in the name of Ederlina. Ederlina's
petition for divorce was denied because Klaus
opposed the same. A second petition filed by
her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all
the properties owned by Ederlina in the
Philippines before he would agree to a divorce.
Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy case
against Ederlina
! Alfred and Ederlina's relationship
started deteriorating. He demanded the return
of all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture.
! Alfred filed a Complaint on October
28, 1985 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal
properties located in Quezon City and
Manila. For Ederlina transfered funds from
their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her
own account without his knowledge and
consent. Using the said funds, Ederlina was
able to purchase the properties subject of the
complaints. He also alleged that the beauty
parlor in Ermita was established with his own
funds, and that the Quezon City property was
likewise acquired by him with his personal
funds.
! Alfred also filed a complaint against
Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court, Davao
City, for specific performance, declaration of
ownership of real and personal properties, sum
of money, and damages. (RTC Davao in favor
of Ederlina, case dismissed)
! RTC of QC: the purchaser of land is
Ederlina (Alfred as an alien was precluded from
recovering the properties from the respondent)
! CA: upheld RTC (the petitioner
knowingly violated the Constitution; hence, was
barred from recovering the money used in the
purchase of the three parcels of land. It held
that to allow the petitioner to recover the
money used for the purchase of the properties
would embolden aliens to violate the
Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance,
the public policy)
!
Pertinent Issues: whether or not the land
belongs to Alfred
!
Held/Ratio- No. It belongs to Ederlina.
The constitution prohibits Alfred from owning
lands. He cannot recover the money used to
buy the properties.

Ayuste vs.CA
GR no. 118784, Sept. 2, 1999

! Facts:
! Christina Ayuste married Rafael
Ayuste on September 24, 1961. They
bought a machine shop (managed by
Rafael) in Lucena and bought a parcel
of land also in Lucena. The title of
land was in the name of Rafael
married to Christina.
! In 1987, Rafael sold the land
in favor of private respondent. The
deed of sale was signed by Rafael
and Christina. In 1990 Christina filed a
complaint for the annulment of the
sale. She claims that her signature
was forged and the sale was without
her knowledge of consent.
- RTC: sale is null and void
- CA: sale is valid, the annulment was instituted
after Rafael died (the deed is voidable but
complaint should be raised during the marriage
as required by Art. 173.)
!
Pertinent Issues: whether or not the
sale is valid
!
-Held/Ratio- Yes. The sale is valid.
! Art. 173 The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Registration of the sale with the Register of
Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole
world. Since the deed of sale was registered on
March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed
to have constructive notice of the sale from
such date.

Villaranda vs. Spouses Villaranda
G.R. No. 153447, Feb,23, 2004

! Facts:
!
Land was left to Vicente Villaranda and
Honorio Villaranda and their siblings by
their parents. In 1976 Honorio and Vicente
executed the deed of exchange where
Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22-
square-meter portion to Honorio, in
exchange for a property in Macasandig,
Cagayan de Oro City. After the execution
of the Deed, Honorio took possession of
the 64.22-square-meter lot and
constructed a building thereon.

! On April 6, 1992, a subdivision plan was
completed, in pursuit of which TCT No. T-
65893 for the 64.22 square-meter share of
Vicente was issued in his name.
!
Honorio and Ana brought an action before
the RTC to compel Vicente to comply with
his obligations under the Deed of
Exchange. They want Vicente to identify
and delineate his undivided portion of the
property and convey to them the 64.22-
square-meter Divisoria lot, in compliance
with his obligations under the Deed.

! During the pendency of the case, Honorio
conditionally sold the Divisoria lot to
Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc.
! Vicente contends that because the
property had not been delivered, the Deed
had not been consummated. Moreover, he
claimed that the Deed had already been
revoked by both parties.
! RTC: in favor of Honorio, contract valid
! CA: upheld RTC
! The provisions of the Civil Code were
applicable to the case at bar, since the
Deed of Exchange had been entered into
prior to the enactment of the Family
Code. Thus, the absence of the wife's
signature on the Deed made it only
voidable,

not void.
! The CA further found that Ana was aware
of the execution of the Deed, and yet she
brought no action for its annulment within
ten (10) years from its execution.
!
Pertinent Issues: Whether there was a
perfected and consummated deed of
exchange
! Whether the Deed of Exchange which was
not signed by the wife of Respondent
Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and
enforceable.
! Held/Ratio- Yes. The deed is valid.
!
The absence of the signature of Ana on
the Deed does not prove lack of her
consent thereto, because a contract may
validly exist even if the parties have not
reduced their stipulations to writing. Too,
assuming that her consent to the Deed is
lacking, such fact would not render the
agreement void, but merely voidable.

! There is no evidence that any action to
annul the transfer made by Honorio was
ever brought by Ana within ten years from
"the transaction questioned." Her right to
bring an action to invalidate the contract
has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed
Deed is still valid and enforceable.
The legal prohibition against the
disposition of conjugal property by one
spouse without consent of the other has
been established for the benefit, not of
third persons, but only of the other spouse
for whom the law desires to save the
conjugal partnership from damages that
might be caused. Not being the proper
party, Vicente cannot avail himself of the
remedy prescribed by Article 173.

Ainza vs.CA
G.R. No. 165420. June 30, 2005

! Facts:
! Antonio and Eugenia owned a lot with an
unfinished residential house located in
Quezon City. In April 1987Concepcion
bought one-half of an undivided portion of
the property from her daughter, Eugenia
and the latter's husband, Antonio, for One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
! No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to
evidence the transaction, but cash
payment was received by the respondents,
and ownership was transferred to
Concepcion through physical delivery to
her attorney-in-fact and daughter,
Natividad Tuliao (Natividad). Concepcion
authorized Natividad and the latter's
husband, Ceferino Tuliao (Ceferino) to
occupy the premises, and make
improvements on the unfinished building.
! Respondents caused the subdivision of
the property. Antonio said that he bought
the property in 1980 and introduced
improvements thereon. That he and his
wife allowed Natividad and Ceferino to
occupy the premises temporarily. Antonio
requested Natividad to vacate the
premises but the latter refused and
claimed that Concepcion owned the
property. Antonio filed an ejectment suit
on April 1, 1999. Concepcion, represented
also filed on May 4, 1999 a civil case for
partition of real property and annulment of
titles with damages.
! Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia,
admitted that Concepcion offered to buy
one third (1/3) of the property who gave
her small amounts over several years
which totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for
which she signed a receipt.
! RTC: Sale is valid. In favor of
Concepcion.( sale was consummated
when both contracting parties complied
with their respective obligations. Eugenia
transferred possession by delivering the
property to Concepcion who in turn paid
the purchase price. )
! CA: sale is null and void. (Applying Article
124 of the Family Code, the Court of
Appeals ruled that since the subject
property is conjugal, the written consent of
Antonio must be obtained for the sale to
be valid. )
! Pertinent Issue: whether there was a valid
contract of sale between Eugenia and
Concepcion
! Held/Ratio:
! Sc: Valid.
! There was a perfected contract of sale
between Eugenia and Concepcion. The
records show that Eugenia offered to sell a
portion of the property to Concepcion, who
accepted the offer and agreed to pay
P100,000.00 as consideration. The
contract of sale was consummated when
both parties fully complied with their
respective obligations. Eugenia delivered
the property to Concepcion, who in turn,
paid Eugenia the price of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), as
evidenced by the receipt .
! The oral contract of sale between Eugenia
and Concepcion was evidenced by a
receipt signed by Eugenia. Antonio also
stated that his wife admitted to him that
she sold the property to Concepcion.
! The action to annul an oral contract must
be commenced within six years from the
time the right of action accrued. No action
was commenced by Antonio to annul the
sale, hence his right to seek its annulment
was extinguished by prescription.
! Under Art. 173 Antonio is still barred from
instituting an action to annul the sale
because since April 1987, more than ten
(10) years had already lapsed without any
such action being filed.
Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask
for the annulment within the prescribed
period, hence, he is now barred from
questioning the validity of the sale
between his wife and Concepcion.

Alinas vs. Alina (supra)

FC 127, FC 100 cf. FC 239

FC128

Partosa-Jo v. CA
216 SCRA 693

FACTS:

- 1980, Prima Partosa-Jo filed two
complaints against Jose Jo for
a)judicial separation of conjugal
property and b) complaint for support
for her and their daughter Monina
- 29 Nov 1983: Negros Oriental RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Prima
but failed to include judgment on
judicial separation of property in the
dispositive portion
- Prima elevated this to CA, CA
affirmed judgment on support but
dismissed petition for separation of
property for lack merit saying that it
was not allowed as their separation
was due to their agreement rather
and not because of abandonment

ISSUES:

- W/N the decision of RTC can be
questioned given that it is final and
executory
- W/N she is entitled to judicial
separation of conjugal property on the
ground of abandonment

HELD/RATIO:

- The RTC failed put judgment on
separation of property in the
dispositive portion, BUT it was made
in the penultimate paragraph reading
as follows:
! ".all the properties in
question are considered
properties of Jose Jo, the
defendant is subject to
separation of property.
- The RTC held that they were legally
married and that the properties were
acquired during coverture although
they were in the name of a dummy
(Chinese national kasi)

- Prima submits that their agreement
was not to be separated but for her to
temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her
pregnancy and that he would visit and
support her. But when she returned to
their house in Dumaguete in 1942, he
refused to accept her.
- She is entitled to separation of
property on ground of abandonment.
- Abandonment implies departure of
one spouse with intent never to return,
followed by prolonged absence
without just cause and without
providing for means although able to
do so. There must be absolute
cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention
of perpetual separation. The
physical separation of the parties,
coupled by the refusalm by Jose Jo
to give support to Prima, sufficed
to constitute abandonment as a
ground for legal separation of their
conjugal property. Aside from this,
he admittedly cohabitated with other
women and have not established just
cause for his refusal to comply with
his duties as husband.
- Court ordered for division between the
two hal/half. It should include
properties such as those which were
registered in the name of other
persons in violation of the anti-dummy
law.
"The past has caught up with the private
respondent. After his extramarital flings and a
succession of illegitimate children, he must
now make an accounting to his lawful wife of
the properties he denied her despite his
promise to her of his eternal love and care.

FC 126 (10
FC 63 (2), FC 66
FC 50 in rd. To FC 43 (2)
FC 134-138
FC129

Metropolitan Bank vs Pascual
GR No. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008

FACTS:
- Nicholson Pascual m. Florencia
Nevalga on 19Jan1985. During the
union, they bought a 250-square
meter lot in Makati from Clarito and
Belen Sering.
- In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psycholohical
incapacity. 31July1995, RTC ordered
dissolution and liquidation of ex-
spouses' conjugal partnership of
gains, however, they failed to liquidate
it.
- 30April1997, Florencia, with Norberto
and Elvira Oliveros obtained a 58
Million Peso loan from Metrobank. To
secure obligation, they mortgaged
their properties, including the lot in
Makati. Florencia gave Metrobank a
copy of the RTC decision and a
waiver allegedly executed on
9Apr1995 by Nicholson in favor of
Florencia covering conjugal properties
that were listed therein but did not
include the Makati property.
- They failed to pay their obligation so
Metrobank initiated foreclosure
proceedings and at the auction sale
emerged as the highest bidder.
- 28June2000, Nicholson filed for nullity
of marriage alleging that the property
was conjugal and was mortgaged
without his consent
- RTC declared the mortgages invalid
and ordered Metrobank and Florencia
to pay Nicholson P100,000.00 moral
damages and P75,000.00 attorney's
fees.
- CA affirmed with modification, deleting
the fees imposed

ISSUE/S:
- W/N the property is conjugal
- W/N the Mortgage was valid

HELD:
- The disputed property is conjugal.
- Metrobank virtually recognized the
conjugal nature of the property when it
refered to them as "spouses, "co-
mortgagor in a)the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure b) published
notice for foreclosure and c) demand
letter to vacate premises of the
property.
- Contrarty to Metrobank's submission,
the matter of the use of conjugal
funds as an essential requirement
for the presumption of conjugal
ownership to arise is WRONG. %
only proof acquisition during the
marriage is needed to raise
presumption.
- The declaration of nullity of
marriage, without more, does not
automatically result in the regime
of complete separation when it is
shown that there was no liquidation
of the conjugal assets.
- While the declaration of nullity
severed the marital bond and
dissolved conjugal partnership, the
character of the properties
acquired continues to subsist as
conjugal property until and after
the liquidation and partition of the
partnership.
- Pending its liquidation, the CPG is
converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership. What governs the property
relation is Art 493 which says the
effect of the alienation or the
mortgage. shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
- Florencia has the right to mortgage !
undivided interest without consent
Mortgage is valid insofar as the share of
Florencia is concerned.

FC 129
FC 129; FC 43(2)
FC 63(2)
FC 130 (cf. FC 104)
FC131
FC132

Santero v. CFI
153 SCRA 728

Facts:
Private respondents are requesting for
a Motion for Allowance from the
estate of deceased Pablo
Pascual (legitimate father of
private respondents) which was
granted by the CFI.
Petitioners (also legitimate children of
Pascual with another woman)
oppose the motion on the
grounds that most of the private
respondents are already of age.
NOTE: neither of the women
are legally married to
Pablo Pascual.
Issue:
W/N court acted with grave abuse of
discretion by granting the motion
for allowance.
Held: NO
Ratio:
Petition lacks merit.
Art. 290 (support for children can apply even
beyond the age of majority) and 188 (right to
allowance) apply. t doesn't matter if they are of
age, gainfully employed and married. The New
Civil Code entitles the children to allowance as
advances of their shares in the inheritance
from their father, Pablo. A substantive right
cannot be impaired by a procedural one (Rule
83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court)

FC 143-146
FC 103 &FC 130
FC 66(2)
FC144
FC145
FC 142
FC 146
FC 87, NCC 1490

FC 134

Maquilan vs Maquilan
June 8, 2007

Facts:
Spouses Maquilan were happily married until
Virgilio discovered that Dita was having an
affair.
He filed a complaint for adultery in which Dita
and her paramour were found guilty.
June 15 2001: Private respondent filed a
Pet i t i on f or Decl ar at i on of Nul l i t y of
Mar r i age, Di ssol ut i on and Li qui dat i on
of Conj ugal Par t ner shi p of Gai ns and
Damages.
Dur i ng pr e- t r i al of case, spouses
cr eat ed a COMPROMI SE
AGREEMENT.
This is with regard to some particular
properties that they either decided to divide
between them or give to their common child,
Neil.
Compromise agreement was given judicial
imprimatur by respondent RTC Judge.
Jan. 15, 2002: Petitioner files an Omnibus
Motion saying that his lawyer did not
"intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the
consequential effects of the Agreement.
Respondent Judge denied Motion.
Aug. 30, 2002: CA also dismissed petition for
lack of merit.
The conviction of the crime of adultery of Dita
does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing
in the conjugal property.
She was only sentenced with the penalty of
prision correccional, without civil interdiction,
which would have deprived her of the right to
manage her property.
Since petition for declaration of nullity was not
yet decided, it would be premature to apply Art.
43 and 63 of FC (re: effects of nullified
marriage or LS)

The spouses also VOLUNTARILY agreed to a
separation of their property which was
approved of by law, in accordance with FC
134. t is the petitioner and his lawyer's fault for
not checking nor objecting to this right away
before it was approved of.

Main Issue:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of
property made by the spouses pending the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
valid.

HELD:
YES. The court fully concurs with the CA %

Rat i o:
Art. 134 of the FC says that separation of
property may be effected and is subject to
judicial approval. In the case at bar, this was
clearly allowed by the RTC so it holds.

Obiter: voluntary separation of property is
subject to rights of all creditors of CPG and
other persons with pecuniary interest (Art 136
FC)

Re: Dita being a guilty spouse: ".the
contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law
and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.

Conviction of adultery does NOT carry the
accessory of civil interdiction, rendering the
agreement still valid, as opposed to what the
petitioner believes. (Look at ratio of CA)
Again, the petitioner cannot use the excuse
that he was misinformed by his previous
counsel. "Negligence of the counsel binds the
client. (Salonga vs. CA)

FC 135 cf. FC 55 (10)
FC 136,
FC 74-75, FC 134

Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson (supra)

FC 137 par. 1
FC l37par.2
FC 138 ofFC 66 (2)
FC 139-140; of FC 66(2)
FC 141 cf.FC67
FC 142

FC 35-38, 53; FC 41,44; FC 45

FC 147

Maxey v. CA
129 SCRA 187 cf. NCC 144

Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both
deceased) lived as husband and wife in Davao,
out of this common law marriage, they had 6
children (petitioners)
1903 when they started living together
1911-1912 when Melbourne bought the lands
1919 when they married in church and when
1
st
wife died.
1953- husband remarried, when 2
nd
wife sold
the land.
1961 when children discovered sale
Plaintiffs are currently praying for the
annulment of the documents of sale over
particular lands that were sold to private
respondent couple by their father's 2
nd
wife.
They allege that common properties belonged
to their parents who acquired the lands during
their lifetime and through their joint effort and
capital. Sales of land by their father were done
without their knowledge and consent and only
after their mother, Regina had died in 1953.
Children discovered sale in 1961.
Respondent spouses insist that they are
buyers in good faith and they believed that the
Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of
land.
Melbourne and maxey started living together in
1903. That same year, the children allege that
they got married "in the military fashion. They
acquired properties in 1911 and 1912. They got
married in 1919.
Regina died sometime in 1919, soon after the
church marriage.
1953: husband remarried.

Issue:
W/N spouses Maxey were married as early
as 1903 "in a miIitary fashion" as aIIeged by
the children
NO. The CFI and the CA were correct in
rejecting this since the Act No. 3613 a.k.a. the
Revised Marriage Law was approved much
later (Dec. 4, 1929). It could not apply to a
1903 marriage.

W/N common law spouses, prior to
marriage, share conjugal property over
lands acquired in 1912.

RTC: applied Art. 144 that states that in
common law marriages, the property
acquired by both through work, industry,
wages, salaries are governed by the rules of
co-ownership.

CA: Ruled otherwise, they believed that the
land was exclusive property of Melbourne
Maxey. Art. 144 should not have applied
because the Regina did not contribute to the
acquisition of the profit. She had no income of
her own. Cannot consider this a "joint effort.

SC: YES. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should
apply there being no showing that vested rights
would be impaired or prejudiced through its
application.

Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they
do not prejudice or impair any vested or
acquired right.

Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code
on August 30, 1950, the formation of an
informal civil partnership between a man and
wife not legally married and their corresponding
right to an equal share in properties acquired
through their joint efforts and industry during
cohabitation was recognized through
decisions of this Court. (Aznar et al. vs.
Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil.
451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-24449, December
31, 1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.)

Under this new code, it is believed that even if
it is only the man who works, there is still a
50-50 sharing of property acquired during
their cohabitation together.

The woman runs the household:
"in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse,
husbands hand over their pay checks and get
an allowance in return and the wife manages
the affairs of the household. . . ." (Dean Cortes)

"In the Philippines, the best man is the
woman." (Gov-Gen Leonard Wood)

Ruling:
"the petitioners should return one-half of the
P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the
private respondents should pay some form of
rentals for their use of one-half of the
properties. Equitable considerations, however,
lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and
return of P650.00 on the other.

Domingo v. CA
226 SCRA 572 (All Opinions)

Facts:
! 1969 previous marriage of Roberto
Domingo and Emerlina dela Paz
! 1976 married Delia Soledad
Domingo
! 1979 present Delia was working in
Saudi Arabia while husband has
remained unemployed (1983-present)
! was the supporter of the
family and purchased real
and personal properties out
of her personal earnings.
Roberto was the
administrator
! 1983 when Delia knew of first
marriage
! 1989 when she discovered he had
another woman and was also selling
her property without her consent.
! Thus asked lower court for
! (1) a temporary
restraining order
stopping Roberto
from exercising any
act of administration
and ownership over
the properties
! (2) fomarriage to be
declared null and
void
! (3) Delia Domingo
be declared sole
and exclusive
owner of all
properties acquired
at time of their void
marriage.
! RTC denied for lack of merit since
marriage is seen as void in the first
place thus steps aren't necessary
! CA: held that prayer for nullity along
with separation of properties may be
raised however they were still denied
for lack of merit. Thus case is in SC
ISSUE: WON respondent may recover certain
real and personal property exclusively
belonging to her
HELD: YES
! Distribution and separation of property
of spouses is one of the reasons why
there's a need to judicially declare that
a marriage is void.
! Court that declares a marriage void
will also provide for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of properties
of spouses. It is a necessary
consequence of judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage
! Rules that apply: FC Art 43
and 44
! Separation of property will be
according to regime of
property relations governing
them.
CONCURRING BY VITUG
When a void marriage is still in existence
(without judical declaration of nullity) neither
the CPG or ACP will apply instead, property
relations shall be governed by co-ownership
rules under Art 147 or Art 148 of FC.

Belcodero v. CA (supra)

Valds v. QC RTC, supra

Carino vs. Carino, supra

Fehr vs. Fehr
G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003

Facts:
! March 1983 petitioner and
respondent moved in together in
Manila.
! July 1983 bought Suite 204 of LGC
condominium. Deal was executed by
respondent and was issued under
petitioner's name
! 1985 got married
! 1997 marriage was declared void
under FC 36
! 1999 RTC issued order resolving
their property. This was contested by
petitioner adducing that Suite 204,
LGC condominium was purchased on
installment basis when they were
living exclusively as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage thus rules
on co-ownership should apply (FC Art
147)
! TC: affirmed ruling that condo unit
was acquired before marriage thus is
solely respondent's property
! CA: dismissed petition for lack of
merit. Thus the present petition.
SSUE: WON Suite 204 is solely respondent's
property
HELD: NO
! FC Art 147 applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to
marry but whose marriage is still void.
! Elements: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each
other (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and
wife (3) union is without
benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void = all 3
elements are present in this
case
! "Capacitated legal
capacity of party to contract
marriage
! presumed that property was
obtained through joint efforts.
! Evidence clearly shows that condo
unit was obtained when they were
living exclusively together thus is
considered COMMON PROPERTY of
petitioner and respondent
Civil code provisions on co-ownership should
thus should thus apply to answer property
regime of the parties.

Joaquino vs Reyes
434 SCRA 260

Facts: - Rodolfo A. Reyes and Lourdes P. Reyes were
married on January 3, 1947 but since 1962,
Rodolfo had been living with his paramour,
Milagros B. Joaquino.
- As Vice President and Comptroller of Warner
Barnes & Company, - Rodolfo obtained a loan
of P140k from Commonwealth Insurance
Corporation in order to purchase a house and
lot in BF Homes, Paraaque. He also
mortgaged the same (through a Special Power
of Attorney) to pay the balance of the purchase
price and secured a life insurance policy from
Philam Life Insurance Corporation to guaranty
the payment where he paid monthly
amortizations. The property was registered
under the name of Milagros Joaquino only
even though it was purchased with the
earnings, and hence conjugal funds, of
Rodolfo.
- When Rodolfo died on September 12, 1981,
Milagros and their natural children claimed that
Milagros was unaware of Rodolfo's marriage,
that the house and lot as Milagros' exclusive
which she allegedly obtained with her own
funds, that she only authorized Rodolfo to
mortgage the house and lot as a matter of
convenience but she personally provided funds
for the amortization, and that she did not
benefit from Rodolfo's emoluments and other
pecuniary benefits. On the other hand, Lourdes
and their children claimed that the properties
were conjugal properties because they were
paid for by the earnings of Rodolfo during the
marriage.

Issue: WON house and lot are conjugal
properties
Held: YES
The presumption in favour of the conjugal
partnership operates in the case at bar
because the properties were acquired during
coverture (NCC 160).
! Even though Rodolfo was already
living with Milagros when the
properties were bought, the rules of
co-ownership between persons
cohabiting as husband and wife
(under NCC 148) only applies to
properties acquired by both through
their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry.
Ownership then is proportional to their
respective contributions, which are
considered equal absent proof to the
contrary.
! Art 153 what are conjugal
properties
! Art 144 DOESN'T APPLY
common law marriages are
entitled to co-ownership
(50/50) laws IF COUPLES
ARE NOT INCAPACITATED
TO MARRY EACH OTHER
WHICH IN THIS CASE
THEY CLEARLY ARE THUS
CAN'T APPLY.
! (X) applied to
adultery/concubinag
e
! ART 148 does when
common-law couple have a
legal impediment, only
property acquired by them
through ACTUAL, JOINT
CONTRIBUTION OF
MONEY, PROEPRTY OR
INDUSTRY, shall be owned
by them in common and in
proportion to their respective
properties
! This also wasn't
proven by petitioner
since she had no
job or money to
gain the properties
in question. Thus
they are conjugal.

! The financial capacity of Rodolfo as
VP and Comptroller of WBC, his
retirement package, his application for
the mortgage loan intended of
'housing' and his monthly
amortizations and semi-annual
premiums payable to Commonwealth
by Philam sufficiently prove that
Rodolfo purchased the property by his
own funds. And where his salaries are
considered cp, the loan and the
purchased properties were also cp.
! On the other hand, Milagros only
showed Affidavits and undated
Certifications to prove that she
purchased the properties by her own
money, borrowing from her siblings,
selling jewellery and selling a
drugstore four years prior. The
registration of the properties under
Milagros' name can thus be
considered only as a donation that is
void under NCC 739 (1) especially
where Rodolfo intended to deprive
Lourdes of ownership over the
properties.
!
n terms of the illegitimate children's right to
Rodolfo's estate, their rights must be
determined in a special proceeding instituted
for that purpose. The issue was not raised or
presented in the original and supplemental
complaints for reconveyance of property and
damages, in the answers of Milagros and her
memorandum. Hence, the illegitimate filiation
of her children could not have been duly
established in the case at bar.

Gonzales vs Gonzales
478 SCRA 327

Facts:
Before they started living together on March
1977, Francisco Gonzales offered Erminda
Gonzales to be his partner in Fiesta Pizza, his
pizza business, and to take over its operations.
She accepted the offer and took care of the
business' daily operations, personnel
management, outlets supervision, and met
people during inspections.
- Despite their marriage on Feb. 4, 1979, the
same was declared void under FC 36 on Feb.
12, 1997. Erminda then sought the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership and claimed the
pizza business to be conjugal property where
she contributed to 80% of the total
management. Francisco, however, claimed that
it was exclusive.

Issue: WON properties should be divided
equally between husband and wife
Held: YES
because the marriage was declared void, the
property regime that applies is co-ownership
under FC 147. Under the rules of co-
ownership, properties acquired by both parties
during their union (under a void marriage) are
presumed to have been obtained through joint
efforts and will be owned by them in equal
shares absent proof of the contrary. Francisco
admitted in a handwritten letter dated Sept. 6,
1989 that Erminda had helped in the
management of the business and was not a
mere housewife. Hence, the business is co-
owned and both Francisco and Erminda are
presumed to have contributed jointly.
! Art 147 applies when )1) when man
and woman capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other
without benefit of marriage (2) when
man and woman live together under
void marriage
! Presumption is anything
acquired during both
instances are obtained
through joint efforts and shall
be divided equally.
Party who didn't participate in acquisition by
other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in acquisition if former's
efforts consisted of care and maintenance of
family and household.

FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50

Juaniza v. Jose
89 SCRA 306

FACTS:
! Passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train
of the Philippine National Railways
(Nov. 23, 1969) which resulted in the
death to 7 and physical injuries to 5 of
its passengers
! Eugenio Jose registered owner and
operator of the passenger jeepney
! At the time of the accident, Eugenio
Jose was legally married to Socorro
Ramos but had been cohabiting with
defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo
for 16 years
! CFI decision on resulting cases for
damages:
! Ordered Jose and Rosalia
Arroyo jointly and severally
to pay
! Rosalia Arroyo filed for Motion for
Reconsideration # denied
! Lower court based her
liability on Art. 144 of the
Civil Code
! CA certified question to SC
ISSUES:
! WON Art. 144 of the Civil Code is
applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship
is incapacitated to marry
! WON Rosalia who isn't a registered
owner of the jeep can be held
solidarily liable for damages with the
registered owner of the same
HELD:
! NO
! Co-ownership contemplated
in Art. 144 of the Civil Code
requires that the man and
the woman living together
must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract
marriage
! NO
! Rosalia Arroyo cannot e a
co-owner of the jeepney
! Jeep belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Jose and his
legal wife
! No basis for the liability of
Rosalia Arroyo for damages
Only the registered owner of a public service
vehicle is responsible for damages that may
arise from consequences incident to its
operation or maybe caused to any of the
passengers therein

Gomez v. Lipana
33 SCRA 615

FACTS:
! Lipana contracted two marriages:
! (1) Maria Loreto Ancino-
1930
! (2) Isidra Gomez y Aquino
1935 # while 1
st
marriage
was still subsisting (Isidra
didn't know)
! Dec. 13, 1943 # Lipana and Isidra
purchased a piece of land in Cubao
(P3,000)
! Torrens Title issued in Feb.
1, 1944: "Joaquin Lipana
married to sidra Gomez
! July 20, 1958 # Isidra died intestate
and childless, survived only by her
sisters
! August 7, 1961 # Ofelia Gomez,
judicial administratrix of sidra's estate
prayed for the forfeiture of the
husband's share in the Cubao
property in favor of the estate
! Art. 1417 of the old Civil
Code
! Trial Court ruled in favor of the estate
! Because. 2
nd
marriage was
void ab initio and the
husband was the one who
gave cause for nullity
ISSUES:
! WON Art. 1417 of the old Civil Code is
applicable
HELD:
! NO
! Since Lipana's 1
st
marriage
hasn't been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal
partnership established by
that marriage has not
ceased.
! Under the 2
nd
paragraph of
Art. 1417, it is upon the
termination of the partnership
by either of said causes that
the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse takes place
! When did the
formed by virtue of
2
nd
marriage
terminate? sidra's
death in 1958
! Art. 1417
was no
longer in
force #
changed
by NCC
(took effect
1950
! No action lies under Art.
1417 for the forfeiture of the
husband's share.
RESULT: recognize right of 2
nd
wife to her
husband while other half is conjugal
partnership of first marriage. Thus decision is
reversed.

Yap v. CA
145 SCRA 229

! Facts: Maning Yap married Talina Bianong
in 1939 and they had 4 children. 2 of which
died in infancy. Herein petitioners are the
two surviving children, Shirley and Jaime.
While the first marriage was still
subsisting, Maning married Nancy on
December 11, 1948. They had four
children. On February 21, 1964, Maning
died because of a plane crash. On March
3, 1964, Talina sought the issuance of
letters of administration for the estate of
Maning. It was opposed by Nancy and her
minor children. Talina was initially
appointed special administratix and then
later Shirley Yap was appointed regular
administratix.
!
! Since there was a residue of properties
and collectible debts after payments to
creditors, the court set the case for hearing
to arriave at a declaration of heirship for
the purpose of liquidating the conjugal
partnership of Maning and his surviving
spouse and to determine the heirs entitled
to inherit his intestate estate. Lower court
declared Talina and her children as the
legal heirs of Maning .
!
! The CA reversed this decision and ruled
that the estate should be equally divided
into two equal part: ! to Talina and her
children and ! to Nancy Yap and her kids
by virtue of the Leyes de Partidas.
!
! Petitioners contend that since Maning died
in 1964 when the NCC was already
effective, the Spanish Civil Code should be
followed.
!
! Issue: WON the second wife is entitled to
inherit
!
! Held. No
!
! Ratio: The records show that the
properties in question were acquired by
Talina and Maning during their marriage.
Hence, these properties in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary are
considered conjugal properties of Talina
and Maning (Art. 142, NCC)
!
! Pursuant to Art. 142 and Art. 185 of the
NCC, the net remainder of the conjugal
partnership of gains after money claims
filed by creditors against the intestate
estate of Maning approved by the lower
court have been paid by the administratix
should be equally divided between Maning
and Talina as their shares. The ! share of
Maning would then comprise his intestate
estate to be distributed to his heirs.
!
! Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit
from Maning Yap because their marriage
was void ab initio (Art. 83, NCC)
!
Ruling: Petition is granted.

Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals (supra)

Agapay vs Agapay
276 SCRA 340

Facts:
! Miguel Palang married Carlina (or
Cornelia) Vallesterol on July 16, 1949
! October 1949, he left to work in
Hawaii
! as early as 1957, Miguel had
attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii
! July 15, 1973 Miguel married with
nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay
! May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda,
jointly purchased a parcel of rice land.
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
101736 issued in their names
! September 23, 1975 Erlinda allegedly
purchased a house and lot and title
was issued in her name
! October 30, 1975, Miguel and
Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of
Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case
filed by the latter. The parties therein
agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of
land to their only child, Herminia
Palang
! 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of Concubinage upon
Carlina's complaint. Two years later,
on February 15, 1981, Miguel died
! July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her
daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz,
herein private respondents, instituted
the case at bar, an action for recovery
of ownership and possession with
damages of the house and lot
together with the riceland
Issue
Who is the owner of the two pieces of property
Held: Carlina, the first wife
! Under FC Article 148, only the
properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision since it for
relationships that have legal
impediments
! Art 147 is the law that
recognizes relationships
without legal impediment and
proof of care and
maintenance of family and
household equates to joint
effort.
! Erlinda failed to persuade the court
that she actually contributed money to
buy the subject Riceland hence the
riceland reverts to the first marriage
! With respect to the house and lot,
Erlinda allegedly bought the same
for P20,000.00 on September 23,
1975 when she was only 22 years old-
however the notary testified that the
property was purchased by Miguel but
put in the name of Erlinda- the
transaction was essentially a void
donation
! Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage
Compromise agreement entered into by
Carliana and late Miguel is not a separation of
property and should not be inferred as such.
NO LIQUIDATION WAS MADE.

Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez
G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000

Facts: ! Spouses alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment
building and that they had allowed the
defendants-private respondents to
occupy the apartment building for the
last seven (7) years, since 1989
without the payment of any rent. They
agreed that after a few months
guillerma tumlos would start paying
rent but she failed to pay after
repeated demands. They prayed that
defendants be ejected
! Guillerma Tumlos averred therein
that the Fernandez spouses had no
cause of action against her, since she
is a co-owner of the subject premises
as evidenced by a Contract to Sell
wherein it was stated that she is a co-
vendee of the property in question
together with [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez
! Defendants alleged Mario Fernandez
and Guillerma had an amorous
relationship, and that they acquired
the property in question as their 'love
nest'
! Guillerma administered the property,
until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of
his marriage. It was also during the
early part of 1996 when Mario
accused her of being unfaithful and
demonstrated his baseless jealousy
! Petitioner's central theory and main
defense against respondents' action
for ejectment is her claim of co-
ownership over the property with
Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the
first instance before the MTC, she
presented a Contract to Sell indicating
that she was his spouse
! CA rejected petitioner's claim that she
and Respondent Mario Fernandez
were co-owners of the disputed
property

Issue:
A. Is the petitioner a co-owner of the
property?
B. Can the claim for support bar this
ejectment suit?
Held:
! the applicable law is not Article 144 of
the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the
Family Code which provides
! Article 144 of the Civil Code applies
only to a relationship between a man
and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or
to one in which the marriage of the
parties is void from the beginning. It
does not apply to a cohabitation that
amounts to adultery or concubinage,
for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his
lawful wife
! Based on evidence presented by
respondents, as well as those
submitted by petitioner herself before
the RTC, it is clear that Mario
Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally
married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is
also clear that, as readily admitted by
petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in
a state of concubinage. Therefore,
Article 144 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable
! Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not
falling under the preceding
Article,[21] only the properties
acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married
to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
likewise apply even if both parties are
in bad faith
! Petitioner's argument -- that the
Family Code is inapplicable because
the cohabitation and the acquisition of
the property occurred before its
effectivity -- deserves scant
consideration. Suffice it to say that the
law itself states that it can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice
vested or acquired rights. In this case,
petitioner failed to show any vested
right over the property in question.
Moreover, to resolve similar issues,
we have applied Article 148 of the
Family Code retroactively
Petitioner failed to present any evidence that
she had made an actual contribution to
purchase the subject property. She anchors
her claim of co-ownership merely on her
cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez

Malilin vs Castillo
333 SCRA 628

Facts:
! -Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a
complaint for "Partition and/or
Payment of Co-Ownership Share,
Accounting and Damages" against
respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo
! -petitioner and respondent, both
married and with children, but
separated from their respective
spouses, cohabited after a brief
courtship sometime in 1979 while their
respective marriages still subsisted.
! -during their union, they set up the
Superfreight Customs brokerage
corporation and also acquired
properties which were registered
solely in Elvira's name.
! -In 1992, due to irreconcilable
differences, the couple separated.
Petitioner demanded from respondent
his share in the subject properties, but
respondent refused alleging that said
properties had been registered solely
in her name.
! -She denied that she and petitioner
lived as husband and wife because
the fact was that they were still legally
married to their respective spouses.
She claimed to be the exclusive
owner of all real and personal
properties involved in petitioner's
action for partition on the ground that
they were acquired entirely out of her
own money and registered solely in
her name.
! -RTC dismissed case. It also ruled
that it is immaterial whether the
parties actually lived together as
husband and wife because Art. 144 of
the Civil Code can not be made to
apply to them as they were both
incapacitated to marry each other.
Hence, it was impossible for a co-
ownership to exist between them.
! -CA granted respondent's motion. t
said in its decision that the desired
declaration of co-ownership and
eventual partition will utterly be an
indirect or collateral attack on the
subject titles in this suit. Verily,
plaintiff-appellant should have first
pursued such remedy or any other
relief directly attacking the subject
titles before instituting the present
partition suit. Apropos, the case at
bench appears to have been
prematurely filed.
! ISSUE: Can plaintiff validly claim the
partition and/or payment of co-
ownership share, accounting and
damages, considering that plaintiff
and defendant are admittedly both
married to their respective spouses
under still valid and subsisting
marriages, even assuming as
claimed by plaintiff, that they lived
together as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage? In other words,
can the parties be considered as co-
owners of the properties, under the
law, considering the present status of
the parties as both married and
incapable of marrying each other,
even assuming that they lived
together as husband and wife (?)
! HELD: Yes
! -Article 148 shall apply in this case. If
the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other, properties acquired by
them through their joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which,
in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal.
There is thus co-ownership even
though the couple are not capacitated
to marry each other.
! -Petitioner sought partition of real
properties and a substantial amount of
personal properties consisting of
motor vehicles and several pieces of
jewelry. By dismissing petitioner's
complaint for partition on grounds of
due process and equity, the appellate
court unwittingly denied petitioner his
right to prove ownership over the
claimed real and personal properties.
The amended decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further
proceedings on the merits.

Saguid vs. CA
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003

Facts:
-Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married
but separated de facto from her husband, when
she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in
Marinduque, sometime in July 1987
-the two decided to cohabit as husband and
wife in a house built on a lot owned by
Jacinto's father.

-In 1996, the couple decided to separate and
end up their 9-year cohabitation.

-On January 9, 1997, private respondent Gina
Rey filed a complaint for Partition and
Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque
-She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00
a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able
to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of
their unfinished house. Also, from her own
earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she
was able to acquire and accumulate
appliances, pieces of furniture and household
effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She
prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount
of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to
the construction of their house, be reimbursed
to her.
-Petitioner Jacinto Saguid claims that expenses
for the construction of their house were
defrayed solely from his income as a captain of
their fishing vessel. He averred that private
respondent's meager income as fish dealer
rendered her unable to contribute in the
construction of said house; Gina did not work
continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but
only for a 6-month duration each year. When
their house was repaired and improved
sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did
not share in the expenses because her
earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily
needs and business of her parents
-RTC rendered judgment in favor of Gina Rey
-CA affirmed RTC ruling

ISSUE: whether or not the parties can be
considered as co-owners of the properties
Held: YES
- it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were
not capacitated to marry each other because
the former was validly married to another man
at the time of her cohabitation with the latter.
Their property regime therefore is governed by
Article 148
30
of the Family Code. In this case,
the proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential.
- Art 148 applies even if cohabitation
or acquisition of property occurred before FC
took effect since no law before it answers
cohabitation of couples living in adultery or
concubiange
- The controversy centers on the house and
personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she
contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of
their house. However, nowhere in her
testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are
receipts in her name for the purchase of
construction materials on November 17, 1995
and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of
P11,413.00.
-Both parties claim that the money used to
purchase the disputed personal properties
came partly from their joint account with First
Allied Development Bank. There is no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their
respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article
148 of the Family Code, in the absence of
proof of extent of the parties' respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to
be equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00, the
existence and value of which were not
questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share
therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e.,
P55,687.50 each.
- Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared
co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the
controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00
and personal properties to the extent of
P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse
the amount of P67,100.50 to private
respondent, failing which the house shall be
sold at public auction to satisfy private
respondent's claim.

Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439 (supra)

Joaquino vs Reyes
434 SCRA 260

Francisco vs Master Iron Works
451 SCRA 494

Facts:
! Josefina Castillo was only 24 when
she married Eduardo Francisco in
1983.
! Imus Rural Bank then executed a
deed of sale for 320,000 in favor of
Josefina married to Eduardo.
! Eduardo then, on 1985, executed an
affidavit of waiver where he declared
that Josefina purchased two parcels
of land including a house before their
marriage.
! In 1986, Josefina mortageged the said
property to Leonila Cando for a loan
of 157K
! 1990 Eduardo bought 7500 bags of
cement from Master Iron Works but
failed tp pay.
! MIW filed a complaint against him,
and the trial court sided with MIW on
1992.
! Sheriff Alejo levied on the property of
Josefina which made her execute an
affidavit of third party claim saying that
the two parcels of land were
paraphernal.
! The property was sold in an auction
for 1,350,000
! Josefina amended her complaint, to
reconvey the property with moral
damages.
! Josefina then filed a petition to annul
her marriage with Eduardo on the
grounds of bigamy.
! RTC of Paranaque granted her plea.
! RTC 1997 found also the sale of the
two parcels of land were null and void
! BUT the CA reversed the RTC's
decision! Saying that the property was
conjugal in nature.
Issues: WON the said property is the
paraphernal property of Josefina
Held: No
Ratio: They are not paraphernal since she
wasn't able to prove that she bought the said
land with her funds before the marriage. There
is no proof that she contributed money on the
acquisition of the said property. The
presumption of conjugality was not overcome.
! evidence lacking: no proof to show
that she borrowed money to buy land
from mother and sister and also failed
to divulge their names.
! 3
rd
claim party affidavit
claiming that properties are
exclusively from the fruits of
own labor negates what she
said that she borrowed the
money
! failed to testify against
whose account the check
was drawn and issued and
whose account it was
! was 23 when she married so
doubtful that she'd have
money before to buy such
property
! bought the property 1 year
and 7 months after marriage
AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER executed by
Eduardo to protect property against third party
claims against him. Also significant is he still
attached his marital conformity to the land's
mortgage.

Atienza vs.de Castro
G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006

Facts:
! Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as
accountant for his two corporations
(Enrico Shipping Corporation and
Eurasian Maritime Corporation) in
1983
! Then their relationship became
intimate despite Lupo being a married
man! They lived together in the later
part of 1983. They had 2 children,
after the second child they parted
ways.
! Then Lupo filed a complaint against
Yolanda for a judicial partition of a
land between them in the Bel-Air
subdivision
! Lupo said Yolanda bought the said
property with his own funds.
! Yolanda on the otherhand said she
bought it with her own funds.
! Trial Court said that the contested
property is owned common by him
and Yolanda and ordered the partition
into two equal parts.
! CA reversed the TC! Saying that it
was the exclusive property of
Yolanda.
Issues: WON the disputed property is the
exclusive property of Yolanda
Held: Yes
Ratio: Since they are not capacitated to marry
each other in their cohabitation, FC 148
applies. Under this regime only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall be owned by them
in proportion to their contributions. Absent of
proof of contribution, it shall be presumed to be
equal. He did not show any evidence that he
contributed in the parcel of land while the
accountant showed bank accounts which
apparently shows that she was capacitated to
buy the said land.
! evidence of De Castro: job as
accountant and businesswoman
engaged in foreign currency trading,
money lending, and jewelry retail,
promisorry notes of dealings with
clients, bank account statements, and
business transactions = had financial
capacity
on the other hand Atienza merely provided
evidence that Yolanda had no such sufficient
funds and didn't provide for evidence regarding
his own capacity to pay for such property.

Acre vs Yutikki
2007

! Beatriz Acre and Sofronio Acre, Jr.
married on November 8, 1957. Have 6
children (petitioners)
! 1972 Sofronio left conjugal dwelling
! Petitioners find out that Sofronio married
Evangeline Yuttikki May 18, 1972, while
still married to Beatriz
! Sofronio dies Nov 16, 1996
! During respondent's marriage with
Sofronio they acquired properties, one
registered to "Evangeline Acre married to
Sofronio Acre another to "E. Acre,
married to S. Acre and N. del Mar, married
to Jose del Mar (Nellie is Evangeline's
sister)
! Petitioners file with RTC for recovery of
properties, saying Sofronio acquired it w/
his own funds
! TC dismisses, saying that the properties
are owned in common by Evangeline and
Sofronio
! CA dismisses appeal as well, declaring
defendant- appellee exclusive owner

Issue: W/n the CA erred in declaring
Evangeline the owner of the
contested properties?

Held: No. Petition denied, CA decision
AFFIRMED.
! The marriage between Evangeline and
Sofronio is indeed bigamous, as such their
property regime is under FC 148
! Properties acquired by the parties
out of their actual joint
contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership
! If there is no contribution from
either or both of the spouses,
clearly there can be no co-
ownership
! Petitioners did not present any evidence
that shows Sofronio made an actual
contribution in acquiring the said
properties. Clearly, co-ownership does
not exist here.
CA correct in saying that the first land in
question was registered under "Evangeline
Acre married to Sofronio Acre, the second land
in question under "Evangeline Acre married to
Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Del Mar, married to
Jose Del Mar rule well settled that the words
"married to preceding Sofronio Acre Jr. are
merely descriptive of the status of Evangeline.

Signey v SSS
GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008

Facts:
! Rodolfo Signey, SSS member, died on
May 21 2001, in the records he had
designated Yolanda as primary beneficiary
and his 4 children with her as secondary
beneficiaries.
! 3 women started claiming his death
benefits from SSS (in order)
1. Yolanda Signey (petitioner)
! Claimed death benefits first (July 6 2001)
2. Gina Servano (respondent)
! Claimed death benefits (July 13 2001)
! Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo
! Claims that she and Yolanda were
common law-wives, while Editha is the
legal wife.
3. Editha Espinosa (respondent)
! Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001)
! Claims that she is the legal wife
! SSS denies Yolanda, saying Gina's 2
children are the primary beneficiaries
under the SSS Law
! Says also that the marriage between
Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void
because Rodolfo was still married with
Editha
! Yolanda files a petition with Social
Security Commission (SSC) along with a
waiver of rights by Editha wherein Editha
waived all claims of benefits from SSS
because she (Editha) was married to a diff
person
! SSC affirms the SSS Decision
! Despite the new waiver by Editha, SSC
gave more weight to the confirmed
marriage of Rodolfo and Editha
! SSC: Mere designation by Rodolfo in the
records of who his beneficiaries were is
not a controlling factor
! SSC then applies SSS Law (RA 8282)
where it says that dependent legit / illegit
children may be primary beneficiaries, and
they have to be minors.
! Rodolfo had one legitimate child who died
earlier than he did
! His children with Yolanda are all over 21
years old
! His children with Gina are qualified (them
being minors)

Issue:
1. W/n petitioner's marriage with the
deceased is valid?
2. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits
against the illegitimate children?

Held: No. There is no merit to the petition
1. The existence of a prior marriage between
Editha and Rodolfa is supported by
evidence
2. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very
clear (court applies statcon) (found in the
case pg. 638):
! It defines who are dependents:
! Legal Spouse
! Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate
child who is unmarried, not employed
and is under 21 years old
! Whoever claims entitlement benefits
should establish his/her right by
substantial evidence
! Since petitioner is disqualified to be a
beneficiary and bec the deceased has no
legitimate child, it follows that the
dependent illegitimate minor children of
the deceased shall be entitled to the death
benefits as primary beneficiaries.
! Gina's 2 minor children are entitled to
100% of the benefits
! Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo
! Claims that she and Yolanda were
common law-wives, while Editha is the
legal wife.
4. Editha Espinosa (respondent)
! Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001)
! Claims that she is the legal wife
! SSS denies Yolanda, saying Gina's 2
children are the primary beneficiaries
under the SSS Law
! Says also that the marriage between
Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void
because Rodolfo was still married with
Editha
! Yolanda files with SSC
! SSC affirms the SSS Decision
! Sayin

Issue:
3. W/n petitioner's marriage with the
deceased is valid?
4. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits
against the illegitimate children?

Held: No. There is no merit to the petition
3. The existence of a prior marriage between
Editha and Rodolfa is supported by
evidence
4. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very
clear (found in the case pg. 638):
! It defines who are dependents:
! Legal Spouse
! Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate
child who is unmarried, not employed
and is under 21 years old
! Whoever claims entitlement benefits
should establish his/her right by
substantial evidence
! Since petitioner is disqualified to be a
beneficiary and bec the deceased has no
legitimate child, it follows that the
dependent illegitimate minor children of
the deceased shall be entitled to the death
benefits as primary beneficiaries.
Gina's 2 minor children are entitled to
100% of the benefits

Borromeo vs Descallar
GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009

Facts:
1) Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian,
arrived in the Philippines in 1983. In
1984, he met respondent Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother
of two boys who was working as a
waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich
and respondent fell in love and
decided to live together.
2) In the Contracts to Sell dated
November 18, 1985
1
and March 10,
1986
2
and A Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 16, 1987 covering
the properties in Agro-Macro
Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue
City, Jambrich and respondent were
referred to as the buyers.
3) However, when the Deed of Absolute
Sale was presented for registration
before the Register of Deeds,
registration was refused on the
ground that Jambrich was an alien
and could not acquire alienable lands
of the public domain. Thus they
erased Jambrich's name from the
document only retaining his signature
in certain areas.
4) Jambrich also formally adopted
respondent's two sons.
5) April 1991, respondent found a new
boyfriend while Jambrich began to live
with another woman in Danao City.
6) Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F.
Borromeo sometime in 1986. In 1989,
Jambrich purchased an engine and
some accessories for his boat from
petitioner, for which he became
indebted to the latter for about
P150,000.00. To pay the debt he sold
his rights to the Agro-Macro properties
to the petitioner.
7) On July 26, 1991, when petitioner
sought to register the deed of
assignment, he discovered that titles
to the three lots have been transferred
in the name of respondent, and that
the subject property has already been
mortgaged.
8) On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court, alleging that the
deed of sale issued for the property in
favor of the respondent do not reflect
the true agreement of the parties, the
latter having paid nothing for the said
properties.
9) Respondent denies the allegation
citing that she had paid for the
property solely and exclusively using
the money from her copra business.
10) RTC rules for the petitioner
(Borromeo) citing the proofs
presented on the earning capacity of
Jambrich at the time the property was
purchased over the supposed
earnings of the respondent from her
Copra business (which were markedly
fictional since the respondent was still
working as a waitress for P1000 a
month at the time of the purchase of
the properties.
11) April 10, 2002 Respondent appealed
to the Court of Appeals. CA sides w/
respondent citing: In the case at bar,
the title of the subject property is not
in the name of Jambrich but in the
name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
Jambrich could not have transferred a
property he has no title thereto.
Issues: WON Respondent has a right over
the said property.
Held: NO, it was proven in the RTC trial that
the properties in question were in fact
purchased from the exclusive funds of Wilhelm
Jambrich who at the time of acquisition had
sufficient income compared to the waitress'
wages of the respondent. As such the
purchase of the property could clearly be
attributed Janbrich and subsequently to the
petitioner. Furthermore the vice of alienage
plaguing the sale of the property to Jambrich
was in fact cured by the transfer of the property
to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen citing
the case United Church Board for World
Ministries v. Sebastian.
FAMILY RELATIONS

FC 149

Alavado v. City of Tacloban
139 SCRA 230

Facts:
-Ricardo was employed as a carpenter-
foreman by the City Engineer's Office of
Tacloban City
-Last day of service was August 19, 1974. (On
leave from April 23 to May 23, 1974). On
August 6, he went to work only to supervise
laborers but he suffered sever headache. Died
on August 7, the day after of Cerebral
Hemorrage.
-W filed claim for death benefits, in her own
behalf and of minor children.
-The hearing officer in Tacloban City issued an
award granting W 5200php as death benefits
and 200php as burial reimbursement.
-Tacloban City appealed. On Nov 29, 1975,
WCC dismissed W's claim for death benefits
on the ground of "lack of filiation between
claimant and deceased.
-According to WCC, Matilde only presented a
marriage certificate. MC is not an authentic
proof of marital status. She should show
original Marriage Contract or MCertificate
issued by the Local Civil Registrar. For filiation,
her presentation of birth certificate is not
enough. BC is not authentic proof of kinship of
the person baptized.
--WCC said W failed to prove that she was
leggaly married to deceased because of a lack
of marriage contract. She only submitted was a
copy of marriage cert issued by church, which
shows that they were married on August 9,
1939. They lived together for 35 years until
death of H.

ISSUE: W the claimant and her children had
the right to claim death benefits of the
deceased.

HELD: Yes.
-Courts look upon the presumption of marriage
with great favor. If such relationship was not
denied or contradicted, the presumption of
marriage must be admitted as fact.
-public and open cohabitation as husband and
wife, birth certificate and baptismal certificate
were held as competent evidence.
-There is no evidence on record that will
overthrow the presumption of marriage.
-The marriage certificate is enough proof of
marriage. It is certified to be a true copy of the
original issued by the Local Civil registrar of
City of Tacloban.
-The provisions of the WCC must be
interpreted in favor of laborers, WCC being a
social legislation aimed at protecting the rights
of the workingmen.
WCC decision is set aside. Award is reinstated.

Arroyo v. CA

FC 150- 151
NCC 2035
ROC Rules 6 Sec. 1(j)
RPC 20, 247 and 332

Gayon v. Gayon
36 SCRA 104

Wainwright v. Versoza
26 SCRA 78

Magbaleta vs Gonong
76 SCRA 511

De Guzman vs genato
89 SCRA 674

O'Lao vs Co Cho Chit
220 SCRA 656

Tribiana vs.Tribiana
G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004

Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Acua
G.R. NO. 154132, August 31, 2006

FC 152,FC 161

Taneo vs CA
304 SCRA 308

FC 153, compare withFC 159
FC154

Patricio vs. Dario
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006

FC 155, FC 160

Modequillo v. Breva
185 SCRA 766

Sian Valley v. Lucasan
109 Phil 294

Honrado vs.CA
G.R. No. 166333, Nov. 25, 2005

Cabang vs Basay
GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009

Ching vs CA (supra)

Modequillo vs Breva
185 SCRA 756

Facts:
As liability for a vehicular accident on March
16, 1976 which killed Audie Salinas and which
injured Renato Culan, Jose Modequillo and
Benito Malubay were ordered to pay indemnity
for damages to spouses Salinas and to
Juanito. Consequently on July 7, 1988, a writ of
execution and levy were issued against a
parcel of residential lot and an agricultural land,
the titles of which were under the name of
Modequillo. Modequillo then motioned to
quash, alleging that the residential lot was their
family home that had been constituted since
1969, prior to the case and hence exempt from
liability by virtue of FC 155.

Held:
The family home is not exempt from liability.
Modequillo's house and lot were constituted as
a family home NOT under the NCC (by judicial
or extrajudicial means) but under the FC by
operation of law when the FC took effect on
August 3, 1988. FC 162 provides that all
existing family residences at the time of the
FC's effectivity are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to the family home under the FC. FC
162 has a prospective application. Hence, his
family home was constituted only on August 3,
1988 and not on 1969 when it was first
occupied as a family home. The accident took
place on March 16, 1976 and the judgment
became final on Jan. 29, 1988, prior to the
constitution of the family home in August.
Liability can thus be held against the family
home.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION

FC163
FC 164 cf. FC 166 in reT to NCC 256-257

Tan v. Trocio
191 SCRA 764

Facts:
! April 1971 when as Felicidad said, Galileo
Trocio raped her which begot a son, Jewel
! Didn't immediately tell the police since Trocio
was thereatening to have her alien husband
and to tell authrorities that she was violating
the Anti-Dummy Law in operation of her
vocational school
! Nov 1979 Felicidad filed case of disbarment
against Atty. Trocio
! Trocio denied allegation of rape, only testifying
that he dealt her and her family's cases and
said she was only doing this because he
declined on her request to increase his fee so
that she may get the extra.
! Feb 13 1986 since Trocio failed to attend the
hearings etc, Provincial fiscal of Lanao Del
Norte, on prima facie evidence presented, held
Trocio administratively liable.
ISSUE: WON Trocio should be disbarred for
gross immoral conduct
HELD: NO, there is lack of evidence
! After incident, she still asked him to be the
lawyer for her cases such as a robbery case
and her claim for indeminity when a fire burned
down the school
! The fear that her alien husband would be
deported has actually been an absent fear
since she said she lost contact of her husband
on the night the tryst happened.
! Keeping her peace for 8 years could be
construed as a condonation of his alleged
immoral conduct. Testimony of household help
that they heard her cries for help is negated by
fact that she said it happened in school
premises. How could the help have been there
then?
! INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW IT
WAS HIS SON: (1) unusual closeness as
testified by her household help (2) pictures
of Jewel and Trocio together = not enough
ground to establish paternity
Presumption is Jewel is the child of the
alien husband since he was born on 1972
when husband and Felicidad were living
together.

Angeles vs Maglaya
469 SCRA 363

Facts:
! Nov 20, 1939 when Aleli Maglaya was born
! 1948 when deceased Francisco married
Belen Angeles
! 1988 when her mother Genoveva died
! March 1998 when Aleli Maglaya filed in Rtv
Caloocan petition to be made administratix of
late Francisco Angeles' estate since she is sole
legitimate daughter of Francisco. This was
contested by his wife Belen Angeles.
! RTC: Aleli failed to prove filiation
! CA: reversed decision and said that Aleli was
indeed a legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva
ISSUE: WON CA erred in declaring Aleli as a
legitimate child
HELD: YES
! Law applied: FC 164 - "children conceived or
born during the marriage of parents are
legitimate"
! Aleli never showed any evidence of a marriage
existing between Francisco and Genoveva. In
fact, if they did marry, it would have rendered
Francisco's marriage to Belen as bigamouse.
However, Aleli herself recognized Belen as the
surviving spouse in her petition for letters of
administration
! Without evidence of marriage, one can't
presume Aleli to be legitimate child
! CA erred in declaring that birth certificate
indubitably establishes legitimacy
! In order for legitimacy to be established, birth
certificate must bear the signatures of BOTH
mother and father. Only attending physician's
signature was in the certificate. Thus it only
showed the fact of birth of a child and not
legitimacy
! Papers and photogrpahs that show Francisco
Angeles as her father is not sufficient enough
to prove filiation.
RESULT: at best, could only be declared a
natural child and NOT a legitimate child.
! SSS vs. Aguas
ISSUE: WON Janet and Jeylynn are legitimate
daughters of Pablo?
HELD: Only Jeylynn is
! Jeylynn proven by birth certificate where
signature of Pablo is present and the fact that
she was born on 1991 when marriage between
Pablo and Rosana who were married on 1977
was still susbsisting
! Pablo never once questioned legitimacy of
Jeylynn
! Presumption of legitimacy, conditions that
husband may contest (398)
! Janet birth certificate shown was only
photocopy with no confirmation by civil register
regarding her date of birth. Thus if one can't
show that one is born during the marriage then
can't be presumed legitimate
Said that she was adopted but no papers to
prove it and only legally adopted children are
considered dependent children. Thus she can't be a beneficiary.

SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546
Feb. 27, 2006

FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, SSS member and
pensioner, died 12/8/96. Pablo's surviving
spouse, respondent Rosanna filed a claim with
SSS for death benefits. She indicated in her
claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his
minor child, Jeylynn, born 10/29/91
4/97, SSS received a sworn letter
from Pablo's sister Letecia contesting
Rosanna's claim for death benefits, alleged
that Rosanna abandoned the family abode
more than 6 years before the and lived w/
another man, de la Pena; Pablo had no legal
children w/ Rosanna. Letecia enclosed birth
cert of Jefren born 11/15/96 to Rosanna and
de la Pena and that the 2 were married 11/1/90
Rosanna contends that Jeylynn was a
legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her
birth cert bearing Pablo's signature as father
Janet, who also claimed to be the
child of deceased and Rosanna, joined as
claimant. It appears in her birth cert that her
father was Pablo and her mother was
Rosanna.
SSS summoned several persons;
some stated that spouses' real child was
Jeylynn, Janet was only an adopted child but
there were no legal papers.
SSS ruled that Rosanna was no
longer qualified as claimant. As for Jeylynn and
Janet, they were not Pablo's legitimate
children.

ISSUE: WON Jeylynn ad Janet are legitimate
children of deceased (thus entitled to death
benefits)
HELD:
YES (Jeylynn); NO (Janet)
Jeylynn's claim is justified by her birth
cert w/c bears Pablo's signature (showing she
was born 10/29/91; Rosanna and Pablo were
married 12/4/77 and marriage subsisted until
latter's death on 12/8/96). Under A164, FC,
children conceived or born during the marriage
of parents are legitimate.
Presumption of legitimacy can't extend to Janet
because her date of birth wasn't substantially
proven. Under RA1161, only "legally adopted
children are considered dependent children.

Rivera vs Heirs of Villanueva
GR No. 141501, July 21, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners are allegedly half-brothers,
half-sis-in-law and children of a half-brother of
deceased PACITA. Respondents are allegedly
siblings, full and half-blood of ROMUALDO;
respondents are denominated as heirs of
Romualdo. Respondent Angelina is allegedly
the daughter of Pacita and Romualdo.
From 1927 until her death in 1980,
Pacita cohabited w/ Romualdo w/out the
benefit of marriage because the latter was
married to Musngi who died on 4/20/63. In the
course of their cohabitation, they acquired
several properties. Pacita died 7/3/80 without
leaving a will.
8/8/80, Romualdo and respondent
Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition w/sale (an extrajudicial settlement of
Pacita's estate). Petitioners filed a case for
partition of Pacita's estate and annulment of
titles. RTC made 2 findings 1) Pacita was
never married to Romualdo 2) respondent
Angelina was her illegitimate child by
Romualdo
ISSUE: WON respondent Angelina was
illegitimate daughter of Pacita
HELD:
NO, a closer examination of the birth
cert reveals that respondent Angelina was
listed as "adopted by both Pacita and
Romualdo. And mere registration of a child in
his birth cert as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption, it does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child. Thus,
she can't inherit from Pacita.
Pacita was 44 y.o., on the verge of menopause
at the time of the alleged birth; Pacita had been
living childless w/Romualdo for 20 years

cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 5(11)
FC 42 in rel. to FC 43(1)
FC54
cf. NCC 40
FC173-174
NCC 364,374,376
NCC 888, NCC 979

Moore v. Republic
8 SCRA 282

Facts: Petitioner Elaine Moore (American
citizen) is married with Joseph Velarde (also
American) had a son out of wedlock William
Michael Velarde (now 14 yrs old) born also at
US.
Said marriage however was dissolved
through a decree of divorce from SC of
California on 5/31/49. Elaine had 2
nd
marriage
with Don Moore on 9/29/56 at LA, CA. William
(minor) lived with them.
Elaine filed @ CFI Rizal a motion to
have her child's surname be changed into
Moore instead of Velarde. TC denied such
petition therefore this appeal.
Issue: Government of the Phil. Opposed
such petition with the following issues a) WON
law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2
nd

husband of his mother b) WON justifiable
reason exists to allow change of name c) WON
mother has the authority to ask such

Held: Regarding the 1
st
issue, RP said that
through NCC 364 legitimate child should use
the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover
cites that in case of annulment, child conceived
before such decree shall use the surname of
his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules
over decree of divorce; therefore law does
NOT sanction such change of name. SC
upheld such position, saying that confusion
may arise wrt (with respect to) paternity and
that said change may even redound to the
prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still
a minor and therefore aforesaid action is
premature. Said child may in his mature age
decide for himself to instigate such change of
name.

Naldoza v. Republic
112 SCRA 658

Facts: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio
Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2 children:
Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio abandoned
conjugal home after Zosima confronted him
about his previous marriage. Also, he allegedly
swindled 50k from Rep. Maglana and 10k from
a certain Galagar, etc.
Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were
teasing them because of their swindler father.
To obliterate any connection between her
children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the
kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima
filed @ CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a petition to
change surname of her 2 children from
Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name).
TC dismissed pet. saying that
aforementioned reasons (swindling,
abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio
<but their marriage has not yet been annulled
nor declared bigamous> ) were not sufficient
grounds to invoke such change of surname.
Furthermore, change of name would give false
impression of family relations.

Issue: WON two children's prayer to drop their
father's surname is justified

Held: NO. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and
Bombi are LC (legitimate children), therefore
they should use their father's surname. Said
minors and their father should be consulted
about such, mother's desire should not only be
the sole consideration. Change of name is
allowed only upon proper and reasonable
cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name
may even redound to the prejudice of the
children later on, may cause confusion as to
the minor's parentage and might also create
the impression that said minors are ICs, which
is inconsistent with their legal status.
In Oshita v. Republic and in
Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change
names have been granted, but petitioners in
said cases have already attained mature age.
In this case, when these minors have attained
the right age, then they can already file said
action for themselves.

Marquino vs IAC
233 SCRA 348

Ong vs CA
272 SCRA 725

FACTS:
-Respondents Alferdo Ong Jr. and Robert Ong
are children of Saturnina Caballes allegedly by
Manuel Ong.
-Manuel (representing himself as Alfredo Go)
was introduced to Saturnina by Vicente Sy and
Constancia Lim (in 1953 at a night club in
cebu). They had a relationship and lived
together for 4 months. It was also established
that prior to meeting Manuel, Saturnina
cohabited with a paralytic.
-Alfredo Ong Jr. (registered as Alfredo Go Jr.)
was born in 1955 and Robert Ong (registered
as Roberto Caballes) 1956. Roberto is
surnamed Caballes because the midwife
informed Saturnina that it should be the case
since she weren't married with Manuel.
Manuel's support dwindled. He stopped seeing
her. She discovered his identity and asked for
support but he refused.
-In 1961 they asked for support but Manuel
denied them. In two occasions Dolores Dy,
Manuel's commonlaw wife, treated private
respondents like close relatives of Manuel Ong
by giving them on November 2, 1979 and
January 6, 1977 tokens of affection, such as
family pictures of Dolores Dy and Manuel Ong
and by visiting them in their house on A. Lopez
Street in 1980.
-Manuel Ong also gave money to Alfredo, first,
as the latter's high school graduation gift and
second, for the latter's educational support.
Manuel Ong even told Alfredo to comeback
with a list of what he needs for school but when
he came back with some friends in September
1982, Manuel turned down his request and
ordered him to leave and threatened to call the
police if he did not leave.
-September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint
for recognition and support against Manuel
Ong. The complaint was amended on
November 25, 1982 to include Robert as co-
plaintiff. Manuel died in May 1990 while the
case is pending.
TC-declared Alfredo and Robert illegitimate
children of Manuel in accordance with Art. 283,
pars. 2 and 4 of the Civil Code.
CA-affirm TC, cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an
additional ground for ordering the recognition of
private respondents as illegitimate children.

Issue: WON Alfredo and Roberto are
illegitimate children of Manuel

Held/Ratio:
Yes. Alfredo and Roberto are sons of Manuel.
Using Article 283 Paragraph. 4 (The father is
obliged to recognize) When the child has in his
favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father .
Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision
covering all cases in the preceding ones, so
that evidence, even though insufficient to
constitute proof under the other paragraphs,
may nonetheless be enough to qualify the case
under par. 4.
In this case, the testimony of Saturnina
Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with
Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957)
which, had it been openly done, would have
constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof
that private respondents were conceived and
born during such relationship and constitutes
evidence of Ong's paternity. This relationship
was further established through the testimony
of Constancia Lim. The evidence for private
respondents is not negated by the admission of
Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with
another man before, because the relationship
terminated at least a year before the birth of
Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before the birth
of the second child Robert Caballes.
SC agree that this DOES NOT fall in Art 283
(2) When the child is in continuous possession
of status of a child of the alleged father by the
direct acts of the latter or his family--- the times
during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo and
gave the latter money cannot be considered
proof of continuous possession of the status of
a child. The father's conduct toward his son
must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this
ground to exist.
Does NOT fall in Art 283 (3) When the child
was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father------
----While Saturnina Caballes testified that she
and Manuel Ong lived together for four months
as husband and wife in order to justify a finding
of cohabitation, the relationship was not open
and public so as to constitute cohabitation.
Petitioner claims that Manuel is sterile (due to
illness during World War). For despite living
with 2 other women, Dolores and Victoria
Veloria (later established as Victoria Balili) but
they didn't have a child. CA dismissed this for
there is no medical proof and Manuel
acknowledged a Lourdes Balili (born 1939) as
his natural child with a Victoria Balili.
An adult male is presumed to have normal
powers of virility and the burden of evidence to
prove the contrary rests upon him who claims
otherwise. Petitioner has not overcome this
presumption

FC 165, 175476

Osmea de Valencia v. Rodriguez
84 Phil 222

Facts:
! Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate
children of the defendant Pio Valencia in the
latter's lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina
Osmena
! Defendants on the otherhand are the
illegitimate children of defendant Pio Valencia
with Emilia Rodriguez his common-law wife.
! Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to
the surname "Valencia

Issues: WON the illegitimate children could
use the surname Valencia

Held: Yes

Ratio: This cannot happen since if plaintiffs
were correct then they could stop numerous
inhabitants from using the surname Valencia
as well. Moreover, Pio Valencia has
acquiesced to this as well. Finally, there is no
law granting the exclusive ownership over a
surname.

Jao vs CA
152 SCRA 359

Facts:
! In 1968, Janice Jao, a minor represented by
her mother Arlene filed a case for support
against Perico Jao.
! It seems from evidence that Perico Jao was
introduced to Arlene in a club. Then they had
sex.
! 1968, Jao accompanied Arlene to a hospital for
a check-up, Jao paid the rentals in the hospital
! Arlene gave birth to Janice on August 16,
1968.
! Arlene said that they had sex on November 30
1967.
! Jao said that they had sex on January 18 1968.
! The NBI, upon order by the court, conducted a
blood grouping test which results say that
Janice could not have been the offspring of
Perico Jao and Arlene Salgado.
! RTC sided with Janice, CA reversed.
Issues: WON Perico Jao is the parent of
Janice

Held: No
Ratio: There could only be compulsory
recognition when the child was conceived
during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father. Janice should've been
conceived between Nov 20, 1967 to December
4, 1967 according to the court. However,
Arlene herself said that they only started to
cohabit on December 16, 1967. Hence, Janice
was NOT conceived during cohabitation.
Moreover, Arlene cohabited with 2 other men!
Lastly, the blood grouping test (which showed
that Janice could not have been a child of
Perico and Arlene) is conclusive on non-
paternity. Hence, it cannot be said with
certainty that Perico Jao is indeed the father.

Uyguangco vs CA
178 SCRA 684

Facts: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in
1975, leaving his wife, four legitimate children
and properties which they divided among
themselves. Graciano Uyguangco filed a
complaint for partition against the petitioners,
claiming that as the illegitimate son of the
deceased and a Anastacia Bacjao, he must not
be left out of the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate. He also claims that he received support
from his father while in high school and was
also assigned by his father as storekeeper at
the Uyguangco store.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that Graciano could not prove his
alleged filiation having none of the documents
required in Art. 278 of the NCC (i.e. record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. Neither may
he resort to Art. 285 of the NCC because he
was already an adult when his alleged dad
died.

Graciano insists however, that he is "in
continuous possession of the status of a child
of his alleged father by the direct acts of the
latter or of his family as is under Art. 283 of the
NCC.

Issue: WON Graciano may adequately prove
filiation.

Held: NO

Ratio:

The Civil Code provisions they invoke have
been superseded or at least modified by the
corresponding articles n the FC.

Since illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children (Art 175),
Graciano may establish his filiation by the
means given in Art. 172. Thus while he has no
record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or
a final judgment or an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, he insists that he has
nevertheless been "in an open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, which is admissible as evidence of
filiation under Art. 172.

As proof to this open and continuous
possessionhe claims that he lived with his
father from 1967 until 1973, received support
from him, used the name Uyguangco without
objection, a special power of attorney executed
in his favor by Apolinario's wife, and another
one by Suplcio Uyguangco, shared in the
profits of the copra family business of the
Uyguangco's and was even given a share in
his deceased father's estate as found in the
addendum to the original extrajudicial
settlement concluded by the petitioners.

However, since his father has already died, his
action is now barred as Art. 172 specifically
requires that when the action is based on other
proofs of filiation such as open and continuous
possession, the action must be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Ruling: Petition Granted.

Mangulabnan v. IAC
185 SCRA 760

Facts: Edna Padilla Mangulabnan filed an
action for damages and support for her child
Alfie Angelo. The TC ordered Ambrocio Tan
Chew Acero to pay monthly support. He then
moved for a reconsideration but was denied on
December 5, 1984. CA annulled the orders of
the TC on the ground that even as to
illegitimate children who are not natural
children, there is a need for the latter class of
children (spurious children) to be recognized
either voluntarily or by judicial decree,
otherwise they cannot demand support as in
the case of an acknowledged child.

Issue: WON recognition of an illegitimate
child like the minor Alfie whose father is
married and had no legal capacity to
contract marriage at the time of his
conception is required before support may
be granted.

Held: NO

Ratio: The requirement for recognition by
father or mother jointly or by only one of them
as provided by law refers in particular to a
natural child under Article 276 of the NCC.
Such child is presumed to be the natural child
of the parents recognizing it who had the legal
capacity to contract marriage at the time of
conception. Thus, an illegitimate child like Alfie
is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or
spurious child in which case recognition is not
required before support may be granted.

However, under Article 887 of the NCC, in all
cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must
be proved. The status of the minor child had
been provisionally established as affidavits of
petitioner and 2 witnesses, and the birth
certificate were presented to prove the
paternity of the child.

Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals
201 SCRA 675, September 24, 199

Facts:

1981: Private Respondent, Teopista Toring
claims to be the illegitimate child of the
petitioner, Casimiro Mendoza.
She alleges that she was born on Aug. 20,
1930 to a Brigida Toring who was then single
while Casimiro was married to Emiliana
Barrientos
Her mother was the one who told her that she
was his child.
She added that growing up, she was
recognized because she was treated as such.
Called him "Papa Miroy, she used to visit him
at his house, Casimiro helped her and her
husband: he bought a truck for him to drive and
when he sold it, gave the proceeds to the
spouses, PR's son, Lolito, was allowed to build
a house on his lot, He opened a joint savings
account with her as co-depositor

She had two witnesses:

Gaudencio Mendoza (cousin of Casimiro) was
informed by petitioner himself that he and
Brigida Toring were sweethearts. Gaudencio
was the one whom Casimiro would send to
give money to Toring when Teopista was born.

Isaac Mendoza (nephew of Casimiro) was
informed by his father (HipoIito, Casimiro's
brother) and his grandmother, Brigida
Mendoza. He also delivered money to
Teopista.

Petitioner denied her claims up to his dying
day. (May, 1986)

Vicente Toring, who is the recognized
illegitimate child of Petitioner and Brigida
Toring, says that petitioner is only his half-
sister because she has a different father.

He substitutes for Mendoza in this case after
petitioner died.

RTC: rules for petitioner because private
respondent failed to show enough evidence to
prove of her filiation.

CA: reversed decision. The two witnesses
showed truthfulness, there is no reason for
them to testify falsely. Vicente Toring would
obviously have more to lose if petitioner wins
this case so he has a motive.

Issue: W/N Teopista is Casimiro Mendoza's
illegitimate child?

Held: YES.

Ratio:
Although Teopista failed to show that she was
in an open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, she
has nevertheless established that status by
another method.
FC 175 grants the right of illegitimate children
to establish their filiation in the same way as
legitimate children. FC 172(2) allows them to
prove filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.
In the case at bar, the RTC failed to consider
the testimony of Isaac Mendoza as another
method of establishing status.
Rule 130, Sec. 39, of the Rules of Court
discusses the act or declarations about
pedigree being allowed as evidence. It has to
conform to 4 requisites so it won't be
considered hearsay:
1.The declarant is dead or unable to testify
Brigida and Hipolito Mendoza passed away at
the time Isaac testified in court.
2.The pedigree must be in issue

Main issue of case!

3.The declaration must be made before the
controversy arose
Isaac knew about this before PR filed in court
4.The relationship between the declarant
(Brigida/Hipolito) and person whose pedigree is
in question
Casimiro) must be shown in evidence other
than declaration.
Presentation of extrajudicial partition of the
estate of Florencio Mendoza where Casimiro is
an heir.
This, including the other evidence presented by
PR and witnesses shows that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro

De Santos vs. Angeles
251 SCRA 206, December 12, 1995

Facts:
Feb. 7, 1941: Dr. Antonio Santos m Sofia
Bona, had one daughter: Maria (petitioner)
Antonio fell in love with another woman, private
respondent Conchita Talag
1949: obtained a divorce decree in Nevada.
1951: married Conchita in Tokyo (obviously
knowing their marriage would be invalid here),
had 11 children.
Mar. 30, 1967: Sofia died
Apr. 23, 1967: Antionio m Conchita in Tagaytay
City
Mar. 8, 1981: Antonio died intestate leaving
P15 million worth of properties
May 15, 1981: PR went to court, asking for
letters of administration in her favor to settle
her husband's estate. Alleged that decedent
was survived by 12 heirs; herself, petitioner,
and her 10 surviving children with Antonio.
Petition was granted.
November 1987: Petitioner filed a motion
arguing that the 10 children were illegitimate.
November 1991: Court declared the 10
children legitimated.

Issue: W/N natural children by legal fiction can
be legitimized.

Held: NO

Ratio:
10 children are considered natural children by
legal fiction:
children born out of void marriages (bigamous
marriage)
another category for illegitimate children
Art. 269 of the Civil Code expressly states that
only natural children can be legitimated.
Natural children are those born of parents who
had no impediment to marry each other.
The children of Conchita and Antonio were
born while his marriage to Sofia was still
subsisting.\The Civil Code provides three
rights, in varying degrees, for children: use of
surname, succession, and support.
Since the 10 children are recognized by both
parents, they are entitled to use of father's
surname. They may also receive support from
Antonio. As a result of his death, they cannot
be deprived of legitime but each child is only
entitled to half of the share of Maria, who is the
sole legitimate child of Antonio De Santos.

NOTE: J. Romero decided this case using only
the provisions of the Civil Code, even though
the FC was already effective at this time.

