Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation Author(s): E. J.

Lowe Reviewed work(s): Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 65, No. 1, Prospects for Dualism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2006), pp. 5-23 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27667849 . Accessed: 11/01/2012 10:59
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Erkenntnis (2006) 65:5-23 DOI 10.1007/sl0670-006-9012-3

? Springer 2006

E.

J. LOWE

SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND THE NON-CARTESIAN PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION

ABSTRACT. selves

Non-Cartesian from as their

substance

dualism bodies

are distinct

from separable In this paper, bodied existence. or standard dualism Cartesian mental proposed operations contrast, character 'blind' causation. A model

persons regards are necessarily

'substances'

organic physical in their own their bodies,

right, in the

or that persons maintains (NCSD) It and any parts of those bodies. but does not maintain that persons sense of disem of being capable than either is better equipped to explain of the possibility is the by to

physicalism causation the NCSD perspective adopting known about with all that is currently it is argued, is consistent which, nervous the brain. Physicalism, central of the human system, including of mental seems ill-equipped of mental causation, causation to explain because the distinctively intentional reduces all such or it effectively level.

it is urged forms of

that NCSD

ideological causation

physical

at a neurological

1 INTRODUCTION Non-Cartesian that selves of intentional substance dualism maintains or that persons and agents

(NCSD)

is to say, self-conscious are distinct actions

and any parts of those bodies, as It regards persons systems. sense of 'substance' in which bearer

subjects bodies from their organic physical as or nervous their brains central such substances this denotes in their

of experience

does not depend of properties which does not maintain that NCSD than itself.1 However, thing other sense are necessarily in of from their the bodies, persons separable It that disembodied existence. of indeed, allows, per being capable in the sense that they genuinely beings, physical as such and weight. An characteristics, possess physical shape, height, he of this sort of view was Strawson, although early proponent want to term resist the 'dualist' almost himself would certainly using sons are themselves in this context.2 NCSD that

own right, in the a persisting entity and for its identity on any

on a number one of which of grounds, is may be defended or standard than either Cartesian dualism it is better equipped

6 of physicalism Cartesian dualism, mental lacks substance, spatial how explaining forms

E.

J. LOWE

to explain insisting no possesses by

the possibility that the self

of mental or as

causation. a purely and hence of in the

location,

any as Jaegwon Kim has recently urged.3 particular, to explain the distinctively other hand, seems ill-equipped or teleological character of mental because causation, reduces all such causation to 'blind' recognizing logical level. NCSD, of the self and the autonomous to avoid both positioned of mental causation model proposed rently system, and known I shall about of

physical is apparently faced soul is causally related

soul, characteristics with to a its

difficulty 'own' body on Physicalism,

intentional it effectively at a neuro aspects is well

causation physical as it does both the physical of mental causation,

nature these

including

argue the operations the brain.

a In the present paper, failings. the will be NCSD adopting perspective that it is consistent with all that is cur of the human central nervous

2 CARTESIAN DUALISM for doubting the identity of the human self or some of of any part it, such as the brain, body, I shall discuss which shortly. But, if we deny any such identity, how can we account for the apparent fact that we have causal control over can we accommodate our in of bodies how the possi short, parts In I the remainder this of causationl of shall first mental paper, bility for denying that look at some reasons is, for self-body identity some a form of substance and then at of dualism ways accepting There how the notion of mental causation might be rendered understanding such a view of the self. consistent with of all substance Ren? Descartes, of course, was the most famous of the doctrine, the mind (or self, or soul) and and exist which the body are two distinct substances, separable a a this in union'. that 'substance' in 'substantial (Note by together an individual meant context Descartes that exists being independently and bears properties, of other such beings save, of course, God over time. There in is no implication, which may however, change dualists.4 On his version Descartes's 'stuff of conception so of substance that it would that a substance be must consist of his of by has, any kind, to allege the that he regarded position some sort of 'spiritual matter', such as the 19th-century spiritualists.) Now, each of a gross caricature of soul as being composed 'ectoplasm' postulated these two substances are many the human reasons

with

NON-CARTESIAN

SUBSTANCE

DUALISM

according

a principal to Descartes, attribute which the other lacks or consciousness, in the case of the mind, and thought, spatial are modes extension and all of its properties in the case of the body of that attribute. of Thus, modes (that is, particular determinations) include and volitions, whereas beliefs, desires, thought particular of extension include to Descartes, but no shape, So, particular shapes, sizes, and velocities. whereas the mind has beliefs, and desires, the body has shape, size, and size, or velocity, or volitions. desires,

modes

according volitions,

but no beliefs, velocity, Descartes has two main argument and body, from and

in favour of this view. First, an arguments the conceiv ability of the separate existence of mind second an argument from the supposed indivisibility, he contrasts with the (more evident) look briefly at those may be reconstructed exist without since at arguments. as follows.

