Bavinck Christ and Law PDF

CTJ 28 (1993): 45-73
CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

by JOHN BOLT I. HERMAN BAVINCK AS ETMCIST?
Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) is best known, celebrated, and studied as a Reformed (dogmatic) theologian, as author of the influential fourvolume Gereformeerde Dogmatiek and not, first of all, as an ethicist.1
1. See, for example, R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als Doginaticus (Kampen: Kok, 1961). The Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, first appeared in the 1890s (between 1895-1901), a second revised and expanded edition was completed in 1911, a third unchanged edition in 1918, and a fourth, also unchanged except for pagination, in 1928-30. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that major scholarly interest in Bavinck the first thirty years after his death centered on his educational philosophy rather than on his dogmatic-theological works. Although no less than five major works on Bavinck's educational philosophy and pedagogy appeared within sixteen years of his death (Cornelius Jaarsma, The Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1936]; J. Brederveld, Hoofdlijnen der Paedagogiek van Dr. Herman Bavinck, met Critische Beschouwing [Amsterdam: De Standaard, 1927]; L. van Klinken, Bavincks Paedagogische Beginselen [Meppel: Boom, 1937]; Fr. S. Rombouts, Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck, Gids Bijde Studie van Zijn Paedagogische Werken ['s-Hertogenbosch-Antwerpen: Malmberg, 1922]; and L. van der Zweep, De Paedagogiek van Bavinck [Kampen: Kok, 1935]), a major study of Bavinck's theology was not completed until 1953 with the appearance of Anthony A. Hoekema's dissertation on Bavinck's theology of the covenant ("Herman Bavinck's Doctrine of the Covenant," Unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1953). S. P. van der Walt's study of Bavinck's philosophy (Die Wysbegeerte van Dr. Herman Bavinck [Potchefstroom: Pro-Rege Pers, 1953]), was completed in the same year. Since 1950, however, thanks in part to G. C. Berkouwer's significant theological work building on Bavinck's foundation and also thanks to the scholarly work of Arnold Van Ruler, Eugene Heideman, R. H. Bremmer and Jan Veenhof, among others, insofar as he is known, Bavinck has become renowned for his dogmatic-theological contribution to the Christian and Reformed tradition.
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CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL
However, his significance as a Reformed, Christian ethicist should not be overlooked. Bavinck's own doctoral work focused on the ethics of the Swiss Reformer Ulrich Zwingli2 and he wrote numerous occasional pieces on general ethical subjects3 as well as more particular topics such as the family,4 the state,5 war,6 and the role of women.7 More broadly theological pieces such as those concerning the Kingdom of God,8 the imitation of Christ,9 common grace,10 catholicity,11 as well as general
2. Herman Bavinck, De Ethiek Van Ulrich Zwingli (Kampen: Zalsman, 1880). 3. See, for example, Hedendaagsche Moraal (Kampen: Kok, 1902); "The Influence of the Protestant Reformation on the Moral and Religious Condition of Communities and Nations," in Alliance of the Reformed Churches Holding the Presbyterian System. Proceedings of the Fifth General Council, Toronto, 1892 (London: Publication Committee of the Presbyterian Church of England: 1892), pp. 48-55. "Welke Algemeene Beginselen Beheerschen, Volgens de Heilige Schrift, de Oplossing der Sociale Quaestie, en Welke Vingerwijzing voor die Oplossing Ligt in de Concrete Toepassing Welke deze Beginselen voor Israel in Mozaisch Recht Gevonden Hebben?" in Proces-Verbaal van het Sociaal Congres, Amsterdam, 1891 (Amsterdam: Hveker, 1892), pp. 149-57. See also several essays in Verzamelde Opstellen (Kampen: Kok, 1921) including: "Christelijke Beginselen en Maatschappelijke Verhoudingen" (pp. 121-50); "Over de Ongelijkheid" (pp. 151-71), and "Ethiek en Politiek" (pp. 281-301). And finally, the series of brochures entitled Schild en Pijl (in which Bavinck's essay on the Imitation of Christ appeared [see note 9, below]), had also projected a volume by Bavinck on Het Zedelijke Leven (The Moral Life) in its second series (1919-20). This volume never appeared in print, likely due to Bavinck's illness in the last year of his life. 4. Het Christelijke Huisgezin, 2nd rev. ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1912). 5. Christelijke en Neutrale Staatkunde (Halversum: Witzel & Klemkerk, 1905). Reprinted in Gern Vergeefs Woord (Kampen: Kok, 1951) pp. 105-38); Christendom, Oorlog, Volkenbond (Utrecht: Ruys, 1920). 6. Het Probleetn van den Oorlog (Kampen: Kok, 1915). Reprinted in Christendom en Oorlog (Kampen: Kok, 1966), pp. 7-40. 7. De Vrouw in de Hedendaagsche Maatschappij (Kampen: Kok, 1918); "De Beroepsarbeid der Gehuwde Vrouw," in Proces-Verbaal van het Tweede Christelijke Sociaal Congres (Rotterdam: Libertas, 1919), pp. 206-25. 8. "Het Koninkrijk Gods," in Handboekje ten dienste der Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland voor het Jaar 1894 (Middelburg: Le Cointre, 1893); "Het Rijk Gods, het Hoogste Goed," in Kennis en Leven (Kampen: Kok, 1922), pp. 28-56. 9. "De Navolging van Christus, I, II, III," De Vrije Kerk, XI (1885), 101-13, 203-13; XII (1886), 321-33; De Navolging van Christus en iet Moderne Leven, No. 3 in the series Schild en Pijl (Kampen: Kok, 1918). Reprinted in Kennis en Leven (Kampen: Kok, 1922), pp. 115-44. 10. De Algemeene Genade (Kampen: Zalsmen, 1894). Translated by Ray Van Leeuwen, this address appeared in the Calvin Theological Journal, 24 (1989), 35-65). "Calvin and Common Grace," The Princeton Theological Review, VII (1909), 437-65. 11. De Katholiciteit van Christendom en Kerk (Kampen: Zalsman, 1888). Reprinted with
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reflections on a Christian worldview12 are filled with ethical insights and claims. And finally, Bavinck lectured extensively on Reformed ethics.13 From this very quick overview it is clear that to do justice to Bavinck as a theologian and Christian thinker, he must be taken seriously as an ethicist as well as a dogmatician.14 This comports with Bavinck's own judgment in his dissertation on Zwingli that theology could only penetrate the consciousness of the modern world to the extent that it demonstrates its ethical value and significance.15 In this essay I am not going to sketch the broad outlines of Bavinck's Trinitarian ethics16 but will focus my attention on an important issue in Reformed ethics, the relationship between Christ and the law. By
introduction by G. Puchinger (Kampen: Kok, 1968). English translation by John Bolt, Calvin Theobgical Journal, 27 (1992), 220-51. 12. Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing, 2nd rev. ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1913); Modernisme en Orthodoxie (Kampen: Kok, 1911); "De Hedendaagsche Wereldbeschouwing," De Vrije Kerk, IX (1883), 435-61. 13.1 have a copy of a handwritten student "Dictaat" entitled "Gereformeerde Ethiek van Profess. Dr. H. Bavinck." This document is dated November, 1902. Since Bavinck did not officially begin his professorate at the Free University until December 17,1902 when he gave his inaugural address, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid (Wageningen: Vada, 1902), these lectures were undoubtedly delivered at Kampen. The manuscript runs to 331 pages of text and is now transcribed. When translated into English a copy will be deposited in the Meeter Center at the Calvin College and Seminary Library. 14. Bastiaan Kruithof has done that in his doctoral thesis ("The Relation of Christianity and Culture in the Teaching of Herman Bavinck," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1955, pp. 217-70). Also see John Bolt, "The Imitation of Christ in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto, 1982. 15. De Ethiek van Zwingli, p. 2. Later in this volume Bavinck writes: "By none of the Reformers is the ethical significance of the gospel so clearly demonstrated as in Zwingli" (p. 60). And furthermore: "None of the Reformers is so amenable to our age as Zwingli" (p. 179). It is also worth noting the ethical elements in some of the theses ("Stellingen") Bavinck defended for his doctoral promotion: V. The separation of dogmatics and ethics is to the advantage of both. X. The Islamic religion has very little ethical value. XX. Direct state welfare should be kept at a minimum. The ideal is not that the State does everything but that everyone in the State does his or her part. And finally, this concern is also reflected in Bavinck's sympathy for the so-called "ethical theology" (ethische thologie). 16. See "The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck," pp. 162-255.
