Catholic Encyclopedia - Pope and Titles

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: The Pope Page 1 of 21
The Pope
tt=74
(Ecclesiastical Latin papa from Greek papas, a variant of pappas father, in classical Latin pappas --
Juvenal, "Satires" 6:633).
The title pope, once used with far greater latitude (see below, section V), is at present employed
solely to denote the Bishop of Rome, who, in virtue of his position as successor of St. Peter, is the
chief pastor of the whole Church, the Vicar of Christ upon earth.
Besides the bishopric of the Roman Diocese, certain other dignities are held by the pope as well as
the supreme and universal pastorate: he is Archbishop of the Roman Province, Primate of Italy and
the adjacent islands, and sole Patriarch of the Western Church. The Church's doctrine as to the pope
was authoritatively declared in the Vatican Council in the Constitution "Pastor Aeternus". The four
chapters of that Constitution deal respectively with the office of Supreme Head conferred on St.
Peter, the perpetuity of this office in the person of the Roman pontiff, the pope's jurisdiction over the
faithful, and his supreme authority to define in all questions of faith and morals. This last point has
been sufficiently discussed in the article INFALLIBILITY, and will be only incidentally touched on
here.
The present article is divided as follows:
I. Institution of a Supreme Head by Christ

II. Primacy of the Roman See
III. Nature and Extent of the Papal Power
IV. Jurisdictional Rights and Prerogatives of the Pope
V. Primacy of Honour: Titles and Insignia
Institution of a supreme head by Christ

The proof that Christ constituted St. Peter head of His Church is found in the two famous Petrine
texts, Matthew 16:17-19, and John 21:15-17.
Matthew 16:17-19
In Matthew 16:17-19, the office is solemnly promised to the Apostle. In response to his profession of
faith in the Divine Nature of his Master, Christ thus addresses him:
Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee,
but my Father who is in heaven. And I say to thee: That thou art Peter; and upon this
rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will
give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth
it shall be bound also in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be
loosed also in heaven.
"Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but
my Father who is in heaven." The prerogatives here promised are manifestly personal to Peter. His
profession of faith was not made as has been sometimes asserted, in the name of the other Apostles.
This is evident from the words of Christ. He pronounces on the Apostle, distinguishing him by his
name Simon son of John, a peculiar and personal blessing, declaring that his knowledge regarding
the Divine Sonship sprang from a special revelation granted to him by the Father (cf. Matthew
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12260a.htm 12/08/2009
11:27).
"And I say to thee: That thou art Peter. . ." He further proceeds to recompense this confession of
His Divinity by bestowing upon him a reward proper to himself:
Thou art Peter [Cepha, transliterated also Kipha] and upon this rock [Cepha] I will build
my Church.
The word for Peter and for rock in the original Aramaic is one and the same; this renders it evident
that the various attempts to explain the term "rock" as having reference not to Peter himself but to
something else are misinterpretations. It is Peter who is the rock of the Church. The term ecclesia
(ekklesia) here employed is the Greek rendering of the Hebrew qahal, the name which denoted the
Hebrew nation viewed as God's Church (see THE CHURCH, I).
"And upon this rock I will build my Church. . ." Here then Christ teaches plainly that in the
future the Church will be the society of those who acknowledge Him, and that this Church will be
built on Peter.
The expression presents no difficulty. In both the Old and New Testaments the Church is often
spoken of under the metaphor of God's house (Numbers 12:7; Jeremiah 12:7; Hosea 8:1; 9:15; 1
Corinthians 3:9-17, Ephesians 2:20-2; 1 Timothy 3:5; Hebrews 3:5; 1 Peter 2:5). Peter is to be to the
Church what the foundation is in regard to a house.
He is to be the principle of unity, of stability, and of increase. He is the principle of unity, since what
is not joined to that foundation is no part of the Church; of stability, since it is the firmness of this
foundation in virtue of which the Church remains unshaken by the storms which buffet her; of
increase, since, if she grows, it is because new stones are laid on this foundation.
"And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." It is through her union with Peter, Christ
continues, that the Church will prove the victor in her long contest with the Evil One:
The gates of hell shall not prevail against it.
There can be but one explanation of this striking metaphor. The only manner in which a man can
stand in such a relation to any corporate body is by possessing authority over it. The supreme head of
a body, in dependence on whom all subordinate authorities hold their power, and he alone, can be
said to be the principle of stability, unity, and increase. The promise acquires additional solemnity
when we remember that both Old Testament prophecy (Isaiah 28:16) and Christ's own words
(Matthew 7:24) had attributed this office of foundation of the Church to Himself. He is therefore
assigning to Peter, of course in a secondary degree, a prerogative which is His own, and thereby
associating the Apostle with Himself in an altogether singular manner.
"And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven." In the following verse (Matthew
16:19) He promises to bestow on Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven.
The words refer evidently to Isaiah 22:22, where God declares that Eliacim, the son of Helcias, shall
be invested with office in place of the worthless Sobna:
And I will lay the key of the house of David upon his shoulder: and he shall open, and
none shall shut: and he shall shut and none shall open.
In all countries the key is the symbol of authority. Thus, Christ's words are a promise that He will
confer on Peter supreme power to govern the Church. Peter is to be His vicegerent, to rule in His
place.
"And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth it shall be bound also in heaven: and whatsoever
thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." Further the character and extent of the
power thus bestowed are indicated. It is a power to "bind" and to "loose" -- words which, as is shown
below, denote the grant of legislative and judicial authority. And this power is granted in its fullest
measure. Whatever Peter binds or looses on earth, his act will receive the Divine ratification.
Objections
The meaning of this passage does not seem to have been challenged by any writer until the rise of
the sixteenth-century heresies. Since then a great variety of interpretations have been put forward by
Protestant controversialists. These agree in little save in the rejection of the plain sense of Christ's
words. Some Anglican controversy tends to the view that the reward promised to St. Peter consisted
in the prominent part taken by him in the initial activities of the Church, but that he was never more
than primus inter pares among the Apostles. It is manifest that this is quite insufficient as an
explanation of the terms of Christ's promise.
John 21:15-17
The promise made by Christ in Matthew 16:16-19, received its fulfilment after the Resurrection in
the scene described in John 21. Here the Lord, when about to leave the earth, places the whole flock
-- the sheep and the lambs alike -- in the charge of the Apostle. The term employed in 21:16, "Be the
shepherd [poimaine] of my sheep" indicates that his task is not merely to feed but to rule. It is the
same word as is used in Psalm 2:9 (Septuagint): "Thou shalt rule [poimaneis] them with a rod of
iron".
The scene stands in striking parallelism with that of Matthew 16. As there the reward was given to
Peter after a profession of faith which singled him out from the other eleven, so here Christ demands
a similar protestation, but this time of a yet higher virtue: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more
than these"? Here, too, as there, He bestows on the Apostle an office which in its highest sense is
proper to Himself alone. There Christ had promised to make Peter the foundation-stone of the house
of God: here He makes him the shepherd of God's flock to take the place of Himself, the Good
Shepherd.
The passage receives an admirable comment from St. Chrysostom:
He saith to him, "Feed my sheep". Why does He pass over the others and speak of the
sheep to Peter? He was the chosen one of the Apostles, the mouth of the disciples, the
head of the choir. For this reason Paul went up to see him rather than the others. And
also to show him that he must have confidence now that his denial had been purged
away. He entrusts him with the rule [prostasia] over the brethren. . . . If anyone should
say "Why then was it James who received the See of Jerusalem?", I should reply that He
made Peter the teacher not of that see but of the whole world.
[St. John Chrysostom, Homily 88 on John, 1. Cf. Origen, "In Ep. ad Rom.", 5:10;
Ephraem Syrus "Hymn. in B. Petr." in "Bibl. Orient. Assemani", 1:95; Leo I, "Serm. iv
de natal.", 2].
Even certain Protestant commentators frankly own that Christ undoubtedly intended here to confer
the supreme pastorate on Peter. But other scholars, relying on a passage of St. Cyril of Alexandria
("In Joan." 12:1), maintain that the purpose of the threefold charge was simply to reinstate St. Peter
in the Apostolic commission which his threefold denial might be supposed to have lost to him. This
interpretation is devoid of all probability. There is not a word in Scripture or in patristic tradition to
suggest that St. Peter had forfeited his Apostolic commission; and the supposition is absolutely
excluded by the fact that on the evening of the Resurrection he received the same Apostolic powers
as the others of the eleven. The solitary phrase of St. Cyril is of no weight against the overwhelming
patristic authority for the other view. That such an interpretation should be seriously advocated
proves how great is the difficulty experienced by Protestants regarding this text.
Conclusion
The position of St. Peter after the Ascension, as shown in the Acts of the Apostles, realizes to the full
the great commission bestowed upon him. He is from the first the chief of the Apostolic band -- not
primus inter pares, but the undisputed head of the Church (see THE CHURCH, III).
If then Christ, as we have seen, established His Church as a society subordinated to a single supreme
head, it follows from the very nature of the case that this office is perpetual, and cannot have been a
mere transitory feature of ecclesiastical life. For the Church must endure to the end the very same
organization which Christ established. But in an organized society it is precisely the constitution
which is the essential feature. A change in constitution transforms it into a society of a different kind.
If then the Church should adopt a constitution other than Christ gave it, it would no longer be His
handiwork. It would no longer be the Divine kingdom established by Him. As a society it would
have passed through essential modifications, and thereby would have become a human, not a Divine
institution. None who believe that Christ came on earth to found a Church, an organized society
destined to endure for ever, can admit the possibility of a change in the organization given to it by its
Founder.
The same conclusion also follows from a consideration of the end which, by Christ's declaration, the
supremacy of Peter was intended to effect. He was to give the Church strength to resist her foes, so
that the gates of hell should not prevail against her. The contest with the powers of evil does not
belong to the Apostolic age alone. It is a permanent feature of the Church's life. Hence, throughout
the centuries the office of Peter must be realized in the Church, in order that she may prevail in her
age-long struggle.
Thus an analysis of Christ's words shows us that the perpetuity of the office of supreme head is to be
reckoned among the truths revealed in Scripture. His promise to Peter conveyed not merely a
personal prerogative, but established a permanent office in the Church. And in this sense, as will
appear in the next section, His words were understood by Latin and Greek Fathers alike.
Primacy of the Roman See

