IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

BRIAN CHARLES VAETH Plaintiff, vs. Martin OMalley, Governor of Maryland, Anthony Brown, Lieutenant Governor of Maryland, Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, City Council President Bernard Jack: Young, Councilman James B. Kraft (D-1), Councilman Brandon Scott (D-2), Councilman Robert Curran (D-3), Councilman Bill Henry (D-4), Councilwoman Rochelle Rikki Spector (D-5), Councilwoman Sharon Green Middleton (D-6), Councilman Nick Mosby (D-7), Councilwoman Helen Holton (D-8), Councilman William Pete Welch (D-9), Councilman Edward Reisinger (D-10), Councilman William Cole (D-11), Councilman Carl Stokes (D-12), Councilman Warren Branch (D-13), Councilwoman Mary Pat Clarke (D-14), in their official and individual capacities,

NO. __________ 18 U.S.C. 241 [Conspiracy Against Rights] 18 U.S.C. 242 [Deprivation of Rights] 18 U.S.C. 402 [Contempts Constituting Crimes] 18 U.S.C. 1001 [Fraud and False Statements] 18 U.S.C. 1519 [Obstruction

and 18 U.S.C. 1621 [Perjury] Board of Trustees, Fire & Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City Peter E. Keith, Vice Chairman, Joan M. Pratt, CPA, Harry E. Black, John P. Skinner, Dickson J. Henry, Frank B. Coakley, Benjamin F. DuBose Jr., Victor C. Gearhart, Robert A. Haukdal, William "Ray" Hudson, Paul S. DeSimone, Sharon Garcia, Claims Administrator and former members Frederick McGrath, Hearing Examiner, Bd. Chairman Stephan G. Fugate, and Edward Heckrotte, in their official and individual capacities, and 18 U.S.C. 1622 [Subornation of Perjury] 18 U.S.C. 1623 [False Declarations Before Grand 18 U.S.C. 207 [Concealment, Removal, Or Mutilation Generally]

The Baltimore City Board of Estimates Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, Board President Bernard Jack: Young, Board Secretary Joan M. Pratt, and Board members City Solicitor George Nilson, Director of Public Works Alfred H. Foxx, Jr., in their official and personal capacities and The Baltimore City Board of Ethics Chairperson Linda B. (Lu) Pierson, Dawna M. Cobb, Guy E. Flynn, Peggy E. Wall, Jennifer Burdick, Director Mr. Avery Aisenstark, and Deputy Ethics Director Thaddeus Watulak, in their official and personal capacities and Chief of the Baltimore City Fire Department James Clack, Deputy Chief Rod Devilbiss, Jr., Medical Director Public Safety Infirmary James Levy, MD, in their official and personal capacities and William Taylor, Vice President IAFF, Rick Hoffman, President IAFF Local 734, Former President IAFF Local 734 Robert Sledgeski, Former Local 734 Vice President Jerome Robusto, former Local 734 Vice President David Cox and George Nilson City Solicitor, David Ralph Deputy Solicitor, Elena DiPietro Chief, Legal Advice and Opinions Practice Group, Thomas Corey Chief, Minority and Women's Business Opportunity Office, Carolyn A. Espy Chief, Collections Practice Group, Gary Gilkey, Chief, Labor & Employment Practice Group, Sandra R. Gutman Chief, Land Use Practice Group, Mark H. Grimes Chief Legal Counsel,

Legal Affairs Practice Group, Richard E. Kagan Chief, Corporate Practice Group, Kurt Heinrich Central Bureau of Investigation, Matthew Nayden Chief, Litigation Practice Group, in their official and personal capacities and Mr. Douglas Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, in his official and personal capacity and Mr. Gregg Schellenberger, States Attorney for Baltimore City, Maryland in his official and personal capacity Defendants

-oOo-

MOTION FOR INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT BY ATTORNEYS UNDER LOCAL RULE 705

Plaintiff requests an investigation into alleged attorney misconduct under U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland Local Rule 705. Disciplinary Proceedings, and brings to the attention of a judge of this court the need for an investigation. Plaintiff's original complaint, upon which this case arises, is number RDB-08-708 in the U.S. District Court for the District Court of Maryland and contains a long pattern and history of numerous allegations of misconduct by numerous attorneys in the Baltimore City Solicitors Office. Plaintiff's allegations against these

attorneys constitute an extensive pattern and history of known misconduct dating back to 1996 and ongoing till present. The multitude of alleged known and unknown fraudulent schemes and the active participation by these attorneys, appointed officials, union representatives, and agents in furtherance of their scheme to defraud not only municipal employees who become disabled in their performance of their duties of their rightful disability retirement pensions, but the United States of America, only causes their scheme of fraud to be further perpetrated on the Social Security Administration, (hereinafter referred to as SSA). The United States Social Security Administration (SSA) is an independent agency of the United States federal government that administers Social Security, a social insurance program consisting of retirement, disability, and survivors' benefits. To qualify for these benefits, most American workers pay Social Security taxes on their earnings and future benefits are based on the employees' contributions. Baltimores Police Officers, Firefighters, and Paramedics are not eligible to receive benefits from the SSA, due to the fact that they receive retirement benefits from the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City. SSA administers the Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter referred to as SSI) program, which is needs-based, for the aged, blind, or disabled. This program was originally called by separate names, Old Age Assistance (originally Title I of the Social Security Act of 1935), and Disability Assistance (added in 1946). In 1973, these assistance programs were renamed and reassigned to SSA. SSI recipients are paid out of the general revenue of the United States of America. In addition, some states pay additional SSI funds. As of this writing, 7 million people are covered by SSI. When a municipal employee is denied of their rightful disability pension arbitrarily and capriciously by the Board of Trustees for the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City,

the employees only option is to apply for SSI benefits. These benefits are the responsibility of the Board of Trustees for the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City and not the United States of America. Under *Local Rule 704, Disciplinary Proceedings: 1. Allegations of Misconduct a. Referral for Investigation When allegations of misconduct which, if substantiated, would warrant discipline of an attorney shall come to the attention of a Judge of this Court, the judge shall refer the matter to the Court's Disciplinary Committee.1

Additionally, under Local Rule 704. Rules of Professional Conduct, this court shall apply the Rules of Professional Conduct as they have been adopted by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The attorneys employed by the Baltimore City Solicitors Office are licensed by the Maryland Bar and practice in both the Maryland federal courts and Maryland State Courts. These attorneys represent a cross section of the highest level federal law enforcement attorneys in the State of Maryland, the highest level State law enforcement attorneys in the State of Maryland and attorneys of the most powerful and politically connected law firms in the State of Maryland. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 705 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS The Federal judges and courts in the state of Maryland have distinguished themselves by actively investigating and enforcing the Maryland Rules of Professional conduct. This is evidenced in the case of convicted lobbyist, Bruce C. Bereano a politically well connected

Rule 705 (Local Rule, pg.66, 67, 68 U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland) Disciplinary Proceedings.

Maryland attorney who was barred from practicing law in the District of Columbia and in the federal courts but won a reprieve to practice law at the Maryland State level because of his association with a Maryland State judge. The primary concerns in a disciplinary proceeding are to uphold the highest standards of professional conduct and to protect the public from imposition by the unfit or unscrupulous practitioner ." Attorney Grievance Comrn'n v. Green, 278 Md. 412,414,365 A.2d 39,40(1976), quoting Maryland State bar Ass'n v. Boone,225 Md. 420,425,258 A.2d 428(1969). Deceiving a court constitutes a most serious and direct interference with the administration of justice and harms to clients, the Bar and the public. Truth and candor are essential to our system of justice and the judiciary must play a key role in deterring fraud. If deception remains unchallenged the public's perception of the legal system the judiciary and our profession will suffer. Only by strictly enforcing rules against deception and by taking initiative against violators will the judiciary earn the respect of the public and help improve the justice system. A court's failure to take action against deception, whether it is by failing to report the misconduct to a disciplinary agency or by failure to invoke contempt power, tacitly encourages this type of professional misbehavior. This memorandum highlights the court's responsibility to enforce all applicable disciplinary rules and presumes that the judiciary will insure that criminal prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice and other similar violations will be pursued when a lawyer's conduct demands it.