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"Christ" I mean the particularity of the Christian story (especially the narrative of Jesus Christ, including cross and resurrection) and the specific moral obligations arising from that story. By "law" I mean the broad universal moral obligations arising from general, creational reality. Put this way, a number of questions arise. Concerning law: What is the relation between creation normativity and the Decalogue? Is the Decalogue a republication of creational law or does it arise out of God's redemptive act of Exodus? Both? Is there such a thing as a specifically redemptive-based morality, in New Testament terms, a distinctive Christian ethic?17 Or, in James Gustafson's terms, "Can Ethics be Christian?"18 The question is complex and can be considered at several levels. Perhaps the first is to ask whether any true morality is possible (that is, can be known and done) apart from some religious or transcendent ground or sanction i.e., can one be good without God?19 From a different vantage point one could ask whether a specifically Christian ethic arising from the Gospel (e.g., following Jesus in sacrificial love) is not really a "religious plus" rather than something moral. Here "moral" would be a restrictive term, referring to universal
17. See Basil Mitchell, "Is There a Distinctive Christian Ethic?" in How to Play Theological Ping-Pong: Essays on Faith and Reason, eds. William J. Abraham and Robert W. Prvost (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), pp. 42-56. See also Mitchell's Gifford Lectures of 1974-75, Morality Religious & Secular (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985 [1980]). 18. James M. Gustafson, Can Ethics Be Christian? (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975). 19. Bavinck addresses this issue in his Dictaat by making a threefold distinction: philosophical ethics (natural, rational), Christian ethics, and theological ethics. Philosophical ethics is possible because the image of God is not wholly lost in the Fall, human beings retain some knowledge of the law (Rom. 2:14,15) as well as a sense of obligation to their neighbor. However, philosophical ethics is inadequate theoretically or noetically because (like natural theology) it is unable to give full answer to the question "What is good?" It is practically inadequate because even if the natural person were able to know the good, he or she would not yet be able to do the good. By "Christian ethics" Bavinck appears to have in mind a Christian philosophical ethic, i.e., a philosophical ethics which explores natural moral life illumined by Christian reflection. He prefers, however, to speak of "theological ethic" for three reasons: (1) Sin results in loss of the divine image the human ethical subject is not "normal." (2) Natural human knowledge of the law is wholly inadequate. (3) Natural neighbor-love is still polluted by egoism. A theological ethics takes its standpoint in the new reality of the Christian person. God regenerates the Christian and the moral subject is now a new person, delighting after God's law in the inward person. The ethical norm is thus purified we see God's law for what it really is. Finally, God makes clear to the moral subject the goal of the moral life His glory. (Dictaat, "Gereformeerde Ethiek van Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck, pp. 138-42.)
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obligations, rationally demonstrable and justifiable as doable human (creational) duties.20 These and similar questions raise the fundamental issue of redemption and creation. If Oliver O'Donovan's thesis is correct ("The foundations of Christian ethics must be evangelical foundations; or to put it more simply, Christian ethics must arise from the gospel of Jesus Christ. Otherwise it could not be Christian ethics."21) how can Christian morality be considered a universal obligation for all people, not only Christians? How does one avoid a "double ethic" a minimalist one for nonChristians and a maximalist one for Christians? Or is such a bifurcation of moral duties perfectly proper? Does it not suggest that being a Christian is something other than or more than "merely human?" This essay will not address all these questions but explore the relationship between specifically Christian obligations (Christ) and universal obligations (the law) as discussed in the broader Reformed tradition, particularly in Calvin, and then focus on Bavinck's own approach to the issue. The discussion will also be restricted for the most part to a consideration of this relationship in the life of the Christian believer. That it is a theme close to Bavinck's own concern is suggested by the title he gave to chapter VI of his
20. This seems to be the position of James Gustafson: "From this point of view, Christian ethics and universal human ethics are convertible terms. What is ethically justifiable to do (in a purely rational sense) is the Christian thing to do, and vice versa. This is given theological legitimacy by the doctrine of the Trinity in which Christ, the second person, is the one in and through whom all things are created. From this point of view, in principle there is no distinctive Christian morality, but all morality that is rationally justifiable is Christian. The historical particularity of the source of the life of the church has no particular ethical significance, though its theological significance is tremendous, for Jesus is the revelation of God. Christians have special obligations perhaps, for example, to follow Jesus in lives of self-sacrificial service, but these are not ethical obligations. They are particular religious obligations. Christians have distinctive ideals, but these cannot be called, in a strict sense, moral ideas, for they are not rationally justifiable. If one chooses to call these obligations and ideals "moral," necessarily one has a double ethics, a minimalistic one that is Christian in a grand theological sense, and a more demanding one that is Christian in a special historical sense. With modifications, this point of view can be found in St. Thomas, Luther, and Calvin" (p. 171). This is not exactly Gustafson's own view since he points beyond this to three aspects of morality that are qualified by Christian experience and belief: (1) reason for being moral, (2) character of the moral agent, and (3) the point of reference (via symbols and principles) used to determine conduct (Can Ethics Be Christian? pp. 173-79). 21. Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrectwn and Moral Order: An OutlineforEvangelical Ethics (Leicester, England, and Grand Rapids, MI: InterVarsity Press and Eerdmans, 1986), p. 11.
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dissertation: "The Guiding Norm (Richtsnoer) of the Christian Life: The Law and the Example of Christ."22
II. CHRIST AND THE LAW IN CALVIN'S ETHICS
The Calvinist tradition has often been characterized and criticized for its alleged one-sided emphasis upon the law and commandments of God. Georgia Harkness, for example, contends that Calvin "unlike Jesus . . . conceived of the will of God in terms of biblical literalism and set up a moralistic code" so that his "whole outlook is tinctured with the Spirit of Moses rather than Christ."23 More recently, Richard Mouw, in a book on divine command morality, acknowledges that Calvinists (and Jews!) in particular are most familiar with what he calls "an imperativist moral culture." It is classical Calvinism that is "an actual theological embodiment of divine command morality" In terms of political thought, such a divine command understanding of moral authority has been linked with notions of absolute, sovereign, divine-right rule by kings and magistrates over sinful, willful, rebellious human subjects. In other words Calvin and Hobbes!24 While it is true that the law in general and the decalogue in particular play a dominant role in Reformed ethics, that is certainly not the whole story Even Ernst Troeltsch who speaks of a "severe legalism in morality" prevailing in Calvinism, qualifies this judgment by noting the
22. De Ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli, pp. 75-88. 23. Cited by I. John Hesselink, "Christ, The Law, and the Christian: An Unexplored Aspect of the Third Use of the Law in Calvin's Theology," in Reformatio Perennis: Essays on Calvin and the Reformation in Honour of Ford Lewis Battles, ed. by B. A. Gerrish and Robert Benedetto (Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1981), p. 16. Hesselink is citing Georgia Harkness, John Calvin, The Man and His Ethics (Nashville: Abingdon, paperback reprint, 1958), pp. 66,113. In Hesselink's judgment, Harkness's assessment is a gross caricature. 24. Richard J. Mouw, The God who Commands: A Study in Divine Command Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 1, 3, 94-97. Mouw later on (p. 151) links the Calvinist emphasis upon law to a Trinitarian preference for the first person of the Trinity: There certainly seem to be Christian groups whose ethical style is strongly oriented toward God the Father. An obvious example of such a style is Calvinism, in which God as Law-giver occupies a very central place in worship and moral decision making. In my own Reformed denomination, for example, the reading of the Decalogue is required at each Sunday worship; in much of Dutch and Scottish Calvinism, the worship service has traditionally been experienced as a regathering at Mount Sinai.