We have shown in the last section that Christ conferred upon St. Peter the office of chief pastor, and
that the permanence of that office is essential to the very being of the Church. It must now be
established that it belongs of right to the Roman See. The proof will fall into two parts:
that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and

that those who succeed him in that see succeed him also in the supreme headship.
St. Peter was Bishop of Rome
It is no longer denied by any writer of weight that St. Peter visited Rome and suffered martyrdom
there (Harnack, "Chronol.", I, 244, n. 2). Some, however, of those who admit that he taught and
suffered in Rome, deny that he was ever bishop of the city (e.g. Lightfoot, "Clement of Rome", II,
501; Harnack, op. cit., I, 703). It is not, however, difficult to show that the fact of his bishopric is so
well attested as to be historically certain. In considering this point, it will be well to begin with the
third century, when references to it become frequent, and work backwards from this point.
St. Cyprian
In the middle of the third century St. Cyprian expressly terms the Roman See the Chair of St. Peter,
saying that Cornelius has succeeded to "the place of Fabian which is the place of Peter" (Epistle
51:8; cf. 75:3).
Firmilian of Caesarea
Firmilian of Caesarea notices that Stephen claimed to decide the controversy regarding rebaptism on
the ground that he held the succession from Peter (Cyprian, Epistle 75:17). He does not deny the
claim: yet certainly, had he been able, he would have done so. Thus in 250 the Roman episcopate of
Peter was admitted by those best able to know the truth, not merely at Rome but in the churches of
Africa and of Asia Minor.
Tertullian
In the first quarter of the century (about 220) Tertullian (On Modesty 21) mentions Callistus's claim
that Peter's power to forgive sins had descended in a special manner to him. Had the Roman Church
been merely founded by Peter and not reckoned him as its first bishop, there could have been no
ground for such a contention. Tertullian, like Firmilian, had every motive to deny the claim.
Moreover, he had himself resided at Rome, and would have been well aware if the idea of a Roman
episcopate of Peter had been, as is contended by its opponents, a novelty dating from the first years
of the third century, supplanting the older tradition according to which Peter and Paul were co-
founders, and Linus first bishop.
Hippolytus
About the same period, Hippolytus (for Lightfoot is surely right in holding him to be the author of
the first part of the "Liberian Catalogue" -- "Clement of Rome", 1:259) reckons Peter in the list of
Roman bishops.
"Adversus Marcionem"
We have moreover a poem, "Adversus Marcionem", written apparently at the same period, in which
Peter is said to have passed on to Linus "the chair on which he himself had sat" (P.L., II 1077).
St. Irenaeus
These witnesses bring us to the beginning of the third century. In the second century we cannot look
for much evidence. With the exception of Ignatius, Polycarp, and Clement of Alexandria, all the
writers whose works we possess are apologists against either Jews or pagans. In works of such a
character there was no reason to refer to such a matter as Peter's Roman episcopate.
Irenaeus, however, supplies us with a cogent argument. In two passages (Against Heresies I.27.1 and
III.4.3) he speaks of Hyginus as ninth Bishop of Rome, thus employing an enumeration which
involves the inclusion of Peter as first bishop (Lightfoot was undoubtedly wrong in supposing that
there was any doubt as to the correctness of the reading in the first of these passages. In III:4:3, the
Latin version, it is true, gives "octavus"; but the Greek text as cited by Eusebius reads enatos.
Irenaeus we know visited Rome in 177. At this date, scarcely more than a century after the death of
St. Peter, he may well have come in contact with men whose fathers had themselves spoken to the
Apostle. The tradition thus supported must be regarded as beyond all legitimate doubt.
Lightfoot's suggestion (Clement 1:64), that it had its origin in the Clementine romance, has proved
singularly unfortunate. For it is now recognized that this work belongs not to the second, but to the
fourth century. Nor is there the slightest ground for the assertion that the language of Irenaeus,
III:3:3, implies that Peter and Paul enjoyed a divided episcopate at Rome -- an arrangement utterly
unknown to the Church at any period. He does, it is true, speak of the two Apostles as together
handing on the episcopate to Linus. But this expression is explained by the purpose of his argument,
which is to vindicate against the Gnostics the validity of the doctrine taught in the Roman Church.
Hence he is naturally led to lay stress on the fact that that Church inherited the teaching of both the
great Apostles. Epiphanius ("Haer." 27:6) would indeed seem to suggest the divided episcopate; but
he has apparently merely misunderstood the words of Irenaeus.
Those who succeed Peter in Rome succeed him also in the

