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Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture
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Promoting American democracy

School of Politics and International Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Version of record first published: 02 Aug 2012.

To cite this article: R. Guy Emerson (2012): Promoting American democracy, Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, 18:6, 629-647 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2012.708993

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Social Identities Vol. 18, No. 6, November 2012, 629 647

Promoting American democracy

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(Received 21 August 2011; nal version received 22 February 2012) Dating from the Reagan presidencys crusade for freedom, democracy promotion has been a central pillar of US foreign policy. Whether claims by George H.W. Bush that beyond containment lies democracy, or by George W. Bush that intervention into the Middle East promoted a march to freedom in the Muslim world, the importance of democracy to US foreign policy should not be underestimated. Far from promoting democracy, however, critics suggest that it is merely rhetorical cover for intervention and control, thus serving US rather than local interests. While not discarding these insights, this paper suggests that while democracy promotion may support US self-interests, so too does it uphold a US self-image by acting as an ideal around which Washington constructs its identity and worldview. Explored in relation to Latin America, it is argued that US democracy promotion enabled by authoritarian representations of Venezuela is central to both a US-authored Latin American identity and, in contrast, integral to challenging it. While Venezuela acts as the reverse image of freedomloving United States and a democratically abiding Latin America, Caracas also challenges US democratic pre-eminence by extending the very notion of democracy and thereby demonstrates how both democracy and US influence more broadly are increasingly sites of contestation. Keywords: identity; democracy; discourse; United States; Venezuela

On 11 April 2002, elements of the Venezuelan military joined with prominent business and labour leaders to overthrow President Hugo Cha vez. Speaking to the nation at 10:20 that night, National Guard General Alberto Camacho Kairuz falsely declared Cha vezs resignation while, shortly thereafter, the President was taken to the la Orchila military base off the Venezuelan coast. With the uncertainty surrounding these events reflected throughout the region, Washington was quick to offer its support to the new transitional civilian government, noting a desire to work with all democratic forces in Venezuela (cited in Hassell, 2002, my emphasis). Far from a military-backed golpe, the White House claimed that the Cha vez government provoked the crisis . . . [as it] suppressed what was a peaceful demonstration (Fleischer, 2002a). These sentiments were echoed by the Department of State, which expressed its solidarity with the Venezuelan people and reinforced the democratic credentials of the golpistas by again expressing a desire to work with all democratic forces in Venezuela (Reeker, 2002). Diplomatic efforts to convince other regional leaders of Cha vezs culpability were also underway. Otto Reich, US Assistant
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Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, summoned regional ambassadors to his office, claiming that the removal of Cha vez was not a rupture of democratic rule, but the resignation of an autocratic ruler who was responsible for his fate (cited in Vulliamy, 2002). Similarly, US ambassador to the Organisation of American States (OAS), Roger Noriega, rebuked other member-states for their concern amid the previous appeasement of Cha vezs anti-democratic behaviour (cited in Clement, 2005, p. 71). Regional reactions, however, were not consistent with that of Washington. The R o Group of 19 Latin American states adopted a resolution condemning the interruption of constitutional order, while the OAS, despite initial US stalling, followed with a unanimous resolution condemning the alteration of constitutional order (BBC News, 2002; Rohter, 2002). With El Salvador the only other regional actor to recognise the de facto government, Cha vezs eventual reinstatement two days later not only embarrassed Washington, but left it isolated on this issue of democratic integrity (Ellner & Rosen, 2002). While this isolation was immediately clear, less apparent at the time was that these events would provide an insight into a larger struggle over notions of democracy and a questioning of US preeminence in Latin America. Dating from the Reagan presidency, democracy promotion has been a central pillar of US foreign policy. Although announcements in 1982 of a crusade for freedom and a campaign for democratic development were undoubtedly dominated by Cold War modes of thinking, these ideas would easily translate into the New World Order. The George H.W. Bush presidency, for example, claimed that beyond containment lies democracy, while the Bill Clinton administration in 1994 implemented Operation Uphold Democracy to return Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. Far from promoting democracy, however, critics of these initiatives claim that they are merely rhetorical cover for maintaining US control and the continuation of its long history of intervention. Nicolas Guilhot, for example, suggests that democracy promotion has shifted from an anti-dictatorial strategy to become part of the arsenal of power itself, particularly since 11 September 2001 (2005, p. 8). Moreover, at the local level William Robinson argues that US democracy promotion undermines the capacity for social change, as it sponsors a stable State more receptive to the demands of international capital than to its own people (1995; 2006). Thus serving foreign interests rather than local needs, William Avile s adds that these initiatives actually undermine Latin American democracies (2005). While not discarding these insights, it is argued below that as much as democracy promotion may support US politico-economic self-interests, so too does it uphold the US self-image. That is, this understanding of democracy acts as the principal ideal around which Washington constructs both an image of itself and the region. Within this setting, democracy becomes the ultimate classifier of the US vision for Latin America, as it both reaffirms an ordered, classifiable region and maintains US leadership as the democratic standard-bearer. More than upholding its preeminent image, however, by exploring the nature of US democracy and its resonance in the Americas it is also possible to demonstrate limits to this influence. These limits, it is suggested, centre on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Indeed, while it will be shown how Caracas is integral to a US-authored Latin American identity, so too, in contrast, is it a basis from which US pre-eminence is challenged. With respect to the former, part one of this paper highlights how representations of an authoritarian

