Contents

IntroductionbyTomSecker 4
NotesonmeetingatYaltabetweentheBigThree,6February1945 10
USStateDepartment,TextoftheAgreementReachedattheCrimea(Yalta)
Conference,March241945 16
PresidentialMemorandum,SovietForeignPolicyTowardWesternEurope,March
21,1946 25
StateDepartmentSecurityBriefingsonItaly,May1947April1948 30
NSC10/2NationalSecurityCouncilDirectiveonOfficeofSpecialProjects,17
th
June1948 64
SIFARreportonGladio,1
st
June1959(Italian) 66
USArmyFieldManual3115OperationsAgainstIrregularForces,May1961 79
USArmyFieldManual3031BStabilityOperationIntelligence:SpecialFields,
18
th
March1970(Germanversion) 129
USArmyFieldManual3031BStabilityOperationIntelligence:SpecialFields,
18
th
March1970(Englishversion)
137
CentralIntelligenceAgency,PotentialCommunistImpactonItalian[redacted]
DefensePosture,27January1978 149
CentralIntelligenceAgencyMemorandum,TheMoroKidnappingandItalian
Politics,27
th
April1978 156
ReportbyformerItalianPrimeMinisterGiulioAndreottifortheStrage
Commission,October18
th
1990(French) 160
EuropeanParliament,ResolutionontheGladioaffair,November221990 167
Introduction
Thiscollectionofaround150pagesofonceclassifiedmaterialshedslighton
theideologicalandoperationaloriginsofthenowinfamousOperationGladio.
Gladioisanumbrellanameusedbycommentatorsandhistorianstorefertoa
seriesofsmallscalecovertarmiesactiveacrossEuropethroughouttheCold
War(19451990).
ThesesecretarmieswereoriginallysetupattheendofWorldWar2inmost
NATOcountriesasameansofresistingSovietmilitaryinvasion.Theirdesign
wasbasedontheresistancemovementswhofoughtagainsttheNazisin
continentalEuropeduringtheSecondWorldWar.TheOfficeofStrategic
Services(OSSlatertheCIA)andtheSpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE
laterMI6)wereinstrumentalinestablishingthem.Theyconsistedofamixture
ofvolunteers,exmilitarymen,paidupspiesofvariousstateintelligence
organisationsand,ultimately,terrorists.
Startinginthe1960s,WesternEuropewasfortwodecadesthemaintargetof
terroristattacks.Whatthesedocumentsshowisnotonlythatthegovernments
ofseniorNATOcountries(primarilytheUSandUK)werethemaininstigatorof
thisviolence,butalsowhy.Takingthedocumentsinturn:
NotesonmeetingatYaltabetweentheBigThree,6February1945
source:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/
AttheYaltaconferencethreeoldmenRoosevelt,ChurchillandStalin
carveduptheworld,creatingtwoblocsdivideddownthemiddleofEurope,and
thuscreatingtheColdWar.
Thenotesononeofthemeetingsattheconferenceshowthatthedecisionas
tohowtodefinePolandsborderswasentirelygeostrategic.Therewasno
concernforPolandhavingsufferedatthehandsofbothGermanyandRussia.
TheAmericansweretryingtoensurethatPolandbegivencertainoilrich
territories,theBritishwereworriedaboutPolandssovereignindependence
andfreedomandtheRussianswantedtomakesurethatthecountrywould
stopservingasacorridorforGermanattacks.
ChurchillspokeofusingthemeetingtocreateagovernmentforPoland,aslip
ofthetonguethatStalinmocked.Themurderoustyrantpointedoutthatthere
werenoPolishdelegatesattheconference,jokinghow,theyallsaythatIama
dictatorbutIhaveenoughdemocraticfeelingnottosetupaPolishgovernment
withoutPoles.
PertinentlyfortheGladiostory,StalinalsospokeofagentsoftheLondon
governmentconnectedwiththesocalledresistanceinPoland,sayingthatthey
hadkilled212Russiansoldiers.Rooseveltcounteredbysuggestingthey
adjournthemeeting,beforeChurchillofferedanondenialdenial,sayingImust
putonrecordthatboththeBritishandSovietgovernmentshavedifferent
sourcesofinformationinPolandandgetdifferentfacts.
TextoftheAgreementReachedattheCrimea(Yalta)Conference,March24
1945source:
http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/files/Documents/YALTA.pdf
Despitethesesquabbles,themenmanagedtocometoanagreementonanew
worldorganisationstretchingfromPolandtoIran.Thiseffectivelybecamethe
newbattleline,andwithinafewyearstheSovietshadannexedEastern
EuropeandtheBritishandAmericanswerestagingcoupsineverywherefrom
IrantoGuatemala.ThistextoftheagreementspellsouttheresultoftheYalta
conference.
Perhapstellingly,thequestionofItalysimportanceinallthiswaslefttolater
discussion.
PresidentialMemorandum,SovietForeignPolicyTowardWesternEurope,
March21,1946source:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/
ThismemorandumforPresidentTrumanshowshowtheprimaryconcernwas
notaboutSovietmilitaryoccupationofWesternEurope,butofsupportfor
democraticCommunistparties.Itcommentsthat,Throughthenational
CommunistPartiestheSovietsapparentlyintendtocreat[e]Leftistcoalitions
leadingtoalargemeasureofCommunistcontrolinnationalgovernments.
ItwentontospeakoftheVaticanasbeingapotentantiCommunistweapon,
andthiswashowthecivilwarofterrorisminItalyhappened.Ontherightthere
wastheCatholicsandtheneoFascists.OnthelefttherewastheCommunists.
Eachsidehaditsattendantmilitantgroups,fromOrdineNuovototheRed
Brigades.Thisideologicaldividebetweenthetwoprostatistfactionssaw
hundredsofpeoplekilledandverylittleaccomplishedinprogressingItalian
democracy.
StateDepartmentSecurityBriefingsonItaly,May1947April1948source:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ciacase/EXK.pdf
ThesesecuritybriefingsmakecleartheWestsworryoverinternalsubversion
ofEuropeviademocraticmeans.TheinternationalallianceofCommunist
politicalpartieswasgainingnumbersandstrength.TheSovietsweredoing
theirbitfordemocracybysendinghundredsofthousandsofSovietnationals
westward.Whatthisshowsishowthepublic,inparticularthosewhomight
givedemocraticsupportforCommunism,werebothaproblemandatarget.
AstheApril1948electionloomed,thebriefingsgotmoreandmoreurgent.
Oneadmitsthat,wearedoingeverythingpossibletosupportthemoderate
democraticelementsinItalywithoutgivingtheimpressionofinterferingin
Italianaffairs.Asthefinalbriefinginthisselectionmakesclear,evenafterthe
AmericansgottheresultthattheywantedintheItalianelectiontheywerestill
concernedaboutpopularsupportforCommunism.
NSC10/2NationalSecurityCouncilDirectiveonOfficeofSpecialProjects,
17
th
June1948source:
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html
ItisinthislightthatweshouldviewNSC10/2.TheNationalSecurityActof
1947hadbroughttheNationalSecurityCouncilandtheCentralIntelligence
Agencyintobeing.WithinafewmonthstheNSCformallychargedtheCIAwith
responsibilityforcovertoperations.
Thedocumentdefinescovertoperationsas,allactivities(exceptasnoted
herein)whichareconductedorsponsoredbythisGovernmentagainsthostile
foreignstatesorgroupsorinsupportoffriendlyforeignstatesorgroupsbut
whicharesoplannedandexecutedthatanyUSGovernmentresponsibilityfor
themisnotevidenttounauthorizedpersonsandthatifuncoveredtheUS
Governmentcanplausiblydisclaimanyresponsibilityforthem.
AmongthespecificexamplesoutlinedbyNSC10/2is,supportofindigenous
anticommunistelements.Indigenousanticommunistelementssuchasneo
Fascistterrorists?Naturally.
SIFARreportonGladio,1
st
June1959
ThisdoctrinewasfirmlyembeddedinthestaybehindinItalyasearlyas1959.
Thisreportdescribedhowtheenemywasnotmilitaryoccupation,butinternal
subversionbypopularCommunistmovements.Itexplicitlydescribeshowthe
theoriesandpracticesofGladio(thestaybehind)shouldbeusedtocounter
thisthreat.Infiltration,acellstructureandthecarryingoutofspecialoperations
arealladvocated.
ThisdocumentemergedduringtheparliamentaryinquiriesinItalyandthelink
whereIobtainedthiscopyisnolongeravailable.ItiswritteninItalianbuta
gooddictionaryandapriorunderstandingofGladiomakeitrelativelyeasyto
interpret.
USArmyFieldManual3115OperationsAgainstIrregularForces,May1961
source:http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA310713
ThisisoneofseveraldefinitivelyauthenticUSArmyFieldManualsthatwere
translatedandusedfortrainingGladiooperatives.Thismanualwasoneofa
batchusedinTurkeytotrainthelocalstaybehindunitsknownasCounter
Guerrilla.
Themanualdetailsexactlywhoisinvolvedintheoperations,listing:
(1)Civilianvolunteersandthoseimpressedbycoercion.
(2)Militaryleadersandspecialists.
(8)Deserters.
(4)Intimeofactivewar,militaryindividualsorsmallgroups
suchasthosewhohavebeencutoff,deliberatestaybehinds,
escapedprisonersofwar,anddownedairmen.
Presumablyfarrightterroristsmanipulatedbythesecurityservicescomeunder
thoseimpressedbycoercion.Themanualincludesadiagramexplaininga
cellstructurethatincludesterroristunits.Thoughthisissupposedlyapicture
oftheenemyitisthesamestructurelaidoutintheSIFARreportonlytwo
yearsearlier.
USArmyFieldManual3031BStabilityOperationsIntelligence:Special
Fields,18
th
March1970source:
http://cryptome.info/fm3031b/FM3031B.htm
AvailableinbothGermanandEnglishinthiscollection,thisdocumentisa
matterofgreatcontroversyanddebate.MostGladioresearchersmaintainthat
itisreal.TheUSauthoritieshavedismisseditasaSovietforgery.Reading
theexplosivenatureofthetext,itiseasytoseewhythereissuch
disagreement.
TheremaybetimeswhenHostCountryGovernmentsshowpassivityor
indecisioninthefaceofcommunistsubversionandaccordingtothe
interpretationoftheUSsecretservicesdonotreactwithsufficient
effectiveness.Mostoftensuchsituationscomeaboutwhentherevolutionaries
temporarilyrenouncetheuseofforceandthushopetogainanadvantage,as
theleadersofthehostcountrywronglyconsiderthesituationtobesecure.US
armyintelligencemusthavethemeansoflaunchingspecialoperationswhich
willconvinceHostCountryGovernmentsandpublicopinionoftherealityofthe
insurgentdanger.
Inessence,provokingorinstigatingviolenceasameansofscaringthepublic
andgovernmentsintobelievinginandactingagainstthethreatofdemocratic
Communism.MypersonaltakeonthisdocumentisthatitprobablyisofSoviet
origin,andbeganlifeasapieceofdisinformation.Thoughitbearsdirect
comparisonwithknownauthenticUSArmyFieldManuals,itisnotentirely
convincing.
However,thedocumentbecamewidelyknownaboutwhenitwasfoundina
raidonthehouseofLicioGelli,thegrandmasteroftheCIAfundedMasonic
lodgePropagandaDue,orP2.WhenaskedbyAllenFrancovichwherehegot
thedocument,GellirepliedafriendintheCIAgaveittome.Hesaid,read
thiswhenyouhavetime.EvenifFM3031BdidstartoutasaSovietforgery,
whatGellisanswersuggestsisthatitbecamepartofthetraining
documentationforcovertoperations.Readersareencouragedtodotheirown
comparisonbetweenthedocumentandothersintheUSArmysFM(Field
Manual)seriesanddeveloptheirownconclusionsastoitsauthenticity.
CentralIntelligenceAgency,PotentialCommunistImpactonItalian[redacted]
DefensePosture,27January1978source:
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001144783/DOC_0001144783.pdf
ThoughtheCIAhasrefusedordelayedFOIArequestsaboutGladio,thisisone
ofthefilesavailableontheirwebsitethatshedslightonthesubject.This
analysisshowshowthehistoriccompromisebetweentheChristianDemocrats
andtheCommunistsinItalyatthistimewascausingtremendousconcernin
thesecurityagenciesoftheWest.
ThepaperdescribeshowiftheCommunistsdidjoinacoalitiongovernment
thentheywouldpotentiallyhaveaccesstoNATOintelligenceanddefence
plans,includingnuclearplanninginformation.Thepapersaysthatinsucha
situationthatItalywouldhavetobecutofffromNATOratherthanrisksuch
informationfallingintoSoviethands.
Assuch,ItalysfutureinNATOwasatstake,andtheimplicationoftherhetoric
inthisdocumentisthatsomethingmustbedone.
CentralIntelligenceAgencyMemorandum,TheMoroKidnappingandItalian
Politics,27
th
April1978source:
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001144784/DOC_0001144784.pdf
ThatsomethingconvenientlyhappenedwhenAldoMoro,theheadofChristian
Democrats,waskidnappedbytheostensiblyCommunistterroristgroupthe
RedBrigades.Morowasheldfor55daysbeforebeingexecuted.
BythetimeofthekidnappingtheoriginalleadershipoftheRedBrigadeswere
allinprison,andthegrouphadbeeninfiltratedbytheItaliansecretservices.
Assuch,themostlikelyexplanationforMorosassassinationisthatitwas
statesponsored,ameansofdestroyingthehistoriccompromise.
ThisCIApaper,writtenwhileMorowasheldcaptive,makesitobviousthatthe
Agencyunderstoodtheeffectofthekidnappingasitwashappening.It
commentsthatasidefromMoro,nooneelseisequippedtoplayhisstabilizing
roleinChristianDemocraticinternalpolitics,andinthepartysrelationswiththe
Communists.
ReportbyformerItalianPrimeMinisterGiulioAndreottifortheStrage
Commission,October18
th
1990
AFrenchversionofareportwrittenbythenItalianPrimeMinisterGiulio
AndreottifortheStrage(massacre)Commission.Andreottioutlinedthestay
behindindetail,howcellsofhighlytrainedmen,armscachesandclandestine
communicationsnetworksexistedalloverthecountry.Thedocumentisin
French,soagainagooddictionarymayberequired.
EuropeanParliament,ResolutionontheGladioaffair,November221990
AspublishedbytheOfficialJournalofEuropeanCommunities,thisresolution
explicitlycondemnsGladio.Thoughitcalledfortheparamilitarystructuresto
bedismantled,andforparliamentaryinquiriestobesetup,mostcountrieshave
simplydeniedtheexistenceofsuchunits.Onlythreecountrieshaveheld
inquiriesBelgium,ItalyandSwitzerland,andinmostcaseswecanonly
speculateattowhetherthesameorsimilarstructuresarestillactivetoday.

/
TOP SEC::..:: f
>U:!:TI NII ;..--; l.\l.To\ HL'i' E::t: : tif: !11 0 TI!Rt:E
4- 8 !' . )( . , ff.ll f\IIARY 6

Amorloll\ne:
The Pru1dont
The Soorotary ot Stnto
Ambassador
Harr7 Hopk1no
Juet.loe
llr. Bohlen
Jl4r. Katthevt
Mr .. His
Brl tloh:
The ?rtme R1nlotor
Mr. J:don
51r Alexander C&dogan
Ambassador Clark lorr
Sir Br1dgeo ( Soorotary
Interpreter
Xr. Sob Dlxon
Mr. Jottror Vlloon
Hr. Oladvyn J ebb
llarabal Stal1n
Mr .
Mr. Vyoh1nak1
Mr. N&hlt7
Amba,aador Oromyko
Amb&o&dor OouoeY
Pavlov (interpreter)
or 111\r CAblnoti
'


(The tlrat part or the meeting v&a 4 evot od to a
dlaoueo10n Of tho YOt1ng prooedure f or tho
organl&at1on. Thle 1e covered ln Mr.

notes.)
?OUND
I should l1ko to br1ng up Poland. I come troa
d1et&nce and therefore have the of a more
d1etant polnt ot v1ew or the problem. There are e1x
or s even
>
- 2-
or seven m1ll1on Poles tn t he Uni ted States. Ae I sa10
1n Tehran, \n general 1 aa 1n rnvor or the Curton llne.
Moe' ?ol ee, tlke the Ch\neae. to AAYe taoe.
St"'-tln:
{lnterruvt tnR) vt\1 anva race, the tn Polano
or the e&1gre Pol ee7
Preaid ent:
The Polea vould 11ke Eaet And or Oere&ny.
lt woul4 eake lt eaeter tor ae at home \t the
could gte eomethlQR to Poland. I ra1sed tho
auostton or glvtng LvoT at It haw nov
that the o\1 landa in aouthveat or Lvo
atght be Klven them. : Rm not aak\ng a 4eflntte tate-
mont but 1 houfl thJt.t WarRha\ Stalt.n oftn nAke a
tn thle dlreotlon.
the moat le thAt of a permanent
ror PolQDd. ln the Unlte4 Stateo lo
AKAlnAt or the Lub\1n governeent on the
ground that lt repreent portlon or tho Pol1h
pe.ople. ..._.hAt peoPle "Ant l.e the cre111 t1.on or a goernment
or nat1on8\ untty to thetr d\ftarnoee.
A governent "hloh would a lt t1ve major parttea
(name them) 18 vhat 1e wont ed. lt say 1nteraet
thAt I ao not know 8ny or the London or or the
Lublin MlkolaJo&yk oAt:,. to \\'oehlnt)ton an<1
1 greAtly by I telt thAt he an
'
mA1n I to aAke ta that there be
created an ad tntertm govern.ent w1ll hAve the
support or the maJor1ty or tho Polloh oe opl . There are
many wa;ye or orenttng ,.uoh a goernment. One or the
many euggeot\ona 1 the poaa\b1l\ty of oret1ng
prealdencr eounoll aade up or a eaal l numbnr or men vho
be the oontrolltng toroe d lnterlM to U? a
more p erzanont I mak.e thi s . -u.ggeat t.on
t roa tho d1ata nce of three thousand ail&e.
dlotr:t:nce 1a "" actvAntA.p;e. vnnt a. Poland thAt vtll.
thoroUKhl7 frten6ty tq the Soviet t or to
Th1& le OR8ent1nl.
S\Alln;
(1nt erruptlng) rr1endly not only to tho Sovl et but 8ll
three a ll1
Pres\4ent:

- J -
'Pru14ent:
thia 1s 1 onlr Ir ve can work out 1ome
eolut1oo or thte prebl e lt v111 make peaoe nuch
Prlme Minl11ter:
I have made repeated deolarat1on 1n tn
AUpp Ort of the 8ov1et cl&1ma to llne, 18
to e&J . le&Ttng Lvov vlth Soviet RuaalA. I hAve been
auob orltlolzed an4 haa kr. Eden by the
party Vhtch ! represent. But I have
that after alt Rueala hilA IU.rt"ered tn rt ghtlnl{
and after a tl h&r ertorta ln h er ola1
1A one rounded not on foro& but on r\ght. In
]::Osl't1oo I blde. aut or oOUrRe lt the m1.1(hty po..,er ,
the Soviet Union, a geftture ot t o ll
lfO&lc.er po"er and made the g eaturo aup;,:e e'ted b)' t ha
ve would aoo1A1c euoh Aotlon.
Hov&Yer, I am aore 1ntereated 1n the question or
PolAn4'o ooerolgn 1ndopondonoo troedo. that ln
trontler llnoe. I vant tho Poloo t o a
homo 1n Europe and to be !roo to 11ve tho1r liCe
there. ThAt loan objoot1Yo vh1oh I have a 1vayo
Marohal 3tal1n proolalm vlth tho utmot flrGnooo. It
1o beoauao I put M7 truot ln hlo 4oolarat1on aoout tho
ooYorelgn 1n4opondonoo and rroo4om or Polan4 that tho
tront1er Queetlon 1 oonelder not ot eupreme 1mportanoe.
Th1a lo vhat lo dear to the hoarto or tho nat1on or
Br1ta1n. Thte 11 what ve went to Ral net Ormany
tor--that PolAnd ehould be tree anO aoverolgn. Everyone
hera knova the reeult lt t o ue unprepAred aa we
were and that 1t ne,._rly coat ue our 11te ae & oat lon.
Great llrltaln ha4 no matar!.al 1ntorot In Poland. l!or
loteret 1 only one or honor we the avord
ror Poland aRalnet Hl tler
1
e brutal attack. NeYer ooul c.\
I be oontont vlth any oolut1on thAt would not leBvo
Poland a tree and independent et&te. Howoer, I haYe
ono qua\1t1oat1onr I 4o not th1nk thRt tho or
Polan4 ooul4 be DAde to oovor boot1le deo1gne by any
Pol1h goYornmont, porhApe by lntr1v.ue
agalnet the Bov1et. I cannot oonoe1Ye thAt the vorl4
organl&at1on would ever tolerAte auoh aotlon or leAv& 1t
only to SoY1et Rueel& to take proper Our most
earneet deft1re Whloh we oare about Nuoh ae our ll
la that Poland 1n her own house and tn her
ovn aoul. I earneetly hope thAt ahall not
tak1ng a praot1oal otop wlth thlo obJective.
At the preae nt t1ae there Are tvo y.overnmentR nbout
whl oh