supreme headship
History bears complete testimony that from the very earliest times the Roman See has ever claimed
the supreme headship, and that that headship has been freely acknowledged by the universal Church.
We shall here confine ourselves to the consideration of the evidence afforded by the first three
centuries.
St. Clement
The first witness is St. Clement, a disciple of the Apostles, who, after Linus and Anacletus,
succeeded St. Peter as the fourth in the list of popes. In his "Epistle to the Corinthians", written in 95
or 96, he bids them receive back the bishops whom a turbulent faction among them had expelled. "If
any man", he says, "should be disobedient unto the words spoken by God through us, let them
understand that they will entangle themselves in no slight transgression and danger" (Ep. 59).
Moreover, he bids them "render obedience unto the things written by us through the Holy Spirit".
The tone of authority which inspires the latter appears so clearly that Lightfoot did not hesitate to
speak of it as "the first step towards papal domination" (Clement 1:70). Thus, at the very
commencement of church history, before the last survivor of the Apostles had passed away, we find
a Bishop of Rome, himself a disciple of St. Peter, intervening in the affairs of another Church and
claiming to settle the matter by a decision spoken under the influence of the Holy Spirit. Such a fact
admits of one explanation alone. It is that in the days when the Apostolic teaching was yet fresh in
men's minds the universal Church recognized in the Bishop of Rome the office of supreme head.
St. Ignatius of Antioch
A few years later (about 107) St. Ignatius of Antioch, in the opening of his letter to the Roman
Church, refers to its presiding over all other Churches. He addresses it as "presiding over the
brotherhood of love [prokathemene tes agapes] The expression, as Funk rightly notes, is
grammatically incompatible with the translation advocated by some non-Catholic writers, "pre-
eminent in works of love".
St. Irenaeus
The same century gives us the witness of St. Irenaeus -- a man who stands in the closest connection
with the age of the Apostles, since he was a disciple of St. Polycarp, who had been appointed Bishop
of Smyrna by St. John. In his work "Adversus Haereses" (III:3:2) he brings against the Gnostic sects
of his day the argument that their doctrines have no support in the Apostolic tradition faithfully
preserved by the Churches, which could trace the succession of their bishops back to the Twelve. He
writes:
Because it would be too long in such a volume as this to enumerate the successions of
all the churches, we point to the tradition of that very great and very ancient and
universally known Church, which was founded and established at Rome, by the two
most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul: we point I say, to the tradition which this
Church has from the Apostles, and to her faith proclaimed to men which comes down to
our time through the succession of her bishops, and so we put to shame . . . all who
assemble in unauthorized meetings. For with this Church, because of its superior
authority, every Church must agree -- that is the faithful everywhere -- in communion
with which Church the tradition of the Apostles has been always preserved by those who
are everywhere [Ad hanc enim eoclesiam propter potentiorem principalitatem necesse
est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab
his qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quâ est ab apostolis traditio].
He then proceeds to enumerate the Roman succession from Linus to Eleutherius, the twelfth after the
Apostles, who then occupied the see. Non-Catholic writers have sought to rob the passage of its
importance by translating the word convenire "to resort to", and thus understanding it to mean no
more than that the faithful from every side (undique) resorted to Rome, so that thus the stream of
doctrine in that Church was kept immune from error. Such a rendering, however, is excluded by the
construction of the argument, which is based entirely on the contention that the Roman doctrine is
pure by reason of its derivation from the two great Apostolic founders of the Church, Sts. Peter and
Paul. The frequent visits made to Rome by members of other Christian Churches could contribute
nothing to this. On the other hand the traditional rendering is postulated by the context, and, though
the object of innumerable attacks, none other possessing any real degree of probability has been
suggested in its place (see Dom. J. Chapman in "Revue Benedictine", 1895, p. 48).
St. Victor
During the pontificate of St. Victor (189-98) we have the most explicit assertion of the supremacy of
the Roman See in regard to other Churches. A difference of practice between the Churches of Asia
Minor and the rest of the Christian world in regard to the day of the Paschal festival led the pope to
take action. There is some ground for supposing that the Montanist heretics maintained the Asiatic
(or Quartodeciman) practice to be the true one: in this case it would be undesirable that any body of
Catholic Christians should appear to support them. But, under any circumstances, such a diversity in
the ecclesiastical life of different countries may well have constituted a regrettable feature in the
Church, whose very purpose it was to bear witness by her unity to the oneness of God (John 17:21).
Victor bade the Asiatic Churches conform to the custom of the remainder of the Church, but was met
with determined resistance by Polycrates of Ephesus, who claimed that their custom derived from St.
John himself. Victor replied by an excommunication. St. Irenaeus, however, intervened, exhorting
Victor not to cut off whole Churches on account of a point which was not a matter of faith. He
assumes that the pope can exercise the power, but urges him not to do so. Similarly the resistance of
the Asiatic bishops involved no denial of the supremacy of Rome. It indicates solely that the bishops
believed St. Victor to be abusing his power in bidding them renounce a custom for which they had
Apostolic authority. It was indeed inevitable that, as the Church spread and developed, new
problems should present themselves, and that questions should arise as to whether the supreme
authority could be legitimately exercised in this or that case. St. Victor, seeing that more harm than
good would come from insistence, withdrew the imposed penalty.
Inscription of Abercius
Not many years since a new and important piece of evidence was brought to light in Asia Minor
dating from this period. The sepulchral inscription of Abercius, Bishop of Hierapolis (d. about 200),
contains an account of his travels couched in allegorical language. He speaks thus of the Roman
Church: "To Rome He [Christ] sent me to contemplate majesty: and to see a queen golden-robed and
golden-sandalled." It is difficult not to recognize in this description a testimony to the supreme
position of the Roman See.
Tertullian
Tertullian's bitter polemic, "De Pudicitia" (about 220), was called forth by an exercise of papal
prerogative. Pope Callistus had decided that the rigid discipline which had hitherto prevailed in
many Churches must be in large measure relaxed. Tertullian, now lapsed into heresy, fiercely attacks
"the peremptory edict", which "the supreme pontiff, the bishop of bishops", has sent forth. The
words are intended as sarcasm: but none the less they indicate clearly the position of authority
claimed by Rome. And the opposition comes, not from a Catholic bishop, but from a Montanist
heretic.
St. Cyprian
The views of St. Cyprian (d. 258) in regard to papal authority have given rise to much discussion. He
undoubtedly entertained exaggerated views as to the independence of individual bishops, which
eventually led him into serious conflict with Rome. Yet on the fundamental principle his position is
clear. He attributed an effective primacy to the pope as the successor of Peter. He makes communion
with the See of Rome essential to Catholic communion, speaking of it as "the principal Church
whence episcopal unity had its rise" (ad Petri cathedram et ad ecclesiam principalem unde unitas
sacerdotalis exorta est).
The force of this expression becomes clear when viewed in the light of his doctrine as to the unity of
the Church. This was, he teaches, established by Christ when He founded His Church upon Peter. By
this act the unity of the Apostolic college was ensured through the unity of the foundation. The
bishops through all time form a similar college, and are bound in a like indivisible unity. Of this
unity the Chair of Peter is the source. It fulfils the very office as principle of union which Peter
fulfilled in his lifetime. Hence to communicate with an antipope such as Novatian would be schism
(Epistle 66:1).
He holds, also, that the pope has authority to depose an heretical bishop. When Marcian of Arles fell
into heresy, Cyprian, at the request of the bishops of the province, wrote to urge Pope Stephen "to
send letters by which, Marcian having been excommunicated, another may be substituted in his
place" (Epistle 66:3). It is manifest that one who regarded the Roman See in this light believed that
the pope possessed a real and effective primacy.
At the same time it is not to be denied that his views as to the right of the pope to interfere in the
government of a diocese already subject to a legitimate and orthodox bishop were inadequate. In the
rebaptism controversy his language in regard to St. Stephen was bitter and intemperate. His error on
this point does not, however, detract from the fact that he admitted a primacy, not merely of honour
but of jurisdiction. Nor should his mistake occasion too much surprise. It is as true in the Church as
in merely human institutions that the full implications of a general principle are only realized
gradually. The claim to apply it in a particular case is often contested at first, though later ages may
wonder that such opposition was possible.
St. Dionysius of Alexandria
Contemporary with St. Cyprian was St. Dionysius of Alexandria. Two incidents bearing on the
present question are related of him.
Eusebius (Church History VII.9) gives us a letter addressed by him to St. Xystus II regarding the
case of a man who, as it appeared, had been invalidly baptized by heretics, but who for many years
had been frequenting the sacraments of the Church. In it he says that he needs St. Xystus's advice
and begs for his decision (gnomen), that he may not fall into error (dedios me hara sphallomai).
Again, some years later, the same patriarch occasioned anxiety to some of the brethren by making
use of some expressions which appeared hardly compatible with a full belief in the Divinity of
Christ. They promptly had recourse to the Holy See and accused him to his namesake, St. Dionysius
of Rome, of heretical leanings. The pope replied by laying down authoritatively the true doctrine on
the subject.
Both events are instructive as showing us how Rome was recognized by the second see in
Christendom as empowered to speak with authority on matters of doctrine. (St. Athanasius, "De
sententia Dionysii" in P.G., XXV, 500).
Emperor Aurelian
Equally noteworthy is the action of Emperor Aurelian in 270. A synod of bishops had condemned
Paul of Samosata, Patriarch of Alexandria, on a charge of heresy, and had elected Domnus bishop in
his place. Paul refused to withdraw, and appeal was made to the civil power. The emperor decreed
that he who was acknowledged by the bishops of Italy and the Bishop of Rome, must be recognized
as rightful occupant of the see. The incident proves that even the pagans themselves knew well that
communion with the Roman See was the essential mark of all Christian Churches. That the imperial
Government was well aware of the position of the pope among Christians derives additional
confirmation from the saying of St. Cyprian that Decius would have sooner heard of the
proclamation of a rival emperor than of the election of a new pope to fill the place of the martyred
Fabian (Ep. 55:9).
The limits of the present article prevent us from carrying the historical argument further than the year
300. Nor is it in fact necessary to do so. From the beginning of the fourth century the supremacy of
Rome is writ large upon the page of history. It is only in regard to the first age of the Church that any
question can arise. But the facts we have recounted are entirely sufficient to prove to any
unprejudiced mind that the supremacy was exercised and acknowledged from the days of the
Apostles.
It was not of course exercised in the same way as in later times. The Church was as yet in her
infancy: and it would be irrational to look for a fully developed procedure governing the relations of
the supreme pontiff to the bishops of other sees. To establish such a system was the work of time,
and it was only gradually embodied in the canons. There would, moreover, be little call for frequent
intervention when the Apostolic tradition was still fresh and vigorous in every part of Christendom.
Hence the papal prerogatives came into play but rarely. But when the Faith was threatened, or the
vital welfare of souls demanded action, then Rome intervened. Such were the causes which led to the
intervention of St. Dionysius, St. Stephen, St. Callistus, St. Victor, and St. Clement, and their claim
to supremacy as the occupants of the Chair of Peter was not disputed.
In view of the purposes with which, and with which alone, these early popes employed their supreme
power, the contention, so stoutly maintained by Protestant controversialists, that the Roman primacy
had its origin in papal ambition, disappears. The motive which inspired these men was not earthly
ambition, but zeal for the Faith and the consciousness that to them had been committed the
responsibility of its guardianship. The controversialists in question even claim that they are justified
in refusing to admit as evidence for the papal primacy any pronouncement emanating from a Roman
source, on the ground that, where the personal interests of anyone are concerned, his statements
should not be admitted as evidence. Such an objection is utterly fallacious. We are dealing here, not
with the statements of an individual, but with the tradition of a Church -- of that Church which, even
from the earliest times, was known for the purity of its doctrine, and which had had for its founders
and instructors the two chief Apostles, St. Peter and St. Paul. That tradition, moreover, is absolutely
unbroken, as the pronouncements of the long series of popes bear witness.
Nor does it stand alone. The utterances, in which the popes assert their claims to the obedience of all
Christian Churches, form part and parcel of a great body of testimony to the Petrine privileges,
issuing not merely from the Western Fathers but from those of Greece, Syria, and Egypt. The claim
to reject the evidence which comes to us from Rome may be skilful as a piece of special pleading,
but it can claim no other value. The first to employ this argument were some of the Gallicans. But it
is deservedly repudiated as fallacious and unworthy by Bossuet in his "Defensio cleri gallicani" (II,
1. XI, c. vi).
The primacy of St. Peter and the perpetuity of that primacy in the Roman See are dogmatically
defined in the canons attached to the first two chapters of the Constitution "Pastor Aeternus":
"If anyone shall say that Blessed Peter the Apostle was not constituted by Christ our Lord as
chief of all the Apostles and the visible head of the whole Church militant: or that he did not
receive directly and immediately from the same Lord Jesus Christ a primacy of true and proper
jurisdiction, but one of honour only: let him be anathema."
"If any one shall say that it is not by the institution of Christ our Lord Himself or by divinely
established right that Blessed Peter has perpetual successors in his primacy over the universal
Church, or that the Roman Pontiff is not the successor of Blessed Peter in this same primacy. -
- let him be anathema" (Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchiridion", nn. 1823, 1825).
A question may be raised as to the precise dogmatic value of the clause of the second canon in which
it is asserted that the Roman pontiff is Peter's successor. The truth is infallibly defined. But the
Church has authority to define not merely those truths which form part of the original deposit of
revelation, but also such as are necessarily connected with this deposit. The former are held fide
divina, the latter fide infallibili.
Although Christ established the perpetual office of supreme head, Scripture does not tell us that He
fixed the law according to which the headship should descend. Granting that He left this to Peter to
determine, it is plain that the Apostle need not have attached the primacy to his own see: he might
have attached it to another.
Some have thought that the law establishing the succession in the Roman episcopate became known
to the Apostolic Church as an historic fact. In this case the dogma that the Roman pontiff is at all
times the Church's chief pastor would be the conclusion from two premises -- the revealed truth that
the Church must ever have a supreme head, and the historic fact that St. Peter attached that office to
the Roman See. This conclusion, while necessarily connected with revelation, is not part of
revelation, and is accepted fide infallibili.
According to other theologians the proposition in question is part of the deposit of faith itself. In this
case the Apostles must have known the law determining the succession to the Bishop of Rome, not
merely on human testimony, but also by Divine revelation, and they must have taught it as a revealed
truth to their disciples. It is this view which is commonly adopted. The definition of the Vatican to
the effect that the successor of St. Peter is ever to be found in the Roman pontiff is almost
universally held to be a truth revealed by the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, and by them transmitted to
the Church.
Nature and extent of the papal power