Truth and candor are synonymous with justice, and honesty is an implicit characteristic of the legal profession. Thus, although rules proscribing fraud, deceit, deception, and dishonesty are somewhat superfluous, most jurisdictions have provisions which impose obligations to be

truthful and which prohibit misleading a court. For example, Canon 1 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that is prejudicial to the administration of justice (DR 1102(A). the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 specifically prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a court and from misleading a court by omission. Rule 3.3 also prohibits an attorney from offering evidence he knows is false.

The professional obligation to report and act upon deception is found in DR 1-103. This very fundamental ABA Code provision requires a lawyer or judge having unprivileged knowledge of a violation of the ABA Code to report it to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation. Similarly, the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B (3) states that "a judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware." The Judiciary has a clear professional responsibility to report and take action against attorneys who deceive the court. Regrettably, current case law reflects little judicial action in this critical area. It is clear that the judiciary must do more to curb deception. In ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement, it is noted that lawyers and judges are reluctant to report instances of misconduct. The publication states: If individual attorneys and judges shirk that responsibility, permitting wrongdoers in their midst to escape disciplinary action unless the circumstances are reported by laymen, the public may conclude that 'self policing' is in reality 'self protection'. The failure of attorneys and judges to report instances of misconduct, while undoubtedly the result of the almost universal reluctance to

inform hampers effective enforcement and does a disservice to the bench, the bar, and the public." In the cases reported in this study the judge usually took action against the attorney, whether by reporting the action to the attorney, or by directly imposing a sanction, or by citing for contempt. However there are cases in which the judge either took no action or merely imposed a fine or contempt citation without making a referral to the disciplinary agency. It must be emphasized that a contempt citation by the judge is not a sufficient disciplinary mechanism. It must be joined with a complaint to and an investigation by a separate body to discipline attorneys. A judge should refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary body regardless of any independent investigation and sanction imposed by a judge himself.

One of the chief reasons for mandating a referral to the appropriate disciplinary authority is the fact that the offending attorney may, and probably is, engaging in the same type of incourt misconduct in other courts. The disciplinary authority is the only agency which can detect such a course of conduct and properly deal with it.

A portion of the evidence and documents this Court will need to initiate an investigation concerning the allegations of attorney misconduct and who would control these key pieces of documentary evidence are as follows. These documents will clearly indicate the active participation and knowledge in furtherance of the multitude of fraudulent schemes by the attorneys only to defraud plaintiff but the following victims:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The United States of America The Plaintiff The US District Court The Circuit Court for Baltimore City The members of the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City

6. 7. 8. 9.

The employees of the City of Baltimore The Office of the Inspector General for Baltimore City The US Social Security Administration The US Department of Justice

THESE ATTORNEYS HAVE A DUTY TO COMPLY WITH ANY REQUEST THIS COURT MAKES FOR THESE DOCUMENTS UNDER THE MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly : (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;

SAMPLE OF DOCUMENTS NEEDED BY THIS COURT TO INVESTIGATE ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT

1. The record, as submitted before the Panel of Hearing Examiners for the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City, June 2003. 2. Several Articles published by the Baltimore Sun. These reports are as follows: a. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1996-08-03/news/1996216036_1_maybin-mercymedical-calvert-maris-mercy-medical b. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-01-08/news/1997008017_1_sisters-ofmercy-stella-maris-mercy-medical c. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-02-25/business/1997056062_1_mercyschmoke-city-police d. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-06-24/news/1997175091_1_mercymedical-stella-maris-mercy-ridge

e. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1998-08-21/business/1998233003_1_mercyretirement-community-entrance-feedical-stella-maris-mercy-ridge f. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-12-17/news/0212170322_1_libertocompensation-system-injured-workers 3. The record presented to this Court and evidence submitted to this Court in case number RDB-08-708. 4. Various complaints that have been filed Local, State, and Federal agencies related to this action. 5. The unlawful findings of fact of the Hearing Examiner for the Panel of Hearing Examiners for the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City, June 2003. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS DEMAND FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE DISCRIMINATORY ACTIONS OF THE CITY OF BALTIMORE TO ULTIMATELY BRING CRIMINAL CHARGES BEFORE A FEDERAL GRAND JURY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR FRAUD, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, PERJURY, AND MALFEASANCE OF OFFICE AMONG OTHERS, AND TO INVOKE PROTECTIONS UNDER PROVISIONS FOUND IN THE WHISTLEBLOWERS ACT

AUTHORITIES

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.V). Baltimore City Code Articles 11, 12, & 22 Baltimore City Charter Subtitles 12 Central Bureau of Investigation, and 22-26 Department of Law. Baltimore City Civil Service Commission Rule 57. Baltimore City Fire Department Manual of Procedures, Sections 106-2, 106-3, 115-5, 301-1, 302-1, 327-3, 328, 328-1, 329-3, 366-1, 366-2, , 366-3, 366-3-1, & 366-6.

H.R.Conf.Rep. 95-950, p. 12, U.S.Code Cong & Admin.News 1978, 504, 534 H.R. 1746, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong.Rec. 7166, 7167 (1972) Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, 2-535 Memorandum of Understanding 2002-2003, the Union of the International Association of Firefighters for Baltimore City and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City. National Labor Relations Act NFPA 1582 Physical Standards Rule 55, 56, 57, & 58 of the Civil Service Commission of Baltimore City S.Rep.No. 92-415, p. 37 (1971), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2137 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1970 ed.) 42 USC 1985 Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights.

CASES CITED

Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. TWA, 630 F.2d 1164, 1168-1169 (1980). Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989) Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 107- 08, 660 A.2d 447, 465-66 (1995) Bartens v. City of Baltimore, 293 Md. 620, 626, 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1982) Biscoe v. Baltimore City Police Dept, 96 Md. App. 1, 7, 623 A.2d 666, 670 (1993) Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 686, n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1952, Carlile v. South Routt School District Re 3-J, 652 F.2d 981 (CA10 1981) Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584 (CA5 1981);

Downey v. Collins, 866 F.Supp. 887, 889 n. 7 (D.Md.) Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 240, 97 S.Ct. 441, 449, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976) Grubbs v. Prince Georges County, 267 Md. 318, 325, 297 A.2d 754, 758, (1972) Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 829 (CA3 1979) Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 270, 761 A.2d 56, 62 (2000) Jackson v. Board of County Commissioners, 233 Md. 164, 167, 195 A.2d 693, 695 (1963) Kerblum v. Schnieder, 609 SO. 2d 138, 139 (FL. 4th DCA 1992) Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 185 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 567 F.2d 429 (1976) Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (CA6 1979) Loewinger v. Prince Georges County, 266 Md. 316, 292 A.2d 67 (1972) Madore v. Baltimore County, 34 Md. App. 1994). 340, 344, 367 A.2d 54, 57 (1976) McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276 (CA5 1978) (en banc) McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) National Labor Relations Board, see NLRB v. Local 264, Laborers' Int'l Union, 529 F.2d 778, 781-785 (CA8 1976) NLRB v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 241 F.2d 130, 133 (CA2 1957) NLRB v. Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 504, 506-507 (CA5 1950) Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596, 100 S.Ct. 800, 813, 63 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980) Shumate v. NLRB, 452 F.2d 717, 720 (CA4 1971); NLRB v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 241 F.2d 130, 133 (CA2 1957) Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92 (1997) Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 366, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1870, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555, n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1887, n. 4, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) Westfarm Assocs. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commn, 66 F.3d 669, 676 (4th Cir. 1995) Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 380-81, 754 A.2d 379, 380 (2000). See 5-303 (b)

STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF

Brian Charles Vaeth, Plaintiff pro se, submits this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Plaintiffs demand for a GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION into the discriminatory actions of the City of Baltimore to ultimately bring a complaint before a Federal Grand Jury for an indictment for the alleged charges contained in this complaint including but not limited to fraud, obstruction of justice, collusion, tortious interference, negligence, perjury, and malfeasance of office, among others, and Plaintiff respectfully invokes the protections found under provisions the Whistleblowers Act. Plaintiff, upon personal knowledge as to the Respondents and their acts, and the contents of the documents referred to herein, and upon information and belief as to all matters, hereby brings this request for an investigation into the serious nature of the allegations made against Respondents. Further, as the above named officials and affiliates have been shown, by prior investigations of unlawful conduct, to have engaged in intentional and malicious acts, in retaliation against members of the Baltimore City Fire Department for reporting the unlawful behavior of Respondents, Plaintiff intends to seek damages for these retaliatory acts. RELATED CASES

The details surrounding Plaintiffs claim are a result of previous claims filed in the Circuit Courtfor Baltimore City, case numbers 24C00005120, 24C03007014, 24C07009752, which were an appeal of an administrative agencys unlawful determination of the denial for retirement benefits from the Fire & Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City and the manner in which the proceedings were conducted. Plaintiff also filed claims in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, case numbers RDB-08-708, US Court of Appeals case number 09-2056 and WDQ-10-0182, Court of Appeals case number 11-2122. The United States District Court claims were brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. sec. 701 et seq. (Rehabilitation Act), and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution for allegations of the denial of due process and equal protection under federal, as well as, Maryland State laws. JURISDICTION STATEMENT

Since United States District Court claims were brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. sec. 701 et seq. (Rehabilitation Act), and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution for allegations of the denial of due process and equal protection under Federal, as well as, Maryland State laws causing Plaintiffs employment to be terminated without cause, the United States District Court has original jurisdiction over this claim. Because the allegations contained in this complaint occurred as a result of the prior proceedings in the US District Court, to which the allegations aforementioned are charged against Respondents and which are fully

disclosed herein, this agency has jurisdiction to investigate this claim and is brought forth under federal and Constitutional laws. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).

STATEMENT OF CLAIM & ARGUMENT

Even the City realizes that controversies in employment exist. So much so that the issue is addressed in the Baltimore City Code, as follows:

The City Council finds that unresolved disputes involving employees in the municipal service are injurious to the public, the municipality, and municipal employees. Therefore, adequate means should be provided for preventing controversies between the municipality and its employees and for resolving them when they occur.2

The Baltimore City Code further mandates that:

MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS ART. 12 SUBTITLE 1 DEFINITIONS; GENERAL PROVISIONS 1-2. Findings and policy. (a) Preventing and resolving controversies.

Because the paramount interest of the public and the nature of municipal governmental processes make it necessary to impose special limitations upon public employment, it is incumbent upon the municipality to provide orderly procedures for the participation by municipal employees and their representatives in the formulation of personnel policies and plans, to insure the fair and considerate treatment of municipal employees, to eliminate employment inequities, and to provide effective means of resolving questions and controversies with respect to terms and conditions of employment, at the same time insuring that the public health, welfare, and safety will be at all times maintained.3 To ensure that the public health, welfare, and safety at all times are maintained, the Baltimore City Code instructs: To that end, it is necessary in the public interest that the municipal officials, municipal employees, and their representatives, shall enter into negotiations with affirmative willingness to resolve grievances and differences.4 Due to Respondents continued failure to act according to the aforementioned provisions of the Baltimore City Code, Plaintiff respectfully submits this complaint alleging fraud and obstruction of justice claims against the above named Respondents. HISTORY Plaintiff was appointed as a Baltimore City Firefighter in 1993. On August 2, 1996, while in the performance of those duties, assisting in interior firefighting operations at the location of a four
3

MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS ART. 12 SUBTITLE 1 DEFINITIONS; GENERAL PROVISIONS 1-2. Findings and policy. (b) Fair treatment of employees. MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS ART. 12 SUBTITLE 1 DEFINITIONS; GENERAL PROVISIONS 1-2. Findings and policy. (c) Cooperative efforts.

story office building in the 400 block of Calvert Street in downtown Baltimore City, he suffered a disabling injury. Heavy smoke and fire conditions were evident upon the arrival of the first unit on the scene of this incident, Truck Company #1, his assigned unit. (The Record as presented before the Panel of Hearing Examiners for the F&PERS.) He entered the building to perform a primary search for trapped and injured occupants when the fourth floor suddenly flashed over.5 The force of the simultaneous combusting of the fourth floor contents hurled him toward the stairwell. He could not regain a solid footing because of the advancing engine companys hoselines being put in place to initiate an attack on the seat of the fires origin and as a result, he fell through the stairway, approximately 40 feet, landing on his back. Plaintiff was wearing his self contained breathing apparatus, or SCBA, which is an assembly that consists of a back-plate that supports a container of compressed breathing air. The SCBA was a contributing factor in the causation of his injury. Members of other companies were entering the building to assist in suppression of the fire and immediately removed him from the area. The force of the flashover caused the separation of the impact cap from the outer shell of his helmet and demonstrates that he was subjected to very extreme forces. These two components are not designed to separate under normal firefighting conditions. Emergency Vehicle Driver, Richard Bisasky and
5

Flashover is one of the most-feared phenomena among firefighters with temperatures reaching 1500 degrees. Firefighters are taught to pay much attention to recognize flashovers and avoid backdrafts. For example, they have certain routines for opening a closed door in a building on fire, such as sitting beside the door instead of in front of it, and to be ready to fight shooting flames. Despite superior protective gear, a firefighter has less than two seconds to evacuate a room that has a flashover. The instantaneous eruption into flame generates a tremendous amount of heat, smoke, and pressure with enough force to push beyond the room of origin through doors and windows. The combustion process then speeds up because it has an even greater amount of heat to move to unburned objects. Flashover is a critical stage of fire growth for two reasons. First, no unprotected living thing in a room where flashover occurs will survive and the chance of saving lives drops dramatically. Second, flashover creates a huge jump in the rate of combustion, and a significantly greater amount of water is needed to reduce the burning material below its ignition temperature. A post-flashover fire burns hotter and moves faster, requires more resources for fire attack, and compounds the problems of search and rescue, exposure protection, and containment.

Lieutenant Gerald Hughes, both assigned to Truck Company 1, were immediate witnesses to this incident. Despite this injury, he refused medical treatment, not knowing the seriousness of it. Fire fighters experience all types of injuries, among these are back injuries that result in the pulling of the muscles and are relatively minor. Plaintiff felt pain similar to that type of injury, as he has experienced on several different occasions and considered it a typical muscle pull. He was examined by paramedics of the Baltimore City Fire Department and demonstrated extreme high blood pressure, typical of surviving an event such as he did and was held by the paramedics until it returned to an appropriate level. He was released from the medic unit and rejoined the members of Truck Company 1 to perform overhaul operations. Plaintiff performed extremely strenuous work as overhauling is a process where all of the affected areas of fire are completely removed of all contents and piled up on the exterior of the building. The incident escalated to five alarms due to the rapid advance of the fire and the extreme outside temperatures exceeding 105 degrees. He worked the remainder of his shift and experienced extreme pain in the area of this perceived muscle pull again the following day. He was taken to the hospital and diagnosed with herniated discs, with compression on the nerve roots. Plaintiff had surgery and returned to the full range of his duties within three months. Plaintiff was eventually determined by PSI to be unable to perform his duties upon a recurrence of this injury in March of 1999. This is within 5 years of the date from which the original injury occurred. A copy of an Employee Incident Report has never been submitted by Defendants associated with this injury and is required by law. In that incident, he experienced extreme pain while operating an 85 foot elevated platform in the performance of his duties, assisting other members of Truck Company #1 with aerial operating procedures. He was transported to the Mercy Hospital Emergency Room and seen by Baltimore City Fire Dept.