- . -
Wh1oh dlrrer. I hAYe ne Yer oeen any or the present
London gOYernmont. thea but have not oought
thelr But Nlkol&Jo<rk, ere
men ot good sanae and hae cont1denoe ln thea. Yo
reza1n ln torormal but friendly oontAot vlth thea. There
wlll be groat orlt1o1am agalnot ua all 1f we t.t thea
Olvtde us ve hAve euch great tn1k1 and oomoon hopes.
Can ve not a goernoent-lnerft ln Poland. A pro-
or government. aa the Pr8aldent 1a1d,
pen41ng tree election eo that a ll three or oan extend
reoognl tlon aa vall the other Unlted Natlona. CAn ve
not pa.Ye the w4y for tl free t'uture on the t'utul'"e cOnfltl-
and Poland? If we oould do
ahould the tabla v!th one atec
aooompliahod tovord future peace and tho prooporttr of
Central Europe. I eure that erreot1e guarantees
o&n b e laid to eeoure the 11ne or coaQuntontlona
of tho Y1otor1ouo ned Army 1n 1ta battle to
Germany. H1 Ooernent cord1ally tbe
PreA1dent'o euggeatlon and proaent the quoatlon to our
Ruao:tan allies.
(Stalin a ten-mtnute 1otera1ealon.}
8tal1n:
Tbt Pr1ae M1n1oter baa eaid that tor Groat Br:tta1n tbo
queotlon or. Pola nd 1s a queet1on or honor. ror Ruea la
1t le not ool} queet1on ot honor but alo or aeourlty.
11 a queet1on ot honor for Ru_aela tor ve ahAl.l
to many thlngo from the booka. But lt 1o a l oo
a que5tlon or aecurltJ or the state not onlJ beoauae ve
r on Poland's trontler but aleo becAuae
h1otor y Poland hoe ntvay boen a corridor tor attok on
Ruesla. It 1 outt1o1ent that tbe taet th1rt1
71Ar1 our hae p&aRed through thla eorrtdor
tv1oe. Tb1e te beCAuee Poland va1 veak. It 1e ln the
Ruae1an tnteret ae well. ae that. of PolAnd that Pola nd
be atrong nnd powerful and 1n a po81tton tn her own and
1n our lntere1t1 to abut the oorrldor by her ovn torate.
oorrldor be seohAn1oal\y ahut fro b7
Ruooia. It oould be shut rrom only by
It 1 neoeesar7 that Poland be tree, independent
powerful . It 1 not only a queatlon or honor but or
1 1ft and d e&th tor the Soviet State . ThAt 1 wny Rua1a
today 1 aga1not the C<arlet pol1oy or abo11t1on or
Poland. We have changed th1e pol1cy
and otartod a pol1o:r or tr1endahl p and ro1
Thle 1s the bft81e or our polloy and ve faTor
1tronp, 1ndependent PolAnO .
I r efer
TOP SECR.:-1
,-, .. _
I
- 0 -
I nov \o our allleo appeal vtth regard to the
Ourson llne. The Preoldent hns ouggeoted mo41r1oat1on,
g1Y1ng Polend LYoY and LYOY Pro1noa. The Prlme M1n1oter
t h1nta that vo ohould mako - goture or magnnn1m1 ty. But
I muot remind you that the llno vs 1nventod not
by Ruaolana but by tore1gnoro. Tho Cur<on llno or Cur <on
ada by CurEon, and the Amer1oana 1n
1918-1919. Ru .. la """not 1nYltod nnd d1<t not
Thls llno wan aoeeptod ngalnot t ho v1ll or tho Ruoo1An
on the baa1o or othnolog1oal datA. Lon1n oppoood lt.
He dtd not vnnt to and Blalyotok
Provlnc oa to ?otand but the Ourton llne gives them t o
Poland. We have rotr8nted from Le nln'a poe\tton. Some
vant ua to be leae Rueslan \han and
Vht vtll tho Ruoo1nnn any at Koocov nd tho
They will aay that Stnt1n Molotov nro rsr l fteft
of Runo1ft than Ourzon and Olomenoeou. I can-
not take euoh a poo1t1on and return to 1 pr oror
that the wor eonttnue " llttlo l onger ond 1! 1Vo Poll\nd
oomponaA t1on 1n the weet et the ot ne rrnl\ny. I
MlkolaJOt7k what rrontter he wanted.
vaa dellghted to hear or A ventern rrontler to th8 r1ver
Netas. I eay that 1 wlll mslntaln thla 1lne nnd
thla oontorenoe to Ther e are two No1 oo
r 1Yeri. Tho and tho woot. I rnvor tho woot.
Nov about tho government. Tho Prlmo Nlnlotor hao
oald that ho vnnto to oroate a Polteh gover naent hero.
I aa arrald that vao a allp or the tongue. Without the
partlolpatlon Poloa oan create no Pol ish gOYorn-
ent. They all oay that I am a but I havo
enough domocratlo reollng not to oot up a Polloh govern-
mont without Poleo. It uot be vtth partlolpatlon
Poleo . Ve had the opportunity ln Moooov to oreato a
Polloh vlth Poleo. Both London and Lublin
groupe met ln Mosoov and oertaln points or
were r oached. MlkolaJotyk returned to London and,vno
k1c.t.ed out or the goTernment. The preeont Londou goern-
ment Arohuohuakl , vhloh 1o ln reality tho
President All those people wore agnlnot
the agreoaent and hoat1le to tho tdeA. They oallod the
Lubl1D government bondlte an6 trAitors. - NnturAlly
tho Lubl1n government patd the omo ooln to thn London
gOYorn.ont. It 1o dlrrloult to brtng them together.
Tho prlnolpal pereonallttoo, Botrut , Ooubka, Korovakt,
won't bear ot the London 6overnment. I aek whst k1nd
or oan bo made . They tolerate Gr abakl
and General J ellkovokl but they hear or

I
- 0-
Under theee olroumetanoee I aa prepared to eupport &n7
attempt to areftto un1ty 1r thoro 1o ooao ohanoo or
I &I'll. orepared to oall the 'liarev ?olea here
or better to Aee them 1n Moaoow. tranlt.ly, the
government hae AR great a deoorat\o 1n
?olsnd a de ORulle hAa tn rrnnee.
Nov &A a m111tary man I mUIJ t eay vh&t l demand or
a country l1boratod by tho Rod Arm,. Y1rot thoro should
be ponoe and qu1ot 1n tho or tho -r=y. Tho aon or
the Rod Army are ao to k1nd ot govern-
mont there 1o 1n Pol-nd but they do vant one that v111
11&lntll1n order tho l1n... Tho l.ubUn
government t'ult1lo th1o role not bodly. Th.,ro nro &!(onto
or the London govornment oonneeted v\th the
underground. They a.r" o&lled rett1llltRi10t} roroea. .,.., hae
haa noth1ng goo4 tram thoQ but QUoh o11. So far the1r
h.nve 21?. RutJalan m111tftry men. They h.AYe
att.Aokod aupr lY r or arms. :t wa8 nnnounoect that
w\relees must be but t oroee
to bre.tik. All the lava or WA.r and oomplA1ned or
being arroted. 1T they attack tho Red Army a ny more
they w1ll be ahot. I compare the or beth
governmonto 1 flnd tho l.ublln oneo are uaoful
the othero the oontrar7, The mtlltlry muot have
and qutet. Tho m111tary "111 oupport uoh a
and I oAnnot do otherw1oe. Buoh 1o the a1tuat1on.
(The aflyn that 1t 1e nov ounrter to
end that tho t1ng should adJourn.)
Pr1 Mtnhtor:
1 muot put on reoord that both the Br1tloh and Sov1et
governments have d1trerent oouroo ot 1nformatlon 1n
Poland And get d1tferont teoto. Perhaps vo are D1eteken
but 1 do not reel that the Lublln ropreents
even one th1rd or tho Pol1oh people. Th1e 1ft MY honoot
opln1on and I aay bo wrons. I have felt tho
underground m1Rht have ooll1o1ono tho l.ubl1n govorn-
ment. I bloodshed, arro&to, &n6
I roar tho etreot on the whole queot1on. Anyone
who n t taoko tho Rol Army ohould be punhhed but l cannot
reel thAt tho l.ubltn government ha any t1ght to roprOA8Dt
the Pol1oh nAtion.
TOP SECRET

. '

YALTA (CRIMEA) CONFERENCE
February, 1945

Washington, March 24 - The text of the agreements reached at the
Crimea (Yalta) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime
Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin, as released by the
State Department today, follows:

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the
United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11,
came to the following conclusions:

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world
organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945,
and should be held in the United States of America.

2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and

(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the
common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term
"Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and
Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the
delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will
support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet
Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three
powers, should consult the Government of China and the French
Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the
present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the
nations which would take part in the United Nations conference
should be as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of
itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union
of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the Republic of China and of
the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the
Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference
to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter , at San
Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a charter
for a general international organization for the maintenance of
international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference
consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals
for the establishment of a general international organization
which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton
Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the
following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be
made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the
concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in
decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second
sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a
dispute should abstain from voting.'

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted
subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of -------- desires in advance
of the conference to present views or comments concerning the
proposals, the Government of the United States of America will
be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other
participating Governments."

Territorial trusteeship:

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent
seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to
the United Nations conference on the question of territorial
trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being
made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a)
existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories
detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any
other territory which might voluntarily be placed under
trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is
contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in
the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for
subsequent agreement which territories within the above
categories will be place under trusteeship.

[Begin first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the
United States of America have consulted with each other in the
common interests of the people of their countries and those of
liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement
to concert during the temporary period of instability in
liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in
assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi
Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of
Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and
economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of
national economic life must be achieved by processes which will
enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of
nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of
their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter -
the right of all people to choose the form of government under
which they will live - the restoration of sovereign rights and
self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived
to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may
exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist
the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state
in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require, (a) to
establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out
emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly
representative of all democratic elements in the population and
pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free
elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people;
and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such
elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and
provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when
matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any
European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make
such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on
the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities
set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of
the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the
United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation
with other peace-loving nations world order, under law,
dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of
all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope
that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be
associated with them in the procedure suggested.

[End first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for
Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority
with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they
will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of
Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was
referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John
Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the
desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR
GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the
French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be
formed out of the British and American zones and its extent
would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation
with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should
be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for
Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

Protocol

On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the
Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in
Kind


1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the
Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be
received in the first instance by those countries which have
borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest
losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three
following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or
the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth
of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well
as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships,
rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial,
transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these
removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying
the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a
period to be fixed.

(c) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed
plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied
reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist
of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from
the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation
as well as the distribution of it among the countries which
suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American
delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial
studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet
Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance
with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22
billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending
consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow
reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be
mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow
reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered
by the commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The conference agreed that the question of the major war
criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign
Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the
conference.

[Begin second section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

VII. POLAND

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the
conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her
complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the
establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be
more broadly based than was possible before the recent
liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional
Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore
be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion
of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad.
This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized
as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with
members of the present Provisional Government and with other
Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad,
with a view to the reorganization of the present Government
along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and
unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of
universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take
part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been
properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of
the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the
present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of
the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of
America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish
Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange
Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be
kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern
frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with
digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers
in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive
substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They
feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government
of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent
of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the
western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace
conference."

VIII. YOGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan
Subasitch:

(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put
into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the
agreement.

(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should
declare:

(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation
(AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav
Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration
with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary
Parliament and

(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly
of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to
subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this
statement should be published in the communiqu of the
conference.

[End second section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

IX. ITALO-YOGOSLAV FRONTIER - ITALO-ASUTRIAN FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation
and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them
and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries
on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact
of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still
under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a
treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the
Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this
could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the
British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter
further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the
proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of
their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference
to reparations.

(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the
situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be
pursued through the diplomatic channel.

[Begin third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up
for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they
should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or
four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals,
the first meeting being held in London.

[End third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

XIV. THE MONTREAUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign
Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals
which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward
in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their
Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the
appropriate moment.

The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three
Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.
M. Molotov
Anthony Eden

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the
United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in
two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in
Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war
against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's
Republic) shall be preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous
attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands
adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;

(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized,
the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being
safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the
U.S.S.R. restored;

(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian
Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly
operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company,
it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet
Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain
sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia
and the ports and railroads referred to above will require
concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President
will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on
advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these
claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled
after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to
conclude with the National Government of China a pact of
friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order
to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the
purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph Stalin
Franklin d. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945.

Memorandum, "Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe",
March 21, 1946. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers.
SOVIET FOREION POLICY TOWARD WESTERN BJROPE
This 1a the second o! a series of articles which will diseuse
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as it applies to s pecific
a.reas ot the world.
Diplomatic pressure and nat ional Coomunis t parties are the chi ef i nstru-
menh used in implementing Sovi et policy in western Europe. By dipl omatic
pressure the Soviet Union appears det ennined to prevent fonnation of a bloc
of western European States ori ented towards Orcat Britain. Through the
national Communi st Parties the Soviets apparently intend to creat Lef tist
coalitions leading to a large measur e of Communist cont rol in nat i onal
goverments.
In analyzirw Soviet policy, it is necessary to consi der both Soviet aims
nnd capabi liti es , t he latter <lepenill.ng not only on the i nfluence tho Soviet
Union can attain, but also on f or ei gn and indigenous forces oppos ing Soviet
influence within individual nati ons,
Principal Soviet efforts in western Europe probably will be dir ected
toward France, because t he fo r eign ard dooestic policies of Italy, Spain,
Portugal, S\dt:terland, &oo the Low Countries , to a consider able degr ee,
reflect French political trends.
SOVIET-FRI!:NCH RELATIO!IS
The offici al Soviet attitude t owar d Franca has passed t hrough t wo phases
since the Ger:aon i nvsion of the U. S. S. R. in June 1941. The U. S. S. R. en-
couraged t he of National Li berat i on and later, the provisional
1
:over!Jllent ot General de Gaulle by .. ttanpting to i molant i n the French a
sense of i n:lebte<lness to t he Soviet Union. This policy culminated in a
fonnal alliance on 12 December 1944 Vdti l e t he pact was bei ng negotiated i n
hoY/ever , t he Sovi ets atternpt ed t o coer ce the Fr ench i nto immediate
r ecognition of t he Polish Con>rni t tee of Na tiow L\ber at i on, rthich, on 1
January 191.5, was to declar e H self the Provi sioru.l Polish Gover no>ont . The
t'rench, however, r efused. on the ground t hat t he regime v;as not r epr esent ative
of the Polish peopl e .
Since thi s initial f ailure to 1rirluence t he French Govennent, the U. S. S. R.
has sought t o r educe Fr ench pr estige. Tne cordiality of t he ear ly war year s gave
way to an attitude of r eserve , although cor r ect dlpllllne.tic r elations wer e main-
t ained. At t he i nsistence of the Sovi et Union, France .not only wns excluded
.from the Yalta and Potsdam Conforonce, but al so i'rom participat ion in the
Bal kan Allied Control Commiasi ons, and from a n equal position in the discussion
of the Balkan poace treaties, Uore recenU y, Soviet-French relations have been
aut horitatively described as " cold."
Repeated French attempts to obt hin Soviet support for i ntel'Mtionalization
of t he Ruhr and organizat ion o! an lrdependent Rhine State have elicited only
t he r esponse thut Fr ench propos!lls were studied. The French colonial
position in t he Near East was a t tucked in t he UNO by the Soviet s , and the
- 1-
.


presence of French troops in Syria and Lebanon waa called to the attention of
the Security Council. The French and the Soviets hold opposite views on
Italian boundaires and colonies.
The only current international i ssue on which France and the U. S. S. R.
agree is the Spanish ques tion, on which the French For eign Minis try, unrter
George Bidault, has been under heavy Le.ftit pr essure in the As sembly. After
closure of the F' r ench-Spanish border on 1 llnrch and the statement on 4 IJarch
by France, Bri tain, and the United States , appealing to the Spanish people to
force Franco
1
6 withdrawal, the French Left, particularly t he Socialist, urged
referral of the Spanioh case t.o the UOO Security Council. The U. S. S. R. also
apparently favors dl.tect international intet-vention in the Spanish situation.
However, France' s dcsiru not to alienate the United States interest in French
probleJis, and to cooperate to some extent >d.th Brit.ish Mediterranean policy,
may lead t he French to compromise at the United !lations Security Council meet-
ing in New York in !larch. Some efforts will possibly be made, however, to
obtain recognition for t.hc Spanish Oovernnent-in-exile, leaders, now in
France, are ideologically close to the French Socialist Par ty.
TilE Fll.EilCH CO:oi1!U NlST PAR'l'Y
The t.Yio phases of Soviet-French relations have been found closely paralleled
by the domestic policy of the French Comrnun1.at Party. During the De Gaulle-
Soviet period qf friendly rel&ti qn:s the promoted unity wi thin the
national Resistance llovement; Party Secretaty-General !Iaurice Thorez keynoted
this policy in a speech from lloscow in ifov<mber 1943 when he asked for unity
among all r' renchmen frorn
11
Conrnuni at to Cutholics," and deemphasized r evolut-
ionary doctrine.
As French-Sovi et r elaUons det eriorattd eurly in 1945, however, tho Party
shi fted from a policy of purti cipation in a "united Front" suppor tinr, the De
Gaulle Ooverrment t o ono of concentration on the fonnotion of a Comllluniat-
docninat ed "popular front .
11
Initially, thic policy was successful; a COllllnunist -
5ocialist "comittl d entente" was set up eatly in 1945, and in the April and
llay municipal elections the parties prt sented joint lists of At
the Socialist Party Cont:ress in August 1945, ho"ever, the Socialist voted
almot unanimously unh.n Comlnunht Party.
Superior organizat\on 110n the !'arty and its 26. 2
of the tottll v,, t c in the national <<lections of a October 191.5, as
c<>mpared to 15. . 3 pccent i n the l'llitional of 1936, while skillful
Comrnun\at maneuveril\'( hus a1 ven the Party equal r epresentation wit.h the
Socillli s ts on the execut.ivo cor01:1ittee o1' the Uentwa.t Confet.leration of Labor
&nd a report ed votil'\f rht1.o or to one.
Al.thoueh the domestic position oJ' th" Contnunist Party in france
.;ves the U. S. S. R. influence in European i ,,ffairs, the
Conrnunist position !X.rtly depends on flexib1l Uy and adaptation to tho
political t emper of Ute nation. The Party' s b.pproach t o the problm or
MtionAlization -- too su,ldt n application \<Ould harm pr otluction --
appears to inuicate lha.t t he French elect orate is not yet
Gufficiently rwolutionary t o accept economic cJtsis as the price of
hi arxist economic democracy .
-2-

Till> Of>POSJTION 1'0
The Sociuli"t Part)' polled 21. percent of the vote in last October s
election arl the L!F.P, " part)' ulightly left of center, 25. J percent, l'hile
the Righti:t although they have not yet united on a comnon proeram,
were eupport,,d by apprOJdmately 15 percent of the electorate.
The clerical tinge of the URP, similar to the Italian Christian Democr ats
and the confoesional parties of Holhnd, and tho very nature of J>nrties on the
Right make them rallying for anti-Com:ounist sentiment . Western Eur o-
pean Socialism always luis been strongly opj)Osed to the revolutionary soci&l.ism
of the Third Inten>ational. The r efusal of the French Sociillsts to merge
nith the Coo!Jllunist Party and U10 Labor victory in Great Britain have en-
couraged conservative i n other western European Parties,
particularly in Italy, to risk dire ct competition with the Communist for
popular b'UPI>Ort .
SOVIET POLICY IN TilE l /h.5TIRN !JbDI1' ERRh NEAN
To est ablish a fully effect! vc security zone in t he west ern llediterranean,
the U. S. S. P.. must neutr ali7e Itllly us a poss1hlc outpost of the British Elnpire,
and either ou .. t OJ' radicully modif)' the r PL1t.l6 of t' ranco, in Srnin, and
Salazar, in Portugual . Actuul Soviet obj ect I vt:o i n the arctl are to secure
control or influence ov"r Venezia Giul.iu, 1'ull$ior, and the lt!<lian colony of
Tripoli tunio. . Soviet part.iciput1 on in t he udrni nl . t.rtion of 'l'nrl(:ier has been
assured by the agreement of 31 Augus t 1945 Current Soviet moves towar d
&nd 'l'ipoli bo nbanaoned if the Soviets secure concessions in the
tast -rn lJedt t.crranean.
The i nt<:J'rlbl ,x>liti cal b&lt. nc .. in I t.&l.y, :.p&in, and Portu.;al does rot
a1>pear to fhVOJ' the of Corilnunht.-dominated goverrrnents . The
Halion Communist Party until supportud Soviet dema nos for Italian
epaations uno Yugoslav cl.Air.w on Ttit:ste. 'rhis anti-Mtionall.s t policy,
combined with wi<leopr ead on tho pui'L of i rr.;sl>onsible groups
affHiateo with the Com.uunist:., hus a<.loed to the populc.rity of the vigorously
&r.ti- Conrnun1 st Chl'isti bn Vcrnocrutic Party. The Chr istian um.ocl'uts a l'e
e&timGted to have the lar.:est voting :;trtn,.>th of Italian par ties; they
recei ve cncourageoent 1'1'0111 Ute Vatic,.n, t1hose poli tical views ure a potent.
::.nti-CO/Illlluniot ,ea,,on in Catholi c I tal y.
'fhe Sovl huve &tl<.illlptod tlwouglt indi t"ct action to briut.r bbout the
fall of the t'rbnco Goverrvne l'rt. in Spain. It l s doubtful that any gr'Oup
cutrently lll8ntuvel'if'\C to succeed JrMlCO v10ultl bo colllplet ely acceptbblc to
t he U. S. S. Jl. Tho Spanish Republican Uoverment-in-Exile has no Couvnunist
portici!"'t.ion. In&i<Je Sjldin, t.ho r"sistence movo.ment, AllFD (tlbt.ionlll
Alliance of Dea.ocratic hich is reported to be ne.;ot1t>t1111: with
the Prt.tender and l\1. t.lo the Goverunent-1n-Exile, is rot controlled
by the <ies:>ite th<ilJ It see;ns likely that the
fall of the t'r unco re,:inoe will uepenci on internal political factors , in-
nuenced, but det el"'\\,\nod, by oubide Pl't,.,Wl't: fr<>ln the .,.R. or
other POllOI''"
-.3-