This section is divided as follows:
1. the pope's universal coercive jurisdiction

2. the pope's immediate and ordinary jurisdiction in regard of all the faithful, whether singly or
collectively
3. the right of entertaining appeals in all ecclesiastical causes.
The relation of the pope's authority to that of ecumenical councils, and to the civil power, are
discussed in separate articles (see GENERAL COUNCILS; CIVIL ALLEGIANCE).
The pope's universal coercive jurisdiction
Not only did Christ constitute St. Peter head of the Church, but in the words, "Whatsoever thou shalt
bind on earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be
loosed in heaven," He indicated the scope of this headship.
The expressions binding and loosing here employed are derived from the current terminology of the
Rabbinic schools. A doctor who declared a thing to be prohibited by the law was said to bind, for
thereby he imposed an obligation on the conscience. He who declared it to be lawful was said to
loose). In this way the terms had come respectively to signify official commands and permissions in
general. The words of Christ, therefore, as understood by His hearers, conveyed the promise to St.
Peter of legislative authority within the kingdom over which He had just set him, and legislative
authority carries with it as its necessary accompaniment judicial authority.
Moreover, the powers conferred in these regards are plenary. This is plainly indicated by the
generality of the terms employed: "Whatsoever thou shalt bind . . . Whatsoever thou shalt loose";
nothing is withheld. Further, Peter's authority is subordinated to no earthly superior. The sentences
which he gives are to be forthwith ratified in heaven. They do not need the antecedent approval of
any other tribunal. He is independent of all save the Master who appointed him. The words as to the
power of binding and loosing are, therefore, elucidatory of the promise of the keys which
immediately precedes. They explain in what sense Peter is governor and head of Christ's kingdom,
the Church, by promising him legislative and judicial authority in the fullest sense. In other words,
Peter and his successors have power to impose laws both preceptive and prohibitive, power likewise
to grant dispensation from these laws, and, when needful, to annul them. It is theirs to judge offences
against the laws, to impose and to remit penalties. This judicial authority will even include the power
to pardon sin. For sin is a breach of the laws of the supernatural kingdom, and falls under the
cognizance of its constituted judges. The gift of this particular power, however, is not expressed with
full clearness in this passage. It needed Christ's words (John 20:23) to remove all ambiguity. Further,
since the Church is the kingdom of the truth, so that an essential note in all her members is the act of
submission by which they accept the doctrine of Christ in its entirety, supreme power in this
kingdom carries with it a supreme magisterium -- authority to declare that doctrine and to prescribe a
rule of faith obligatory on all. Here, too, Peter is subordinated to none save his Master alone; he is
the supreme teacher as he is the supreme ruler. However, the tremendous powers thus conferred are
limited in their scope by their reference to the ends of the kingdom and to them only. The authority
of Peter and his successors does not extend beyond this sphere. With matters that are altogether
extrinsic to the Church they are not concerned.
Protestant controversialists contend strenuously that the words, "Whatsoever thou shalt bind etc.",
confer no special prerogative on Peter, since precisely the same gift, they allege, is conferred on all
the Apostles (Matthew 18:18). It is, of course, the case that in that passage the same words are used
in regard of all the Twelve. Yet there is a manifest difference between the gift to Peter and that
bestowed on the others. In his case the gift is connected with the power of the keys, and this power,
as we have seen, signified the supreme authority over the whole kingdom. That gift was not
bestowed on the other eleven: and the gift Christ bestowed on them in Matthew 18:18, was received
by them as members of the kingdom, and as subject to the authority of him who should be Christ's
vicegerent on earth. There is in fact a striking parallelism between Matthew 16:19, and the words
employed in reference to Christ Himself in Apocalypse 3:7: "He that hath the key of David; he that
openeth, and no man shutteth; shutteth, and no man openeth." In both cases the second clause
declares the meaning of the first, and the power signified in the first clause by the metaphor of the
keys is supreme. It is worthy of note that to no one else save to Christ and His chosen vicegerent
does Holy Scripture attribute the power of the keys.
Certain patristic passages are further adduced by non-Catholics as adverse to the meaning given by
the Church to Matthew 16:19. St. Augustine in several places tells us that Peter received the keys as
representing the Church -- e.g. Tractate 1 on the Gospel of John, no. 12: "Si hoc Petro tantum dictum
est, non facit hoc Ecclesia . . .; si hoc ergo in Ecclesia fit, Petrus quando claves accepit, Ecclesiam
sanctam significavit' (If this was said to Peter alone, the Church cannot exercise this power . . .; if
this power is exercised in the Church, then when Peter received the keys, he signified the Holy
Church); cf. Tractate 124 on the Gospel of John, no. 5; Sermon 295. It is argued that, according to
Augustine, the power denoted by the keys resides primarily not in Peter, but in the whole Church.
Christ's gift to His people was merely bestowed on Peter as representing the whole body of the
faithful. The right to forgive sins, to exclude from communion, to exercise any other acts of
authority, is really the prerogative of the whole Christian congregation. If the minister performs these
acts he does so as delegate of the people. The argument, which was formerly employed by Gallican
controversialists (cf. Febronius, "De statu eccl.", 1:76), however, rests on a misunderstanding of the
passages. Augustine is controverting the Novatian heretics, who affirmed that the power to remit sins
was a purely personal gift to Peter alone, and had disappeared with him. He therefore asserts that
Peter received it that it might remain for ever in the Church and be used for its benefit. It is in that
sense alone that he says that Peter represented the Church. There is no foundation whatever for
saying that he desired to affirm that the Church was the true recipient of the power conferred. Such a
view would be contrary to the whole patristic tradition, and is expressly reprobated in the Vatican
Decree, cap. 1.
It appears from what has been said that, when the popes legislate for the faithful, when they try
offenders by juridical process, and enforce their sentences by censures and excommunications, they
are employing powers conceded to them by Christ. Their authority to exercise jurisdiction in this
way is not founded on the grant of any civil ruler. Indeed the Church has claimed and exercised these
powers from the very first. When the Apostles, after the Council of Jerusalem, sent out their decree
as vested with Divine authority (Acts 15:28), they were imposing a law on the faithful. When St.
Paul bids Timothy not receive an accusation against a presbyter unless it be supported by two or
three witnesses, he clearly supposes him to be empowered to judge him in foro externo. This claim
to exercise coercive jurisdiction has, as might be expected been denied by various heterodox writers.
Thus Marsilius Patavinus (Defensor Pacis 2:4), Antonius de Dominis (De rep. eccl. 4:6-7, 9), Richer
(De eccl. et pol. potestate, 11-12), and later the Synod of Pistoia, all alike maintained that coercive
jurisdiction of every kind belongs to the civil power alone, and sought to restrict the Church to the
use of moral means. This error has always been condemned by the Holy See. Thus, in the Bull
"Auctorem Fidei", Pius VI makes the following pronouncement regarding one of the Pistoian
propositions:
[The aforesaid proposition] in respect of its insinuation that the Church does not possess
authority to exact subjection to her decrees otherwise than by means dependent on
persuasion: so far as this signifies that the Church "has not received from God power,
not merely to direct by counsel and persuasion but further to command by laws, and to
coerce and compel the delinquent and contumacious by external and salutary
penalties" [from the brief "Ad assiduas" (1755) of Benedict XIV], leads to a system
already condemned as heretical.
Nor may it be held that the pope's laws must exclusively concern spiritual objects, and their penalties
be exclusively of a spiritual character. The Church is a perfect society (see THE CHURCH, XIII).
She is not dependent on the permission of the State for her existence, but holds her charter from God.
As a perfect society she has a right to all those means which are necessary for the attaining of her
end. These, however, will include far more than spiritual objects and spiritual penalties alone: for the
Church requires certain material possessions, such, for example, as churches, schools, seminaries,
together with the endowments necessary for their sustentation. The administration and the due
protection of these goods will require legislation other than what is limited to the spiritual sphere. A
large body of canon law must inevitably be formed to determine the conditions of their management.