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importance of the example of Christ and the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit in Calvinist ethics: In Calvinism . . . Christ is . . . the Lawgiver, the Example, and, above all, the Lord and head of the Church, which undertakes to follow Him, and which through the Holy Spirit is drawn by him into his dynamic power. In Calvinistic theology, within the doctrine of the Two Natures, a relative independence is assigned to the Human Christ, through which he gains salvation through obedience. Since then, the power of this work of Christ is imparted to believers in Christ by the Holy Spirit, Christ is thus an Example of unfailing faithfulness and holiness, the law-giver of the Christian rule of sanctification, the guarantee before God for those who follow Him, and who will receive into their souls the activity of His will.25 That the law must not be divorced from Christ (as in legalism) nor Christ from the law (as in typically Lutheran separations) is overwhelmingly clear in Calvin's own thought.26 In the section of the Institutes where Calvin describes the life of the Christian in terms of the imitation of Christ,27 he begins: "The law of God contains in itself that newness by which his image can be restored in us. But because our slowness needs many goals and helps, it will be profitable to assemble from various passages of Scripture a pattern for the conduct of life in order that those who heartily repent may not err in their zeal."28 The next chapter begins with a similar observation and qualification. "Even though the law of the Lord provides the finest and best-disposed method of ordering a man's life, it seemed good to the Heavenly Teacher to shape his people by an even more explicit plan to that rule which he had set forth in the law"29
25. Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, trans. Olive Wyon (New York: Harper and Row, paperback reprint, I960), pp. 594-95. 26. In addition to Hesselink's article, cited above (n. 21), the studies of Ronald S. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959), and Lucien Joseph Richard, The Spirituality of John Calvin (Atlanta: John Knox, 1974), provide an overwhelming amount of evidence demonstrating the inherent connection between Christ and the law in Calvin's thought. 27. Institutes of the Christian Religion III.vi-x. I am using the translation of Ford Lewis Battles in the Library of Christian Classics series edited by John McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960). 28. Ibid., III.vi.1. 29. Ibid., III.vii.1.
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The beginning of this "more explicit plan" Calvin finds summarized in the words of Romans 12:1 where "the duty of believers is 'to present their bodies to God as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to him. "m The Christian is called to deny self and be ruled by the Spirit of Christ, to put off the old nature and to put on the new. It is in this process of mortification and vivification that Jesus Christ in his death and resurrection is the example and pattern for the believer. Calvin's description of the life of the Christian as an imitatio Christi, it must be remembered, is the heart of his discussion on regeneration and sanctification.31 If the means of sanctification is participation in the death and resurrection of Christ, the goal of that sanctification is the restoration of the original image of God. As Richard notes: "The whole purpose of redemption, and of the process of sanctification especially, is the restoration of a lost order, of the image of God in man."32 It is thus clear that Calvin considers redemption in Christ to be a restoration of the order created by Christ. For this reason: "Calvin's concept of order directly influenced his understanding of the need to imitate Christ and of the nature of this imitation. The creation of order and the redemption of order occur in the person of Christ."33 Christ the eternal Logos is the creator of order. As importantly, Christ the obedient man is the pattern of the new and true sanctified humanity the goal as well as the means of sanctification. Richard's summary of this important point is worth citing in full: In the humanity of Christ, we see, according to Calvin, a perfect pattern of order, of true moderation and harmony. When Calvin appealed, as he frequently did, to his congregation to live according to the order of
30. Ibid. 31. The complete title of Book III of the Institutes, focusing on the internal work of the Holy Spirit, is: "The Way in Which We Receive the Grace of Christ: What Benefits Come to Us from It, an What Effects Follow." 32. Richard, p. 113. Richard cites two important passages from Calvin at this point: "Christ is the most perfect image of God into which we are so renewed as to bear the image of God in knowledge, purity, righteousness and true holiness" (Institutes, I.xv.4). "Adam was first created after the image of God, and reflected as in a mirror the divine righteousness; and that image having been defaced by sin must now be restored in Christ. The regeneration of the godly is indeed .. . nothing else than the formation anew of the image of God in them" (Commentary on Ephesians 2:24; OC, 51,208-9). Richard's discussion and conclusions parallel those of Wallace, pp. 103ff. 33. Richard, p. 115.
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nature, or true humanity, or according to the rule of moderation, he was not referring to a philosophical rule of life, but to the very person of Christ. When Calvin spoke of the order of nature, which included in his thinking the ideas of orderliness and regularity of events within creation, of proper interrelation among all things in creation, and of the realization by every creature of its appropriate purpose, he was speaking of nature as it originally was, ought to be and really is in the humanity of Christ. In Christ is complete unity and harmony between the will of God and will of men.34 This true order or harmony, the restored image of God, which is the goal of sanctification, is reflected in the law.35 The image of God, according to Calvin, consists of true righteousness and holiness.36 There is, therefore, a very important qualification to the so-called law-ethic of Calvin, a qualification that prevents it from becoming legalistic. The law, as part of the process of sanctification (not justification!), cannot be understood or function in the life of the Christian apart from the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit. It is the new person redeemed by Christ who uses the law created in Christ as a guide and pattern of the restored image of God. Calvin's understanding of Jesus Christ as the law-full pattern for the Christian life of sanctification needs to be considered from yet another angle. For Calvin, the focus and inspiration of the Christian life is the ascended Christ.37 Our human nature is in heaven38 and it is thus a concern for the restoration of our true humanity that leads Calvin, in his description of the Christian life, to stress a meditatio futurae vitae as well as a contemptio mundi.39 It is true that Calvin considers the meditatio futurae vitae to be an essential part of the original order of man's life as an image bearer of God.40 However, the contemptio mundi is a con34. Ibid., pp. 115-16. 35. See Wallace, pp. 112ff. 36. Institutes, III.iii.9. Calvin makes reference here to II Cor. 4:4 and Eph. 4:24. 37. Institutes, Ill.ix, "Meditation on the Future Life/' The phrase "focus and inspiration" is taken from Ronald Wallace, p. 87. See also Heinrich Quistorp, Calvin's Doctrine of the Ust Things, trans. Harold Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, 1955), pp. 51ff. 38. Hence the importance of the so-called extra-calvinisticum in Calvin's theology. See David Willis, Calvin's Catholic Christology: The Function of the So-Called Extra-Calvinisticwn in Calvin's Theology (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966). 39. Institutes, III.x. See Wallace, pp. 87-94. 40. See Wallace, pp. 104ff.
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sequence of, and therefore qualified by, the reality of sin. Warns Calvin: "But let believers accustom themselves to a contempt of the present life that engenders no hatred of it or ingratitude to God."41 This present earthly life "is never to be hated except in so far as it holds us subject to sin; although not even hatred of that condition may ever be turned against life itself."42 It is striking that, taking chapters six to ten of Book Three as a climactic order, Calvin follows his discussion on the meditatio futurae vitae (chapter nine) with a concluding chapter on the use and enjoyment of this life.43 Furthermore, this ninth chapter on the meditatio futurae vitae as well as Book III as a whole, both conclude with a reference and a chapter respectively on the resurrection of the body.u There is thus an unmistakable tension in Calvin's ethics, a tension between detachment from or even renunciation of this world and an affirmation of it.45 This tension, which Kenneth Kirk judges to be an enduring problem in the history of Christian ethics,46 arises out of and
41. Institutes, III.ix.3. 42. Ibid., III.ix.4. 43. Ibid., III.X, "How one must use the present life and its helps." 44. "To conclude in a word: if believers' eyes are turned to the power of the resurrection, in their hearts the cross of Christ will at last triumph over the devil, flesh, sin, and wicked men" (ibid., III.ix.6). Book III.xxv is entitled "The Final Resurrection." 45. Troeltsch describes the tension in the attitude of the Calvinist to the world thus: "He finds it impossible to deny the world in theory and to enjoy it in practice." This leads, according to Troeltsch (and Weber!) to an "intramundane asceticism" (Social Teachings, pp. 606-7). 46. Kenneth Kirk, The Vision of God (London: Longmans, Green, 1931), pp. 7ff. Kirk terms this tension as one between "rigorism" and "humanism." The rigorist position is marked by an ascetic other-worldliness,in which the goal of human life is considered to be the vision of God. Humanism, on the other hand, stresses a this-worldly orientation in which the goal of life may be said to be the building of the kingdom of God on earth. Both streams appeal to Scripture, the one especially to the sacrificial example of Jesus Christ, the other to the doctrine of the kingdom of God. Both also have a long and cherished tradition in the Christian church, the former particularly in the monastic tradition, the latter notably in the variety of millenarian movements that have arisen in Christianity. In Kirk's judgment, "Within the womb of the Christian Church these two children rigorism and humanism have striven for the mastery from the moment of their conception; and to the fortunes of that fierce battle no student of Christian ethics can be indifferent. Here are two tendencies pointing towards codes of very different types. Which of them is Christian, and which non-Christian: or better still, if both are Christian, how are they to be harmonized in a single code of conduct?" (ibid., p. 8). In Calvin's ethic both streams come together in his imitatio Christi ethics.