SOVli.T BALTIC POLICY
Soviet policy t.ormrd the Scandinavian Goverrments is predicated on a con-
cept of Scandinavia as part of the "security zone. " The organization
of this northern zone began by the acquisiU on of strategic areas in Finland,
and the latter was made ndlitarily helpless and v1ecl<ened economically nnd
politically. To ptevent any possibility of an nnti-Sovi et gl"oupil18 nround
the Baltic, the Soviets may seek toextend this zone to include bases in
notthcrn Noruay, on Bear Islnnd, or in Spitzbcr,;en, and possibly on Dnnl sh
or Swedish t erritory in the llaltic Sea.
The Soviets will continue their efforts 1-candinavian countries
from joinil18 a Bloc,
11
or forming 11 "llorthern Bloc" &mOl: th .. Asclves,
to maintain neut1illty i1' the UID foils to preserve peace among the Great
Pol"ters.
l>ince a succe&sJ'ul worlo security orgr.nhntion would work to the advant-
nge of small countries iike NoM!IIy, Sweden, and Dcii!Uirk, it is unlikely that
thoy 11ould at present the Sovi o;t U.nlon and simultaneously weu.kcn the
UNO by overtly fomine all ionces pr edicated on the inability of the UOO to
preserve peace. If a collapse of the secuiUy appeaNd irr,ninont, how-
evt' r , it is likely that :Sweden would reassert ita tr .. di tional policy of
neutrality and attecpt t o induce Norv1ay and Oennark to join in a ndlitury
alliance; Dew.ark, on the other hand, pl'Obably 110uld choose a different
course. of her connection with the l>Jropean ma.inland, Dermark likely
would find it impo5si ble to isolate herself ft'OID a war envelopil'{! the
Contino!nt.
The of the CO<l'<.IUniet Parties to the u. t.. S. R. is
HmHtd by t heir or110ll size. At the last elections, the
Communis t,; polled 10. 1, percent of the Swedi"h veto, 12 percent of the
Nol'I\C(Iian vote, and 12. 5 percent of the Dan! lih Moreover, Scand1 nuvian
Soc16lixt parties substar.tial utmy majorities.
COIICLUSIONS
Soviet policy in l:umpc seeks to fost<or Leftist with
Co'li'IUnlst phrLiciphtion, in in<il.vidual count1'ies Hhile, at the
aLtl'lllpUn,:: to uiscour&ge the formation of " "lleott rn Bloc, viewed in Uoseow
lb potentially anti-Soviet . It appears thut Sovht policy, backed by Soviet
po11vr in Euro?e, has been, and will to be, successful in prcvcntine
fol1nhl establisJ.ment ol' such a bloc, nltlrour,h connurlit.y or' interont, corrJllon
f ear , and some didilce oJ' the U. S. S. lt. will result in some
dear ee of unity aroo111: tho States of west.ern l!:utopt .
The Corn:nuni st ParUes in '1\tstern li<11opc have attanpted wit.h vhrylf\8 success
to ilnplc:nent Sovi<.t in national domestic <Jffai rs as well as in foreign
political affairs. \,hJle western l:.ut-Opcan Colllluuniats are stro1111, will-organized,
and able to cr.-&te considor .. ble inter""l Oisot'<let should Soviet so
dema nd, they hhVe btlen identifiad with lloscow to reduce thPir
potential influence and to lr.lrrove the position of Sochlht, as 11ell aa


'
moderate and clerical, parties which benefit from their anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist orientation. Coonunist 1nnuence, however, -..ould probably be in-
creased byl prolonged failure to solve the economic problems of the
area; (2) evidence that Orent Britain and, particularly, the United States
did rot intend to take an active interest in affaire; and (J) a
definite collapse of Big Three unity and failure of theUNO.
-)..

f b
((.
exK
Tap Summary
For the Secretary
May 26, 1947
ITALIAN AND FRENCH STRUGGLE AGAINST
Conditions in France and Italy have now reached a point where
the struggle between Cor;munist and non-Communist forces appears to
have entered a decisive stage, In France Socialist Premier Ramadier
is courageously attempting the experiment of governing with the Com-
munists in opposition. In Italy Premier de Gaspari's coalition cab-
inet last week resigned in the face of a desperate financial crisis,
declining public confidence in the government and unremitting Com-
munist attacks on the rroderate parties, The anti-Cocmunist forces
in Italy are apprehensive over following
11
Ramadier experiment"
since they are still fearful of the Communists and the degree of dis-
order which the Comnunists might foment if excluded from government
participation, De Gaspari's Christian however, have appar-
ently decided that they can no longer afford to shoulder the major
responsibility for Italy's critical conditions, with the Communists
remaining in the government and sabotaging the efforts of the Christian
Democrats to improve conditions, Charged by the Communists with hav-
ing placed undue reliance on western support while antagonizing the
USSR, and accused by almost everybody of having failed to solve Italy's
urgent problems, the .Christian Democrats have steadily lost ground
while the Communists have prospered mightily, In resigning de Gaspari
appears to hope for a broader coalition, which will spread responsi-
bility and reduce the number of portfolios in the hands of the Com-
munists, or else for a government excluding the
Factors in Italian Crisis. The immediate issue which produced
the fall of the de Gaspari government was the financial crisis marked
by a budget deficit of over 600 billion lire and by general loss of
confidence in the future of the lira, Campilli, Italy's able Minister
of the Treasury, has adMitted that all the measures wHch he had adopted
to restore confidence in the lira had failed and he has expressed the
opinion that the only remedy which now exists is the importation of con-
sumer goods on a vast scale, Beneath the financial crisis, however,
lies a fundamental lack of confidence in the government, based on sev-
eral factors in Italian political life since the end of the war, The
governments since Liberation have been hampered by the sharply competing
philosophies of the parties composing them. The earliest governments
authority during military operations. Since the trans-
fer of full responsibility to the Italians, elections, the institutional
question, and especially the peace treaty have monopolized the attention
of the government and politicians, Party strife and smbi tiona have
resulted in unworkable ministerial organization, and incompetence and
inexperience have resulted from theinevitable epurstion of many indi-
viduals trained in government who were Fascists and from paying off
D E,"CL.(-i.P.SIF'IE'D
obligations
B.O. Hf,Ua.
By_
-2-
obligations to members of the resistance with political positions,
The largest factor, however, is the fact that the Communists have
used their participation in the government to infiltrate every state
administrative organization and to sabotage every effort toward the
effective solution of Italy's problems.
Communist Successes, An indication of the advance of the Com-
munists in Italy is that their reported membership increased from
1,708,000 to 2,166,000 in 1946. With their Socialist allies they
have gained control of the municipal governments in Genoa, Turin,
Milan, Florence, Bologna, Last month they won a plurality in the
provincial elections in Sicily, the most conservative region of Italy,
obtaining 24% of the vote as compared with 7, 9% in June, 1946. They
confidently expect to consolidate their grip on the labor movement,
having elected 70% of the delegates to the Convention of the Labor
Federation being held next month, The measure of their success is
reflected by a greater display of confidence, a growing intransigence
on important issues, more open use of intimidatidn ana increasing
threats of resort to violence if necessary to gain their ends,
"The Rawadier Experiment. In France, where Premier Ramadier
has taken a firm stand against the Communists, the situation appears
somewhat more favorable than in Italy, The party composition ofthe
present government appears to be, under existing political conditions,
the best that could be hoped for, It excludes both the Communists on
the extreme left and reactionary elements on the right,and it com-
bines the fundamentally democratic forces of the center and left which
still command the support of the French Parliament and people despite
a general public feeling of disillusionment with government fumbling
and incoherence, Furthermore, its component elements are oriented
toward us through a mutual belief in liberty and human decency and
through deep fear and distrust of ruthless Soviet imperialism, Fin-
ally, there is the extremely important fact that the government is
essentially Socialist and is headed b,y a Socialist, It therefore has
the support of substantial elements of the vital trade union movement
and if it succeeds, it will unquestionably gain increased working class
support.
Communists Move Cautiously . Since the formation of the Ramadier
Government the Communists have been acting with great circumspection,
and they are not expected in the near future to resort to extreme
action such as a general strike, Such a move would force the Social-
istsfurther any from them, would lay them open to charges of crippling
F r e n ~ h economic recovery solely for their own political ends, and might
well throw real support to de Gaulle, While they are trying to intimi-
date the government by threatenjng a general strike, this threat appears
less "frightening" than it was a year ago, Some observers who were con-
vinced a year ago that the Communists were in a position to paralyze
the national economy b,y stopping all essential industries and trans-
port now seriously question whether the Communists would be able to
carry
-3-
carry out an effective general strike for more than several days at
the most. However, beneath the surface, the Communists are doing
everything to torpedo the Ramadier government. Through their
domination of labor they appear to be using tactics of limited sabo-
tage of production. There have been a series of individual spon-
taneous" strikes, which have no sooner been settled than others cropped
up elsewhere to take their place. The Communists have also cleverly
stepped up the tempo of their propaganda against the government policy
of a strictly controlled economy, thereby capitalizing on the wide-
spread resentment among all classes in France against fumbling, red-
tape and the plethora of government controls and regulations.
Critical Economic Problems - It is in our very real interest for
the Ramadier government to succeed. To do so it will need continued
courage as well as shrewdness and luck, and it may at some point need
outside support. It must maintain its cohesion despite internal dif-
ferences on economic policies and continued Communist sniping. Ramadier
is faced with critical economic problems which must held to manage-
able proportions if the economic and political situation is not seri-
ously to deteriorate. The hardship in the conditions of life of the
average worker and salaried employee inevitably causes discontent end
makes them vulnerable to exploitation by the Communists. Lack of coal
end low labor productivity both tend to retard expansion of industrial
and agricultural production, which is irr.perative. An ever present
threat of an uncontrolled inflationary spiral, which is very likely to
occur unless the wage level is held and production increased, hangs
over the government. Among the most acute problems is the food short-
age, r.hich had led to a reduction in the bread ration and a natural
deterioration in morale. Ramadier is fighting hard to avoid a further
reduction.
Consequences of Failure. The consequences of a failure of the
Ramadier Government on both the French internal and the international
situation would he extremely grave. There is a serious division in
the Socialist party on the question of participating in, let alone lead-
ing, a government l!'ithout the Communists. If Rame.dier
1
s Government
fails, the strong left-wing opposition to the policy of the present
leadership will ,be greatly reinforced, and it is almost certain that in
such an event the Socialist left-wing would take over direction of the
party. In addition, the fall of the Ramadier Government would almost
inevitably weaken the newly forged ties wHch at the moment link the
forces of the center and left in the present government. But the major
disaster attending collapse of the government would be the division of
into two hostile extremist camps -- the Communists on the one
side and de Gaulle on the other -- with an inevitable struggle to the
finish between them.
SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN AREAS
One Kremlin method of ensuring continued control over Eastern Europe
apparently
-4-
apparently involves extensive colonization by Soviet citizens of
certain politically strategic areas. A substantial number of Soviet
families are being settled in eastern Germany and Austria, along the
Black Sea Coast of Rumania, and in Bulgaria.
In Germany an estimated 300,000 Soviet nationals are being dis-
persed through the territories of Pomerania and
Silesia. In Austria the settlers generally have occupied the farms
along the Austro-Hungarian border; in Rumania and Bulgaria settlement
has taken place principally in the coastal areas. Soviet nationals
now constitute approximately half of Constanza's population of 100,000;
in Bulgaria they now reportedly number and may eventually total
200,000.
Especially significant is the geographic pattern which the coloni-
zation is following. In Germany and Austria the effect has beenthe
establishment of an ideologically and ethnically solid population-barrier
against the West. The in Austria, moreovsr, form a Slavic
corridor connecting the Slavic peoples of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia
and separating the non-Slavic inhabitants of Austria and Hungary. In
Rumania and Bulgaria, a bridge of Soviet nationals is being built in
the direction of the Turkish straits, serving at the same time to cut
off the natives of those countries from access to the Black Sea.
In addition to their more or less passive fUnction of serving the
Kremlin as ethnic barriers and bridges in vital areas, these settlers
are in a position actively to promote Soviet purposes: (1) by joining
with local communists in the formation of pro-Soviet underground organi-
zations -- such organizations are already in existence in Austria and
Rumania and are being armed and equipped by Soviet occupation commanders;
(2) by forming political pressure groups which would seek to persuade
local governments to follow pro-Soviet policies or would demand "plebis-
cites" either on "independence" or on incorporation of their areas into
the USSR; (3) by creating incidents" which would serve as pretexts for
armed Soviet intervention in the protection" of Soviet nationals.
PROSPECTS FOR DUTCH USE OF FORCE IN NEI
The rapid deterioration of Dutch-Indonesian Republic relations in
the Netherlands East Indies and the widening area of disagreement which
has developed in the two months since the signing of the Linggadjati
Agreement have greatly increased the possibility that the Dutch will
to break the deadlock in negotiations. Although Dutch
military operations against the Republic might be successful in their
initial phases, hostilities would degenerate into bitter, protracted
guerrilla warfare, which would eliminate the possibility of achieving
a peaceful solution for many years. This state of affairs would give
further encouragement to the growth of anti-Western sentiment through-
out the Far East and might result in the dispute being brought before
the Security Council of the UN.
The
-5-
The present situation arises basically from the divergence of
Dutch and Indonesian views on the degree of autonomy which the Republic
will enjoy during the interim period before the establishment ofthe
United States of Indonesia. The Dutch hold that Netherlands sovereignty
shall apply over all the Indies in the interim period, while the Republic
rejects Dutch sovereignty as inapplicable to itself in view of Dutch
recognition in the Linggadjati Agreement of the de facto authority of
the Republic in Java, and Sumatra.
US Policy in Southeast Asia. Recognizing the importance of develop-
ments in Southeast Asia to the security and to the economic and political
of the United States, we have within the past fortnight instructed
our Emoassies in Paris and The Hague to express to the French and the
Dutch our concern with the dangers which appear to us inherent in the
developing in Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies re-
. spectively. Yle have maintained that the whole future relationship be-
tween western and the emergent nations of the Far East
and in consequence, the character 'of these nations --"may be determined
by the present attitude of the metropolitan powers toward the nationalist
movements within their colonial possessions. In particular, we have
.stressedLthat developments in one country have immediate repercussions
'thioughout the area. We have stated unequivocally that we recognize t'he
danger tp)t the nationalist movements may take a Pan-Asiatic direction
or result in the establishment of totalitarian regimes, We have expressed
the opinion that the interests of the western democracies and ofthe peoples
of the area can best be served by close association, on a voluntary basis,
between the peoples concerned and the western power which has tradition-
ally been responsible for their welfare and with whose customs, laws, and
languages they are familiar,
Sources:
weekly Review of State Department
. Weekly Summary of Central Intelligence Group
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department Telegrams
S/S-R:BKS:lwn
!POP BBeRE'f
COMMUNIST THREAT IN ITALY
. .
Italian Communist leader Togliatt1 this week gave
public warning that his party may abandon democratic
methode for the conquest of power and resort to violence
in its efforts to overthrow Premier de Gaspari's moderate
government. In a meeting of partisans at Modena,
Togliatt1 admitted that the Communists bad 30,000 well-
armed partisans at their aDd threatened that if
the government did not give prompt ot its demo-
cratic spirit" the COmmunists would have to fight".
The Italian Communists have hitherto.been following tac-
tics or "moderation" apparently confident that they -
will rise to power th1'ough legal methods. The 1Jim1nent
withdrawal or Allied troops trom Ital7. haa increased the
poss1bil1t7 of. direct Communist action to seize power and
bas rendered more effective other Communist methods for
taking control of the countr7. Despite Togl1att1' a "call
to arms". other COIIIIIIUD1.st tactics appear.aore likely.--
under present coJJd1tiona. It may well be that Togliatt1
1
a
statement vas designed primarily to intimidate the govern.;.
ment. In carrying out their offensive, the Italian Com-
munists have open to them two main courses or action;
1) sudden overthrow of the De Gas peri Government by Com-
munist-sponsored armed force, following withdrawal-of
Allied troops; aJJd 2) Communist-inspired general strikes
to para17ze the important north Italian industrial area,
aJJd thus ser1opsl7 interfere v1th future implementation
of the program for European recovery.
Indications of Possible Direct Action - By the em-
ployment or tactics sLiilar to those used in Greece,
the first course is within the realm of posaibility. Al-
though the Italian and Carabinieri have some 200,000
troops to oppose CQBBUDist guerrilla estill&ted to number
as m&D7 as 50,000 the addition of partially-armed aDd
trained Ital1an aDd Yugoslav Communists aDd fellow-travel-
lers could apprec1abl7 increase the strength of the revo-
lutionists Furthermore redeplo7JIIent of Italian al'IIIOd
(orce.s to protect the Yugoslav frontier following the with-
drawal of Allied forces vou1d remove certain troop. units
trom important CQIIIIIlUJ11st-dom1n&ted centers in north Ital7.
Recent developments within the Ca.munist Part7 1n Ital7
m&7 increase the likelihood of direct militarr action.
There bas long been a division within the party between

li:.O. &tJ
-2-
the Togl1atti faction, which has favored peaceful poli-
tical infiltration, and the pro-revolutionary group
headed by Luigi Longo, a member of the International
Brigade during the Spanish civil war and partisan leader
in Italy during World War II. The recent departure
of eight members of the "direct.action" group for Moscow
may indicate closer coordination between this element
and the USSR and consequent intensification of Communist
para-military activity. Togliatti's last speech may
mean that be will go along with the revolutionary faction.
Indications of More Moderate Line - Two factors
militate against Communist revolution in Italy. The USSR
is unwilling to support directly such a step because it
might involve war with the US. An even more potent
reason against it is tbat the failure or the European
recovery program, or even failure of the US to provide
.Italy with emergency wheat and dollars,dur,tng this criti-
cal interim period, might 'deliver Italy into the bands of
the Communists by popular vote at the next national elec-
tions. It would therefore seem more logical for the
Italian Communists to await the outcome of the elections,
scheduled for April 1948, before using revolutionary
tactics. -The continuation of threats and intimidation is
a permanent policy, and any Communist statements regard-
ing the necessity for violence can be considered to be
made partly for propaganda purposes It will be remember-
ed tbat Togliatti made a speech threatening "direct action"
prior to the Sicilian elections in April, and it is certain
tbat the leftist majority in tbat former stronghold of
conservatism vas created in part by the Sicilians terror
of Communist reprisals.
S rikes Cause Economic Deteriora ion - Of the two
courses of action, t e second seems most likely. There
is evidence tbat it bas already been embarked upon.
Paralysis of the north Italian industrial section, which
is perbaps second only to the Ruhr in its importance to
the European econo1117, through "spontaneous" general strikes
could defeat the operation of the European.recovery program
and eventually throw not only Italyinto the Soviet orbit,
but possibly France as well. The strike of 600,000 agri-
cultural workers in the Po Valley, which began on September 9
indic.tes tbat the Communists are nov making every effort
to bring production to a standstill. Communist-sponsored
strikes are causing a fUrther deterioration of the
cal economic situation, which bas already compelled the
Premier to appeal for emergency wheat from the US in
'lOP SECJm!l
-3-
to restore Italy's essential pasta ration. The De Gasperi
Government must cope in same vay vith the desperate eco-
nomic c r ~ s i s before the September 23 meeting of the Con-
stituent Assembly, vhen a vote of no confidence proposed
by Lett Wing Socialist Nenni vill be discussed. Which-
ever course the Communists follov, their chances of sue-
cess are excellent unless the De Gasperi Government can
ameliorate the economic crisis by procuring sufficient
wheat or through successful operation of the Buropean
economic recovery program.
us Viev on Broadening of Government - Representatives
of smaller Italian parties h&ve recently given indications
that they would favor a broadening of the Italian Govern
ment and reinclusion of the Communists, apparently believ-
ing that the Communists vould genuinely cooperate in the
government and failing to realize that the real issue in
Italy today is between democracy aDd totalitarianism and
not mere rivalry between individual political parties. We
have informed Ambassador Dunn that ve vouid welcome parti-
cipation in the Italian Government of the greatest possi-
ble number of the moderate left, center and right groups
prepared to work together tor the best interests of the
Italian people. Such representation in the government
would give it the greater strength and stability that it
needs at this critical time. We will not support extrem-
ists and we cannot support thos.e who, while not themselves
ot the extreme left or right, make common cause with ex-
tremists. Bringing the Communists back so soon after
forming a government. without them would certainly add to
their prestige in Italy and abroil.d., and they would exploit
it as evidence of the inability of any Italian cabinet to
govern without them. Recent international events such as
the Soviet attitude on European reconstruction have tended
to weaken the influence or the Communists--a trend wbicb
would oJI].y be reversed by bringing them back into the
government. In our opinion collaboration between the real
democratic forces 1n Italy and the CQUDUnists is impossi-
ble since their ultimate aims are entirely divergent.
ANOTHER CRISIS IN FRAI'CE
!be French Government of Premier Ramadier has sur-
vived another crisis, receiving a vote or confidence from
tbe Assembly by the narrow margin of 292 to 2-3, but there
seems little doubt that its prestige bas seriously declined
The latest vote of confidence came over the government's
program of coal subsidies as a means of preventing a rise
in industrial prices. None or the parties, including
!9P SEGJIB'J!