What makes them illegitimate children?
Natural children by legal fiction are
illegitimate children born out of a void
marriage. In this case, their parents were in
a bigamous marriage.
What are the rights of an illegitimate child?
Right to use of surname of father, being
recognized by him
Right to support
Right to legitime, ! of the share of
decedent's legitimate child

Lim vs. Court of Appeals
270 SCRA 1, March 18, 1997

FACTS:
! Maribel's Story
! Maribel met Raymond during her first night as
a receptionist at Tonight's Club and Resthouse
along Roxas Blvd.
! Petitioner wooed her and they soon lived
together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a
succession of apartments
! Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already
pregnant
! Returned to Manila in October 1981
! Couple never married because petitioner
claimed that he wasn't financially stable
! Maribel gave birth on January 17, 1982
! Bill for confinement were paid by Raymond
! Raymond caused the registration of the name
Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child's birth
certificate
! Raymond's feelings towards Maribel waned
! Maribel filed a complaint against Raymond for
support
! Raymond's Story
! He met Maribel in 1978 at Tonight's Club and
Resthouse
! Maribel started to kiss him on the cheeks and
neck, whispering to him that they could go
anywhere and rest
! He declined saying that he only wanted
someone to talk to
! They became friends, there was no intimacy
! Alleged that he wasn't Maribel's only customer
at the club
! In 1980, she left for Japan to work as an
entertainer
! In 1981, she returned to Manila pregnant and
appealed to Raymond for help because she
claimed that she couldn't face her relatives in
her condition
! Raymond got her an apartment and paid its
rentals until she gave birth on Jan. 17, 1982
! Raymond admits paying the bills but claims
that Maribel was supposed to pay him back for
it
! When she failed to do so, he stopped seeing
her
! Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's
child
! RTC rendered judgment in favor of Maribel
(granted support)
! CA affirmed
ISSUES:
! WON Raymond is the father of Joanna Rose
HELD:
! Yes
! Letter 1
! "n return, promise to be a loving & caring
husband & father to both of you.
! Raymond considered himself to be the father of
Joanna
! Contrary to his vehement assertion that he
Maribel were just friends
! Letter 2 (Aug. 11, 1981)
! Petitioner lovingly told Maribel to take care of
herself because of her "situation, obviously
referring to the state of pregnancy
! It was only after Raymond separated from
Maribel that he started to deny paternity of
Joanna Rose
! He didn't object to being identified as Joanna
Rose's father as disclosed in the Certificate of
Live Birth
! Art. 175: Illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same
evidence as legit children
! Art. 172(1): The filiation of legitimate children is
established by (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register
Other evidences: Pictures of Raymond
cuddling Joanna Rose

Tijing vs CA
2001

FACTS:
! Petitioners are husband and wife with 6
children, the youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
(born April 27, 1989)
! Bienvenida:
! August 1989 # Angelita Diamante went to her
house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job;
made Bienvenida wait while she went to the
market; left her 4-month-old son Edgardo, Jr.
under the care of Angelita; when she returned,
both Angelita and Edgardo Jr. were gone
! Oct. 1993 # Bienvenida read in a tabloid about
the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose
remains were lying in state in Hagonoy,
Bulacan; Bienvenida went to Bulacan and
allegedly saw Edgardo, Jr. for the first time in 4
years
! Claims that her son was already named John
Thomas Lopez
! Avers that Angelita refused to return the boy to
her despite her demand
! Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for
habeas corpus
! Two witnesses: (1) Vasquez, who assisted in
the delivery of Edgardo, Jr.; and (2) Benjamin
Lopez (brother of Tomas Lopez), who testified
that his brother couldn't have possibly father
John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile
and that Tomas admitted to him that John
Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son
! Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother
of the child
! At 42yo, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez
on April 27, 1989
! Has 2 other children with her real husband,
Angel Sanchez
! Birth of John Thomas was registered by her
common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the
Local Civil Reg of Manila on Aug. 4, 1989
! RTC concluded that since Angelita and her
common-law husband couldn't have childred,
the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility; minor and Bienvenida showed
strong facial similarity # granted petition for
habeas corpus
! CA reversed and set aside the decision
ISSUES:
! WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy
! WON Edgardo Tijing, Jr. and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person and is the
son of the petitioners
HELD:
! YES
! The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto
! YES
! Evidences purporting to the fact that John
Thomas Lopez is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.:
! Angelita could no longer bear children # she
underwent ligation in 1970
! Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a
son (because of an accident + admittance to
Benjamin + Tomas and legit wife had no
children after almost 15 years together)
! Unusual that the birth certificate of John
Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez
instead of the midwife 4 months after alleged
birth
! Physician or midwife's duty
! Filed 30 days after birth
! False entry of "Married puts to doubt the other
data in birth certificate
! Strong facial similarities between the child and
Bienvenida
! Clinical records presented by Vasquez
(assisted in Bienvenida's delivery)
PETITION GRANTED.

Eceta vs. Eceta
428 SCRA 782, May 20, 2004

Facts:
1) Certiorari of CA affirmation of RTC ruling
awarding 1/8 portion of disputed property to n
illegitimate daughter Ma. Theresa Eceta.
2) Rosalina Eceta marries Isaac Eceta in 1926,
they acquire several properties including
disputed property in Cubao. They also have a
legitimate son Vicente.
3) saac dies in 67' leaving properties to Rosalina
and Vicente
4) Vicenta dies in 77' leaving an illegitimate
chiId n Ma. Theresa (Ma. Theresa
illegitimate for being born to unmarried
parents).
5) Vicente's heirs are his mother Rosalina and his
illegitimate daughter Ma. Theresa.
6) 91' Ma. Theresa files for Partition and
Accounting w/ damages for the Cubao property
citing her co-ownership thereof by being an
heir to Vicente.
7) Rosalina avers that the property is her
exclusive property.
8) During the pre-trial parties admitted their
relationship as grandmother and grand
daughter.
9) RTC rules for Ma. Theresa awarding her " of
the property
10) Rosalina appeals to CA they affirm the
decision but modify it by awarding the n 1/8
only.
Issues:
WON the certified Xerox of a Xerox of the
birth certificate is competent evidence of
filiation.
WON the admission made by the that n is
her grand daughter is enough to prove
filiation.
Held:
Yes and Yes, duly authenticated birth
certificate signed by Vicente is competent
evidence of filiation. So are the following:
-The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment
-An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private hand written instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof;
-the open and continuous possession of the
status of legitimate child
-Any other means allowed by the rules of court
and special laws (record of birth, will, court
statement, any authentic writing). All of w/c do
not require a separate action for judicial
approval.

Briones vs. Miguel
440 SCRA 455, October 18, 2004

Facts:
1) Review of CA decision awarding custody of
minor child to mother (custody til child reaches
age 10 then he is to choose w/c parent he
wants to stay with) w/ visitation rights to the
Father, Joey D. Briones.
2) Mar 5, 02' files for Habeas Corpus claiming
the child was visited by ns Maricel and
Francisca Miguel relatives of the mother of the
child, n Loreta Miguel, under the pretext of
taking the child to SM, then they did not return.
3) claims that he extensively looked for the
child but failed so he was compelled to file for
habeas corpus.
4) H mother Loreta alleges that the child was not
taken as he was fetched by her w/ the
consent.
5) H and met in Japan and had a relationship
together w/c bore the child Michael Kevin
Pineda (relationship eventually soured accd'g
to n Loreta because of illicit relationship w/
another woman, n now married to Japanese
national).
6) petitions for joint custody when the mom n
Loreta is away.
Issues:
WON the natural father of an illegitimate
child may be denied custody of his own
child.
Held:
Yes, the child being born outside of a
legitimate marriage is considered illegitimate
since his illegitimacy is not cured by his
parent's later marriage. As such he is covered
by Art 176 of the family code that mentions
among other things that a mother shall have
"parental authority over the illegitimate child,
regardless of whether the father acknowledges
paternity over the child. Acknowledgment of
paternity is only a means of compelling support
for the child not entitling custody. Moreover the
Family Code does not distinguish b/w the
natural and spurious nature of the illegitimate
child as they are treated in the same category.
Furthermore absent any compelling reason for
depriving n Loreta custody over the child (such
as neglect or abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity,
and affliction w/ a communicable disease)
custody shall remain w/ the mother, with the
father granted visitation rights.
(action moot since child off to Japan during
the pendency of the action)

Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals
441 SCRA 96, October 21, 2004

Both the dad and son are named camelo, so
you don't get confused
Facts: Version of Florencia Regodos
! Controversy stems from a petition for
recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private
respondent Camelo Regodos
! Camelo Regodos was born on September 9,
1982. Florencia testified that she was the one
supporting her child
! Florencia recounted that after her husband left
in 1981, he went to Escalante, Negros
Occidental to look for work and was eventually
hired as Camelo's household help
! On January 2, 1982, Camelo brought her to
Bacolod City where they checked in at the
Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse.
Camelo promised to support her if she got
pregnant
! Florencia claimed that she discovered she was
carrying Camelo's child 27 days after their
sexual encounter
! On suspicion that Florencia was pregnant,
Camelo's wife sent her home. But Camelo
instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City
where he rented a house for her. On
September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her
aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she
gave birth to her child, private respondent
Camelo Regodos
Version of Camelo Cabatania
! Basically he says that the father of the child is
Florencia's husband and when they had sex,
she was already pregnant
! Petitioner refused support, denying the alleged
paternity
! He denied going to Bacolod City with her and
checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
vehemently denied having sex with her on
January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City
Issue
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE
CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
CAMELO REGODOS that the evidence was
insuffucient
It was further established by the CA that
Florencia was posing as a widow but in reality
was living with her husband
Aside from self serving testimony, respondents
only presented certificates of live birth and
baptismal certificates
Held
! Trial court and CA decided that the child was
Camelo's The trial courts finding of a paternal
relationship between petitioner and private
respondent was based on the testimony of the
childs mother and the personal appearance of
the child
! The fact that Florencias husband is living and
there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress
The trial court and CA should not have
overlooked this fact (though really stupid to
presume that the kid is the son of her husband
when he looks very much like the other guy)

Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
460 SCRA 315, June 15, 2005

Facts:
! Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin
Prollamante sued Martin's alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support
and support pendente lite
! Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34
th

birthday on November 10, 1999
! The baby's birth certificate was purportedly
signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered
the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fe's repeated requests for Martin's
support despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child
! Arnel is actually married and has a family of his
own at the time he impregnated Fe
! Arnel claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to
him in the acknowledgment of Martin's birth
certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously
reflected his marital status as single when he
was actually married and that his birth year
was 1965 when it should have been 1964
! July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court

Issue:
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1)
whether a complaint for support can be
converted to a petition for recognition and (2)
whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered
in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioner's constitutional right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination
Held:
! The petition is without merit.
! It is undisputed and even admitted by the
parties that there existed a sexual relationship
between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining
question is whether such sexual relationship
produced the child, Martin.
! Being the first case where DNA testing was the
focal issue the court examines the history of
DNA testing
! The court opened the possibility of admitting
DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated
in Tijing v. Court of Appeals
! In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and
murder victim's DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were
admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether an association exist(ed) between the
evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their
profile
! The SC upheld the constitutionality of
compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility
of the results thereof as evidence since both
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution is simply against the legal process
of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence
There is no violation of the right of self
incrimination in DNA testing

Alba vs. Herrera
GR No. 148220, July 29, 2005

Facts:
! 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo
Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba
before the trial court a petition for compulsory
recognition, support and damages against
petitioner (Rosendo Herrera)
! Rosendo Herrera denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondent's
mother
! Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking
of DNA paternity. respondent presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D who
testified that the test is 99.99% accurate
! Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and
contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-
incrimination
! trial court and CA granted the motion to
conduct DNA paternity testing
Issue:
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA
test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction
to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the
conditions under which DNA technology may
be integrated into our judicial system and the
prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test
results in a paternity suit
Relevant Provisions
The relevant provisions of the Family Code
provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.
The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The word "pedigree includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree.The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any
one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family
bibles or other family books or charts,
engraving on rings, family portraits and the like,
may be received as evidence of pedigree.

Held:
! By 2002, there was no longer any question on
the validity of the use of DNA analysis as
evidence. The Court moved from the issue of
according "official recognition to DNA analysis
as evidence to the issue of observance of
procedures in conducting DNA analysis -
People v. Vallejo
! It aII boiIs down to evidence and it's
admissibility
! Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded
by statute or the Rules of Court.[48] Evidence
is relevant when it has such a relation to the
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence.[49] Section 49 of Rule 130,
which governs the admissibility of expert
testimony, provides as follows
! The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he is shown to possess may be received
in evidence
! This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to
the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence.
Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is
allowed "when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue
! The court goes on to discuss the Vallejo case
on the caution with the method employed in the
actual testing DNA.
! In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data: how
the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests
Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed

Angeles vs. Maglaya
469 SCRA 363, September 2, 2005

Facts:
! The reason for this case is that Aleli Maglaya
filed a petition for appointment as administratrix
of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles
because she (respondent) is the sole legitimate
child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado,
and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles,
decedent's wife by his second marriage, are
the surviving heirs of the decedent
! Belen, the second wife averred that Aleli is not
the daughter of Francisco because the birth
certificate was not signed by him. Furthermore,
she alleges that Aleli has not presented the
marriage contract between her supposed
parents or produced any acceptable document
to prove such union
! Respondent testified having been born on
November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado,
who died in January 1988
! She also testified having been in open and
continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
! Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf,
namely: Tomas Angeles,[6] Francisco
Yaya,[7] Jose O. Carreon[8] and Paulita
Angeles de la Cruz.[9] Respondent also
offered in evidence her birth certificate which
contained an entry stating that she was born at
the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado
and whereon the handwritten word "Yes
appears on the space below the question
"Legitimate? (Legitimo?); pictures taken during
respondent's wedding as bride to Atty.
Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her
marriage contract. Likewise offered were her
scholastic and government service records
! Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that
filiation was not fully proved
! Trial court ruled that respondent failed to prove
filiation
! CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is the legitimate
child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado
Held:
! The Tison case, established that: (a) a child is
presumed legitimate only if conceived or born
in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy
of such child cannot be attacked collaterally
! the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164
of the Family Code[20] may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual basis
therefor, i.e., that the child's parents were
legally married and that his/her conception or
birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a
child is legitimate does not arise
! Only basis for establishing filiation by the CA
was respondent's gratuitous assertion and an
entry in her certificate of birth.
! There is absolutely no proof of the decedent's
marriage to respondent's mother, Genoveva
Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or
marriage contract doubtless the best
evidence of Francisco's and Genoveva's
marriage, if one had been solemnized[21]
was offered in evidence. No priest, judge,
mayor, or other solemnizing authority was
called to the witness box to declare that he
solemnized the marriage between the two.
None of the four (4) witnesses respondent
presented could say anything about, let
alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At
best, their testimonies proved that respondent
was Francisco's daughter
! respondent has not even presented a witness
to testify that her putative parents really held
themselves out to the public as man-and-wife
! she did not even allege that the marriage to
Belen was bigamous hence negating her own
assertion that her "mother and father were in a
valid marriage
! Respondent had declared that her mother
Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly,
that when Francisco contracted marriage with
petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva
and Francisco were already "spouses. Now,
then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter
lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and
Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that
the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen
Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva's death,
would necessarily have to be bigamous
Hence the resolution of the CA is reversed
and set aside

Guy vs CA
GR No. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006

Facts
! June 13, 1997: Karen Oanes Wei and
Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their
mother Remedio Oanes, filed petition for
letters of administration before the Makati
RTC.
! Karen and Kamille allege that they are the
duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
! October 29, 2009: Sima Wei died
intestate, leaving behind an estate valued
at PhP10M in real and personal properties.
His known heirs include his surviving
spouse Shirley Guy and children Emy,
Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all
surnamed Guy. (Michael is herein
petitioner).
! Karen and Kamille prayed for the
appointment of a regular administrator for
the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's
estate, but for the meantime, prayed for
the appointment of petitioner Michael as
Special Administrator of the estate.
! Michael prayed for the dismissal of the
petition. He contends there is no need for
letters of administration being prayed for
by Karen and Kamille because Sima Wei
left no debts. Also, Karen and Kamille
should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of
Sima Wei according to FC175.
! Before Sima Wei died, Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for
her minor daughters "by way of financial
assistance and in full settlement of any
and all claims of whatsoever nature and
kind x x x against the estate of the late
Sima Wei. Michael now contends that
because of this Release and Waiver of
Claim, respondents are now estopped
from making claims from the estate of the
decedent.

Pertinent Issues
1. W/N Remedios is deemed to have waived
her daughters' legitime by virtue of the
Release and Waiver of Claim between her
and the decedent
2. W/N Karen and Kamille are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation
in view of FC175
Held
1. NO
2. No decision on this issue
Ratio
1. As we already know now, the law prohibits
implicit waivers of rights. Although the
document is titled Release and Waiver of
Claim, there is nothing in the document
that states unequivocally a waiver of
hereditary rights. It merely states that
Remedios received PhP300,000.00 for the
education of Karen and Kamille. Also,
under NCC1044, parents or guardians
may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization. In the
case at bar, such an authorization is not
present. The Release and Waiver of Claim
is therefore null and void.
2. The court did not decide on this issue
yet and decided to remand the case to
the trial court for reception of evidence.
A ruling on this issue would be
premature considering the respondents
have yet to present evidence, not
before the SC, but before the trial court.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of
an illegitimate child is established by a
record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, or an
admission of filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument signed
by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime. However, if the
action is based upon open and
continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the rules or special
laws, it may only be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent (FC175). It
is clear therefore that the resolution of the
issue of prescription depends on the type
of evidence to be adduced by private
respondents in proving their filiation.
However, it would be impossible to
determine the same in this case as there
has been no reception of evidence yet.

Petition denied; remanded as to the third issue.

Verceles vs. Posada
G.R. No. 161338, April 27, 2007

Facts
! Maria Clarissa Posada was employed in
the office of Mayor Teofisto Verceles, a
close family friend.
! November 11, 1986: Teofisto tried to flirt
with Clarissa while in a hotel restaurant
when they were supposedly attending a
conference, but Clarissa managed to
escape and leave the hotel immediately.
! December 22, 1986: Teofisto requested
Clarissa to brief him on the progress of
barangay projects in his hotel. Once again,
Teofisto made his advances, offered her a
position. This time, Clarissa succumbed.
! September 23, 1987: Verna Aiza Posada
was born to Clarissa.
! October 23, 1987: Clarissa and her
parents sued Teofisto for damages.
Pertinent Issue
1. W/N filiation of Verna was sufficiently
established
2. W/N filiation can be resolved in an action
for damages with support pendente lite
Held
1. YES
2. YES
Ratio
1. Any authentic writing is a ground for
compulsory recognition and is in itself a
voluntary recognition of filiation that does
not require a separate action for judicial
approval. The handwritten letters of
Teofisto in response to Clarissa's
confession of her pregnancy, two of which
were in his letterhead as Mayor, are
conclusive that he had sired Verna. His
handwriting was also proven by
comparison with the pictures of his youth
and as a public servant he had given
Clarissa that bear his handwritten notes at
the back. Moreover, in his Memorandum
he admitted his affair with Clarissa, his
exchange of love letters, and his giving
money during her pregnancy. Hence,
under FC172(2), his private handwritten
letters suffice to establish his paternity. He
did not present evidence of his own to
rebut Clarissa's evidence.
2. Although the caption states "Damages
coupled with Support pendente lite, the
caption is not determinative of its nature of
a pleading where Clarissa's averments
(meeting with Teofisto, his offer of a job,
his amorous advances, her seduction,
their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her
child, his letters, her demand for support of
the child) were essentially a case for
recognition of paternity.
Petition denied.

People vs Umanito
GR No. 172607, Oct. 26, 2007

Facts:
On July 15, 1989, Rufino Umanito allegedly
raped AAA (name withheld), for which he was
on October 15, 1997. Although AAA was an
unmarried woman, 12-18 years of age and of
good reputation, Rufino contended that she
was actually impregnated by her married lover;
that her mother only prodded her to accuse
him; that he was at home the whole day of July
15, 1989, working in their picture frame family
business; that he courted AAA but they were
not sweethearts. On the other hand, AAA
claimed that she met Rufino only on the day of
the rape but later claimed that they were
actually friends, and later, that they were
actually close friends.

Issue: WON Rufino is guilty of rape

Held:
Relevant to the determination of Rufino's guilt
is the filiation of AAA's child who was born out
of the alleged rape. Hence, Rufino's paternity
over the child is key to his acquittal. SC thus
ordered Rufino, AAA and child to subject
themselves to DNA testing and remanded the
case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence
under the New Rule on DNA Evidence,
Sections 4, 5, 7, and 8. (The New Rule on DNA
Evidence took effect on October 15, 2007.)
By doing so, SC acknowledges the strong
weight of DNA testing as exculpatory evidence
in determining filiation, reiterating its rulings in
People v. Yalar, Tijing v. CA, Herrera v. Alba,
and Tecson v. COMELEC. This is because
DNA is composed of two copies: one copy from
each parent, and each DNA configuration is
unique to a person.

Ugalde vs. Ysasi
G.R. No. 13062, Feb. 29, 2008

Facts:
On February 15, 1951, Jon de Ysasi and Lorea
de Ugalde married in civil law and on March 1,
1951, married in church law. They had a child
but they separated in April 1957. On June 2,
1961, they agreed to have their conjugal
partnership dissolved as of April 15, 1957. The
CFI approved this Amicable Settlement on
June 6, 1961. However, on May 26, 1964, Jon
married Victoria Eleanor Smith. Hence, on
December 12, 1984, Lorea petitioned for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
Pending appeal in CA, a petition for Judicial
Declaration of Nullity of their Marriage was filed
and granted on May 31, 1995 for lack of a
marriage license. The Certification of Nullity
was issued on November 20, 1995. CA then
decided affirmed RTC decision that no conjugal
partnership exists and that the Amicable
Settlement was valid; it added that their
marriage was void, deciding without knowing
about the earlier judgment on the nullity of their
marriage.

Issue as stated in the case:
WON CA did not err in affirming RTC ruling
that there is conjugal partnership and that the
Amicable Settlement is valid and in adding that
their marriage is void

Held:
CA and RTC did not err in ruling the non-
existence of a conjugal partnership because it
has already been dissolved by the Amicable
Settlement which had been judicially approved,
and it also resulted from the subsequent
declaration of nullity of their marriage.

CA erred in adding the decision that their
marriage is void because such nullity had
already been decided in a separate case.

Issue concerning illegitimacy but not
explicit in the case:
WON their child is legitimate

Presumptive Held:
No. As a consequence of the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, their child is illegitimate
because the child was born outside of a valid
marriage

Montefalcon v Vasquez
GR No. 165016, June 17, 2008

Facts:
1999 Dolores Montefalcon filed with RTC-
Naga for acknowledgment and support by
Ronnie Vasquez of their son Laurence as his
illegitimate child
3 summons were delivered to Vasquez all of
which remained unanswered
2001 court, taking Vasquez' silence as truth
to the allegations, declared Laurence as his
illegitimate child and ordered him to support the
child. Vasquez resurfaced after this decision
and appealed it. Thus the case.

ISSUE: WON Laurence is the illegitimate child
of Vasquez
HELD: YES, and is thus entitled to support.
FC Article 172, the filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the following:
(1) through record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final order

This is evidenced by Laurence' record of live
birth which Vasquez signed and supplied the
data.
FC Article 195 - parent is obliged to support his
illegitimate child.

Support comprises everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family

RESULT: decision of RTC on legitimacy and
support is reinstated.

Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be
impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the
child because of:

(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were
living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or

(c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have
been that of the husband, except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of
Article 164; or

(3) That in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification of either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation,
or undue influence.

DOJ Opinion No. 11 Series of 1990

DOJ Opinion No. 4, Series of 1998

FC 166

Andal v. Macaraig
89 Phil 165
Facts:
! Jan 1941 Emiliano Andal ,who was married
to Maria Duenas, became sick with
tuberculosis. His brother Felix went to live with
them to help them with the farm.
! Sept 10 1942, Maria eloped with Felix and lived
together from 1942-1943
! Jan 1, 1943 Emiliano died. Maria didn't attend
the funeral $
! June 17, 1943 Maria gave birth to Mariano
Andal
! Maria then filed for recovery of land that was
originally given to Emiliano by his mother upon
his marriage to Maria. Maria said that the land
is her son's since he is the legitimate heir of
Emiliano.

ISSUE: WON Mariano is the legitimate son and
can thus inherit the land

HELD: YES
! Art 108 of NCC - Children born after the one
hundred and eighty days next following that of
the celebration of marriage or within the three
hundred days next following its dissolution or
the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
! Emiliano is presumed to be legitimate sine he
was born within 300 days following the
dissolution of marriage.
! Evidence did not show that Emiliano, even
when he was sick of tuberculosis, could not
sexually perform so even if Maria was having
an affair even before eloping with Felix, it is still
presumed that Mariano is Emilianos' son.
RESULT: son is the legit heir and thus inherits
the land of his father

Macadangdang v. CA
100 SCRA 73

! FACTS:
! Mejias is married to Anahaw
! Majias allegedly had intercourse with
Macadangdang sometime in March 1967
! Due to the affair, she and her husband
separated in 1967
! October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a
boy (Rolando Macadangdang)
! April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for
recognition and support against
Macadangdang
! Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for
its dismissal
! Court dismissed the complaint
! CA reversed the judgment and declared
Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio
Macadangdang.
!
! ISSUES:
! Whether or not the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of
the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin
Anahaw; and
! Whether or not the wife may institute an action
that would bastardize her child without giving
her husband, the legally presumed father, an
opportunity to be heard.
!
! HELD:
! YES
! The birth of Rolando came more than one
hundred eighty 180 days following the
celebration of the said marriage and before 300
days following the alleged separation between
aforenamed spouses. # Art. 255: Rolando is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son
of Mejias and Anahaw
! Rolando was born on October 30, 1967.
Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967,
the time difference is clearly 7 months. The
baby Rolando could have been born
prematurely. But such is not the case.
Respondent underwent a normal nine-month
pregnancy.
! Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive
in the absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in
the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child
! the fact remains that there was always the
possibility of access to each other # same
province
! Physical impossibility:
(1) impotence of husband;
! inability of the male organ to copulation, to
perform its proper function
(2) living separately in such a way that access
was impossible; and
(3) serious illness of the husband.
! NO.
! Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed
legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy
! Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in
itself, cannot destroy the presumption of
legitimacy of her child, because it is still
possible that the child is that of the husband
! Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of
a child born to his wife
! Art. 220

PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Ong vs. Court of Appeals
272 SCRA 725

Concepcion vs. CA
G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005

Facts:
Dec 29, 1989 Gerardo married Ma. Theresa.
One year later
Dec 1990 - their son Jose Gerardo was born.
December 19, 1991 - Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on
the ground of bigamy since she was still
married to Mario Gopiao who she married on
Dec 10, 1980 and which was never annulled.
This was granted
Ma. Theresa then filed for action to change
Jose' surname from Gerardo to hers and to
disallow Gerardo visitation rights since Jose is
now just his illegitimate son. Both TC and CA
dismissed her petition.
Ma. Theresa then filed for a motion for
reconsideration where she said that Jose was
not actually the illegitimate son of Gerardo but
the legitimate son of Mario. CA thus reversed
its ruling and declared Mario to be the father of
Jose. Thus the case filed by Gerardo.

ISSUE: WON Jose is the legitimate child of
Mario

HELD: YES
Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child
who is conceived or born during the marriage
of his parents is legitimate.
It is clear that Ma. Theresa and Mario were
married when she gave birth to Jose. , Article
167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered
legitimate althouh the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
Thus even if it is clear that she also married
Gerardo, this does not negate the legitimacy of
Jose as son of Mario.
Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was
no access that could have enabled the
husband to father the child
No evidence to show that there was no way
that they could have had contact within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child since they only
lived four kilometres apart, she in Fairview QC
and he in Loyola Heights QC
Assertion of Ma. Theresa that Jose is the son
of Gerardo can't be used since law is clear that
an assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a
valid marriage.
Birth certificate carries no weight since proof of
filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy
of the child is being questioned, or when the
status of a child born after 300 days following
the termination of marriage is sought to be
established. In this case, legitimacy is certain.

RESULT: declared son of Mario Gopiao after
15 years.

A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (RULE ON DNA Evidence) effective October 15, 2007

Jao v. CA
152 SCRA 359

People v. Tumimpad
235 SCRA 483

Facts:
Victim is Sandra Salcedo, a 15 yo Mongoloid
with the mental capacity of a 5 year old, and
daughter of Lt. Teofisto and Pastora Salcedo
August 7, 1989 Sandra complains of
constipation, the following day she points at
Tumimpad and says "Mama patayin mo yan,
bastos!
Due to repeated vomiting, lack of appetite, and
mood swings, Sandra is brought to a doctor
where she it is discovered that she is pregnant
! January 11, 1990 Sandra gives birth to a boy,
Jacob.
! Pastora (mother) files complaint alleging that
Sandra was raped by Constable Tumimpad
and Constable Prieto sometime between
March and April 1989. Hence, trial ensued
! During trial:
! Sandra is able to single out Tumimpad and
Prieto as the perpetrators when she was
shown pictures and during a police line-up
! A blood test was also done and it showed
Jacob O, Sandro B, Tumimpad O, Prieto
- A
! Court convicts Tumimpad of rape, Prieto is
acquitted

Issue: W/n the lower court erred in convicting the
Tumimpad on rape based on a blood grouping
test, and not on a paternal tests known as
chromosomes or HLA test

Held: No. Decision affirmed.
! The victim was able to identify Tumimpad as
the perpetrator on more than one occasion,
she is even able to detail how the rape took
place
! Usually blood test results are used to prove the
presumption of non-paternity where results
show the impossibility of alleged paternity.
In this case however, the blood test is used as
evidence to merely show the possibility of
Tumimpad being the father and results come
out as positive of that possibility, that taken
with the testimonies and identifications made
by Sandra are enough to prove Tumimpad's
guilt.

TIJING (supra)

Herrera vs. Alba (supra)

AGUSTIN (supra)

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne Diaz
G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007

Facts:
! Nov 1993 Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted,
and the friendship blossomed into love.
! Jinky however, was already married to
Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national, in
spite of this, the lovers lived together out of
which Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25, 1998
! Rogelio initially recognized Joanne as his, only
to abandon the family on Sept 1998, Jinky
thereafter files a complaint
! Judgment rendered in favor of Jinky , Rogelio
files a new motion and is granted
! RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelio's
admission that he was the one who shouldered
hospital bills during Joanne's birth and that on
some instances he continued visiting Jinky
after the birth of Joanne
! Rogelio goes to the Court of Appeals, during
the pendency of the trial, however he dies, and
is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong.
! CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA
analysis to finally determine the paternity of
Joanne, hence the petition

Issue: W/n the court erred in remanding the
case for DNA analysis despite the fact that said
analysis is no longer feasible given that
Rogelio Ong is dead

Held: No, decision of the appellate court is
affirmed.
! Case discusses DNA testing again, see
Herrera vs Alba.
! The new rules on DNA testing allows for the
application of DNA testing for as long as
biological samples of Rogelio Ong is present
! Biological samples any organic material
originating from the person's body, even if
found on inanimate objects
! Thus, even if Rogelio is dead, biological
samples may be available and used for DNA
testing
! As held in Tecson vs Comelec: "Any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to
Presently, DNA testing has evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering, the Court therefore reiterates its
stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity

People v. Quitoriano
G.R. No. 118852, Jan. 20, 1997

FACTS:
1. Quitoriano was charged of the crime of rape.
2. He allegedly raped the victim, Edna Pergis, on
December 24, 1992
3. in June 1993, her aunt, Teresa Pergis,
discovered that Edna was pregnant.
4. On August 2, 1993, private complainant filed a
complaint for rape against accused-appellant
5. She gave birth on October 31, 1993.
CONTENTIONS:
Accused:
private complainant gave birth more than ten
months after the alleged rape; therefore, the
child could not have been the accused's
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child could have been the
accused's.
HELD:
Yes.
The fact that private complainant gave birth
more than ten months after the alleged rape
does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto
Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque
Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal
gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it
can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman
is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed
that the child delivered by private complainant
on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is
not impossible that the child was conceived in
December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape.

FC 166(3)
FC167

Chua Keng Giap v. JAC
158 SCRA 18

FACTS:
1. Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the
late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon
City. He claims that he is the son of Chua Bing
Guan and Sy Kao.
2. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for
lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's
capacity to file the petition. No cause of action
because he is not the son of the
abovementioned couple as testified by the
mother herself.

CONTENTIONS:

Respondent:
a. Res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had
been declared as not the son of the spouses
Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-
12592, for the settlement of the estate of the
late Chua Bing Guan.
b. Mother's testimonials: SY Kua herself testified
that she is not her son.

Petitioner:
a. paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner
is to be decided. Therefore, the testimony of
the mother should not be credited.

ISSUE:
W/N Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing
and Sy Kua.

HELD:
Yes.
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of
Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More
than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could
say ---- as indeed she has said these many
years ---- that Chua Keng Giap was not
begotten of her womb.
Petition Denied.

Rodriguez v CA
245 SCRA 150

FACTS:
1. On October 15, 1986, an action for
compulsory recognition and support was
brought before court, by respondent Alarito
(Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido
Rodriguez, petitioner herein
2. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother,
Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness.
3. In the course of her direct examination, she
was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of
the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel
raised a timely objection which the court
sustained.
4. The petitioner now comes to this court
questioning the act of the lower court in
sustaining the objection

Contentions:

Petitioner:
Felicitas Agbulos Haber should not be allowed
to reveal the name of the father of private
respondent because such revelation was
prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Said Article provided:

"When the father or the mother makes the
recognition separately, he or she shall not
reveal the name of the person with whom he or
she had the child; neither shall he or she state
any circumstance whereby the other party may
be indentified."

Respondent:
Navarro v. Bacalla: the testimony of the mother
of the plaintiff in said case, could be used to
established his paternity

ISSUE:
Was the Lower Court correct in sustaining the
objection?

HELD:
Yes.
REASON 1:
Private respondent cannot invoke our decision
in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA 114 (1965).
While we ruled in Navarro that the testimony of
the mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be
used to established his paternity, such
testimony was admitted during the trial without
objection and the defendant accepted the
finding of the trial court that he was the
father of the plaintiff.

Rule: the testimony of the mother may be used
to prove paternity IF the father does not
object.

In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected
to the calling of the mother of private
respondent to the witness stand to name
petitioner as the father of said respondent.

REASON2:

No similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines has been
replicated in the present Family Code. This
undoubtedly discloses the intention of the
legislative authority to uphold the Code
Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on
the investigation of the paternity of
illegitimate children.

Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines were repealed by the
Family Code, which now allows the
establishment of illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children (Art. 175).

Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation
of legitimate children is by any of the following:

"The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
'(1) The record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register or a final judgment; or
'(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.'
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
'(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
'(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)'"

Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family
Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the filiation may be
proven by "any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father."

FC 168, 169
FC 170, 171

Cobatbat-Lim vs IAC
166 SCRA 451

Facts: Case at hand is a squabble over the
estate of late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat.
Petitioner is Violeta Cabatbat-Lim who claims
to be the only child of Esperanza while the
resps are the sisters and children of a
deceased brother.
Priv resps (sisters of Esperanza) filed
@ CFI Pangasinan for partitioning of
Esperanza's estate (died intestate on 4/23/77).
Part of her estate is the Calasiao Bijon Factory
which is in possession of Violeta (alleged child
of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat). They
were saying that Violeta is only a ward (ampon)
through the ff evidences:
! Absence of any records that Esperanza was
admitted to hospital where Esperanza was
supposedly born
! Absence of birth certificate in the live birth
section of the Provincial Hospital (1947-1948)
! Civil registry certification of 3/9/77 that there is
no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat from
5/26/48 or 49
! Certification that Esperanza and Proceso were
only guardians (from Principal II of the Pilot
School)
! Amparo Reside's testimony on 5/21/48 that she
was in the Provincial Hospital to watch a cousin
give birth and there she met Benita Lastimosa
who gave birth to an IC Baby Girl Lastimosa on
5/26/48 (now known as Violeta Cabatbat)
Violeta on the other hand tried to adduce
evidence that will support her claim. Among
which he showed are the following:
! Her birth record filed 6/15/48 showing her birth
of 5/26/48 and that she's an LC of Esperanza
and Prospero
! Proceso's testimony that she's his child w/
Esperanza
! Benita Lastimosa's denial that she delivered at
Provincial Hospital
! MC of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao showed that
Esperanza is the mother of the bride
! Deed of Sale 5/14/60 where minor Violeta is
assisted by 'mother' Esperanza
! Deed pf Absolute Sale 4/21/61 assisted by
'father' Proceso
TC held that Violeta is NOT natural child of E
and P therefore NOT a legal heir.

Issue: WON Violeta is a natural child of
Esperanza and Proceso
Held: NO. TC and CA findings on filiation is
given great accord, conclusive upon the SC.
TC then said that the Registry Book of hospital
admission doesn't even Esperanza was a
patient on 5/26/48 and it doesn't even show
that Esperanza was ever admitted from 12/1/47
6/15/48. On 5/26/48, Records only show that
there was one birth at that day and that was
Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC baby
girl Lastimosa.
Absence of birth record in
the Civil Regitry makes her exhibit doubtable.
Moreover, her reliance on NCC 263 is
misplaced as such action is not to impugn
legitimacy but to claim inheritance as legal
heirs from a childless aunt. They do not claim
that she's an C but that she's not a child of
their aunt at all.

Gaspay v. CA
238 SCRA 163

Facts: Flaviano Gaspay died intestate on
10/14/83, then married to Agueda Denoso
(childless). On 7/6/88 priv resp Guadalupe
Gaspay Alfaro alleged @ TC that she's
acknowledged IC of Flaviano with Claudia
Pason, prayed for issuance of letters of admin
of Flaviano's estate.
Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and
Eriberta (next of kin) who filed for an MTD
(motion to dismiss) saying that Guadalupe is a
stranger.
TC denied the MTD saying that such
was based on indubitable grounds but TC
nonetheless dismissed petition saying that
testimonial and documentary evidence failed to
prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show
Guad consenting to the acknowledgement as
IC and that such action should have been filed
in the lifetime of Flaviano.
CA reversed TC on 9/30/91 saying
that:
! Evid is ample to prove filiation as IC
! Evid is sufficient to show that Guad consented
to the acknowledgement as IC
! Action can be instituted after death of putative
father

Issue: WON Guadalupe is an IC

Held: YES. TC did not discount the testimony
of Martin Garin (agent to logging
concessionaire of Flaviano for 18 years) who
verified handwriting and signature of Flaviano
in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming
(Guad and his husband Bartolome Alfaro)
regarding the hospitalization expenses of
Guad's daughter. CA said that TC must have
assumed that Flaviano's handwriting must
have metamorphosed during the years but it
could be possible that handwriting of Flaviano
never changed at all. Also when Guadalupe
filed said action, she still used Gaspay affixed
to her legal surname as married to Alfaro,
thereby shouting to the world her consent to
the acknowledgment of an IC. As to the action
being instituted after death of putative father,
CA said "action based on acknoweldgement
may be brought even after death of putative
father. She thereby proved entitlement to the
admin of estate. Moreover, the petitioners
neglected to apply for a letter admin 30 days
after the death of Flaviano Gaspay.

Benitez-Badua v. CA
229 SCRA 468

Facts: Vicente Benitez married Isabel
Chipongian, acquired many props in Laguna.
Isabel predeceased Vicente, former died on
4/25/82 while latter died intestate on 11/13/89.
On 9/24/90 Vicente's sis and nephew
Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and Feodor
Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of
letter of admin for Aguilar, saying that Vicente
had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez
Badua was never a related by blood and not
legally adopted therefore not a legal heir.
On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying
that she's sole heir and she's capable of
managing estate. She presented the ff evids:
! Cert of live brith
! Baptismal cert
! ITR and Info Sheet for Members of Gsis of late
Vicente naming her as daughter
! School records
Private resps (Victoria) presented testimonial
evids:
! That spouse failed to beget a child
! Isabel (then 36) was even referred to an ob-
gyne for treatment
! Victoria Benitez Lirio (then 77 years old and
about to die) elder sis of Vicente categorically
declared that Marissa is not a biological child
TC on 12/17/90 dismissed petition of
Victoria. Ruled that Marissa is legitimate
daughter and sole heir (relying on FC 166 and
170)
CA reversed on 5/29/92 saying that
Marissa is NOT biological child and therefore
not legal heir. CA said that TC failed to apply
FC 166 and 170.

Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of
Vicente and Isabel and WON TC misapplied
FC 166 and 170

Held: NO. Marissa is not a biological child and
yes, TC misapplied said FC provisions. SC
said that reliance on FC 164, 166, 170 and 171
are misplaced since said provisions show
situation where husband denies own child with
wife and not a situation where a child is alleged
not to be a natural child of a couple.
SC only sustained CA findings on
ruling that Marissa is not a biological child
Vicente and Isabel based on the ff:
! Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant, as
substatntiated by his brother Dr. Nilo
Chipongian, saying that she's been married
already for 10 years but at age 36 was not yet
pregnant and so she was even brought to the
attention of Dr. Manahan who was a well
known ob-gyne. Many other people (neighbors)
corroborated this point that Iabel never became
pregnant. Had she been, it would have been
noticed by people around her.
! Marissa's birth certificate is highly dubious
because it showed that she was born in the
Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she
would have been born in the hospital and in the
skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the ob-
gyne of her putative mother.
! Extrajudicial settlement of Nilo and Vicente
after sabel's death saying that they are the
sole heirs of the deceased Isabel for she has
no other ascending or descending heirs
Letter of Isabel to Vicente pleading him to give
Marissa her share which she would not have
need to do had Marissa been their legal heir

Lim v.IAC (supra)

Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao
378 SCRA 563

Facts: CA reversed RTC w/c declared William
Liyao Jr as IC of William Liyao and ordered
Juanita et al to recognize jr as compulsory heir
of the deceased William (successional rights to
be granted thereof).
On 11/29/76 Jr (represented by
mother Corazon Garcia) filed for said action for
compulsory recognition as IC of William Liyao,
being in continuous possession of status as
child and recognized as such child by
decedent.
Corazon had been legally married but
was de facto separated with husband Ramon
Yulo for 10 years and was said to have
cohabited with William from 1965 up to his
death in 1975. She has 2 other daughters by
1
st
marriage and it was claimed that Jr (Billy)
was born during said cohabitation. This was
supposedly with the knowledge of William's LC
by wife Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Tita Rose and
Chritina who were both employed in Far East
Realty Investment where William and Corazon
are Pres and VP respectively. Both sides have
virtually different stories.
TC was convinced of the
preponderance of evidence that William sired
Jr (billy) because he was conceived during said
cohab of William and Corazon and he has
been in continuous possession and enjoyment
of status of a child of William through his overt
acts of:
! Securing birth certificate through confidential
secretary Mrs. Rodriguez
! Openly and publicly acknowledging billy as son
! Providing sustenance and introducing him even
to his LCs
CA reversed saying that:
! Law favors legitimacy
! Gave credence to marriage of Corazon with
Ramon Yulo (legally married with no legal
separation)
! That Corazon and Ramon were seen in each
other's arms during the time that Corazon and
William were supposed to be cohabiting
! Birth cert and baptismal cert not enough proof
of paternity in the case where William had a
hand in preparing such docs
! Neither family pix would prove filiation
! Passbook presented did not show that William
opened such for Billy and Corazon because it
does not bear William's signature and name

Issue: WON Jr (billy) is an IC and WON he can
impugn his own legitimacy to claim from estate
of his supposed father

Held: NO. presumption of legitimacy is strong.
Even if Jr. insists that Ramon and Corazon
have been separated already for 10 years such
that there is physical impossibility for sexual
union, de facto separation is of no bearing.
Impugning legitimacy under NCC 255 can only
be invoked by husband and only in qualified
situations, his heirs. Petition cannot prosper
because child born within valid marriage is
deemed LC even though mother may have
declared against said legitimacy or has been
sentenced as an adulteress.

FC 172-173

Diaz vs. Court of Appeals
129 SCRA 621, June 22, 1984

Facts:
1) In 1911 Isidro Azarraga dies leaving 10
children the first 7 of who are illegitimate born
to his mistress Valentina Abarracoso.
2) The legitimacy of the 8
th
child is in question in
this suit namely Leodegario, (the 9
th
Filomena
was the only one established as legitimate
being born to the valid marriage of Isidro and
his lawful wife Calixta Lozada)
3) Sept 10, 49' Leodegario dies intestate(no will)
in an accident in Manila he leaves behind no
spouse and no children to inherit his property
amounting to P28,000 worth of real estate in
Capiz.
4) Oct 15, 49' original Maria Diaz, daughter of
the decedent's sister Filomena, (she died
during the pendency of the case and was
replaced by her heirs) files for letters of
Administration w/ the CFI.
5) Oct 25, 49' Amador Azarraga (4
th
illegitimate
child of Isidro, half brother of decedent) files an
opposition to the petition citing that the
deceased is an illegitimate son of Isidro via
Valentina Abarracoso and thus is his brother
rather than the mother's.
6) Mar 1, 50' CF rules in favor of
7) Aug 17, 70' 20 years after granted admin, n
Eduardo Azarraga (heir of Amador) files for the
removal of admin from citing failure to render
a final accounting of the estate and a project of
partition. He also requests to be granted
admin.
8) H s cite that the decedent is not a legitimate
child of Isidro and thus is not the full blooded
sibling of the mother who was a legitimate
child.
9) asserts the opposite, that decedent
Leodegario is legitimate
10) CF again rules for
11) H files with CA and is upheld and is granted
admin to the prejudice of
Issues:
WON Leodegario is a legitimate child of
Isidro and his legal wife Calixta Lozada
Held:
YES, the proved the legitimacy of
Leodegario through his school records (UST
Law) which cited the decedent's name as
Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada. It was further
strengthened by the preponderance of the will
of Pastora Azarraga which stated that the
decedent and the mother Filiomena are full
blooded siblings. Moreover the court order of
Mar 1, 50' (granting admin to the ) also
acknowledges this fact of legitimacy.
CA set aside CFI affirmed.

Reyes v. CA
135 SCRA 439

Facts:
Certiorari of CA decision reversing CFI
dismissal of action for reconveyance by the n.
1) H file w/ CF for order compelling the rene
Reyes aka Irene Ramero to execute a deed of
reconveyance on several props to the n. H
allege that acquired the props in question
through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation by
registering herself as the sole child of decedent
Franciscoo Delgado and thus entitled to inherit.
2) H who are the sisters and brother of the
decedent claim otherwise since they allege the
was born during the legal marriage of her
mother Genoveva Ramero and the latter's
husband Justino Reyes.
3) claims that she was the fruit of the
cohabitation b/w her mother and the decedent
during the time subsequent to the separation of
her mother w/ Justino Reyes. She also claims
continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate child since she mentions that
decedent supported her financially through her
education.
4) CF rules against n dismissing the order for
reconveyance.
5) H appeal to CA which rules in their favor
reversing the CFI declaring that the TCTs of
the on the said props are null and void.
6) CA rules that though was a spurious child of
the decedent she was never recognized and
thus cannot inherit.
7) in her motion for reconsideration w/ the CA
cites how she was in fact acknowledged by the
decedent as proven by the latter's consent
noted on the marriage certificate.
Issues:
WON is a recognized chiId of the
decedent and is thus able to inherit.
Held:
NO, it is a well established doctrine
that for an illegitimate child to inherit he/she
must first be recognized by the putative parent
through voluntary or compulsory means. In this
case the was never validly recognized by
Francisco Delgado contrary to her assertions.
The evidence she presented was not
compelling to establish her filiation to the
decedent. For instance her birth certificate was
not signed by Francisco. Furthermore it cannot
be said that her baptismal certificate is credible
evidence regarding filiation since the
statements contained therein only attest to the
administration of the said sacrament on the
said date. In addition to this her permanent
student records and her written consent to her
father's operation both being unsigned and not
written in her father's handwriting cannot
suffice as proof of filiation. Moreover the
pictures she present did not give weight to her
arguments as they are not constitutive of proof
of filiation. Finally the alleged consent
stipulated by Francisco in the marriage
certificate cannot be given weight since it is not
signed and does not appear in the decedent's
handwriting.
Decision affirmed in toto

Tison vs. Court of Appeals
276 SCRA 582, July 31, 1997

Facts:
1) Mar 5, 83'Teodora Dezoller Guerero dies w/ no
children leaving the prop in question to her
husband and the heirs of her brother(who died
in 73'), the .
2) Jan 2, 88' After her death, her husband Martin
Guerero adjudicates the house to him and sells
it to n Teodora Domingo.
3) Martin dies on Oct 25, 88' and s Tison and
Dezoller file for reconveyance Nov. 2, 88 for
1/2share of the prop.
4) During the hearing the birth cert.s marriage
cert.s w/c prove the filiation to the decedent
Teodora through their common link to their
father Teodora's brother Hermogenes Dezoller.
More importantly they present the testimony of
one of the Corazon Dezoller Tison attesting
that some time in 1946 the decedent had
actually acknowledged her as her niece
(declaration of filiation).
5) H files a demurrer to the evidence citing that
they fall short of the requirements set by Art
172 of the Family Code and that the testimony
of Corazon Dezoller Tison was self serving and
uncorroborated.
6) Dec 3, 92' TC rules for n granting the demurrer
and dismissing the action for reconveyance.
7) CA affirms citing the evidence presented was
inadmisible.
Issues:
WON the satisfy of the quantum of proof
mandated by Art 172 of the FC.
Held:
YES, the court held that legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally in an action for
reconveyance, as such the court held that
there being a presumption of legitimacy in
relation to the status of the petitioners the n's
failure to adduce evidence disproving such a
fact renders the presumption effective. Thus
his choice to file a demurrer rather than adduce
evidence to controvert the assertions comes
as a implied admission of the fact of legitimacy.
More importantly the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison fell within the definition of a
declaration about pedigree that is exempt form
the rule on hearsay based on the following
conditions: 1) that the declarant is either dead
or unable to testify; 2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is subject
of inquiry, 3) that such relationship be shown
by evidence other than the declaration 4) that
the declaration was made ante litem motum
(before the commencement of the suit).
Moreover the declaration may stand only if it
pertains to the claimant's right over the
declarant's own estate (as in this case). f
however the declaration is to claim a right from
another family member other than the
declarant's estate the declaration may not be
deemed credible.
Judgment reversed and set aside.

Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals
289SCRA 188, April 20, 1998

Facts:
Arturio Trinidad was born on July 21, 1943
from Felicidad Molato and Inocentes Briones,
who allegedly married on May 5, 1942. Upon
the death of Inocentes, Arturio lived with his
aunt Lourdes in the property of Patricio Briones
(father of Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix) until he
grew up and got married. When Arturio
returned to the property upon Lourdes'
invitation and sought to claim the share of his
father on the land, Lourdes refused to partition
the property and claimed that Inocentes never
married, died single, and has no child. On the
other hand, Arturio claimed that his parents
were legally married but failed to provide their
marriage certificate and his birth certificate to
show his relationship with Inocentes because
these were lost during the war.

Issue: WON Arturio is the legitimate
child of Inocentes
Held: Yes
1. The parents of Arturio, Inocentes and
Felicidad, were validly married
a. Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan certified
that all its records of marriages and birth,
among others, were either lost, burned or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation
b. Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo testified that
his parents' were married and cohabited as
husband and wife
i. Meren was one of the witnesses to the nuptials
ii. Jovita was the barangay captain who had
attended the birth and baptismal parties of
Arturio
2. Arturio was born during their marriage and
cohabitation
a. The baptismal certificate of Arturio show his
parents to be Inocentes and Felicidad and his
birth to be on July 21, 1943, after the legitimate
and legal wedding of Inocentes and Felicidad
Family photos of Lourdes and Felix with
Arturio's wife and children substantiate his
claim that they had lived together in the
property, contrary to Lourdes' claim that they
had not

Jison vs. Court of Appeals
286 SCRA 495, February 24, 1998

Facts:
1. Francisco Jison was married to Lilia Lopez
Jison in 1945 and together, they had
Lourdes
2. Francisco impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar, Lourdes' nanny, who gave birth to
Monina Joson on August 4, 1946

3. March 13, 1985: Monina filed a petition for
recognition as Francisco's illegitimate child
a. That Esperanza was still employed by
Francisco at the time Monina was
conceived in 1945
b. That sexual contact between Francisco
and Esperanza was not impossible
i. Castellanes, Sr., a worker in the Nelly
Garden that Lilia managed testified that
Lilia spent her evenings in the Nelly
Garden, working from 6PM to 3AM
c. That the affidavit she signed on
September 21, 1971 where she
denounced her filiation with Francisco was
acquired under duress
i. Bilbao, the procurement officer, hacienda
overseer and administrator testified that he
was present during the event
d. That Francisco fathered Monina and
recognized her as his daughter and
That Monina has been enjoying the open
and continuous possession of the status
as Francisco's illegit child where Francisco
i. Sent her to school
Paid for her school expenses
Defrayed her hospitalization expenses
1. Testified to by Monina herself and
Ledesma, a banker and former mayor
ii. Gave her monthly allowances which he
instructed his office personnel to do
Paid for her mother's funeral expenses
Acknowledged her paternal greetings and
Called her his "Hija or child
1. Testified to by Tingson, Nelly Garden's
paymaster
a. who recorded its expenses and issued
vouchers and
b. who knew the persons receiving money
from Francisco's office and
c. who kept Monina's accounts in a separate
book to hide it from Lilia, as instructed by
Francisco
iii. Recommended her for employment in
Merchant Financing Corporation that is
managed by the wife of his first cousin
iv. Allowed her to use his house in Bacolod
Paid for her long distance telephone calls
1. Testified to by the houseboy, Duatin, that
a. Monina was introduced to him as
Francisco's child when she stayed there
b. Monina calls Francisco "Daddy
c. Francisco instructed him to treat Monina
just like the rest of his children
d. He hid Monina whenever Francisco and
Lilia were there, as instructed by Francisco
v. Had her vacation in his apartment in
Manila
vi. Allowed her to use his surname

Issue: WON Monina is the illegitimate
child of Francisco

Held: YES
1. The preponderance of evidence
mentioned above sufficiently established
her filiation despite
a. the Affidavit dated Sept. 21, 1971,
attesting that Francisco is not her father,
because it would not have been necessary
if it were not true; Francisco had gone to
such great lengths in order that Monina
denounce her filiation
b. Monina's birth and baptismal certificates
were not signed by Francisco because
these are not conclusive evidence of
filiation
c. Notes of Francisco's relatives attesting to
Monina's filiation are without merit since
i. they are not shown to be dead or unable to
testify
ii. they are not family possessions
Rule 130, Secs. 39, 40 require that family
possessions to be regarded as evidence of
pedigree should be articles representing, in
effect, the family's joint statement of its belief
as to the pedigree of a person

Labagala vs. Santiago
371 SCRA 360

Facts:
1. Siblings Nicolasa, Amanda and Jose Santiago
owned a parcel of land, which was registered in
Jose's name alone
2. February 6, 1984: Jose died intestate
a. Nicolasa and Amanda, as his legal heirs,
sought the recovery of title, ownership, and
possession of his 1/3 share in the property
b. The case was filed against Ida C. Labagala
who claimed
i. To be Jose's legitimate child with Esperanza
Cabrigas
1. His income tax return listed Ida as his daughter
ii. To have been the donee of his 1/3 share of the
property
1. A Deed of Sale, covering the entire parcel of
the property, was executed on March 1979 in
da's favour BUT
2. The sale was actually a donation
iii. To had caused the issuance of a title in her
name over the entire parcel of land by virtue of
the sale in order to prevent the property from
being sold by public auction for Nicolasa and
Amanda's failure to pay its realty taxes
iv. To have always been staying on the property
1. Previous ejectment cases by Nicolasa and
Amanda were instituted against her in 1985
2. Cases were resolved in da's favour
3. Contentions of Nicolasa and Amanda
a. Ida is a child of Leo Labagala and Cornelia
Cabrigas
i. Leo Labagala signed and prepared the birth
certificate of Isa Santiago as her father
ii. Birth certificate of Ida Santiago had the same
birth date and place as the claimed day and
place of Ida Labagala (1969, Manila)
iii. da did not present a birth certificate of an 'da
Santiago' and only alleged that she had been
using the surname since her childhood
iv. Jose stated in a Civil Case (No. 56226) that he
did not have any child.
b. The Deed of Sale was forged
i. It was not signed by Jose but only
thumbmarked, which Jose had never done
ii. Ida was unemployed then and could not have
afford the price of P150k
iii. Ida concealed the sale as she registered the
deed only on Jan. 26, 1987 or 8 years after the
sale

Issue: WON Ida Labagala is Jose's
child
Held: NO
1. NCC 263 does not apply
a. Applies only for situations where doubt exists
that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife
(issue of legitimacy)
b. Not for situations where a child is alleged not
be the child at all of a particular couple
2. Birth certificate of Ida Labagala is conclusive
proof of her filiation with Leo and Cornelia
a. BC was signed and prepared by the father, Leo
b. Ida did not present any birth certificate in the
name of a "da Santiago
c. Baptismal and Income Tax Return are not
proofs of filiation but only of the fact that a
baptism had been administered and that tax
has been paid in a certain amount, respectively
3. Use of a family name does not establish
pedigree
4. Ida contradicted herself in relation to her
filiation with Cornelia
a. In her testimony, she denied knowing Cornelia
In her petition, she admitted that Cornelia is her
mother, Esperanza's sister

Tecson vs. COMELEC, Poe, et al.
G.R. No. 161434, Mar. 3, 2004

De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon
366 SCRA 499

Facts:
! Aug 23, 1964 Danilo Jesus and Carolina
Jesus were married. Their union produced two
children, Jacqueline (March 1, 1979) and Jinky
Jesus (July 6, 1982).
! June 7 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his own
illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de
Jesus
! 12 March 1992 Juan Dizon died. Jacqueline
and Jinky then filed an action to be part of the
heirs of his estate as his illegitimate children in
a notarized document.
! TC: ulitimately dismissed the complaint for lack
of cause of action and for being improper since
it's not the proper forum to question their
paternity and filiation. Thus the present case
ISSUE: WON Jinky and Jacquelin are the
illegitimate children of Juan Dizon
HELD: NO
! Presumption of law is that of legitimacy. Those
who are born in wedlock without conclusive
proof that there was physical impossibility for
the parents to conceive the child are
considered legitimate. Upon the expiration of
periods found in FC 170 and 171, this
presumption of civil status becomes fixed and
unassailable. It is only when the legitimacy of
the child has been disputed can paternity of the
husband be rejected.
While the recognition of illegitimacy by Dizon
was made in accordance with the rules on
recognizing illegitimacy, this does not negate
the legitimacy they hold with Danilo Jesus.
Petitoners were born during the marriage of
their parents. The certificates of live birth
also identify Danilo de Jesus as their father.
Thus, before they can be recognized as
illegitimate children, they must first contest their
status as legitimate children of Danilo Jesus.

Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
460 SCRA 315, June 15, 2005

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin
Prollamante sued Martin's alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support
and support pendente lite
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th
birthday on November 10, 1999
The baby's birth certificate was purportedly
signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered
the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fe's repeated requests for Martin's
support despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child
Arnel is actually married and has a family of his
own at the time he impregnated Fe
Arnel claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to
him in the acknowledgment of Martin's birth
certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously
reflected his marital status as single when he
was actually married and that his birth year
was 1965 when it should have been 1964
July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE: WON DNA testing is self-incriminatory
and violates privacy of person

HELD: NO
Being the first case where DNA testing was the
focal issue the court examines the history of
DNA testing
The court opened the possibility of admitting
DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated
in Tijing v. Court of Appeals
In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and
murder victim's DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were
admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether an association exist(ed) between the
evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their
profile

The right against self-incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to
be excluded is not an incrimination but as part
of object evidence.

right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common
good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that
enhance public service and the common
good.

where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent or
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

No evidence to show this

If criminal can be subject to it at expense of
death, what more in a civil case for paternity?

Ong vs. Diaz
December 17, 2007

Facts:
! Nov 1993 Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted,
and the friendship blossomed into love.
! Jinky however, was already married to
Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national, in
spite of this, the lovers lived together out of
which Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25, 1998
! Rogelio initially recognized Joanne as his, only
to abandon the family on Sept 1998, Jinky
thereafter files a complaint
! Judgment rendered in favor of Jinky , Rogelio
files a new motion and is granted
! RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelio's
admission that he was the one who shouldered
hospital bills during Joanne's birth and that on
some instances he continued visiting Jinky
after the birth of Joanne
! Rogelio goes to the Court of Appeals, during
the pendency of the trial, however he dies, and
is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong.
! CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA
analysis to finally determine the paternity of
Joanne, hence the petition

! ISSUE: WON DNA testing is applicable when
Rogelio has already died
! HELD: YES
! death of the petitioner does not ipso facto
negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA.
! Def of biological sampling - any organic
material originating from a person's body, even
if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible
to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and
other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
! Any physical residue left by deceased
RESULT: case is remanded to RTC for DNA
testing

FC175

Castro v. CA
173 SCRA 656

Facts:
! Background love story: Pricola Maregmen
after marrying one Felix de Maya on May 23,
1913 realized the mistake she made and went
back to her real love, Eustaquio Castro whom
she lived with until her death on Sept 11, 1924.
Their illicit affair bore them a daughter , Benita
Castro on May 27, 1919.
! Two earlier civil cases were filed against Benita
Castro. The first by her uncle and aunt Juan
and Feliciano Castro that they and not Benita
should be the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who
died on May 27, 1923 and the second by
Marcelina Bautista, the wife of her alleged
father Eustaquio Castro who died on August
24, 1961. Marcelina also alleges that she and
not Benita should be the compulsory heir of the
property of Euestaquio.
! TC: consolidated the cases and ruled Benita is
indeed the acknowledged and recognized child
of Eustaquio Castro and is entitled to
participate in the partition of the properties left
by him.
! CA: affirmed the decision of TC and held that
Eustaquio Castro voluntarily recognized Benita
through the records of birth he registered
himself.

ISSUE: WON Benita Castro Naval is the
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child
of Eustaquio Castro

HELD: YES
! Since FC is now the law being used and no
vested rights will be prejudiced, FC 172 can be
used to prove that Benita possessed an open
and continuous possession of the status of an
legitimate child which action can be brought in
her lifetime
! Evidence:
! lived with Eustaquio for 42 years, even when
she was already married
! Aunt and Uncle Juan Castro and Feliciana
Castro admitted that she was the daughter in
Civil Case no 3762.
! Eustaquio himself reported and registered
Benita's birth. Plus there was no indication that
he should have signed certificate or taken
judicial action in order for her to be recognized
as his illegitimate child
! Eustaquio gave away Benita during her
wedding to Cipriano Naval
! certificate of baptism and the picture of the
Castro family during the wake for Eustaqui
! rule on separating the legitimate from the
illegitimate family isn't necessary because
Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were
the only immediate family of Eustaquio.
OBITER: Unless she asks about NCC
! diff between voluntary and compulsory
recognition IN THIS CASE, Eustaquio
voluntarily recognized her since he himself took
care of and registered her record of birth in the
municipality. Thus even if his signature was
missing, his actions clearly show his voluntary
recognition of her.
! voluntary recognition: natural child merely asks
for a share in the inheritance in virtue of his
having been acknowledged as such, and is not
trying to compel the father or his heirs to make
the acknowledgment
! NCC 131 law thspat applies for voluntary
recognition: "The acknowledgment of a natural
child must be made in the record of birth, in a
will or in some other public document
! acknowledgment has been formally and legally
accomplished because the public character of
the document makes judicial pronouncement
unnecessary
! compulsory recognition - requires judicial
pronouncement of illegitimacy since recognition
was made in a private document.
! NCC 135-136 apply.
! recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts
because a private writing, lacking the stronger
guaranty and higher authenticity of a public
document is not self- executory. based on an
express recognition so found and declared by
the court after hearing
! diff between natural and spurious IN this
case, she was a natural child of Eustaquio but
a spurious child of Pricola
! natural - those born outside of lawful wedlock
of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other
! spurious had legal impediment to marry when
child was conceived and born.
in case the recognition is made by only one of
the parents, it will be presumed that the child is
natural if the parents recognizing it had the
legal capacity to contract marriage at the time
of the conception

Lim v. CA
65 SCRA 160

Facts:
! Francisco Uy executed an affidavit that said he
was the son and sole heir of deceased Susana
Lim and her property now belongs to him
! Felisa Lim, the alleged natural daughter of
Susana Lim, filed a suit in CFI against
Francisco to nullify the said affidavit. She
presented the ff. evidence to show that she is
the acknowledged natural daughter of Susana:
! Certificate of baptism which states that Felisa
is Susana's daughter
! Marriage contract which shows consent of
Susana to the marriage of her daughter.
! On the other hand, Francisco provided the ff.
evidence
! Application for alien registration which lists
Susana as his mother
! Order of Bureau of Immigration cancelling
application stating that Susana is his mother
! Identification certificate issued by Bureau of
Immigration describing his Filipino citizenship
taken from his mother Susana Lim
! TC: recognized Susana as the natural child
! CA: ruled that neither one of them showed that
they were voluntarily or compulsory recognized
by Susana

ISSUE: WON Felisa is the natural daughter of
Susana

HELD: NO. Francisco is not a pertinent issue
anymore since he decided to argue that he
bought the property with his own money thus it
should be declared as his through implied trust
Felisa's evidence hinges on her marriage
certificate where Susana gave her consent.
She declares that this is a public instrument,
which shows Susana's recognition (Art 1216 of
Civil Code of 1889). However, public
instruments are defined as public documents
authenticated by a notary or a competent
public official. A marriage certificate is not a
notarized public document but a mere
declaration by the contracting parties of their
marriage.

Baas v. Baas
134 SCRA 260

Facts:
! Plaintiffs alleged that late Raymundo
Banas, was acknowledged natural son of late
BIBIANO Banas therefore, by descent, they are
entitled to decedent's share
! Defendants denied that Raymundo
was the natural son of late Bibiano, nor was he
acknowledged by the latter; use of surname
Banas by Raymundo was justified, Raymundo
being Pedro's (Bibiano's brother) son
! Late Raymundo was a natural child,
born 1894 of Dolores and of unknown father. It
was Bibiano who shouldered raymundo's
school expenses (in Beda) until Raymundo
became a teacher
! In 1926, Raymundo married Trinidad,
niece of Bibiano's wife (Faustina); Trinidad
lived with Bibiano's family before the marriage
and took care of the latter's children
! n Raymundo's marriage cert, name
of father was stated to be Bibiano. Pedro
appeared as one of the sponsors.
! Dec 1928, Raymundo and Pedro
executed sworn statements before an atty.
Wherein Raymundo declared that he was the
natural son of Dolores and came to know thath
his father was Pedro and he realized that there
had been an error in his marriage cert; Pedro
declared that he has a natural son named
Raymundo whom he recognized, and he asked
for the correction of the said cert
! June 30, 1930, Pedro Baas wrote to
"M.R.P. Juez del Arzobispado de Manila"
wherein he reiterated that he had recognized
his natural son born of Dolores (who is insane),
Raymundo; he requested for the correction of
his son's and grandsons' baptismal cert
! July, 1930 Bibiano executed sworn
statement stating that Raymundo is Pedro's
son
! 1954, Bibiano died; 1955, Raymundo
wrote to Atty. Faustino in which he complained
about the alleged in justice done to him by
Bibiano's wife
! June 24, 1955, Bibiano's heirs, the
defendants, extra-judicially settled his estate by
means of a deed of extra judicial settlement
among themselves which was notarized by
Atty. Angel Vecino, brother of Trinidad
! November 7, 1955, the spouses
Raymundo Baas and Trinidad executed a
mortgage over their house and lot in 1444
Kalimbas St., in favor of herein defendant
Angel V. Baas
! 1962 Raymundo died; 1965, his heirs
filed complaint for partition and recovery of
hereditary share
! Trinidad said she discovered certain
documents w/c established Raymundo's
filiation to Bibiano 1. handwritten note
addressed to Raymundo w/ salutation "Su
padre from B. Banas 2) matriculation certs of
Raymundo w/ Bibiano as father
3) report card w/ Bibiano as
parent/guardian 4) autobiographies of
raymundo w/ alterations

ISSUE: WON RAYMUNDO WAS AN
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL SON OF
BIBIANO

HELD: NO
! The note w/ "su padre unreliable,
assuming it's authentic, the same doesn't
constitute a sufficient proof of a valid
recognition
! Formalities of voluntary recognition
under Article 278 of the New Civil Code is that
recognition shall be express and made either in
the record of birth, in a will, in a statement in a
court of record, or in any authentic writing
! Note w/ "su padre is a mere
indication of paternal solicitude.The Filipinos
are known for having very close family ties.
Extended families are a common set-up among
them, sometimes to the extent that strangers
are also considered as part of the family.
! Tthe rule of incidental
acknowledgment does not apply to plaintiffs-
appellants' note (w/ "su padre) since it is not a
public document where a father would
ordinarily be more careful about what he says
! Even if the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs-appellants constitute a sufficient proof
of a voluntary recognition, still their complaint
will not prosper since it is evident that if there
was acknowledgment on the part of Bibiano, he
had rectified or repudiated the same by his
sworn statement
! Considering that Raymundo was born
in 1894, and was already of majority age in
1915, long before Bibiano's death in 1954, he
should and could have filed such action either
under Article 135 of the Old Civil Code, or
Article 283 of the New Civil Code
Such action for the acknowledgment of a
natural child is not transmissible to the natural
child's heirs; the right is purely a personal one
to the natural child

In re Christensen
102 Phil 1055

Facts:
! Christensen, American citizen and his
laborer Bernarda lived as husband and wife
(but were not married) continuous for over 30
years; 2 children: Lucy and Helen
! Christensen died April 1953; he left a
considerable amount of properties; in his will
he appointed petitioner Aznar as executor,
declared he had only 1 child (Lucy) giving to
her the rest of his properties; 1000 for
Bernarda and 3,600 for Helen (who, accdg to
Christensen, is not in any way related to him)
! Respondents filed oppositions to the
probate of the will; Helen contends that the
dispositions therein were illegal because she
and Lucy were both children of Christensen,
yet she was given only 3,600
! Bernarda claimed ownership over !
of Christensen's prop (co-ownership)
! Lucy alleged that before, during and
after conception of Helen, their mother
Bernarda was generally known to be carrying
relations with 3 different men and during the
lifetime of the decedent, he verbally disavowed
relationship w/ Helen

ISSUE: WON Maria Helen Christensen Garcia
had been in continous possession of the status
of a natural child of the deceased EdwardE.
Christensen

HELD: YES
! Helen was born in 1934, during the
period when Bernarda was publicly known to
have been living as common-law wife of
Christensen (Bernarda testified in favor of
Helen)
! Christensen spent the weekends
with Bernarda and their child Lucy in the
Christensen plantation. Even granting that
Zosimo Silva (alleged lover of Bernarda who
testified to that effect) at his stage fitted himself
into the picture, Helen's mother and the
deceased were publicly known to be living
together as husband and wife.
! In fact, Christensen from Helen's
birth in 1934 providedfor her maintenance;
shouldered the expenses for her education;
tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname
"Christensen"
! Hisrepudations of her relationship
with him came about only after he andBernarda
parted ways in March, 1950, and after Helen
took sides with her mother. Furthermore,
despite that decedent's desire that she
continue her studies, Helen ignored the same
andgot married to a man for Christensen held
no high esteem.
! Testator' last acts cannot be
made the criterion in determining whether
oppositor was his child or not, for human
frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a
person to adopt unnatural or harsh
measures against an erring child
The LC directing Lucy to acknowledge Helen is
absurd , for the heirs would be compelled to
recognize such child as a natural child of the
deceased without a properprovision of the law.
The Civil Code only requires a declaration by
the court of the child's status as a natural child
of the parent

Ilano v. CA
231 SCRA 242

FACTS:
! With Artemio's promise of marriage,
Leoncia eloped w/ him in April 1962. He came
home to her 3 or 4 times a week
! The apartment where they stayed was
procured by Melencio, employee of Artemio;
Leoncia wa provided by Artemio, thru Melencio
or the maid 700 a month; Artemio's support
was sometimes in form of cash or check like
Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532,

the signature appearing thereon having been
identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner
! In Oct 1962, she delivered a still-born
babay, the death cert was signed by Artemio.
! May, 1963 Leoncia's niece stayed w/
the latter. When their 2
nd
child, Merceditas, was
born, Artemio left instruction to give the birth
cert to Leoncia for her signature, as he was
leaving early (so he wasn't able to sign the said
cert)
! Artemio signed Merceditas' report
card as her parent and he was the 1 whom she
recognized as her Daddy; he would bring
candies, etc and he would take her for a drive
and cuddle her to sleep
! (Artemio sometimes accompany
leoncia for pre-natal check-up)
! Artemio denied of any relationship
with Leoncia; he disowned the handwritten
answers and signatures in death cert of the 1
st

child; he denied everything except the check
! Melencio admitted that he was the
one who procured the apartment for Leoncia,
leased it in his name, paid the rentals and
bought the necessities therefor. He and
Leoncia lived together and shared the same
bed.
! Wife and daughter of Artemio
corroborated Artemio's testimony that he was
home on Dec 30, 1963 (2
nd
child's birth date)
because he was sick then hospitalized and he
never slept out of their house
! Artemio contends that order of
appelate court directing him to pay "back
support is erroneous since the complaint
against him has been dismissed by the trial
court, therefore was absolutely no obligation on
his part to give support to Merceditas

ISSUE: WON Merceditas is illeg child of
Artemio

HELD: YES
! The role played by Melencio S. Reyes
(alleged lover of Leoncia) in the relationship
between Leoncia and appellant was that of a
man Friday
! The belated denial of paternity after
the action has been filed against the putative
father is not the denial that would destroy the
paternity of the child which had already been
recognized by defendant by various positive
acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's
father. A recognition once validly made is
irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn
! It was Artemio who made
arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic)
at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to
the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examination by Artemio
! Artemio run as a candidate in the
Provincial Board of Cavite, Artemio gave
Leoncia his picture with the following
dedication: "To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong".
! Any other evidence or proof" (last par
of A283) that the defendant is the father is
broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article.
The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has
a right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the
Philippines.)

Baluyut v. Baluyut
186 SCRA 506

Facts:

Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza were
minors when they filed this petition. They were
represented by their mother and guardian ad
litem, Norma Urbano.
The petition is filed against Felicidad Baluyut
and the CA. Felicidad is the wife of the
deceased, who had an illegal relationship with
Norma Urbano because he was already
married at the time. The petition states that the
minors are his illegitimate children and
therefore have a legal interest on the estate of
the deceased Enrique Baluyut.
They further allege that they were in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of children of the decease during his
lifetime b direct overt acts. (he supported them
and maintained them.
They added to having been deliberately
excluded from the estate of Enrique Baluyut.
Felicidad, who is the widow and appointed
administratrix of the estate, opposed the
petition.
Trial Court: declared that the minors were the
forced heirs of the deceased (under NCC
887(5)) and ordered Felicidad to provide
monthly support for the minors.

CA: reversed the decision; the petition was
dismissed (although the CA did recognize them
as Enrique's illegitimate children)

Issue:
W/N the petitioners are the illegitimate children
of the deceased and are therefore entitiled to
monthly support.

Held: Proof of filiation is not sufficient to confer
upon them any hereditary rights in the estate of
the deceased. The decision appealed from is
affirmed.

Ratio
The illegitimate child must be acknowledged
by the putative parent. (as was decided by SC
in a previous case: Reyes, et al. v.
Zuzuarregul, et al.)
The illegitimate child, to be entitled to support
and successional rights from his parents, must
prove his filiation through this means -
Voluntary or compulsory (NCC 283) recognition
through:

Record of birth
Parent's will
Statement before a court of record
Any authentic writing (NCC 278)

In the case at bar, there was no evidence to
show voluntary recognition.
The records of birth were not signed by the
father even if it was in the name of Enrique
Baluyut
There is no evidence of authentic writing or
statement before a court

With regard to compulsory recognition, the
petitioners relied on testimonies by the mother
and another witness:
"The combined testimony of Norma Urbano
and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as
the issue of recognition is concerned tends to
show that Norma was kept by the late Enrique
M. Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of
Liberata and then in a house supposedly
rented from one Lacuna. But this Lacuna was
not even presented to testify in support of the
claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut
rented his house for Norma. And, according to
Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma
some twice a week in the house where she
kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the
hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger
children of Norma. But, according to Liberata
herself, it was not Baluyut who personally paid
the hospital bills but he gave the money for the
payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he
requested her to pay the money to the hospital.
This only shows that Baluyut was hiding his
Identity as the father of the children of
Norma, an act which is inconsistent with
recognizing such children as his own."

The SC is very strict in applying the law for
compulsory recognition, much more than with
voluntary recognition.
NCC 283 enumerates the cases where the
father is obliged to recognize the child:

b.) when the child is in continuous possession
of the status of a child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the latter or his family.
c.) when the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father
. these enumerations are inconsistent with
the testimonies of the witnesses. Baluyut
appeared to be hiding the fact that he was the
father of the minors.

Mendoza v. CA
201 SCRA 675

Marquino v. IAC
233 SCRA 348 (1994)

Fernandez v. CA
230 SCRA 130

Facts:
Petitioners are filing for recognition and support
against the private respondent claiming to be
PR's illegitimate children
Violeta P. Esguerra is single and the mother of
the two petitioners, Claro Antonio and John
Paul.
Violeta and Carlito met sometime in 1983 at
the Meralco Compound tennis courts.
They started their illicit sexual relationship 6
months after meeting.
She did not know that Carlito was already
married until the birth of her two children.
She said that they were married in civil rites in
October, 1983 but in March, 1985 she
discovered that the marriage license was
spurious.

Petitioners provided evidence in the form of:
Birth certificates
Baptismal certificate
Photographs of Carlito during the baptism and
of him and Claro while in Violeta's home
4 witnesses: 3 are friends of Violeta who
introduced Carlito to them as her husband and
1 priest who testified that Carlito presented
himself as the father of petitioner at the
baptism

PR Carlito denied the allegations and said he
was only a sponsor at the baptism of Claro. He
had 2 witnesses: one who affirmed his initial
claim to being just a sponsor at the baptism
and another as a waiter of a restaurant who
said he never saw them together at the
restaurant where Violeta said the frequented
together.
RTC: ordered PR to recognize the two as his
sons and to provide P2000 as support each per
month

CA: reversed the decision. CA says that proof
is inadequate.

Issue:
W/N the minors are the children of Carlito
Fernandez.

Held: NO. SC finds no merit in petition.

Ratio:
Documentary evidence provided for by the
petitioners are insufficient.

Photos are unreliable
Baptismal certificates cannot be held as a
voluntary recognition of parentage
Birth certificates weren't prepared (SGNED) by
Carlito himself and cannot be used as
evidence.
The testimony by the priest was misleading. He
didn't really remember the face of Carlito and
had to be shown a picture by Violeta first.

Jison vs. CA
286 SCRA 495

Eceta vs. Eceta (supra)

David vs. Court of Appeals
250 SCRA 82, November 16, 1995

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary
of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a rich
businessman.
2. Private respondent is a married man and a
father.
3. However, despite this, Daisie and Ramon
cohabited
4. Out of this union, Christopher J., was born (on
March 9, 1985).
5. Christopher J. was followed by two more
children, both girls, namely Christine, born on
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24,
1988.
6. The relationship became known to private
respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa
in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and
introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
7. the children of Daisie were freely brought by
Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.
8. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to
allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay.
9. Daisie agreed.
10. but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
child.
11. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus.

Respondents:
a. Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of
custody of a minor child may be decided in a
habeas corpus case contemplate a situation
where the parents are married to each other
but are separated
b. respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he
being a very rich businessman; whereas,
petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters
and parents for support. In fact, he financially
supported petitioner-appellee and her three
minor children. It is, therefore, for the best
interest of Christopher J that he should
temporarily remain under the custody of
respondent-appellant

ISSUE:
Whether or not the child should be given back
to Daisie.

HELD:
Yes.

REASON 1:
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at
the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family
Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner,
who, as a consequence of such authority, is
entitled to have custody of him.
The fact that private respondent has
recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but
not for giving him custody of the child.

REASON 2:
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child
under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."
3

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed
out, Christopher J., being less than seven
years of age at least at the time the case was
decided by the RTC (reckoning time), cannot
be taken from the mother's custody.
Even now that the child is over seven years of
age, the mother's custody over him will have to
be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must
respect the "choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit"
and here it has not been shown that the mother
is in any way `unfit to have custody of her child.

RebuttaIs of respondnets' arguments

On A. Rule 1021 1 (the rule on habeas
corpus) makes no distinction between the case
of a mother who is separated from her husband
and is entitled to the custody of her child and
that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by
law, is vested with sole parental authority, but
is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.

Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto."

On B. Nor is the fact that private respondent is
well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the
custody of her children, especially considering
that she has been able to rear and support
them on her own since they were born.
Petitioner is a market vendor earning from
P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the
RTC decision was rendered. She augments
her income by working as secretary at the
Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a
monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an
arrangement with her employer so that she can
personally attend to her children. She works up
to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for
time lost during the day. That she receives help
from her parents and sister for the support of
the three children is not a point against her.
Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for
every member of the family are characteristics
of the close family ties that bind the Filipino
family and have made it what it is.

Tonog vs. Court of Appeals
376 SCRA 523, February 7, 2002

FACTS:

1. September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog
gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with private respondent
Edgar V. Daguimol.
2. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner
left for the United States of America to work as
a registered nurse
3. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father
(private respondent herein) and paternal
grandparents.
4. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed
a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith
and it was approved
5. Petitioner opposed. on October 4, 1993, a
motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to
her.
6. The trial court granted the motion and the case
to determine custody of Gardin Faith is now
pending.
7. The respondent filed a petition for review on
certiorari asserting that temporary custody
should be awarded to him because the child
has lived with him all her life and "t would
certainly wreak havoc on the child's
psychological make-up to give her to the
custody of private respondent, only to return
her to petitioner should the latter prevail in the
main case. Subjecting the child to emotional
seesaw should be avoided

ISSUE:
W.N. temporary custody should be granted to
the father.