Indeed, there is a fallacy in the assertion that the Church is a spiritual society; it is spiritual as regards
the ultimate end to which all its activities are directed, but not as regards its present constitution nor
as regards the means at its disposal.
The question has been raised whether it be lawful for the Church, not merely to sentence a
delinquent to physical penalties, but itself to inflict these penalties. As to this, it is sufficient to note
that the right of the Church to invoke the aid of the civil power to execute her sentences is expressly
asserted by Boniface VIII in the Bull "Unam Sanctam". This declaration, even if it be not one of
those portions of the Bull in which the pope is defining a point of faith, is so clearly connected with
the parts expressly stated to possess such character that it is held by theologians to be theologically
certain (Palmieri, "De Romano Pontifice", thes. 21). The question is of theoretical, rather than of
practical importance, since civil Governments have long ceased to own the obligation of enforcing
the decisions of any ecclesiastical authority. This indeed became inevitable when large sections of
the population ceased to be Catholic. The state of things supposed could only exist when a whole
nation was thoroughly Catholic in spirit, and the force of papal decisions was recognized by all as
binding in conscience.
The pope's immediate and ordinary jurisdiction
In the Constitution "Pastor Aeternus", cap. 3, the pope is declared to possess ordinary, immediate,
and episcopal jurisdiction over all the faithful:
We teach, moreover, and declare that, by the disposition of God, the Roman Church
possesses supreme ordinary authority over all Churches, and that the jurisdiction of the
Roman Pontiff, which is true episcopal jurisdiction is immediate in its character
(Enchir., n. 1827).
It is further added that this authority extends to all alike, both pastors and faithful, whether singly or
collectively. An ordinary jurisdiction is one which is exercised by the holder, not by reason of any
delegation, but in virtue of the office which he himself holds. All who acknowledge in the pope any
primacy of jurisdiction acknowledge that jurisdiction to be ordinary. This point, therefore, does not
call for discussion. That the papal authority is likewise immediate has, however, been called in
question. Jurisdiction is immediate when its possessor stands in direct relation to those with whose
oversight he is charged. If, on the other hand, the supreme authority can only deal directly with the
proximate superiors, and not with the subjects save through their intervention, his power is not
immediate but mediate. That the pope's jurisdiction is not thus restricted appears from the analysis
already given of Christ's words to St. Peter. It has been shown that He conferred on him a primacy
over the Church, which is universal in its scope, extending to all the Church's members, and which
needs the support of no other power. A primacy such as this manifestly gives to him and to his
successors a direct authority over all the faithful. This is also implied in the words of the pastoral
commission, "Feed my sheep". The shepherd exercises immediate authority over all the sheep of his
flock. Every member of the Church has been thus committed to Peter and those who follow him.
This immediate authority has been always claimed by the Holy See. It was, however, denied by
Febronius (op. cit., 7:7). That writer contended that the duty of the pope was to exercise a general
oversight over the Church and to direct the bishops by his counsel; in case of necessity, where the
legitimate pastor was guilty of grave wrong, he could pronounce sentence of excommunication
against him and proceed against him according to the canons, but he could not on his own authority
depose him (op. cit., 2:4:9). The Febronian doctrines, though devoid of any historical foundation,
yet, through their appeal to the spirit of nationalism, exerted a powerful influence for harm on
Catholic life in Germany during the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century. Thus it was
imperative that the error should be definitively condemned. That the pope's power is truly episcopal
needs no proof. It follows from the fact that he enjoys an ordinary pastoral authority, both legislative
and judicial, and immediate in relation to its subjects. Moreover, since this power regards the pastors
as well as the faithful, the pope is rightly termed Pastor pastorum, and Episcopus episcoporum.
It is frequently objected by writers of the Anglican school that, by declaring the pope to possess an
immediate episcopal jurisdiction over all the faithful, the Vatican Council destroyed the authority of
the diocesan episcopate. It is further pointed out that St. Gregory the Great expressly repudiated this
title (Epistle 7:27 and Epistle 8:30). To this it is replied that no difficulty is involved in the exercise
of immediate jurisdiction over the same subjects by two rulers, provided only that these rulers stand
in subordination, the one to the other. We constantly see the system at work. In an army the
regimental officer and the general both possess immediate authority over the soldiers; yet no one
maintains that the inferior authority is thereby annulled. The objection lacks all weight. The Vatican
Council says most justly (cap. iii):
This power of the supreme pontiff in no way derogates from the ordinary immediate
power of episcopal jurisdiction, in virtue of which the bishops, who, appointed by the
Holy Spirit [Acts 20:28], have succeeded to the place of the Apostles as true pastors,
feed and rule their several flocks, each the one which has been assigned to him: that
power is rather maintained, confirmed and defended by the supreme pastor (Enchir., n.
1828).
It is without doubt true that St. Gregory repudiated in strong terms the title of universal bishop, and
relates that St. Leo rejected it when it was offered him by the fathers of Chalcedon. But, as he used
it, it has a different signification from that with which it was employed in the Vatican Council. St.
Gregory understood it as involving the denial of the authority of the local diocesan (Epistle 5:21). No
one, he maintains, has a right so to term himself universal bishop as to usurp that apostolically
constituted power. But he was himself a strenuous asserter of that immediate jurisdiction over all the
faithful which is signified by this title as used in the Vatican Decree. Thus he reverses (Epistle 6:15)
a sentence passed on a priest by Patriarch John of Constantinople, an act which itself involves a
claim to universal authority, and explicitly states that the Church of Constantinople is subject to the
Apostolic See (Epistle 9:12). The title of universal bishop occurs as early as the eighth century; and
in 1413 the faculty of Paris rejected the proposition of John Hus that the pope was not universal
bishop (Natalis Alexander, "Hist. eccl.", saec. XV and XVI, c. ii, art. 3, n. 6)
The right of entertaining appeals in all ecclesiastical causes
The Council goes on to affirm that the pope is the supreme judge of the faithful, and that to him
appeal may be made in all ecclesiastical causes. The right of appeal follows as a necessary corollary
from the doctrine of the primacy. If the pope really possesses a supreme jurisdiction over the Church,
every other authority, whether episcopal or synodal, being subject to him, there must of necessity be
an appeal to him from all inferior tribunals. This question, however, has been the subject of much
controversy. The Gallican divines de Marca and Quesnel, and in Germany Febronius, sought to show
that the right of appeal to the pope was a mere concession derived from ecclesiastical canons, and
that the influence of the pseudo-Isidorean decretals had led to many unjustifiable exaggerations in
the papal claims. The arguments of these writers are at the present day employed by frankly anti-
Catholic controversialists with a view to showing that the whole primacy is a merely human
institution. It is contended that the right of appeal was first granted at Sardica (343), and that each
step of its subsequent development can be traced. History, however, renders it abundantly clear that
the right of appeal had been known from primitive times, and that the purpose of the Sardican canons
was merely to give conciliar ratification to an already existing usage. It will be convenient to speak
first of the Sardican question, and then to examine the evidence as regards previous practice.
In the years immediately preceding Sardica, St. Athanasius had appealed to Rome against the
decision of the Council of Tyre (335). Pope Julius had annulled the action of that council, and had
restored Athanasius and Marcellus of Ancyra to their sees. The Eusebians, however, had contested
his right to call a conciliar decision in question. The fathers who met at Sardica, and who included
the most eminent of the orthodox party from East and West alike, desired by their decrees to affirm
this right, and to establish a canonical mode of procedure for such appeals. The principal provisions
of the canons which deal with this matter are:
that a bishop condemned by the bishops of his province may appeal to the pope either on his
own initiative or through his judges;
that if the pope entertains the appeal he shall appoint a court of second instance drawn from
the bishops of the neighbouring provinces; he may, if he thinks fit, send judges to sit with the
bishops.