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is centered in the peculiar Christie focus of Calvin's ethics. It is the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ that is the pattern for the believer's life of sanctification, for mortification and vivification. The Christian life thus involves self-denial, cross bearing, meditatio futurae vitae, and even contemptio mundi. This same Jesus Christ, however, is also the restored, orderly image of God, the true, lawful, pattern of our humanity, which must therefore be affirmed. Niesel is thus quite correct in stating that "Calvin preaches neither pessimism nor optimism but calls us inexorably to the imitation of Christ."47
III. CHRIST AND THE LAW IN HERMAN BAVINCK
One finds in Bavinck emphases similar to those of Calvin. Our focus here will be on Bavinck's treatment of the imitatio Christi theme in two essays, one published at the beginning of his career in 1885/86 and the other toward the end, in 1918.48 The original impetus for Bavinck's interest in and attachment to the ethical significance of imitatio Christi theme, however, may have come, as was suggested earlier, from his doctoral studies on the ethics of Ulrich Zwingli. (Recall the title of Bavinck's sixth chapter: "The Guiding Norm of the Christian Life: The Law and the Example of Christ.") Yet, the content of Bavinck's view is, I believe, shaped as much or perhaps more by Calvin than by Zwingli. Bavinck is generally appreciative of Zwingli's ethical interest (he praises him as the most ethical of all the Reformers)49 in particular his positive conception of law. In fact, Zwingli, in Bavinck's judgment, runs into the danger of losing sight of the distinction between law and gospel. "The gospel is an explication of the law, the law an incomplete gospel" (p. 77). Unlike Calvin, Zwingli does not, in Bavinck's judgment, tie the notion of law directly to the Decalogue but attempts to draw all moral obligations from the central love command. Zwingli sharply distinguishes between so-called "ceremonial" and "ethical" elements in the Decalogue. It is the ethical, the demand of love to God and to neighbor, that is the true lex naturae. Strictly speaking, the Decalogue as external
47. Wilhelm Niesel The Theology of Calvin, trans. Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1956), p. 151. 48. See bibliographic information in note 9 above. I will refer to the first as Imitation I and the second as Imitation II. 49. De Ethiek Van Ulrich Zwingli, p. 60. References that follow in the text will be to this work.
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law is for the unbeliever; the believer is bound by the greater demand of love that is its essence. The Christian life, according to Zwingli, is guided more by example (voorbeeld) than by precept or command (p. 84). For this reason, Zwingli emphasizes the importance of the example of Christ. Christ came into the world not only to redeem us but to be an example of holy, obedient living. "Christ fulfilled the law not only in this sense that he accomplished for us what we could not do ourselves, but also in the sense that he clarified the law for us and made the Father's will better known to us so that we now have a better idea what is expected of us" (p. 85). Christ clarifies and heightens the demand of the law for us by disclosing its "inner essence and goal" (p. 88). The importance of Christ's example for us is underscored when Zwingli notes that "Christ could have been murdered along with the children of Bethlehem and would still shed his blood as an atonement for our sin, 'sed sic exemplari caruissemus' ("but in that case we would have been without example") (p. 85). For the believer therefore, not the Decalogue but Christ, and the law's inner reality (i.e., love) as He exemplifies it, is the true norm for the Christian life. Bavinck notes that Zwingli does not elaborate his general emphasis on Christ and his exemplary, renewing, sanctifying influence on believers although, in response especially to Luther's critique, Zwingli did limit the imitation of Christ to certain virtues such as obedience, humility, modesty, and patience. The imitation of Christ is thus in some sense a partial rather than a comprehensive ideal (pp. 86-87).
A. IMITATION I
Five years after completing his doctoral study in 1880, Bavinck published the first of his imitation-of-Christ essays. This essay appears to have been written specifically for the Christelijke Gereformeerde (Christian Reformed) readership of De Vrije Kerk, a journal that had come into existence in 1875 because of a concern about the relative isolation of the Afscheiding church and its failure to participate in the public, cultural, political, theological, educational, and scientific struggles of the Dutch nation.50 It should be noted here that Imitation I was written and published prior to the Doleantie of 1886 and obviously prior to the Union of 1892.
50. See further "Bavinck's Audience: De Vrije Kerk," in "The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck/' pp. 79-83.
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The important difference between Bavinck's two articles on the imitation of Christ is that Imitation I is primarily a historical survey of the imitation theme in the Christian church, while Imitation II is predominantly a systematic exposition of the theme, particularly as it comes to expression in the Sermon on the Mount. Since this historical survey was, by Bavinck's own admission, selective rather than exhaustive, restricted to "several key concepts" (enkele voorname opvattingen)51 an examination of his principles of historical selection is illuminating. Bavinck distinguishes four main types of imitation ethics: the martyr, the monk, the mystic, and what he calls the rationalist concept. He also mentions but does not really explore the "pure" imitation of the early church, as expressed for example in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to Diognetus,52 and the sectarian protest movements of the Middle Ages. Concerning the latter, he is most appreciative of the Waldensians but more critical of the Franciscans and Dominicans (particularly their mysticism) (pp. 209-11). What is striking here is the fact that Bavinck does not go on to consider the spiritual descendents of the medieval protest movements. He not only fails to mention Wycliffe and Huss, but he also completely ignores the various Anabaptist and pietist movements of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. He moves straight from medieval mysticism to post-Enlightenment rationalism (p. 324). This is especially surprising when one bears in mind that Bavinck's Christelijke Gereformeerde readers would have readily identified with the Anabaptist and pietist struggles for a free and pure church. Furthermore, when we recall the important role of the later, more mystical phase of Dutch Reformed pietism on the spirituality of the Secession community,53 this is a remarkable and noteworthy omission. Bavinck also fails to consider Zwingli in spite of the fact that only a few years earlier he had devoted an entire chapter on the law and the example of Christ in his dissertation on Zwingli's ethics. Even Calvin, for whom the imitation of Christ is the key in the discussion of the Christian life in Book III of the Institutes,54 is not considered by Bavinck.
51. Imitation I, p. 101. Page references which follow in the text will be to this work. 52. See "The Epistle to Diognetus," in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), I, 26-27. 53. For details see the historical orientation in chapter II of "The Imitation of Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck," pp. 39-57. 54. Institutes, III.vi-x.