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Venezuela act as the reverse image of a democracy promoting United States and a democratically abiding Latin America. Having illustrated the importance of an inferior Venezuela to US identity practices, part two then seeks to problematise these practices by focussing on Caracas itself. It does so by charting the Cha vez administrations attempts to extend the very notion of democracy and thereby question Washingtons role as the democratic standard-bearer for the region. Part one: an authoritarian Venezuela and the democratic Americas While descriptions of Cha vez as an autocrat originated in domestic opposition to his 1998 presidential campaign, the tenets of this criticism are taken up and expanded upon by US officials (Buxton, 2005). This was nowhere more apparent than in the US response to the 2002 coup. [D]etails still are unclear, maintained White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, however, [w]e know that the action encouraged by the Chavez [sic] government provoked this crisis. According to the best information available, he continued, the Chavez government suppressed peaceful demonstrations (Fleischer, 2002a). While Fleischer was uncertain of the exact details, clearer was he of the fact that an authoritarian Cha vez had lost the support of his people. It was the Venezuelan leader, and not the coup plotters, who contravened democratic principles. These authoritarian representations, however, are not confined to the 2002 coup, nor to the Bush administration. President Obama, for example, has expressed his concern about the [Cha vez] governments actions which have restricted the universal rights of the Venezuelan people, threaten[ing] basic democratic values, and has accused Cha vez of tak[ing] over independent media outlets (Obama, 2010; Theis, 2011). Moreover, in relation to a proposed internet censor an initiative also undertaken by the Australian Government Venezuela was again singled out for curtail[ing] freedom of expression by limiting full access to and use of these technologies (Obama, 2011c). Although these arguments of authoritarianism appear hard to sustain in the face of 14 free and fair elections during the Cha vez presidency, dictatorial representations continue to retain their currency in Washington. A potential explanation for this positive reception may lie in the authoritarian thesis capacity to demarcate a totalitarian Venezuela from a freedom-exporting United States. With autocratic characteristics reviled amongst the US public, the portrayal of Cha vez as a crazed dictator stands in contrast to the perceived role of Washington in Latin America (Campbell, 1992). It evokes a larger narrative of a freedom-loving US public, with the exclusion of Caracas thus functioning as a condition for the emergence of a democratically unimpeachable United States. This image is consistent with the historical role Washington sees itself carrying out in the region. [O]ne of the great prides and success stories in American politics, argued the White House in response to criticism of its handling of the 2002 Venezuela coup attempt, has been that in the last 20 years, there has been a wonderful sea change in Central and South America, brought in large part as a result of people like Otto Reich and Elliot Abrams and others, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, who worked very hard to bring democracy to the region (Fleischer, 2002b, my emphasis).1 Benevolent and paternalistic, the belief that the United States is both an active promoter of democracy and an exemplary guiding light throughout the Western Hemisphere is a bi-partisan position. Indeed, recounting Washingtons importance to the democratic health of the region, Obama

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confirmed that he will stand with struggling democrats as they denounce elections that are not free or fair and fight those who seek to undermine the democratic process, so that flawed elections can no longer be used to legitimize rule in places like Venezuela (Obama, 2008). Through such pronouncements Washington positions itself as a democratic watchdog, not only providing the region with direction but also ensuring democratic compliance (Cavell, 2002). Beyond a reverse image to a democratic Washington, the authoritarian thesis also acts as a prism through which to categorise Venezuelan behaviour and as an interpretive straitjacket that its leader is unable to escape (Nathanson, 1988). This position is nowhere more apparent than in explaining Cha vezs democratic success. Described by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as a democratically elected leader who does not govern democratically and by President Bush as a man [who] was elected by the people but who does not respect the democratic institutions within his country, the official view of Cha vez confines Washington to a negative appreciation of Venezuelan democracy (Clinton, 2009; Bush, 2002a, p. 459).2 This negativity even resulted in former Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, likening Venezuela to the Third Reich, with Cha vez a person who was elected legally, just as Adolf Hitler was elected legally, and then consolidated power (Jones, 2007, p. 18). Unsurprisingly, these views are often at odds with the region. In response to Cha vezs first electoral defeat in nine years, for example, President Bush greeted the no vote in a 2007 referendum with claims that the Venezuelan people rejected one-man rule and voted for democracy (Bush, 2007). Reinforcing the sense of occasion, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, declared the vote a victory for the people of Venezuela (Burns, 2007). These comments, however, stood in contrast to Brazils Foreign Affairs Minister, Celso Amorin, who claimed that the [Venezuelan] president accepted the result in a very calm and elegant manner, and significantly different to statements made by President Felipe Caldero n of Mexico that Cha vez had shown enormous valor to admit such results. Further illustrating the divergence of opinion, Argentine President Nestor Kirchner was effusive in his praise, describing the Venezuelan leader as a great democrat (MercoPress, 2007). Moreover, any popular political initiative undertaken in Caracas is interpreted as part of a larger design to further Cha vezs own political fortunes (Dalby, 1988). The establishment of low-cost state subsidised supermarkets, for example, is derided as a relic of 1950s clientelistic politics and labelled populist. The current Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in the US House, Connie Mack of Florida, noted in 2010 that populism is the worst enemy of prosperity in Latin America (2010, p. 8). While populism involves a complex set of political actions, the US usage is largely deployed pejoratively to dismiss the Cha vez presidency and delimit any deviation from the primacy of liberal democracy and a market economy (Motta, 2009).3 Describing such politics as making no sense and referring to recent electricity cuts in Caracas, Secretary Clinton remarked that this [is] not the way a democracy operates. He [Cha vez] is taking over companies and taking their assets and, unfortunately now, we see the results of those economic policies (Clinton, 2010b). Similarly, her predecessor claimed that such policies were irresponsible, with Secretary Condoleezza Rice condemning the Venezuelan leader for promising easy answers, whereby they dont have to keep up with the fundamentals of good economic performance, [where they] dont need to worry about open markets, dont have to worry about open trade, you dont have to be fiscally responsible