Ramadiers ovn Socialist party, vas satisfied vith the
government's program. Ramad ier survived. merely because
leaders of the non-Communist parties did not want to
overthrow him before the municipal elections scheduled
for October, tearing that Ram&diers fall vould play
into the hallda of the Communists on one aide alld of de
Gaulle on the other.
Split Within Socialist Parti - During the crisis
Ram&dier vas threatened vith a serious rift vitbin hie
ovn party as a reaul t or demands tram the left Wing ot
the party that he tollov the economic directives or the
recent Socialist Congress and introduce legislation tor
greater "direction" or the econC11117. 1'he lett-v1ng
Socialist group attempted to perauade. the direot1D com-
mittee or the party to call a special congress to disci-
pline" Ramadier and his Socialist Ministers tor insub-
ordination in tailing to tollov party These
efforts vera unauccesstul, however, and the directi.Dg
ca.mittee.a1mply announced ita desire tbat'the economic
policy of the gover.DIIIent continue to "evolve" along the
lines ot the resolutions ot the party.congreas, stating
that a special congress would be held after the munici-
pal elections. The overt struggle 1n the French Social-
1st Party concerns control over: 1) current economic and
colonial policies, 2) the ideological orientation ot the
party,and 3) the party's mission in continental Europe.
1'his struggle baa divided the Socialists into tvo nearly
equal factions. On the right ot the cleavage are Leon
Blum, Premier Ramadier, moat ot the Socialist ministers
and parliamentarians; and about the local
executives. !he vi.Dg, led by GU7 Mollet, the -
part,- a secretary general, baa the support ot ot the
local executives aDd a maJority on the Socialist Executive
COGIIII1ttee, Polio,- clashes between the factions have occur-
red over Socialist conceaaiona to the MRP on Indochina. and
.Algeria and to the R.Sical.a and the MRP on price controls
Rmedier defends &ctiona as realistic compromises
necessitated b,- the Socialist mlnority position 1n both
the cabinet and the legislative body. Mollet's group
insists on greater conceaa1ona to native nationalisms and
on a planned dQaeat1c eoonom7 favoring the worktng class--
or, taU1ng the latter, v1tbdraval from thegovernment.
!he practical motivation of the lett-wing atand is a de-
to capitalise on worker discontent v1th Communist
leadership in order to register Socialist gains in the
October municipal elections.
Diailluaiogpent over Present S78tem - Qual1tied ob-
servers believe that the Ramad1er Government vill prob-
abl,- be able to bang on untU after the municipal elections
-5-
but that it is not likely to last much longer than that
as it is nov constituted. While most or the French people
admit that Ramadier has tried to meet the problems which
his government bas raced, the conYiCtion is growing that
he has neither sufficient authGrity to dominate his ovn
party, let alone a coalition government, nor sufficient
forcefulness or prestige to galvanize the people to make
the sacrifices on which the country's very survival may
depend. There is an increasing belief that France cannot
be governed effectively under the present system vith its
division of political forces and the limitations or the
constitution. More and more Frenchmen are agreeing with
de Gaulle that a strong government vith greater authority
is imperative. A return to power by de Gaulle is now
considered to be a definite possibility since Frenchmen
who are disillusioned over the present governmental system
see only two alternatives--de Gaulle or Communism--and
most Frenchmen would infinitely prefer an unknown adven-
ture Yithde Gaulle to a Stalinist police state. The Com-
munists, however, still the strongest P..r'!iy in France,
can be expected touse all. the resources at their disposal
to keep de Gaulle out.
Reaction to de Gaulle - French popular reaction to
De Gaulle's recent charge that the US is giving preference
to plans tor German recovery over plans for France has in-
creased his chances or returning to power aDd may endanger
US objectives in Europe. Al.though moat Frenchmen are pro-
US and fundamentally anti-CODIIIlunist, they are apparently
beg1nn1ng to fear that US policy threatens French security
by proposing to re-build a strong G e ~ y at the expense
or France's prosperity aDd hence or France's safety.
Because only the Communists had emphasized this viev prior
to DeGaulle's speech.or September 7, his new tack v111
further weaken C0111111unist appeal, vb1le strengthening his
ovn, and drav to him popular support nov flowing away from
the Ramadier Government. If DeGaulle accedes to power and
the economic situation continues to deteriorate, he is
capable or leading the French into a nationalistic adven-
ture (opposed to both Soviet and US policy) Ybich would
make the implementation or the European recovery program
virtually impossible.
..
COMM!JNIST DITEN'UONS IN WESTERN GERMANY
. The Communists in the bizonal area of western Germany
are accelerating their penetration or German labor organ-
izations. The success or this penetration will enable the
COIIIIIIWlist Party 1n that part or Germany 1t it should later
-6-
be suppressed as a political organization, as its leaders
apparentl7 anticipate, to continue its activities as an
underground movement through the workers. At present the
Communists are attempting to infiltrate the unions while
preserving simultaneousl7 the appearance of non-Communist
control b7 permitting Social Democrats to remain in promi-
nent offices temporaril7. The current Communist strateg7
is to win over the individual worker and thus assume com-
mand of the union through control of the rank and tile.
Marxist sentiment is particularl7 strong in the Rheinish-
Westphalian industrial region and especiall7 powerful in
the Ruhr. In addition, a reliable American trade union-
ist reports extensive expansion of Communist influence in
Greater Hesse. The overall plan is to gain sufficient
strength to be in a position to abut off or seriousl7 cur-
tail bizonal production.
Sources:
Week17 Review of State Department
Weekl7 Snmmar7 of Central Intelligence Group
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department Telegrams
Intelligence Digest
S/S-R:lvn
.
'!op Secret SU111111&17
For the Secretary
lfovember 24, 1947
- 'fOP SBeRB!
CC!JUiuluST JI9!1J!!21 IN ITALY Alm PRABCE
'l'he Communist campaign against European recovery
took more violent form in both Italy and Prance during
the past 'lien da;ys as strikes and disorders spread over
the tvo countries. While this Communist-inspired vio-
lence probably :represents the beginning or a militant
errort to create a ":revolutionar:r situation rather than
the beginniDg or an immediate revolutionaey coup, there
have been several indications tb&t the Italian Communists
have begun a maJor errort to overthrow the moderate govern-
ment or Pl'em1er de Gaaper1, b;r violent methode if' neeea-
S&l7. '!be evidence point inS tow.rd thia incl\rles: 1)
widespread Communiat-1nap1red riots dUPiagthe paat 10
days; 2) a :report that C0111111uniat m111tar;r aet1v1t;r, pre-
ceded b7 inc:reaa1ng demonstrations, 11 1Ja1nent in Italy;
3) a :report f'ram Soviet satellite diplomatic sources or
a decision by the Kremlin that the main errorta of' the
"Camintorm" v111 be directed against Italy; 4) a threat
by left ving 8oc1al1at leader lllenn1, vb.o ia a cloae col-
laborator vith the COIIIIIlUDists, that unleaa de Gasper! 1a
replaced by an independent there vill be continued d18-
turbances with no aaaurancea aa to the consequences; and
5) the :recent use or delaying tactic a b7 the Soviet rep:re-
on the tour pover naval commission tor d1atr1-
but1on of' the Italian tleet.
Disorders Sveep 8oth - Duriag the past veelc
a number or coal .llliMra in nort ern FJoance, 8111Plo,-ees or
severel Pl"eDCh autcmobUe factories and fiour millers in
ever&l French cities nnt on strike. '!be port of' Harae1lle
vas tied up by a strike of' vaterf'ront, transport and
industrial vorlcers. Riots lead b7 tough CCIIIIII1U1liat shock
troops broke out in Jlarse1lle. CCIIIIINJ11st-1nap1red disorders
avept over northern Ital7, later;o sp:read1Dg to the aouth,
aa the Communists or the
of' alleged neo-taacista" aDd belabored the government tor
. pe1"1111tt111s the contiJwed existence or such groupe. Of't1cel!
or the right ving U011o QualUIIIQue and other rightist groupe
in several cities were wrecked.. IJ'hese tactics appear to be
a natural outgrowth or the more."'11l111tant approach heralded
by the cam1ntorm" announcement last month, :representing
another phase in the Communist efforts to undermine economic
stab111t7
1
foment popular unrest and ditt1cult1es
tor the moderate in these tvo key western
.. ".D
0. J..;n
By
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European countries. 'rhey may well be desiglled also to
test the Communists ovn militant machinery and the re-
sistance to such 1n order to prepare the ground
an all-out to seize pover. It ia reported
that at this stage the main concentration the Kremlin
1a toward Italy rather than France, baaed on the belief
that the internal a1tuat1on 1n France is "not yet ripe"
whereas in Italy it !a viewed as very
Communist Moves in Italx - 'rhe Italian Communists
are evidently determined at all coats to get rid of Premier
de Gasper!, around whom anti-Communist sentiment is polar-
izing and vho represents the major obstacle to their ob-
jectives. As one to this end, they have indicated
tbl-ough their stooge, lett wing 8oc1a11at leader
that they would be prepared to sign a vith a new
coalition goverlllllent provided de Gasper! stepped dovn and
an independent became Priae Minister, and that the alter-
native to such an arrangement would be continued disturb-
ances regardlesa ot conaequences. It is to be expected that
removal of de Gasper! would constitute a resounding victory
the COIIIIIUil1sts with Italian public opinion, would lead
to steps toward bringing the Communists and
v1Dg Socialists back into the government before the elec-
tions next spring, and would create conru&ion and chaos
in the anti-COIIIBUD1st ranks vhich would be uaetul in any
attempt at vlo1.ent aeisure ot powr.
Soyiet !Actica on Jayal Camp1ssion - Recent tactics
by Soviet representatives on the Four Power R&val Commis-
sion tor distribution of the Italian fleet have given a
indication of the Kremlin's intentions toward Italy.
Vhile the Soviet representative initially displayed a desire
to expedite the vork ot the he baa or late been
adopting delaytag tactics &bd tr71Ds to restrict the powers
ot the C01111isaion. Although it vaa agreed tbat tbe Com-
miaaion should meet in Rome the tirst day atter ratification
ot the Italian peace treaty, the Soviet representative did
not appear in Roae until attel" the announcement by the US
ot the renunciation ot ita share ot the Italian neet. 'l'he
Soviet representative baa consistently blocked notification
ot 'the &l.locationa to the Ita11a.n Ooverraent until last
week vhen his position becaaae unteMble. !.iB:ettlien 'iris.isted
tbat the notification be on a top secret baaia. Possible
motives tor these tactics may be 1) a desire that Italy
retain the entire navy ill expectation of eventual COIIIIIUDist
oontrol, 2) the pl"evention ot UDtavorable publicity toward
the USSR 1n connection v1tb COIIIllluniet ettorta to gain
'f9P SJWRB'P
'f'OP 5ECRB'f
-3-
control during the next tev months, aDd 3) concern over
the possibility that the Soviet-allocated ships may be
scuttled b7 the Ital!ans.
R!mtdier Government Falla in France - !be acute
econasic situation in France, brought to a head by the
wave ot strikes, baa alre&d7 led to the resignation or
Premier Ramadier. Ramadier a move, tollovil'lg several
da,.. or negotiations looking toward the r.ormation ot a
stronger "caretalcer goverlllll8nt" to bridge the gulf between
de Gaulle &Dd the COJIIIIUDists, vas forced by the hostility
ot the Radical Socialists to the strict Socialist economic
progr&IJI and b7 basic disagreements betwec the MRP arx1 the
Socialists on measures needed to balt the wage-price
api.r&l. 'fbe Asselllbl7 1'alled to give a vote ot confidence
to the veteran Socialist Leon Blum, but has nov e:od.orsed
the errorta to the MRP Minister ot Finance Robert Schuman
to tol'lll a nev 6abinet. However' an,- coalition govermaent
vhich is termed vill race the same economic and. political
P2'Qblellll vbich confl'onted Ramadier, and vill have to deal
vith them aoxoe ettect1vel7 11' it is to aurvi,e. Meanvhile
the sJll"NdiDg COIIIIIIUDist-1nap1red atrilces in France ma7
develop into a aeries or regioo&l strikes vhich will be
identical in ettect, v1th a national general strike. '!'be
Ccmmun1ats probabl7 wish to avoid the appearance or a
geural strike in order to prevent a definite showdown
with the gove:r!lMnt at this time. Suoh videepre&d strikes,
hovever, are in line vith the "COIIIIlini'ol'lll" directive tor
the increase or Qrevolutionar,- maas action" on all tronta,
regardless or adverse consequences to local
parties, am the disruption or economic &lid political
structures in order to defeat the European xoecover,- progrea.
COJOOJJIIST SB'rBft.Cii Il! CZBCJIOSLOVAlCI,&
aoderate parties in Czechoslovakia have managed
tempor&r117 to halt advances tovard incxoeased
d0!1111nation. '!'he COIIIIIUDJ.ats auttered. a setback in their
ettorts to reconstruct the Slovak mo&rd ot COIIIIlisaionera,
the highest adainistr&tbe organ 1n Slovakia, &lid the
aodeM.te parties have also dr&vn nev hope as a result ot
t}le ouster or atrOJ28l7 pro-901111111Diat Zdenelc Pierl!nger as
or the Social Democratic Part,-.
Fierlinger bas been replaced b7 Bobumil Lausman vho
8troll817 believes in deaocr&tic practices or govel'Zlllent
alld bas C0\11'8800U8l7 decried COIIIIUDist abuses. Under
his leadership the Social DeJDOCratic Part7 M7 be expected
/-"
_, ..
- TOP SECRE'f
.. "
-4-
. "
" '
.. ';.. :;'.
- !'OP 8ZCD"l'
'1' 0 P-sECflE'P---
-5-
Sources:
Weekly Review or State Department
Veekly Su.mary or Central Intelligence Agency
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department '1'
8
legrams
Intelligence Digest
S/S-B:lvn
......... oz
Tap SeeOPet Stmunary
F th S t
-.fh tof'CII"<tole"' o/
or e ecre ary 10 """ '-' 'l.rat 1
January 19, 1948 :0.;:,. .!' P'L L d ... : ':Lr
POOITION QF ITALIAN COMMUNISTS \
Although there is no reason to believe that Communist plans for
violent action in Italy have been abandoned, it appears likely that
the strong US reaction to the threat of violence in Italy, the un-
popularity of the recent trial strikes, and Communist reversals in
France have caused the Kremlin and the Italian Communists to review
their program, Qualified observers consider that unless they receive
Kremlin orders to the contrar.f, the Italian Communists would prefer
to try to gain power through the elections scheduled for April before
making any insurrectionary attempt, One iactor reinforcing this con-
clusion is that with the strengthening of the Italian police and armed
forces, the firmer attitude of the Italian Government and its broader
political base, the present government now appears capable of defeat-
ing any Communist campaign of violence or revolution not overtly re-
inforced by the Soviets or their satellites,
Communist Election Prospects - Observers estimate that although
the Communists have lost ground in terms of popular support, they
could still under present conditions, along with their left wing Social-
ist stooges, win 35% of the vote in the coming national elections. If
a considerable portion of the electorate could be kept away from the
polls through intimidation or othervlise, this percentage would be aub-
stantie.l.ly increased, perhaps to the point where even if the Communists
did not win a majority, any government formed without them would lack
sufficient parliamentary support to govern effectively, Furthermore,
if the Italian Government islforced to reduce the bread ration, the Com-
munist position would be enhanced and'the scales might well
be tipped in their favor./Communist strategy may therefore be to secure
a postponement of the elections in the hope that the government will be
forced to make the ration cut before elections are held,
rf(.
ti\
/
Communist Congress at Milan - The threat of violence or insurrection,
however, has by no means disappeared and such an attempt will be made at
any time it is dictated by the interests of the Kremlin, The training
and organizing of Communist direct action forces is continuing, and the
Communist apparatus has quietly rehearsed movements of 20 to 30 thousand
of its members to the major cities of northern and central Italy, includ-
ing Rome, by rail and truck, The seriousness of the Communist threat is
corifirmed W reports on the Communist congress in Milan, which was attend-
ed by 'delegates from numerous other European countries, Italian Com-
munist leader Togliatti is said to have told the congress that parliamentary
procedure was unnecessary in its present form and that force should not
be excluded as a means to the establishment of a "new democracy". The
chief committee of the congress, divided into military and political sub-
;_,:.;
K.V ;.-..:..:_,_ ...;.,, :: r.
-2-
committees, is reported to have considered plans for insurrection in
Itely and France, It is also reported that Spanish Comunist repre-
sentatives who entered Italy clnndestinely for the meeting stated that
the Spanish Communists were prepared to set in motion a series of dis-
orders in Spain coordinated with developments in other countries; that
the question of a serious Communist offensive to lower production and
create discontent in nestern Germany was discussed; and that it was
decided the French Communists would proceed with the strengthening of
their organization and illegal apparatus,
Italy Primary Target of Kremlin - Reports on the congress in Milan
give further indication that Italy rather than France is for the pres-
ent the Kremlin
1
s primary target in western Europe. Observers consider
that while the Communists will continue to try to prevent economic
stabilization in France, they do not intend to foment disorders until
the economic situation further deteriorates, It is believed that for
the immediate future the French Communists will use tactics of encourag-
ing slowdovms and secretly sabotaging French industry with a view to
creating popular misery which can later be exploited, while striking
at the government
11
legally
11
through propaganda and parli!llllentary attacks,
' .. .
COMMUNIZATION OF HUNGARY
Although the political control of the Communist-dominated govern-
ment in Hungary is in fact, if not in appearance, the situ-
ation in Hungary has not yet deteriorated to the extent that it has in
the Balkan states, Factors which have thus far combined to slow the
process of communization are the essentially western orientation of
the Hungarian people, the greater and more enlightened strength of the
Roman Catholic and Protestant churches in Hungary as compared with the
Orthodox church in Bulgaria and Rumania, the advanced stage of Hungarian
culture and_education, the basic individualism and conservatism of the
Hungarian peasant, a greater industrialization and, especially, the
popular consciousness of Hungary's geographic location as a racial island
in a Slavic sea, However, since the flagrantly Hungarian
elections of August 31, 1947, which the Communists manipulated to con-
firm their position ofpower, all effective political opposition to com-
plete Communist control has been disorganized, imprisoned, intimidated into
silence or has fled abroad, and it appears that the process of economic
and social sovietization can henceforth go forward more or less at will,
The police and army are being brought effectively under Communist control,
civil liberties have been suppressed, and the groundwork for the eventual
sovietization of the Hungarian economy has been laid through outright
So:viet control of the extensive former German assets in Hungary and the
natiQnalization of heavy industry and banks.
future Prospects - The vast majority of Hungarian people o! all
ranks and classes still look toward the west and hope for eventual liber-
ation from Soviet and Communist domination, Communist consolidation of
the positions gained with the support of the Soviet occupation authorities
-.3-
is, however, steadily progressing, and the possible means to halt this
process, either through the implementation of the Hungarian peace treaty
or through effective UN action, appear to be extremely limited at this
time, The Hungarian people, fearing a new war and realizing the limited
extent of possible remedial measures in their behalf, are nevertheless
believed to be most desirous of continuing evidence of western interest
in and support for their problems, Historically they have always feared
and opposed Russian totalitarianism and imperialism, be it under old or
new Czars, On the other hand, having experienced rul.e by a right-wing
authoritarian regime wluch was characterized by certain feudal aspects,
they emerged from the war with new hope of achieving a government based
on democratic principles and processes, and have a deep interest in the
efforts of western to create a peaceful and economically
sound L1lrope. Unless there is continuing evidence of our interest in the
welfare of the Hungariao1 peo,:ole and of progress in our efforts to aid in
European recovery
1
which the average Hungarian feels will counteract the
objectives of his Conununist masters, all hope and morale will eventually
disappear and the vast majority of Hungarians, like the Bulgarians, may in
their own self-interest resign themselves to the inevitability of Com-
munist dictatorship in southeastern Europe,
BRITISH RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES
Although Arabs have long felt that the dominant position of the UK
in the Near East made the British the archenemy, many Arabs are now be-
ginning to feel that the refusal of the UK either to support or to en-
force partition in Palestine indicates that the British may prove valu-
able friends in the fight to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state,
Meanwhile, the UK is quietly improving its relations with the Arab nations
while outwardly maintaining a pretense of complete impartiality in
Palestine. Despite sincere attempts by the UK to keep the peace in
Palestine until the termination oi' the mandate, there is little doubt that
the British have already decided that partition is hopeless solution for
the Palestine problem. They are, consequently, attempting to safeguard
their vital economic and strategic interests by strengthening their in-
fluence with the goveriiiilents and peoples of the Arab world,
Evidence of British Policy - Several recent developments have indi-
cated improved understanding between the UK and several of the Arab
States, An Anglo-Iraqi sterling agreement, providing that Iraq remain
within the sterling bloc, was concluded in December, More recently,
the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance was renewed, Egypt and the UK have
recently concluded a mutually satisfactory financial agreement and may
soon re-open negotiations on the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. British efforts
to iMProve relations with Saudi Arabia are to be seen in the recent
invitation extended to Prince Feisal, the Foreign Minister, to visit
London in February and in Anthony Eden's current visit to Ibn Saud in
Riyadh. The UK is giving military aid to the Arabs by fulfilling its
long-standing arms contracts with Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt. The
.IJ?GP SESRE'i'
-4-
British in Palestine appear to be covertly selling arms and aDmnmition
to the Syrian Government. Several hundred British ex-ermy officers are
reported to have volunteered for military service with the Arabs, and
the Foreign Office has indicated tl1at there is no effective means of
preventing them from enlisting.
MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA
The current Chinese Communist offensive in Manchuria, seventh in
a series which began a little more than a year ago, demonstrates
strikingly the extent towhich the Nationalist military position has
deteriorated during the yea:r. The focus of Manchurian operations has
shifted gradually southvre.rd, with Communist forces driving deeper into
Nationalist territory. The seventh offensive has brought the civil war
for the first time to the outskirts of Mukden, major Nationalist
bastion in Manchuria, and has resulted in the interdiction of all rail
lines into and within lrenchuria. The recent declaration by the Com-
munists of their intention to conquer all Manchuria during 1948 appears
to be a realistic estimate of their capabilities.
' .
Broad Communist strategy over the past year has been to contain
Nationalist forces within separate geographic areas, to confine the
Nationalist units in their areas to the large cities, and then to deny
them sui'ficient supplies of food and f'uel. Resultant military and
economic attrition is reducing the amount of men and materiel which the
Communists need to take these cities. Currently, this process of regional
containment and attrition has reached a very advanced stage in ltanchuria;
it is well advanced in North China and is beginning to develop in
Nationalist areas along the Lunghai railroad. If the Communist units in
Central China succeed in isolating the Nationalists to the north, a
Communist p'enetration into China south of the Yangtze can be expected
to follow a similar pattern. The Nationalists at this time do not appear
to possess adequate materiel or manpower to cope with the increased scope
of Communist operations.
Sources:
Weekly Review of State Department
Weekly SUIIllllary of Central Intelligence Agency
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department Telegrams
Intelligence Digest
S/S-R:lwn
!I!SP S E G ~
CHINA: COMMUNIST CONTROLLED AREAS
40
YELLOW
5 E A
"
SEA 'OF
__\ --
sour t4
c" ' ~ " .. '------1
"'
,;i;l F Q( T t
U.S. GPO- S
Top Seexet
For the Acting ecretary
March 29, 194
'FOP SElOfl'l'
REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH
Reactions to President Truman's address to Congress March 17 on
the international situation have been extremely favorable throughout
the non-Communist world. There is every reason to believe that the
speech has greatly encouraged the free nations of Europe and bas
bolstered their determination to resist further expansion of
totalitarian Soviet Europe. Official comment from the Foreign Min-
isters of such countries as the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Austria, and Turkey has been uniformly enthusiastic. The Foreign
Ministers of the five countries participating in the western European
union all felt that the President had done everything within his power
to assist the union. Bevin and Belgian Premier Spaak have both indi-
cated that they did not expect much more at this time than full moral
and material support for the western European union along with unoffic-
ial consultations. The non-Communist press has also applauded the
speech. Typical comments were to the effect that it demonstrates a
realization of world responsibility on the part of the US; that it was
a solemn warning to the USSR that further expansion will not be toler-
ated; that by deterring the USSR.from further aggression it will serve
to prevent war; and that it underwrites the Brussels treaty for a west-
ern European union and implies military support for the free nations
of Europe. It is interesting to note that the speech produced a def-
inite wavering on the part of two powerful Swedish newspapers which
have in the past supported Sweden
1
s stubborn policy of "neutrality"
between east and west. About the only unfavorable non-Communist reac-
tion came from the Chinese press which criticized the President's fail-
ure to mention China or the Far East. There was a mild note of disap-
pointment in some quarters over the fact that the speech did not go as
far as preliminary rumors predicting a military guarantee of the free
European nat.ions.
Communist Reactions - There has so far been no indication as to
what effect the speech will have on the Kremlin. There is some reason
to believe, however, that it hit home in Moscow. In an interview with
Molotov on the afternoon of the day after the speech was delivered,
Ambassador Smith found Molotov looking unusually pale and more tired
than he had ever seen him, and Smith conjectured that President Truman's
speech had been the subject of an allnight session of the Politbureau
the previous night. Molotov, while not cordial, was very polite, was in
an untlsually conciliatory frame of mind, and was apparently prepared
to make concessions on the housing and. customs problem that has been
plagUing our Embassy. Behind the iron curtain, portions of the speech
were
;.
:-.: ',._; ; .:.. .;
-3-
cooperation will be difficult to achieve. The development of such an
organization will depend in large measure on 'l!hether the UK alters its
present basic attitude toward the CEEC.
CRUCIAL ELECTIONS IN ITALY
On April 18 the Italian people will go to the polls in a national
election the results of which will be of vital importance to all the
free countries of western Europe. There is only one real issue
involved in theelections--whether Italy.will remain a free country or
will be subjected to a totalitarian dictatorship controlled from Mos-
cow. The Communists, with a powerful organization, strong financial
backing and shrewd leadership, are making a determined effort to come
to power b.Y "legal electoral means. At the present time the political
situation in Italy is so fluid that it is impossible to make any accur-
ate estimate of the results of the elections or the nature of the new
government Which will be formed after the elections. Much will depend
on developments between now and April 18 not only in Italy but in the
international arena. According to present predictions, the Communist
controlled peoples bloc", which includes the Communists and left wing
Socialists under Nenni, is likely to obtain between 35 and 45% of the
votes with Premier de Gaspari's Christian Democrats receiving 35 to 40%
and the moderate left parties now in the government--the Republicans
and right wing Socialists under Saragat--polling 10 to 15%.
Dnger of Communist Control - In view of the fact that the smaller
parties are staunchly anti-Communist, the chances now appear to be that
de Gasperi will form the new government and that the Communists will
again be excluded. On the other hand, there is a definite possibility
that the Communists will receive such a strong vote thst it will be
impossible for any government to function without them. If they are
admitted to the government at all, there is a strong likelihood that
through the familiar methods of sabotage and infiltration, they would
in the course of time obtain complete control of the government. If
the Communists are convinced before the elections that they will be
defeated, it seems quite likely that they will try to seize power b.Y
violence, and 1f they are defeated in the elections, there are definite
indications that they will make such an attempt. Communist control of
Italy would be extremely serious for the free nations of Europe and
for our policy of support for free E'lirope. It would facilitate Com-
munist penetration of France, Spain and North Africa, would weaken the
position of Greece and Turkey in their resistance to the USSR; would
turn the southern flank of the western forces in central Europe, and
would give the USSR a powerful strategic position astride the Mediter-
ranean.
US Support for Pemocratic Elements - We are doing everything
possible to support the moderate democratic elements in Italy without
giving the impression of interfering in Italian internal affairs . We
hsve
-4-
have made it clear to the Italians that if they choose to vote into
power a government in which the dominant political force would be a
party whose hostility to ERP has been frequently proclaimed, we could
only consider this as evidence of Italy's desire to disassociate itself
from ERP and we would have to conclude that Italy had removed itself
from the benefits of ERP. In our information program we are doing
everything possible to let the Italian people know that while the
choice is theirs, in our opinion it is the choice and
dictatorship. We have demonstrated our support for a democratic Italy
by proposing, in concert with the British and French, that the Big
Four and Italy negotiate a protocol to the Italian peace treaty pro-
viding for the return of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italian Sov-
ereignty. We are now considering taking the initiative in reopening
the question of Italy's admission to UN, which has hitherto been
prevented by Soviet opposition.
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CHINA
The threat of an unprecedented financial crisis has greatly com-
plicated the critical military and political problems now facing the
Chinese National Government. Deterioration in the government's econ-
omic position, .as measured by soaring commodity prices and black market
exchange rates for foreign currencies, has accelerated at an ominous
rate since February 10. In the ensuing six weeks, general commodity
prices have doubled, and US dollars on the Shanghai black market have
trebled in terms of Chinese currency. The government's official hold-
ings of foreign exchange are believed to be nearing exhaustion. With
the possible exception of an immediately implemented US aid program,
there are no economic or other factors now in evidence which can halt
this accelerated movement toward complete financial collapse. Basic-
ally, the deterioration in the government's economic position reflects
the general lack of confidence--now approaching panic--in the govern-
ment's ability to contain the CoDllllllnist military forces. Important
interests in Chinese financial circles appear to be extremely skeptical
about the possibility that US aid can be effective. A single major
military defeat sustained by Nationalist armies may be sufficient to
cause a general refusal to accept the Chinese national dollar as a med-
ium of exchange and a consequent reversion to barter.
Consequences of Financial Collapse - A financial collapse will
have immediate and serious implications with respect to the National
Government's military effort. The government's ability to maintain its
armies in the field wilLbe jeopardized and the possibility of a com-
plete''military and political debacle will be imminent if the economic
situation continues to deteriorate at its present rate. There is no
evidence of either official Chinese determination or a government plan
to cope with the mounting inflationary pressures. The apathy with which
the National Government is viewing the approaching collapse of its
financial structure demonstrates how much more serious and pressing are
the military and political problems which currently monopolize the
government's attention.
-2-
were quoted in the press so as to produce a distorted effect. For
example, a Belgrade newspaper consistently eliminated the phrase "free
countries of Europe", indicating that these words touched a particularly
sensitive spot in the Communist nervous system. Comment in the Communist
press characterized the speech as an attempt to create a war psychosis
for election purposes, pressure onERP countries to join a military
bloc, blackmail against the U S ~ R , and US intimidation of other countries
and interference in their affaire.
COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION
Although the current meeting of the Committee of European Economic
Cooperation reflects a growing recognition by all 16 participating coun-
tries of the urgent need of western European economic integration, the
majority still appear reluctant to set up the strong continuing CEEC
organization desired by the US. The closest approach to the US concept
is the French proposal, supported by Italy, for an organization with
specific detailed powers and a strong secretariat capable of independent
action. Several nations, however, are still reluctant to collllll.it them-
selves: 1) to support an organization which has sufficient power to unify
European recovery efforts; or 2) to join fully in the cooperative meas-
ures necessary for European recovery.
UK Opposes Strong CEEC - Despite its assertions to the contrary,
the UK in particular still does not wish a strong CEEC, apparently pre-
ferring a weak organization in which final authority on economic coop-
eration remains in the hands of the individual governments. llacy of the
smaller nations, like Switzerland and Sweden, tend to favor the British
approach, as infringing least upon their own sovereignty. The UK atti-
tude, apparent in its cautious approach to such projects as customs
unions and multilateral clearing arrangements, is based largely upon
the fact that Britain, more than any other participating CEEC country,
bas extensive non--European economic and political ties. Consequently,
Britain considers ita recovery to be much more dependent upon direct US
aid than on closer economic integration with western Europe, and it fears
that such integration might involve weakening its Commoll'lnlalth bends.
The UK, therefore, would prefer to preserve its freedom of action rather
than collllll.it itself to a strong CEEC.
Dangers of Weak Organization - Unless the continuing CEEC organi-
zation is made stronger than appears likely at present, it may be unable
to achieve the economic integration of western Europe essential to recov-
ery. Many of the participants at the Paris Conference have recognized
that the CEEC must develop full economic cooperation and not confine
itself to the mere programming and reviewing of US aid. Without a strong
CEEC capable of taking an overall approach to the European recovery prob-
lem and resolving or overriding conflicting national views such
cooperation
TGP SEGRm
-5-
Sources:
Weekly Review of State Department
Weekly Summary of Central Intelligence Agency
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department Telegrams
Intelligence Digest
S/5-R:lq
..
'i'SP SSSRm
.::rep Seer et Summary
For the Secretary
April 12, 1948
TOP SECRE'f'
5 b ~ - - - -
GERMANY Both the Soviet walkout from the Allied Control Council
{ACC) and recent Soviet interference with transporta -
tion into Berlin indicate. that the USSR: 1) has abandoned hope of using
the ACC to hinder the present western European reconstruction pro-
gram, and 2) intends to accelerate preparations for the esta b1ishment
of an eastern "German state" whenever the Kremlin decides that the
western powers can be successfully blamed for partitioning Germany.
In this preparatory phase, the USSR may place the Soviet zone under
a "democratic" and "loyal" German administration, created from the
Communist-dominated Peoples' Congress and strengthened by trained
Germans from the former Moscow ''Free Germany Committee''. Both
the presence of the western powers in Berlin anli thE! functioning of
the ACC hamper the realization of the Soviet objectives and, unless
allied determination remains obviously strong, further Soviet attempts
to eliminate these hindrances can be expected.
RUHR Soviet preparations for possible clandestine activity against
US-UK occupation authorities in the Ruhr are indicated by
current replacement of known Communist leaders with new party men
from the Soviet zone and with thoroughly indoctrinated former prisoners
of war. Probable reasons for the replacements are: 1) comparative
failure of the present leadership of the Communist Party (KPD) in the
Ruhr; 2) Soviet,dissatisfaction with the opposition of many old KPD
leaders to pro-Soviet policy dictates from Moscow; 3) preparations
to go underground in the event of US-UK action against the party; and
4) the danger of using well-known and easily-identified party le'a.ders
in clandestine and illegal operations.
ITALY Prospects that the Italian Communist Party will obtain a
sufficiently large plurality in the April 18 elections to
ensure Communist or left-wing Socialist representation in the next
Italian Government have sharply diminished. Concurrently, the party's
capabilities for successful large-scale insurrection without active
military' assistance from Yugoslavia, have been considerably reduced.
Unless the Communists receive substantial outside aid, the government
TOP SECRET
DECLABiliTIED
K o. 12005, 5<-o. ts.e
'I'OP aE:C};!E T
-2-
now appears sufficiently strong to prevent its overthrow by force
and to put down large-scale rebellion. Whether the Kremlin, even
under these circumstances, will direct an insurrection either before
or after the elections cannot be predicted. If, as seems probable,
the Communists fail to secure representation in the new govern-
ment, they will then launch a new program of strikes and sabotage
to wreck the recovery program and discredit the government.
In the past few months the Italian armed services and security
forces have been greatly strengthened, not only by new equipment
but also by a considerably improved morale. At the same time the
Communist para-military forces have been weakened and to some
extent disrupted by government seizure of clandestine munitions
dumps and caches and the interception of arms shipped in from
abroad. No evidence available indicates that Yugosl.av forces--the
most logical source of outside assistance--are being prepared for
action in Italy. Finally, and probably most important, the Italian
masses appear less inclined than ever to support a Communist
uprising and have become increasingly anti-Communist in their
attitude.
FINLAND Although Finland gained substantial concessions from
the USSR during negotiations on the recently signed
treaty of mutual assistance, the treaty will provide the USSR with
an excuse for further moves against Finland whenever the Kremlin
considers it necessary. Future Soviet action toward Finland will
depend on the course of events within Finland and on international
developments. An intensification of the "cold war" would prompt
the Kremlin to hasten the campaign for Communist domination of
Finland. Similarly, a pronounced rightist swing within Finland or
increased Finnish cooperation with the west might also persuade
the USSR to move more quickly. Finnish non-Communists, there-
fore can be expected to vote for ratification of the treaty, to main-
tain superficially friendly relations with the Communists and ~ t h e
USSR, and to move ca'u tiously in their relations with the west.
GREECE Recent Greek Army successes have probably been
sufficiently dislocating to the guerrilla forces to
necessitate postponement of the large-scale offensive reportedly
'f'OP SECRET
'FOP SEGRE'l'
-3-
planned by Markos for the latter part of April. It is possible
that the army, by retaining the initiative, can prevent the success-
ful launching of any concerted guerrilla offensive in the near
future. Nevertheless, the army victo ries are limited in extent,
and a decisive defeat of the guerrillas is not yet in prospect.
EGYPT The shor't-lived strike of the Egyptian police, although
brought on by purely economic grievances, may indir-
ectly lead to a settlement of Egypt's long-standing differences
with the UK over the Sudan and British military rights in Egypt.
The Egyptian Government's inability to cope with the strike has
seriously impaired Prime Minister Nokrashi 's prestige and may
bring about his downfall. His most likely successor is Senate
President Heykal, who has consistently maintained that successful
termination of the Anglo-Egyptian deadlock is essential to Egypt's
future.
CHINA Despite Chiang Kai-shek's announced unwillingness to
be a candidate for the presidency of the Chinese National
Government, he will undoubtedly be elected to this position by an
overwhelming majority of the National Assembly on April 12. Party
leaders are unanimous in stating that Chiang is China's indispensable
man for the presidency. Thus, the effects of Chiang's action have
been to assure him the presidency, to rally the full . .support of the
Kuomintang to his leadership, and to enhance his authority. In view
of the basic and growing weaknesses of the K uomintang and the
National Government, however, this strengthening of Chiang s poli-
tical position may prove to be temporary. Chiang's maneuver was
undoubtedly prompted as a measure to offset these weaknesses. The
Kuomintang had become disrupted by increasing factionalism and by
mounting discontent .with Chiang - s leadership to such an extent that
there was danger that the National Assembly would be the scene of
public attacks on his policy by party members, thus leading to an
open split.
For 'the moment, Chiang has secured from Kuomintang leaders
a clear mandate to continue his rule, and consequently he will be
under less pressure to alter his policies or reorganize the govern-
ment. Unless the government demonstrates under his leadership
more success than hitherto in coping with its enormous military
and economic problems, dissatisfaction and criticism will inevitably
TOP SECRE.T
'I'OF SECRE'I'
-4-
mount and will be more difficult to silence.
SIAM Control of the Siamese Government by a group of military
extremists now appears assured. Once foreign recog-
nition of the Abhaiwong Government had been obtained, the extremist
military group demanded the resignation of the government because
of its inability to bring about the return of normal economic condi-
tions. The military group then declared to the Regency Council
that only Marshal Phibun would be acceptable as the new premier.
In view of the determination of the members of the Abhaiwong Gov-
ernment to boycott a Phibun Government, it is expected that Phibun
will experience , difficulty in forming a new cabinet of any significant
strength and that its tenure of office will be solely dependent on army
support. Every effort will be made during the assu111ption of office
by the new government to observe all legal forms in order to avoid
jeopardizing recently-obtained recognition, but the essential character
of government control as based on military force will remain
unchanged.
KOREA A developing split among South Korean rightists over
the choice of candidates for the forthcoming UN-
observed election and over the form a provisional government
should take when the assembly convenes has made Syngman Rhee's
chances of emerging as chief of the South Korean Government almost
certain. Rhee 's autocratic policies as head of this government would
probably assist the USSR in its efforts to win away South Korean
leaders. Future Soviet moves will probably include demands for
the withdrawal of occupation troops both from North and South Korea
and pressure for recognition by the UN of a Soviet-sponsored People's
Republic.
Sources:
Weekly Review of State Department
Weekly Summary of Central Intelligence Agency
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department Telegrams
Intelligence Digest
S/S-R:llq
::POP SECRET
SoePet Summary
For the Secretary
April 26, 1948
PROSPECTIVE COMMUNIST STRATEGY
The defeat suffered by the Communists in the Italian
election has further reduced Communist capabilities for
assuming power and has vastly improved the morale and con-
fidence of the anti-Communists in both Italy and Franco.
An increasing number of left-wing European Socialists and
follow-travellers may now abandon their Communist associa-
tion. The Communists in western Europe thus are confronted
with a considerable loss in political influence in addition
to their already reduced capabilities for revolutionary
action.
Possible Lines of Soviet Action - Italy and France
may consequently enjoy a brief respite while the Communists
regroup their forces and revise their strategy. The USSR,
however, can be expected to maintain its pressure in
Germany. Moreover, it will probably continue its aggres-
sive tactics in the Near East. In Iran, continuing Soviet
pressure may eventually lead to actual intervention, pro-
fessedly based on the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty. The deteri
orating situation in Palestine may soon present the Kremlin
with an opportunity for greatly expanded covert
intervention. Although the satellites continue to exercise
caution in their support of the guerrilla forces in Greece,
they are. capable of vastly increasing the scale of their
covert aid. In Latin America, the USSR can be expected to
seize upon any favorable opportunities for exploiting local
unrest or violence.
Communist Tactics in Western Europe - For the immediate
future, Communist activities in western Europe are likely
to be directed toward rebuilding the popular front rather
than an early or determined bid for power. A Communist
drive to recover the allegiance of the non-Communist left
is indicated by these recent developments: 1) French Com-
munist Leader Thorez on April 18 called upon Communists,
Socialists, and Catholics to unite in defense of French
"liberty and independence"; 2) the Cominform Journal, re-
versing its original position, is now professing to repro-
all workers' parties, not merely the Communists; 3)
the German Communists recently voiced approval of a "Middle-
Class Auxiliary" of the Socialist Unity Party, which.might
conceivably develop into the long-expected "nationalist"
movement based on the Bismarckian concept of Russo-German
'l'OP 8EGF!E'l'