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These omissions must have been deliberate on Bavinck's part (they were not due to ignorance) and it is possible, therefore, to draw several tentative conclusions about Bavinck's principles of selection. Although he calls attention to forms of imitation that he judges to be valid, Bavinck considers the four main types he classifies and sketches in some detail in a predominantly negative light. All four, the martyr, the monk, the mystic, and the rationalist, represent distinct identifiable types that a self-conscious Christelijke Gerformeerde reader would regard negatively the first three because they represent a decidedly Roman Catholic emphasis and the fourth because of its unambiguous modernist, rationalist point of view. By selecting and focusing attention on precisely those four concepts, at the expense of more amenable ones (such as the imitation ideal of the early church, the sectarian movements of the Middle Ages and post-Reformation period, and particularly Zwingli and Calvin), and by presenting these concepts in such a way that a self-conscious orthodox Reformed Christian would be led to reject each one, it seems that Bavinck is attempting to wean the sectarian and pietist elements within his own fellowship from a certain kind of imitation spirituality that was evident in that community and that Bavinck himself rejects. At the same time, Bavinck is paving the way for his own characteristic understanding of a proper and valid imitation of Christ. We get a glimpse of Bavinck's own concept when we note yet a second dimension to his principles of historical selection. It must be remembered that the martyr, the monk, and the mystic, all represent a rigorist and elitist ideal that necessarily calls forth a countervailing, less demanding, universal, and general ethic. None of these three types can survive as ideals outside of a double standard, a double morality. Here we need to distinguish a universal moral ideal for all people from a more specific universal moral ideal for all Christians. The problem with the three types under discussion is that they not only create a "double morality" by distinguishing Christian from human morality but also a double standard for Christians. Jesus Christ cannot be imitated in this way by all his followers. In Bavinck's presentation of the fourth type, the rationalist one, the same problem comes to the fore in a somewhat different fashion. Because Jesus "had no family, avoided societal and civil positions, did not indulge in the arts or sciences, was apparently uninvolved and not interested in countless dimensions of human life" (p. 325), he simply cannot be a universal ideal. The imitation of Christ is thus reduced to obeying his teaching and "being filled with and following after his 'spirit' in its essence and core" (p. 325).
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Bavinck's principle of selection thus has an important second dimension. Not only does he present the history of the imitation of Christ in such a light as to call forth a primarily negative response to the dominant motifs of imitation in the history of Christianity, but he also leads his reader to reject any understanding of imitation that cannot be a universal ideal for all Christians. Once again the persuasiveness of his argument is strengthened by his not including those sectarian, Anabaptist, and pietist groups for whom the imitation of Christ and a literal following of the Sermon on the Mount did in fact represent a universal (at least for Christians) and social as well as individual and personal ideal. In this regard it is quite significant that Bavinck takes pains to call attention to the double standard still operative in his own favorite medieval sectarian group, the Waldensians (pp. 206-7). It can be concluded, therefore, that although Bavinck is partial to what he judges to be a "pure" form of the imitation of Christ ideal, his historical selection indicates a predominantly negative attitude to the history of imitation spirituality. Furthermore, his selection also indicates his rejection of all forms of "double morality." This critique of a "double morality" comes to the fore especially in Bavinck's assessment of monasticism. Since the monastic ideal could never become "obligatory for all people . .. without the destruction of society itself" but had as its goal the achievement of "a higher level of perfection than was possible in ordinary life," it resulted in "a pernicious distinction of two kinds of morality, of higher and lower obligations, of counsels and commandments." According to Bavinck: "This distinction had two ruinous consequences. It promoted pride and trust in good works among those striving for perfection and a complacent indifference to the ideals of holiness in the practical daily lives of ordinary people" (p. 112). Late in the essay in a brief summary of the first three positions, Bavinck focuses his critique on the externalism involved in the monastic understanding of imitation as "a simple repetition and copying of the personal life of Jesus." Bavinck concludes: "As a result it is all too possible for someone outwardly to be Christ-like yet inwardly very unChrist-like, to appear to be one with him while actually very far from him. The essence of the imitation of Christ is lost in a number of external and obvious deeds which repeat those of Jesus" (p. 322). As an illustration of this Bavinck contends (perhaps unfairly) that while the life of Jesus is fully a life for others "the life of the withdrawn monk is really for self. Leaving the world to its own devices and without a thought for others, the monk, at the very best, labors for
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his own perfection" (pp. 322-23). When withdrawal is regarded as the essence of true virtue, an end rather than a means, when the "religious" life becomes a forsaking of the world, it becomes "a caricature of the true worship of God" (p. 323). Even if unfair, this critique does keep Bavinck's agenda clearly before his audience. Mysticism is also criticized by Bavinck for its externalism, particularly its excessive attention to and realistic appropriation of the suffering of Jesus. Bavinck concludes his discussion of medieval mysticism with this summary: In general, the character of medieval imitations of Christ consisted of meditation on and contemplation of the suffering of Jesus. Medieval piety was wholly preoccupied with the cross and focused its attention on the tears, the wounds, the lashes, and agony of the Lord. By means of fasting and vigil, meditation and weeping, men strove to place themselves in the life circumstances of Jesus, to make his suffering theirs, to experience the pain of his wounds. Imitation consisted of an empathetic repetition of Jesus' own suffering (p. 213). Bavinck's discussion of what he refers to as the "rationalist concept" is disappointingly brief. His criticism simply calls attention to the fact that if Jesus is only our example, however we may consider him as such, he comes to us as our Judge rather than our Savior. "He who sees Jesus only as an example is overwhelmed and becomes discouraged. To see Jesus is to experience judgment on our conscience and our powerlessness to truly imitate him" (p. 325). In summary, Bavinck notes: "Only when we know and experience him as Redeemer, as the one whose suffering covers our guilt and whose Spirit fulfills the law of God in us, only then do we dare to look at him and consider him our example" (p. 325). While Bavinck thus presents the history of the imitation of Christ in a predominantly negative manner, he does not reject imitation itself as a valid ideal for the Christian life. Even the martyr, the monk, and the mystic positions reflect certain legitimate dimensions of the Christian life. Bavinck is only critical of certain aberrations, deviations, excesses, of "one-sidedness" in these ideals as they came to actual expression. He is especially appreciative of the distinctive, self-denying, crossbearing life-style of the early church. That Bavinck sees this life-style essentially in terms of the Johannine "in the world but not of the world" is apparent from his approving quotation of the Epistle to Diognetus. The early Christians considered themselves as sojourners on the earth; their real citizenship was in heaven. Yet, very importantly, they "are
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distinguished form other men neither by country, nor language, nor the customs which they observe. For they neither inhabit cities of their own, nor employ a peculiar form of speech, nor lead a life which is marked out by any singularity" (p. 102). It was this self-consciousness concerning a dual citizenship, rooted in a new relation to God and giving rise to a sacrificial, cross-bearing life-style, which Bavinck regards as the genuine following of the example left behind by Jesus Christ. While the example of Jesus is relevant for everyone and for all circumstances ("He is everyone's example and he is our example in everything" [p. 326].), Bavinck finds the key to a proper imitation in the fact that the one moral law is valid for all people everywhere and "requires of all the same virtue and obligations." Jesus is our example because as a true and sinless human being who fulfilled the law in his innermost being he exemplifies a perfect harmony of virtues; all the virtues are found in him in complete harmony. "There is thus in him no tension between being and consciousness, between word and deed, since, as the truth itself, he is what he says. All the requirements of the law, knowledge and trust, righteousness and holiness, love to God and to humanity, are incarnate in him. In him, the law itself lived among us" (p. 326) ,55 Our lives are not however to be mere copies or simple reproductions of Jesus' life. True imitation "consists of a free, spiritual application of the principles by which he lived, completely fulfilling the moral law" (p. 327). Constructively, then, Bavinck sees the imitation of Christ in a twofold sense. It is in the first place a mystical union, a spiritual, living communion with Christ sealed by baptism. This life of union with Christ involves a fellowship of suffering and self-dying, sacrificial love and culminates in a fellowship in Christ's resurrection and ascension in glory (p. 328). Secondly, as a direct consequence of and concrete expression of the primary spiritual fellowship with Jesus Christ, imitation involves taking those virtues and obligations which conform to God's law as normative for our moral life. It is thus the revealed moral law, the Ten Commandments which, in the final analysis, determines that which may and must not be imitated in the life of Jesus. Bavinck stresses the imitation of Christ, however because "examples often have greater persuasive power than mere doctrines of law" (p. 332). Furthermore, while "the law itself cannot change us, redirect us or renew us . . . from
55. This idea of a harmony of virtues is also prominent in Calvin's understanding of the imitation of Christ. See Richard, The Spirituality of John Calvin, pp. 111-16.