HELD:

Yes.

In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the
paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child.

Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned,
Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213
of the Family Code provides that "[n]o child
from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.

The exception allowed by the rule has to be
for "compeIIing reasons for the good of the
child. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery,
the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce
decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand her
situation.

This is not intended, however, to denigrate the
important role fathers play in the upbringing of
their children. While the bonds between a
mother and her small child are special in
nature, either parent, whether father or mother,
is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of
custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of the other
parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride,
and other feelings of either parent but the
welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule
on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for
guardianship before the trial court have not
been terminated, and no pronouncement has
been made as to who should have final
custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the
welfare of the said minor as the controlling
factor, we find that the appellate court did not
err in allowing her father (private respondent
herein) to retain in the meantime parental
custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should
not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places
to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.

COMMENT: The court never expounded on
what these compelling reasons are. The best
answer I could find is stated in the next
paragraph saying that the SC cannot decide on
questions of fact. And the determination of w/n
the mother is a good mother is indeed a
question of fact. But it still does not answer why
custody was granted to the father.

Is the compelling reason the fact that her
mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the
child is already staying at the father's house
and moving the child to and fro would cause
the child distress? Are these reasons
compelling enough for the court to award
temporary custody to the father? don't know

Are cases regarding temporary custody
exceptions to Articles 176 and 213? don't
know.

For reference, I also posted the full text of the
case.

Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is
a question of fact to be properly entertained in
the special proceedings before the trial court. It
should be recalled that in a petition for review
on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law.
We are not in the best position to assess the
parties' respective merits vis--vis their
opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of
the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
preference and opinion must first be sought in
the choice of which parent should have the
custody over her person.

A word of caution: our pronouncement here
should not be interpreted to imply a preference
toward the father (herein private respondent)
relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a
statement against petitioner's fitness to have
final custody of her said minor daughter. It
shall be only understood that, for the present
and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of
the subject minor should remain with her father

WHEREFORE, The trial court is directed to
immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc.
No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision

OBITER: Parental Authority and its
Renunciation

Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman
Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required
by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for
the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of
their heart and senses. As regards parental
authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor.

GR: Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law.
The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of EXC:
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
children's home or an orphan institution.

When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor
to another, such as a friend or godfather, even
in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a
definite renunciation is manifest, the law
still disallows the same.

Liyao vs. Liyao
378 SCRA 563, March 7, 2002

FACTS:
1. Ramon Yulo and Corazon Garcia are married
but are legally separated
2. They have two children, Enrique and
Bernadette
3. William Liyao and Respondent Juanita Liyao
are also married.
4. William and Juanita have two daughter, Tita
and Linda Christine
5. While their marriages were subsisting, Corazon
and William cohabited until the latter's death.
6. Out of this union, petitioner William Jr, was
born.
7. William Junior claimed to be the illegitimate son
of William.

Contentions of petitioner
1. petitioner "was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of said
William Liyao, petitioner having been
"recognized and acknowledged as such child
by the decedent during his lifetime."
& He presented witnesses including the
children of Ramon Yulo and Corazon
Garcia, saying that William always recognizes
him as his son and that when there were
guests William would say, "Hey, look I am still
young, I can still make a good looking son."
2. his mother, Corazo Garcia, had been living
separately for ten (10) years from her husband,
Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited
with the late William Liyao and it was physically
impossible for her to have sexual relations with
Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived
and born

ISSUE:
Is the evidence presented sufficient to prove
that William Jr. is the illegitimate son of William
Sr.?

HELD:
There is no need for the court to go to the
substantive issues because from the onset,
petitioner lacks the required personality to file
the suit.

the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code
may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set
forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a
strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple
reason that he is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity
of his wife produces and he should be the one
to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even
his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory.

It is therefor clear that the present petition
initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad
litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to
compel recognition by respondents of petitioner
William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the
late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled
that a child born within a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation. If the husband (in this case Ramon
Yulo), presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the
status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot
choose to be the child of his mother's alleged
paramour. On the other hand, if the
presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the
child cannot elect the paternity of the husband
who successfully defeated the presumption.

ISSUE 2:
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo,
the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with
Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner
amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the
latter?

HELD:
No. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional
cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed
to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is
nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon
Yulo has already passed away at the time of
the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the
initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case
at bar was initiated by petitioner himself
through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not
through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is
settled that the legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties and within
the period limited by law.

Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn
the legitimacy of the child only in the following
cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the
expiration of the period fixed for bringing his
action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the
complaint, without having desisted from the
same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the
husband. (112)

LEONARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 125329. September 10, 2003

Facts:
! Petitioner Ann Brigit Leonardo was born in
Manila to common-law spouses Eddie
Fernandez and Gloria Leonardo. In her Birth
Certificate Leonardo was her surname.
! Wanting to change her surname to that of her
father, they sent a letter to the Local Civil
Registrar on August 1, 1994.
! The Local Civil Registrar denied their request
citing FC 176 which states that petitioner, being
illegitimate, should carry the surname of the
mother.
! Hence this case.
Issues: WON AnnBrigit Leonardo could use
her father's surname
Held: NO
Ratio: The Family Code has repealed NCC
366 which allows natural children to use the
surname of the father if the child is recognized
by BOTH parents. Now, in the Family Code, an
illegitimate child should use the surname of the
mother even if the father acknowledges
him/her. Hence, Ann Brigit has NO right to use
the surname of the father.

Republic vs. Capote
February 2, 2007

Facts:
! Respondent Trinidad Capote filed a petition to
change the name of her ward from GIOVANNI
GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES.
! Minor GIOVANNI is the illegitimate child of
Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso.
He was born in 1982 before the Family Code.
! His father failed to take up responsibilities on
matters of financial, physical and emotional
support to GIOVANNI.
! The trial court approved the change of name
Issues: WON GIOVANNI is allowed to use the
surname of the mother (NADORES)
Held: YES
Ratio: This is because under NCC 366, the
surname of an illegitimate child is based on the
recognizing parent, And since GIOVANNI was
never recognized by his father, the change of
name to NADORES is legal.

cf. RPC 345, -RPC 46, 59

Solinap vs. Locsin
371 SCRA 711

Facts:
! On September 16, 1996, Juan Locsin Jr. was
appointed as the sole administrator of the
Intestate estate of Juan Locsin (JHONNY
LOCSIN)
! Juan Locsin Jr. claims to be the acknowledged
natural child of JHONNY.
! Petitioners said that Juan Locsin Jr. is not an
acknowledged natural child of JHONNY since
there is no "Sr. in JHONNY's name.
! A Birth Certificate from the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City was submitted by Respondent,
which states that "Juan Locsin Sr. is his father
! Petitioners on the otherhand submitted a Birth
Certificate from the Civil Registrar General
where it shows that the signature of the father
was not there. They also presented handwriting
experts saying that the Birth Certificate of
Respondent is a FAKE.
! RTC and CA sided with respondent. Hence this
Petition
Issues: WON the record of birth of respondent
is authentic
Held: NO IT IS A FAAAAAKE!
Ratio: "The records of births from all cities and
municipalities in the Philippines are officially
and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar
General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil
Registrars. Since the records of births cover
several decades and come from all parts of the
country, to merely access them in the Civil
Registry General requires expertise. Hence,
the records in the Civil Registrar General
should conform with the record of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo. But in this case it did not. SO
WHCH S THE FAKE ONE? Respondent's
birth certificate revised form was recorded in
December 1, 1958. But his birth was recorded
in 1957. So how in the effin world would a 1958
document be used in 1957? T'S A FAKE! The
petitioners on the otherhand presented a birth
certificate revised form dated 1956, no
irregularity at all since it could be used in 1957.
Next, the back portion of the birth certificate of
respondent was TORN and are merely
CARBON copies (original copy dapat). Hence
Juan Locsin Jr. has failed to prove that he is
filiated with JHONNY LOCSIN.

Pp vs. Delantar
G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007

Facts:
! On August 27, 1996, an information was filed
against Simplicio Delantar saying that he
violated RA 7610 for willfully, feloniously,
and unlawfully promoting and inducing
AAA, a female child below 12 years of age,
to indulge in sexual intercourse for money
and profit
! On September 4 1996, accused entered a plea
of not guilty.
! On February 25, 1999, the RTC- Pasay branch
rendered a decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
violation of RA 7610.
! The testimony of AAA tells us that she was first
brought to the first client (an Arab National
named Mr. Hammond) at least 11 times. She
told the court that the accused told her that she
needed to do it because they had to pay some
obligations and debts.
! Afterwards, AAA no longer wanted to have sex
with the Arab National, but then the accused
told her that there is nothing wrong with it as
long as the penis does not penetrate her
vagina (The Arab client never inserted her
penis into her, binabastos lang siya nito.)
! The second client is Romeo Jalosjos, and
Jalosjos called the accused as "suking bugaw.
Jalosjos often paid 5-10K pesos for the
services of AAA.
! The accused brought the case to SC for
petition
Issues: WON Delantar is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating RA 7610
Held: Yes
Ratio: In Section 5 of the RA 7610 it states that
"SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse.Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse. t is clear
that accused-appelant coerced and influenced
AAA into having sex with the Arab guy and
Jalosjos for 2 reasons. FIRST, Delantar
instilled helplessness into her by saying that
she had to do it because they had debts and
electric bills to pay (so wala nang choice yung
bata diba?). SECOND, Delantar had MORAL
ASCENDANCY over AAA because he was her
father figure. All of these point to Delantar
coercing and influencing AAA.
MORE IMPORTANT ISSUE: WON Delantar is
a "Guardian of AAA. (Because if he is a
guardian then he will be sentenced to reclusion
temporal.
HELD: NO
Ratio: The birth certificate of AAA saying that
Delantar was her father was NOT signed by
Delantar. Hence it is not clear if Delantar is
indeed a father. Was he a guardian? NO. A
guardian envisioned by law is a person who is
the biological father or adopted parent of the
child.

Gapusan v. CA
183 SCRA 160

Facts:
! Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and
without legitimate issue on April 6, 1966
! Neither her surviving spouse, Prospero Parcon,
nor her other known relatives three (3)
sisters and a nephew made any move to
settle her estate judicially
! Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an
acknowledged natural daughter of Felisa
Gapusan Parcon, instituted judicial
proceedings for the settlement of the latter's
estate. The court appointed her administratrix
of the estate
! On April 22, 1968, Prospero Parcon, Felisa
Parcon's surviving husband, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order of January 16,
1968. He denied that Ligaya was an
acknowledged natural child of his deceased
wife, and applied for his own appointment
as administrator of his wife's estate
! Ligaya presented the ff. evidence
! a) Felisa Parcon's sworn statement of assets
and liabilities wherein Ligaya is named and
described as the daughter of Felisa (Exh. 4);
! b) Felisa Parcon's application for GSIS life
insurance in which Ligaya is set out as her
(Felisa's) daughter (Exh. 3);
! c) Check No. 44046 of the Government
Service Insurance System in the sum of
P505.50 paid to her (Ligaya) as her share in
the death benefits due the heirs of Felisa
Parcon (Exh. 2); and
! d) a family photograph, showing Ligaya
beside the deceased
! Prospero Parcon, on the other hand, sought to
demonstrate that Ligaya's exhibits did not
constitute conclusive proof of her claimed
status of acknowledged natural child, for the
reason that:
! a) another document, Felisa's application for
membership in Negros Occidental Teachers'
Federation (NOTF), merely named Ligaya as
her "adopted daughter;"
! b) in the distribution of death benefits pursuant
to the decedent's GSIS insurance policy, supra,
Ligaya was allocated only P500.00 whereas
Prospero received P1,000.00; and
! c) Mrs. Leticia Papasin (Felisa's sister) and
Vice-Mayor Solomon Mendoza travelled from
afar to affirm before the Probate Court on the
witness stand that Ligaya was not the daughter
of Felisa,
6
Mrs. Papasin's testimony being that
in 1942 an unknown "drifter" had sold Ligaya,
then an infant, to Felisa.
! The RTC sided with Ligaya however the CA
did not. According to the CA, the evidence at
best showed merely that Ligaya had been
treated as a daughter by Felisa, but that this
did "not constitute acknowledgment" but "only a
ground to compel recognition;" and that Ligaya
had failed to establish that she had been
acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with
Article 278 of the Civil Code

Issue: WON the evidence is sufficient to
prove that LIGAYA is the acknowledged
natural child of the deceased
or more specifically: whether or not Felisa's
sworn statement of assets and liabilities
and her application for insurance are
"authentic writings under article 278 of the
civil code" which effectively operated as a
recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as her
natural child, even if no action was brought by
the latter to compel the former, during her
lifetime, to recognize her as such

Held:
! Recognition of natural children may be
voluntary or compulsory
! Compulsory recognition is sometimes also
called judicial recognition. It is recognition
decreed by final judgment of a competent
court.
! Art 281 (NCC) provides that judicial approval
is needful if the recognition of the minor is
effected, not through a record of birth or in
a will but through a statement in a court of
record or an authentic document
! The evidences of Felisa are all considered
authentic documents: they are the genuine or
indubitable writings of Felisa Gapusan Parcon
! Felisa's application for membership in the
Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation,
where Felisa describes Ligaya as her
"adopted" daughter is also inconsequential
since it was only mentioned as "adopted to
hide Felisa's shame and reluctance to confess
publicly to her colleagues in the teaching
profession that she had borne a child out of
wedlock. Furthermore it only proves that
Ligaya is Felisa's daughter
Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a
voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Felisa
Gapusan Parcon. She is therefore entitled, in
accordance with Article 282 of the Civil Code,
to bear her mother's surname, and to receive
the hereditary portion accorded to her by the
Code

People v. Barranco
177 SCRA 103

Facts:
! Rosalia Barranco (19) was raped by
Bartolome Barranco, the second cousin of
her father who lives 100 meters away from
her house
! Feb 10,1980. Rosalia was raped by Bartolome
(Bart because bartolome is too long) while
being threatened with death (Bart was holding
a butcher's knife to her neck)
! March 19, 1980, Bart attempted rape but
foiled because Rosalia was able to fend him
off by hitting him with a piece of wood
! On the eve of the same day, rosalia
confessed to her mother the rape. They
went to the police and had a physical exam.
Turned out she was pregnant
! Noong ika-3 ng Abril, 1981 trial court convicted
Bart of Rape and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua
Issue(s)
! Among others, the issue that concerns us
here is that Bart alleged that the court
cannot order him to acknowledge the child
as his own
Held (I have reproduced the original
followed by my humble interpretation)
Subalit mayroong pagkakamali
ang mababang hukuman ng ipag- utos nito
na kilalanin ng nahahabla bilang anak ang
bunga ng kanyang kasalanan.
Ang nahahabla ay may-asawa.
Hindi maaari na kilalanin ang
batang bunga ng kasalanan na anak ng
isang may-asawa.
4
Subalit may
katungkulan siyang sustentuhan ang bata
ayon sa batas.
5
Bukod pa dito dapat
pagbayarin ang nahahabla ang malaking
pinsala na ginawa niya kay Rosalia
Barranco ng halagang P 30,000. 00
The trial court erred when it ordered that the
child be acknowledged as Bart's because the
child of a sin cannot be acknowledged by a
married man. However he is entitled to support
the child.

People v. Rizo
189 SCRA 265

Facts: Concepcion Dimen noticed that the
stomach of her 22-year old mongoloid sister
was bigger than usual. She discovered that she
was pregnant. Felicidad revealed that Rizo, the
husband of her yaya had intercourse with her
in the bodega. Rizo admitted that he had
sexual intercourse with Felicidad. On October
22, 1986, Felicidad delivered a baby. Rizo did
not confirm nor deny that he had sexual
intercourse with her but filed a motion to
dismiss claiming insufficiency of evidence. RTC
found Felicidad to be a competent witness and
rendered judgment against the accused. RTC
also ordered Rizo to recognize the offspring as
his legitimate son despite the fact that Rizo is a
married man.

Relevant issue:
WON Rizo can be compelled to recognize
the offspring of the crime.
Held: No
Ratio: The rule is that if the rapist is a married
man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the
offspring of the crime, should there be any, as
his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That
portion of the judgment ordering him to
recognize the child as his legitimate son should
therefore be eliminated.

People vs. Magtibay
G.R. No. 142985. Aug. 6, 2002

Facts: Rachel Recto went to the store to buy
cigarette and ice when Magtibay pulled her
hand and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her in a grassy place. She
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy.
Magtibay claimed he was bedridden due to
influenza but the RTC found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. He was
penalized with RECLUSION PERPETUA and
to indemnify the victim Rachelle Recto of
50,000 without subsidiary imprisonment.

Relevant Issue:
WON the accused is ordered to provide
support to the victim's child born out of the
rape.

Held: Yes

Ratio: Concerning the acknowledgment and
support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of
the Revised Penal Code provides for three
kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on
the offender: a) indemnification, b)
acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in
every case to support the offspring.

Under the FC, the kid is considered an
illegitimate child. Art. 176 of the FC vests
parental authority upon the mother and
considering that an offender sentenced to
reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental
authority over his children, no further positive
act is required of the parent as the law itself
provides for the child's status.

Hence, accused should be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim's child.

Dempsey v. RTC
164 SCRA 384

Facts: Janalita Rapada cohabited with Joel
Dempsey without the benefit of marriage and
Christine Marie was born. The child receives
monthly support from him in the sum of $150.
Janalita seeks for the accused to declare
Christina Marie as his dependent and after his
American citizenship. Dempsey freely and
voluntarily and spontaneously entered a plea of
guilty to the offenses charged against him
which was abandonment and failure to provide
adequate support for the child though he had
the means to do so. Municipal Trial Court found
him to be guilty. He appealed for the penalty of
imprisonment be changed into a fine and not to
be acquitted. RTC reversed the earlier
decision.

Relevant issue #1:
WON Christina is entitled to the rights
arising from the parental responsibility of
her father, she being an illegitimate child.

Held: Yes. Illegitimate children have rights of
the same nature as legitimate and adopted
children. This is enunciated in Art. 3 of PD 603
which provides that all children shall be entitled
to the rights herein set forth without distinction
as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social
status, religion, political antecedents, and other
factors.

Relevant issue#2:
WON as part of the civil liability, the
accused is required to recognize Christina
as his natural.
Held: No. The recognition of a child by her
father is provided for in the NCC and now in
the FC. In this criminal prosecution, where the
accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and
the issue of recognition was not specifically
and fully heard and tried, the trial court
committed error when it ordered recognition of
a natural child as part of the civil liability in the
criminal case.

People v. Bayani
G.R. No. 120894 Oct. 3, 1996

FACTS:
! Complaint filed by Maria Elena Nieto for the
crime of rape against Sgt. Moreno Bayani
! Accused filed motion for bail
! Prosecution presented Dr. Baraoidan, a
Medical Specialist who examined Maria Elena
! Declared that Maria Elena's enlarge cervix
connoted pregnancy
! Complainant's testimony
! Bayani was their neighbor, her uncle's
kumpadre (were like family)
! Bayani invited her to Laoag, where she was
taken to a motel, threatened with a gun and
raped (June 28, 1992)
! She didn't tell anyone until her boyfriend,
Ambrosio confronted her
! Ambrosio told a teacher, school protected her
! Gave birth on March 21, 1993
! Motion for bail was denied
! Defense presented:
! Bayani
! Asserted that Maria Elena was his mistress
and that the sexual intercourse was with her
conset
! Bernanrd Javier (information officer at the
motel)
! Declared that upon check-in, he noticed that
Maria Elena "was happy and even laughing
! RTC: Guilty
! Bayani Appealed
! Sol Gen:
! "apart from the 50,000.00 as indemnity,
appellant should be made to support his
illegitimate child with Maria Elena, in conformity
with Article 345(3) of the RPC
ISSUES:
! WON Bayani is guilty of the crime of rape
! WON Bayani should support his illegitimate
child
HELD:
! Yes
! YES
! RPC 345(3)
! Persons guilty of rape , seduction or abduction
shall be sentence to (a) indemnify the offended
woman; (b) acknowledge the offspring, unless
the law should prevent him from so doing; and
(c) in every case, to support the offspring.
! While it has been held that recognition of
offspring of rape cannot be ordered in the
absence of evidence, in this instance, however,
before both the trial court and this Court, the
accused expressly admitted paternity of the
complainant's child thus giving rise to the
obligation to provide support.
FC 176 provides for illegitimate children's
entitlement to support in conformity with the
Code (FC 201)

FC 177

Abadilla vs Tabiliran
249 SCRA 447

FACTS:
! Complaint filed by Ma Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk
of Court assigned at the sala of respondent
Judge Jose Tabiliran
! Respondent charged with gross immorality,
deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of
a judge
! Complainant's allegations:
! respondent had scandalously and publicly
cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan
during the existence of his legitimate marriage
with Teresita Banzuela
! that respondent shamefacedly contracted
marriage with said Priscilla
! that respondent falsely represented himself as
"single in the marriage contract and dispense
with the requirements of a marriage contract by
invoking cohabitation for 5 years
! Earlier: wife filed a complaint for abandonment
of family home and living with a certain
Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son
! Charge of Deceitful Conduct:
! Complainant claims that respondent caused to
be registered as legitimate his three illegitimate
children with Priscilla by falsely executing
separate affidavits
! Other charge: Corruption
! Respondent:
! Declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla is
not and was neither bigamous nor immoral
because he started living with her only after his
1
st
wife had already left and abandoned the
family home in 1966
! Since then, 1
st
wife's whereabouts is not known
and respondent has had no news of her being
alive
! Further avers that 25 years had already
elapsed since the disappearance of his 1
st
wife
when he married Priscilla in 1986
! Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on
2 counts of corruption

ISSUES:
! WON Tabilaran is guilty of deceitful conduct
HELD:
! YES
! Children were born in 1970, 1971 and 1975
and prior to the marriage of respondent to
Priscilla, which was in 1986
! As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to
know that, despite his subsequent marriage to
Priscilla, these 3 children cannot be legitimated
nor in any way be considered legitimate since
at the time they were born, there was an
existing valid marriage between respondent
and his first wife, Teresita
! Applicable Provision # Art. 269 of NCC: Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children
born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment o marry each
other, are natural.
! Legitimation is limited to natural children and
cannot include those born of adulterous
relations
! Reasons:
! 1. The rationale of legitimation would be
destroyed
! 2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in
terms of successional rights;
! 3. There will be the problem of public scandal,
unless social mores change;
! 4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage
! 5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the
parents marry many years after the birth of the
child.
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision,
whether old or new, can give refuge to the
deceitful actuations of the respondent.

FC 178,FC 180
FC 180-181
DOJ Opinion No. 106 Series of 1991
FC 182
FC179
ADOPTION
Lazatin v. Campos
92 SCRA 250

FACTS:
! Jan. 13, 1974: Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died
intestate, survived by his wife, Margarita de
Asis, and his adopted twin daughters,
respondents Nora and Irma
! 1month after: margarita de Asis commenced
an intestate proceeding
! April 11, 1974: Margarita de Asis died, leaving
a holographic will
! Nov 22, 1974: pettioner intervened for the first
time in the proceedings to settle the estate of
Dr. Mariano Lazatin, as an admitted illegitimate
child
! Aug. 20, 1975: petitioner filed a motion to
intervene in the estate of Margarita de ASis as
an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit
executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the
deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin, that petitioner
was an "illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin and was
lated adopted by him. This affidavit was later
modified on Aug. 19, 1975 to state that
petitioner was adopted by both Mariano and
Margarita.
! Respondent court heart petitioner's motion to
intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
Margarita, at which hearings petitioner
presented no decree of adoption hi his favor.
Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over
private respondents' objections, that he had
recognized the deceased spouses as his
parents; he had been supported by them until
their death; formerly he was known as "Renato
Lazatin but was compelled to change his
surname to "Sta. Clara when the deceased
spouses refused to give consent to his
marriage to his present wife; that .. (Page
257)
! March 4, 1976: Respondent Court barred the
introduction of petitioner's evidence
! March 16, 1976: petitioner filed a motion to
declare as established the fact of adoption
! Court denied motion

ISSUES:
! WON the respondent Court erred in not
allowing petitioner to introduce new evidence
HELD:
! NO
! Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem,
which creates between 2 persons a
relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. (ADOPTION
DEFINED PAGE 259!!!! Too long for me to
reproduce)
! Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below
doesn't lead us to any proof of judicial
adoption.
! No proof of specific court of competent
jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding
initiated by the late spouses
! No judicial records of adoption or copies
Petitioner cannot properly intervene in the
settlement of the estate as an adopted son
because of lack of proof

Cervantes v. Fajardo
169 SCRA 575

FACTS:
! Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this
court over the person of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes.
! Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to
respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and
wife.
! Respondents offered the child for adoption to
Gina Carreon's sister and brother in law, the
petitioners.
! Petitioner spouses took care and custody of
the child when she was barely 2 weeks old.
! An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the
child by herein petitioners was also executed
by respondent Gina
! The appropriate petition for adoption was filed
by petitioenrs over the child
! RTC rendered a decision granting the petition
! Angelie Anne Fajardo # Cervantes
! Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners
received a letter from respondents demanding
to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get
back their child.
! Petitioners refused to accede to the demand
! Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child
from her "yaya at the petitioner's residence on
the pretext that she was instructed to do so by
her mother. Gino brought the child to her house
! Petitioners demanded the return of the child
but Gina refused
!
ISSUES:
! WON the writ should be granted.
HELD:
! YES
! Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married
to a woman other than respondent Gina # his
open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the
minor that desireable atmosphere
! Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners
with full knowledge and consent of respondents
A decree of adoption has the effect, among
others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except
where the adopting parent is the spouse of the
natural parent of the adopted

R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law)
A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002)

Republic v. CA
205 SCRA 356

! Facts:
! Feb 2, 1988 - Zenaida Bobiles (private
respondent) filed petition to adopt Jason
Condat, court grants it given that all
requirements for adoption are satisfied
! Petitioner appeals to CA who affirms the trial
court decision, hence this petition
!
! Issue:
1. W/n CA erred in ruling that the FC cannot be
applied retroactively to the petition for adoption
2. W/n CA erred in affirming the decision w/c
granted the petition in favor of the spouses
Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles
!
! Held / Ratio:
1. No.
! Zenaida filed for adoption when PD 603 (Child
and Youth Welfare Code) was the law here a
petition for adoption may be filed by either or
both of the spouses
! Under the FC however (Art 185), joint adoption
by both spouses is mandatory
! Petitioner contends that the FC should be
applied retroactively and adoption should be
dismissed
! Art. 246 of the FC provides for retro effect
provided it doesn't impair vested rights
! Under PD 603, Zenaida had the right to adopt
by herself, and when she filed for adoption, the
right to file such petition alone was vested on
her
! FC Art. 185 is remedial in nature, despite the
fact that these laws are retro actively applied, it
will not be so appied as to defeat procedural
steps completed before the enactment
! As long as the petition for adoption was
sufficient in form and in accordance with the
law in governance at the time it was filed, the
court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it
fully disposes of the case
2. No.
! Though Dioscoro was not named as a
petitioner, he did provide written consent that
he himself actually joined his wife in adopting
the child w/c is sufficient to make him a
petitioner
! The future of the child must not be
compromised by insistence of rigid adherence
to procedural rules.
! Adoption statutes are liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of the
adoption institutions and to protect the child.
Welfare of the child is of paramount
consideration.
! The rights concomitant to and coferred by the
decree of adoption will be for the best interest
of the child.
The CA found the following in the petition and
correctly approved the adoption: Natural
parents gave consent / DSWD recommended
approval / Trial court approved / Written
consent of adopting parents

Santos v. Aransanzo
16 SCRA 344

Facts:
! Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed
petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and
Aurora Santos on June 4, 1949
! With their parents whereabouts unknown, their
current guardian, Crisanto de Mesa gave his
written consent, Paulina being 14 yo likewise
gave consent. Hence, Court grants petition
! Oct 21, 1957 Juliana dies, Simplicio files for
settlement of intestate estate including Paulina
and Aurora as surviving heirs
! Gregoria Aranzanso, alleges that she is the
first cousin of Juliana files an opposition to the
petition stating that Simplicio's marriage to
Juliana was bigamous and thus void and that
the adoption of Paulina and Aurora were void
for there is no written consent from natural
parents
! Demetria Ventura, alleging also that she is the
first cousin of Juliana and adding that she is
the mother of Paulina Santos, like wise files as
opposition
! CFI says that validity of adoption cannot be
attacked collaterally, CA however REVERSES
and declares that the adoption is void for lack
of written consent. Petitioners file for
preliminary injunction against the CA orders
and the Court grants it hence this petition by
the respondents

Issue: W/n the respondents can assail in
settlement proceedings the adoption decree of
Paulina and Aurora Santos

Held / Ratio: No.
! If natural parents have abandoned the children
guardian consent suffices.
! Furthermore, the adoption court made
sufficient findings that the natural parents of
them minors couldn't be located, hence its
order cannot be attacked collaterally.
! Hence the CA erred in reviewing, under
collateral attack, the determination of the
adoption court that the parents of Paulina and
Aurora Santos had abandoned them.
! Even if Simplicio were married to another
person (not decided in this case), the estate of
Juliana being the subject matter, the adopted
children status of Paulina and Aurora is not
affected, hence they succeed Juliana.
! Respondents cannot intervene in the
settlement proceedings and attack the adoption
As the adoption is held valid, and in intestate
succession, adopted children exclude first
cousins, the CA decision is reversed

Daoang v. Municipal Judge
159 SCRA 369

Facts:
! Respondent spouses Antero and Amanda
Agonoy filed petition for adoption of the minor
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos
! Petitioners minors Roderick and Rommel
Daoang assisted by their father, file an
opposition claiming that the Agonoys have a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy
(mother of Roderick and Rommel), who died
March 1, 1971 thus Agonoys are disqualified
to adopt under NCC Art 335
! Trial court still grants the petition for adoption

Issue: W/n respondent spouses are
disqualified to adopt under NCC Art. 335 par. 1

Held / Ratio: No
! Art 335 those w/ legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or children by
legal fiction cannot adopt
! The law is clear children mentioned therein
do not include grandchildren
! The legislators of the NCC obviously intended
that only those persons who have certain
classes of children are disqualified to adopt
! Adoption used to benefit the adopter. This has
since changed as now; the present notion on
adoption promotes the welfare of the child and
the enhancement of his opportunities for a
happy life.
Under the law now in force, having legitimate,
legitimated, etc children is no longer a ground
for disqualification to adopt

Duncan v. CFI
69 SCRA 298

Facts:
! robin (british) and maria lucy (american) are
h&w. They have no kids but previously adopted
a child and wishes to do so again with a child
whom they have named as colin berry Duncan.
They are now challenging CA decision which
denied them the adoption of minor Colin Berry
Christensen Duncan.
! CA banked its decision on NCC 340 which
provided for the written consent of following
people, more specifically the mother of the
child who was known to Atty. Velasquez, latter
was arguing that such was already sanctioned
by privileged communication b/w lawyer and
client. Nonetheless CA there is no such
relationship in this issue
! May 1967. Couple received the 3 day old child
from Atty. Velasquez whom they had baptized
as colin berry Duncan. Said child was given to
attorney by mother who made her swore never
to reveal her identity and look for a suitable
couple who will adopt him. In the petition for
adoption filed sept 1967, it was atty. velasquez
who stood as de facto guardian/ loco parentis
who thus gave consent. CA pressed on
knowing the identity of the mother as she
should have been the one who gave consent
(as per CA).
Issue:
! WON consent from mother (because child was
IC and unrecognized by father) was still
needed
! HELD: NO.
! Consent should come from <as per Ncc Art.
340 (2)>The parents, guardian or person in
charge of the person to be adopted. Section 3,
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing it as
each of the known living parents "who has not
abandoned such child."
! natural and unwedded mother has not
bothered to inquire into the condition of the
child, much less to contribute to the livelihood,
maintenance and care of the same. In short,
this parent is the antithesis of that described in
the law as "known living parent who is not
insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned such child." SC is convinced that in
fact said mother had completely and absolutely
abandoned her child. Therefore there is no
more legal need to require the written consent
to such parent of the child to the adoption
! WON Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the
undisputed custodian of the abandoned waif,
may be considered as the guardian under Art.
340 or the person standing in loco parentis of
said infant contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil
Code.
! HELD: YES
! Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion
to accept the child and to extend to it the
protection and care it badly needed. Since
there had been no showing that the identity of
the natural mother was made known to the trial
court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said
mother seen fit to present herself before the
court despite the public notice given to the
proceedings as required by law, there clearly
appears only one person who could be
considered as the guardian exercising patria
potestas over such abandoned child. Since
there was no guardian ad litem appointed by
the court and the child not being in the custody
of an orphan asylum, children's home or any
benevolent society, there could not have been
anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez who could, with reason, be called
the guardian of said infant
! WON the spouses Robin Francis Radley
Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen, are
qualified to adopt the child
! HELD: There is no showing that they suffer
from any of the disqualifications under the law.
Above all, they have the means to provide the
child with the proper support, care, education
and love that a growing child needs, even if
they have previously adopted another child as
theirs. They have actually already cared for the
child for nine years since the proceedings for
adoption was instigated and they must have
been the only parents that the child has ever
recognized. It would be supreme injustice if
they will be denied of the adoption rights over
the child.
Minor child is hereby recognized as
adopted by herein spouses.

OBITER: . The law is not, and should not be
made an instrument to impede the
achievement of a salutary humane policy. As
often as is legally and lawfully possible, their
texts and intendments should be construed so
as to give all the chances for human life to exist
with a modicum promise of a useful and
constructive existence. (How the Court bends
over its back in considering the best welfare of
the child) %

Landingin vs. RP
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006

Facts:
! Diwata Landingin (us cit of Filipino descent)
filed for adoption on 2/4/2002 of the minors
Elaine,elma,and Eugene who are all nat.
children of her brother manuel and Amelia
ramos.
! Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children
were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria
Taruc Ramos while their mother went to Italy,
remarried and had two children (never
communicated again). Diwata now supports
said minors, together with help from other
relatives. Maria passed away on November 23,
2000 and Diwata now therefore seeks to adopt
said minors. Said minors have already given
their written consent to adoption. She is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she
is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own
who are already married, gainfully employed
and have their respective families; she lives
alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where
she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. Diwata's own children have
also given their written consent already. Her
brother Mariano Ramos who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in
petitioner's custody.
! Court ordered DSWD to conduct case study
and submit report in time for the hearing. OSG
also entered its appearance. Since her petition
was unopposed, she presented ex-parte.
! Diwata testified in her behalf, presented Eliane
Ramos, the eldest among the adoptees, to
testify on the written consent that she and
siblings exec. Also presented was the Affidavit
of Consent purportedly executed by her
children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley.
! PAgbilao, the DSWD field officer assigned to
the case, reported that minors are eligible for
adoption because the mother has voluntarily
consented to their adoption by the paternal
aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her
inability to provide the parental care, guidance
and support they need (Affid of Consent by
mother). Moreover, said minors have
expressed the desire to be adopted through a
joint Affidavit of consent. And lastly, the minors
are present under the care of a temporary
guardian who has also family to look after.
Pagbilao interviewed the mother of the minors
who went back to PI from Italy during the
summer for a 3-week vacation.
! But Diwata was not able to present Pagbilao as
witness offer in evidence the voluntary consent
of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Neither was
she able to present any documentary evidence
to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
! TC declared the minors freed from all legal
obedience and maintenance from their natural
parents and also declared to be children of
Diwata. Moreover, TC ordered that from Dizon-
Ramos, the surnames of the minors would now
be Ramos-Landingin.
! OSG appealed CA saying that there was no
consent from the biological mother. With this,
CA reversed TC, saying that Diwata was not
able to prove that the biological mother
consented to the adoption nor was the affidavit
of consent by Diwata's children be admissible
since such was exec in Guam and not
acknowledged before philippine Consular
Office. Nor is she stable enough to support the
children.
Issue: 1)WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt
the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos
2)WON the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-
adopter's children sufficiently complies with the
law
3)WON petitioner is financially capable
of supporting the adoptees.

Held: 1)NO. The discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with
due regard to the natural rights of the parents
over the child. Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) requires
the consent from biological parents. The
general requirement of consent and notice to
the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of
the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption. Written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of
a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. Amelia (mother) was said to
be in PI, therefore it would not have been
impossible to solicit Written Consent from her.
! That consent is no longer needed because of
mother's abandonment is untenable. f mother
had really abandoned, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian. Merely permitting the child to remain
for a time undisturbed in the care of others is
not such an abandonment
! More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that
the latter will not miss her guidance and
counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.
Again, it is the best interest of the child that
takes precedence in adoption

2) NO. Section 2 of Act No. 2103 (pardon me if
I would no longer expound on this point, this
part deals more with technicalities of
instruments I think e.g. including the
intrinsic/extrinsic validity of such instruments
$) What is important here is that no further
proof was introduced by petitioner to
authenticate the written consent of her
legitimate children therefore said evidence is
inadmissible

3) Primary consideration in adoption is the best
interest of the child, it follows that the financial
capacity of prospective parents should also be
carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly,
the adopter should be in a position to support
the would-be adopted child or children, in
keeping with the means of the family. She only
has a part-time job, and she is rather of age
therefore financial stability is questionable.
Even if she says that she has children to rely
on, adopter must be the main breadwinner.

Minor children not permitted to be adopted
due to legal infirmities (but Court said that
Diwata is not prevented from filing new
petition for adoption of herein minors #
paasa haay)

Pardo de Tavera v. Cacdac
167 SCRA 626

Facts:
! On 19 june 1986 the Gordons sought to adopt
the minor, Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio, a
natural son of Adoracion Custodio. On the date
of hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the
Petition, OSG failed to send any rep for the
State.
! Evidences established that:
! Gordons (british spouse) are allowed by their
home country to adopt foreign babies
specifically from the Republic of the
Philippines.
! Husband is employed at the Dubai Hilton
International Hotel as Building Superintendent
therefore financially secured
! Anthony's mother, Adoracion Custodio, had
given her consent to the adoption realizing that
her child would face a brighter future
! Case Study Report submitted by the Social
Worker of the Trial Court gave a favorable
recommendation
! natural mother thought of the best for her 1yr
2mos child.
! TC declared Anthony the truly and lawfully
adopted child of the Gordons
! Gordons wrote MSSD for a travel clearance for
Anthony on 8/11/86 but MSSD opposed even if
subpoenaed saying that
! the Report of the Court Social Worker and that
of the Pastor of the International Christian
Church of Dubai cannot take the place of a
report of the MSSD or a duly licensed child
placement agency
! required six-month trial custody had not been
met nor the reasons therefor given as required
by Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (P.D. No. 603)
! Gordons had given P10,000.00 to the natural
mother, which is reflective of the undesirable
attitude of the Gordons to shop for children as
if they were shopping for commodities
! under Muslim law (Dubai), Anthony cannot
inherit from the adopting parents
! Gordons had filed another petition for adoption
of a baby girl before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 94, on 24 June 1986 but
because she died a month later they tried to
pass off another child to whom they gave the
same name and represented that she was the
very same girl they were adopting
! there being no Memorandum of Agreement
between Dubai and the Philippines there is no
guarantee that the adopted child will not be
sold, exchanged, neglected or abused.
WON travel clearance can be withheld
by MSSD following the objections MSSD is
raising
HELD: NO. as TC has held.
! TC ordered the MSSD to issue the travel
clearance under pain of contempt and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue the
corresponding passport saying that
! Court Social Worker Report could take the
place of a report from a duly licensed
placement agency or of the MSSD
! Court had impliedly dispensed with the six-
month trial custody considering that the
Gordons were foreigners whose livelihood was
earned abroad
! Decision had become final and executor
! TC relied on 1) the Resolution of this Court in
Administrative Matter No. 85-2-7136-RTC
denying the request of the MSSD for a
Supreme Court Circular to all Regional Trial
Court and 2) ruling in Bobanovic vs. Hon.
Montes "n refusing to grant the travel
clearance certificate, respondent MSSD
discounts and negates the effects of a valid
and final judgment of the Court regarding which
no appeal had even been taken from
(Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes G.R. L-71370,
July 7, 1986)."
& 10K given by Gordon spouses was only a
financial assistance to the natural mother of the
child
& Spouses also would want to adopt a baby girl
but upon learning that she's mongoloid, they
turned her over to International Alliance for
Children, where she unfortunately died.
& Muslim laws shall not apply to them, they being
Britons.
TC order already final and executory!!!