or simplicity,

divisibility The conceiv ability (1) It is conceivable

of the soul, which of the body. Let us argument that

I should is possible,

(2) What
about.

is conceivable

a body. least God

can bring

it

(3) So, it ispossible that I should exist without a body. (4) If it is possible that I should exist without a body, then I and my
body must (5) Therefore, This argument be distinct I and my is open and body substances. separable are distinct and separable in various places, substances. at step

to challenge

notably

guide

to possibility that is, to real or metaphysical Step possibility. a body or, in other words, that my body is essentially (4) presumes in which my body exists, it is a body (for that in every possible world a body, if my body is not essentially then it is possible that I am my and the possible in which those worlds in which I exist without a body are

(2) and at step (4). Step (2) presumes that conceivability

is a reliable

body,

simply however, with step

exists but is not a body).5 my body That, so is a very plausible the main lies presumption, difficulty the that what is conceivable is (2), supposition really pos to if it is supposed sible.6 But step (1) is also controversial, especially as a whole via step (2) is, I think, step (3). The argument imply too to much and that carry force, questionable persuasive simply seems to most be the verdict of Des since certainly philosophers
cartes's time.

is rather argument divisibility in the following structed fashion. (1) The self or soul lacks any parts

The

simpler,

and may

be

recon

into which

it is divisible.

8 (2) The body, of parts. being spatially

E.

J. LOWE

extended,

is divisible

and

so composed and the self

the self and the body are distinct (3) Hence, the body, unextended. is, unlike (Note conclusion

substances

the conceivability delivers the that, whereas argument that the self and the body are distinct and separable sub the divisibility delivers the conclusion that the self stances, argument and the body are distinct substances and only the latter is extended.) to be challenged, but itmay as (2) presumes, is logi whether, being extended sufficient for divisible into to it For is parts. cally being possible maintain that even a simple substance may, in principle, be spatially it is premise Here, also be questioned (1) that ismost likely extended.7 reveal at this stage that my own view is perhaps a so that the self is indeed extended substance: simple, but spatially of the divisibility that, in fact, I agree with the two premises argument aside the presumption, in (2), that being extended (setting implicit I should

that does not mean that I think However, implies being divisible). that the argument is a good one. Indeed, I could not myself employ reason that argument without since part of my for circularity, a that the self is I substance is that maintaining simple precisely believe it to be distinct But this is already from the body.8 to pre suppose bility from something that argument. My the body (or any part of it) will be outlined shortly. To sum up: I think that it is clear enough that Descartes's are simply not for his version of substance dualism arguments belief in his doctrine, so I shall is part of the conclusion, (3), of the divisi own reasons for holding the self to be distinct two suffi say no

to warrant ciently compelling more about them here.

3 NON-CARTESIAN Let me stance now

SUBSTANCE DUALISM

dualism

Descartes, does not that be able

I mean sub by non-Cartesian explain more fully what mean a I NCSD. this which with holds, By position that the self is distinct from the body or any part of it, but insist either that the self is separable from anything bodily or

it is spatially It allows, that is, that the self may not unextended. a body and that it may be extended to exist without in space, as thus possessing such and size, spatial properties shape, spatial location. Itmay also allow that indeed, I think that it should insist the self is simple, or not composed of parts, although I shall not dwell

NON-CARTESIAN

SUBSTANCE

DUALISM

on

to think of the self-body that point now. One way relation to NCSD relation of embodiment is by analogy with according a bronze statue and the lump of bronze composing relation between

the the it

at any given time.9 The statue and the lump are, very plausibly, not to exist in the absence each could continue of the identical, because other but the lump could survive squashing into a thin disc, (for example, the statue could whereas statue the could the survive not, one of of its arms, but would then be composed of a replacement

different

Even so, the statue clearly does need to be lump of matter). of material: it could not exist in an entirely something composed state. Of course, if the self really is simple, as I believe, 'disembodied' then this analogy is imperfect, but it still suffices to let us see how two individual 'substances' that is, non-identical and may be distinct a related that they exactly at coincide yet be so intimately spatially given time, many shape, size, and mass. in favour of NCSD, and why of substance dualism? share, at that of their physical should As it be pre for the second

time and necessarily such as their properties, What ferred can be said to Descartes's