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(Rice, 2005b). The implications of this dismissal, however, are only elevated given that Southcom, the body responsible for Latin America (excluding Mexico) at the Department of Defense, views radical populism as an emerging threat to US interests in the region (Hill, 2004). Extending this example further, these populist tendencies are said to reflect an authoritarian leader intent on maintaining power and control over a deceived populace. Indeed, according to Washington, the Venezuelan people are either misled in their support for Cha vez, or righteously fighting for their political freedom in spite of an authoritarian leader. In the case of the latter, the people are reified for their unshakable pursuit of democracy, despite Obamas concerns over the restriction of their universal rights . . . [and] basic democratic values (cited in Theis, 2011). Placed in opposition to Cha vez, Washingtons support of the Venezuelan people has at least two consequences. First and foremost, it reinforces the authoritarian thesis by placing the Venezuelan people in opposition to the Cha vez regime. That the Venezuelan people could actually support the Bolivarian Revolution or, conversely, that they could oppose US policy is rendered unthinkable (Weldes & Saco, 1996).4 Secondly, the Venezuelan people are viewed as sharing the same liberal, democratic values as US citizens. Just like a freedom-loving US people, the people of Venezuela and Latin America, Rep. Mack maintained, seek to uphold their freedom of speech, but want do so without being punished by its governments (2010, p. 9). By constituting a disgruntled Venezuelan populace and then likening it to the US citizenry, a confrontational policy approach towards Caracas not only becomes justifiable, but Washington becomes morally obligated to assist Venezuelans in overcoming tyranny (Weldes & Saco, 1996). The portrayal of Venezuelans as freedom-loving, de facto US citizens therefore enables Washington to righteously intervene in Venezuelan politics, and offers Secretary Clinton the moral authority to wish for a better future for the people of Venezuela . . . [and] wish that their government would govern more in the interests of all of the people (Clinton, 2010b). A vision of hope/new partnership: a US-authored Latin American identity Beyond depicting itself as a benevolent, guiding light to the region, Washingtons representations of Caracas also fashion a particular Latin American identity. Again predicated on the exclusion of Venezuela, President Bush outlined his vision for the region in an address to the Summit of the Americas at Fort Lauderdale in June 2005.
In the new Americas of the 21st century, bringing a better life to our people requires choosing between two competing visions. One offers a vision of hope it is founded on representative government, integration into the world markets, and a faith in the transformative power of freedom in individual lives. The other seeks to roll back the democratic progress of the past two decades by playing to fear, pitting neighbor against neighbor, and blaming others for their own failures to provide for their people. (Bush, 2005a)

Imposing its own interpretive framework over the Americas, Washington demarcates the region into a democratic vision of hope and, in a thinly-veiled reference to Caracas, a competing authoritarian ideal. Expanding upon these competing visions and foregoing any veiled criticisms, Secretary Rice argued before a Senate committee that Venezuela offers a competing vision of authoritarian leadership and

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commodity-driven economies (Rice, 2007, p. 111). Similarly, her successor noted that she was deeply concerned about the behavior of the Venezuelan Government, which we think is unproductive . . . and is limiting, slowly but surely, the freedoms within Venezuela (Clinton, 2010a). With democracy and freedom proclaimed as hallmarks of the US vision, an authoritarian Venezuela is clearly outside of this community. Cha vez becomes an illiberal anomaly in the democratic Americas, with interAmerican relations structured by competing logics of freedom and totalitarianism; a remarkable consistency with the ideological struggle that underpinned the Cold War. In addition to promoting a cohesive Americas by excluding Venezuela, this vision is also constructed through a process of equivalence whereby the region is simplified into a homogenous, clearly intelligible whole. Defining a common history, Bush stated at the 35th General Assembly of the OAS that [w]ere the children of the New World, founded in empire and fulfilled in independence. Our people are united by history and geography (Bush, 2005a). This shared position was confirmed in 2011, when Obama spoke of a special bond with our neighbors to the south, maintaining that [i]ts a bond born of shared history and values (Obama, 2011a). While both readings could be labelled selective given the different processes of independence, not to mention the inconsistent support (at best) on the part of Washington for Latin American liberation struggles the significance of the above statements lies not in their truth-value, but in their capacity to affect a US-authored Latin American identity. As children of the New World, the region is portrayed as having a shared history and values from which the common ideals of liberty and freedom are generated; ideals best epitomised by Washington. Indeed, the region is frequently placed in a position of anteriority, following and thereby confirming the US experience. President Bush, for example, depicted Central America as yet-to-be realised young democracies, struggling to succeed and viewed the Andean nations as [g]ood, young democracies presumably following Washingtons historical trajectory (Bush, 2005b, pp. 1652 1653). Similarly, for his part, Obama reinforces this teleological reading, applauding the regions fledgling democracies which, although politically immature, appear destined to follow the US example of representative democracy (Obama, 2009c, p. 3). In order to maintain this vision, however, any claims to Venezuelan democracy must be dismissed as either a democratically elected leader who governs in an illiberal way, or as a radical populist intent on increasing his personal power. To admit the democratic authenticity of Venezuela within this antagonistic system would not only undermine the veracity of the authoritarian thesis, but would also affect the key element around which the US constructs its vision of the region: Washington as the democratic standard-bearer. Consistent with the logic of difference and similarity outlined by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in relation to the maximum separation between, yet equivalence within, two divided visions in their case between peasant and urban cultures the US-authored image of a democratic region is premised upon no element of its vision being able to interact with elements of the competing authoritarian position (except on the basis of opposition). Interaction, in this sense, is minimised so as to both distinguish and solidify the respective visions (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This precarious balance was demonstrated by Obama on his first trip to the region. The Presidents call for a new partnership was not only dependent on moving beyond blam[ing] the United States, but also predicated on recognising that we all have a responsibility to see