physicians where his pain was controlled. This incident was determined to be a Non Line of Duty Injury at that time, despite the recurrence of an injury that was suffered in the Line of Duty. An M.R.I. or Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan was performed the following day which demonstrated a further herniation of the L4 vertebral disc. This was not determined to be impinging on the nerve roots and was not seen as the reason for this occurrence of pain. Plaintiff sought treatment from his physician, Dr. John Dean Rybock, who performed the initial surgery on his back in 1996. Another surgery was performed to ascertain his complaints of during which, it was determined, Dr. Rybock would have to excise the accumulation of scar tissue, resulting from the first surgical procedure for herniations of the L4-5, S1 vertebral discs. The scar tissue was impinging on the nerve roots, not evident on the MRI scans, in the base of the spinal cord causing his pain and the interruption of his being able to control his bladder function. The MRI only showed the progression of the abnormalities of the herniated disc, and was not enhanced to demonstrate the accumulation of the tissue or specifically, the impingements on the nerve roots. The contrasting solution required to be ingested prior to the commencement of the scan did not enhance these areas; therefore it would not appear on the scan. The only way to ascertain whether he was justified in his continuing complaints of back pain was to perform an exploratory procedure. Because the scar tissue accumulation was a result of the work related injury and the subsequent need to have surgery, Plaintiff challenged the Non Line of Duty determination to the Civil Service Commission, which was properly designated to be a recurrence of the Line of Duty injury, directly pursuant to that challenge. It provides for a longer period of time to recover from an injury that occurs while in the Line of Duty than the time afforded for an injury that isnt work related. A post surgical infection ensued, seriously complicating Plaintiffs recovery. Despite his complaints, as demonstrated in the evidence, of

extreme pain that was not typical of the recovery experienced from the original surgery, this post surgical infection went undiagnosed by both the Plaintiffs physician and the Fire Department from March until August of 1999. Plaintiff experienced extreme pain and paralysis as a result of this infection until he was admitted to the hospital in August of 1999 for treatment. He remained in the hospital for rehabilitation and continued antibiotic therapy upon his release. During this time, on June 16, 1999, Plaintiff was determined by Fire Department physician to be unable to perform the duties of a firefighter for the City of Baltimore. This decision was rendered without providing him with an opportunity to recover from the surgery and post operative infection prior to the expiration of 1 year, the time allowed for recovery from Line of Duty injuries. A determination was not to be considered until the expiration of the one year time, or until March 23, 2000. Evidence demonstrates a prejudicial determination that Plaintiff was prescription drug dependent and was seeking medication by the employers medical representative, the departments physician Dr. Paula Lyons of PSI, before the diagnoses of the post operative infection. As a result of the post surgical infection, Plaintiff has been diagnosed with Leukopenia.6 Further discovery will support this assertion of this disease that was caused by the occurrence of his occupational injury. This would qualify as an occupational disease, as it was contracted as the result of an occupational injury and these diseases are known to be slow and insidious in its approach. An individual suffering from an occupational disease can seek compensation for his or her condition under workers' compensation statutes or such federal

Leukopenia - Definition - A low white blood cell count, or leukopenia, is a decrease in disease-fighting cells (leukocytes) circulating in your blood. The benchmark for a low white blood cell count may vary slightly among medical practices. A low white blood cell count in adults is generally defined as fewer than 3,500 white blood cells per microliter of blood. A low white blood cell count in children varies with age and sex. There are several subtypes of white blood cells, each with a different disease-fighting activity. If you have a low white blood cell count, you most likely have a decrease in only one type. A related laboratory test determines the percentage of each type of white blood cell in a sample.

legislation as the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C.A. 901 et seq. Worker's compensation statutes typically require that the worker contract the disease during the course of employment; that the disease be peculiar to the worker's job by virtue of how it is caused and manifested or how job conditions result in a particular hazard, unlike employment in general; and that there be a substantially greater risk of contracting the disease or condition on the job in a different, more serious manner, than in general public experiences. Retirement was forced upon Plaintiff, despite his physicians opinion and ultimately, disability benefits were not awarded in his favor. A less favorable award of limited disability benefits was awarded, of which Plaintiff believed that if he was not allowed to perform his duties because of an injury that was suffered in the Line of Duty, and the recurrence of scar tissue resulting from the first surgical procedure that is a reflection of a Line of Duty injury, he deserved and was eligible for a retirement benefit reflective of benefits for the Line of Duty injury. He immediately filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, asserting that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal due to an error in the administrative judges finding of fact. Plaintiff also filed a request for reinstatement to the Baltimore City Fire Department, which was granted in January of 2001. Pursuant to this reinstatement, he did not pursue the appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The error made is evidenced in the record as submitted to the administrative hearing. The City Solicitors Office asserts that Plaintiff abandoned this appeal. This is not true. Upon the occurrence of Plaintiffs reinstatement, relating to the aforementioned appeal, Former Chief William Goodwin acknowledged that he was ordered to fire him. This should be sufficient evidence to support Plaintiffs contention that Respondents actions were calculated to deny him of his rightful pension and that their actions continue until this day.

As stated throughout filings to the Court, Plaintiff suffered recurrences of this injury in 2001 and 2002. Several incidents occurred while he was performing his duties and the final occurrence that ultimately precluded him from returning to work, did not happen while he was at work. Another surgery was performed, and this injury was determined to be Non Line of Duty. This determination was made by the Public Safety Infirmary and was upheld as the proper status by the employer after requesting that it be determined properly, reflective of the Line of Duty injury. Plaintiff challenged this through the recognized bargaining unit for the Baltimore City Fire Department, IAFF Baltimore Firefighters Local 734. He was informed that this request for a determination that the injury was a reflection of the Line of Duty injury suffered in 1999 was denied. This would serve as the dispute with the adverse employment action that was taken and required by Plaintiff to be filed with the City. Since Plaintiffs recognized bargaining unit was IAFF Local 734, Baltimore Firefighters, the only manner for which he could challenge this determination was through them. This was not reflective of the policies, procedures, or statutes enacted by legislation, however he was only afforded the shorter recovery period allowance and retirement was forced upon him again. Plaintiff was placed in a vocational rehabilitation program relating to his award of benefits from the Workers Compensation Commission of Maryland before being given an opportunity to recover from the injury and have the proper corrective surgery for his persistent experiences with extreme back pain. The Plaintiffs medical file was in the possession of Comp Management and would have reflected the status of his recovery from his back surgery was never released to the Panel of Hearing Examiners for consideration because the Bd. of Trustees, F&PERS claims administrator, Ms. Sharon Garcia never requested it from them. Plaintiff introduced evidence of the injury occurring to his back on September of 2001, in which he was transported to the emergency room at Mercy Hospital after experiencing extreme

disabling pain while at work. Respondents utilized a Non Line of Duty injury, which occurred several months later to prohibit him from returning to his position. Although this claim involves the aspect that a further progression of the L4-5 vertebral disc herniation, evident from past scans and x-rays, finally progressed to the point of causing extreme pain and the loss of sensation to feeling in his extremities, PSI determined, as did the hearing examiner, that this was the cause of an injury that did not occur in the Line of Duty. The evidence could also cause to infer that the Line of Duty injury of September of 2001 precipitated the events that led up to the July 02 surgery. Many inferences can be drawn from this case however; the finder of facts decision is the only one that matters. The inferences drawn from the action must be based on fact and be supported by evidence, which in this case, evidence shows that it was not. The Workers Compensation Commission determined that Plaintiffs claim was work related and properly awarded him compensation. The administrative hearing and the placement in the vocational rehabilitation program were discriminatory and caused several prejudicial events to take place. Plaintiff continually complained of back pain throughout 2001 and 2002 until the time of his recurrent surgery in July of 2002. Upon his inability to return to his duties within six months, he was Cut-Off or severed from employment with the Defendants on December 28, 2002. During this time, and while still undergoing treatment with Dr. John Rybock, Plaintiff was informed that Dr. Rybock was leaving the public practice and accepting the position as Dean of Admissions for the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. This is understood to be a distinctive honor, for a man with the professional accomplishments of a dedicated and competent neurosurgeon, worthy of the bestowing of such honor. At the time, however, Plaintiff was diagnosed with failed back syndrome, or to be exact, he received no substantial benefit from

the July 02 surgery.7 For improvement, he would have to seek further treatment from another surgeon due to Dr. Rybock accepting the position of Dean of Admissions. Plaintiff was referred to a physician, through his fiancs family who resided in Florida, by the name of Dr. Ryan Glasser. Upon this forced retirement on December 28, 2002, and the demonstration that the physicians would not allow him to return to his duties, on January 1, 2003, Plaintiff relocated to Florida in order to facilitate acquiring the services of Dr. Glasser. It was his belief that he was free to choose the provider of his choice and he thought Doctor Glasser had a more aggressive approach and understood Plaintiffs surgical needs. Dr. Glasser opinioned that an intervertebral spinal fusion surgery was the last available option to correct his back disablement.8 Plaintiff was still subjected to the terms of the vocational rehabilitation program during the time he sought this treatment and was continually threatened with the cutting off, or severing of the Workers Compensation Commission award of benefits provided to him for not complying. The terms stated that Plaintiff was actively required to pursue employment by engaging in pre-employment interviews. A Functional Capacity Examination was ordered by the Vocational Rehabilitation program directors, Comp Management, Inc., an agency contracted by Defendants to administer their Workers Compensation obligations, to assess his capacity to perform work. This was
7