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Christ, who is both our Savior and our example, proceeds reforming recreating, renewing power, a power that makes us like him and completely restores the image of God in us" (pp. 332-33).50
B. IMITATION II
Bavinck's second treatment, in 1918, of the imitatio Christi theme was, as its title ("The Imitation of Christ in the Modern World") suggests, more explicitly apologetic.57 This apologetic concern draws attention to an important historical-contextual difference between Imitation I and Imitation II. The first article, written prior to the church union of 1892, had been addressed to a church communion that was relatively isolated from the cultural mainstream of Dutch life. Bavinck's predominantly negative interpretation of the history of imitation spirituality had focused on certain (particularly Roman Catholic) excesses and aberrations of the imitation ideal, but he had left the ideal itself intact. The apologetic problem of whether the ideal itself is possible and defensible in the modern world had been left out of consideration. Bavinck's audience did not include the learned detractors of the Christian religion. His concern, rather, was that his Christelijke Gerformeerde readers come to a proper, biblical understanding of the imitation of Christ. By 1918 the situation was considerably different and Imitation II is addressed to a different audience. The church union of 1892 spelled the end of isolation for a majority in the Christelijke Gereformeerde community. This group was unavoidably drawn under the umbrella of the Dutch neo-Calvinist revival led by Abraham Kuyper and thrust into the ecclesiastical and political spotlight of Dutch life. By 1918, therefore, it was practically impossible for Bavinck to ignore the apologetic question inherent in the ideal of the imitation of Christ, especially when we
56. This notion is also crucial to Calvin's soteriology. See R. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life, Part III, "The Restoration of True Order." 57. It appeared in a series of brochures entitled "Schild en Pijl" (Shield and Arrow), intended to serve as a defense (schild) of biblically revealed truth and an arrow (pijl) directed against all opponents of a Christian world-and-life view. Each booklet had printed on its cover the following description of the series' purpose: "De brochurenreeks Schild en Pijl bedoelt het verdedegen der in de Heilige Schrift geopenbaarde waarheid and de bestrijding van de vijanden der Christelijke wereld-en levens beschouwing voornamelijk door een behandeling van actuelle vraagstukken in bevattelijken vorm." Page references that follow in the text are to "De Navolging Van Christus en het Moderne Leven," in Kennis en Leven, pp. 115-44.
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bear in mind the key role of the neo-Calvinists in Dutch political and governmental life and the important factor of the World War. Merely formulating a proper biblical understanding of the imitation of Christ was no longer sufficient. Even for Dutch Reformed Christians, deeply involved as they were in the social and political life of their nation, not to mention the strident modernist opponents of the Christian religion, the apologetic question had to be faced. Could one still be a follower/imitator of Jesus Christ in the modern world, and if so, how?58 To address this issue, Bavinck's approach in Imitation I a overview of the imitation ideal in the history of the church showing how and where it had departed from the Early Church's pure form was no longer adequate. The validity of the imitatio Christi ideal is no longer an assumption but a problem, in particular a hermeneutic (then and now) problem. The normativity, for the contemporary Christian of the Early Church's position on culture in general is now called into question. The history of the imitation ideal is no longer viewed in terms of deviations from the pure ideal of the early church but in terms of necessary adjustments to that ideal arising from the desire to be faithful to the gospel and its principles in a new situation. In the post-Constantinian situation "the church had to adopt a different posture to the world. The exercise of negative and passive virtues was no longer sufficient to sustain it in its new task of reforming and renewing the world in accord with Christian principles" (p. 131). This contention that the Christian church's task is not the same always and everywhere, that its ethical ideal needs an adjustment when circumstances change, is the single most important difference between Imitation I and Imitation II. In Bavinck's words: "It is difficult to prove the contention that our position vis--vis our culture must be identical" [to that of the early church] (p. 137). While this difference significantly colors Bavinck's understanding of the imitation of Christ as a valid ethical ideal for the Christian life, the fundamental agreement between the two articles concerning the imitation ideal must not be overlooked. Although his discussion of the New Testament ethic and its normativity for Christian life is far more sophis58. See, for example, Imitation II, p. 120: "In the midst of all these questions arises one about the imitation of Christ and life in the modern world. Is there even room for such an imitation? Can it still be taken seriously by people in the state, industry, business, market place, stock exchange, office or factory, in science and art, in war, even at the front?"
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ticated in the second article, the imitation of Christ remains, for Bavinck, a valid ideal. Furthermore, as in the first article, Bavinck considers the imitation of Christ as a valid ethical ideal because Jesus fulfilled the moral law. "The example of Christ becomes for the apostles a noteworthy illustration (leerzame illustratie) of the most important virtues which the law requires of us, especially love" (p. 133). The fundamentality of law which was so prominent in the conclusions of Imitation I is retained in Imitation II. There is however, a shift of emphasis even at this point of fundamental agreement. In Imitation I the moral law of the Old Testament served as the criterion for the imitation ideal. The Ten Commandments form the constitution of a life of obedience to God and "in the final analysis determine that which may and must not be imitated in the life of Jesus."59 In Imitation II Bavinck stresses Jesus' concretization and heightening of the Old Testament law. Rather than using only the Decalogue as a standard for the imitation ideal, in Imitation II Bavinck stresses the freedom of the Christian in applying the ideal. "Although all are subject to one and the same moral law, the duties under that law vary considerably . . . thus while the virtues to which the imitation of Christ calls us are the same, circumstances may modify its application" (p. 143). Thus a literalism about the imitation of Christ is ruled out. "The true imitation of Christ does not consist of an external following or a mere listening to his words, or even in saying 'Lord, Lord,' but in doing the will of the heavenly Father as he himself perfectly fulfilled it. True imitation is thus a matter of being conformed to the image of Christ" (p. 123). According to Bavinck, the Sermon on the Mount serves as a concrete, illustrative clarification of this imitation of Christ (and thus of the moral law). These three words serve as a capsule summary of Bavinck's interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. In the first place, the Sermon on the Mount is concrete: "The nature of this imitation is clarified in the Sermon on the Mount by means of concrete examples" (p. 123). "From the beginning to the end [of the sermon] he [Jesus] deals with concrete deeds and places them as examples before his disciples" (p. 127). Bavinck uses the word "concrete" to describe a mediating position between the Scylla of spiritualizing and the Charybdis of literalism.