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that the people of the Americans [sic] have the ability to pursue their own dreams in democratic societies (Obama, 2009a). In using the personal pronoun we, however, Obama not only claimed to speak on behalf of Washingtons (democratic) allies, but he also threw into relief those not within the we, those who continue to view Washington negatively and who do not govern democratically (Shapiro, 1988). That is, both Obamas we and the larger US new partnership (and vision of hope) demarcate Washington and the rest of Latin America from an authoritarian, oppositional Venezuela. These practices of democratic exclusion regulate the Americas by demonstrating what is and what is not appropriate behaviour. Viewed from this regulatory position, representations of an authoritarian Venezuela act to discipline other States by domesticating a particular type of democratic behaviour at the expense of any form which deviates from the US experience. The US reaction to participatory democracy in Venezuela is a case in point. Deriding the elections that installed a new constitution and National Assembly within Cha vezs first years in office, the former Under Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric affairs, Peter Romero, claimed that in Venezuela you do not see a government that rules; only plebiscites, referenda, and more elections (cited in Gime nez, 2002). These derisions are not limited to Caracas. In reference to both Venezuela and Bolivia, two states which have undertaken constitutional reform to enable greater popular involvement, Bush told reporters: Im concerned about the erosion of democracy in the countries you mentioned (Bush, 2006, p. 992). Demonstrating this exclusion even more succinctly, Rep. Mack in 2010 described the leaders of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba as thugocrats . . . [who] alter their constitutions so they can remain leaders for life (Mack, 2010, p. 8). Any experimentation or departure from the authorised democratic model is identified as a corruption and a threat to democratic consolidation (Clement, 2005). Fixed in a position anterior to Washington, Latin American states are granted the right to meet US expectations, however, they are unable to choose differently from the options already outlined for them (Chomsky, 1993). Promoting democracy? Although the authoritarian thesis originated in a domestic Venezuelan context, the effect of its repetition in Washington is radically different. The authority attributed to US statements not only confirms an autocratic reading of Cha vez, it also results in specific policy consequences. Indeed, the strategic requirement to combat the dangers of authoritarianism, combined with the moral imperative to act on behalf of the Venezuelan people, serves as a powerful narrative that enables Obama to frame the support for programs to aid Venezuelas democratic institutions . . . [as] vital to the national interests of the United States (Obama, 2009b). Given this moral authority, any accusations regarding the violation of Venezuelan sovereignty can be dismissed on the grounds of supporting the Venezuelan people. In such a light, the following candid comments made by Secretary Rice appear commonsensical: we are going to continue to fund organizations that are trying to resist [the Cha vez administration]. But I think we want to make this about [the] American defense of democracy, not a rhetorical contest with the President of Venezuela (Rice, 2007, p. 78).