Failed back syndrome (FBS), more commonly referred to as "failed back surgery syndrome" (FBSS), refers to chronic back and/or leg pain that occurs after back (spinal) surgery. Multiple factors can contribute to the onset or development of FBS. Contributing factors include but are not limited to residual or recurrent disc herniation, persistent post-operative pressure on a spinal nerve, altered joint mobility, joint hypermobility with instability, scar tissue (fibrosis), depression, anxiety, sleeplessness and spinal muscular deconditioning. An individual may be predisposed to the development of FBS due to systemic disorders such as diabetes, autoimmune disease and peripheral blood vessels (vascular) disease. Intervertebral Spinal Fusion, a new type of surgical treatment is available for patients who have been unsuccessful at controlling their back pain with non-surgical treatments. The procedure uses a new type of device called an intervertebral fusion cage to perform a spinal fusion between two or more vertebrae in the lumbar spine (the lower back).

ordered to place him in the appropriate rehabilitation plan that was reflective of his disabling injury. This FCE was performed in March of 2003, well after the December 28, 2002 Cut-Off date of his employment as a firefighter and is troubling because although he demonstrated his abilities to the extent that a person awaiting surgery for an intervertebral spinal fusion could, he was found to be self limiting in his tests. This was not reflective of Plaintiffs actions and is supported by evidence of the fact that he was diagnosed with failed back syndrome after July 02, by Dr. John Rybock and he was awaiting surgery to be performed by Dr. Ryan Glasser to correct that deformity. Administrators of that Functional Capacity Examination of March of 2003 did not have the medical records associated with his pending surgery and his efforts were mistakenly opinioned to be in bad faith, or self limiting to project a much worse depiction of his abilities than what really existed. There is no evidence from Comp Management that details the status of Plaintiffs medical condition at that time other than what has been submitted by Plaintiff at the occurrence of the hearing. Plaintiff believes that providing the persons responsible for conducting a fair assessment of his abilities during that period, the updated medical history of Plaintiff was essential to determining his ability to perform work while waiting to have surgery to correct a disablement resulting from being diagnosed with failed back syndrome. Plaintiffs efforts are consistent with the abilities of someone who is waiting to have this procedure. An administrative hearing for his retirement benefits proceeded before the Panel of Hearing Examiners for the Bd. of Trustees, F&PRS on June 16, 2003. At the hearing, Mr. Frederick McGrath, the administrative hearing examiner asked about the presence of a Functional Capacity Exam report. The only Functional Capacity Examination report of record was the March 2003 report that Plaintiff presented as evidence. This test was not performed prior to the December 28, 2002 Cut-Off date as prescribed by Baltimore City Fire Department, Physical Standards

policies and the utilization of the standards as found in NFPA 1582.9 Mr. McGrath utilized this report to opinion that Plaintiff was lying about the severity of his condition instead of having a proper report that was submitted in accordance with NFPA standards, before he was severed from his employment. The hearing examiner was not presented the information from Comp Management that would properly reflect his current status, as awaiting surgery for the injury. Interviews for potential employment were scheduled around Plaintiffs therapy program throughout 2003-2004, but did not afford him time to recover from the therapy sessions that routinely left him in pain from the tough physical demands of the therapy. This interfered with his recovery from the intervertebral spinal surgery and interfered with his right to seek gainful employment. Plaintiff was ruled to be not disabled from the performance of his duties by the same administrative hearing examiner, at the occurrence of the first administrative hearing. The hearing examiner was prejudicial and discriminated against him due to his expressed desire to challenge the hearing examiners previous decision. In that action, Plaintiff was denied all benefits, although he was at least minimally qualified to receive an Ordinary Retirement benefit, which fully supports his complaint that this was demonstrated as willful intentional retaliation for filing another application for retirement benefits. Plaintiff had no other choice but to file for
9

NFPA 1582: Standard on Comprehensive Occupational Medical Program for Fire Departments This standard contains descriptive requirements for a comprehensive occupational medical program for fire departments. 1.1.1* The medical requirements in this standard are applicable to fire department candidates and members whose job descriptions as defined by the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) are outlined in NFPA1001, Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications; NFPA 1002, Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications; NFPA 1003, Standard for Airport Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications; NFPA 1006, Standard for Rescue Technician Professional Qualifications; NFPA 1021, Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications; and NFPA 1051, Standard for Wildland Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications. 1.1.2 This standard provides information for physicians and other health care providers responsible for fire department occupational medical programs. 1.1.3 These requirements are applicable to public, governmental, military, private, and industrial fire department organizations providing rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical services, hazardous materials mitigation, special operations, and other emergency services. 1.1.4 This standard shall not apply to industrial fire brigades that also can be known as emergency brigades, emergency response teams, fire teams, plant emergency organizations, or mine emergency response teams.

these benefits. This would not have been the appropriate benefit that he should have received but nevertheless, one in which he was eligible due to the fact that the determination to not allow him to return to his duties was because of an injury that was perceived to be disabling enough to disqualify him from his duties by the employer. There are no reports or statements from Plaintiff or his doctors that supports the employers contention. Plaintiff raised an objection to Mr. McGraths findings of fact and the prejudicial acts that were evident to have occurred because of them. This objection was not properly ruled on as directed and the hearing continued. Plaintiff was subjected to the administrative hearing while he was undergoing treatment for this injury and after the decision of the administrative law judge that denied his retirement benefit he filed a timely petition for an appeal of the administrative hearing examiners decision on September 29, 2003. He underwent surgery on October 16, 2003 and not only went through the long and typically difficult recovery process associated with therapy; he complied to the best of his efforts with the vocational rehabilitation program terms. Plaintiff should never have been subjected to any final determinations, rulings, or vocational reassignment programs while receiving treatment for that injury. As Plaintiff has submitted, he received the denial of his benefits on the same day his father passed away, forever correlating the erroneous decision associated with the unjustifiable termination from his calling with the remembrance of his fathers death. This has had a devastating effect on his ability to properly honor the life of his father by marking this profoundly saddening day in the history of his life, and the relationship with which that denial has on his memory. Claimant honors his father appropriately, but he will never forget the events of that day and the unfortunate association that comes along with it. It is by coincidence only that he received this notification on that date.