version

itmay be urged that NCSD is a less extreme and intuitively question, more plausible doctrine less extreme because to it is not committed more the possibility of disembodied existence and it because plausible our intuition not just our bodies, occupy that we ourselves, respects of shape, size, mass, and spatial location. space and have properties One may also point out, as I have already that the standard done, are for Cartesian not dualism As for the very compelling. arguments as follows. I answer It seems clear, upon however, question, that the identity-conditions of selves and bodies reflection, including as do those of statues differ radically, parts of bodies quite as much and lumps of bronze. of entities of any (By the 'identity-conditions' the conditions and given kind, K, I simply mean logically necessary first for the truth any identity-statement of the form 'a is the same K as b\ where 'a' and '?' are names for entities of kind K.10) In evidence of this, it is very plausible to suppose, for example, that I could survive parts a wholly inorganic sessing the gradual replacement of appropriate kinds, 'bionic' of every cell in my body by so that I would end up pos in all of its parts from my distinct sufficient

body, of course, is that I cannot existing biological body.11 The implication, same as have the those of my existing biological identity-conditions I can survive a change which it and all body or any part of it, because of its parts cannot survive and consequently I cannot be identical with that body or any part of it.

10 Another and inmy view

E.

J. LOWE

is consideration compelling or that either my whole the following. It does not appear any body, - as in the way that / do the unique part of it, can qualify particular of and other conscious mental all of states, for my thoughts subject no one bodily for the existence is necessary of all of those entity even if each of them depends states of mine, for its existence mental even more for instance, that it were proposed upon some bodily entity. Suppose, believe. Now, that I am identical with my brain, as many physicalists even if it is granted that each of my conscious and feelings thoughts on some depends of my brain and seems clear that conscious neuronal particular activity going on in some part it could not exist in the absence of such activity, there is no one part of my brain such that all of my

and feelings depend upon neuronal activity going thoughts on precisely there. Nor, of course, need all of my brain exist in order to enjoy each and every one of my conscious and for me thoughts a even true I if it is that without brain would enjoy no feelings, I could still and feelings whatsoever. For, clearly, thoughts even if my brain were have many conscious and feelings thoughts in various different ways by the loss or destruction of various reduced means But be it. all of this that the of different parts relationship conscious tween my particular conscious clear me to exist and feelings and my brain or any thoughts from the relationship between my part of it is very different as and their For it seems and me, feelings subject. thoughts conscious and feelings and every one of these thoughts requires in other words, could not exist without me since, after and of them could exist as someone else's conscious thoughts

that each -

all, none

as we have just and still less as no one else's.12 By contrast, feelings, seen, it is not true of each and every one of my conscious thoughts the whole of my brain and feelings that it could not exist without in of them could still exist even if it were reduced since many existing, as we have also seen, is there is any specific part of ways. Nor, my brain such that it is true of each and every one of my conscious and feelings that it could not exist without that part existing. thoughts various Hence, whole for kind that cells I conclude or with any is that that I cannot be identical specific part of it. In my a strong I, as a self or subject of experience, possess - a kind of unity of unity, in virtue of being a simple substance as it is of millions of is not possessed by my brain, composed and separable material parts (all of the neurons and other either with my brain as a reason view, the ultimate

this

distinct

it up). make that collectively see any remotely plausible to I simply cannot way for a physicalist a I to that such the indeed, think, argument. foregoing respond

NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM 11 to denying of is ultimately the very existence committed philosopher some philosophers Of course, the self or T, as a subject of experience. this position, have bravely notably David Hume13 though adopted even he conceded I prefer to that doing so is intolerably paradoxical. see in it the reductio ad absurdum of physicalism.

4 THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION But let me turn now to the problem causation. This has of mental a particular to present for been thought Cartesian difficulty a but is that really so, and if so, does it equally present that

always dualism often

difficulty for NCSD? Let us look at Cartesian dualism first. Here it is

an unex it is completely how mysterious could have causal any tended, non-physical impact upon the presumption the body that any cause of a being, perhaps, complained substance event must either be located where that event to it by a chain of events connecting to the location of the effect.14 This presumption that the domain chain is, or at least be the location of the cause

physical related

another, namely, in the sense that no purely

is closely related to events is causally closed, of physical can lead backwards of causation from a

causes some of which are non effect to antecedent physical seem in It that Cartesian dualism character.15 may certainly physical cannot meet if the presumptions this sort of objection, mentioned just are correct seems to imply that the this form of dualism because mental causes unextended NCSD, in a supposedly effects, bodily being changes could have no spatial location. Be that as it may, in contrast, does not insist that the self is unextended and of soul,

so apparent in spatial properties, and hence it is not nearly lacking to sort of objection that the preceding it. In any case, we need applies to think afresh about mental in order to see whether, causation and if so how, NCSD can accommodate it.