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More than rhetorical admonitions, therefore, an authoritarian Cha vez enables Washington to democratically intervene in Venezuela. The principal agencies involved in this democracy promotion are the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Beginning its programme in August 2002 so as to maintain democratic stability and strengthen the countrys fragile democratic institutions, USAID clearly operated under a mandate to educate Venezuelans on the correct form of democracy (US Agency for International Development, 2010). During its first two years of operations, USAID and a subsidiary organisation with the disquieting name of the Office of Transition Initiatives had a budget of US$10 million, the majority of which was used to fund approximately 64 opposition groups and programmes.5 By 2010, however, the external funding reached more than US$57 million, the majority coming from USAID and NED (Golinger, 2011). While such funding points to the existence and free operation of opposition parties within Venezuela, thereby undermining claims of authoritarianism, so too do such programmes demonstrate an alignment between the official US appreciation of Venezuela and those of both USAID and NED. Indeed, one of the chief recipients of NED funding, the International Republican Institute (IRI), has clearly sought to capitalise on this common authoritarian reading. Before coming to power, for example, the IRI warned US officials that Cha vezs electoral victory illustrated the possibility that the country may veer away from the democratic path being followed by most Latin American countries . . . For these reasons, they cautioned, the travails of Venezuelan democracy bear watching (cited in Clement, 2005, p. 65). Further demonstrating a lack of impartiality, an IRI report in 2001 publicised its firm working relationship with opposition figures, and disclosed a visit of the then opposition presidential candidate, Francisco Arias Ca rdenas, to Washington where they spoke of the shortcomings of President Cha vezs administration and the desperate need for change in Venezuela (cited in Clement, 2005, p. 70). In addition to fostering relations with local opposition groups, both USAID and NED attempt to refashion Venezuelan democracy from below. Stating its objectives for 2002, NED sought to expand the constitutional, legal, and political space for civil society, NGOs, and opposition political party development. Consistent with these moves from below are attempts to cultivate agents of influence amongst local political and civic leaders who are expected to share US aspirations and worldviews (Robinson, 2006). Another recipient of NED funding, the National Democratic Institute, set up an office in Venezuela in 2001 with a US$210,500 grant, stating that in order to help salvage democracy in Venezuela, an effective political party system must be rebuilt (cited in Clement, 2005, p. 69, my emphasis). Such comments allow democracy promotion initiatives to penetrate every level of society. In 2006, for example, the US Senate Appropriations Committee defined the act of promoting democracy to include programs that support good governance, human rights, independent media, and the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties, NGOs, and citizens (US Senate, 2006). With good governance concerning the executive and legislative branches, law and human rights falling under the purview of the judiciary, and concerns regarding the media ensuring the monitoring and/or intervention into the fourth estate, every strata of society becomes a target. Indeed, in 2009 alone, NED provided US$47,000 to promote public debate . . . and to strengthen the capacity of citizens to influence government

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decision making, US$165,800 to strengthen the understanding of democratic values among workers and business owners, US$35,390 to build the capacity of Venezuelan journalists, and a further US$600,000 grant to IRI to create and implement strategies to address issues at the local, municipal and state level[s] (National Endowment for Democracy, 2010 [my emphasis]). This complete saturation of the local political system is only confirmed by USAID objectives which seek to strengthen democratic governance, support civic engagement, promote human rights, and expand national dialogue (US Agency for International Development, 2011). Further insight into the US vision is provided by examining the particular brand of democracy promoted; an insight that only re-affirms the abject nature of Venezuela. In 2011, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Arturo Valenzuela, maintained that the Obama administration has worked tirelessly to safeguard democratic values [and] promote economic opportunity (Valenzuela, 2011). While such statements appear relatively innocuous, the implications of this politico-economic vision are potentially vast. For its critics, the promotion of market-orientated democracy represents a low-intensity understanding that limits the role of the State. With policy decisions increasingly left to the responsibility of experts, the economic wellbeing of the State and its citizenry are determined through their relationship with the market. Issues regarding who controls the material and cultural resources of society, and in whose interests society is organised, become increasingly irrelevant to the discussion of democracy (Robinson, 1995). In contrast to more popular conceptions of democracy where political power is a means of transforming unjust socioeconomic structures and democratising social and cultural life, low-intensity democracy explicitly isolates the political from the socio-economic sphere (Robinson, 2006). As a result, issues of alleviating poverty are left to the individuals relationship with the market, rather than their engagement in the political system. Viewed accordingly, democracy becomes part of a wider neoliberal discourse within which democratisation is the political corollary to economic liberalisation and internationalisation (Gill, Rocamora, & Wilson, 1993). Linking democracy, free trade and prosperity, President Bush maintained that [b]y working together to promote democracy, free trade, economic prosperity, effective governance, and human rights, we will keep the new Pan American spirit of freedom and cooperation alive and well for generations to come (Bush, 2002b, p. 625). It is within this logic that the full effects of the US vision of hope are realised. With its vision founded on representative government [and] integration into the world markets, it is clear that both elements are integral to the US-authored image of Latin America. This vision is also consistent with that of the Obama administration. Speaking in Brazil, Secretary Clinton noted the need for a new start in Caracas, wherein the Venezuelan leadership must restore private property and return to a free market economy (Clinton, 2010a). Both its political and economic dimensions are at odds with the US model. As a result, Obamas description of Cha vez as a force that has impeded progress in the region appears more than appropriate (cited in Forero, 2009). Institutionalising American democracy Seeking to institutionalise its democratic vision at the 35th General Assembly meeting of the OAS in 2005, Washington proposed the Declaration of Florida:

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Delivering the Benefits of Democracy. Building on the Democratic Charter of September 2001, the Declaration of Florida was described as a democratic early warning system, with then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega maintaining that the OAS needed to act proactively in the defense of democracy (Noriega, 2005). The proposal exhorted the Permanent Council to develop a process to assess, as appropriate, situations that may affect the development of a member states democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power (Azpiazu, 2005b). While initial concerns were raised about the potential for US intervention under the aegis of democracy, Secretary Rice was quick to clarify the proposal. This is not a matter of intervening to punish, she argued. However, far from dismissing the possibility, she continued: [i]ts a matter of intervening to try and sustain the development of democratic institutions across the region (cited in Gedda, 2005). Alluding to the regions fragile democracies and implicitly demonstrating concerns over its capacity for self-governance, she emphasised the need for some means, some mechanisms, some tools to try and help to prevent crises before they break (Rice, 2005c). Washington, accordingly, proposed an oversight mechanism that would enshrine monitoring compliance and anticipate crises that might undermine democracy and work to strengthen democratic institutions (Azpiazu, 2005b; Brinkley, 2005b). Although proposed within the OAS, the United States saw itself playing a key monitoring role. As Secretary Rice noted [w]ere talking about the OASs role in making certain that the Democratic Charter is adhered to, but also how we can assist countries that are trying to strengthen weak democratic institutions (Rice, 2005c, my emphasis). More than monitoring regional democracies, the significance of the Declaration would be to institutionalise a particular reading of democracy. Placed in accordance with the regulatory consequences outlined by Michel Foucault in relation to disciplinary practices, such monitoring techniques exhibit a normalising judgement that hierarchically rank those observed according to the level of distance they represent from the authoritative model. The surveillance of each countrys political system would accordingly normalise a specific, US-authored form of democracy, with any variation scripted as inferior and thereby worthy of further oversight and/or intervention. Monitoring would consequently become a strategy for making regional actors aware of the correct model. Within this setting the US brand of representative democracy would become the standard from which it is possible to qualify, classify and punish Latin American states (Foucault, 1977). The proposal would also reaffirm Washingtons vision for the Americas. In framing the Declaration of Florida debate Secretary Rice noted that [t]his is an issue of what kind of hemisphere do we want to be (Rice, 2005c). Operating through a logic of exclusion and equivalence that simplified the region into a liberal/illiberal frame of reference, Rice noted: [t]ogether, we must insist that leaders who are elected democratically have a responsibility to govern democratically (cited in Williams, 2005). This vision was again predicated on excluding Caracas. [T]he fact is, Secretary Rice maintained, that there are concerns about democratic development in Venezuela. Further, when questioned about democratic diversity in the region, Rice declared: I dont believe that there are different kinds of democracy. Codifying her statements by employing the morally-charged example of authoritarian communism, she continued: [w]ho ever thought that East Germany was democratic? It was not. And so when people talk about different kinds of democracy, I say lets go back to

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the basics of democracy. Put simply, she added: I dont think we need a new definition of democracy. We know it when we see it (Rice, 2005a). While proposed under the Bush administration, these views have carried over into the Obama presidency. Assistant Secretary Valenzuela, for example, spoke in 2010 of the need for the OAS to take preventive action in situations that may affect the viability of democratic institutions and of counteracting emerging threats to democracy before they reach the crisis stage (Valenzuela, 2010). Similarly, on a 2011 trip to Chile, Obama exhorted: just as we defend democracy and human rights within our borders, lets recommit to defending them across our hemisphere, only to add in another poorly-concealed reference to Venezuela . . . surely we can agree that democracy is about more than majority rule, that simply holding power does not give a leader the right to suppress the rights of others . . . [w]e have to speak out when we see those principles violated (Obama, 2011b, p. 6). Despite bi-partisan support domestically, the Declaration of Florida was immediately derided throughout the region as a US pretext to intervene in democracies (Azpiazu, 2005b). Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, for example, told Secretary Rice that democracy is not imposed. It is born from dialogue, while the Venezuelan OAS ambassador Jorge Valero stated [t]here will be no acceptance in the heart of the Americas for any proposal that means trying to impose a single model of democracy (cited in Azpiazu, 2005b; Backhander for US, 2005). The most forceful criticism, however, centred on the potential for US interference. Anything that looks like intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, claimed Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez, will meet with resistance from Venezuela and the vast majority of Latin American countries (Agence France Presse, 2005). Concerned that a monitoring committee could impact member-states internal affairs, Amorim asserted that [w]ed like to strengthen democracy in the region but wed also like to avoid intruding mechanisms (Brinkley, 2005a; Gedda, 2005). More than dismissing the US position, regional actors repudiated assumptions of Washingtons democratic superiority. In principle, asserted Ruben Aguilar, the Mexican presidential spokesman, we are not in agreement with any tutelage from anybody (cited in Daniel, 2005). Anxious of US directives, its OAS ambassador, Jorge Chen, claimed that if the Declaration was to pass, it could not be something that comes from on high, while Venezuelan Ambassador Valero denounced any proposal which rendered the OAS a democratic police force (cited in Brinkley, 2005a; Riechmann, 2005). However, it was Argentine ambassador to the OAS, Rodolfo Hugo Gil, who best reflected the sense of disquiet, describing the proposal as impossible to sell to any adult human being (cited in Brinkley, 2005a). In the face of this criticism, Washington was forced to accept a watered-down version of the declaration. With debate exceeding the allotted period by six hours, it first changed the proposal from monitoring regional democracy to an assistance mechanism for fragile democracies and, in the end, settled on initiatives for cooperation (Azpiazu, 2005a; Christie, 2005). Rejecting attempts to institutionalise intervention, a States right to decide their own political status and economic, social and cultural development was added to the final declaration (Agence France Presse, 2005). As one commentator noted, [i]t may have been the first OAS meeting in over 30 years to be held in the United States, but it was also the first time really that we