Upon being released from the care of his physician and relocating back to his home at his present address of 8225 Poplar Mill Road, Nottingham, MD 21236-5581, he requested to be reinstated to the Baltimore City Fire Department, pursuant to Mr. McGraths decision that he was not disabled from the performance of his duties. This request was denied and Plaintiff discovered that the petition for an appeal of Mr. McGraths decision was dismissed for lack of prosecution on November 15, 2004. Plaintiff never received this notification, nor has he received any correspondence from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in association with this appeal. At all times, Plaintiff has made certain to inform all parties of his contact information and mailing addresses. As found in Rule 55, Removal for Cause, of the Civil Service Commission states in part that No person shall be removed from a position in the Civil Service except by the appointing officer having jurisdiction over such person, and the said appointing officer shall give the employee so removed, or by mail registered to the employees last known address, written notice of the removal, in which shall be given the reasons therefore. A copy of the notice to the employee shall be furnished [to] the Commission forthwith. This was completed on November 18, 2002. After notice has been given, the appointing officer shall schedule an informal conference with the employee to be held on or before the effective date of removal. At this conference, the employee may submit a written statement in response to the reasons for termination proffered, or may orally respond to the proffered reasons. This was completed on November 21, 2002 during the Employee Exit Interview conducted by Lt. Jeffrey Zablocki, Truck 1 BCFD. This evidence is in the Citys possession and has not been afforded to Plaintiff, as of this date. On the interview form he asserts that he was treated unfairly during the process of being determined ineligible by the department, however, this information is contained in his employment files and would have been disclosed upon discovery, if so ordered. As of the

Courts decision on August 11, 2009, Plaintiff made another attempt to obtain information from his employment file that would demonstrate substantial compliance. He was denied due to an ongoing EEOC investigation. Plaintiff has requested to discover these documents from his employment file but has not been afforded the opportunity, as of this date. The Commission Rule further requires that, The said notice shall state further that the employee has the right within 5 days from the date said notice is given to him, or from the date it is mailed, to request the Commission, in writing, to investigate his removal At that time, December 28, 2002, there was no dispute over the Public Safety Infirmarys determination to medically disqualify him from performing his duties. The dispute arose when a Function Capacity Examination or other Medical Evaluation as prescribed by NFPA 1582 standards was not being facilitated to assess whether he could or couldnt perform his duties. As mentioned, a letter from his former counsel, on December 2, 2002 demonstrates this. (Exhibit 4) The notification provisions under Rule 55 of the Baltimore City Civil Service Commission are similar to that of the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act. The purpose of the LGTCA is to provide a remedy for those injured by local government officers and employees acting without malice and in the scope of employment, while ensuring that the financial burden of compensation is carried by the local government ultimately responsible for the public employees actions. Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 107- 08, 660 A.2d 447, 465-66 (1995). Thus, the LGTCA requires Maryland counties and other entities defined therein as local governments, 5-301 (d), to pay, up to certain limits, judgments for compensatory damages rendered against their employees as a result of tortious acts committed in the scope of employment. Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 380-81, 754 A.2d 379, 380 (2000). See 5303 (b). The LGTCA generally requires that plaintiffs give local government defendants notice

of claims within 180 days of the injury, 5-304(a), and that such notice be given to designated government officials. 5-304(b)(1). The purpose of the notice requirement is, to protect the municipalities and counties of the State from meretricious claimants and exaggerated claims by providing a mechanism whereby the municipality or county would be apprised of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation, i.e., while the evidence was still fresh and the recollection of the witnesses was undiminished by time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and its responsibility in connection with it. Williams v. Maynard, supra, 359 Md. at 389-90, 754 A.2d at 385 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bartens v. City of Baltimore, 293 Md. 620, 626, 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1982)). See Jackson v. Board of County Commissioners, 233 Md. 164, 167, 195 A.2d 693, 695 (1963). Maryland has recognized that substantial compliance with the statutory requirements may nevertheless satisfy the statute where the purpose of the notice requirement is fulfilled. Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. at 390, 754 A.2d at 385; Grubbs v. Prince Georges County, 267 Md. 318, 325, 297 A.2d 754, 758, (1972); Jackson v. Board of County Commissioners, 233 Md. at 167-68, 195 A.2d at 695; But see Loewinger v. Prince Georges County, 266 Md. 316, 292 A.2d 67 (1972). The LGTCA includes an exception to the notice requirement also. Section 5-304(c) provides that unless the defendant can affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced by lack of required notice, upon motion and for good cause shown the court may entertain the suit even though the required notice was not given. The question of whether there is good cause to waive the notice requirement is within the discretion of the trial court. Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 270, 761 A.2d 56, 62 (2000); Madore v. Baltimore County, 34 Md. App. 340, 344, 367 A.2d 54, 57 (1976); Downey v. Collins, 866 F.Supp. 887, 889 n. 7 (D.Md.1994). The trial courts findings will not be disturbed, therefore, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Heron, 361 Md. at

271, 761 A.2d at 63; Madore, 34 Md. App. at 344, 367 A.2d at 56-57; Westfarm Assocs. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commn, 66 F.3d 669, 676 (4th Cir. 1995). The test for whether good cause exists to permit waiver is that of ordinary prudence, that is, whether the claimant prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. Heron, 361 Md. at 271, 761 A.2d at 63 (quoting Westfarm Assocs., 66 F.3d at 676-77); see also Madore, 34 Md. App. at 345, 367 A.2d at 57. Despite his filing of a grievance with IAFF Local 734s representative, Mr. Jerry Robusto, Plaintiff asserts that the communication between his former counsel and the Citys third party claims administrator, Comp Management Inc., on December 2, 2002 would have furthered the assertion that he substantially complied with the notification intent of Civil Service Commission Rule 57, as the intent was to give the agency sufficient notification to facilitate an investigation. Despite many requests by Plaintiff for an investigation of this matter by the boards for which all Respondents were employed, they refused to follow the Baltimore City Codes mandate that an review of the proceeding before each board be conducted, therefore, Plaintiff alleges the obstruction of justice charge against each and every one of them in their professional and individual capacities. The primary question in the United States District Court action was whether the statutory time limit for filing charges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1970 ed.) was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in the District Court. Respondents, through counsel, argued that his complaint was barred by Title VII's "statute of limitations" because Plaintiff failed to file charges with the Baltimore City Civil Service Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the statutory time limits. This is absolutely not true. Even though Plaintiff asserts that he did in

fact file the perquisite charges, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on its reading of the statutory language as "jurisdictional." Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 240, 97 S.Ct. 441, 449, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555, n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1887, n. 4, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977); Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Other Courts of Appeals that have examined the same materials have reached the opposite conclusion. Carlile v. South Routt School District Re 3-J, 652 F.2d 981 (CA10 1981); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584 (CA5 1981); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (CA6 1979); Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 829 (CA3 1979); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 185 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 567 F.2d 429 (1976). In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to follow McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276 (CA5 1978) (en banc). Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. TWA, 630 F.2d 1164, 1168-1169 (1980). In McArthur, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement in a Title VII class action, holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because no plaintiff had filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Although subsequent legislative history is not dispositive, Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596, 100 S.Ct. 800, 813, 63 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 686, n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1952, n. 7, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the legislative history also indicates that Congress intended the filing period to operate as a statute of limitations instead of a jurisdictional requirement. In the final Conference Committee section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong.Rec.

7166, 7167 (1972), the Committee not only termed the filing period a "time limitation," but explained: "This subsection as amended provides that charges be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Court decisions under the present law have shown an inclination to interpret this time limitation so as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of the law; it is not intended that such court decisions should be in any way circumscribed by the extension of the time limitations in this subsection."

The Senate Labor Committee's section-by-section analysis of the amendments explained that "[t]his subsection would permit . . . a limitation period similar to that contained in the Labor-Management Relations Act, as amended." S.Rep.No. 92-415, p. 37 (1971), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2137. The Court has recognized that the National Labor Relations Act was "the model for Title VII's remedial provisions," Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 366, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1870, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Because the time requirement for filing an unfair labor practice charge under the National Labor Relations Act operates as a statute of limitations subject to recognized equitable doctrines and not as a restriction of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, see NLRB v. Local 264, Laborers' Int'l Union, 529 F.2d 778, 781-785 (CA8 1976); Shumate v. NLRB, 452 F.2d 717, 720 (CA4 1971); NLRB v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 241 F.2d 130, 133 (CA2 1957); NLRB v. Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 504, 506-507 (CA5 1950), the time limitations under Title VII should be treated likewise. Being subjected to the process, after being severed from his position during the subsequent spinal surgery and rehabilitation interfered with his ability to comply with these requirements.

Moreover, when Congress in 1978 revised the filing requirement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.V), which was modeled after Title VII, see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979), the House Conference Report explicitly stated that "the 'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable modification for failing to file within the time period will be available to plaintiffs under this Act." H.R.Conf.Rep. 95-950, p. 12, U.S.Code Cong & Admin.News 1978, 504, 534. Respondents were fully aware of all of the events disclosed in the above recitation of the reasons surrounding Plaintiffs actions. They enrolled him in a vocational rehabilitation program, provided payment for medical services rendered on behalf of him, provided compensation to him in association with the awarding of Workers Compensation benefits, when all that was required was to not interfere with his recovery and his rights associated with an occupational injury, allow him to regain the property right he held on his appointment with the Baltimore City Fire Department without prejudice or discrimination, and protect him from being subjected to prejudice and discrimination. This claim is brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. sec. 701 et seq. (Rehabilitation Act), and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution for allegations of the denial of due process and equal protection under Federal, as well as, Maryland State employment laws and breach of contract causing Plaintiffs employment to be terminated, without cause.