litO. s...:a. ti.e
By
TGP SECRE':P
-2-
cooperation; and 4) the Kremlin reportedly has issued a
directive to the French Central Communist Committee call-
ing for a program of non-violence in western Europe and
intensified activity in Germany and the Near East.
Defeat of ERP a Main Goal - Defeat of the European
recovery program remains a prime objective of Communist
strategy. Strikes and industrial sabotage, conducted
ostensibly on the basis of local economic issues rather
than political considerations, can be expected. Although
Communist propaganda will continue to impugn US motives
in promoting recovery, the Kremlin may hence forth moder-
ate its attacks upon present western European governments.
However, Communist propagandists may intensify their
efforts to contrast "peaceful" Soviet intentions with US
"warmongering" and "imperialist designs.
11
Such a drive
would be designed to win the support of those western
Europeans who are prepared to seek "peace. at ,any price"
and to encourage a relaxation of western, and particularly
US, military preparedness.
Situation in Greece - In Greece, the Kremlin is also
faced with a possible reduction of Communist capabilities.
Differences between Greek Communists and Soviet-satellite
Communists have apparently arisen over problems concerning
Soviet aims in Greece and the conduct of the civil war.
Greek Communist leaders are reportedly disturbed by the
failure of the satellites to provide the guerrillas with
enough aid to halt the continuing successes of the Greek
Army, and the Minister of Interior in the Markos government
is said to be distrustful of the "selfish" policy of the
USSR and fearful that Yugoslavia may be planning to seize
Greek Macedonia. Moreover, certain Greek Communist leaders
believe that the primary Soviet intention in the civil war
is to wage a long campaign of economic attrition against the
US and not to effect the rapid military defeat of Greece.
In view of the successful operations of the Greek Army, it
is apparent that the Kremlin must decide soon whether to
authorize a drastic increase in aid to the guerrillas or
allow their gradual defeat by the Greek Army.
May Day Strikes in Latin America - Although Communist
May Day demonstrations in Latin America may result in local
distUrbances, present indications are that the Latin American
governments will be fully capable of controlling any out-
breaks. In Mexico, the electrical workers have threatened
to call a May Day strike. If they are joined by the petrol-
eum workers, miners, and railway workers (all closely allied
with the electrical workers by inter-union agreements), the
.ll'Of BEGRE'l'
'!'OP 8EGRE'F
-3-
resulting strike could cause a general paralysis of the
country anj threaten the stability of the Mexican Govern-
ment. Sporadic violence may break out in Cuba, and pos-
sibly in a few other countries, though there are no indi-
cations at present of coordinated plans for strikes or
public distrubances.
USSR Several measures recently adopted by the
USSR are designed apparently to increase
the Soviet Union's military and economic capabilities
and to facilitate a transition from a civilian to a mili-
tary economy. By a recently-published decree, military
ranks are established for all administrative, engineering,
and technical personnel now in industries under jurisdic-
tion of the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. This decree, which is al-
most identical with the one issued in 1947 to govern the
coal ministries, may indicate the format+on pf quasi-mili-
tary organizations. In addition, civilian defense groups
are reportedly being established for each city block in
Moscow, and air raid systems are being reorganized.
GERMANY Increased military activity by the USSR in
eastern Germany, particularly in Berlin, dur-
ing the past 30 days can probably be regarded primarily as
measures to consolidate the Soviet postwar position in
western Europe and to continue the war-of-nerves against
the western powers. Such activity is estimated to
have the following objectives: l) a further sealing of
the western border of the Soviet sphere; 2) normal replace-
ments for Soviet armed forces in Germany; 3) participation
in the program of maneuvers now conducted in all ter-
ritories occupied by the USSR; and 4) a contribution to the
war-of-nerves designed to decrease or eliminate western re-
presentation in Berlin and the Allied Control Council. Al-
though increased military activity may be expected to con-
tinue for some time, it is probably not a preparation for
movement against western Europe.
CHINA Political disintegration in Nationalist
China, both in the provinces and the central
regime at Nanking, appears to have reached a relatively
stage. In addition to well-established separatist
tendencies in south China, a feeling of regional independence
is apparently growing among Nationalist civil and military
officials in north China, largely as a result of the inability
or the unwillingness of the National Government to extend
realistic military support. Some direct overtures from
local military commanders for US military aid, a tendency
JFOF 8EGRE''
JllB P SBG HE'!'-
-4-
among provincial governments to raise and support their own
levies (in at least one case in contravention to National
Government ordinances ) , and evidence of increasing liaison
among North China leaders --- all indicate that while north
China officials still hope for assistance from Nanking,
they have ceased to expect it.
.
Sources:
..
Weekly Review of State Department
Weekly Summary of Central Intelligence Agency
Current Economic Developments of State Department
State Department Telegrams
Intelligence Digest
S/S-R:lwn 'fOP SECRE''
Psychological and Political Warfare
292. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects
NSC 10/2
Washington, June 18, 1948.
//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Although undated,
this directive was approved by the National Security Council at its June 17 meeting and the final text, incorporating changes made at the meeting, was
circulated to members by the Executive Secretary under a June 18 note. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. NSC 10/2 and the June 18 note are also reproduced
in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 213-216.
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit
and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national
security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It
therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for
them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the over-all
control of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of
peace:
a. A new Office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime.
b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National
Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects.
c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of
operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of
Central Intelligence Agency.
d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:
(1) Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State/1/ and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and
conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central
Intelligence and the representative of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National
Security Council for decision.
/1/According to an August 13 memorandum from Davies to Kennan, Kennan was subsequently appointed as the representative of the Secretary of State.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1947-53: Lot 64 D 563) See the
Supplement.
(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are
accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.
(3) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives
in each area), of such operations as will affect them.
e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and
agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare.
f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for
these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.
4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war
where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders
therefor will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.
5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this
Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US
Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any
responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action,
Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950
Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment
Department of State
Washington, DC
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance
movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such
operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.
6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.
1NFORMAZ10NI I'ORZE AIU.I.ATE
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na. 18 parte aua, .U Sertiz1o :Wol-madcni u.s.A., ha ult.!
riC>rmenta 1n data 7 ottobre 1957, oho 11 wuo
nulle eaig<>llll:e
dorivant-:1. dlll.J:a lllino.oo:La <U uua e111cl'gon:w. o ooaupqziollo,
/
./.
I
ji'ULGAZlONE I ! '.-:;?" ... .,._
[ VIETJIT.ll. DlVUL(.;..-.z
1
0NJ
11 las& sui Goneetti Go<U:!ioati 4&lla horte 1 ta
CDioa dsUa opGl"9.ZioD1 S/B (v<IG nl.legab n,Z c!al t11:ol.o
e Jlri.l:loipi o,-ganizza1:1T1 blla ope;nu:ioDJ. st.,.
lleh.Ul.d", nonohll. l.'.U.lesutg n.) oontea-te la 11om" d.J.
")Lt.Duale S/:B).
_ lo aoh=a d1 mssGila della oparar;1on1 5/B (v<U.all..n, t.)
U pi.= 5/ll (vds.e.U..n,5)
11 pie.no d.1 aicura:u.a S/ll {vda,all,n,6)
11 prognuoll'& di. roolutem>ntQ S/ll
11 p:l.e.n" degl.i addeatl'MOBI!.1:1 S/:B
(v<U. &Ul..l:i.7}
(vdJ.all,n,6)
1. la prll:l& d:l. or<tina ogsettivo e ooncer:u> i ten!
tort a b popol4zioni obe <1oveauoro
l'(locupa.zione 'Ji U aoTnrtU!mtg 1ur1:tor1
e JIOpolazioni abe d.!rl.l'opo:rnzicma riolnrebb!
ro i.Do11anlen1;o e appogg1o all.a rtlairirmza;
z. ln aoconda lo di oi"dille BO!;&Dttino e ooll.OGJ'DQ oio l'aut.2.
r:ttll legitU.ma delle Stato, la. q\lale por 1
1
fJTWlt=..li'UI
41 gre.v:i ct:fosa alla oua integr.l:tl 11 troverobba ad a..-er
adottatc, ocn tal.i temputivo cpportul!e predispouido-
n11 provvadimenti atti ad aeatounrle ll preatigic e
l'ulhricra ca:pacitlt 111 e d1 ganmo.
lfe deriva con avidcllza., l 'alto s:l.gni!1c11.1:o politico
(nel sensa aupariore ddla parcla} obe &oa\80& un'i.Diziati-
va tipo S/ll nelle mnn1 del Sil'A.R, onpaoe oll. aeeic=-
ro o.l Ca.,o della State V.ae.sioL'O doll.o. D.!.:!oafl, por
tualitll. d<>l 10omen'to d1 ""'ercon::a, 1111a leva d.1 :lungo brnooio
di gr .. n<l& port.n-ta por iucor"!!'Sini'U ln dal tO,!:
ritoric e j ;:otori lega.li o lo
I q: rZ{r 1-' s.I?<\ o !
auaolTO<>aa ,. queot:a del1cGta prcminei>ta
ee n1 ca.ao o ad altro ore;unizao.zioni i.llcontrollate o nl oe.o:
v:hio .U intereani d.1 )lartito, :t'1n1::1nt1vu in talc cwopo.-
:tV. La Seziolu s.!.ll", prepost<>
1
ooc.e ai 6 detto
1
o.l C<>lllpJ.to in
quutione,, un.<lrganismo I<!IC<lra in !ase di
ma ormai nattamente e Easa si art!
col.a oome aeg..tel
Co.po Sozione, in !undone d.1 cocrdi.n:ltore dell
1
overn::io-
DO "GLJ.liiOf
- 3" gruppo
- gru.ppo
r A DIVULGAZioNE I
- c. J.,
per :torganizznzione 1.11
ne di mrpoorto &nern.le a di attin.done
aeua sr!l.L.l J.Ll>IIIJ. e aolla STELL! !:UlU!lA,
or"Jlizt.azion1 U>gl<lbl!.te tad GIJ.mo;
perle org;o..nizzazion.t epeoh..li" ill
ne d1 eeeterlo. pe=ecte doll orsnnt:::.!!.
zione llLliiiO" e d:l. u1:tivuziooe ae:t:to brun-
cbe ooer<>ti'I"' m...urro (lntonsa.Z1ooi -
- l'rop.1-g>onda - ETuione e .rot;a-
Guerriglia) e della unitll. di pronto impic-
1!!!. (Rcdodmdro
1
.Azn1aa
1
Cinestru) 1
,per lB tecnica e la t:m.s:lidnicn.1"
1
in t'ufl.
".ione di eu .. norto P"r i eolleeentj "GLA-
a grande e pi<lco1a diatanza e d1
vozione de1 Centro Radio C
W'lf&Zi!IWI;
per "l.'atUTitll. aerea,in :f'Wir>ions di b:t'll..ll-
cn di "uppo .. to n'.i,oo
1 'ot>ernzicl'le "GLADIO"
1
(Centre .iddestramcnto Guasta!orl
e l'att1v:1tll
e,1n di baac opcrotivo-addeatrn-
va dello,erazione
l':attaai di unorgan1:zaz.1one attraVOt"'O
:;I:FJ.X eaplica comando torn a:poc1al1",
dell'ap:pilrl!otO ore;nniz=ativo-di<lettico o d1 supporlo ad
<Jste lltoeoaario,
lftl oomplesao,l'organii:-zazicm a1 avUuppata e d
aTilllppa l\L!lgo la segu.l!llti d1N1:trleil
2. ooat1=1one dell'eppare.to di:rcUi'VI;I centro.le (las.,..
SA llel eu.;. 1:>sieme) e e'lnerale
operaZ1ona1
2. ooatttuziona G meaaa a punto della baae addeatrativa,
del corpo ht:ruHori
1
del.la dottrl.ml
1
ddle aUru:...tu.ra
d!dat"tiche {:1.1 Cent:ro .Addeatl"'!!.onto l}ua.eh.torl
l!lilillf-} in fullzioDe anohe del suo oventunle futuro :1!:>-
:Pieao COOle bBae oper&.tiYa;
j, costitu.zione Cutro t1"1l=isoinll1, in OI.S>l'<>Wo n.J.-
l.a. base ope:rativa, ca.pa.ce di mn't$11.ere 1 colls6(l"1enti
a diatwua con le rcti d1 evol-
gera attivit/1. radio d1 prnp!l&anda a d1 dtat"url>o (C