There is nothing whatever to suggest that new privileges are being conferred. St. Julius had recently,
not merely exercised the right of hearing appeals in the most formal manner, but had severely
censured the Eusebians for neglecting to respect the supreme judicial rights of the Roman See: "for",
he writes, "if they [Athanasius and Marcellus] really did some wrong, as you say, the judgment
ought to have been given according to the ecclesiastical canon and not thus.... Do you not know that
this has been the custom first to write to us, and then for that which is just to be defined from
hence?" (Athanasius, "Apol." 35) . Nor is there the smallest ground for the assertion that the pope's
action is hedged in within narrow limits, on the ground that no more is permitted than that he should
order a re-hearing to take place on the spot. The fathers in no way disputed the pope's right to hear
the case at Rome. But their object was to deprive the Eusebians of the facile excuse that it was idle
for appeals to be carried to Rome, since there the requisite evidence could not be forthcoming. They
therefore provided a canonical procedure which should not be open to that objection.
Having thus shown that there is no ground for the assertion that the right of appeal was first granted
at Sardica, we may now consider the evidence for its existence in earlier times. The records of the
second century are so scanty as to throw but little light on the subject. Yet it would seem that
Montanus, Prisca, and Maximilla appealed to Rome against the decision of the Phrygian bishops.
Tertullian (Against Praxeas 1), tells us that the pope at first acknowledged the genuineness of their
prophecies, and that thus "he was giving peace to the Churches of Asia and Phrygia", when further
information led him to recall the letters of peace which he had issued. The fact that the pope's
decision had weight to decide the whole question of their orthodoxy is sufficiently significant. But in
St. Cyprian's correspondence we find clear and unmistakable evidence of a system of appeals.
Basilides and Martial, the bishops of Leon and Mérida in Spain, had in the persecution accepted
certificates of idolatry. They confessed their guilt, and were in consequence deposed, other bishops
being appointed to the sees. In the hope of having themselves reinstated they appealed to Rome, and
succeeded, by misrepresenting the facts, in imposing on St. Stephen, who ordered their restoration. It
has been objected to the evidence drawn from this incident, that St. Cyprian did not acknowledge the
validity of the papal decision, but exhorted the people of Leon and Mérida to hold fast to the
sentence of deposition (Epistle 67:6). But the objection misses the point of St. Cyprian's letter. In the
case in question there was no room for a legitimate appeal, since the two bishops had confessed. An
acquittal obtained after spontaneous confession could not be valid. It has further been urged that, in
the case of Fortunatus (Epistle 59:10), Cyprian denies his right of appeal to Rome, and asserts the
sufficiency of the African tribunal. But here too the objection rests upon a misunderstanding.
Fortunatus had procured consecration as Bishop of Carthage from a heretical bishop, and St. Cyprian
asserts the competency of the local synod in his case on the ground that he is no true bishop -- a mere
pseudo-episcopus. Juridically considered he is merely an insubordinate presbyter, and he must
submit himself to his own bishop. At that period the established custom denied the right of appeal to
the inferior clergy. On the other hand, the action of Fortunatus indicates that he based his claim to
bring the question of his status before the pope on the ground that he was a legitimate bishop.
Privatus of Lambese, the heretical consecrator of Fortunatus who had previously been himself
condemned by a synod of ninety bishops (Epistle 59:10), had appealed to Rome without success
(Epistle 36:4).
The difficulties at Carthage which led to the Donatist schism provide us with another instance. When
the seventy Numidian bishops, who had condemned Caecilian, invoked the aid of the emperor, the
latter referred them to Rome, that the case might be decided by Pope Miltiades (313). St. Augustine
makes frequent mention of the circumstances, and indicates plainly that he holds it to have been
Caecilian's undoubted right to claim a trial before the pope. He says that Secundus should never have
dared to condemn Caecilian when he declined to submit his case to the African bishops, since he had
the right "to reserve his whole case to the judgment of other colleagues, especially to that of
Apostolical Churches" (Epistle 43:7). A little later (367) a council, held at Tyana in Asia Minor,
restored to his see Eustathius, bishop of that city, on no other ground than that of a successful appeal
to Rome. St. Basil (Epistle 263:3) tells us that they did not know what test of orthodoxy Liberius had
required. He brought a letter from the pope demanding his restoration, and this was accepted as
decisive by the council. It should be observed that there can be no question here of the pope
employing prerogatives conferred on him at Sardica, for he did not follow the procedure there
indicated. Indeed there is no good reason to believe that the Sardican procedure ever came into use in
either East or West. In 378 the appellate jurisdiction of the pope received civil sanction from
Emperor Gratian. Any charge against a metropolitan was to come before the pope himself or a court
of bishops nominated by him, while all (Western) bishops had the right of appeal from -- their
provincial synod to the pope (Mansi, III, 624). Similarly Valentinian III in 445 assigned to the pope
the right of evoking to Rome any cause he should think fit (Cod. Theod. Novell., tit. 24, De
episcoporum ordin.). These ordinances were not, however, in any sense the source of the pope's
jurisdiction, which rested on Divine institution; they were civil sanctions enabling the pope to avail
himself of the civil machinery of the empire in discharging the duties of his office. What Pope
Nicholas I said of the synodal declarations regarding the privileges of the Holy See holds good here
also: "Ista privilegia huic sanctae Ecclesiae a Christo donata, a synodis non donata, sed jam
solummodo venerata et celebrata" (These privileges bestowed by Christ on this Holy Church have
not been granted her by synods, but merely proclaimed and honoured by them) ("Ep. ad Michaelem
Imp." in P.L., CXIX, 948).
Much has been made by anti-Catholic writers of the famous letter "Optaremus", addressed in 426 by
the African bishops to Pope St. Celestine at the close of the incident relating to the priest Apiarius.
As the point is discussed in a special article (APIARIUS OF SICCA), a brief reference will suffice
here. Protestant controversialists maintain that in this letter the African bishops positively repudiate
the claim of Rome to an appellate jurisdiction, the repudiation being consequent on the fact that they
had in 419 satisfied themselves that Pope Zosimus was mistaken in claiming the authority of Nicaea
for the Sardican canons. This is an error. The letter, it is true, urges with some display of irritation
that it would be both more reasonable and more in harmony with the fifth Nicene canon regarding
the inferior clergy and the laity, if even episcopal cases were left to the decision of the African
synod. The pope's authority is nowhere denied, but the sufficiency of the local tribunals is asserted.
Indeed the right of the pope to deal with episcopal cases was freely acknowledged by the African
Church even after it had been shown that the Sardican canons did not emanate from Nicaea. Antony,
Bishop of Fussala, prosecuted an appeal to Rome against St. Augustine in 423, the appeal being
supported by the Primate of Numidia (Ep. ccix). Moreover, St. Augustine in his letter to Pope
Celestine on this subject urges that previous popes have dealt with similar cases in the same manner,
sometimes by independent decisions and sometimes by confirmation of the decisions locally given
(ipsa sede apostolica judicante vel aliorum judicata firmante), and that he could cite examples either
from ancient or from more recent times (Ep. 209:8). These facts appear to be absolutely conclusive
as to the traditional African practice. That the letter "Optaremus" did not result in any change is
evinced by a letter of St. Leo's in 446, directing what is to be done in the case of a certain Lupicinus
who had appealed to him (Epistle 12:13). It is occasionally argued that if the pope really possessed
jure divino a supreme jurisdiction, the African bishops would neither have raised any question in 419
as to whether the alleged canons were authentic, nor again have in 426 requested the pope to take the
Nicene canon as the norm of his action. Those who reason in this way fail to see that, where canons
have been established prescribing the mode of procedure to be followed in the Church, right reason
demands that the supreme authority should not alter them except for some grave cause, and, as long
as they remain the recognized the law of the Church should observe them. The pope as God's vicar
must govern according to reason, not arbitrarily nor capriciously. This, however, is a very different
thing from saying, as did the Gallican divines, that the pope is subject to the canons. He is not
subject to them, because he is competent to modify or to annul them when he holds this to be best for
the Church.
Jurisdictional rights and prerogatives of the pope