5 NCSD AND THE NON-IDENTITY OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CAUSES What to trace the purely is that if we were plausible bodily as the movement of any peripheral such of my event, bodily arm on a given occasion, in time indefinitely backwards far, we would a find that those causes like the of branches tree, into a ramify, maze nervous events of antecedent in my system and brain complex causes these neural events being widely distributed across large areas of seems

12 those

E.

J. LOWE

no single focus anywhere, the parts of my body and having no distinct causal chains to which moreover, they belong possessing, 1 below.17 And yet, my mental act of decision See Figure beginnings.16 or choice to move my arm seems, from an introspective point of view, to be a singular and unitary occurrence which somehow initiated my if at all, can we reconcile action of raising my arm. How, these two seems act It to facts? of choice with my apparent impossible identify nor even individual neural with combination of event, any any it and they seem to have such dif events, because or seems to be uni ferent causal features The act of choice profiles. the neural role, whereas tary and to have, all by itself, an 'initiating' seem to be thoroughly events to and in contribute disunified merely individual neural different which
movement.

to a host of different ways lead independently of one

ongoing another

causal to

of chains, many arm the eventual

enable us to see how both of these causal can, I believe, can be correct, without on one being action physical perspectives sort to the and without reducible other of rivalry between the any to the person or selftwo. The act of choice to me, in is attributable to parts of the this case whereas the neural events are attributable are even and self and distinct if body things, they are not body: NCSD separable things. bodily movement the act of choice the Moreover, explains causally the movement of my arm in a different way the neural events explain it. The neural events from the way in which at such in the particular way that it did explain why the arm moved a direction a speed and in such-and-such at a certain precise and-such

the act of choice explains why a movement time. By contrast, of that a arm in kind this of occurred around case, my general rising I about the time that it did. It did so because shortly beforehand decided to raise my precise speed, a movement ofthat difference between arm. My and direction, did not determine the certainly arm's movement, timing of my only that occur around about then. The sort would decision of causal explanation reveals itself

general the two kinds

\/

\/

\/

\/\/

\/

\/

\y

Figure

I.

NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM 13 one contemplates clearly when If I had not decided cations. been have an arm-movement remained of their respective counterfactual to raise my arm, there wouldn't that kind at all my arm would impli have either

instead, however, events,

at rest or, if I had decided to make another movement a in quite different way. It doesn't it would have moved seem, that one can isolate any neural event, or any set of neural non-occurrence would as the non-occurrence

have had the same exactly of the decision.18 my Rather, consequences one can or or most set if this that that neural of event, say is that the arm-movement neural had not occurred, have events, might - more or in a somewhat different manner proceeded jerkily, perhaps, arm more not at would that have remained rest, or my quickly in a quite different kind of way. would instead have moved whose

6 COUNTERFACTUALS, This

CAUSATION, AND THE NON-IDENTITY

THESIS

one and warrants last point is an extremely further important It is now standard practice of elucidation. amongst philosophers logic to interpret in terms of and language counterfactual conditionals 'If it were be true if case, q is is the one the actual

as follows.19 A counterfactual of the form possible worlds, case case it be that p, then would the that q" is said to the in which p is the and only if, in the closest possible world the 'closest' possible world in question also the case where in which p is the case but otherwise from differs minimally world. Now, suppose D, to raise my decision, choice is identical with identifiable as a cause that a physicalist arm on a given a certain neural were occasion

to propose that my act of my mental

is correctly event, N, which of the subsequent of my arm's bodily event, B, must stress B I that and each of are, D, N, them, par (Here rising. at a particular moment of time, with B ticular events, each occurring at least an appreciable fraction of a second later than D and occurring our not to act do take effect immediately since decisions and the N, occur same must D at TV of that and the course, suppose, physicalist us conse to be identical.20) them Let concede, time, since he holds is true: 'If N had not oc that the following counterfactual not have occurred'.21 What I am interested in is curred, then B would sort event in the following what of would have occurred, question: In other words: in the closest stead of B, if N had not occurred? sort of event occurs in which N does not occur, what possible world quently, instead of Bl My contention is that what occurs in this world is an

14 event reason event must of the same sort as B, for this is as follows.

E.

J. LOWE

differing

from B only

very

slightly.