J.oe)-J. ..... U .rv .. ,.]_1 'u<
nitzaziona,
pia.no di eieuro:zza dell 'opera.t1one;
pilUle d1 rccluta.ttH>IIto del personal.e;
pirulo deali
piano via alle
ve po.uibilit/1. di rell.linazione)f
-piano dolln doci.WcntnziollO oul terrene, l'=binte,
eli obiattivi;
5. effettua:z:ione di oorsi addost:rattvi di e)e111enti della
Snzione 5J.JJ p:rcsso 111 eouola del Serv:ido ,\lner1Cnno o
&<ld<atrn
./.
'
VIE f iH A DIVUU; I
5. attinzione dolle brunche oporativo medi!l.llte la coGti-
di qua.n,o.ta nuclei (ognuno au 2-3 uomiiU "ope-
rnt1rl" 1:1 2 lllll.r<>onhti) a
6 :rNC11:11 int<>mat1T"1 I"
10 n11cld di eo.bote.safo s
6 mu;:l.d di l'rtiP"ganda "P"
6 nuclei d1 evaeione e \lge ":E"
12 nu.ol.a1 di "G"
a<ront1 tu.'t"ti 11 ca:t'!!:.ttero <U "IJl.l_al!:!.OIU, opera:&1Vo e <11
eoll.el;lllOlBII.tQ" pr-ecostitnite till dal teo:.po di po.ce,anzi-
riservueene i11nnc1o o l'i.nf1ltro-..1onn in tompo
di Ol!lergenza o d.1 occupafione;
1. di unita di g!.lnrrlgl.in d.1 proDto 11:1pieso,
1n :regioni di pe.rticolare int'lrcsee, J!recisamenhl
l.a "ST:c:L.I. ALl'Z!!A." nel r:!.lll.lacei!IJJ.toPi ft.lln
preoni.atentt or(;8llh!:adcne
6
0SOPPO"
1
ddl.a oonllt-
ntanza attuale d1 cir.., 600 uo:aini e tendento a 1.000
unitS d:l iJ;,ptea:o, pii.t altre 1.000 mobtlitabt-
>11
la "StELU MARillA" ., .. ,. rillllaccia!l
tesi a.l.le preutstent1 Orl!antzuzioni
la. "BOIOlli2UlW" ............... , della
za programr,ata d1 100 + 200 llllid.l
la "AZALEA" ......... ,_,_ __
gra!lll:lllta d1 1oo aoo u.nitlt;
de11n for:n j>l"<>-
P/vv; la "GIR'ESTRJ, ............................ .
:f'orza
<>o

programmata/ 100 :. 200 unitll.,
I s' <W"''Tol
.;.
dellu
8. appront=cnto
1
dislocaz1olle pu1.ferioa i.IIJUpZZi.ni
del Serrtrlo " prediupoa1Zioni d1 oe.acon41mento dei
llll'terlll.1i necessari d V8rl tlmoe.nti operati'Vi, 8
precieqontoH
per 1 nuclei "I" - s - "1'" - - G,
11 epeciali 1.11 cccten1tcr1 14one1 al
ntteco:ndinentc
1
td apparati :no.d.io rice-trasmittenti
per 1 a jp"a-Cd& d.is-:oa..n::.a.;
ptr le u.citk d.1 pronto ill:]:h,go, l:lf\t8:r"1al.i di ll'!,u1-
P9.Sei""'nto, IIJ;'I:!..IIOentc o :un1z1ulllll::.tntn 41 tipo tlJ!
diZiCnale, per il
i.lc.p1e,gc
1
nonclll= apparu.ti radio per 1
a brovu e e a:rande distc.m:a;
9. addntnl:.:w.to e a.lle :!unz1oni
ve ed eeocutive d1 element! del vuclei 1 delle un1t3
di proll.to illl.pi"BOI
10. rlcoll,lli;ioni hrre3trl d acree delle zone d1 parti-
colarB interesse;
11. nccolta della. dcolllll&n\az:lon cnrtogra:f1ce
1
1l.O.IICgl'tl!i-
c& e

degli
obiett1Vi
1
della aulle operaii&
ni speo1al1 svelte du.rentc h seconda b'ler:ro. t:oUdiale;
Contro Addestrm:;cnto
bient:i d1 pouibile Upiego:
(attivitll. aerea e
(attivitll aequ.-a e eubacquea)
(nttiv:itll. in tcncni ditficlli),
noi tre ":!!!
.;.
' .. l
'
v. Allo

al"'"l
&alda premasee central!, &ta
p.ndo nel campG periferieo per la realU&u.1onc dd nE_
prai.ndicati nucllti "Inforu:>.ziont- Sabotegsio" -"PrE_
Pi18>Uide"- e Fu68"- "Gue:r:rigl.ia" e U."litil d1
:pro:>to iJ::IJ>iego,
ll piano 01"6lm1:uod1-v0 b ..
tu..,o per l'.Hh Itnlin (I e II
!.r. ord.l.ne di succnsiva U.p<>Ttan::.o., preveda di
.._-.che <!lle a ceri<!ioM.li
(III o IV
La ripartitione del te,-ritorio :!.tal.io.no in """
ha una !ina.litil. di
,_.,. e.ustl.lo org;>.ni:u.t!ve,
ll pin."lo c.renniztat1yo clell "GLADIO"
yrotede in 1 seUenti d1 uonini<
i (
! l.. per 1 n11old I
' "IsY""S"
1
1'
/ '. :
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i "'"1:1
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doi nucla!
V!ETATA DIVUlGAZIONE!
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10 -
In tenenc!o ancnc con:o do,llo "l"IP-
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1
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le e qualitlcazione d1 agent1 4estinat1 ed
ni IJr qu.ato baee operaun, 11 Centro Ad-
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ti dirottivi per 11 isni:1oato
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6
al che esea
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,.. ...... ,_ 01 BUtrta ,o d1 ..
tfott1, ooni1tht
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vclltua.l1-tA d1 A\"ve!Umcz:tU cbe doVO$$U'O 1':1.!!
togrttA del UD!S'tl'O .bese, U dell& la'ttll. 8Clllpre vi't!,;
lo e
DIVIJLGA:ZIUNE

P s{Cr..:zT I
\\_N\_t;P

J '.):t:.;X ..
'FM 31-1
lDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 1
19960709 005
-
\' ' '
' !
THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST
QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY
FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
PAGES WHICH DO NOT
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
.I
FrELD MANU ALl
No. 31-15
*FM31-15
HEADQUARTERS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE AR1\1:Y
WASIHNGTON 25, D.C., 31 Ma11 1961
OPERATIONS AGAINST IRREGULAR FORCES
\CHAPTER 1.
Section [. General _ - Parngrapb
Purpose and Rcope _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
Terms---------------------------------------- 2
Basic precepts. ___________________ .____________ 3
IIf8i;crational Environment
Ideological basis for resistance. _______ ._. _____ .__ 4
... _. __ _. __ _ _ --. 5
Irregular force activities and tactics __ _____ ____ - 6
Political factors .. _________ _________ --. 7
Qeographical factoiL.,. _____________ - _______ . _ - _- 8
Relationship of foroes--------------------------- 9
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT AND CONBUCT OF OPERATIONS
Section I. Command and Control
Activewar------------------------------------
6old. war situations- - --------------------------
II. Planning
General---------------------------------------
Planning factors- - ________ -- _____ ----- __ - . ----
III. Propaganda and Civic Action .
Propaganda . _-_- ____ ._-----._-----------------
Civic action .. --. ____ - __ ----. _-------- . ---.--
IV. Police Operations
General ------------------------------------
Ron.dblocks _______ _______ -- . _.--- _-.-- _--.---
operations. _____ . _______ _. __ _
Block control _________ -- __ _____ .----_ .. -----
Installation and community security ____________ _
Security of surface lines of communication. ______ _
Apprehended irregular force me-mbers:::-:::-:::::-_____ _
V. Combat Operations
General ______ .. ___ .______________ _ ____ ____ -
Reaction operations _____ - -- ___ -.- _ - - -. _- ----- -
Harassing operations _____ -- ___ ------ . - _---- -
opern.tions. ______ __ -. _. ___ ---- __ -------
Eliminntion operations ____ .- ___ ._- _- ---- _- ------
Combn.t in urban areas ___ . ______ - _- _- - -.- _--- -
CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF
FORCES
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24:
25
26
27
28
Pap
3
3
3
4
6
6
18
10
19
12
12
14
1&
17
18
19
20
21
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
27
2T
29
General ____________ -------------------------- 29 32
Military forces _________________________________ . 30 33
Civil forces and local individuals. _______________ . ) 31 34:

*This manuoJ supersedes FM 31-15, 7 January 1953, including C 1, 5 November 1954.
(;!)5302"-61-1
1
l'
1":
''t
. ;_fl
4. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Section I. Intelligence
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :32
Overt collection____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :33
Covert collection_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 34
Counterintelligence_____________________________ 35
II. Loiistjcs __
Supply and maintenance________________________ 36
Transportation_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 37
Evacuation and hospitalization__________________ :38
Construction ______________________________ . _. 39
III. Signal Communication
"General._-:_ ____ .. ____ .. __________________ . _ ... __
Communication equipment ___________________ ---
Communication procedures _______________ .. __ _
Electronic countcrmcasure!L _ .. ____________ . _. _. _
IV. Support by Other Services
Air Force support __ . _______ . ______ ... _._. ___ ---
40
41
42
43
Navy and Marine support----------------------
CHAPTER 5. TRAINING
44
45
2
Page
;)()
:38
:38
38
3!)
40
41
42
42
43
43
44
44
45
46
47
I
l
I
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Section I. GENERAL
1 . Purpose and Scope
a. This manual provides to the and stall's of
comiJined arms force;:; whidt lw .. ve a primary mission of t1liminat iug-
irregular forces.
h. The t(>Xt discusses the nature of irregular forces eomprised of
otganized guerrilla units and underground and their sup-
porters; and the organization, training, tactics, techniques. and
procedures to he employed by a, eombined arms force, normally in
conjunction with eivil agencies, to destroy large, well-organized irreg-
ular forces in act.i\'e or cold Will' situations.
('. These opentt.ions may be required in situations wherein an irreg-
ular force either constitutes the only enemy, or threatens rear areas
of regular milit.u.ry fot<.es whieh :ue <'.ondueting <'.onvcnt.ional
opemtions.
d. The mat(rial contaimd herein is applieable to both nuclca.r and
nonnuclear warfare.
2. Terms
((,, The t>1'111 irregular, used in eomuinations sueh as irregular forcl'S,
irregulat a.ctivit.ies, and c,ount.(lt'inegultu operations, is used in t.lw
broad sense t.o rcfm to all types of notwon vcntional forces and opPra-
tions. It includes partisan, insurgent., subversive, resist:u1ec,
terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations ami
methods.
b. Inegular activities include acts of a military, political, psycho-
logical, a,nd economic nature, conducted predominantly by inhabitant."
of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority
of the loca.l government. or an o<eupying power, and using primarily
irregular and informal groupings and measures.
3. Basic Precepts
a. An irregular force is the outward manifestation of a resistance
mO\'ement against the local gO\ernment by some portion of the popuht-
tion of an area. Therefore, t.he growth and continuation of an ir-
regular force is dependent on support furnished by the population
3
even though the irregular force also receives support from an external
power.
b. vVhen an irregular force is in its formative stage it may he
eliminated by the employment of civil law enforcement measures and
removal of the factors which cause the resistance movement. Once
formed, an irregular force is usually too strong to be eliminated by
such measures. A stronger force, such as a military unit, can destroy
the irregular force, but the resistance movement will, when convinced
that it is militarily feasible to do so, reconstitute, the irregular force
unless the original causative factors are also removed or alleviated.
a. The ultimate objective of operations against an irregular force
is to eliminate the irregular force and prevent its resurgence. To
attain this objective the following tasks must be accomplished :
(1) The establishment of an effective intelligence system to
furnish detailed, accurate, and current knowledge of the
irregular force.
(2) The physical separation of guerrilla elements from each
other, their' support base in the local population, under-
ground elements, and any sponsoring power.
( 3) The destruction of irregular force elements by the defection,
surrender, capture, or death of individual members.
(4) The provision of political, economic, and social. necessities
and the ideological reeducation of dissident elements of the
population to prevent resurgence of the irregular force.
d. Princi pies of operation:
( 1) Direction of. the military and civil effort at each level is
vested in a single authority, either military or civil.
(2) Military actions are conducted in consonance with specified
civil rights, liberties, and objectives.
(a) Operations are planned to be predominantly offensive
operations. .
( 4) Police, combat, and civic action operations are conducted
simultaneously.
( 5) Task forces employed against guerrilla elements are
organized to have a higher degree of aggressiveness and
mobility than the guerrilla elements.
Section II. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
4. ldeologica.l Basis for Resistance
. a. The fundamental cause of large-scale resistance movements stems
from the dissatisfaction of some portion of the population, whether
real, imagined, or incited, with the prevailing political, social, or eco-
nomic conditions. This . dissatisfaction is usually centered around a
desire for one or more of the following:
4
l
( 1) N at.iona 1 independence.
(2) Relief from actual or alleged opptession.
( ~ ) El iminat.ion of foreign occupation or exploitation.
( 4) gconomic and social improvement.
( 5) glimination of corruption.
(6) Religious expression.
b. "In-country" factors may cause a. resistance movement to form
locally or a resistance movement may be inspired by "out-of-country,
elements who crPate and sponsor such a movement as a means of pro-
moting their own cause. Often, another country will lend support to
:t local resistance movement and attempt to eont.rol it. to further its
own aims.
r.. Resistance movements begin to form when dissntisfnction oreurs
among strongly motivated individuals who cannot further their cause
by pet\.Ceful and legal means. Under appropriate conditions, the nt.ti-
tudes and beliefs of these individuals, who are willing to risk their
lives for their beliefs, spread to family groups nnd neighbors. The
population of entire areas may soon evidence widespread discontent.
When legal rpcourse is denied, discontent grows into disaffection and
members of the population participate in irregular activities.
d. Small dissident groups living and working within the estnb-
lished order gradually organize into underground elements that con-
duct covert irregular activities. As members of underground organi-
zations are identified and as the spirit of resistance grows, overt.
gttetTill:t bands form in secure areas and become the military arm
of the itTegular force. Characteristically, the srope of irregular
aet.ivit.ies prognss in this order: Pnssive objection, individual <'X-
pression of opposition, minor sabotage, major sn.bot.nge, individual
violent action, and organized group violent nction.
e. Once individuals have participated in irregular activities, should
there he any change of heart, they are usually forced to contintw,
cithct by prPssme from their comrades or by h<ing designated crim-
inals by local authority.
5. Irregular Force Organization
a. The organization of irregular forces varies according to purpos>,
terrain, character and density of population, availability of food,
medical supplies, arms and equipment, quality of leadership, amount
and nature of external support and direction, and the countermeasur<'s
used against them. Units or elements may vary in size from a few
saboteurs to organized paramilitary units of division size or larg<'r
with extensive support organizations.
b. A large irregular force normally consists of two organized ele-
ments: a guerrilla element which operates overtly, and an underground
element which operates covertly. Members of large guerrilla. units
5
..
are usually severed from their normal civilian pursuits while mem-
bers of small guerrilla bands may alternately be either guerrillas
or apparently peaceful citizens. Members of the underground usually
maintain their civilian pursuits. Both elements are usually supported
by individuals and small groups who may or may not be formal
members of either element but who furnish aid in intelligence, evasion
and escape, and supplies. Such supporters are often considered to
be a part of the underground. A given individual may be a member
of two or more organizations and may participate in many forms
of irregular activity.
c. The underground elements of an irregular force must conduct
the majority of their activities in a covert manner because of the coun-
termeasures used against them. They are usually found in all resist-
ance areas. Successful organizations are compartmented by cells for
security reasons. The cellular organization prevents one member,
upon capture, from compromising the entire organization (fig. 1).
d. Organized guerrilla units are usually found in areas where the
terrain minimizes the mobility, surveillance, and firepower advantage
of the opposing force. They vary from small groups who are lightly
armed, to large paramilitary units of division size or larger with ex-
tensive support organizations (fig. 2). Large organizations normally
include elements for combat, assassination and terrorism, intelligence
and counterintelligence, civilian control, and supply. Guerrilla units
are composed of various categories of personnel. Members may in- ,:,l
elude-
( 1) Civilian volunteers and those impressed by coercion.
(2) Military leaders and specialists.
( 8) Deserters.
(4) In time of active war, military individuals or small groups
such as those who have been cut off, deliberate stay-bellinds,
escaped prisoners of war, and downed airmen.
6. Irregular Force Adivitles and Tadics .
a. An irregular force presents an elusive target, since it will usually
disperse before superior opposition, and then reform to strike again.
However, as the guerrilla elements of an irregular force grow and
approach parity with regular units in organization, equipment, train-
ing, and leadership, their capabilities and tactics likewise change and
become similar to those of a regular unit.
6
( 1) Overt irregular activities include-acts of destruction against
public and private property, transportation and communica-
tions systems; raids and ambushes against military and police
headquarters, garrisons, convoys, patrols, and depots; ter-
rorism by assassination, bombing, armed robbery, torture,
mutilation, and kidnaping; provocation of ineidents, re-
-
Principal
Agent
Espionage
Subagent
Espionage
(2 or more)
Agent
Espionage
(2 or more)
County Chief
and Council
Principal
Agent
Sabotage
Subagent
Sabotage
(2 or more)
Agent
Sabotage
(2 or more)
Principal
Agent
Terrorism
Subagent
Terrorism
(2 or more)
Agent
Terrorism
(2 or more)
1
Closely controlled psychological altack of the entire area.
Intel
Cell(s)
2
Intel
Cell(s)
2
Intel
Cell{s)
2
Direct rl.'portingo to chief and council on directed nssignmcnts, usually high leYcl
agents.
Cutouts. ( Slcurity measures which permit communication but prevent physical