In virtue of his office as supreme teacher and ruler of the faithful, the chief control of every
department of the Church's life belongs to the pope. In this section the rights and duties which thus
fall to his lot will be briefly enumerated. It will appear that, in regard to a considerable number of
points, not merely the supreme control, but the whole exercise of power is reserved to the Holy See,
and is only granted to others by express delegation. This system of reservation is possible, since the
pope is the universal source of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Hence it rests with him to determine in
what measure he will confer jurisdiction on bishops and other prelates.
(1) As the supreme teacher of the Church, whose it is to prescribe what is to be believed by all the
faithful, and to take measures for the preservation and the propagation of the faith, the following are
the rights which pertain to the pope:
it is his to set forth creeds, and to determine when and by whom an explicit profession of faith
shall be made (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. 24, cc. 1 and 12);
it is his to prescribe and to command books for the religious instruction of the faithful; thus,
for example, Clement XIII has recommended the Roman Catechism to all the bishops.
The pope alone can establish a university, possessing the status and privileges of a canonically
erected Catholic university;
to him also belongs the direction of Catholic missions throughout the world; this charge is
fulfilled through the Congregation of the Propaganda.
It is his to prohibit the reading of such books as are injurious to faith or morals, and to
determine the conditions on which certain classes of books may be issued by Catholics;
his is the condemnation of given propositions as being either heretical or deserving of some
minor degree of censure, and lastly
he has the right to interpret authentically the natural law. Thus, it is his to say what is lawful or
unlawful in regard to social and family life, in regard to the practice of usury, etc.
(2) With the pope's office of supreme teacher are closely connected his rights in regard to the
worship of God: for it is the law of prayer that fixes the law of belief. In this sphere very much has
been reserved to the sole regulation of the Holy See. Thus
the pope alone can prescribe the liturgical services employed in the Church. If a doubt should
occur in regard to the ceremonial of the liturgy, a bishop may not settle the point on his own
authority, but must have recourse to Rome. The Holy See likewise prescribes rules in regard to
the devotions used by the faithful, and in this way checks the growth of what is novel and
unauthorized.
At the present day the institution and abrogation of festivals which was till a comparatively
recent time free to all bishops as regards their own dioceses, is reserved to Rome.
The solemn canonization of a saint is proper to the pope. Indeed it is commonly held that this
is an exercise of the papal infallibility. Beatification and every permission for the public
veneration of any of the servants of God is likewise reserved to his decision.
He alone gives to anyone the privilege of a private chapel where Mass may be said.
He dispenses the treasury of the Church, and the grant of plenary indulgences is reserved to
him. While he has no authority in regard to the substantial rites of the sacraments, and is
bound to preserve them as they were given to the Church by Christ and His Apostles, certain
powers in their regard belong to him;
he can give to simple priests the power to confirm, and to bless the oil of the sick and the oil of
catechumens, and
he can establish diriment and impedient impediments to matrimony.
(3) The legislative power of the pope carries with it the following rights:
he can legislate for the whole Church, with or without the assistance of a general council;
if he legislates with the aid of a council it is his to convoke it, to preside, to direct its
deliberations, to confirm its acts.
He has full authority to interpret, alter, and abrogate both his own laws and those established
by his predecessors. He has the same plenitude of power as they enjoyed, and stands in the
same relation to their laws as to those which he himself has decreed;
he can dispense individuals from the obligation of all purely ecclesiastical laws, and can grant
privileges and exemptions in their regard.
In this connection may be mentioned his power to dispense from vows where the greater glory
of God renders it desirable. Considerable powers of dispensation are granted to bishops, and,
in a restricted measure, also to priests; but there are some vows reserved altogether to the Holy
See.
(4) In virtue of his supreme judicial authority
causae majores are reserved to him. By this term are signified cases dealing with matters of
great moment, or those in which personages of eminent dignity are concerned.
His appellate jurisdiction has been discussed in the previous section. It should, however, be
noted
that the pope has full right, should he see fit, to deal even with causae minores in the first
instance, and not merely by reason of an appeal (Trent, Sess. XXIV; cap. 20). In what
concerns punishment,
he can inflict censures either by judicial sentence or by general laws which operate without
need of such sentence.
He further reserves certain cases to his own tribunal. All cases of heresy come before the
Congregation of the Inquisition. A similar reservation covers the cases in which a bishop or a
reigning prince is the accused party.
(5) As the supreme governor of the Church the pope has authority over all appointments to its public
offices. Thus
it is his to nominate to bishoprics, or, where the nomination has been conceded to others, to
give confirmation. Further, he alone can translate bishops from one see to another, can accept
their resignation, and can, where grave cause exists, sentence to deprivation.
He can establish dioceses, and can annul a previously existing arrangement in favour of a new
one. Similarly, he alone can erect cathedral and collegiate chapters.
He can approve new religious orders, and can, if he sees fit, exempt them from the authority of
local ordinaries.
Since his office of supreme ruler imposes on him the duty of enforcing the canons, it is
requisite that he should be kept informed as to the state of the various dioceses. He may obtain
this information by legates or by summoning the bishops to Rome. At the present day this jus
relationum is exercised through the triennial visit ad limina required of all bishops. This
system was introduced by Sixtus V in 1585 (Constitution, "Rom. Pontifex"), and confirmed by
Benedict XIV in 1740 (Constitution, "Quod Sancta") .
It is to be further observed that the pope's office of chief ruler of the Church carries with it jure
divino the right to free intercourse with the pastors and the faithful. The placitum regium, by
which this intercourse was limited and impeded, was therefore an infringement of a sacred
right, and as such was solemnly condemned by the Vatican Council (Constitution, "Pastor
Aeternus", cap. iii). To the pope likewise belongs the supreme administration of the goods of
the Church.
He alone can, where there is just cause, alienate any considerable quantity of such property.
Thus, e.g., Julius III, at the time of the restoration of religion in England under Queen Mary
validated the title of those laymen who had acquired Church lands during the spoliations of the
previous reigns.
The pope has further the right to impose taxes on the clergy and the faithful for ecclesiastical
purposes (cf. Trent, Sess. XXI, cap. iv de Ref.).
Though the power of the pope, as we have described it, is very great, it does not follow that it is
arbitrary and unrestricted. "The pope", as Cardinal Hergenröther well says,
is circumscribed by the consciousness of the necessity of making a righteous and