The

It seems

from what we know about the neural causes of an evident, must be an immensely such as B, that TV complex neural event: it of a very large number of be, in fact, the sum (or 'fusion') in some particular each of them consisting events, a must in that TV be way. here, (Recall, firing particular to occur an appreciable amount of time before B, at a time of B are many the neural antecedents and quite widely neural

individual neuron's supposed at which distributed for

across my cerebral cortex.) It would be utterly implausible to maintain, D is for example, the physicalist that my decision or even of a small the firing of just a single neuron, identical with If D is identical with any neural event at all, it of neurons. number can surely only be identical with an extremely one, con complex neurons over quite a large in the firing of many distributed seems cortex. it of cerebral that if TV However, my indisputable region sum a number of individual of neural events, is, thus, the very large in which TV itself does not occur in then the closest world is a world sisting which neural highly complex TV in of from very slightly respect it is the sum. In other words, which another the same individual neural events a neural in which possible world more than this minimal possible standard world in which we semantics event, TV*, occurs, differing only events the individual of neural will TV* consist of almost

exactly as TV,plus or minus one or two. Any event occurs that differs from TV in not This as the closest qualify is evidently what the

way simply will TVdoes not occur. about

for counterfactuals know clear

But, given what nervous system, it causes

us to say in this case. the functioning of the brain and requires

in which TV* that, in the possible world a a event to similar because such small occurs, very B, bodily TV and TV* in respect of the individual difference between neural to events of which the sums cannot be expected they are respectively a very big difference between a good deal of redundancy their bodily effects. There is, we in the functioning of neural sys or the to fire of one or two motor neurons,

it seems

make know,

tems, so that the failure at most abnormal firing of one or two others, will typically make only a minimal to the difference with behaviour regard peripheral bodily to the question than ensues. Thus, the answer earlier what posed event would sort of bodily occurred? is this: a bodily same way have occurred instead

TV had not occurred, my as it actually did.

of B, if TVhad not event very similar to B. In other words, if arm would still have risen in almost exactly the

NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM 15 I hope, we can see Now, we ask what sort of bodily my decision, D, to raise my answer. get a very different I had not made my arm would the importance of this conclusion. event would have occurred instead arm had not then we For, of B if if

occurred, plausibly if D had not occurred if Very plausibly, arm act I to of choice that the very did raise my then not have risen at all. It is, I suggest, quite incredible to

that if I had not made that very decision, have D, I would suppose a decision D in made from other words, virtually indistinguishable to raise my arm in the same, or virtually another decision the same, if I had not made that decision, then I would way. On the contrary, or else no decision a quite different at all. decision either have made nervous Either way that there is defective in my assuming nothing my arm would not have risen almost system exactly as it did. If all of this reasoning is correct, then it follows unavoidably that with which my decision D cannot be identical with the neural event TV to identify the physicalist it, for the counterfactual proposes impli of these two events are quite different. cations of the non-occurrence If D had had not not exactly for this parallels the reason given earlier for the non identity of the self with the brain or any part of it. It is that a mental act of choice or decision is, in a strong sense, a singular and unitary sum or fusion of independent neural event, unlike a highly complex one or two of such as N. N* differs from N only in excluding events, reason the individual That neural is why N events and N* others. one or two N or including composing can be so similar and thus have such occurred, my it would occurred, arm would have risen not have almost risen at all, but ifN as it did. The

ultimate

similar effects. But D cannot be thought of, in like man intelligibly of myriads of little events and that is why, in ner, as being composed the closest possible world in which D itself does not occur, there does not occur differs another decision D* which differs from D as little as N* from N.

7 THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF MENTAL CAUSATION So far, voluntary I have tried to explain movements the mental be and neural causes of

distinct, bodily consistently as I do, that such movements have both mental and neural allowing, causes. Now I want to say a little more about the respects in which or physical is distinctively different mental causation from bodily causation. causation Most importantly, it is the causation

why must

with

is intentional causation then, mental of an intended effect of a certain kind.

16

E.

J. LOWE

is not like this. All physical causation causation Bodily causes are not 'directed towards' the sense that physical

is 'blind', in their effects

causes are. Both sorts of causation in the way that mental need to be to give a full explanation in order invoked of human action and seems best equipped to accommodate NCSD this fact. The very logic of intentional causation differs from the logic of bodily causation. isfact causation, Intentional causation while bodily causation is event to move That is to say, a choice or decision one's body in causation.22 a certain way is causally for the fact that a bodily responsible a a movement certain kind whereas neural occurs, event, or set of of a neural is causally for events, particular responsible bodily move event. The decision, is a particular which unlike the neural ment, event, occurs, event, (One doesn't not causally explain why that particular bodily movement one cannot least because intend to cause a particular to bring it about that an event of a certain kind occurs.