Piyllt'(' I. 'l'VlJC undcrrTrornul nryani::ation.
prisals, holding of hostages; a.ud denial aeti Yitics, such
as arson, flooding, demolition, use of chemical or biolo:.rical
agents, or other acts desi:.rneu to prevent use of an installa-
tion, area, product, or facility.
(2) Covert irregular aeti\'ities inelude-Pspionage, dis-
semination of propaganda all(l rumors, delaying or misdirect-
ing orders, issuing false or 1nisleading ordPrs or rpports, as-
sassination, Pxtortion, blaekmail, tlwft, eounterfcitin:,r, and
idt>ntifying individuals for tel'l'oristic attack.
7
8
L
r
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
L
65 Percent of Regt HQ
2 430 men Personnel Armed
.
REGIMENT
-----
Political Regimental
Commissioner '
Commander
I I
Medical
Supply
Group
Group
I I
Communi- Person-
cations net
50 Percent of Bn HQ
760 men Personnel Aimed
BATTALION
~
~
Battalion Chief
-----
Political Deputy Battalion
-----
Commissioner ' Chief
I
-1
I
I I
I
Machineaun lntelllaence Medical
Service
Platoon Platoon Platoon
Squad
180 men 75 Percent Armed
COMPANY
t-
1-
...
Company Chief
-----
Deputy Chief
Political Director 1
I
I
I
I
36 men
Secretary
Service
Platoon
Medical I
Squid Squad
naible for propapnda. Reapo
All ftru res are JeprIM&U...
11 men
LEGEND

Squad
Commlnd.
_ _ _ Political Control.
ll'lgure !. Tflpe guerrilla organization.
Chief of
Staff
I
Scouting and
lntelll
aence
I
Operations and
Education
I
Secretary
I
Intel
Squad
. .,.. ....
b. lrrPgular forrP l:1dics v:n.v: hm\'P\'Pl'. tlw followin!! t:tdics are
r,ommon to all il'l'<'!.ntl:lr forc<'s:
( 1 ) ( ,' lfr'l'l'il!lf /If('/ ir.-<. ThP I :ll'l i(';; llsrd hy t h(' pJWITi ll:t :1 re de-
:-;ig-Jwd to wrakrn his enenty :11Hl to gain support of the popn-
lat.ion. Guerrilla tactics follow wPII-kno\\'n pncepts: ff t.lw
<'nrmy attacks, if he dPfends, "harass;" and if
he withdraws or at. any time he is \'lllnerabiP, ''altaek."
(a) Otwrrilla. ladies arn primarily small unit, infantry-type
lartirs which make full use of accurate intrlligenc(', <le-
tailr<l planning- and rehrars:d. simple t<'dmiqu<'s of nm-
nrti\'PJ', spP<'d. surpris(l, infilt.rat.ion. ion in night.
opPrations. :tn<l tlw und<rntiningof Plll'lllY momle. SpPe<l
iR :t rPlat.i\'<' t.hing- and i:-; usually accomplislHd l1y sueh ae-
tions as mn.rching l':l.pidly or nights to reach I he
of attack. Surprise is gained by the combined Pltments
of speed, selection of unsuspected objeetives, and
iberate deception. Infiltration is n. basie tactic of sue-
cessful guerrilla, units and tlwy quickly develop great skill
in infiltrating areas by milita.ty units. By
specializing in night operations, a guerrilla force effectively
reduc(ls its ndnembilit.y to a it and at-tillery attack. Enemy
morale is undermined by con!'tant harassment, exhibi-
tion of n. violent combative spirit, fanaticism, self-sacrifice,
and use of propngnndn, toltrP:lts, blackmail, and
bribery.
(h) A rt.illery and nrmor nrc seldom available to gtwrri lla units.
This frpes the guerrilla force from extensi\'e combat trains,
permits excellent ground mobility in rugged terrain, and
facilitates infilt-mtion teehnicpws. 'Vhen artillery is avail-
able, in(livi<lnnl picC't:'S at'(' usually emplar('d at. night, dug-
in, and ('Xp<'rt.ly eamouflaged.
(o) \Vlwn surromulcd ot' off, guerril1as immediately at-
tempt to brenk out by force at a point or disb:md and
extiltrnt.e individually. If both fail, individual guerl'illu.s
attPmpt to hide or mingle with the peaceful civilian
population.
(d) Guerrilla base areas are carefully guarded Ly a warning
1wt consisting of gucrri11ns and/or civilian supporters.
'\Yarning stations, which are relocated frequently, cover
all avenut:>s of approach iuto t.he guerrilht nre:t.
(2) Undergroumd element tactics. The tactics employed by un-
derground elements arc designed to gain the same results as
guerrilla tactics.
(a) Underground organizations attempt, through nonviolent
persuasion, to indoctrinate and gain the participation of
:)9!)302" -- Gl---2
9
i
. !
. j
groups of the population who are easily deceived hy
promises and, through coercion by terror tactics. to force
others to participate.
(b) Espionage and sabotage are common to all mH.l<'rgronnrl
groups.
(c) Terroristic attack such as assassination and bombings are
used to establish tension and reduce police or military
control.
(d) Propaganda is disseminated by implanting rumors, dis-
tributing leaflets and placards, and when possible, hy
operating dandestine radio stations for broadeasting
purposes.
(e) Agitation tactics include fostering of black markets. and
promoting demonstrations, riots, strikes, and work slow-
down.
(3) Overt and c01Jert activities. Both overt and covert activities
are employed in active war or occupation situations to inten-
tionally draw off enemy combat troops from commitment
to their primary mission.
7. Political Factors
a. Operations against irregular forces are sensitive politically, par-
ticularly during cold war operations. The scope and nature of mis-
sions assigned and commanders' decisions will emphasize political
aspects to a greater extent than in normal military operations.
b. The presence of a foreif.,rn military force operating ngainst ir-
regular forces will invariably be exploited by hostile political propa-
ganda.
8. Geographical Factors
a. The vastness of an area over which such operations may be con-
ducted can result in large areas which cannot be closely controlled.
When such areas nre sparsely populated or when they contain un-
friendly elements of the population, they become likely areas for the
development of a. hostile resistance movement.
b. Areas of rugged or inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, for-
ests, jungles, and swamps, are extremely difficult to control, and the
guerrilla elements of an irregular force are most likely to flourish in
such areas.
9. Relationship of Forces
a. Under the Geneva Conventions, as discussed in FM 27-10, "The
Law of Land Warfare," a guerrilla may, in time of war, have legal
status; when he is captured, he is entitled to the same treatment as a.
regular prisoner of war if he-
10
I.
I
( l) Is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
(2) "\Years a fixed and distinctive sign at a distane('.
(
('1 . 1
, ,arrws open y.
( 4) Conducts op-rations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.
b. The nndr.rground elements of an irr<>gular force normally do
not. hold h'g;al stat us.
r. Oroups of eivilinns that tuke up arms to resist. an invader have
the status of h<'lligerents, but inhubitants of oerupied territory who
rise agaiust t.hc oeeupier are not entitled to belligerent status. IIow-
P\'W, the occupier hus the responsibility of making his occupatiou
a dual and ei!'P<'I by preventing mganized r<'sistance, and pmrnpt.ly
suppr<'ssing activities. Tho lu.w of land warfare furt.lwr
authoriZt'S t.hB occupier to demand and force compliance with count.rr-
meusures ( F.M -10).
d. IIistoric:dly, legal status has been of litt.Io concern to members
of an irregular force and has had little effect on their decision to
participate in irregular activities.
11
'