Republic v. Toledano
233 SCRA 9

Facts:
! February 21, 1990 private respondents
spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of
private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse
! Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. He married Evelyn, a
Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On
August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized
citizen of the United States of America in Guam
#physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12)
year old minor.
! 1981-1984, Nov 1989 to present, Simon was
and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his
consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the
adoption due to poverty and inability to support
and educate her son.
! social worker Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda
recommended the granting of the petition for
adoption
! TC granted the adoption petition of Clouse
spouse
! OSG objected saying that the Clouse spouse
are not qualified to adopt under Pjhilippine law

Issue: WON Clouse spouse are not qualified to
adopt under Philippine law

Held: YES. FC 184 and 185 bars the Clouse
spouse from doing so. Respondent Alvin A.
Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional
cases in the aforequoted provision. He is a
natural born US Citizen and Simon is neither
his relative by consanguinity nor legitimate
child of his spouse. Evelyn on the other hand
has already become naturalized. She would
have qualified under FC 184(3) because she's
a former Filipino who sought to adopt her
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption
cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint
adoption by the husband and wife.

R.A. 8043, "The Law on Inter-Country Adoption"
A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002)

Some important notes on R.A. 8043 "The Law on nter-Country Adoption
! Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child, i.e. 15 years old and
below by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is field, the
supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the Philippines.
! Mandates the creation of The Inter-Country Adoption Board that acts as the policy-making body for
purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation and coordination with the Department,
the different child-care and placement agencies, adoptive agencies, as well as non-governmental
organizations engaged in child-care and placement activities
! Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been
exhausted before resorting to Inter-Country Adoption and ensure as well that such is for the best
interest of the child
! Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted.- Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption.
! SEC. 9. Who May Adopt.- Any alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an
application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she;
! is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be
adopted, at the time of application unless the adaptor is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted
or the spouse of such parent
! if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
! has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national
laws, and has undergone the appropriate counselling from an accredited counsellor in his/her country
! has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
! is eligible to adopt under his/her nation law
! is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and
example to all his children, including the child to be adopted
! agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions
of this Act;
! from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a
similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable
Philippine laws

FC 189
FC 186

Tamrago v. CA
209 SCRA 518

Facts:
! Minor (10 yrs old) Adelberto Bundoc shot
Jennifer Tamrago with an air rifle (causing
death) on 10/20/82
! Civil complaint for damages was instigated by
Macario Tamargo (Jennifer's adoptive parent)
and Cesar and Aurelia Tamargo (nat. parents)
against Adelberto's nat parents (Victor and
Clara Bundoc) w/ whom Adelberto was living
with @ time of incident. Another axn was
actually filed for Reckless Imprudence resulting
to homicide (but adeleberto was acquitted/
exempted following minority w/o discernment)
! But prior to incident, (12/10/81), Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura filed pet. to adopt adelberto
w/c CFI granted in 11/18/82 or after said
incident.
! The nat. parents of Adelberto, following such
adoption were saying that they were no longer
indispensable parties to the damages (parental
liability because such was already transferred
by virtue of the adoption)
! Petitioners however were saying that since
adelberto was with them @ time of incident, it
should be them and not the Rapisura spouse
who should be party to said action.
! TC ruled for Victor and Clara Bundoc (nat.
parents) and said that they were not
indispensable to the case at hand

Issue: WON the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned, may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter when actual custody
was yet lodged with the biological parents.

Held: NO. liability stays with the natural
parents, most especially that adelberto was still
with them at said incident.
! NCC 2180 speaks of parental obligation for the
damages of minor children in their company.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the
torts of their minor children living with them,
may be seen to be based upon the parental
authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the parents were
negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who
is in their custody and control. Parental liability
is, in other words, anchored upon parental
authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority.
! In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when
parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus
follow that the natural parents who had then
actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
! Article 221 of the Family Code of the
Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,
shall have been in the actual custody of the
parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage:
! no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the
time the tort was committed.
Nat. parents of Adelberto were held liable
(indispensable party) and case remanded to
TC to proceed with such.

Cervantes v. Fajardo
169 SCRA 575

FACTS:
! Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this
court over the person of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes.
! Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to
respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon, who are common-law husband and
wife.
! Respondents offered the child for adoption to
Gina Carreon's sister and brother in law, the
petitioners.
! Petitioner spouses took care and custody of
the child when she was barely 2 weeks old.
! An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the
child by herein petitioners was also executed
by respondent Gina
! The appropriate petition for adoption was filed
by petitioenrs over the child
! RTC rendered a decision granting the petition
! Angelie Anne Fajardo # Cervantes
! Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners
received a letter from respondents demanding
to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get
back their child.
! Petitioners refused to accede to the demand
! Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child
from her "yaya at the petitioner's residence on
the pretext that she was instructed to do so by
her mother. Gino brought the child to her house
! Petitioners demanded the return of the child
but Gina refused
!
ISSUES:
! WON the writ should be granted.
HELD:
! YES
! Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married
to a woman other than respondent Gina # his
open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the
minor that desireable atmosphere
! Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners
with full knowledge and consent of respondents
A decree of adoption has the effect, among
others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except
where the adopting parent is the spouse of the
natural parent of the adopted

FC 189 (3), FC 190

IN THE Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia
454 SCRA 541

! Facts:
Aug. 31, 2000: Petitioner Honorato Catindig filed a
petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
She was born on June 26, 1994
Her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia
He prays that upon adoption, her name will be
Stephanie Nathy Garcia Catindig
RTC: Granting the adoption and petition to change
her name ONLY to Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Petitioner files a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration regarding the surname, Garcia
as her middle name.
RTC: denies petiton
Hence, the case at bar.
Petitioner submits that trial court erred in depriving
Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence
of adoption.
There is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name.
Customs grant every Filipino to have a middle
name as his/her mother's surname
A middle name is a part of a name of a person
Rights of an adopted child to bear a proper name
should not be violated
It would help Stephanie avoid the stigma of her
illegitimacy
Her using "Garcia is not opposed by either family
OSG agrees with petitioner on three grounds:
FC 189 makes it necessary since Stephanie still
maintains a filiation with her natural mother as
an intestate heir of he latter
No law prohibiting such
Customary for every Filipino..
!
! Issue:
May and illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name?
!
! Held: YES. Petition is GRANTED.
!
! Ratio:
The use of a person's surname is for practical and
legal purposes, it is NECESSARY
The name of an individual has two parts, the given
name and the surname.
The use of the surname is fixed by law under
Articles 364-380 of the Civil Code
The law is SILENT as to the use of a middle name.
However in Art 375(1) it is considered when
there is identitiy of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants.
The law is notably silent with regard to an adopted
child's middle name.
OSG correctly points out Art. 189 of the FC with
regard to filiation required as an intestate heir.
The underlying intent of adoption is in favor of
the adopted child.
RA 8552
It is shown that she is very close to both her parents
and she lives with her mother
There should be liberal construction of adoption
statues in favor of adoption
NCC 10 provided that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation..it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.

FC 191
FC 192

Lahom vs. Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

Facts:
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom
took in sabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo
since he was two years old, treating him as if
he were their own child.
It was only in 1971 that the spouses petitioned for
adoption. In 1972, this was granted and the
Civil Registrar of Naga City changed his name
to Jose Melvin Lahom.
1999: Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
the decree of adoption:
Jose Melvin refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to Lahom, in utter disregard for the
feelings of the spouses
Before her husband died, he even wanted to revoke
the adoption but was only stopped by Isabelita
Diosdado further desired to give to charity whatever
properties or interest may pertain to
respondent in the future.
Respondent failed to show concern for Petitioner
and remained indifferent
He does not act like a son, there is an
uncomfortable relationship between the two
the only motive to respondent's adoption is his
expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of the spouses Lahom
1998: RA 8552 provided grounds committed by
adopter for the rescission of adoption and also
stated that "Adoption, being in the best interest
of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter. However, adopter may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Art. 919 of the Civil Code.
Respondent objects to motion
RTC: dismissed the petition
There is a lack of cause of action
Said rights of petitioner to rescind should have been
exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules.
Legal ground for the petition have been
discovered and known to petitioner for more
than 5 years, prior to the filing of the instant
petition of December 1, 1999, hence the action
had already prescribed.
!
! Issue:
May the subject adoption, decreed on May 5, 1972,
still be revoked or rescinded by an adopted
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
In the affirmative, has the adopter's action
prescribed?
!
! Held: The Petition was DISMISSED.
!
! Ratio:
SC begins with a brief background on the law:
welfare of the adopted started becoming of
paramount concern
creation of written instruments that would protect
and safeguard the rights of the adopted
children
adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility and its underlying intent was
geared to favor the adopted child
R.A. 8552 secured these rights and privileges and
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted
child. The new law also withdrew the right of an
adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave the adopted child the sole right to
sever the legal ties created by adoption.
It was also months after the effectivity of the R.A.
No. 8552 that Isabelita filed an action to revoke
the decree of adoption granted in 1975.
Therefore, her petition could no longer be
pursued.
!
! Additional: (just copy-pasted, this is in
relation to the prescription period % )
Interestingly, even before the passage of the
statute, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the five-year bar rule under
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not
fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled
to protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges. While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right," the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created
by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by
the state's determination on what it may deem
to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to regulation
by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action
given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.
SUPPORT

FC 194

Pelayo v. Lauron
12 Phil 453

Facts:
1. October 13, 1906, evening: Dr. Arturo Pelayo
was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and
Juana Abella
a. He was asked to give birth to their daughter-in-
law
b. He assisted in the delivery of the child
c. He was kept occupied until the next day
d. He valued his fee at P500 BUT Marcelo and
Juana refused to pay without reason
2. November 23, 1906: Complaint by Pelayo
against Lauron and Abella for collection
3. Contentions of Lauron and Abella:
a. that their son and his wife lived independently
from them and in a separate house
b. that if she did stay in their house that night, it
was due to fortuitous circumstances
c. that their daughter-in-law had died due to the
childbirth
4. April 5, 1907: RTC Held
a. Lauron and Abella absolved from the complaint
due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish a
right of action against them

Issue/s: WON husband is bound to
pay the bill
Held: Yes
1. Article 142 and 143, Civil Code: Mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by
way of mutual support
a. Includes medical services in case of illness
b. That when either of them by reason of illness
should be in need of medical assistance, the
other is under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in
order that health may be restored
c. That the father and mother-in-law are strangers
with respect to the obligation that devolves
upon the husband to provide support
d. Hence, her husband, and not her father and
mother- in-law, is liable
i. That it is of no matter who called the doctor
and requested his services
That there was imminent danger to her life and
medical assistance was urgently needed

Sanchez v. Zulueta
68 Phil 110

Facts:
1. Feliciano Sanchez married Josefa Diego
2. Child: Mario Sanchez
3. 1932: Feliciano refused to support Josefa
and Mario and abandoned them
a. Josefa and Mario have no means of
subsistence
b. Feliciano received a monthly pension of
P174.20 from US Army
4. Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez sought
monthly allowance for support and support
pendente lite against Feliciano Sanchez
a. Contentions of Feliciano:
i. Josefa had an affair with Macario Sanchez
which resulted to Mario Sanchez
ii. October 27, 1930: Josefa abandoned the
conjugal home
iii. As the illegitimate child of Josefa with Macario,
Mario is not entitled to his support
b. He asked for an opportunity to adduce
evidence in support of this defense which RTC
and CA denied

Issue/s: WON Macario and Josefa
are entitled to support
Held: Yes
1. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid
defense against
a. an action for support of the wife
b. an action for support of the child who is the fruit
of such adulterous relations
i. Defense should be established and not merely
alleged
ii. Proof must therefore be permitted
Hence, Feliciano has a valid defense and he
asked for an opportunity to present evidence to
prove his allegations, it was error to deny him
the opportunity

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
88 SCRA 803

Facts:
1. January 18, 1958: Manuel J. C. Reyes m Celia
Ilustre-Reyes
2. They had children
3. March 10, 1976: Manuel attacked Celia by
a. fist blows
b. bumping her head against the cement floor
c. pushing her down the 13-flight stairs
d. hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half
unconscious
4. May 11, 1976: She left their office
5. May 26, 1976: She returned to get her
overnight bag
a. Manuel demanded that she get out but she
ignored him
b. Hence, he
i. doused her with grape juice
ii. kicked her
iii. attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was
stopped by her driver
6. June 3, 1976: By Celia Ilustre-Reyes against
Manuel J. C. Reyes
a. Action for support pendente lite
b. Legal separation he had attempted to kill her
7. Contentions of Manuel
a. Celia committed adultery with her physician
b. She is thus not entitled to support and if she
was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the
Court was excessive

Issue/s: WON Celia is entitled to
support pendent lite
Held: Yep
1. Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for
support BUT only if proven
a. In fact, adultery is a good defense and if
properly proved and sustained will defeat the
action
b. BUT it must be established by competent
evidence and not merely alleged
i. During hearing of the application for support
pendente lite, Manuel did not present any
evidence to prove his allegation
ii. During hearing of the application for action for
legal separation, Manuel did not present any
evidence to prove his allegation
c. YET Celia asked for support pending litigation
from their conjugal partnership and not
necessarily from Manuel's private funds

2. Determination of Amount
a. Celia was unemployed and without funds
b. All their conjugal properties, including
corporations where Manuel is President,
Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession
of Manuel
i. Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61
ii. Development and Technology Consultant Inc.
earning P98,879.84
iii. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc.
iv. That these companies have entered into multi-
million contracts in projects of the Ministry of
Public Highways
c. The amount was reduced from P5000 since
their children are in the custody of Manuel
d. In determining the amount to be awarded as
support pendente lite
i. not necessary to go fully into the merits of the
case
ii. sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and
amount of evidence which it may deem
sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the
application
iii. in view of the merely provisional character of
the resolution to be entered
mere affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record may satisfy the court to
pass upon the application for support pendente
lite

De Asis vs, CA
G.R. No. 127578, Feb. 15, 1999

Facts:
1. October 14, 1988: Vircel D. Andres, mother
and legal guardian of minor Glen Camil Andres
de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
support of Glen against Manuel de Asis
a. that Manuel is the father of Glen
b. that Manuel refused/failed to provide for the
maintenance of Glen despite repeated
demands
c. Contentions of Manuel:
i. that Glen is not his child
ii. that he cannot be forced to support him then
2. July 4, 1989: Manifestation of Vircel
a. that Manuel had made a judicial
admission/declaration of his denial of paternity
b. that it seemed futile to continue the claim of
support
3. dismisses August 8, 1989: Action was
dismissed
a. Both parties agreed to move for the dismissal
of the case
b. Provided that Manuel will withdraw his
counterclaim
4. September 7, 1995: Complaint for maintenance
and support against Manuel by Glen,
represented by Vircel
a. Manuel's motion to dismiss due to res judicata
where the Manifestation of Vircel was, in effect,
an admission of lack of filiation, which
admission binds both parties
b. Manuel's motion was denied because
renunciation or waiver of future support is
prohibited by law

Issue/s: WON action for support is barred by
Manifestation
Held: NO
1. Manifestation of Vircel is void because the
Right to support cannot be renounced or
compromised
a. NCC 301: The right to receive support cannot
be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a
third person. Neither can it be compensated
with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .
b. NCC 2035: Future support cannot be the
subject of a compromise.
i. No compromise upon the following questions
shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal
separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
c. WHY: Because of the need of the recipient to
maintain his existence
i. He is not entitled to renounce or transfer the
right for this would mean sanctioning the
voluntary giving up of life itself.
ii. It is to virtually allow either suicide or the
conversion of the recipient to a public burden
which is contrary to public policy
iii. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence,
support which is the means to attain the
former, cannot be renounced.

d. The manifestation amounted to a renunciation
i. It severed the filiation that gives Glen the right
to claim support from his putative parent
e. The agreement for the dismissal of the
complaint is in the nature of a compromise
which cannot be countenanced for violating the
prohibition against any compromise of the right
to support

2. Filiation of Glen must be judicially established
and cannot be left to the will or agreement of
the parties

NCC 297: Allowance for support is provisional
because the amount may be increased or
decreased depending upon the means of the
giver and the needs of the recipient

De Guzman vs Perez
496 SCRA 474

Facts:
! Petitioner Roberto de Guzman and private
respondent Shirley Aberde were sweethearts
while studying law in UST.
! Their studies were interrupted when Private
Respondnet Shirley became pregnant.
! Robby de Guzman, their child, was born on
1987.
! They never got married, but Roberto did marry
another woman in 1991 and begot 2 children
from her.
! Petitioner Roberto de Guzman only sent
money to Robby's schooling twice (1992 and
1993), and provided money as well when he
was sick.
! In order to support the child, Private
Respondent went to Hong Kong to work as a
factory worker. BUT, her savings were still
being depleted. So. . . .
! In the year 2000, Private Respondent
demanded support from Petitioner.
! 2000, Private Respondent also filed a
complaint for abandonment and neglect of
Child under Article 59(2) of PD 603
! In answer, Petitioner said that he has never
abandoned Robby, He gave support.
! The City prosecutor of Lipa found probable
cause to the charge neglect of child.
! But before he could be arraigned, he filed a
petition for review before the Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez (who at present is
facing graft and corruption charges, how ironic.
% )
! Perez denied the petition saying that
petitioner's luxurious lifestyle constituted
circumstancial evidence.
! Hence this petition.
Issues:
! WON there is probable cause to the charge
neglect of child under Article 59(2) of PD 603
against Petitioner.
Held: YES there is
Ratio: Petitioner is charged with neglect of child
punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603 which
provides that:
Art. 59. Crimes. - Criminal liability shall attach
to any parent who: (4)Neglects the child by not
giving him the education which the family's
station in life and financial conditions permit.
He is capable of giving support since the
notarized GIS of the RNCD Development
Corporation shows that petitioner has 750K of
paid-up-shares in the company. Hence there is
probable cause and the petitioner's guilt must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt after.

FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 122

Lerma v. CA
61 SCRA 440

Facts:
! Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz were
married on 1951.
! Then on 1969 petitioner filed a complaint for
adultery against the respondent
! 1969, Respondent then filed for legal
separation on the grounds of concubinage and
attempt against her life. MOREOVER, she
wanted support pending trial for their youngest
son.
! 1969 Respondent Judge granted respondents
application for pendente lite.
! Petitioner filed for a preliminary injunction
which was dismissed
! Meanwhile, in 1972, the CFI of Rizal found
Respondent and Teodor Ramirez (his
paramour) guilty of adultery
Issues: WON adultery is a good defense
against the respondents claim for support
pendente lite.
Held: YES!!
Ratio: The right to separate support or
maintenance, even from the conjugal
partnership property, presupposes the
existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. There
must be a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately for
him/her to gain support. In other words, the
right to support was lost by the respondent
when she was found guilty of adultery.

Ryes vs Ines-Luciano (supra)

Mangonon vs. CA
G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006

Facts:
! 1975, Maria Belen Mangonon and Private
Respondent Delgado married in 1975
! As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent, the marriage was annulled
on 1975
! Within 7 months of the annulment of their
marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rina
and Rica.
! Her second husband, Danny Mangonon raised
her two twins as Private Respondent Delgado
has already abandoned them.
! 1994 Belen Mangonon filed for a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support in behalf
of her minor children (Rica and Rina)
! At the time of the petition, Rica and Rina are
about to enter college in the USA. But despite
their admission to the universities, they are
financially incapable
! Petitioner, who earns 1,200 dollars a month,
could hardly give general support to the
children, much less their required educational
support. So they demanded support from
Private Respondent.
! Respondent Federico failed to sign the birth
certificate, hence they need a judicial
declaration in order to be legitimated. He said
that their legitimacy should first be established
before they could claim for support.
! Moreover, Federico also said that he is also
unable to give support.
! Trial court resolved the case and awarded a
MEASLY and MICROSCOPIC 5,000
pesos/child.
! Petitioner was angered by this and filed the
present petition.
Issues: Since both the parties are unable to
give support, can the grandfather
(FRANCISCO) be the one to furnish support?
Held: YES
Ratio: First of all, the twins were able to prove
their filiation, because Lolo Francisco wrote
letters to them when they were young, and that
he himself wrote the surname "Delgado in the
letters which just means that Lolo Francisco
consented to it.On the issue of support, An
eminent author on the subject explains that the
obligation to give support rests principally on
those more closely related to the recipient.
However, the more remote relatives may be
held to shoulder the responsibility should the
claimant prove that those who are called upon
to provide support do not have the means to do
so.
Lolo Francisco said that Petitioner has the
means to support the children, but this is
BELIED by the fact that they obtained huge
amounts of loans for them to even enroll at
these US universities. Finally and I quote:
"There being prima facie evidence showing that
petitioner and respondent Federico are the
parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to
support their children's college education. In
view however of their incapacities, the
obligation to furnish said support should be
borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article
199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco,
as the next immediate relative of Rica and
Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents. It
bears stressing that respondent Francisco is
the majority stockholder and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial,
Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve
gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is
engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight
forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Citadel Shipping which does business with
Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also
owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn,
owns real properties in different parts of the
country. He is likewise the Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co.
and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel
Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties
here and abroad.
41
It having been established
that respondent Francisco has the financial
means to support his granddaughters'
education, he, in lieu of petitioner and
respondent Federico, should be held liable for
support pendente lite.

FC 200-204

Canonizado v. Benitez
127 SCRA 610

FACTS:
! Sept. 27, 1968: CA rendered a decision
ordering defendant to give plaintiff a monthly
support of P100.00 beginning with October
1964, payable in advance within the first 5 days
of each month
! Said decision became final and executory on
Jan. 21, 1969
! Oct. 24, 1969: order of execution was issued
for P27,900 follow by the writ itself on Oct. 28,
1969
! Writ was recalled and set aside to enable
Canonizado to correct the amount therein
stated
! On Oct. 6, 1967, Christina (daughter) became
of age but since she was still studying then, her
support was formally terminated only in April
1969
! Total amount due her as of this latter date was
determined at P16,150 for the period from Oct.
1964 to April 1969
! Writs of execution were again issued on Feb.
10 and March 30, 1970 # both were returned
and unsatisfied
! July 11, 1973: Petitioner and Respondent
entered into an Agreement
! Petitioner filed a motion for execution and
contempt of court
! Aug. 3, 1976, petitioner and respondent
entered into an agreement
! Jan. 12, 1982: petitioner filed a motion to
require the respondent to pay current support
beginning Feb 1978 based on the decisions of
Sept. 27, 1968 and Jan. 21, 1969
! Respondent filed an opposition on the ground
that his obligation to support has terminated
ISSUES:
! WON Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
can be compelled by mandamus to
! 1. Issue an alias writ of execution for the
payment of arrearages in support
! 2. Act on the petitioner's motion for payment of
current support
HELD:
! 1. Yes
! Although petitioner obtained the favorable
judgment on Jan. 21, 1969, she can still
enforce the same by a motion for a writ of
execution, notwithstanding the lapse of the 5-
year period because a judgment for support
doesn't become dormant
! Since the obligation is a continuing one, the
court never loses jurisdiction to enforce the
same
! Agreements entered into were only for
deferment but never for a waiver or giving up of
the respondent's obligations
! 2. No
! NCC 303: The obligation to give support shall
also cease: (3) when the recipient may engage
in a trade, profession, or industry, or has
obtained work, or has improved his fortune in
such a way that he no longer needs the
allowance from his subsistence.
! This doesn't affect the right to support between
spouses but only the action to make it
demandable
! Subsists throughout the period that the
marriage subsists
! Respondent can rightfully file motion to oppose
the payment of current support to terminate the
demandability of the same for the time being
! Respondent judge cannot be compelled by
mandamus to order respondent to pay current
support when the latter alleges that a ground
exists for the suspension of such obligation
A judgment for support is never final in the
sense that not only can its amount be subject
to increase or decrease but its demandability
may also be suspended or re-enforced when
appropriate circumstances exists

FC 200-208

Lacson vs. Lacson (supra)

Sy vs CA
Dec. 27, 2009

FACTS:
! 19 January 1994: respondent Mercedes Tan
Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against
petitioner Wilson Sy # minor children Vanessa
and Jeremiah (children of Mercedes)
! Petitioner: Mercedes is unfit to take custody of
the minors
! She abandoned her family in 1992
! Mentally unstable
! Cannot provide proper care to the children
! Trial Court issued writ and awarded custody to
Mercedes
! CA affirmed
! Petitioner wasn't able to substantiate his
contentions
ISSUES:
! WON custody should be awarded solely to the
respondent
! WON CA had jurisdiction to award support in a
habeas corpus case
HELD:
! YES
! FC 213: In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the
parent is unfit.
! law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper
person to have custody of her children so that
they may not only receive her attention, care,
supervision but also have the advantage and
benefit of a mother's love and devotion for
which there is no substitute
! absent any compelling reason to the contrary,
the trial court was correct in restoring the
custody of the children to the mother, herein
respondent, the children being less than seven
years of age, at least at the time the case was
decided.
! Moreover, petitioner's contention that
respondent is unfit to have custody over the
minor children has not been substantiated as
found by both courts below.
! YES
! FC 203: the obligation to give support is
demandable from the time the person who has
a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
! Rules of Court permits the ventilation of the
question regarding the care and custody of the
children as an incident to any proceeding, even
a habeas corpus proceeding.
! Respondent testified during trial, without any
objection on petitioner's part, regarding the
need for support for the children's education
and other necessities
Applying Section 5,[32] Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of
support was tried with the implied consent of
the parties, it should be treated in all respects
as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And
since there was implied consent, even if no
motion had been filed and no amendment had
been ordered, the Court holds that the trial
court validly rendered a judgment on the issue

FC 198;
Rules of Court, Rule 61
PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

FC 209

Medina vs. Makabali
27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969

FACTS:
! Feb. 4, 1961: Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave
birth to Jospeh Casero in the Makabali Clinic,
owned and operated by respondent Dra.
Venancia Makabali
! Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabli from
birth, who took care and reared Jospeh as her
own son
! Court extracted a promise from Dra. Makabali
to allow the mino a free choice with whom to
live with when he reaches 14yo # Court held
that it was for the child's best interest to be left
with his foster mother
! Zenaida appealed
ISSUES:
! WON the writ be given
HELD:
! NO
! When our law recognizes the right of parent to
the custody of her child, Courts must not lose
sight of the basic principle that "in all question
on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount (NCC 363)
! For compelling reasons, even a child under 7
may be ordered separated from the mother.
! The right of parents to the company and
custody of the children is but ancillary to the
proper discharge of parental duties to provide
the children with adequate support, education,
moral, intellectual and civic training and
development (NCC 356)
Zenaida proved remiss in these sacred duties

Unson vs. Navarro
101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980

Facts: Unson and Araneta were married on
April 19, 1971. Maria Teresa, their child would
stay with petitioner during school days and
spend weekends with her mother but her
mother wouldn't even bother to pick her up
during non-school days. During early part of
1978, Unson found out that Araneta has been
living with her brother in law Reyes. Reyes and
Araneta later beget two kids and later
embraced a protestant sect. Petitioner
contends that Maria Teresa was born and
reared under the Roman Catholic faith and
should not be exposed to an environment alien
to the Catholic way of life which is the
upbringing and training her father is committed
to. Araneta claims that they had an amicable
arrangement and no specific terms were
agreed and stipulated upon by her and Unson
regarding custody of the child and that Maria
Teresa was always allowed to visit and to be
picked up at any time by petitioner's parents.
She admits her present circumstances at first
impression might seem socially if not morally
unacceptable but Maria Teresa has been
reared and brought up in an atmosphere of
Christian love, affection and honesty.

Issue: WON custody of the child should be
given to the mother.

Held. No.

Ratio: It is in the best interest of the child to be
freed from the obviously unwholesome, not say
immoral influence, that the situation in which
Araneta has placed herself might create in the
moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now
in her formative and most impressionable stage
in her life. She might start getting ideas about
the peculiar relationship of her mother with her
own uncle-in-law.

The Court has no alternative than to grant
Araneta no more than visitorial rights over the
child. Anyway, decisions even of the SC on the
custody of minor children are open to
adjustment as the circumstances relevant to
the matter may demand in the light of the
inflexible criterion.

FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234

Eslao vs CA
266 SCRA 317

Facts: Maria Paz and Reynaldo Eslao were
married on June 22, 1984 and after the
marriage, they stayed with petitioner Teresita,
the mother of the husband. Two children were
born. Leslie was entrusted to the care and
custody of Maria's mom while Angelica stayed
with her parents at Teresita's house. On
August 6, 1990, Reynaldo died. Petitioner
wanted to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga
but Teresita insisted on keeping the child with
her in the meantime to assuage her grief due to
her son's death.

Maria later met James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese American who is an orthodontist and
they decided to get married. She joined her
new husband in SFO, USA and then later
returned to the Philippines to be reunited with
her kids and then bring them with her as her
new husband is willing to adopt her kids.
Teresita, however, refused to give her Angelica
because she claims that Maria has already
abandoned her.

The lower court granted the custody of the
minor Angelica to the mother, Maria Paz. CA
affirmed this decision.

Issue: WON custody of Angelica should be
granted to Maria Paz

Held: Yes

Ratio: The child's welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody. The mom is
married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative
practice of his profession in SFO. In her
grandmother's house, the rooms are rented to
other persons. The foremost criterion is the
physical and moral well being of the child
taking into account the respective resources
and social and moral situations of the
contending parties.

When the mom entrusted the custody of her
minor child to the grandmother, what she gave
to the latter was merely temporary custody and
it did not constitute abandonment or
renunciation of parental authority. For the right
attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution which do not
appear here

FC 211-213 cf. FC 49, 102(6) and 63(2)

Hontiveros v. IAC
132 SCRA 745

Facts: Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros and
private respondent Brenda Hernando are the
father and mother of an acknowledged natural
child born on November 27, 1981 named
Margaux Hontiveros. From November 1981 to
June 1982, the child had been under the care
and custody of Brenda and Alejandro used to
take the child out during Saturdays and return
her Saturday night. On June 21, 1982,
Alejandro picked the kid up and never returned
her to the mother. Mom then filed a petition for
habeas corpus to recover custody of Margaux
without depriving the father of his visitorial
rights. At the hearing conducted on September
9, 1982, the minor child was "produced before
the Court and a settlement was reached upon
agreement of the parties that Margaux shall be
under the custody of the petitioner for 7 days
every other week. On May 24, 1983, the
petitioner filed an urgent petition for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
mom from bringing the kid to the USA where
she is bound for.

Relevant Issue: WON petitioner is entitled
to custody of his minor child Margaux.

Held: No.

Ratio: Article 363 of the NCC provides that No
mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure. Clearly,
Brenda has a clear legal right under Art. 17 of
PD 603 to the custody of her minor child, there
being no compelling reasons to the contrary.

While the petitioner would have the court
believe that private respondent is unfit to take
care of his child, it is too late in the day to do so
because under the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in the SC.

Unson v. Navarro (supra)

Espiritu & Layug v. CA
G.R. No. 115640(1995)

Facts: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita
Masauding met in 1976 in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was a nurse. In 1977,
Teresita left for LA, CA, USA to work as a
nurse and in 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his
employed to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer.
They maintained a common law relationship
and they begot two kids, Rosalind (1986)and
Reginald (1988). Reynaldo and Teresita got
married in 1987. They decided to separate in
1990. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children
and went back to CA. Reynaldo brought the
kids back in to the Philippines but then he had
to leave his kids with his sister because his
assignment in the US was not yet completed.

Teresita returned to the Philippines and on
Dec. 8, 1992 filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against the petitioners to gain custody
over the children. The TC dismissed the
petition and suspended Teresita's parental
authority over the kids and declared Reynaldo
to have sole parental authority over them but
with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by
the parties and to be approved by the Court.
The CA reversed this decision and gave
custody to Teresita and visitation rights on
weekends to Reynaldo.

WON Teresita is more suitable and better
qualified in helping the children to grow into
responsible, well-adjusted and happy
young adults.

Held: No.

Ratio: If a child is under seven years of age,
the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive: It can be overcome by
"compelling reasons". If a child is over seven,
his choice is paramount but, again, the court is
not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the
court may find the chosen parent unfit and
award custody to the other parent, or even to a
third party as it deems fit under the
circumstances.

In the present case, both Rosalind and
Reginald are now over seven years of age.
Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on
August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the
same age on January 12, 1985. In a
psychological test, the responses of Rosalind
about her mother were very negative, causing
the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's
anxiety. Among the things revealed by
Rosalind was an incident where she saw her
mother hugging and kissing a "bad man who
lived in their house and worked for her father.
All of the 8 recommendations of the child
psychologist show that Rosalind chooses
petitioners over the private respondent and that
her welfare will be best served by staying with
them . The mom's conduct and demeanor in
the courtroom or elsewhere demonstrated her
temper. She was also legally married already
when she married Reynaldo and she entered
into an illicit relationship with another man in
the house of the petitioner.

Not only are the children over seven years old
and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit
or immoral activities of the mother had already
caused emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values, at least in Rosalind. The assignment of
Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary
one. He was sent there to oversee the
purchase of a steel mill component and various
equipment needed by the National Steel
Corporation in the Philippines. Once the
purchases are completed, there is nothing to
keep him there anymore.

The children are now both over seven years
old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear front the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person.

Santos Sr. v. CA
G.R. No. 113054(1995)

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army
lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by
profession, were married in 1986.
2. Their union beget only one child, Leouel
Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
3. From the time the boy was released from the
hospital until 1990, he had been in the care
and custody of his maternal grandparents,
private respondents herein, Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia.
4. This was arranged by the spouses Leouel and
Julia themselves
5. On September 2, 1990, petitioner abducted the
boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
6. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for
Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr

Contentions:
Petitioner:
since private respondents have failed to show
that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father,
substitute parental authority granted to the
boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the
Family Code is inappropriate.
On the other hand, private respondents aver
that
1. they can provide an air-conditioned room for
the boy and
2. that petitioner would not be in a position to take
care of his son since he has to be assigned to
different places.
3. They also allege that the petitioner did not give
a single centavo for the boy's support and
maintenance.
4. Furthermore, petitioner's use of trickery and
deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after
being hospitably treated by private
respondents, does not speak well of his fitness
and suitability as a parent.
5. Respondent had never given any previous
financial support to his son, while, upon the
other hand, the latter receives so much bounty
from his maternal grandparents and his mother
as well, who is now gainfully employed in the
United States.

ISSUE:

To whom should the child be awarded to?
HELD:
To his father, Leouel Santos.
The law vests on the father and mother joint
parental authority over the persons of their
common children.
16
In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority.
17
Only
in case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority
be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
18


We find the aforementioned considerations set
by the respondent insufficient to defeat
petitioner's parental authority and the
concomitant right to have custody over the
minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he
has not been shown to be an unsuitable and
unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated
love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding,
the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents.
22
The latter's wealth is not a
deciding factor, particularly because there is
no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in
no position to support the boy - Just as long as
it is proved that he can support the boy.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to
allowing him custody over the boy. So many
men in uniform who are assigned to different
parts of the country in the service of the nation,
are still the natural guardians of their children.
It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority,
care and custody over their children merely
because of the normal consequences of their
duties and assignments, such as temporary
separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting
away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest
custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young
boy whom they have reared for the past three
years is understandable. Still and all, the law
considers the natural love of a parent to
outweigh that of the grandparents, such that
only when the parent present is shown to be
unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents
exercise substitute parental authority, a fact
which has not been proven here.
Parental authority and responsibility are
renounced except in cases authorized by
law.
10
The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of
A. adoption,
B. guardianship and
C. surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution.
renunciation of parental authority.
12
Even if a
definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
13

Therefore, when Santos "gave the child to
respondents, what was given was merely
temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental
authority.

Sagala-Eslao v. Cordero-Ouye
G.R. 116773, Jan. 16, 1997

FACTS:
1. on June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz
Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were
married
2. after their marriage, the couple stayed with
respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the
husband.
3. out of their marriage, two children were
begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who was born
on February 23, 1986 and Angelica Eslao who
was born on April 20, 1987
4. Angelica stayed with her parents at
respondent's house while the other child
stayed at the home of the mother's parents.
5. on August 6, 1990, petitioner's husband
Reynaldo Eslao died
6. Maria Paz now wants to move back to
Pampanga where her mother and other
daughter were.
7. She intended to bring Angelica along with her
8. But the grandmother refused saying that
Angelica compensates for the loss of her son.
9. Maria Paz then met Dr. James Manabu-Ouye,
a Japanese-American.
10. on March 18, 1992, They decided to get
married.
11. on January 15, 1993, the petitioner migrated to
San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new
husband
12. When she informed her new husband of her
desire to get her children back, he was
supportive and even expressed willingness to
adopt the two children.
13. She went back to the Philippines so that she
could get her daughters back.
14. However, the grandmother would not permit it.
15. Maria filed a case for custody
Contentions:
Petitioner argues that
1. she would be deserving to take care of
Angelica;
2. that she had managed to raise 12 children of
her own herself;
3. that she has the financial means to carry out
her plans for Angelica;
4. that she maintains a store which earns a net
income of about P500 a day, she gets P900 a
month as pension for the death of her husband,
she rents out rooms in her house which she
owns, for which she earns a total of P6,000 a
month, and that from her gross income of
roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000
for the maintenance of her house.
5. More importantly, respondent already
abandoned her child, making her an unfit
parent.

ISSUE:
To whom should custody be granted?

HELD:
To the mother.

REASON1:
The paramount consideration is always the
welfare of the child.
"The petitioner herein is married to an
Orthodontist who has a lucrative practice of his
profession in San Francisco, California, USA.
a. The petitioner and her present husband have a
home of their own and they have three cars.
b. The petitioner's husband is willing to adopt the
petitioner's children.
c. If the children will be with their mother, the
probability is that they will be afforded a bright
future.
d. Contrast this situation with the one prevailing in
the respondent's [grandmother's] house. As
admitted by the respondent, four of the rooms
in her house are being rented to other persons
with each room occupied by 4 to 5 persons.
Added to these persons are the respondent's 2
sons, Samuel and Alfredo, and their respective
families (ibid., p. 54) and one can just visualize
the kind of atmosphere pervading thereat. And
to aggravate the situation, the house has only 2
toilets and 3 faucets.

REASON2:
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA
407, we stated, viz:
"Parental authority and responsibility are
parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a
definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
Thus, in the instant petition, when private
respondent entrusted the custody of her minor
child to the petitioner, what she gave to the
latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation
of parental authority. For the right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the
law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
to a children's home or an orphan institution
which do not appear in the case at bar.

Bondagjy vs. Bondagjy
371 SCRA 642

FACTS:
1. On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before
her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by
conversion.
2. Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married
on February 3,1988 under Islamic rites.
3. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children,
namely, Abdulaziz and Amouaje,
4. At the time of their marriage, unknown to
petitioner, respondent was still married to a
Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced.
5. This was the cause of their de facto separation.
6. Sometime in December 1995, the children lived
in the house of Sabrina's mother.
7. On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the
children baptized as Christians. She was also
reconverted as a Christian.
8. On March 11, 1996, respondent Fouzy Ali
Bondagjy filed an action to obtain custody of
his two minor children, Abdulaziz, 10 and
Amouaje, 9.
Contentions:
Respondent:
1. on various occasions Sabrina was seen with
different men at odd hours in Manila
2. she engages in 'zina' (illicit sexual relation)
3. she would wear short skirts, sleeveless
blouses, and bathing suits.
6
Such clothing are
detestable under Islamic law on customs.
4. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children
sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of
P40.00 after the children come home from
school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school,
7

the children would be happy to see him but
they were afraid to ride in his car.

Petitioner: P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to
Muslims.

ISSUE1:
What law governs?

HELD1:
Family Code.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency
of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim
laws. The Family Code shall be taken into
consideration in deciding whether a non-
Muslim woman is incompetent. What
determines her capacity is the standard laid
down by the Family Code now that she is not a
Muslim.