only can only intend if one can make it an object of something as an I cannot event the but make non-existent future yet thought, can as at most of I think of the future my thought object including an event of a certain kind, such as a rising of my arm.) As I have just remarked, the two species of explanation, mental and physical, the following certain kind that kind Intentional cases such as are both reason. occurred occurred, causation and are mutually for complementary, a a event of Merely why particular an to is not necessarily event know of yet why required to know as opposed can provide to an the cannot. event latter More of type some of other kind. in explanation an event, specifically:

bodily a particular to be which may appear bodily movement, a coincidental from inas merely purely physiological point of view as it is the upshot much of a host of independent neural events pre to be merely coincidental from an appear ceding it will by no means intentional point of view, since it was an event of a kind that the agent intended

in which

causation

to produce.23 fact that a mental Notice, here, that the foregoing decision, D, to a cannot kind of certain be said to cause movement, perform bodily occurrence the particular of kind that whose renders B, event, bodily that decision is already successful the of the arguments implied by section of this paper. For, given that D is not identical with preceding the actual does not neural occur different in which cause, TV,of B, the closest possible world is still a world in which D occurs but in that world caused TV a

B*, ensues, being slightly bodily movement, a slightly different neural TV*. (Clearly, if D is not cause, to suppose with that the closest world TV, then there is no reason

there by identical in

NON-CARTESIAN

SUBSTANCE

DUALISM

17

which world more does the

TVdoes in which from not occur, occurrence

not

occur of

is also these

one events

in which do not a world

D does occur in which

not

occur,

for a

both other of D

the actual

world

than

things being equal.) However, is compatible with the occurrence movements

differs evidently just one of them this means that of two

numerically and hence that At some of

different bodily does not causally bodily movement

of the same kind, B and B*, determine which of these occurs, but only of their kind occurs.

on the I anticipate the following this point, objection possible Couldn't the that the concede part simply physicalist. physicalist our is not identical with the the complex neural event TV, in example, and thereby concede that D does not cause the mental decision D still B, that is caused bodily movement, by TV while particular some D is identical with neural call it which that event, M, insisting to to Dl According that I am attributing ex is identical with a neural event, M, which causally some movement not of B's kind but occurred, why bodily plains why B in particular for occurred. No such a position is not tenable, reasons which we have already encountered. that Recall that I argued has precisely this view, D the causal role conditional is true: 'If D had not oc counterfactual following no movement of J5's would have occurred'. then kind curred, bodily to raise my arm, That is to say, if I had not performed that decision not have risen in anything like the way that it did it my arm would some or not at all, in would either have moved quite different way, the because to do if I had not made any something quite neural thing. Can the same thing be said with regard to the putative once again, plausibility event Ml No, it can't. This is because, de mands that the physicalist takes M to be an extremely complex neural so of the firings of very many individual neurons, event, composed that the closest one in which in which M itself does not occur will be possible world a neural event, M*, occurs which differs from M only in neurons. And it simply of the firing of one or two individual to suppose that this very should make all the difference small difference arm between M and between different I would that decision, or else not have either decided have decided to do

respect isn't credible and M* some

my rising kind of bodily movement Conse quite different occurring. that is true of M the counterfactual conditional is this: 'IfM quently, of B's kind would had not occurred, then a bodily movement still once are because different have occurred'. counterfactuals more, So, new true of D and M, D and M cannot be identical. The physicalist's proposal proposal. encounters The the same exactly is that mental difficulty as did his original difficulty causes like D have a strong

18

E.

J. LOWE

fails to characterize neural events such unity which extremely complex as TVand M. Because of this lack of strong unity, the closest worlds in occur are events like TVand M do not which in which worlds the vast majority bodily Much have of effects their parts still occur, still ensue. can and should be with the consequence that similar

more

said on

discussed

tent with

of them extensively many the foregoing remarks for present

these matters, but since I I shall rest con elsewhere, purposes.24

8 CAUSAL CLOSURE AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM Here itmay be asked: But what about the causes of my acts or choice? Are or mental, or both? My own these bodily, or choice isfree, that an act of decision in the 'libertarian' is to say, it is uncaused.25 This is not to say that decisions that they demand of a only inexplicable, explanations of decision is opinion sense - that are simply non-causal

are explicable sort. Decisions in terms of reasons, not causes. That is to say, if we want to know why an agent decided to act as he did, we reasons so to to in the light of which he chose need into the inquire to NCSD, to the self decisions attributable are, according to the body or any part of it, there is no implication here that event is uncaused. any bodily How But now it may be wondered: is it really possible for mental acts of decision to explain in the physical if that domain, anything act.26 Since and not domain how, is causally we precisely, of the physical domain. to the thesis of physical I said, no chain of causal closure, can lead backwards from a purely physical effect to ante closure some of which on are causation that mental the NCSD in character. But new-physical as I have described model, it, causal closure, since it does not or choice are events closed, defined in the sense the causal defined earlier? Let us recall