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have seen Latin America being vocal that they are not going to complacently follow suit after the United States (Christie, 2005). Part two: the Venezuelan challenge More than a limit to US diplomatic influence, the events within the OAS suggested a broadening of political space that exceeded US attempts to qualify the region and classify a notion of American democracy. At the forefront of this expansion was Venezuela. While preceding the Declaration of Florida, Venezuela has sought to institutionalise an alternative democratic vision within the OAS through its Social Charter of the Americas. Rather than divorcing the socio-economic from the political, Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, insist on social justice as a precondition for democracy. Promoted as a corrective to the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez proposed the Charter as a way of overcoming the limitations of an elitist democracy, a democracy that is merely electoral and to build an inclusive democracy with equality (cited in Parish, Peceny & Delacour, 2007, p. 226). Questions of economic and social parity are at the forefront of this process. Explicitly confronting low-intensity democracy and its tenets of minimal state interference and laissez-faire market economics, Rodriguez argued that democracy cannot be limited purely to the political realm. It has to be included in the economic, the social, and the cultural . . . the need of social justice as a fundamental component of democracy (Rodriguez, 2005). Put simply, where the calamities of hunger and poverty exist, democracy is in doubt and human rights are a fiction (Rodriguez, cited in Gindin, 2005). According to this view, without substantial reform and the redistribution of economic assets, representative institutions irrespective of their democratic value will mirror the undemocratic power relations of society (Gill et al., 1993). Politics becomes a tool for change and a means to resolve such material problems as housing, health, education, land ownership, and broader social inequalities (Amin, 1993; Robinson, 1995). It is in this context, Rodriguez continued, that we believe that the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the Social Charter of the Americas are complimentary and mutually reinforcing. The first alludes to civil and political rights, the second to economic, social, and cultural rights (Rodriguez, 2005). Despite opposition to the imposition of US democracy, the implementation of the Social Charter is not yet realised, as discussions over its final make-up are ongoing. In the most recent, October 2011, OAS meeting, the Joint Working Group of the Permanent Council and CEPCIDI on the draft Social Charter of the Americas convened to discuss the draft resolution. With comments still to be garnered from the General Assembly and the drafting process ongoing, the proposal still appears some way off ratification. These limitations aside, however, abundantly clear is the extent of the struggle over the very notion of democracy. While defining democracy has become a major ideological battle, the stakes involved in the Americas revolve around the increasingly contested US vision of hope/new partnership. Pointing to the dimensions of this struggle, Cha vez directly challenges US credentials by highlighting the supposed deficiencies in its understanding of democracy. As opposed to models that demarcate the economic from the political, Cha vez maintains that [w]e truly fight for a world of justice, of equality, of

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liberty, of complete and authentic democracy (Cha vez, 2006, p. 294). Not only does Venezuela speak critically of the US position, but this criticism opens up space for different translations of what constitutes politics. Constitutional reform in Bolivia (2009) and Ecuador (2008) reflect similar attempts to extend popular participation, while steps towards a greater redistributive mechanism promoted by the State are also underway in Brazil and Argentina. Programmes such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil or social welfare payment plans in Argentina explicitly reintroduce the economic into Latin American politics (Robinson, 2008). Venezuela is active in this regional promotion, having founded along with Cuba a series of welfare programmes under the banner of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America. While not restricted to health notably also including education and the exchange of foodstuffs, technology, infrastructure, petrochemicals, raw materials and financial resources the most well-known programme, Mission Barrio Adentro, involves Venezuelan oil being exchanged for Cuban doctors to operate throughout the region. While not wanting to dismiss the practical consequences and the on-the-ground limitations involved in these initiatives, the interest below centres on how these positions affect the US role in the Americas. Limits to prescribing American democracy At its most radical, Venezuela demonstrates a limit in US capacity to unify an understanding of democracy in the Americas and fix it as an object over which it can monitor and control. US discursive and institutional power is challenged by highlighting a novel way of conceiving democracy and placing this understanding as a corrective to US conceptions. This redescription allows the objectives and importantly the practices of democracy to be reworked. Democracy consequently becomes a site of contestation, whereby Latin America is no longer a passive recipient of US knowledge. Demonstrating the regulatory consequences of this contestation, if notions of democracy are challenged then so too is Washingtons capacity to call the region to account for not following its model. It allows the possibility of moving beyond a US-centric vision, enabling Latin America to see themselves from multiple vantage points. As a result, the context within which representations of an authoritarian Venezuela circulate alongside visions of Washington as a democratic standard-bearer are themselves potentially reformulated. Exploring this reformulation in greater detail, central to US practices of representation is the need to dismiss Venezuela so as to maintain the integrity of its democratic project. Rather than the automatic democratic standard-bearer for the Americas, US democratic pre-eminence, it is suggested, is energised through lessthan-equal representations of Latin American democracy. Implicit in its criticism of Venezuela, for example, is the belief that Washington is the democratic absolute against which the region is negatively measured. The authoritarian thesis, in this context, becomes the perpetual affirmation of US superiority. Irrespective of whether it is a democracy promotion initiative in Venezuela or representations by US officials of an authoritarian populist, both these physical and linguistic acts help constitute an inferior Venezuelan democracy and a pre-eminent United States. Through such practices Washington becomes a self-enclosed democratic totality whereby, irrespective of the position taken, their superiority is affirmed either through the persistence