59. Imitation I, p. 332.
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Bavinck rejects categorically any spiritualizing that suggests that in the Sermon, Jesus is only concerned with the disposition of the heart. Such a position does violence to the words of Jesus. "In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus unequivocally forbids his disciples to take a dispute to court, to repay evil with evil, to wreak vengeance, to hate an enemy, to swear an oath, to look at a woman lustfully, etc. In all of this Jesus means exactly what he says and says exactly what he means. He demands that his disciples not only be disposed to follow his instructions but that they actually do as he says" (p. 127). At the same time Bavinck also warns against an extreme literalism in applying the words of Jesus. "One must be careful not to press the word of Jesus too far, since he places these concrete deeds which his disciples must imitate before them in the form of images which no one can take and apply literally. This applies not only to the plucking out of one's eye or the cutting off of one's hand, but also [and somewhat remarkably!] to resisting evil, to turning the cheek, etc., as much as to the foot-washing command of John 13:14." Bavinck summarizes his own position with a distinction between "literal" and "concrete": "While they are not to be taken literally, all these examples are nonetheless to be understood practically and concretely" (p. 127). Secondly, we need to consider Bavinck's emphasis upon the exemplary, illustrative nature of the Sermon on the Mount. Bavinck's claim concerning the apostolic understanding of the imitation of Christ is also true of his own understanding of the Sermon: "The example of Christ becomes for the apostles a noteworthy illustration of the most important virtues which the law requires of us, especially love" (p. 133). The most important consequence of this emphasis upon the illustrative nature of the Sermon is that it must then be regarded as a partial rather than comprehensive ethic for the Christian life. In support of this position Bavinck engages in what is in effect an elementary form of audience criticism of the Sermon. On the basis of Matthew 5:1,2, as well as the content of the Sermon itself, Bavinck concludes that "it was directed especially to the disciples. It was not intended for the nation as a whole or even for its prominent leaders but for the relatively small band of disciples who were not members of the upper echelon of society but of the lower classes which possessed very little eminence or influence.. .. The majority of his disciples [came] from that segment of society characterized by the Old Testament as the poor, the meek, the afflicted, and the lonely." While "Jesus invites those who are weary and heavy laden, who sigh beneath the hard yoke of the Scribal interpretation of the law, to come
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to him and find rest," he also warns them that they must be prepared to experience suffering and tribulation for his name's sake. The ethic of the Sermon is thus partial and incomplete, rooted in the specific circumstances of the early church. "When we keep all this in mind it becomes very easy to understand why Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount, exalts precisely those virtues which his disciples would require above everything else in such circumstances" (pp. 125-26). In sum, the Christian does not have the freedom to accept or reject the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount but does have the freedom to apply the moral virtues and principles, which the sermon illustratively concretizes, in different ways depending upon the circumstances. The Sermon is not only illustrative of the moral law (and thus of the imitation of Christ), but it is also for that very reason a clarification of it. The ethical instruction of Jesus is based on the foundation of an Old Testament theonomous morality. "In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus emphatically declares that he has not come to annul the law and the prophets but to fulfill them. In other words, Jesus declares that he had come to concretize and heighten the demands of the law and the prophets" (p. 124). This clarification of the law, according to Bavinck, must be seen in the context of Jesus' rejection of the Scribal /Pharisaic interpretation of the law. Jesus takes issue "not with the words of the law itself but with its incorrect interpretation and application. It is over against this that Jesus sets his "But I say unto you." Thus the clarification of the Sermon consists of Jesus' setting aside "the traditions of men" and returning "to the very Word of God" (p. 125). Bavinck argues that his exposition of the Sermon on the Mount is confirmed by the rest of the New Testament. The social circumstances of the early church (a minority in a hostile world) meant that the apostles were forced to extol the so-called passive virtues of longsuffering lowliness, meekness, patience, and so forth, (pp. 128-29). Bavinck goes even further. "We must," he notes, "state the case even more strongly. Not only do these so-called passive virtues occupy the prominent place in the ethic of the New Testament, but believers are constantly enjoined to fulfill their obligation and virtually never called to insist upon their rights." The classic example of this, of course, is the institution of slavery. "The New Testament at no point declares slavery to be immoral. . . . Similarly, in the relations of children, wives, and subjects to their parents, husbands, and rulers, the strongest emphasis is placed upon the submission of the former to the latter." Bavinck follows this with a revealing observation: "An other and higher ideal is
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nowhere set before them; nowhere do we find a positive instruction to stand up for their freedom, to insist upon their rights, to improve their lot in life, to consider possible positions of influence for good in state and society" (pp. 129-30). The ethic of the New Testament is thus dominated by passive and negative virtues. This is because "the ethic of the New Testament was written from the vantage point of an oppressed and persecuted body of believers" and because "the early Christians lived with the expectation that Jesus was returning shortly, that the present generation would be the last." The results of exercising these virtues were monumental; the Christian church overcame the world by the power of the Cross. "Having achieved this, however, the church had to adopt a different posture toward the world. The exercise of negative and passive virtues was no longer sufficient to sustain it in its new task of reforming and renewing the world in accord with Christian principles" (pp. 13-31). By stressing the specific social circumstances of the early church as a key constitutive element in the formulation of the New Testament ethic, Bavinck opts for a certain relativization of that ethic. "When the church, by purely ethical and spiritual means, overcame the world," he notes, "[it] could no longer be satisfied with a negative attitude to the world and its culture" and had to strike out in a "new and somewhat different direction" (p. 134). The relativization of the specific and concrete ethic of the New Testament, however, does not mean a relativization of the authority of the New Testament itself, since "the outlines for this task [reforming and renewing the world in accord with Christian principles] had already been sketched in the teaching of Jesus and the apostles. Even though temporary circumstances, the need of the hour, had pushed to the foreground the admonitions to love and suffer long which were found in that instruction, the positive elements were not totally lacking but were latent in the central facts of the Christian gospel" (p. 131). The givens of the gospel that were important for Christians coming to terms with this new task are the three central facts in Christian salvation history: the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection. "The Incarnation is a sign of the gracious love of God the Father through the Son" which "extends to the whole world, to the entire creation, which was originally good, completely a work of God, not only in its spiritual but also in its material existence." The Crucifixion proves that God's love is not opposed to his justice, "but as it were, takes justice up into itself; God exercises his righteousness in the way of grace since
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the cross is at the same time a revelation of the highest love and of strict justice, simultaneously a fulfillment of law and gospel." The Resurrection and exaltation of Christ, following his death and humiliation, are guarantees for believers that if they have died with Christ they shall also live with him; if they "thus temporarily forfeit their rights on earth and patiently suffer injustice, it is not because they do not value justice but because they have entrusted their cause to God who will assuredly afflict those who afflict his people and reward those who are afflicted with the inheritance of eternal life" (p. 132). At this point we need to consider briefly why Bavinck takes this position. In a nutshell, the reason is "that culture taken in the broadest sense and including marriage, family, business, vocation, agriculture, industry, commerce, science, art, politics, and society, is not to be seen as a special product of Christianity. In richer or poorer forms, it can be found among all peoples." The reason that Bavinck takes pains to stress this is found in his doctrine of the Trinity. Christianity, rooted as it is in the redemptive work of God the Son, "has never pretended to be the source of all culture or even that it was its task to bring forth culture. On the contrary, the New Testament presupposes the Old Testament; redemption is accomplished on the foundation of creation; the work of the Son is bound to that of the Father; grace follows nature; rebirth can take place only after birth." Bavinck continues by paraphrasing one of his favorite and most frequently quoted Scripture references, James 1:17: "All the products of culture, marriage, family, state, etc. are good and perfect gifts coming down from the Father of lights" (pp. 135-36). The norms and laws governing culture are therefore not found in Christianity as such. Human culture has a life of its own and is subject to its own laws, which are not discernible from the Gospel as a new law, but can only be uncovered by humanity through experience and investigation. Bavinck thus rejects all biblicistic and gospel-monistic efforts to "Christianize" social, cultural and political life. "It is not the study of Scripture but careful investigation of what God teaches us in his creation and providence that equips us for these tasks" (pp. 123-24). While it is true that the Gospel message is and remains a scandal for the non-believer, Bavinck claims: "It is difficult to prove the contention that our position vis--vis our culture must be identical [to that of the early church]." He believes that "the culture of the present is simply not saturated with heathenism in the same way and to the same degree that it was in the apostolic era. Although it contains many pantheistic and materialistic tendencies which attempt to gain the upper hand, our
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culture does notfindits origins in them." Since many of the roots of modern culture are themselves Christian, the unity of the struggle has been lost. "There is simply far too much in our present-day culture that we gladly and thankfully accept and which we daily use and enjoy. The discoveries of science, the new vistas opened up by the historical sciences, the wondrous things brought forth by technology, are of such a nature that they cannot but be regarded as good and perfect gifts coming down from he Father of lights." A totally antithetical position to the world is incorrect and impossible. "With respect to all human culture it is the responsibility of Christians to judge between good and evil. In actual fact that is precisely what Christians do. No one accepts the existing culture as a whole and no one rejects it altogether" (pp. 137-38). On the ethical level Christianity has also had a transforming effect on the world. "Whatever moral objections one may have about our present society, it cannot be simply designated as heathen . . . governments, legislatures, judiciaries, official life in its entirety, are still influenced by the ethical norms derived from Christianity. Even the modern state and civil order for the most part are grounded in Christian principles." For this reason, Bavinck contends, the imitation of Christ is not an impossible ideal for life in modern society (pp. 138-39). That Bavinck intends this to be taken with all seriousness is clear from his discussion about war. Most broadly, Bavinck insists that while there is no inherent conflict between love and justice, between the moral and civil orders because they both have their origin in the divine will, he also insists (for eschatological reasons) that they should not be identified with one another. "Justice is different from and narrower than morality; the two should not be in conflict, but they will also never be completely one and the same." Not only is justice exclusively concerned with external relationships and conditioned by social-historical circumstances, but, more importantly, "the perfection of individuals and communities belongs to another dispensation." Since "the law of God which is the complete and perfect moral ideal of Christianity is simply not fulfilled by any person on earth" and "the circumstances and relations of a people at a given time . . . are always far removed from perfection . . . thoroughly healthy culture is factually impossible; it has not and never will exist among any people" (p. 139). This salvation-historical realism implies an inevitable duality between love and justice, between the moral and civil orders in this dispensation. Bavinck is sympathetic to Christians who find this duality or dualism unacceptable and "insist that Christian principles be radically and consistently applied to the
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state and civil society" (p. 139). Nevertheless, he does not accept the criticism, and his reason for this will become clear when we take a closer look at his analysis of the war problem.60 The insistence upon a radical and consistent political application of Christian principles becomes especially acute in the lamentable instance of war. War especially appears to be a direct violation of the imitatio Christi, the teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, and the commandment concerning neighbor-love. Bavinck allows for conscientious objection to war but also notes that "from the Christian standpoint, the conscience is quite fallible, and this fallibility is not at all innocent but serious and dangerous" (p. 139). The danger arises "from the fact that condemnation of each and every war is not something all by itself, but is . . . inseparably linked with criticism of the whole civil order" (p. 140). The question of the Christian and war, in the final analysis, comes down to this: "Can the civil order be maintained in a sinful world without coercion and punishment, and, if this is not possible, is Christianity then called to oppose that order?" In Bavinck's judgment there can be no doubt whatsoever about the correct answer to this question. "Law as well as gospel, the civil as well as the moral order, have a divine origin . . . without authority and coercion society is impossible. Christ did not come to resist or set aside this ordinance of God but rather to establish and sanctify it; grace presupposes and restores nature; the gospel fulfills rather than abolishes the law" (p. 141). The problem of war, of course, arises from the reality of sin. "In the sinful world in which we live, the necessity of the civil order implies the prerogative to wage war in situations of critical need." Bavinck harbors no illusions about the actuality of just war practice even though he supports the theory. "The very small number of truly just wars in contrast to the many wars which were conducted for unholy reasons and unholy ends, obliges us to work for a secure peace." However, abusus non tollit usum. "Situations may arise in which nations have no alternative but war." Bavinck even goes further than this. Because there are moral and spiritual values, such as freedom of religion and con-
60. See Kruithof's discussion on the question of war in "The Relation of Christianity and Culture in the Teaching of Herman Bavinck/' pp. 266-70. In addition to the second imitation article, which is framed in the context of the question of war, Bavinck wrote two substantial essays on the question: Het Problem van den Oorlog (Kampen: Kok, 1914) and Christendom, Oorlog, Volkenbond (Utrecht: Ruys, 1920).