According causation cedent does intentional

causes not violate

the thesis events

mediating to bodily purely physical leading effects: it does not postulate that there are 'gaps' in chains of physical causation that are 'filled' by mental events.27 As we have seen, on the can a NCSD decision model, explain the fact that a bodily movement on a given occasion, but not the particular of a certain kind occurred in chains of causation movement Even then NCSD that occurred.28 if physical causation is deterministic, so, itmay be protested, no on the there for intentional is really causation scope to explain model because the relevant anything physical,

postulate between

of physical acts of decision

NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM 19 counterfactuals that if I had not not have still have will It will be false, to say all be false. for instance, to raise my arm, a rising of my arm would the same bodily movement would rather, precisely

decided

occurred: occurred, did cause

actually never any

events that the same physical caused by precisely is true, there was for if physical determinism events should not have real possibility that those physical it

nor that they should have had different so. effects. Maybe occurred, in quantum the 20th But, in view of the developments physics during we now not know that causation is in fact deter century, physical so the objection ministic, The NCSD model of is an idle one intentional and can causation safely be ignored. seem may nonetheless

I suggest that that is because to many philosophers. they are puzzling - one still in the grip of an unduly of causation simple conception admits of one event by one or more which only of the causation antecedent which stretch of causation events back belonging indefinitely to one or more Since chains this of causation far in time. is the only sort causa intentional

recognized tion on the NCSD model To

of such a science.29 reason to dismiss because itwill seem more

the perspective a physicalist, this invisibility will seem like a as spurious, the notion of intentional causation I hope, To more broad-minded 'non-scientific'. philosophers,

by the physical to be is bound

sciences, invisible from

like a reason to perceive no genuine conflict between more in the sciences and humanistic another, physical explanation our our to intentional reference choices of actions, way by explaining or decisions for which we make and the reasons them.

ACKNOWLEGDMENTS an earlier version I am grateful received when for comments of this a was as at the delivered lecture of M?nchen paper special University on am also grateful to two referees for their comments in July 2004.1 and criticisms recommendations draft of a previous for amendments and to Wolfram Hinzen draft. for his to the penultimate

NOTES
1 For more on this of substance, see Lowe (1998), 6.

2 See Strawson (1959), especially Chapter 3. 3 See Kim (2001). I do not want to imply that I myself
objection. As I have remarked elsewhere, the idea that

conception

Chapter

fully endorse this sort of

must be 'local' was

causation

20

E.

J. LOWE

some of gravitation abandoned 300 years ago: by the Newtonian effectively theory are made Similar observations Lowe pp. 22-23. (2000b), concerning post-Newtonian to the present Hinzen in their contribution and Juan Uriagereka physics by Wolfram seem to a issue of Erkenntnis. since still wedded However, many philosophers on causation, can at least claim localization constraint NCSD over Cartesian in philosophical dualism debate. 4 Descartes See, especially, (1984). 5 on see Trenton For more this point, Merricks, (1994), I find is technically it extremely Merricks's correct, objection regard 'body' an entity's ontological as qualifies on category an ontological as being one of par a dialectical advantage

80-85. Although I because implausible, its essential features and pp. excellence. 1. For more on

surely

category

ontological categories, 6 For extensive debate possibility,

see Lowe

7
8

see Gendler

(2006), especially Chapter the controversial between relationship and Hawthorne (2002).

conceivability

and

See further Lowe (1998), pp. 202-203.

See, especially, Baker Lowe (2000). (2001). I explain and thus why see a 'constitution' Imyself don't view of accept as imperfect, the foregoing in Lowe analogy own view 15-21. My is that the relationship of less intelligible on that account.

Compare embodiment

like Baker's,

See also Lowe pp. (2001). (2000b), is a sui generis the embodiment one, but none 10 see Lowe or Lowe For more details, (1989), 11 Baker pp. 122-123. (2000), Compare

(1997).