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is the short title of United States law (Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, enacted July 26, 1990), codified at 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. It was signed into law on July 26, 1990, by President George H. W. Bush, and later amended with changes effective January 1, 2009. The ADA is a wide-ranging civil rights law that prohibits, under certain circumstances, discrimination based on disability. It affords similar protections against discrimination to Americans with disabilities as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which made discrimination based on race, religion, sex, national origin, and other characteristics illegal. Disability is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity." The determination of whether any particular condition is considered a disability is made on a case by case basis. Disability is, in the ADA, defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity." Examples of major life activities include, but are not limited to, "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working". The Act overturns a 1999 U.S. Supreme Court case holding that mitigating measures had to be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limited a major life activity; it specifically provides that such impairment must be determined without considering such ameliorative measures. Another court restriction overturned is the interpretation that an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity must also limit others to be considered a disability. A qualified person with a disability must not only be an individual with a disability, but a qualified individual. An employer is not required to hire or retain an individual who is not qualified to perform the job. According to the regulations, a qualified individual with a disability is someone with a disability who satisfies the requisite work, experience, education and other job

related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the position. There are two basic steps to determine if an individual is qualified under the ADA. The first step is to determine if the individual meets the necessary prerequisites for the job such as; education, skills, experience, licenses, training, certificates, etc. The second step requires an employer to focus on the essential functions of the job. Many people with disabilities can perform essential functions of the job but are denied employment because they cannot do things that are only marginal to the job. Titles II and III of the ADA protect qualified individuals with disabilities. Not every person with a disability is necessarily qualified. To determine if a person with a disability is eligible to participate in the services and programs offered by a public or private entity, a person with a disability is considered to be qualified if the person meets the essential eligibility requirements with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies or practices, auxiliary (communications) aids or services; or removal of architectural, communications or transportation barriers. The "essential eligibility requirements" for participation in many activities may be minimal. If a person with a disability who is otherwise qualified cannot perform one or more essential job function because of his disability, an employer, in assessing whether or not the person with the disability is qualified to do the job, must consider whether there are modifications or adjustments that would enable the person to perform these functions. Such modifications are called "reasonable accommodation." Plaintiff needed no accommodation in order to perform his duties. The only thing he required was no interference from Defendants in order for him to resume his duties. People who exercise their rights under the ADA or

individuals who assist them in exercising their rights are protected against retaliation and coercion such as threats, intimidation or interference. This claim involves both of those elements. In response to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in the US District Court for Maryland, Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment that states affirmative defenses recognized by the Court. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants motivation for filing such a general dispositive motion on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that he failed to state a claim that can be granted by the Court is that they are grossly unaware of the actions involving their own agencies and through the incompetency of employees of the City of Baltimore, are committed to covering their mistakes up. Because Plaintiff is not an experienced attorney and because of the extremely prejudicial and discriminatory acts of Defendants, he has since had to redirect his focus from saving the lives of others to now saving his own. Plaintiff has found it to be impossible to retain counsel due to several aspects. The first is economical of course. Since his unlawful termination, he receives no compensation, no benefit, and is confronted with the stigma that surrounds individuals with back injuries in the employment marketplace. Plaintiff cannot find employment, within the limits of his education and experience that are not involved with heavy physical labor. Plaintiff is well trained and imminently qualified for driving a truck, concrete demolition and construction, and structural firefighting in an urban fire department. All of which require a strong back. If Plaintiff can perform those duties, such as those in the concrete construction trade, then surely he can perform the duties associated with the suppression of fires. A re-examination would facilitate just that and is even required of from the Bd. of Trustees, F&PRS.10

10

Baltimore City Code Article 22, 34 Benefits, F&PRS

Second is the stigma that surrounds taking on a case that has begun with different counsel. As stated, Plaintiff retained the services of Alex Katzenberg, Esquire to pursue the special disability retirement action. This relationship suffered due to Plaintiffs growing frustration to Mr. Katzenbergs lack of attention to the matter. Mr. Katzenbergs lack of preparation was evident in the representation he provided. He provided no evidence, no testimony, and no witnesses. Mr. Katzenberg did object to the absence of the injury report that was the cause of that action, the fact that evidence was missing, and that the character of the hearing was proceeding on the mistaken principle that Plaintiff desired the retirement. Men who achieve their lifelong goal of becoming a firefighter do not just give it up easily. Plaintiff pursued his career in the department with the same passion as he is now asserting his rights. Still this stigma complicates the facilitation of counsel. The last aspect is the extensiveness of the claim and its history. Due to the restrictions imposed upon him in relation to the aforementioned aspects, he has not entered into the economical aspect that representation would require. It is estimated, based upon the compensation that the Court finds appropriate in the awarding of legal fees, a lawyer with even average legal competence would cost approximately $200-$250 dollars per hour. The extent of the filings in Court alone should suggest that a high cost would be warranted and exacted from him. Plaintiff simply cannot afford representation. He was told that he could not get a lawyer to touch it if he tried by different lawyers and he continued with his diligent pursuit of his claim.

(g) Reexamination of members retired on account of disability. (1) (i) If a retired member is receiving a disability retirement allowance and has not yet attained age 55, the panel of hearing examiners may require the retired member to undergo a periodic medical examination, but not more often than once in any year, to determine whether he or she has become fit to resume duties in the classification in which he or she was performing duties at the time of retirement.

Despite the above factors and the desire to be represented, which the Court is in no way obligated to provide, Plaintiff is confident that he will prevail on the merits of this action before the Court. He filed a Motion to Compel Discovery but due to Respondent Sabrina Willis fraud and perjury committed before the court, as evidenced by the filing of the fraudulent affidavit signed by Mr. Devilbiss, Jr., Plaintiff was denied this request. With the proper opportunity for discovery, he would have certainly been able to assemble any evidence required to prevail on all his claims on just those pleadings and overcome any dispositive motion of the City before the claim could have been submitted for a finding of fact on the merits. Since the filing of the original complaint, the City filed a number of defenses in their pre trial motions without actually filing an answer, which asserted that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. This was countered by Plaintiffs contention that because it deals with the raising of a federal question, the Court indeed had jurisdiction over the subject matter. There is also the defense that he failed to state a claim for which the Court could grant relief. This also has to be evidence of reaching because they failed to address important facts to answer Plaintiffs allegations of Due Process violations while being treated for the injury. The City knew it because they were paying for it. Surprisingly, the events as depicted in this pleading are nowhere addressed by the City. It is as if they hope they will never be revealed, they never happened, or they dont know they happened. Plaintiffs rights were egregiously violated and the City remains intent on denying his request for redress, and he suffers everyday that goes by without review despite the requirement that one be commenced. The City has not provided the Plaintiff an answer however they filed a second motion to dismiss the amended Complaint, in furtherance of their unlawful assertions. It appears to Plaintiff that he has fulfilled the requirement by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has

presented sufficiency in stating his claim still the City seems unwilling to provide the least amount of redress that is demanded and automatic. This review is mandated by the Charter of Baltimore City that establishes each agency. A system of checks and balances has been adopted by those agencies to protect employees and citizens of Baltimore from violations prohibiting them of their rights. This is not apparent in this matter. If the case had been reviewed as mandated, this federal claim would be unnecessary. The Respondents demonstrate a desire to remain ignorant of the fact that the rights of an imminently qualified firefighter, dedicated to the preservation of life and property, were violated in such an egregious manner as to deny him benefits that he was otherwise entitled to. Plaintiff was not afforded either a pre-termination hearing, or a termination hearing as required by law. Either hearing would have been able to establish the existence of the judicial error and sought to reverse the error that violated his rights. As he has been severed from his position, without compensation of any kind, Plaintiff considers himself to be in effect, terminated from his employment. The City asserted that the facts in this case are not in dispute. The question that remains to be answered in this case; is Plaintiff disabled from the performance of his duties as a firefighter or isnt he? The employers medical representative, PSI, namely Dr. James Levy medical director, determined that he was disabled from an injury that prevented him from returning to his duties. Upon the occurrence of an administrative hearing for benefits associated with the perceived disability, the hearing examiner ruled that he was not disabled from the performance of his duties. Plaintiff raises the issues as found in Biscoe v. Baltimore City Police Department, 96 Md. App. 1,(1993), that [i]f an officer claiming [an] incapacity applies for retirement and is rejected upon a finding that he or she can perform the duties of an available position, the Police Commissioner cannot dismiss the officer upon a finding that the officer