ISSUE2:
Under the Family Code, is she unfit to not be
granted custody of the children?
HELD2:
No. She is able to provide for the needs of their
children sufficiently. And the husband is always
busy.

what determines the fitness of any parent is
the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the
children,
The record shows that petitioner is equally
financially capable of providing for all the needs
of her children. The children went to school at
De La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with
their tuition paid by petitioner according to the
school's certification.
32

Either parent may lose parental authority over
the child only for a valid reason. In cases
where both parties cannot have custody
because of their voluntary separation, we take
into consideration the circumstances that would
lead us to believe which parent can better take
care of the children. Although we see the need
for the children to have both a mother and a
father, we believe that petitioner has more
capacity and time to see to the children's
needs. Respondent is a businessman whose
work requires that he go abroad or be in
different places most of the time. Under P.D.
No. 603, the custody of the minor children,
absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is
given to the mother.
39
However, the award of custody to the wife does
not deprive the husband of parental authority.
"Even when the parents are estranged and
their affection for each other is lost, the
attachment and feeling for their offsprings
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law
nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer
absent, of course, any real, grave and
imminent threat to the well-being of the child."

Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as
his Constitutionally protected natural and
primary right.
41
He may visit at least once a
week and may take the children out only with
the written consent of the mother.

Pp vs. Glabo
371 SCRA 567

FACTS:
1. Mila Lobrico, a 21 year old mental retard, was
raped by his uncle.
2. She got pregnant and gave birth while the case
was pending.
3. He is found by guilty beyond reasonable doubt
by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
What is his role in the rearing of the child? Can
he exercise parental authority?

HELD:

He is mandated to support the child. No other
allowable form of exercise of parental authority
is allowed.

Concerning the acknowledgment and support
of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of
civil liability that may be imposed on the
offender:

a) indemnification,
b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and
c) in every case to support the offspring.

With the passage of the Family Code, the
classification of acknowledged natural children
and natural children by legal fiction was
eliminated and they now fall under the specie
of illegitimate children. Since parental authority
is vested by Article 176 (illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of the
mother) of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to
reclusion perpetua automatically loses the
power to exercise parental authority over his
children, no "further positive act is required of
the parent as the law itself provides for the
child's status." Hence, accused-appellant
should only be ordered to indemnify and
support the victim's child. However, the amount
and terms of support shall be determined by
the trial court after due notice and hearing in
accordance with Article 201 of the Family
Code.

Vancil vs. Belmes
358 SCRA 707

Facts:
-Dec 12 1986 Reeder Vancil, a navy
serviceman, died leaving behind his two
children Valerie and Vincent by his common-
law wife Helen Belmes
-May 1987 Bonifacia Vancil, Reeder's mom,
executed guardianship proceedings for the two
children which was graned. Valerie was 6 and
Vincent was 2
-Aug 1987 Helen Belmes opposed the
guardianship saying that since she is the
mother she should be the guardian since the
two children were both permanently residing
with her while Bonifacia was an American
naturalized citizen who lived in Colorado. . RTC
rejected this
-CA: reversed RTC decision and proclaimed
Helen as the guardian. Bonifacia appealed thus
the case
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in appointing
Helen Belmes their mother as guardian
HELD: YES! Note, this case now only concerns
Vincent since Valerie at this time was already
18 years old.
! FC 211 father and mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority.
! This is an inherent right derived from the nature
of the parental relationship
! FC 214 - in case of death, absence or
unsuitaibility of the parents, parental authority
may be exercised by the surviving
grandparents
! Grandparents may only be appointed when
there is need for a substitute parental authority.
Mother is clearly not dead and Bonifacia did
not give any evidence that she was morally
unfit to be the guardian of Vincent. Her
allegation that Helen's live-in-partner raped
Valerie several times does not mean anything
since Valerie's guardianship is no longer in
question.
! Bonifacia is not qualified to be a guardian
! Too old
! Lives in US and she herself admitted that she
was not sure whether or not she would actually
move back to the Phil for two years in order to
take care of 16 year old Vincent. Most likely,
she will also just leave him in someone else's
care
Convicted of libel in Cebu.

Sombong vs. CA
G.R. No. 111876, Jan. 31, 1996

Facts:
! April 23, 1987 Arabella Sombong was born to
Johanna Sombong
! Nov 1987 Johanna took a sick Arabella to Sir
John Clinic. She was not released to Johanna
after treatment since she was still sick and
Johanna could not pay. Johanna left her in the
clinic and only came to visit her two years later
in 1989.
! 1992 Johanna filed a petition with the RTC-
QC of a writ of Habeas Corpus for Arabella.
However Dra Ty, the owner of the clinic said
that they already discharged Arabella on 1989.
At the fear of being arrested, she directed them
to Marietta Alvar who took care and raised a
child from the clinic named Cristina Neri.
! RTC: declared that Cristina was Arabella. Thus
the child should be given back to Johanna
! CA: reversed RTC decision since there was not
enough evidence to prove that Cristina was
indeed Johanna's missing daughter.
SSUE: WON Cristina is Arabella's missing
daughter
HELD: NO
! In order for a writ of habeas corpus on a minor
to prosper, these elements must be present:
(1) petitioner has right of custody over minor
(2) rightful custody of the minor was withheld
(3) best interest of the minor to be in custody of
the petitioner
! In this case, evidence shows that Cristina is not
the missing daughter
! Dr. Trono, the petitioner's own witness, could
not certainly say it it was really Arabella who
was given to Marietta Alvar since there were
other children who were left in the clinic
! Cristina was already in the custody of Marietta
on April 1988 and was baptized on that same
month. On the other hand, Cristina said that
she last saw her daughter on 1989 which the
clinic also held to be true since she was
confined from Nov 1987 to April 1989
! Demeanor in court was not of a mother who
just found her lost child. She did not even
glance at her.
! Confessed that she was going abroad and
would leave child in the care of nuns
Marietta Alvar on the other hand clearly shows
that she can financially, physically, and
spiritually care for the child and since we are
looking at the child's best interest, Cristina
should not be taken away from her

Tonog vs. CA
376 SCRA 642

FACTS:

September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog
gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with private respondent
Edgar V. Daguimol.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner
left for the United States of America to work as
a registered nurse
Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father
(private respondent herein) and paternal
grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed
a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith
and it was approved
Petitioner opposed. on October 4, 1993, a
motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to
her.
The trial court granted the motion and the case
to determine custody of Gardin Faith is now
pending.
The respondent filed a petition for review on
certiorari asserting that temporary custody
should be awarded to him because the child
has lived with him all her life and "t would
certainly wreak havoc on the child's
psychological make-up to give her to the
custody of private respondent, only to return
her to petitioner should the latter prevail in the
main case. Subjecting the child to emotional
seesaw should be avoided

ISSUE:
W.N. temporary custody should be granted to
the father.

HELD:

Yes.

In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the
paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child.

Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned,
Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213
of the Family Code provides that "[n]o child
from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.

The exception allowed by the rule has to be
for "compeIIing reasons for the good of the
child. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery,
the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce
decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand her
situation.

This is not intended, however, to denigrate the
important role fathers play in the upbringing of
their children. While the bonds between a
mother and her small child are special in
nature, either parent, whether father or mother,
is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of
custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of the other
parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride,
and other feelings of either parent but the
welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule
on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for
guardianship before the trial court have not
been terminated, and no pronouncement has
been made as to who should have final
custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the
welfare of the said minor as the controlling
factor, we find that the appellate court did not
err in allowing her father (private respondent
herein) to retain in the meantime parental
custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should
not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places
to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.

! Parental authority and responsibility are
renounced except in cases authorized by
law. The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of
chiIdren's home or an orphan institution.
! When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor
temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
! Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides
that parents and individuals exercising parental
authority over their unemancipated children are
entitled, among other rights, "to keep them in
their company.

COMMENT: The court never expounded on
what these compelling reasons are. The
best answer I could find is stated in the next
paragraph saying that the SC cannot decide
on questions of fact. And the determination
of w/n the mother is a good mother is
indeed a question of fact. But it still does
not answer why custody was granted to the
father.

Is the compelling reason the fact that her
mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the
child is already staying at the father's
house and moving the child to and fro
would cause the child distress? Are these
reasons compelling enough for the court to
award temporary custody to the father? I
don't know

Are cases regarding temporary custody
exceptions to Articles 176 and 213? I don't
know.

For reference, I also posted the full text of
the case.

Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is
a question of fact to be properly entertained in
the special proceedings before the trial court. It
should be recalled that in a petition for review
on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law.
We are not in the best position to assess the
parties' respective merits vis--vis their
opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of
the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
preference and opinion must first be sought in
the choice of which parent should have the
custody over her person.

A word of caution: our pronouncement here
should not be interpreted to imply a preference
toward the father (herein private respondent)
relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a
statement against petitioner's fitness to have
final custody of her said minor daughter. It
shall be only understood that, for the present
and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of
the subject minor should remain with her father

WHEREFORE, The trial court is directed to
immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc.
No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision

OBITER: Parental Authority and its
Renunciation

Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman
Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required
by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for
the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of
their heart and senses. As regards parental
authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor.

GR: Parental authority and responsibility are
parental authority only in cases of EXC:
children's home or an orphan institution.

definite renunciation is manifest, the law
still disallows the same.

Laxamana vs. Laxamana
388 SCRA 296

Facts:
! 1984 Raymond Laxamana and Lourdes
Laxamana got married. Their marriage blessed
them with three children
! 1991-1996 Raymond became drug-
dependent and was in and out of facilities
! 1997 Raymond was declared drug-free by
the court. However he allegedly became violent
and irritable leading to Lourdes leaving him on
1999 along with her three children
! Aug 1999 Raymond filed a writ of habeas
corpus for custody his three children while
Lourdes filed for the annulment of their
marriage
! Sept 27 1999 Raymond amended the petition
to visitation rights instead. TC granted this.
They also asked both to undergo a psych
evaluation, which TC would then use to resolve
the case as agreed upon by both parties.
Psych evaluations showed that he was still not
completely cured of his drug addiction even if
his drug urine test was negative. However, TC
still granted him visitation rights and gave
custody to Lourdes.
SSUE: WON TC's decision that is based on
the psych evaluations considered the
paramount interest and welfare of the children
HELD: NO
! TC should have still conducted a trial after the
psych evaluations even if both Raymond and
Lourdes agreed that such tests would resolve
the issue of custody. To base it solely on the
psych evaluations is insufficient to justify the
TC's decision as seen in the ff:
! History of drug dependence presented does
not show his moral, financial, and social well-
being
! Fact that psych evaluation said he was not
completely cured is not corroborated with other
evidence that he is unfit to provide for and
support the children.
! TC also did not ask children who they wanted
to live with since as they are above 7 years,
they are permitted to choose which parent they
want to stay with at the discretion of the court.
! Only said there was indications of fear of his
drug-dependency
RESULT: case is remanded to RTC for proper
trial.

Roehr vs Rodriguez
404 SCRA 495

Facts: Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and
resident of Germany married Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina in 1980 in Hamburg,
Germany. Their marriage was reatified in 1981
when they married each other again in Negros
Oriental. They had two children, Carolynne
born in 1981 and Alexandra born in 1987. In
1996, Carmen filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Meanwhile, Wolfgang
already obtained a decree of divorce in
Hamburg in 1997 and the court granted him the
custody of their two children. Carmen now
assails this decision while Wolfgang claims that
the decree of the Court in Hamburg is binding.

WON Carmen can still question the decree of
the court in Hamburg

Held: Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees
obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal
effects thereof like custody of children must still
be determined by our courts. The Court also
found that Carmen had no participation at all in
the proceedings of the divorce and there was
no showing who the offending spouse is. It was
also not proven that Carmen was unfit to be
granted the custody of her children.

Briones vs. Miguel
G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004

Facts: Joey Briones and Loreta Miguel were
not married but they begot a son, Michael
Kevin Pineda while they were still in Japan. In
2001, Maricel and Francisco Miguel came to
the house of Joey to visit Michael and asked if
they can bring him to SM. Joey agreed.
However, Maricel and Francisco did not return
the minor child. Loreta was then back in the
Philippines and she claims that it was not
Maricel and Francisco who took the child from
Joey. It was her who took the child. Joey
wanted custody of the child during the time
Loreta will be in Japan.

WON Joey is entitled to the custody of their
illegitimate child

Held: No. Joey's claim has become moot
because Loreta already brought Michael with
her in Japan. The Court held that Joey's
recognition of his illegitimate child could only
be a ground for support but not of custody. The
minor child shall be under the custody of Loreta
all the more that she was not found to be unfit
of becoming a mother. The father has the right
for visitation.

Gualberto vs. Gualberto
G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005

Facts: Jocelyn Gualberto brought her 4 year
old child with her as she abandoned her
husband Crisanto in 2002. Crisanto claims that
she abandoned him because she was having
lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay.
Nevertheless, the trial court granted Jocelyn
with the custody of the child since the child is
below seven years old. She also stated that
she has no objection to the father visiting the
child even everyday provided that they live in
Mindoro. The CA reversed the ruling and
granted Crisanto the custody of the child on the
ground that Jocelyn is unfit for the custody of
the child because of her immoral act of living
with another woman.

WON Jocelyn deserves the have the custody
of the child

Held: Yes. The Court held that it is not enough
for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was
a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she
carried on her purported relationship with a
person of the same sex in the presence of their
son or under circumstances not conducive to
the child's proper moral development. This was
not shown by Crisanto.

Silva vs. CA
275 SCRA 604

Facts: Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales
cohabited without the benefit of marriage since
Carlitos was a married man. The union saw the
birth of two children, Ramon and Rica. Later
on, a rift in their relationship surfaced allegedly
due to Suzanne's resumption of her acting
career. Suzanne refuted the claim saying that
she never actually stopped working. Instead,
she claimed that it was Carlitos who started the
rift of their relationship since he was often
engaged in gambling and womanizing. She
wanted custody of their children without
visitorial rights of their father as Carlitos'
activities will affect the moral and social valued
of the children. Meanwhile, she got married to
a Dutch national and immigrated to Holland
with the two kids.

WON the father can visit his children

Held: Yes. The Court appreciated the
apprehensions of Suzanne that it is not good
for the children to see that their father is living
with another woman. Nevertheless, it seemed
unlikely that Carlitos would have ulterior
motives mores than a parent's desire to be with
his children even only on weekends. The Court
also gave a precautionary measure that in no
case can Carlitos take the children out without
the written consent of Suzanne.

Salientes vs Salientes
500 SCRA 128

Facts:
1) Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and
petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes
are the parents of the minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel S. Abanilla.
2) Couple lived with parents, petitioners
Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes
3) H has problems w/ in-laws and suggests that
they move to his own house. refuses and
troubles escalate w/ n leaving the household.
4) He was then prevented from seeing his son.
5) H files for habeas corpus w/c RTC grants.
6) appeals (motion for recon w/ RTC, certiorari
w/ CA) and is denied by both the RTC and the
CA.)
7) argue that under Article 213[7] of the Family
Code, which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise and that there was
no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by
his own mother. As such they assert the said
writ was void.
8) H argues that Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to the second part of his petition
regarding the custody of his son. It does not
address the first part, which pertains to his right
as the father to see his son w/c is the primary
reason for the petition for Habeas Corpus.
Moreover he maintains that, under the law, he
and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared
custody and parental authority over their
son (Art. 211).
Issues:
WON the Court of Appeals erred when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Held:
NO, the CA did not err in dismissing the
petition for certiorari because clearly the RTC
was correct in issuing the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the instant case where the n a lawful
parent of the child had been denied the
capacity to visit his child. In accordance w/ the
n arguments dwelling on Art 211 of the FC the
SC ruled:
Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
Antonette have joint parental authority over
their son and consequently joint custody.
Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be
adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a
judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
parents are still entitled to the custody of their
child. n the present case, private respondent's
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to
see his child as alleged in his petition.[11]
Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
As such the n was correct in attesting to his
joint custody and right to visitation of the child
and filing the proper action to assert that right.

Sy vs CA
GR No. 162938, Dec. 27,2007

Facts:
1) Jan 19, 1994 n Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filaes for
Habeas Corpus w/ the RTC for her 2 minor
children Vanessa and Jeremiah against her
husband Wilson Sy and for the court to
decide on the custody of the children.
2) answers claiming that he should be awarded
custody because the n abandoned the family
since 92', was mentally unstable and cannot
provide for the care of the children.
3) RTC grants the writ and awards custody to n
having pay support in the sum of P50,000 a
month.
4) files w/ CA. CA denies motion citing the lack
of proof of the holding that the ndid not
abandon since she was driven out of the
conjugal home by the family for religious
differences, that she had left for Taiwan to work
their and sustain her children and that her act
of praying in the rain was not attributable to
insanity.
Issues:
WON the courts were correct in granting
custody to the n as the mother of the
children.
Held:
Yes, according to Article 213 of the FC, in
cases of separation in fact w/o the
corresponding judicial decree, the court will
award custody of the child based on the best
interests of the child in this if the child is over 7
years of age he/she may be able to choose w/c
parent to stay w/ if his/her choice is a suitable
parent (i.e. fit by absence of moral depravity,
habitual drunkenness or poverty). However if
the child is under 7 he/she shall be given to the
mother unless the mother is considered unfit.
In all cases the preference of the law is to
award the child to the mother as based on the
intent of the Code Commission voicing out its
recommendation for the preference for the
mother in custody cases as a means allowing
the mother to maintain her natural right to
nurture the child

FC 214-216. FC 233

Vancil vs Belmes
358 SCRA 707

Facts:
1) Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of
Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
United States of America who died in the said
country on December 22, 1986. During his
lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named
Valerie and Vincent by his common-law
wife,Respondent Helen G. Belmes.
2) May of 1987- files guardianship proceedings
w/ RTC of Cebu over the persons and
properties of minors Valerie and Vincent
(Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was
a 2-year old).
3) July 15, 1987- Bonifacia Vancil was appointed
legal and judicial guardian.
4) August 13, 1987- n submitted an opposition to
the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a
similar petition for guardianship.
5) June 27, 1988- n files for the Removal of
Guardian and Appointment of a New One,
herself. asserting that she is the natural mother
in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors. (She also
cites that petition was filed under an improper
venue since was a naturalized U.S. citizen
residing in Colorado).
6) October 12, 1988- court rejected and denied
n's motion. Appeal denied.
7) CA reverses RTC citing:
Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in
the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of
her minor children. The law on parental
authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and
now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the
Family Code) ascribe to the same legal
pronouncements.
8) March 10, 1998- appeals to SC
9) September 15, 1998- n manifests that custody
of Valerie has become moot and academic w/
the latter reaching the age of maturity on
September 2, 1998. Thus case only for the son
Vincent.
Issue:
WON the mother of the minor Vincent
should be his guardian (WON grandmother
has right to guardianship over the mother).
Held:
YES, the natural mother of the minor, has the
preferential right over that of petitioner to be his
guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code
provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.
Being the natural mother of the minor Vincent,
n has the corresponding natural and legal right
to his custody.Petitioner contends that she is
more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Petitioner's claim to be the guardian of said
minor can only be realized by way of
substitute parental authority pursuant to
Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 214. n case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can
exercise substitute parental authority only
in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
respondent. Considering that respondent is
very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent,
petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to
be the minor's guardian, respondent's
unsuitability. Petitioner asserts this based on
the allegation that Valerie was raped several
times by the n live in partner. However this
case pertains to Vincent and is thus not directly
attestable to that fact. Moreover the status as
a U.S. resident, her old age and her conviction
of libel in the country deem her unlikely to be
able to execute the duties of a guardian (has
not been in RP since 87'). Moreover courts
should not appoint persons as guardians
who are not within the jurisdiction of our
courts for they will find it difficult to protect
the wards.

FC218-219,FC233
cf.FC 221 inrel. toNCC 2180

Palisoc v. Brilliantes
41 SCRA 548

Facts:
1) May 19, 1966 spouses MOISES P.
PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC file a
case w/ the RTC for damages on the death of
their son Dominador Palisoc inside Manila
Technical Institute grounds (laboratory room)
against defendants Antonio C.
Brillantes(member of the Board of Directors),
Teodosio Valenton (the president), Santiago M.
Quibulue (instructor of the class), and Virgilio
L. Daffon (co-student and assailant of Palisoc).
2) The death of the victim was believed to have
been caused by the heavy fist blows to the
body which he had incurred from a fight with
Daffon w/c damaged his internal organs. The
lone witness to the event, Desiderio Cruz,
attested that he and Daffon were fixing a
machine w/ the victim was looking on. After a
snide comment by Daffon regarding his
inaction the victim slapped him w/c started the
fight. Daffon then retaliated w/ fist blows to the
body. After w/c Palisoc fell down and fainted
after which he was brought to the hospital
where he later died from his injuries.
3) The TC found Daffon guilty for the quasi delict
under Article 2176 of the NCC but absolved the
other defendants from liability under Article
2180 of the NCC. The court cited that the
damages to incurred in the case would not be
on the defendant from MTI since Article 2180
of the new civil code contemplated a situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control or influence on
the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
Issues:
WON under the factual findings, the trial
court erred in absolving the defendants-
school officials from civil liability under Art.
2180 of the NCC.
Held:
YES, the SC held the lower court erred in its
application of Art. 2180 in as much as they
misconstrued the phrase 'so long as they (the
student) remain in their (the school's) custody',
to mean that the school incurs liability for a
student's actions only if the student actually
boards or resides w/ them (a case where their
influence over the student supersedes that of
the parents(as held in Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals)), to counter this the SC held that the
mentioned phrase actually implied that liability
arises not from the boarding of the student w/
the school but from the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.
As such being that the offense occurred in
school premises during class time within the
supervision of the school. They should be held
liable under 2180 unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with
the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code,
by "(proving) that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage." w/c they did not do.
Additional Held:
-Daffon's parent's not accountable since he
was no longer a minor.
-Brillantes was not held liable since he was
only a member of the board and not the owner,
since the school was incorporated on August 2,
1962.
-the school was not held liable since it was not
impleaded.
-the damages were was raised to 12000 to
keep up w/ devaluation.
J.B.L. Reyes concurs:
-while in the case of parents and guardians,
their authority and supervision over the children
and wards end by law upon the latter reaching
majority age, the authority and custodial
supervision over pupils exist regardless of the
age of the latter A student over twenty-one, by
enrolling and attending a school, places himself
under the custodial supervision and disciplinary
authority of the school authorities, which is the
basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for
his torts, committed while under such authority.
Makalintal dissents:
-It (ruling that custody in 2180 means mere
custody in school rather than board) would
demand responsibility without commensurate
authority, rendering teachers and school heads
open to damage suits for causes beyond their
power to control.
-Article 2180, says that "the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." Note
that for parental responsibility to arise the
children must be minors who live in their
company this implies that a similar sense of
custody ('living in their company') is implied in
the case of schools.

Amadora v. CA
160 SCRA 315

Facts:
Alfredo Amadora was shot by a classmate,
Pablito Daffon, while in the auditorium of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. He was in
school to finish a physics experiment as a pre-
requisite to graduating that year. He died at 17.
The respondent school and its faculty members
submit that they cannot be held liable for what
happened because, technically, the semester
had already ended.

Issue:
W/N they should be held liable now that the
semester had ended when the incident
happened.

Held:
NO. Petition is Denied.

Ratio:
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code states that:
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their
custody."

There have been cases in the past where who
was liable would depend on w/n the school was
academic or non-academic. If it were
academic, the teacher-in-charge of the student
would be liable, while if it were non-academic,
the head would be. (The ratio of this being that
heads of schools of arts and trade would be
closer and more involved with their students,
who can be considered their apprentices.)

The Court believes that this provision should
apply to ALL schools, academic and non-
academic.

Even if the student was within the school
grounds and basically doing nothing, he is still
within the school custody and subject to the
discipline of school authorities.

However, in the case at bar, none of the
respondents can be clearly said to have been
responsible for what happened to Amadora.

The school itself cannot be held directly liable
because according to the provision, it is only
either the teacher-in-charge or the head of the
school.

The rector, dean of boys or the high school
principal also may not be held liable because it
is clear that they are not teachers-in-charge.

Alfredo's physics teacher cannot be held liable
because he was not necessarily the teacher-in-
charge of Daffon.

Salvosa v. IAC
166 SCRA 274

Facts:
The Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an
academic institution and is also an institution of
arts and trade.

Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC
Unit, which is under the full control of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Jimmy. B. Abon is its duly appointed armorer,
he was appointed by the AFP and he also
receives his salary from the AFP. He also
receives his orders from the AFP. He is also a
commerce student of the BCF.

Mar. 3, 1977: Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a
student of the University of Baguio in the
parking lot of BCF with an unlicensed firearm
which he took from the armory of the ROTC
Unit.

Heirs of Napoleon (Respondents) sued for
damages from Abon, his officer, officers of the
BCF and BCF, Inc.

The RTC rendered their decision, sentencing
the defendants to pay jointly and severally for
damages.

The IAC affirmed with modifications the
decision of the RTC.

Issue: W/N the petitioner can be held solidarily
liable with Jimmy Abon for damages under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code.

Held: NO.

Ratio:
Even if Abon was enrolled in BCF, the incident
was around 8 pm, Jimmy Abon was supposed
to be in the ROTC office at that time, as
ordered by his Commandant, Ungos.
Abon could not have been in the custody of
the school at the time, as he was under direct
orders to have been somewhere else.
IAC decision is reversed.

PSBA vs. CA
February 4, 1992

! Facts:
Aug. 30, 1985: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed
on the 2
nd
-floor premises of PSBA. He was a
3
rd
year commerce student but it was
established that those who stabbed him were
not members of the school's academic
community.
His parents filed a suit for damages against
PSBA and its corporate officers.
RTC and CA: ruled for the parents of the
deceased
The petitioners motioned for the dismissal of
the suit twice before it was brought up to the
SC on the grounds that they are presumably
sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and
therefore, the complaint states no cause of
action against them since academic institutions
such as the PSBA are beyond the ambit of the
rule.
!
! Issue: W/N the petitioners should be
held liable.
!
! Held: Petition is DENIED.
!
! Ratio: (NOTE: the SC agrees to the
ruling of the lower courts, but has a different
ratio from them.)
Art. 2180 establishes the rule in "loco parentis.
It is true that the student was killed by people
who were not, in any way, affiliated with PSBA.
However, the incident was done within the
campus itself.
When a student enrolls in a campus, it is up to
the school to provide for an atmosphere
that wouId promote the students' desire to
learn. Adequate steps should have been taken
to maintain peace and order in the campus.
In the case at bar, it has not yet been clearly
established w/n the school was at fault due to
negligence in providing proper security
measures.
The Court dismisses the petition and orders the
RTC to continue proceedings to find out w/n
PSBA was negligent

Saludaga vs. FEU
30 April 08

! Facts:
Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law
student of FEU when he was shot by Alejandro
Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at
the premises.
Rosete insists that the shooting was accidental
and he was released because there was no
formal complaint filed against him.
Saludaga filed a complaint for damages
against respondent (FEU and Edilberto de
Jesus, president) because they breached their
obligation to provide students with a safe and
secure environment and an atmosphere
conducive to learning.
Respondents also filed a complaing agains
Galazy Development and Management
Corporation, who provides security services for
the campus.
RTC: Respondents are ordered to pay jointly
and severally Joseph Saludaga for actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
Galazt are also to indemnify the respondents.
CA: Reverses the appeal and dismisses the
case filed by Saludaga.
!
! Issue:
W/N the respondents are liable to Saludaga
As to the Third-Party Complaint, W/N Galaxy is
liable for damages to FEU
!
! Held:
YES except that De Jesus (president) should
not be held solidarily liable with FEU and with
modifications as to the amount of damages to
be paid.
YES.
!
! Ratio:
Citing PSBA vs. CA, there is a contractual
obligation between the student and the
academic institution where he is enrolled in. As
such, it is the duty of the campus to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises in
order to provide the students with the
necessary skills and knowledge to pursue a
higher education or a profession.
The fact that Saludaga was shot by a security
guard hired by the school to maintain that
peace and order is prima facie showing that the
respondent has failed to comply with its
obligation to provide a safe and secure
environment for its students.
The respondents aver that the incident was
fortuitous because they could not have
reasonably foreseen that an accident like that
would happen. In addition to that, Rosete was
not even their employee, but was sent to them
by Galaxy. The respondents believe that they
did perform their obligation by selecting the
services of Galaxy to provide them with
security services.
SC believes that they respondents failed to
discharge the burden of proving that they
exercised due diligence in providing a safe
learning environment for their students. They
failed to prove that they ensured that the
guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security
Service Agreement. FEU should not have
given full discretion to Galaxy in choosing
which security guards would be assigned to the
campus.
De Jesus cannot be held solidarily liable
because FEU is a separate entity, with a
personality distinct from the persons
composing it. (oblicon!!!)
! Obiter: Re: Third Party Complaint
Since Galaxy was negligent in its selecting of
employees and also failed to monitor
petitioner's condition, they are also bound to
pay damages to FEU. (Galaxy's president is
solidarily liable in this case because he should
have been directing the affairs of the security
agency, he also assured the petitioner of
shouldering his medical expenses but failed to
fulfill this promise.)

St. Francis High School v. CA
194 SCRA 341

! Facts:
! Respondent spouses file a complaint based on
the ff circumstances:
! Ferdinand Castillo, their son, freshman student
of St. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic
! Because of short notice, respondent spouses
(parents) did not allow their son to join but
merely allowed him to bring food to the
teachers and go home after doing so, however,
because of persuasion by the teachers,
Ferdinand went on to the beach
! During the picnic, one of the female teachers
was drowning, some students including
Ferdinand came to the rescue, but in the
process, Ferdinand himself drowned,
resuscitation failed, he was rushed to the
hospital but declared DOA
! Due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise
proper diligence of a good father of the family
in preventing their son's drowning, respondents
prayed of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and expenses for
litigation.
! TC found in favor of the respondent against
petitioner-teachers BUT dismissed the
complaint against St. Francis HS
! Both parties appeal to the CA who ruled that
the school should be liable as well, and that the
teachers should be liable (except for two who
were late to the picnic and hence cannot be
ruled negligent) Hence, this petition by St.
Francis HS et al
!
! Issue: W/n there was negligence
attributable to the petitioners which warrants
award of damages to the plaintiffs
!
! Held / Ratio: Petition impressed with
merit
! Note that the respondents spouses allowed
their son to join the excursion
! The fact that he gave money to his son to buy
food for the picnic even without knowing where
it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to
join the same.
! Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 2180
of the NCC in rendering petitioner school liable
for the death of respondent's son. Article 2180,
par. 4 states that: "xxx Employers shall be
liable for damages caused by employees
acting w/in the scope of their assigned tasks
xxx
! In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners
were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks.
! The picnic had no permit from the school
principal, Benjamin Illumin because it was not a
school sanctioned activity
! Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of
I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did
her best and exercised diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent any untoward
incident or damages to all the students who
joined the picnic Testimony shows that they
did all that was humanly possible to save the
child
! Connie even invited co-petitioners Tirso de
Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have
knowledge in First Aid application and
swimming.
With no act of fault or negligence, hence, no
moral damages can be assessed against
petitioners

St. Mary's Academy vs. Carpitanos
G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002

Facts:
! From Feb 13-20 1995, St. Mary's conducted an
enrollment drive, pat of which were school
visits from where prospective enrollees were
studying
! As a student of St. Mary's, Sherwin Carpitanos
(son of respondent spouses) was part of the
campaign group
! Sherwin, along with other students were riding
the jeep, owned by co-respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, driven by James Daniel, 15 yo, also
a student, allegedly, he was driving in reckless
manner resulting the jeep to turtle, and Sherwin
died as a result of injuries sustained
! After trial, RTC ordered St. Mary's to pay the
spouses Carpitanos for damages
! St. Mary's appeals, CA denies, hence this
appeal

Issue: W/n CA erred in holding petitioner liable
for damages for the death of Sherwin

Held / Ratio: Yes, CA decision reversed
! Under FC Art. 218, Schools have special
parental authority (APA)over a minor child
while under their custody such authority
applies to field trips and other affairs outside
school whenever authorized by the schools
! Under FC Art. 219, if a person under custody is
a minor, those exercising SPA are liable for
damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their custody
! For St. Mary's to be liable, there must be an act
or omission considered negligent and which
has proximate cause to the injury, and the
negligence must have causal connection to the
accident
! Respondents fail to show that the negligence
was the proximate cause, hence reliance on
Art 219 is unfounded
! Respondents Spouses Daniel (parents of
driver) and Villanueva (owner of the jeep) admit
that the cause of the accident was not
negligence of St. Mary's nor the reckless
driving of James but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep which the
Carpitons do not dispute
! There is likewise no evidence that St. Mary's
allowed the minor James to drive, it was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of the jeep owner who
allowed James to drive
! Hence liability for the accident whether caused
by negligence of the driver or detachment of
steering wheel guide must be pinned on the
minor's parents. The negligence of St. Mary's
was only a remote cause.
With the evidence presented by St. Mary's and
with the fact that the Daniel spouses mention
the circumstance of detachment of steering
wheel, it is not the school but the registered
owner of the vehicle who shall be responsible

FC215
ROC Rule 130 Sec. 25 cf. Secs. 22 & 23
FC 220-222, FC 223-224

Medina v. Makabali
27 SCRA 502

Facts:
! Feb 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida gave birth to
Joseph Casero in Makabali Clinic, Pampanga,
owned by respondent Dra.Venancia Makabli
! Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabali from
his birth, and the latter reared Joseph as her
own son.
! Zenaida never visited the child nor paid for his
expenses until Aug of 1966 where she claimed
for custody of the minor
! Trial disclosed that Zenaida lived with Feliciano
Casero with two other children, with the
tolerance of Casero's lawful wife who lives
elsewhere
! During trial, the minor addressed the
respondent as Mammy, and even chose to stay
with the respondent
! With Dra. Makabili made to promise to allow
the minor the free choice of whom to live with
upon reaching the age of 14 the Court held
that it was for the child's best interest to be left
with the foster mother

Issue: W/n LC erred in ordering the minor to
stay with the respondent

Held / Ratio: No, petition dismissed
! While the law recognizes the right of parent to
the custody of her child, Courts must not lose
sight of the basic principle that "in all questions
on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount" (NCC Art. 363), and that for
compelling reasons, even a child under seven
may be ordered separated from the mother

! The right of parents to the company and
custody of their children is but ancillary to the
proper discharge of parental duties to provide
the children with adequate support, education,
moral, intellectual and civic training and
development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
As remarked by the Court below, petitioner
Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred
duties; she not only failed to provide the child
with love and care but actually deserted him,
with not even a visit, in his tenderest years,
when he needed his mother the most.

Luna v. IAC
137 SCRA 7

Facts:
! Private Respondent Maria Santos is an
illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna,
who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Luna
! Maria is married to Sixto Salumbides, and they
are the parents of Shirley, who is the subject of
this child custody case.
! 2-4 months after the birth of Shirley, her
parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless
couple with considerable means who loved
Shirley and raised her as their very own
! Petitioners asked for the respondents' consent
to Shirley's application for a US Visa because
they wanted to bring her to Disneyland but to
no avail.
! Hence, petitioner left Shirley with the
respondents, upon the latter's request, but with
instructions that their drive take and fetch
Shirley to Maryknoll college every school day.
! When the petitioners returned on October 29,
1980, they learned that the respondents had
transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica
College. The private respondents also refused
to return Shirley to them. Neither did the said
respondents allow Shirley to visit the
petitioners.
! In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition
for habeas corpus, and the trial court rule in
favor of them
! Respondents appealed to CA, who reversed
the order
! Petitioners opposed the execution of the
judgment and filed a motion for reconsideration
on grounds of the subsequent emotional,
! psychological, and physiological condition of
the child Shirley which would make the
judgment prejudicial to the child's best
interests.
! Shirley made manifest during the hearing that
she would kill herself or run away from home if
she should ever be separated from her Mama
and Papa, the petitioners herein, and forced to
stay with the respondents.
! Regardless, respondent court still ruled in favor
of the respondents
Issue: Who has rightful custody of Shirley?

Held: Petition granted, Shirley goes to the
petitioners
! Shirley's manifestations that she would kill
herself or run away if she were taken away
from the petitioners would make the judgment
unfair, unjust, if not illegal
! NCC Art. 363 provides that questions relating
to the care, custody, and education, etc of
children, the latter's welfare is paramount
hence best interests of the minor can override
procedural rules even the rights of the
biological parents
! Furthermore, in her letters to the members of
the court, Shirley depicted her biological
parents as selfish and cruel who beat her often.
"To return her to the private respondents would
be traumatic, as requested by the child herself,
let us not destroy her future

Cuadra v. Monfort
35 SCRA 160

R.A. 7610, The Child Abuse Law

FC 225-227

Pineda vs CA
226 SCRA 754

RA 9231, Sees. 12-B and 12-C

Lindain v. CA
212 SCRA 725

Radillo vs. Ferrer
152 SCRA 407

FC228cf.RA6809
FC229cf.FC 193
FC 23 1-232

Chua v. Cabangbang
27 SCRA 791

! pacita chua worked as a hostess, lived w/chua
ben in 1950 (had a child who died in
infancy).cohab then with sy sia lay (Robert and
betty chua sy as fruits). After betty's birth, they
separated. She then became victo ran
villareal's mistress.1960, a girl was born to her
but then they separated and she gave the child
away to a comadre in cebu
! may1958 bartolome cabnagbang and
wife(childless)acquired custody of betty(4
months old) and had her baptized as grace
cabangbang
! on how cabangbangs acquired betty: accdg to
pacita, it was villareal during their cohab who
gave betty to cabangbangs (for favors villareal
received)she only knew of such when betty
was 3 yrs old and was brought to her by
villareal who then returned betty to the
cabangbangs due to threat,etc. cabangbangs
say they found her wrapped in bundles @ their
gates and then treated her as their own,that
only when betty/grace was 5 ! that
controversy arose
! TC said that betty was given to cabangbangs
by villareal but with k and consent from pacita
! Pacita demanded the custody of the child, filed
for HC. Resps were the cabangbangs and
villareal
! writ issued by court but body of child was not
produced
! TC eventually ruled that for the welfare of the
child, she should remain in the custody of the
cabangbangs
! WON child should be with pacita
! HELD: NO. NCC 363 says that minor under 7
shall not be separated from mother, but issue
is now moot as grace is already 11
! The courts may, in cases specified by law,
deprive parents of their [parental] authority."
And there are indeed valid reasons, as will
presently be expounded, for depriving the
petitioner of parental authority over the minor
Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang
! petitioner did not at all - not ever - report to the
authorities the alleged disappearance of her
daughter, and had not been taken any step to
see the child when she allegedly discovered
that she was in the custody of the
Cabangbangs.
! Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:

"The courts may deprive the parents of their
authority or suspend the exercise of the same if
they should treat their children with excessive
harshness or should give them corrupting
orders, counsels, or examples, or should make
them beg or abandon them."

! record yields a host of circumstances which, in
their totality, unmistakably betray the
petitioner's settled purpose and intention to
completely forego all parental responsibilities
and forever relinquish all parental claim in
respect to the child
! She surrendered the custody of her child to the
Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963,
or after the lapse of a period of five long years,
before she brought action to recover custody
! her own unadulterated testimony under oath -
that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia
Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing
the petitioner the support which he
peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when
she gave the child away. she expressed her
willingness that the child remain with the
Cabangbangs provided the latter would in
exchange give her a jeep and some money
! She needs the child as a leverage to obtain
concessions - financial and otherwise - either
from the alleged father or the Cabangbangs. If
she gets the child back, support for her would
be forthcoming - or so she thinks - from the
alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand,
if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she
would agree provided they gave her a jeep and
some money.
! Note that this was not the only instance when
she gave away a child of her own flesh and
blood. She gave up her youngest child, named
Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu
because she could not support it.
! petitioner has no regular source of income.
There is no assurance at all that the alleged
father, Sy Sia Lay - an unknown quantity, as far
as the record goes - would resume giving the
petitioner support once she and the child are
reunited.
! But the record indubitably pictures the
Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of
consequence in the community, who have
given her their name and are rearing her as
their very own child, and with whom there is
every reason to hope she will have a fair
chance of normal growth and development into
respectable womanhood.
! WON custody of betty/grace is without basis
as the couples are not related by blood or
affinity
! HELD: NO. law provides that custody can even
be given to a third person when it appears that
both parents (either legally or de facto sep) are
improper persons to entrust the care of the
child
The petitioner has not proven that she is
entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy
or Grace Cabangbang.