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science that are worth more than prosperity, welfare, and peace, Bavinck judges that in times when these are threatened "any government that failed to call its subjects into battle would thereby prove its unsuitedness for the task which God entrusted to it" (p. 141). While Bavinck acknowledges that there are situations in which the civil order is so thoroughly corrupted that passive resistance is the Christian's duty (the Early Church in the Roman empire is given as an example), he insists that "Christians who desire to live according to the law of God and to imitate the example of Jesus do not need to oppose the civil order nor in principle condemn all war." Even in a situation of war the Christian can be an imitator of Christ. Those who interpret Jesus' words in such a way as to demand a radical rejection of the civil order forget the social limitation of his words. "They misunderstand ... the intention of Jesus' words since these words totally fail to mention the duties of citizens and civil authorities and are only concerned with the virtues which his disciples, following his example, are called to exercise practically in their relations with others in a hostile society" (p. 142). The virtues that Jesus' followers are called to exercise arise from the one moral law of God although the application of that law and the specific duties demanded of people will vary As an example, Bavinck cites the case of a soldier whose duty it is "to resist the enemy in times of war even though personal vengeance or hate are categorically to be rejected" (p. 143). While he grants that "the circumstances of war place tremendous obstacles in the way of practicing those virtues," he insists that "there is essentially no difference between the difficulties that soldiers, even at the front, face in their calling to imitate Christ, than can be found in the course of ordinary life." In both cases "it requires a costly act of self-denial and struggle to remain faithful in the small and great things and to keep oneself undefiled from the world." For this reason, "if a war is clearly tied to the preservation of justice, Christian citizens can enter the conflict with free consciences, and, even on the battlefield, exercise those virtues demanded by the imitation of Christ" (p. 143). Bavinck notes that it is easier to adopt a position of radical rejection of culture than one of transformation. "It is much easier to curse capital, to condemn war, to reject all culture, than it is to walk in all these areas as a Child of God and to imitate Christ. And yet, it is precisely this that is required of us if we wish to remain standing in the struggle and to overcome the opponent as the early church did" (p. 144).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The imitation of Christ thus functions as both an active and a passive ideal in Bavinck's ethics. Following Christ may in certain circumstances require Christian passive resistance to an evil civil order, but in all circumstances must shape and influence the Christian's active involvement in society and culture. A passive imitation of Christ in the Christian life of discipleship is directly proportional to the degree of hostility that a society in general displays to the Christian gospel and church. The ethic of the New Testament as a whole must be seen in the context of such a hostile culture and society. For this reason Bavinck relativizes the ethic of the New Testament with its emphasis upon passive and negative virtues. In a socio-cultural situation where the Christian gospel has been a leaven and the hostility has diminished to such an extent that Christians can take active, culturally influential positions within society, the imitation of Christ as such cannot be the comprehensive theme governing the various spheres of life. Norms for political life, business life, science, and so forth, cannot be drawn from the imitation of Christ nor the Gospel, not even Scripture itself, but can only be discovered, as laws of creation by experience and investigation. Cultural life is not a product of Christianity; Christianity presupposes cultural life. Nevertheless, because all human cultural activity is affected by sin and sin can only be overcome by spiritual power, the imitation of Christ remains a necessary aspect of the Christian's active cultural involvement. To ignore the imitation of Christ as an essential ingredient of the life of Christian discipleship is to court the danger of worldliness. The imitation of Christ is not a new law. The freedom of the Christian, in the Spirit, to apply the imitation principle must be respected. Spiritual discernment is necessary to judge the extent to which the imitation of Christ requires passive or active resistance to evil. But the struggle against sin goes on. In that struggle to do the will of God, the free application of the imitation of Christ remains the key to a proper life of Christian discipleship. In a sympathetic, yet fairly critical review of Charles Sheldon's In His Steps, Bavinck summarizes the true imitation of Christ thus: "The true imitation of Christ occurs when, freely and independently as children of God, in our circumstances and relationships, even when it demands of us the most severe self-denial and a bearing of the heaviest cross, we do the same will of God which Christ explicated and perfectly fulfilled at the cost of his glory and life, even
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to the death on the cross, since whoever does the will of God is Jesus' brother and sister and mother."61 How then does Bavinck relate the particularity of "Christ" to the universality of "law"? Clearly, the law representing universal, creational, human obligations is ontologically prior. The law, including our obligations to God as well as to our neighbor, is the touchstone for a genuinely human existence. Love, the fulfillment of the law, is constitutive of humanity. However, because sin distorts both our awareness of and our ability to do the good required by the law, Christ the Redeemer, obediently fulfilled the moral law and clarified its true meaning. In a sinful world, self-giving love results in suffering. The imitatio Christi, our incorporation into his death and resurrection and following him in a life of sacrificial, self-giving love, is the sine qua non both to knowing and doing the will of God which alone is life indeed for human beings. In short, we are Christian in order to be truly human. A final note. In this paper we have considered Bavinck's understanding of Christ and the law from the vantage point of the imitatio Christ theme. This was done deliberately to explore the relation between the historical particularity of the Christian story (especially the Cross) and the universal moral order (the law), especially for the life of Christian discipleship. Justifying extending the moral demand of sacrificial-love universally to all people, even to those who do not self-consciously follow Jesus, would require us to explore in greater detail the Trinitarian framework, hinted at in this paper, focusing on Christ as "mediator" of Creation, as the Logos of the moral order, inseparable from but nonetheless distinct from the incarnate Jesus. This is the ultimate resolution of the Christ/law problematic. It is also the topic of another essay.
61. "Wat Zou Jezus Doen," De Bazuin, XLVIII (1900), no. 8.
^ s
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CTJ 28 (1993): 45-73

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

59. Imitation I, p. 332.

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHRIST AND THE LAW IN THE ETHICS OF HERMAN BAVINCK

61. "Wat Zou Jezus Doen," De Bazuin, XLVIII (1900), no. 8.

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