12 See further Lowe (1996), pp. 25ff. 13 See Hume (1978), p. 252 and also the Appendix.
14 See in n. 3 above, I am not it recognize of many I myself Imerely in the minds

for reasons mentioned (1993). And again, again Kim I this sort of complaint. that with entirely sympathize implying as one that seems, or some purchase to have rightly wrongly, contemporary 15 See, for wish philosophers. Kim example, to endorse any such Once of I do not mean

(1993).

more, causal

to that

imply

that

like it is closure, principle only something That does many today. contemporary widely championed by philosophers physics not in fact subscribe to or support is urged and by any such principle by Henry Stapp to the present Peter Molenaar in their respective contributions issue of Erkenntnis. 16 is indeed evidence the There that of which pattern ample empirical brain-activity movement is the before very characteristically precedes (until voluntary shortly over the cortex, distributed in build-up. and gradual movement) non-specific, widely et al. (1969). See Deecke See also. Popper and Eccles pp. 282ffand pp. 293f. (1977), 17 runs to from In Figure the direction of time the the bottom of the 1, top diagram, a particular event each node of the 'tree' represents with the foot of the tree bodily the arm-movement and the nodes it representing above representing particular a relation events and each nodes with neural line between of causation, represents event two the of the neural that is represented nodes such connected any upper by as a cause event that is represented of the neural being represented by the lower one. one The diagram and vastly than a fully realistic is, of course, very schematic simpler it correctly the would be. But for our purposes fact the back further that, represents trace in time we of any particular the neural antecedents the movement, bodily we may in number of one another and more them to be. greater expect independent 18 seem I say only that it doesn't that one can Note isolate that, at this stage, any or set events. next such neural of neural In the section of the paper, I shall event,

NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM 21

advance event, same difficult reasons for that it is very unlikely thinking one whose non-occurrence events as impossible the non-occurrence to of my decision. that there is any have had such neural

or set of neural consequences if not

would But,

argument. lutely compelling establish is a strong probability. remains the question of how my the same time,

a negative', 'prove In matters like Of course,

if by a 'proof the most that this, if my conclusion to neural of of them the events by

notoriously, one means one

the exactly it is very an abso to hope there then

can

is correct,

decision

is related to any section

something would another paper. require 19 I simplify Lewis See, especially, (1973). that materially affects the argument that

that it is not related given about in the final this matter

paper,

on at about going I shall say identity. but a full account

his I am

account

somewhat,

but

not

in any way

20

developing.

Itmay perhaps be thought that doubt is cast on the proposed

Libet's His celebrated findings here: but, is true. The I am not experiments concerning are, to say the least, controversial, see Lowe for further discussion, I think, then, cases, of of the

identity of D with N
of volitions: and pp. I shall see not

by Benjamin Libet (1985). consider

timing however,

21

them

(2000b)

252-256.

All that I am presupposing

account. advanced taking

was indeed a cause of B, then this here is that if TV

cannot, have any any advantage, at least in some For the various on with me quarrel reasons that have statements reasons, entail see Lowe

counterfactual this been

physicalist

the corresponding 22

for doubting, counterfactuals.

whether some of

causal these

discussion

(2002), Chapter
For very full

10.
discussion of the distinction between mean of to event causation however, and fact that I I don't pp. 21ff. (1988), of Bennett's characterization suggest, the distinction.

causation, endorse

see Bennett every aspect

23
24 25

I discuss this point more fully in Lowe (1999).

in particular, again, for Lowe See, example, See Lowe (2003a). of interactive dualism with causal (1999).

26
27

Compare Dancy
For more on

(2000).
physical closure,

the consistency be asked: closure that But what for any event

28

see Lowe (2000a).

Here itmay causal in effect, rule But out not only a principle of for fact causation and thus cause must of anything itself be physical? Would physical like my NCSD model of mental causation? of course Yes, to urge causation, also one if a physicalist but were

physical claim, this not it would. interactive tantly physical physical,

anything such a physicalist position

dualist

question-begging. is equivalent

not appeal an to this claim could to argue against like mine, because such would be bla any 'argument' To assert that any cause of anything must itself be physical to asserting can be non that no cause of anything physical something to appeals dualism it is in that of is so this

which contradicts the interactive dualist's claim that directly cause. A have a non-physical 'causal closure that may physical argument' a principle of causal closure which is itself inconsistent with interactive amounts, in effect, the physicalist's overridingly point. 29 In this own strong to nothing interest as this. more not See than this: P, therefore not closure further not-P. to appeal again Lowe to a causal (2000a) for

Hence,

principle elaboration

connection,

see Lowe

(2003b).

22

E.

J. LOWE

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NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM 23

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Department of Philosophy University of Durham, 50 Old Elvet,

DH1, E-mail: 3HN, Durham, UK [email protected]