beneficent use of the duties attached to his privileges....He is also circumscribed by the
spirit and practice of the Church, by the respect due to General Councils and to ancient
statutes and customs, by the rights of bishops, by his relation with civil powers, by the
traditional mild tone of government indicated by the aim of the institution of the papacy
-- to "feed" -- and finally by the respect indispensable in a spiritual power towards the
spirit and mind of nations ("Cath. Church and Christian State", tr., I, 197).
Primacy of honour: titles and insignia

Certain titles and distinctive marks of honour are assigned to the pope alone; these constitute what is
termed his primacy of honour. These prerogatives are not, as are his jurisdictional rights, attached
jure divino to his office. They have grown up in the course of history, and are consecrated by the
usage of centuries; yet they are not incapable of modification.
Titles
Pope
The most noteworthy of the titles are Papa, Summus Pontifex, Pontifex Maximus, Servus servorum
Dei. The title pope (papa) was, as has been stated, at one time employed with far more latitude. In
the East it has always been used to designate simple priests. In the Western Church, however, it
seems from the beginning to have been restricted to bishops (Tertullian, On Modesty 13). It was
apparently in the fourth century that it began to become a distinctive title of the Roman Pontiff. Pope
Siricius (d. 398) seems so to use it (Ep. vi in P.L., XIII, 1164), and Ennodius of Pavia (d. 473)
employs it still more clearly in this sense in a letter to Pope Symmachus (P.L., LXIII, 69). Yet as late
as the seventh century St. Gall (d. 640) addresses Desiderius of Cahors as papa (P.L., LXXXVII,
265). Gregory VII finally prescribed that it should be confined to the successors of Peter.
Pontiff
The terms Pontifex Maximus, Summus Pontifex, were doubtless originally employed with reference
to the Jewish high-priest, whose place the Christian bishops were regarded as holding each in his
own diocese (Epistle of Clement 40). As regards the title Pontifex Maximus, especially in its
application to the pope, there was further a reminiscence of the dignity attached to that title in pagan
Rome. Tertullian, as has already been said, uses the phrase of Pope Callistus. Though his words are
ironical, they probably indicate that Catholics already applied it to the pope. But here too the terms
were once less narrowly restricted in their use. Pontifex summus was used of the bishop of some
notable see in relation to those of less importance. Hilary of Arles (d. 449) is so styled by Eucherius
of Lyons (P.L., L, 773), and Lanfranc is termed "primas et pontifex summus" by his biographer,
Milo Crispin (P.L., CL, 10). Pope Nicholas I is termed "summus pontifex et universalis papa" by his
legate Arsenius (Hardouin "Conc.", V, 280), and subsequent examples are common. After the
eleventh century it appears to be only used of the popes.
Servant of the Servants of God
The phrase Servus servorum Dei is now so entirely a papal title that a Bull in which it should be
wanting would be reckoned unauthentic. Yet this designation also was once applied to others.
Augustine (Ep. 217 a. d. Vitalem) entitles himself "servus Christi et per Ipsum servus servorum
Ipsius". Desiderius of Cahors made use of it (Thomassin, "Ecclesiae nov. et vet. disc.", pt. I, I. I, c.
iv, n. 4): so also did St. Boniface (740), the apostle of Germany (P.L., LXXIX, 700). The first of the
popes to adopt it was seemingly Gregory I; he appears to have done so in contrast to the claim put
forward by the Patriarch of Constantinople to the title of universal bishop (P.L., LXXV, 87). The
restriction of the term to the pope alone began in the ninth century.
Insignia and marks of honour
Tiara
The pope is distinguished by the use of the tiara or triple crown. At what date the custom of
crowning the pope was introduced is unknown. It was certainly previous to the forged donation of
Constantine, which dates from the commencement of the ninth century, for mention is there made of
the pope's coronation. The triple crown is of much later origin.
Cross
The pope moreover does not, like ordinary bishops, use the bent pastoral staff, but only the erect
cross. This custom was introduced before the reign of Innocent III (1198-1216) (cap. un. X de sacra
unctione, I, 15).
Pallium
He further uses the pallium at all ecclesiastical functions, and not under the same restrictions as do
the archbishops on whom he has conferred it.
Kiss
The kissing of the pope's foot -- the characteristic act of reverence by which all the faithful do
honour to him as the vicar of Christ -- is found as early as the eighth century. We read that Emperor
Justinian II paid this respect to Pope Constantine (708-16) (Anastasius Bibl. in P.L., CXXVIII 949).
Even at an earlier date Emperor Justin had prostrated himself before Pope John I (523-6; op. cit.,
515), and Justinian I before Agapetus (535-6; op. cit., 551). The pope, it may be added, ranks as the
first of Christian princes, and in Catholic countries his ambassadors have precedence over other
members of the diplomatic body.
(For the full list of men who have held this office, see LIST OF POPES.)
About this page

APA citation. Joyce, G. (1911). The Pope. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert
Appleton Company. Retrieved August 12, 2009 from New Advent:
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12260a.htm
MLA citation. Joyce, George. "The Pope." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 12. New York: Robert
Appleton Company, 1911. 12 Aug. 2009 <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12260a.htm>.
Ecclesiastical approbation. Nihil Obstat. June 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor. Imprimatur.
+John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
Contact information. The editor of New Advent is Kevin Knight. My email address is feedback732
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CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: The Pope Page 1 of 21

The present article is divided as follows:

I. Institution of a Supreme Head by Christ

Institution of a supreme head by Christ

The gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

The passage receives an admirable comment from St. Chrysostom:

Primacy of the Roman See

that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and

St. Peter was Bishop of Rome

Those who succeed Peter in Rome succeed him also in the

St. Ignatius of Antioch

St. Dionysius of Alexandria

Nature and extent of the papal power

1. the pope's universal coercive jurisdiction

The pope's universal coercive jurisdiction

as regards the means at its disposal.

The pope's immediate and ordinary jurisdiction

The right of entertaining appeals in all ecclesiastical causes

of the canons which deal with this matter are:

Jurisdictional rights and prerogatives of the pope

(4) In virtue of his supreme judicial authority

is circumscribed by the consciousness of the necessity of making a righteous and

Primacy of honour: titles and insignia

Servant of the Servants of God

Insignia and marks of honour

About this page

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