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of the US image in its (necessarily incomplete) implementation by an abiding Latin America or through the danger associated with its conspicuous absence. Democracy, as argued, becomes the ultimate classifier of Washingtons vision, both re-affirming an ordered and classifiable Latin America and maintaining US leadership of the region. However, by viewing these practices of representations as performatively reproduced, the implications of undermining the US logic becomes apparent. If US claims to democratic unimpeachability are energised by dismissing Venezuela, then it is possible to conceive this disavowal as constitutive of US supremacy. More than constituting what it names, however, conceiving of an illiberal Venezuela as performatively constructed also points to the importance of the existing beliefs and assumptions that operate in the Americas which make an authoritarian Venezuela intelligible. This reading is dependent upon a series of inter-subjectively shared understandings that view Cha vezs actions at odds with the expected modes of behaviour. The power of the performative construction, therefore, is not the initial will on the part of the United States to ascribe Venezuela as illiberal; rather, this reading only succeeds if it is viewed as conforming to existing assumptions and systems of knowledge on, in this case, democratic governance.6 What the events within the OAS suggest, however, is that while there remains the intent on the part of Washington to exclude Venezuela, the intelligibility of this move does not necessarily resonate in the Americas. The effects of this limit are vast. By promoting a different political path Caracas disturbs the US understanding of democracy and the legitimacy upon which it justifies intervention. The link between the processes of subjectification and the policy this reading enables is consequently contested with the inability to repeat an authoritarian reading of Venezuela not only undermining the US vision for the region, but also affecting Washingtons position as the democratic standard-bearer: able to righteously intervene in the interests of democracy.7 Reflecting this limit to the vision of hope/new partnership, the assumed anteriority of Latin American democracies becomes increasingly questioned. Rather than viewing themselves as inferior (fledgling democracies) or in a process of following the US example (young democracies), difference is recast as manifesting the possibility of alternate ways of viewing politics. As a result, Washington is forced to acknowledge a limit in both its own position in the Americas and, importantly, in its vision that understands the region as either copying or corrupting its example. Conclusions What this paper has sought to demonstrate is that what qualifies as democracy in the Americas is highly political. Be it US or Venezuelan readings, the very ascription of the political was in no sense prior to, or separable from, a normative operation that denoted appropriate subjectivities and forms of behaviour. Indeed, it was clear from the US vantage point that what qualified as an intelligible Latin American subject required that certain identities could not exist. Whether it was a democratic Venezuela or an agential region forging its own democratic path, an understanding of both was imbued with the power of US knowledge that rendered non-conformity as inferior and dangerous. This enabled Washington to bring liberty where authoritarianism previously existed and maintain its own democratic unimpeachability from which it

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was able to perceive, diagnose and prescribe the Americas through reference to itself and its historical experience. Accordingly, the US vision acted as a self-enclosed discourse that reduced regional complexity by placing the Americas in a polarised view of time: one an already complete absolute, the other a not-yet (and never to be) realised facsimile. Interestingly, such representations of the region were consistent during both the Bush and Obama administrations. Indeed, not only was a level of consistency apparent in the practices of equivalence and difference within the respective vision of hope and new partnership excluding Venezuela while embracing the rest of the region but so too did this sense of continuity extend to the competing logics of freedom and totalitarianism that also governed the Cold War. More than a self-sustaining discourse, however, the identity practices involved in the US understanding of democracy were dependent upon an inter-subjectively shared belief on what was appropriate political behaviour. It was dependent upon a regional silence in ignoring erroneous (Venezuelan) behaviour, and regional passivity in conforming to Washingtons vision. Rather than repeating these roles, however, the failure of the Declaration of Florida and the associated difficulty in isolating Caracas Argentinean descriptions of Cha vez as a great democrat suggested a limit to the US position. In acknowledging this contestation, however, it was not suggested that the Venezuelan model could replace, nor necessarily displace, the US ideal from the region. Rather, it was to recognise that even amid the uncertainty surrounding the Venezuelan-proposed Social Charter, no longer was there a common American belief in a single democratic path. Indeed, efforts to classify American democracy from both Washington and Caracas became a regulatory fantasy. More immediately apparent, however, this paper demonstrated how the US failure to fix a particular understanding of democracy pointed to a threshold in its regional pre-eminence. Unable to call the region to account for not following its democratic model (here loosely termed as consistent with US self-interest), Washingtons claims to democratic stewardship over the Americas (self-image) were fundamentally contested. Notes
1. Abrams was a former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy. 2. The statement made by Secretary Clinton was remarkably similar to that made by her predecessor Condoleezza Rice, who labelled Cha vez a democratically elected leader who governs in an illiberal way (cited in Parish et al., 2007, p. 224). 3. This dismissal is also evident among much scholarship. See, for example, Castan eda (2006), Hawkins (2003), and Krastev (2006). 4. Interestingly, similar discursive tactics were implemented in other contexts. In relation to Cuba, for example, John F. Kennedy maintained that US support was with the people of Cuba now suffering under the yoke of a dictator; while in relation to Panama, President George H.W. Bush maintained that [t]he Panamanian people want democracy and not tyranny, and want Noriega out (as cited in Alcoff, 1991, p. 5). 5. The majority of that funding went to anti-Cha vez messages in the media and an unsuccessful campaign to recall the president from ofce in 2004. For more, see (Golinger, 2011). Moreover, within the Ofce of Transition Initiatives itself, by 2010 it had funded 623 small-grant and technical assistance activities totalling US$20,327,746 (US Agency for International Development, 2010).

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6. For an in-depth appreciation of this inter-subjective or coded basis of the performative, see Butler (1993) and Deleuze & Guattari (1987). 7. For more on the productive construction and limitations of this process of subjectication from which this argument is made see Butler (1997).

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