cannot perform those duties. Biscoe, 96 Md. App. at 22. The findings that existed in Biscoe did not concern the permanence of Biscoes injuries. Instead, the concern existed because, on the one hand, Biscoe was told by the Board that he could perform his duties and, on the other hand, he was told by the police department that he could not perform them. Thus, the issue in Biscoe was not the permanency of Officer Biscoes injuries, but the conflict created by the fact that the disability retirement board found that Biscoe was still able to perform light duty, and therefore not qualified for a pension, and the fact that the police department later terminated Biscoes employment because it determined that Biscoes injuries did not permit him to perform even light duty on a full-time basis. This conflict created an impermissible Catch-22. Plaintiff also raises the case of Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92 (1997). Matthew Stone, a paraplegic firefighter, sued the City of Mount Vernon under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Stone alleged that the Department refusal to accommodate his disability by assigning him to a light-duty position violated his rights under the disability statutes. The City moved for summary judgment arguing that Stone was unable to perform the essential functions of the job of firefighter. The United States Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision. The appellate Court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether fire suppression was an essential job function. Stone was hired by the Department in 1990 and served as an active firefighter. His duties mainly involved extinguishing fires, entering burning buildings, and performing rescues. He performed those duties until December 1992 when he sustained injuries in a non-work related accident which induced paraplegia. After undergoing physical rehabilitation, Stone was able to walk for a few hours at a time with the assistance of leg braces, use a wheelchair, and drive a car which is outfitted with special hand controls that enable him to drive. He was able to get into and out of his wheelchair and car without assistance and to

climb and descend stairs out of his wheelchair while pulling it along with him. During his paid leave, made possible by contributions of accrued paid leave from fellow firefighters, Stone taught fire and rescue related courses to probationary firefighters. In 1994, after passing an examination qualifying him for promotion to lieutenant, Stone requested that he be returned to active duty and assigned to a position where his disability could be accommodated. In May of 1995, Stone was informed that he could not be accommodated and could not return to work. Stone then filed suit against the City. The City moved for summary judgment which the federal District Court awarded for the City before discovery was completed. The District Court concluded that no reasonable fact-finder could find that Stone was able to perform the essential functions of the firefighter job. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated summary judgment and remanded the case back to the Circuit Court because there was still a question whether fire suppression was an essential function of the job in two bureaus of the Department, the Fire Alarm Bureau ("FAB") and the Fire Prevention Bureau ("FPB") and whether the Department could reasonably accommodate Stone by assigning him to a position within one of those specialized bureaus. The Court found that although Stone could not fight fires, there was no evidence that he could not perform other duties of the bureau positions. There was no evidence that assigning Stone to one of the bureaus would have been unreasonable given career placement of other injured firefighters to these positions. The Court found no evidence that the cost of accommodating Stone would exceed the benefits. Stone supervisor thought very highly of him and considered him to be an asset. The only "cost" shown by the City and the Commissioner was that Stone would not be able to perform fire suppression duties if called upon to do so. There was no evidence that there would be a need to hire an additional firefighter if Stone was assigned to a bureau position. Finally, the Court rejected the Commissioners stated

concerns about future implications of accommodating others if Stone were accommodated. The Court noted that each case must be looked at individually. Plaintiffs case certainly wasnt treated in that manner. After reviewing the above cases, Plaintiff immediately requested to be reinstated but was denied, as these cases are similar in the context of their complaints. Plaintiff cannot receive Supplemental Social Security benefits because although the employer considers him to be disabled, the hearing examiner rules in contrary, stating he is not. The decision to award or deny a Plaintiff retirement benefits must be based upon finding of fact, testimony, documented evidence, and not opinion based outside of that which is presented. The intent of this is to provide a fair and impartial tribunal before the administrative agency. Evidence that was presented by the Board of Trustees, F&PRS, namely Ms. Sharon Garcia, Claims Administrator, was not representative of Plaintiffs complete medical file and was essential to him receiving fair and equitable compensation due to this perceived disability of Plaintiff by the employer but no one else. Plaintiffs rights were not upheld and this aspect is the precipitating factor for the current legal situation. The transcripts should be considered as well. The transcripts reflect that something had gone wrong and that someone needed to rectify it. The Court ruled that Plaintiff did not file a dispute with the adverse employment action, as provided under Rule 55-57 of the Baltimore City Civil Service Commission Rules. The Assistant City Solicitor, Ms. Sabrina Willis submitted an affidavit by Chief Rod Devilbiss, Jr. that after performing a full inquiry and investigation into whether a dispute was filed, no evidence of a dispute could be found. Either Assistant Chief Devilbiss, Jr. committed perjury or the City Solicitors Office withheld this information intentionally. Testimony could have been obtained that IAFF Local 734s representative filed a grievance on the issue, however that testimony has yet to be introduced. Courts have ruled that

when a contract employee is terminated, a process has to be adhered to that provides for a pretermination hearing and a final determination hearing before terminating the employee. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 981 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.N.C. 1997). Plaintiff was only afforded a hearing for disability retirement for benefits before the Panel of Hearing Examiners for the Bd. of Trustees, F&PRS, not a hearing for violating policy or rules pertaining to the City of Baltimore and discipline or discharge as provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding 2002-2003 between the City of Baltimore and the Baltimore Firefighters Local Union 734. Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court. In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated, "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted. Fraud upon the court has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."

CONCLUSION

Nothing in the law allows for fraudulent actions from either party in adversarial proceedings such as this. For this reason and for the malicious behavior as demonstrated by the City Solicitors Office and all Respondents named in this complaint, Plaintiff respectfully requests the granting of an investigation. When firefighters or police officers become disabled in the Line of Duty, if errors in the legislation exists the firefighter or police officer should not be subject to having his life destroyed by a corrupt agency of the City, just to avoid taking responsibility for their own incompetence and fraudulent misrepresentations. Plaintiff is not attempting to litigate any claim for retirement benefits before this agency, it is his desire to report the above allegations to request an investigation to be commenced in order to discover and sanction the unprofessional conduct of the City Solicitors Office. The requisite fraud on the court occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial systems ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing partys claim or defense. Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989). When reviewing a case for fraud, the Court should consider the proper mix of factors and carefully balance a policy favoring adjudication on the merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system. Id. At 1117-18. Because dismissal sounds the death knell of the lawsuit, Courts must reserve that medicine for instance where the defaulting partys misconduct is correspondingly egregious. Id. At 1118. The trial court has the inherent authority, within the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when a plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court, or where a party refuses to comply with court orders. Kerblum v. Schnieder, 609 SO. 2d 138, 139 (FL. 4th DCA 1992).

Plaintiff has forwarded complaints to each one of the agencies named herein and has not received the fair investigation into his claim, as is mandated. Plaintiff hereby respectfully requests that he be afforded the full attention of the Board of Ethics and not just the Executive Director Avery Aisenstark, who has recently been found to have not met with the Board for 6 years. It is during the 6 years, as covered herein, that Plaintiff filed his first complaint with the Board of Ethics. The Executive Director demonstrated that the Board of Ethics dismissed the complaint. How can this be possible when Mr. Aisenstark hasnt met with them in 6 years. Due to the allegations of fraud and obstruction of justice, Plaintiff hereby requests that he be afforded all of the provisions, as found in Article 8 of the Baltimore City Code. A hearing to present the volumes of evidence into these allegations is requested.