De Guzman vs Perez
496 SCRA 474

See: R.A. 8369, "An Act Establishing Family Courts, Granting Them Exclusive Original
Jurisdiction Over ChiId and FamiIy Cases."
See: RA. 7610, "ChiId Abuse Act"

RA 6809
FC 234 as amended
FC 236 as amended cf. FC 15, NCC 2180
SURNAMES

NCC 364-380

RA9255

Naldoza v. Republic, supra

Johnston v. Republic
7 SCRA 1040

Facts:
1. June 24, 1960: Petition for Adoption of Ana
Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion
Georgiana by Isabel Valdes Johnston
a. The 2-yr.-10-mo. old baby was then under the
custody of the orphanage Hospicio de San
Jose whose Mother Superior consented to the
adoption
b. As alleged in the petition, Isabel was then
married to Raymond Arthur Johnston who also
consented to the adoption
2. Adoption was granted BUT
a. Surname of the child was changed to 'Valdes'
because it was held as the 'surname of the
petitioner'
3. October 24, 1960: Motion to change the
surname to 'Valdes Johnston'

Issue/s: WON Adopted child can use
the surname of adopter's husband
Held: No
1. Because only Isabel adopted Ana, only her
surname can be used by the child
a. NCC 341 (4): Adopted minor is entitled to use
the adopter's surname
i. Husband of Isabel did not join in the adoption
ii. His consent to the adoption did not have the
effect of making him an adopting father
iii. Hence, his surname cannot be used because it
would give the wrong impression that he
adopted Ana also and wrongly entitle Ana to
the status of his legitimate child under NCC
341 (1)
b. But why Valdes despite her marriage to
Johnston? Because 'Valdes' remains as her
own surname

2. Use of the surname of the husband is only an
addition to the surname of the wife and it does
not change the latter
a. NCC 370 (1) allows a married woman to add to
her surname her husband's surname
BUT she has a surname of her own to which
her husband's surname may ONLY be added if
she so chooses

Ng Yao Sing v. Republic
16 SCRA 483

Facts: Petition for change of name to Keng
Lee Uy
1. A Chinese resident of Dumaguete has a
number of names in various records:
a. Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate
of residence
b. Jesus Uy Keng Lee, in his school records
c. Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records
d. Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general
public
e. Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns
f. Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of
registration
2. Having various names had caused much
confusion in his school records and
unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him
in his dealings with the public
3. City attorney opposed
a. that there is no necessity for the change of
name
b. that he is guilty of a violation of the laws
regarding the use of names and surnames
4. CFI ruled in favour of Keng Lee Uy

Issue/s: WON Keng Lee Uy can have
his name changed

Guidelines for Petitions for Change of Name
1. Jurisdictional Requirements for the Petition of
Change of Name
How the court acquires jurisidiction
a. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition is
acquired after publication of the:
i. "order reciting the purpose of the petition"
ii. "date and place for the hearing thereof"
iii. for three successive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation
b. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object "to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established."
c. Publication must contain the following
information
i. the name or names of the applicant
ii. the cause for which the change of name is
sought
iii. the new name asked for

2. NCC 408: A person's real name is that which is
entered in the civil register
a. Civil register is an official record of the civil
status of persons
b. The only name that may be changed is the true
or official name recorded in the civil register

Held: NO! Jesus Ng did not
properly follow the requirements.

Re: Publication of the Petition
3. Although the Petition was published in "The
Negros Times," a weekly newspaper in
Dumaguete City,
4. The title of the case was there printed as: "In
the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng
Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner."
a. 'Jesus Ng Yao Siong' was used in the petition,
the order of publication, and the publication
itself
b. 'Jesus Ng Yao Siong' was not the real name of
Jesus Ng
His name in the civil register is merely "Jesus
Ng"
c. 'Jesus Ng Yao Siong' was not the only name
he was known for
i. The title of the publication should have
included his aliases
1. Because: Readers of newspapers merely
glances at the title of the petition. It is only after
he has satisfied himself that the title interests
him, that he proceeds to read down further
2. Hence, the names should not just appear in the
body
ii. It should have read: "In the matter of the
change of name of Jesus Ng, otherwise known
as Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Uy Keng Lee,
Uy Keng Lee Jesus, Keng Lee Uy and Uy
Keng Lee"
5. Hence, the requirement of publication was not
met and the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case

Re: Absence of Proper and Reasonable Cause
for Change of Name
6. The alleged "confusion in the school records
and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to
him in his dealings with the public do not
constitute proper and reasonable
7. Such problems arise from his own use of
different names which would naturally lead to
different people transacting with him by one
name or the other

Re: Violation of the Law
8. Jesus Ng violated:
a. Commonwealth Act 142, entitled "An act to
regulate the use of aliases"
He was not "authorized by a competent court"
to use an alias nor were his aliases
pseudonyms for literary purposes" (as
stage/pen names) or names by which he had
been known since his childhood"

Llaneta v. Agrava
57 SCRA 29

Facts: Petition for change of name to Keng
Lee Uy
5. A Chinese resident of Dumaguete has a
number of names in various records:
a. Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate
of residence
b. Jesus Uy Keng Lee, in his school records
c. Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records
d. Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general
public
e. Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns
f. Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of
registration
6. Having various names had caused much
confusion in his school records and
unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him
in his dealings with the public
7. City attorney opposed
a. that there is no necessity for the change of
name
b. that he is guilty of a violation of the laws
regarding the use of names and surnames
8. CFI ruled in favour of Keng Lee Uy

Issue/s: WON Keng Lee Uy can have
his name changed

Guidelines for Petitions for Change of Name
9. Jurisdictional Requirements for the Petition of
Change of Name
How the court acquires jurisidiction
a. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition is
acquired after publication of the:
i. "order reciting the purpose of the petition"
ii. "date and place for the hearing thereof"
iii. for three successive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation
b. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object "to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established."
c. Publication must contain the following
information
i. the name or names of the applicant
ii. the cause for which the change of name is
sought
iii. the new name asked for

10. NCC 408: A person's real name is that which is
entered in the civil register
a. Civil register is an official record of the civil
status of persons
b. The only name that may be changed is the true
or official name recorded in the civil register

Held: NO! Jesus Ng did not
properly follow the requirements.

Re: Publication of the Petition
11. Although the Petition was published in "The
Negros Times," a weekly newspaper in
Dumaguete City,
12. The title of the case was there printed as: "In
the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng
Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner."
a. 'Jesus Ng Yao Siong' was used in the petition,
the order of publication, and the publication
itself
b. 'Jesus Ng Yao Siong' was not the real name of
Jesus Ng
His name in the civil register is merely "Jesus
Ng"
c. 'Jesus Ng Yao Siong' was not the only name
he was known for
i. The title of the publication should have
included his aliases
1. Because: Readers of newspapers merely
glances at the title of the petition. It is only after
he has satisfied himself that the title interests
him, that he proceeds to read down further
2. Hence, the names should not just appear in the
body
ii. It should have read: "In the matter of the
change of name of Jesus Ng, otherwise known
as Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Uy Keng Lee,
Uy Keng Lee Jesus, Keng Lee Uy and Uy
Keng Lee"
13. Hence, the requirement of publication was not
met and the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case

Re: Absence of Proper and Reasonable Cause
for Change of Name
14. The alleged "confusion in the school records
and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to
him in his dealings with the public do not
constitute proper and reasonable
15. Such problems arise from his own use of
different names which would naturally lead to
different people transacting with him by one
name or the other

Re: Violation of the Law
16. Jesus Ng violated:
a. Commonwealth Act 142, entitled "An act to
regulate the use of aliases"
He was not "authorized by a competent court"
to use an alias nor were his aliases
pseudonyms for literary purposes" (as
stage/pen names) or names by which he had
been known since his childhood"

Telmo v. Republic
73 SCRA 29

Facts:
Milagros Llerena was admitted to the bar in
1923,
1930/1930: married Pedro M. Telmo
1946: attorney's oath: using Milagros Llerena-
Telmo
The Telmo spouses sojourned in the United
States and Pedro, following the American style,
changed the spelling of his name to "Thelmo.
His diploma from the University of Michigan
spelled his surname as Thelmo. Their 4
children have been using Thelmo but were
baptized Telmo.
Mrs. Telmo was appointed justice of the peace
of Kabasalan, Manicahan and Taluksangay,
Zamboanga
In a lot of cases filed against her as a justice,
some used the name, "Telmo, while others
used "Thelmo. n the case that resulted in the
termination of her tenure as justice of the
peace, she used "Thelmo.
1964: She filed a petition in the CFI of
Zamboanga City praying that her husband's
surname be changed to Thelmo. (NOTE: her
husband did not join her as a co-petitioner but
he executed an affidavit interposing no
objection to his wife's petition.)

Two of her sons, surnamed "Thelmo,
expressed conformity in a joint affidavit.
At the hearing, she presented documentary
evidence in the form of certificates and
diplomas of her children surnamed "Thelmo,
Telegrams addressed to her as Atty. Milagros
Thelmo, and articles of incorporation of 2
corporations she is a part of with her surname
spelled, "Thelmo.
She did not present in evidence her passport,
visas and titles and deeds but she alleged that
her name in those were also "Thelmo.
She also wants to change her husband's
surname in order to distinguish her sons from
other Telmos who are the illegititmate children
of the relatives of her husband.
The City Fiscal of Zamboanga City opposes on
the ground that the real party to the petition
should be her husband and sons.

Issue: W/N there is ample justification to allow
Mrs. Telmo to change the spelling of her
husband's surname.

Held: NO.

Ratio:
According to Art. 370 of the Civil Code, a
married woman may use her husband's
surname.
If she wants judicial authorization in the
changing of the spelling, it is the husband who
should initiate the proceedings.
It was not the husband, in the case at bar, who
asked for a change of spelling of his surname.
The Court also believes that there is not
enough substantial reason for the changing of
spelling of Atty. Telmo's surname.

Tolentino v CA
162 SCRA 66

Facts:
1931: Arturo Tolentino m Consuelo David,
private respondent. Union produced kids.
1943: They were legally divorced pursuant to
the law during the Japanese Occupation.
Consuelo had abandoned Arturo for 3
continuous years.
Arturo m a Pilar Adorable who died soon after
their marriage
1945: Arturo m Constancia, petitioner. Union
also produced kids.
Consuelo has continued using the surname
Tolentino until this case was filed.
3
rd
party defendant, Arturo admits that the use
of Tolentino by the private respondent was with
his consent and the consent of his family.

Issue: W/N a woman who has been legally
divorced from her husband may be enjoined by
the latter's present wife from using the
surname of her former husband.

Held: NO. Case is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

Ratio:
Philippine laws are silent to the issue. After all,
there are no provisions in our laws regarding
divorce.
Senator Tolentino himself commented on Art.
370 of the Civil Code that "the wife cannot
claim an exclusive right to use the husband's
surname. She cannot be prevented from using
it; but neither can she restrain others from
using it.
The private respondent has given proof that by
enjoining her from using Tolentino, there would
be serious dislocation on her part with regard
to contracts formed, etc.
It is already public knowledge that Constancia
is the legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo
has never represented herself after the divorce
as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino anyway.
The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to
show any problems that would be occur by
allowing private respondent to use Tolentino.

Legamia v. IAC
131 SCRA 479

Yasin v Hon Judge Shari'a Court
G R No 94986 (1995)

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
G R No 148311, March 31, 2005

In Re Change of Name, Julainan Carulasan Wang
G R No 159966 March 30, 2005

Facts:
! Sept 22, 2002 Julian Lin Wang filed a petition
through his mother to drop his middle name
and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
! Reasons he wants to change name
! in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a
person's name, they anticipate that Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against
because of his current registered name which
carries a middle name.
! Julian and his sister might also be asking
whether they are brother and sister since they
have different surnames.
! Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore's
Mandarin language since they do not have the
letter "R but if there is, they pronounce it as
"L.
! TC: denied the petition since reasons given
were not recognized by law
! Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari arguing that the trial court has
decided a question of substance that should
not determined by the Court ie if FC 174
prohibits child from dropping his name
ISSUE: WON he can be allowed to drop his
middle name
HELD: NO
! grounds one can change name: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e)
a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest
! characteristics of a name: ) It is absolute,
intended to protect the individual from being
confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in
certain respects, for nobody can be without a
name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial
proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of
man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis
causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
! Middle names serve to identify the maternal
lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and
surname as he has.
! In this case, rejected because
! Still a minor
! Reason was only for convenience. Did not
really say how dropping his middle name could
help him integrate better.
continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name
.
ABSENT

NCC 38 1-396, FC 41

Reyes v. Alejandro
141 SCRA 65

Facts: In October 1969, Erlinda Reynoso
Reyes prayed for the declaration of absence of
her husband Roberto L. Reyes who have been
absent in their house since April 1962 due to a
misunderstanding over personal matters. Since
then she doesn't know his whereabouts. He left
no will or debts.

She said they acquired no properties or debts
during marriage. She said her only purpose in
filing the petition is to establish the
absence of her husband, invoking the
provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of
Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code.

CFI dismissed the case

Issue: WON Roberto must be judicially
declared absent.

Held: No. The purpose of the declaration is to
provide an administrator of the property.

Ratio:
Rule 107 of the Rules of Court is based on the
provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on
absence. The provision is concerned with the
interest or property of the absentee. The
purpose of the declaration is to provide an
administrator of the property.

The reason and purpose of the provisions of
the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to
396) are:
1. The interest of the person himself who
has disappeared;
2. The rights of third parties against the
absentee, especially those who have rights
which would depend upon the death of the
absentee; and
3. The general interest of society which
may require that property does not remain
abandoned without someone representing it
and without an owner (Civil Code by Francisco,
Vol. 2, pp. 930-931, 1953 Ed.).

When to declare for absence:
1. when he has properties which have to
be taken cared of or administered by a
representative appointed by the Court (Article
384, Civil Code);
2. the spouse of the absentee is asking
for separation of property (Article 191, Civil
Code) or
3. his wife is asking the Court that the
administration of all classes of property in the
marriage be transferred to her (Article. 196,
Civil Code).

For civil marriage law
! Necessary to judicially declare spouse an
absentee only when (1) there are properties
which have to be taken cared of or
administered by a representative appointed by
the Court (2) the spouse of the absentee is
asking for separation of property (3) wife is
asking the Court that the administration of
property in the marriage be transferred to her
! Otherwise law only requires that the former
spouse has been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage, that
the spouse present does not know his or her
former spouse to he living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage
RESULT: in this case, since there were no
properties to speak of, it was right for the TC to
dismiss the case.

Eastern Shipping v. Lucero
124 SCRA 425

! On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr.
was appointed as captain of the ship
EASTERN MINICON of eastern shipping lines
! Under the contract, his employment was good
for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract
would automatically terminate upon arrival of
the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless
renewed. It was further agreed that part of the
captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid
to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila
! Captain Lucero sent three distress messages
to the company on the following dates
! February l6,1980 7am; February l6/80
3:30pm; FEBRUARY 16/80 9:50pm
! On the third message he stated that seawater
was entering the vessel and they were
preparing to abandon ship
! The company notified the coast guard. Search
results were negative
! The insurers of the company confirmed the
loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company
paid the corresponding death benefits to the
heirs of the crew members, except respondent
Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept
! July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for
for payment of the accrued salary allotment of
her husband which the Company had stopped
since March 1980 and for continued payment
of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall
have returned to the port of Manila. She
contended that the contract of employment
entered into by her husband with the Company
was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the
same was to terminate only upon the vessel's
arrival in Manila
! The company refused to pay. The National
seamen board upheld the complaint and the
decision was affirmed by the NLRC
Issue: WON Mrs Lucero was entitled to the
accrued salary
Held:
The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391
regarding the presumption of death at sea.
They argue that it was too early to presume
that Mr. Lucero has died because under the
law, four (4) years have not yet passed.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board
a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel or aeroplane;...
The Supreme Court ruled however that a
preponderance of evidence from the telegraph
messages and the fact that the vessel was not
heard of again show that it can be logically
inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew
perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs.
Navarro
4
"Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can
be made, the presumption does not step in,
and the rule of preponderance of evidence
controls."
Hence the decision of the NLRC is reversed;
however, death benefits should be paid.

Tol-Noquera v. Villamor
211 SCRA 616

Facts:
! December 1986, Daya Maria Tol (seeking
admistration of the estate) alleged that she was
the acknowledged natural child of Remigio Tol,
who had been missing since 1984 and a
certain Diosdado Tol had fraudulently obtained
a title of Remigio's property
! Diosdado countered that Daya maria was not
an acknowledged natural child of the absentee
and the title was originally in his name
Issue: WON DAYA MARIA TOL can be
appointed administratrix when Remigio was not
yet declared presumptively dead
The relevant laws on the matter are found in
the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 381. When a person disappears from his
domicile his whereabouts being unknown, and
without leaving an agent to administer his
property the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
appoint a person to represent him in all that
may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under
similar circumstances the power conferred by
the absentee has expired.
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the
preceding article having been made, the judge
shall take the necessary measures to
safeguard the rights and interest of the
absentee and shall specify the powers,
obligations and remuneration of his
representatives, regulating them according to
the circumstances, by the rules concerning
guardians.
Art. 383. In the appointment of a
representative, the spouse present shall be
preferred when there is no legal separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse
present is a minor, any competent person may
be appointed by the court.
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any
news about the absentee or since the receipt of
the last news, and five years in case the
absentee has left a person in charge of the
administration of his property, his absence may
be declared.
Art. 385. The following may ask for the
declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may
present an authentic copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law
of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of
the absentee some right subordinated to the
condition of his death.
Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence
shall not take effect until six months after its
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Held:
It is not necessary that a declaration of
absence be made in a proceeding separate
from and prior to a petition for administration.
The purpose of the cited rules is the protection
of the interests and property of the absentee,
not of the administrator

Manuel vs. People
G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005

Facts:
! July 28, 1975, Eduardo Manuel was married to
Rubylus Gaa
! He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in
January 1996, eventually had sex with her, and
eventually married her on April 22, 1996 all the
time saying he was single
! Through their joint efforts, they were able to
build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan,
Baguio City. However, starting 1999 Manuel
went to the house 2-3 times a year and
eventually on January 2001, packed his clothes
and left without giving financial support
! Tina became curious and went to the NSO and
to her amazement learned that her marriage
was bigamous
! Manuel testified that Tina had been informed of
his prevous marriage but nevertheless agreed
to marry him
! He further claimed that he was only forced to
marry her because she threatened that she
would commit suicide
! July 2, 2002, Eduardo Manuel was convicted of
Bigamy
! Basically Manuel says that his marriage was in
good faith because his previous wife was
absent for 20 years hence his first marriage
was dissolved
! He appealed to the CA, CA affirmed the
decision of trial court
! He points out that, under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has
been absent for seven years, whether or not
he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for
all purposes except for succession, while the
second paragraph refers to the rule on legal
presumption of death with respect to
succession.
Issue: duh,
WON second marriage is void for being
bigamous
Held:
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered on the proceedings in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not
an aggroupment of empty or useless words.
The requirement for a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse is for
the benefit of the spouse present, as protection
from the pains and the consequences of a
second marriage, precisely because he/she
could be charged and convicted of bigamy if
the defense of good faith based on mere
testimony is found incredible.
Moreover;
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of
contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this
Court for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent
spouse.

Hence the petition is denied

Olaguer vs. Purugganan
G.R. No. 158907, February 12, 2007

Facts:
! Alleges that he was the owner of 60,000 share
of stocks (worth 600k), employed as EVP
Businessday Corporation, President of
Businessday Info System and Svces &
Businessday Marketing Corp
! Active in the political opposition against Marcos
together with resps Raul Locsin and Enrique
Joaquin
! Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an
unwritten agreement that, in the event that
Eduardo was arrested, they would support the
Eduardo's family by the continued payment of
his salary
! executed a Special Power of Attorney on
5/26/79 appointing Locsin, Joaquin and
Hofilea for the purpose of selling or
transferring petitioner's shares of stock with
Businessday
! during trial, Eduardo testified that he agreed to
execute the SPA in order to cancel his shares
of stock, even before they are sold, for the
purpose of concealing that he was a
stockholder of Businessday, in the event of a
military crackdown against the opposition
! parties acknowledged the SPA before
respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was
then the Corporate Secretary of Businessday,
and at the same time, a notary public for
Quezon City
! By the time he was released from prison 6
years later, he was no longer a shareholder in
the said bank
! According to the respondents, they were just
doing what was accorded in the SPA, given
that the price of theirs plummeted below
market value because of the stigma brought
about by olaguer being a very prominent
oppositionist
Issue: WON absence as mentioned in SPA
should be understood as that of NCC 381 ART
381. When a person disappears from his
domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and
without leaving an agent to administer his
property, the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
appoint a person to represent him in all that
may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when
under similar circumstances the power
conferred by the absentee has expired.
Or incapacity as per NCC 38
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to
act

HELD: NO. If it were, then the very existence of
that SPA would be rendered nugatory. Olaguer
has to be a minor or insane for that SPA to
have function. An SPA has to be construed
strictly but its provision has to be construed as
to its existence, i.e. understood in a way that
will give more power/ function to that SPA.
Since the said SPA executed by Olaguer gave
powers to the respondents to actually dispose
of his share, he cannot therefore assail such
now. And even if the said contract is assailable,
it was already ratified by the reception of the
amount 600,000 by Olaguer's wife and in-laws
from 1980-1982

FUNERALS

NCC 305-3 10

Eugenio v. Velez
185 SCRA 425

Facts:
Already discussed many times
! HC served over the body of Vitaliana Vargas
who allegedly died on the 28
th
of august 1988
but was only made known to the courts on
September of 1988 after the HC petition of
vitaliana's bros and sis, with the allegation that
tomas eugenio unduly took away their sister
sometime in 1987 and made her reside in his
palacial residence in Misamis Oriental
! Tomas eugenio was arguing that HC should
not govern the dead body, and besides he was
already (allegedly) able to secure a burial
permit to bury her at the grounds of PBCM of
which he is the head
! The bro and sis of vitaliana were arguing that
tomas doesn't belong to the list of persons who
are mandated by the law (accdg to NCC 305
and 308) to bury her <he being just a common-
law husband, therefore lawfully has no
relations with her>
Issue: WON the bros and sis are the lawful
custodians of her body (right to bury the
deceased)

Held: YES. SC decided for the sisters and
brothers of vitaliana, given that tomas was just
the common-law husband of vitaliana, the right
to bury her therefore remains on the nearest
kin of vitaliana, who are the resps herein

ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTER

NCC 407-413
ROC, Rule 108
RA 9048

Barretto vs Local Civil registrar
74 SCRA 257

Facts:
! Born of Faustino Barretto and King Lian (both
natives of Amoy, China) but was recorded
allegedly in the name of Rosario Barretto (as
per Register No. 1167(f44) in the record of
births of the civil register of Manila) #allegedly
a female child Rosario was born on that 29
th
of
june 1944
! According to the Book No. IV, Folio 83 of the
record of baptisms of the Parroquia de Chinos
in Manila, a boy by the name of domingo sy
barrette was baptized on 21
st
of may 1950 of
the aforementioned parents
! Registered as an alien in BID, also issued a
native-born certificate of residence (29
th
june
1958)
! Domingo Barreto alleges to have only known
the mistake in his birth certificate upon filing for
an ML
! He therefore sought to have the alleged
erroneous entries be corrected (regarding his
name and sex)
! Filed two pets (due to dismissal of the 1
st
, with
the 2
nd
being limited to a correction of sex)
! TC granted but OSG appealed
Issue: WON the alleged error is merely clerical
in nature such that change therein could easily
be dispensed

Held: No. it was not a clerical error. If the name
in the record of birth were Domingo Barretto
and his sex was indicated therein as female, it
might be argued that the error would be
clerical. But that is not the fact in this case. The
situation is more complicated. A person named
Domingo Barretto claims that he is Rosario
Barreto and that the word "female" in the
latter's birth record is a mistake.
In this case, there is a need to ascertain as to
WON Rosario and Domingo are one and the
same person. TC decision is therefore set
aside

Republic vs Dela Cruz
118 SCRA 18

Facts:
! Respondent herein (felecisima velarde) sought
to have changes be introduced in the birth
certificates of his children (ruben, Cynthia,
Reynaldo, roger, Rolando and romeo) alleging
that there were error in the records of said
children as per nationality, name of their father,
her middle name, nationality of their mother,
and finally their legitimacy <as born of
common-law union>
! OSG objected to such, saying that the changes
sought herein would affect the nationality,
filiation, and the civil satus of the children and
should therefore be resolved not in a summary
procceding
! TC granted herein prayers because they
maybe substantial errors (not just clerical), it
allegedly gives justice to the correct status of
the children
Issue: WON herein changes should have been
granted by the courts

Held: No. The changes being sought herein
would greatly affect the civil status, filiation and
the nationality of the children (as have been
argued by the OSG). LC erred in not taking
consideration of such. The name of the alleged
father (Lee Tieng) as being different from what
appears in said certificates (lee uping, alipio
lee, ting wee lee) could very well point
todifferent persons and should not therefore be
treated simply as a typo error.
LC decision therefore is set aside

Repubic vs Flojo
152 SCRA 550

Facts: Inocencio P. Carag filed a petition to
correct an entry in his register of birth wherein
he was erroneously registered as "Chinese
instead of a Filipino citizen. At the hearing, it
was established that he was born in Aparri,
Cagayan on March 15, 1947, to a Filipino
father, Vicente and Anastacia Pe. It was then
ruled the Inocencio is a Filipino citizen so that
the correction must be made. The RP
questions this ruling.

Issue: WON proper adversary proceeding
was employed to allow corrections to be
made in the birth certificate

Held: Yes.

Ratio: The facts have been fully and properly
developed. The opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite
party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.

The court adheres to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established
provided that the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.

Republic v. Sayo
188 SCRA 634

Facts: Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was born on
January 9, 1952 in Nueva Vizacaya as the fifth
legitimate child of his parents. The nurse
erroneously reported to the Local Civil
Registrar that his and his parents' citizenship
as Chinese instead of Filipino. He now claims
that he and his parents are Filipino citizens.
Copies were furnished to the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, the Office of the SolGen, and
the Local Civil Registrar. Copy of the notice of
hearing was posted and it was also published
in a newspaper of general circulation published
once a week for three consecutive weeks. The
TC then proceeded to receive evidence for the
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
representing the Government.

Issue: WON the procedure followed
satisfied the requirements of "appropriate
adversary pro-proceedings"

Held: Yes

Ratio: It is true that if the subject matter of a
petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving nationality of citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be
granted in a summary proceedings. However it
is also true that a right in law may be enforced
and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
proper remedy is used.

Biana, Jr. submitted the following: a voters ID
of his father, a decision of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that his father is a natural
son of a Filipino citizen and that his mother,
being a legal wife was also a Philippine citizen,
a certification issued by a the Bureau of
Immigration stating that the father is a Filipino
citizen, the birth certificate of his brother stating
that he is the son of Philippine citizens and his
Voter's ID.

Republic v Valencia
141 SCRA 462

Facts: Leonor Valencia in behalf of her minor
children Bernardo and Jessica Go filed a
petition for the cancellation and/or correction of
entries of their birth in the Civil Registry in the
City of Cebu. The TC issued an order directing
the publication of the petition and the date of
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in
the city and province of Cebu once a week for
three consecutive weeks and notice was duly
served on the SolGen, the Local Civil Registrar
and Go Eng. The petition seeks to change the
nationality or citizenship of Bernardo and
Jessica from Chinese to Filipino and their
status from Legitimate to Illegitimate and
changing also the status of the mother from
married to single. The Local Civil Registrar
avers that the corrections sought are not
merely clerical but substantial, involving as
they do the citizenship and status of the minors
and the status of the mother.

The TC granted the petition.

Issue: WON the proceedings that took place
could be regarded as proper suit or
appropriate action for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil register.

Held: Yes.

Ratio: The persons who must be made parties
to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1)
the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an
order fixing the time and place for the hearing
of the petition, and (2) cause the order for
hearing to be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. The
following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been
followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as "summary". There can be no
doubt that when an opposition to the petition is
filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person
having or claiming any interest in the entries
sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and
the opposition is actively prosecuted, the
proceedings thereon become adversary
proceedings.

The decision of the TC was affirmed by the SC.

Republic v Marcos
182 SCRA 223

Facts: Pang Cha Quen, a Chinese national
married Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen.
She had a previous marriage to a Chinese
citizen Sia Bian who fathered her child, May
Sia alias Manman Huang. She registered her
daughter as an alien under the name Mary
Pang, which is her maternal surname because
the child's father has abandoned them. Now
Pang Cha Quen prays that her daughter's
name be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz
since Alfredo has grown to love her as his own
daughter. Judge Marcos granted such petition.

WON the name of Mary Pang can be changed
to Mary Pang De la Cruz

Held: No. Firstly, the republic pointed out that
the petition to change the name did not include
"Mary Pang but only May Sia and Manman
Huang. The omission of her other alias "Mary
Pang" in the captions of the court's order and
of the petition defeats the purpose of the
publication. The general rule is that a change
of name should not be permitted if it will give a
false impression of family relationship to
another where none actually exists.
Furthermore, Mary Pang is the only one who
can pray for the change of her name. This
cannot be done by her mother for her.

Labayo-Rowe v Republic
168 SCRA 294

Facts: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition
for the correction of entries in the civil registry
with the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. She asked the court to order the
Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando,
Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth
certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr.
and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to
petitioner's name which appears in both
certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as
regards her civil status and date of marriage
which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria
Miclat as "married" with the year appearing
"1953 Bulan." She claimed that she was never
married to Vicente Miclat and that she was now
married to an American citizen, William Rowe.
Her petition was granted changing her civil
status from married to single in the birth
certificate of Victoria.

WON Emperatriz can change her civil status
from married to single in Victoria's birth
certificate

Held: No. The petition for correction of entries
in the civil registry does not only involve the
correction of petitioner Labayo's name and
surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
Labayo in the birth certificates of her children.
The petition also seeks the change of her
status from "married" to "not married" at the
time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing
the status of her child Victoria Miclat from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate." The right of the
child Victoria to inherit from her parents would
be substantially impaired if her status would be
changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate."
Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation
and embarrassment resulting from the stigma
of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear
thereafter.

Sermonia vs CA
233 SCRA 155

Facts: Jose Sermonia was charged with
bigamy in 1992 after his first wife Virginia
Nievera discovered that he was married to
another woman, Ma. Lourdes Unson in 1975.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the fist marriage has been legally
dissolved. It is punishable by prision mayor.
The penalty prescribes a 15 year period which
runs from the day the crime is discovered.
Sermonia alleges that he cannot be convicted
since his second marriage, which is registered
in the Office of the Civil Registrar, which is
open to the public, has it prescriptive period
expiring on 1990. Thus, the case, which was
filed on 1992 since his first wife only
discovered the second marriage in 1991, shall
be dismissed.

WON the 15-year prescriptive period started
when Sermonia filed his second marriage
contract in the Office of Civil Registrar

Held: No. Sermonia intended to keep his
second marriage upon claiming that he was
single prior to it. He also did not tell his first
wife about it. Furthermore, Sermonia cannot
argue that the file of his marriage can be found
in the official records of the state but the
problem is you cannot check another person's
file. Therefore, he knew that he was committing
bigamy. The Court affirmed the decision of the
CA.

Zapanta v Registrar
237 SCRA 25

Leonor v. Court of Appeals
256 SCRA 69

Lee et al vs CA
367 SCRA 110

Eloisida vs Local Civil Registry
382 SCRA 23

Facts:
! Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition to correct the
ff entries in the Birth cert of her son Charles
Christian:
! Surname from Borbon to Eleosida
! Parents' wedding date should be blank
! nformant's name should be Lourdes Eleosida
! In support she contended that:
! Son was born out of wedlock
! The she and the child's father, Carlos Borbon,
were never married
! Therefore child is illegitimate and should have
mother's surname
! TC then issued a notice of hearing, furnishing
copies for the petitioner, respondent Carlos
Borbon, the office of the Local Civil Registrar
(LCR) and the Solgen
! TC dismissed the petition for lack of merit
stating only clerical errors of harmless nature
may be corrected but this petition changes
the status of the child. Hence this petition

Issue: W/n corrections of entries in Birth
Certificates may be allowed even if the errors
to be corrected are substantial and not merely
clerical errors?

Held / Ratio: Yes, case remanded to lower court to
proceed
! Apply the ruling in Republic vs Valencia
substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established under
Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. (See ROC,
Rule 108 - Sec 3-5)
! Substantial changes that affect the marriage
between a couple and the legitimacy of a child
are allowed under Rule 108 provided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are
complied with.
! Records show that: (1) the trial court ordered
issued a notice of hearing, (2) ordered the
publication of said notice, (3) the notice stated
that the petitioner shall prove her petition
during hearing and (4) other persons with any
interest thereon shall also appear and show
any reason why the petition shouldn't be
granted, (5) Respondent, LRC, and Solgen
were all furnished a copy of the notice
! The foregoing satisfy all the procedural
requirements to make it an adversary
proceeding, therefore TC erred in dismissing
the case

Barco vs CA
GR No 120587,Jan 20,2004

Facts: (Medyo complicated case sorry :p)
! 12/24/70 Respondent Nadina Maravilla
marries Francisco Maravilla
! Feb 1977 Spouses opt to live separately, the
next year they obtain an ecclesiastical
annulment of the marriage
! 6/9/78 Birth of June Salvacion, Birth Cert lists
Francisco as father, Maravilla as the child's
surname, Nadina signs the Birth Cert
! Nadina later on claims that the real father is
Armando Gustilo
! At the time of June's birth, Armando was
married, after his wife dies, he marries Nadina
on 8/21/82
! 3/12/85 Nadina obtained judicial declaration
annulling her marriage to Francisco
! 3/17/82 Nadina files petition to correct the
Birth Cert of June.
! Name should be June Gustilo and Armando is
the real father
! Francisco confirms to the petition by signing it,
Armando acknowledges June as his daughter
! 1/7/85 RTC Order grants petition and
orders corrections to be made
! 12/19/86 Armando dies, estate proceedings
arise from his death.
! Enter Jose Vicente, an alleged biological child
of Armando he files an annulment of the RTC
Order
! Enter Milagros Barco, files as the guardian of
Mary Joy Ann Gustillo alleging that Mary Joy
also has a legal interest in the annulment of the
RTC Order as the child was likewise fathered
by Gustillo.
! CA dismisses the petitions both Jose Vicente
and Barco, hence this petition by Milagros
Barco claiming that the RTC Order of 1/7/85
lacks jurisdiction
Issue: W/n the RTC Order had the jurisdiction
to pass judgment on the original petition of
Nadina

Held / Ratio: Yes, petition dismissed.

! 2 aspects of jurisdiction w/c are vital for the
disposition of cases, both of which Barco
claims the RTC did not have
! Jurisdiction over the parties
! Jurisdiction over the nature of the
action/subject of the petition

a. Jurisdiction over the parties
! Before substantial corrections to the civil
registry is allowed, facts must be established in
a proceeding
! Barco points out that she was not impleaded as
a party in the original petition of Nadina Yes,
Barco is indeed a party in the petition,
however, we cannot expect Nadina or any
other petitioner invoking Rule 108 to know all of
a father's legitmate / illegitimate children
! CA correctly pointed out that through
publication (in accordance with Sec 4 of Rule
108) they "binded the whole world to the
subsequent judgment in the petition, including
Barco

b. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action /
subject of the petition
! Barco asserts that the general rule is that the
jurisdiction of the court in the correction of
entries in the civil register is limited to clerical
mistakes
! This argument has already been debunked in
many cases most notably in Lee vs CA :
! It was declared that the provision (Art 412) did
not qualify what kind of entry could be changed
or corrected, and therefore the statute should
be construed as such the meaning of each
word is within context of the subject treated
! RA 9048 has also effectively changed the
nature of proceeding under Rule 108 (Though
9048 may not be applicable to this Barco case
it is an indication that substantial corrections
to the civil status in the civil registry may be
effected through a filing of a petition under Rule
108)

! Lastly Barco argues that the petition for
correction had prescribed and that the petition
for correction should be filed by the person
whose name is sought to be changed no
merit
! Under the law the Makati RTC has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition for
correction
Despite the fact that the RTC may have
ordered (because from the facts it seems that
June is an illegitimate child of Armando) the
RTC order is already final at most it is an
error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which is
different from lack of jurisdiction.

Republic vs Benemerito
GR NO 146963, March 14, 2004

Facts:
! Respondent Petronio Benemerito files petition
asking for the correction of the record of birth of
his son Joven Lee on file with the LCR of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija
! Change of father's name from Peter Laurente
Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito
! Change of marriage date of Joven's parents
from 9/1/89 to 1/25/98
! Petronio testifies that he was surprised to
discover later on that the above information
were erroneously recorded in his son's Birth
Cert - TC granted the petition
! The Republic appeals contending that
indispensable parties themselves were not
notified of the proceedings and because of the
substantial changes sought by respondent
this may be threshed out only in adversarial
proceedings. But CA affirms the TC Decision

Issue: W/n the CA erred in affirming the TC
Decision w/c granted the petition w/o an
adversarial proceeding

Held / Ratio: Yes, decision reversed set aside,
but respondent may initiate the proper
adversarial proceedings
! ROC Rule 108 in rel to NCC 412 states a
procedure by w/c an entry in the civil register
may be cancelled or corrected, what is
described in those statutes are clerical errors
one that may be harmlessly changed
! On the other hand, substantial changes may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings
! The corrections sought are not clerical errors, it
changes the status of the child and may affect
successional and other rights of the child and
other persons related to either the respondent
and his wife
! Rule 108 provides that interested parties may
avail themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceedings and that the corresponding
petition should implead as respondents the
civil registrar and all other persons who may
have any interest that would be affected
! RTC proceedings fail to meet procedural
requirements
Added info: RA 9048 merely makes possible
the correction of clerical errors, it leaves to
Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes
in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial
proceedings

Ceruila vs Delantar
477 SCRA 134

Silverio vs. RP (supra)

Republic vs. Capote
G.R. No. 157043, February 2,2007

Republic vs KHO
GR No. No. 170340. June 29, 2007

Facts:
! On 2001, Carlito Kho requested the court to
correct his Birth Certificate and change the
citizenship of his mother from Chinese to
FILIPINO, and her name from Maribel to
MARIVEL.
! Also, he wanted to change his fathers
nationality from filipino to CHINESE, and his
name from John Kho to JUAN KHO.
! He also wanted to delete the word "MARRED
beside the phrase date of marriage of his
parents (Eugene and Juan Kho) because he
said that his parents were NEVER married.
! He additionally prayed to the court that the date
of marriage of himself and his wife be changed
form 1989 to 2000.
! In 2002, the TRIAL COURT ordered the Civil
Registrar to effect all the changes Carlito
pleaded for.
! The Republic however, APPEALED. Saying
that MARIVEL was never impleaded as an
indispensable party to the case.
! CA however, AFFIRMED the trial courts
decision. Hence the case.
Issues: Was the failure to implead Marivel and
Carlito's parents rendered the trial short of
adversarial proceedings?
Held: No
Ratio: An in rem proceeding is validated
through publication. Not only was the notices
published in newspapers of general circulation,
but also the notices of the trial were even sent
to their residences. So this is enough to make
the parties aware of the proceedings in court.
On other issues, the deletion of the married
status is also valid since Eugene and Juan
were really not married.

Republic vs. Jennifer Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676, Sept. 12, 2008

Facts:
! Jennifer Cagandahan was born on Januay 13,
1981, and was registered as a female in her
birth certificate.
! But while growing up she developed secondary
male characteristics. She was diagnosed to
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia ( I
searched this and this actually causes
"AMBGUOUS genitalia.)
! Upon reaching 13 years of age, her ovaries
stopped growing, she had no breasts, and she
had no menstruation. She said that in mind and
in emotion she was a MAN.
! So she prayed that her name be changed from
Jennifer to JEFF and female to MALE.
! Dr. Michael Sionson recommended also that
the court render the gender change since it
would be advantageous to her.
! OSG however says that petition is fatally
defective because the respondent did not
implead the CIVIL Registrar as a party in the
petition.
Issues: WON the petition should fail because
the respondent did not implead the Civil
Registrar as a party in the petition
Held: NO
Ratio: The Supreme Court says that there was
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to
the local registrar. The court says that since he
produces male hormones and that he
considers himself a man, and that no one
showed that they will be prejudiced by the
change of name and gender, then it is just
proper that the court grants the petition. HE IS
NOW A MAN.

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