CHAPTER 2
CONCEPT AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
Section I. COMMAND AND CONTROL
10. Active War
a. The measures which U.S. military commanders may take against
irregular forces during hostilities and in occupied enemy territory are
limited to those which are authorized by the laws of land warfare
(FM 27-10). '
b. Army operations against irregular forces in a general
war will be conducted within the command structure established, for
the particular theater. The senior headquarters conducting the
tion may be joint, combined, or uniservice. If an established dpm-
munication zone exists, control of operations against an irregular f9rce
in this area will normally be a responsibility of the Theater Ahny
Logistical Command or the appropriate section headquarters.
a. Continuity of commanders and staff officers and retention of the
same units within an area are desirable to permit commanders, staffs,
and troops to become thoroughly acquainted with the terrain, the
local population, the irregular force organization, and its
of operations. '
11. Cold War Situations
a. In liberated areas in which a friendly foreign government has
been reestablished and in sovereign foreign countries in time of peace,
the authority which U.S. military commanders may exercise against
irregular forces is limited to that permitted by the provjsions of
agreements which are concluded with responsible authorities of the
sovereign government concerned.
b. The chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission in each country, as the
representative of the President, is normally the channel of authority
on foreign policy and the senior coordinator for the activities of all
representatives of U.S. agencies and services in such a country. Iri
some instances, diplomatic representation may not be present, or the
relationship between the diplomatic representative and the military
commander may be further delineated by executive order (fig. 3).
12
. I
United States
US Department
US Oversea and Host
of State
Unified Command host country Country
I l
Command
Administrative Direction by
Administrative
control agreement
control
US Diplomatic
Mission
I
b etween
countries
Combined
Command
.._ _______ ---,
Operational
control
I
US MAAG
I
Foreign policy
direction and
senior
coordinator
I
I
I
I I I
Operational
control
I
US forces for Host
Operations Against Country
Irregular Forces Forces
,._h l I I I I I
I L -Coordination- _ _J L - Coordination - ..J
1 I
L- - - - - Equipment and Advisory support - - - - - ...J
1
1
'i.gurc ;f. rrlatimrships in a ('old war situatioH.
c. headquarter:;, 01' joint. Ol' combine<l COllllllalldS may
eontrol opemtions against inegulat' forees in a cold war situation.
Pa.rticipution by t.he host country is normal and usually makes a. com-
bined command mandatory.
rl. Responsibility for civil contl'ol and administration is Sfweificd
in agreements reached wit.h the host. country and usually is vrstcd in
the legally eoustituted government to the maximum Pxtent
If the military force conunandcr has been given civil n'sponsibilities,
agreements usually will st.at.e that full responsibility for liberated Ot'
secured areas be transferred to loc:d authorities as soon as the military
situation permits.
13
;. '-
''
Section II. PLANNING
12. General
a. Operations against irregular forces are designed to establish
control within the resistance area, eliminate the irregular force, and
assist in the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reeducation required
to provide a suitable atmosphere for peaceful living. These goals are
sought concurrently, but in specific instances priorities may be estab-
lished. The specific actions required to attain each goal are often the
same, and even when different, are usually planned and conducted
concurrently.
b. Operations against irregular forces are planned according to
these basic considerations.
( 1) The majority of operations consist of small unit actions.
(2) Operations are primarily offensive in nature; once initiated,
they are continued without halt to prevent irregular force
reorganization and resupply. Lulls in irregular activities or
failure to establish contact with hostile elements may reflect
inadequate measures in the conduct of operations rather than
complete success.
(3) Operations are designed to minimize the irregular force's
strengths and to exploit their weaknesses.
(a) The greatest strength of an irregular force lies in its inner
political structure and identification with a popular cause,
its ability to conceal itself within the civil population, the
strong motivation of its members, and their know ledge of
the resistance area.
(b) The greatest weakness of an irregular force lies in its de-
pendence upon support by the civil population; its lack
of a reliable supply system for food, arms, and ammunition;
and its lack of transportation, trained leadership, and com-
munications.
( 4) The close relationship between the civil population and the
irregular force may demand enforcement of stringent con-
trol measures. In some cases it may be necessary to relocate
entire villages, or to move individuals from outlying areas
into population centers. It may be necessary to relocate
those who cannot be protected from guerrilla attack, :tnd
those who are hostile and can evade control.
c. Terrain and the dispositions and tactics of guerrilla forces usually
limit the effectiveness of artillery. However, the demoralizing effect
of artillery fire on guerrillas often justifies its use even though there
is little possibility of inflicting material damage. Ingenuity and a
departure from conventional concepts often make artillery support
possible under the most adverse circumstances.
14
-:.
. . I
l .
!
.... , ,., _, I
i .{ ,': \' ' I: j
d. The rough terrain normally occupied by guerrilla forces often
limits the use of armored nltieles. TioweYer. armored ,ehicles pro-
vide protected eommunieat ions, etfcctive mobile roadblocks, :t,nd con-
voy escort. Planning should t hercfore include the ('mployment. of
armor whenever its use is feasible. \Vhen used against guerrillas,
armored vehicles must be closely supported by infantry, as gliPITillas
am skilled at improvising- antitank mPans and may he PquippPli with
ncoillPss weapons and light roekets.
r. The lw.Iicopter has wide application when used against irregular
forc<'s, suhjed. to the usual limitations of weather and visibility. Its
('a.pability for delivering t.mops, supplies, and suppr.'ssive fires, and
its ability to tly at low SfH'<'d, to land in a. smuJI clearing, and to hovPr
IIJ:tkP it. highly llSPfUI.
f . . Morale of forces engaged in operations against irregular forcl'S
prcslnt:s some planning considerations not encountered in othlr t.ypps
of combat. Operations against a force that seldom offers a
disintegrates bef01-e opposition, and then re-forms and strikes again
where it is least expectld may induce strong feelings of futility
among soldiers and dilute their sense of purpose.
fl Acti\'it.ies between adjaeent. commnnds must be coordinated to
insure unit.y of pffort. If a comm:.md in one area carries out vigorous
opera.tions while a neighboring command is passive, guerrilla elements
will move into the quiet. ana until danger has passed. Underground
elements will either remain quiet or transfer their efforts temporarily.
!t... Definite n'!'{Wnsibilit.iPs for the entire area of operations are
specified, using clearly defined bouodaries to subdi,ide the arPa.
Boundal'ies should not. prPVPnt hot pursuit of irt'<'gular force eiPIIll'llts
into an adjacent ana. Coordination should, however, hl' accom-
plished hl,twcen n.tfected commands nt t.he earliest oppot-
t.nnity. Bonnd.ari('s should he well defined nnd Hhould not bisect
swamps, dense forests, mountnin ridges, or other key terrain features
used by guerrilla elemt>nts for ea.mps, headqunrt.ers, or bases. Sim-
ilal'iy, well-defined bounduries should be used to divide urbun areas
to immre complete coverage.
i. Terrain and the dispositions and tactics of guerrilla forces fur-
Hish excellent opportunity for the employment. of chemical and
biological agents and riot control agents. Operations against inegu-
Jar forces should evaluate t.he feasibility of chemical and biological
operations to assist in mission accomplishment.
13. Planning Factors
rt. Planning for operations against irregular forces requires a de-
tailed analysis of the area concerned and its population. Close u.tten-
tion is given to both the civil (political, economic, social) and the mili-
tary situations
15
b. The following specific factors are considered in the commander's
estimate:
16.
( 1) The motivation and loyalties of various segments of the
population, identification of hostile and friendly elements,
vulnerability of friendly or potentially friendly elements to
coercion by terror tactics, and susceptibility to enemy and
friendly. propaganda. Particular attention is given to the
following:
(a) Farmers and other rural dwellers.
(b) Criminal and tough elements.
(c) Adherents to the political philosophy of the irregular force
or to similar philosophies.
(d) Former members of armed forces.
(e) Existence of strong personalities capable of organizing an
irregular force and their activities.
(2) The existing policies and directives regarding legal status and
treatment of civil population and irregular force members.
(3) The terrain and weather to include-
(a) The suitability of terrain and road and trail net for both
irregular force and friendly force operations.
(b) The location of all possible hideout areas for guerrillas.
(c) The location of possible drop zones and fields suitable for
the operation of aircraft used in support of guerrilla units.
( 4) The resources available to the irregular force, including-
( a) The capability of the area to furnish food.
(b) The capability of friendly forces to control the harvest,
storage, and distribution of food.
(c) The availability of water and fuels.
(d) The availability of arms, ammunition, demolition mnte-
rials, and other supplies.
( 5) Irregular force relations with any external sponsoring power,
including-
( a) Direction and coordination of irregular activities.
(b) Communication with the irregular force.
(c) Capability to deliver organizers and supplies by air, sen,
and land.
(6) The extent of irregular force activities and the force organ-
ization to include-
(a) Their origin and development.
(b) Their strength and morale.
(c) The personality of the leaders.
(d) Relations with the civil population.
(e) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.
(f) Status of equipment and supplies.
(g) Status of training.
. ...
I.'
. '
,.,I\
1 ...._
i
{(
. {
(h) gffectiveness of communications.
( i) gffectiveness of intelligence, including- cotmterintelliA"Cnce.
(7) The size and composition of :forces available for counter-
operations to include-
( a) Own forces.
(b) Other military units within the urea.
( Civil police, paramilitary units, and self-rleflnse unitR.
{8) The communication facilities available to :dlow effective con-
trol of forces engaged in counteroperations.
Section Ill. PROPAGANDA AND CIVIC ACTION
14. Propaganda
a. Propaganda is planned and employed in t.lw campaign to achieve
the following immediate goals:
( 1) Divide, disorganize, and induce defection of itregulnr force
members .
(2) Reduce or eliminate civilian support of guPrrill:t elpments.
(:l) civilians from participating in eo,ert. aeti,iti('s on
t.he side of the irregular force.
( 4) 'Vin the act.ivesupport of noncommitt.ed civilians.
( o) Preserve and strengthen the support of friendly civiJi:ms.
(6) Win popular approval of the local presence of friendly mili-
tary forces.
( 7) < >bt.ai n national unity or disunit.y as desi r(.ld.
b. Propaganda activities uimed u.t achieving the immediate goals
cited above must, as n minimum, be in consonance with {'Itch of tlw
desit(.ld gonls, and should contribute tot lwir
aU.ai nm{'nt.
r.. Fot pnrpos{'S of planning and directing the progmm,
t lw populat.ion iR divided into fi.ve nudi('nC('R. :u-e-
(L) Otterrill:tttnit.s.
( 2) { T ndcrground elements.
(:l) Those civilians who provide information, suppliN;, refugP,
rmd other assistance to the guerrilln.s and the underground.
( 4) The noncommitted civil populat.ion.
( 5) Friendly elements of the civil population.
d. Propaganda themes are based on the recogni1:able aspects of
friendly economic and political programs and on potentially divisive
characteristics of hostile target audiences. Possible di \isive factors
:tre-
( 1) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among
elements of the irregular force.
(2) Rivalries between irregular force leaders.
(3) Danger of betrayal.
C:){)lJ302 -Gt--3
17
' ; \ :
( 4) Harsh living conditions of guerrilla elements.
( 5) Scarcity of arms and supplies.
( 6) tielfish motivation of opportunists and apparent supporters
of the resistance movement.
e. Troop units of the TOE 33-series should be included in the
friendly force structure on a selective basis. (See FM 33-5, Psycho-
logical 'Varfare Operations.)
15. Civic Adion
a. Civic action is any action performed by the military force
utilizing military manpower and material resources in cooperation
with civil authorities, agencies, or groups, which is designed to secure
the economic or social betterment of the civilian community. Civic
action can be a major contributing factor to the development of favor-
able public opinion and in accomplishing the defeat of the irregular.
Military commanders are encouraged to participate in -local
civic action projects wherever such participation does not :seriously
detract from accomplishment of their primary mission. :(See. EM
41-5, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government, and FM
41-10, Civil Affairs/Military Government Operations.). . t:. .. :
b. Civic action can include assistance to the local as
construction or rehabilitation of transportation and
means, schools, hospitals, and churches; assisting in agricultural.im;.
provement programs, crop planting, harvesting, or processing; and
furnishing emergency food, clothing, and medical aid as in periods. of
natural disaster. . r
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c. Civic action progTams are often designed to employ the
number of civilians until suitable economy is 'fhe
energies of civilians should be directed into constructive and
toward ends which support the purpose of the campaign. . U nemplo"ed
and discontented masses of people, lacking the bare necessities of. life,
are a constant hindrance and may preclude successful accomplishment
of the mission.
d. Civic action is an instrument for fostering active civilian opposi-
tion to the irregular force and active participation in and support of
operations. The processes for achieving an awareness in civilian
populations of their obligation to support stated aims should begin
early. Commanders should clearly indicate that civil assistance by
the military unit is not simply a gift but is also action calculated to
enhance the civilians' ability to support the government.
e. Civil affairs units of the TOE 41-series are employed to assist in
the conduct of civic action projects and in the discharge of civil
responsibilities.
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Section IV. POLICE OPERATIONS
16. General
Commanders and troops wi1lusua1Jy be required to deal with local
ei,rii authorities and indigenous milit:try personnel. 'Vhen the local
eivil government is in('ff('ct.ive, the military commander may play a
major role in keeping order.
a. The activities and movPments of the civil population are re-
st.ricted and controJled. as necessary, to maintain law and order and to
prevent a guerrilla force from mingling with and receiving support.
from t.he civil population. When the military commander is not
a.uthotized t.o <>X<'rcise dinct. control of eiYilians. he must take every
legitimu.te action to infhHnee the appropriate authorities to institute
nece.qgary men.sures. Poliee-type operations may he conducted hy
either military or civil forces or a. combination of both.
b. Restrictive measures are limited to those which are absolutely
essential and can be enforced. Every effort is made to gain the willing
cooperation of the local population to comply with controls and re-
strictions. However, pst.ablished measures are enforced firmly and
justly. Free movement of civilians is normally confined to their local
communities. Exceptions should be made to permit securing food,
att-endance at public worship, and necessary tra,el in the event of
illness.
o. Punishment of civilians, when authorized, must be used with
realistic discretion. If the people become frustrated and alienated as
a rc.'lult of unjust punishment, the purpose is defeated. Care is taken
t.o punish the true offender, since subversive acts are often committed
to provoke unjust retaliation against individuals or communities
cooperating with friendly forces.
d. Police operations employ roadblocks and patrol, search and
seizure, surveillance, and apprehension techniques. Tho following
list is representative of the police-t.ype controls and restrictions which
may be necessary.
( 1) Prevention of illegal political meetings ot rallies.
(2) Registration and documentation of all civilians.
(3) Inspection of individual identification documents, permits.
and pusses.
( 4) Restrictions on public and private transpottat.ion and com-
munication means.
(5) Curfew.
(6) Censorship.
(7) Controls on the production, storage, and distribution of
foodstuffs and protection of food-producing areas.
(8) Controlled possession of arms, ammunition, demolitionR,
drugs, medicines, and money.
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e. Patrolling is conducted to maintain surveillance of urban and
rural areas, both night and day. Foot patrols are similar to normal
police patrols, but are usually larger. :Motor patrols are nsed to
conserve troops and to afford speed in reacting to incidents. Aircraft
are employed to maintain overall surveillance and to move patrols
rapidly. Improvised landing pads such as roofs of buildings, parks,
vacant lots, and streets are used. A patrol is a show of force and must
always reflect high standards of precision and disciplined bearing.
Its actions are rigidly controlled to preclude unfavorable incidents.
f. Surveillance of persons and places is accomplished, both night
and day, by using a combination of the techniques employed by mili-
tary and civil police and counterintelligence agencies. The majority
of surveillance activities are clandestine in nature and may require
more trained agent personnel than are normally assigned or attached
to army units. Surveillance operations must be highly coordinated
among all participating agencies.
g. Facilities for screening civilian and interrogating suspects are
established and maintained. The requirements are similar to those
for handling refugees, line crossers, and prisoners of war. Organiza-
tion is on a team basis and normally consists of military and . civil
police, interpreter/translators, POW interrogators, and CI agents.
Each team is capable of operating at temporary locations on an area
basis to support operations against civil disturbances and large scale
search and seizure operations.
17. Roadblocks
Roadblocks are employed to control illegal possession and move-
ment of goods, to check the adequacy of other controls, and to appre-
hend members of the irregular force. . , .
a. Roadblocks are designed to halt traffic for search or to pass traffic
as desired. They are established as surprise checks because irreg\tlar
force members and their sympathizers soon devise ways of circum-
venting permanent checkpoints.
b. Teams are trained and rehearsed so as to be capable of establish-
ing roadblocks in a matter of minutes at any hour. Local officials
may _be called on for assistance, to include the use of official inter-
preters, translators, interrogators, and local women to search women
and girls. .
c. Roadblocks are established at locations which have suitable areas
for assembling people under guard and for parking vehicles. for
search. Troops are concealed at the block and along the paths and
roads leading to the block for the purpose of apprehending those
attempting to avoid the block.
d .. The inspection of and. the search of persons and ve-
hicles must be rapid and thorougp. The attitude of per-
20
forming these duties must. be impersonal and r.orred. because many
of the people sParrhed will be friendl.v or neut.rnl.
r. Tho est.ablishnwnt of roadblocks must be> coordinated. but knowl-
('dge of where and whPn must be closely controlled.
18. Search and Seizure Operations
Search and seizure operations are r.onducted to screen a built-up
arPa, apprehend irrrgulat' force members, and uncover and seize
i llega.l arms, communication means, medicines, and supplies. Search
and opemt.ions may be conducted at. any hour of night or day.
a. A sBltJ'ch and seizure opel'ation is intended to be a controlled in-
corwenicnc.e tot lw population concerned. The persons whm;e property
is searched and \\'hosl' goods are seized should he irritated and fright-
ened to such an PXtt-nt that they will neither harbor irregular force
members nor support them in the future. Convctsely, the action must
not be so harsh as to drive t.hem to collaboration with the irregular
force because of resl'ntment.
b; A built-up area to searched is divided into block square zones.
A Re:trch party is assigned to each zone and each party is divided into
three groups: a search group to conduct the search, a security group to
encitcle the urea to prevent ingress/egress, apprehend and detain per-
sons, and secme the open street areas to prevent all unauthorized
movement; and a r('serve group to assist as needed. The population
may or may not be warned to clear the streets and to remain indoors
until permission is given to leave. Force is used as needed to insure
compliance. Each head of household or business is directed to as-
semble all persons in one room nnd then t.o accompany t.he senreh pn.rt.y
to forest.n.ll charges of loot.ing or vnndn.Iism.
r. Buildings which have been sen.rched are clearly m:trked by H.
coded system to prevent. false clearances.
19. Block Control
Block control is the constant sutveillnnce und reporting of personnel
movements within a block or other small populated area by a resident
of that block or area who has been appointed and is supervised by an
appropriate authority. Because of the civil authority and lengthy
time required to establish a block control system, it is normally insti-
tuted and controlled by civil agencies. An established block control
system should be supported by the military force, and in turn, be ex-
ploited for maximum benefit.
a. Block control is established by dividing each block or like area
into zones, each of which includes all the buildings on one side of a
street within a block. A resident zone leader is appointed for each
zone, and a separate resident block leader is appointed for each block.
Heads of households and businesses in each zone are required to report
21
1. .,
all movements of people to the zone leader; to include arrivals and de-
partnrrs of their own families or neighbors, and strangers.
Zone lPaders report all movements in their zone to the block l{'ader.
The hloek leader reports daily, to an appointed authority, on 11ormal
movements; the prrsence of strangers and other unusual circum-
are reported immediately.
b. The cooperation of leaders is secured by appealing to patriotic
mot.ives, by pay, or through coercion.
c. Informant." are established separately within each block to submit
reports as a check against the appointed block and zone leaders. An
informnnt net system is est nblished using key informants for the covert
control of a number of block informants.
20. Installation and Community Security
Critical military and civil installations and key communities must
be secured against sabotage and guerrilla attack.
a. Special attention is given to the security of food supplies, arms,
ammunition, and other equipment of value to the irregular force.
Maximum use is made of natural and manmade obstacles, alarms,
illumination, electronic devices, and restricted areas.
Fields of fire ure cleared and field fortifications are constructed for
guards and other local security forces. The local security system is
supplemented by vigorous patrolling using varying schedules and
routes. Patrolling distance from the installation or community is
at least that of light mortar range. Specially trained dogs may be
used with guards and patrol::;. As a against espionage and
sabotage within installations, rigid security measures are enforced
on native labor, to include screening, identification, and supervision.
All security measures maintained on a combat bnsis, ami all per-
sonnel keep their weapons available for instant use. The routine
means of securing an installation are altered fr\quently to prevent
irregular forces from obtaining detailed accurate information about
the composition and habits of the defense.
b. The size, organization, and equipment of local security forces are
dictated by their mission, the size, composition, and eti'ectiveness of
the hostile force, and the attitude of the eivil population. Security
detachments in remote areas normally are larger than those close to
supporting forces. Patrol requirements also influence the size of
security detachments. Hemote detachments maintain a supply level
to meet the contingency of isolation from their base for long periods
and should be independent of the local population for supply. Bal-
anced against the desirability for self-sufficient detachments is the
certainty that well-stocked remote outposts will be considered as
prime targets for guerrilla forces as a source of arms and ammuni-
22
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1
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tion. Reliable communications between the responsible headquarters
and seeurit.y detachments are essential.
r. Ont.lying installations arc organizrd and prrpared for all-round
defPIISP. Ad'quatc guards and paJ.rols :trc used to prevent smprise.
PrPcaut.ions arc taken to prevent guards from being surprised nnd
o\'PrpowPrPd b'forc they c:m g-i,c t.he a.larm. Concealed and covered
approaeh<\'l to the posit ion am mined and boobyt.rapped, with due
tonsiderat.ion for safety of the civil population. Areas from which
short.-r:tngc fire can be placed on the position are eleared and mined.
PPrsonrwl arc providt'd with auxiliary exits and covered routt's from
I heir slwlters to combat. positions. Buildings used for sheltl.'l'S arc
with c.are. wooden 01' othN' light. strlldlll'PS :11'0
a voided. If t.hcy must he used, tlw walls :U'l' roinforcNi for protect.ion
aga.inst. small-a.rms fire. Supplies arc dispersed and placed in pro-
l('ctl.'d storage. Adequate is provided for communication
inst.alla.tions a.nd equipment.. Individual alertness is maintained by
frequent practice alerts which ma.y include full scale rehearsal of
defense plans. Local ci\ilians, inelndiug children, arc not permit.t.ecl
to Pnter tho defpnsivc positions. Civilian informants and observa-
tion and listening posts are <'sta.blished along routl's of approa.ch to
1 he installa.t.ions.
21. Security of Surface Lines of Communication
I ines of <ommnnieation which have proved particularly
ndnerahlc to guerrilla. attack and sabotage should he abandoned, at
)past. temporarily, if nt. all possible. Long surface lines of commu-
nication cannot be <ompll.'tl.'ly proteeted against a. determined irregu-
lar force without. eommiU ing an PXePssive numl.xw of troops. 'VIwn
a miltoad, canal. pipc>lirw. or highway llltlSt he ut.ilizPd, the following
llW:tS\lt'('S may he l'PfJUirPd.
tl. Hegul:tr ml.'asun.s arc taken to prot.ect control and
mn.intenanr> installn.t.ions. repair and maintenance crt'ws, and traiJie.
V"ttlnerable features such as major cuts in mountain passes, under-
passt's, tunnels, bridgt's, locks, pumping stations, wntet towers, power
:-,tnt.ions, and roundhouses require permanent guards or continuous
smTeillancc of approacht's. If necessary, the right.-of-wa.y of high-
ways, railroads, canals, and pipelines arc declared and posted as a.
restTicted zone. The zone includes the area, aoo meters on each side
of the right-of-way. Civilian inhabitants arc evacuated from the
zone; underbrush is cleared and woodt'd areas are thinned to permit
good visibility.
'' Frequent air and ground patrols arc made at varying times,
night and day, along the right-of-way and to the flunks, t.o discourage
trespassing and to detect mines, sabotage, and hostile movements.
23
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Armored vehicles, aircraft, and armored railroad cars are used by
patrols when appropriate.
e. Lone vehicles, trains, and convoys which cannot provide their
own security are grouped if practicable and are escorted through
danger areas by armed security detachments. All traffic is controlled
and reported from station to station.
22. Apprehended Irregular Force Members
a. Operations a g a i n ~ irregular forces may generate sizable groups
of prisoners which can create serious problems for both the military
force and civil administration. Large numbers of confined personnel
can generate further political, social, and economic difficulties. There-
fore, the evaluation and disposition of prisoners must contribute to
the ultimate objective.
b. When irregular force members defect or surrender voluntarily,
they have indicated that their attitudes and beliefs have changed, at
least in part, and that they will no longer participate in irregular
activities.
( 1) Confinement should be temporary, only for screening and
processing, and be separate from prisoners who have not ex-
hibited a change in attitude.
(2) Promises made to induce defection or surrender must be met.
(8) Postrelease supervision is essential but need not be stringent.
( 4) Relocation may be required to prevent reprisal from former
comrades.
c. When irregular force members are captured, they can be expected
to retain the attitude which prompted their participation in irregular
activities.
24
( 1) Confinement is required and may continue for an extended
period.
(2) Prisoners against whom specific crimes can be charged should
be brought to justice immediately. Charges of crimes against
persons, such as murder, should be made, if possible, rather
than charges of crimes directly affiliated with the resistance
movement which may result in martyrdom and serve as a
rallying point for increased irregular activity.
( 8) Prisoners charged only with being a member of the irregular
force will require intensive reeducation and reorientation
while confined. In time, consistent with security, those who
have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate may be con-
sidered for release under parole. Relocation away from pre-
vious comrades may be necessary and provision of a means
for earning a living must be considered.
(4) Families of prisoners may have no means of support and a
program should be initiated to care for them, educate them
..
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in the advantages of law and order, and enlist their aid
in reshaping the attitudes and beliefs of their confined family
members.
Section V. COMBAT OPERATIONS
23. General
a. Combat operations are employed primarily against the guerrilla.
elements of an irregular force. However, underground elements some-
times attempt to incite large-scale organized riots to seize nnd hohl
areas in cities and large towns; combat operations are usually required
to quell such uprisings.
b. Combat tactics used against guerrillas are designed to seize the
initiative and to ultimately destroy the guerrilla force. Defensive
measures alone result in an ever-increasing commitment and dissipa-
tion of forces and give the guerrillas an opportunity to unify, train,
and develop communications and logistical support. A defensive
attitude also permits the guerrillas to concentrate superior forces,
inflict severe casualties, and lower morale. However, the deliberate
use of a defensive attitude in a local area as a deceptive measure may
prove effective .
. c. Constant pressure is maintained against guerrilla elements by
vigorous combat patrolling and continuing attack until they are elimi-
nated. This keeps the guerrillas on the move, disrupts their security
and organization, separates them from their sources of support,
weakens them physically, destroys their morale, and denies them the
opportunity to conduct operations. Once contact is made with a
guerrilla unit, it is maintained mttil that guerrilla unit is destroyed.
d. Surprise is sought in a11 operations, but against well-organized
guerrillas it is difficult to achieve. Surprise may be gained by attack-
ing at night, or in bad weather, or in difficult terrain; by employing
small units; by varying operations in important particulars; and by
unorthodox or unusual operations. Counterintelligence measures
are exercised throughout planning, preparation, and execution of
operations to prevent the guerrillas from learning the nature and
scope of plans in advance. Lower echelons, upon receiving orders, are
careful not to alter their dispositions and daily habits too suddenly.
Tactical cover and deception plans are exposed to guerrilla intelligence
to deceive the guerrillas as to the purpose of necessary preparations
and movements.
e. The military force attacks targets such as guerrilla groups, camps,
lines of communication, and supply sources. Unlike normal combat
operations, the capture of ground contributes little to the attainment
of the objective since, upon departure of friendly forces, the guerrillas
will reform in the same area. Specific objectives are sought that
25
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will force the guerrillas to concentrate defensively in unfavorable
terrain, and that will facilitate the surrender, capture, or death of
t.Iw maximum number of guerrillas.
f. Those guerrilla elements willing t.o fight. in open battle are iso-
lated to prevent escape and immediately attacked. <tuerrilla elements
whieh avoid open battle are forced into areas which permit contain-
ment. Once fixed in place, they are attacked and destroyed. Consid-
Pration should be gi\'en to the employment of chemical agents to assist
in these actions.
y. 'Vht>n the guerrilla. area is too laq,rc to be elc.arcd simultaneously,
it. is divided into snbarens which are dcarcd individually in turn.
This technique requires the scaling off of the subarea in which the main
(ffort. is concentrated to prevent escape of 6"llerrilla groups. Once a
subutca is elearcd, the mu.in combat force moves to the next subarea
and tepeu.ts the process. Sufficient forces remain in the cleared area to
pre.vcnt t.lte development of new guerrilla brroups and to prevent the
infiltration of g-uerrillas from unclenred areas. Pending the concen-
t.rat.ion of a. main effort in a subarea, sufficient forces arc employed to
gain and maintain contact with guerrilla units to harass them, and to
conduct reaction operations.
24. Reaction Operations
a. Reaction operntions are those operations conducted by mobile
combat units, operating from static security posts and combat bases,
for the purpose of reacting to local guerrilla activities. 'Vhcn a guer-
rilla. unit is located, the reaction force deploys rapidly to engage the
gttel'rilb unit., disrupt. its cohesion, and destroy it by capturing or kill-
ing its members. If the guerrillu, force cannot he contained and de-
stroyed, contact is maintained, reinforcements are dispatehed if
needed, and the guerrillas are pursued. Flnnk elements seek to en-
n ~ J o p and ('ttt off t.lw 1-etreuting guerrillas. The g-uerrillas should be
prevented ftom reaching populated areas whel'C they can lose t.heir
identity among the people, and from disbanding and disappearing by
hiding and infiltration. When escape routes have been effectively
bloeked, the attack is continued to destroy the guerrilla force. The
mobility required to envelop and block is provided by ground and air
vehicles and by rapid foot movement.
b. Reaction operations nre simple, preplanned, and rehearsed be-
cause the majority of actions will be required at night. To gain this
end the area and possible targets for guerrilla attack must be known in
detail. Common targets include desolate stretches and important
junctions of roads and railroads, defiles, bridges, homes of important
persons, military and police installations, government buildings, pub-
lic utilities, public gathering places, and commercial establishments.
Primary and alternate points are predesignated for the release of re-
26
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I
action forces from centralized control to facilitate movement against
multiple targets. Such points are reconnoitered and are photographed
for use in planning and in briefing. vVithin security limitations, ac
tual release points are used during rehearsals to promote completo
familiarity with the area.
25. Harassing Operations
a. Harassing operations prevent guerrillas from resting and re-
grouping, inflict casualties, and gain detailed knowledge of the
They nre executed by extended combat patrols and larger combat units.
Specific harassing missions include-reconnaissance to locate guerrilla
units n.nd camps; raids against guerrilla camps, supply installations,
patrols, and outposts; ambushes; marketing targets; assisting major
combat forces sent to destroy guerrilla groups; and mining guerrilla
routes of communication.
b. Harassing operations are conducted night and day. Operations
at night are directed at guerrillas moving about on tactical and ad-
ministrative missions. Operations during the day are directed at
guerrillas in their encampments while resting, regrouping, or training.
26. Denial Operations
a. Operations to deny guerrilla elements contact with, and support
by an external sponsoring power, are initiated simultaneously with
other measures. Denial operations require effective measures to secure
extensive border or seacoast areas and to preclude communications and
supply operations between a sponsoring power and hruerrilla. units.
b. The method of contact and delivery of personnel, supplies, and
equipment whether by air, water, or land must be determined at the
earliest possible time. Border areas ure secured by employing border
control static security posts, reaction forces, ground and aerial
observers, listening posts equipped with electronic and patrols.
When time and resources permit, wire and other obstacles, minefields,
cleared areas, illumination, and extensive informant nets are estab-
lished throughout the border area. Radio direction finding and jam-
ming, and N u vy or Air Force interdiction or blockade elements may he
required.
27. Elimination Operations
a. Elimination operations are desib"'led to destroy definitely located
guerrilla forces. A force much larger than the guerrilla force is
usually required. The subarea commander is normally designated
as overall commander for the operation. The plan for the operation
is carefully prepared, and the troops are thoroughly briefed and
rehearsed. Approaches to the guerrilla area are carefully recon-
noitered. Deception operations are conducted to prevent premature
disclosure of the operation.
27
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b. The encirclement. of guerrilla forces is usually the most etl'ect.ive
wa.y to fix them in position so as to permit their complete destruction.
28
( 1) If terrain or inadequate forces preclude the etfective encircle-
ment of the pntim held area. then the most im-
port-:wt part of tho area is encircled. The encirclement is
made in depth with adequate l'PSet'vcs and supporting Ple-
nwnts to meet. possible g-uerrilla attack in force and to block
all avenues of PS(':tpe.
(2) The planning-, preparation, and PXecution of the operation
are aimed at. sudden, complPt.c encirclement. that will tohtlly
surprise t.lw gnenillas. The move into position nnd the
(Aflcirclement is normally accomplished at night to permit
maximum seeurity and surprise. The encirclement. should
be completed by daybteak t.o permit good visibility for the
remainder of the opPration.
(3) Support n.nd reserve units are committed as required t.o in-
sure sufficient densif'.y and depth of troops nnd t.o establish
and maintain contact. between units. Speed is emphashmd
throughout the t-arly phases of the ndvnnce to the line of en-
citclement.. Upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units
occupy defensi ,.e positions. The most critical period in tho
operation is the oeeupat.ion of the line of encirclement, espe-
cially if the opemtion is at night. Large guerrilla formations
may be expe<ted to react violently upon disronring that
they h:we be(n <ncircled. The gttelTiiJas will probe fot gaps
nnd attack weak points to force :t gnp. Escape mutes may be
deliberately e.stahlished as ambushes.
( 4) Units organizing the line of encirclement. deploy strong
patrols to their front.. Air reconnniRsance is used to supple-
ment reconnaissance. Reserves are committed if
guerrilla. forr_.es sueceed in breaking through or infiltrating
the line of enci rclcment..
( 5) Once the encirclement is firmly estn.blished, the elimination
of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and
thoroughly. A carefully controlled contraction of the perim-
eter is begun, which may be conducted in any one of three
ways:
(a) By a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the
encirclement.
(b) lly driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide
the area, followed by the destruction of the guerrillas in
each subarea.
(c) lly establishing a holding force on one or more sides of the
perimeter and tightening the others against them.
( 6) During any of the foregoing maneuvers the units that
advance from the initial line of encirclement must be inl-
prcssed with the necessity of thoroug-hly combin!! Pver.'
possible hiding place for guerrilla personnel and equipment.
echelons comb all the terrain again. Areas t ha 1
appear t-otally inaccessible, tiUCh as swamps or marshes,
bn thoroughly searched. Guerrilla ruses discovered durin!!
the operation are reported promptly to all participating-
units and agencies. All local individuals, including men,
women, and children, found in the area. are held in custody
and are released only after identification and on orders from
appropriate authority.
c. Luck of time, inadequate forces, or the tcnain may prevent
encirclement operations. Surprise attacks followed by aggressive
pursuit may prove successful in these cases. The position, probable
escape routes, and strength of the guerrilla forces must be ascertained
before launching the operation. Ambushes should be cstablislll'd
early on possible escape routes. Patrolling should be. conducted
in a manner designed to confuse the guerrillas as to specific plans or
intentions. Chances of achieving surprise are increased by using
airmobile or airborne forces, and by inducing trustworthy local gui<h-s
who are thoroughly familiar with the terrain and guerrilla disposition
to collaborate and guide the attacking force over concealed routes.
d. After a successful attack on a guerrilla formation, the arPa is
combed for concealed guerril1a personnel an<l equipment.
and records are collected for intcl1igence analysis. Ambu::;hes a ro
retained along trails in the area for extended pPri()(}:.; to kill or capt uro
Pscapces and stragglers from the gucrri lla foreP.
28. Combat in Urban Areas
a. Underground elements in cities and towns often incite orgmtized
rioting, seize block wide areas, erect street hanicudcsl and resist any
attempts to enter the area. Nonparticipants eaught in the arPa are
usually held as hostages. The objectives of theso operations arc to
commit the countering force to actions against the civil population
which will result in a gain of sympathizers for the irrc:.,Tttlar force and
make it appear that the irregular force is promoting a popular causP.
b. vVhen an urban area has been seized it must be reduced as soon as
possible to prevent un apparent success or victory by the irregular
force, to maintain popular support for the friendly cause, and to free
troops for usc elsewhere. The operations required to reduce it
ble normal street and house-to-house fighting. The following tactics
arc employed:
29 ..
30
( 1) A cordon is established to suiTound and seal the barricaded
area. The cordon is established at the next street or road,
out from the barricaded area, which offers good visibility,
tields of fire, and ease of movement. All unauthori1..ed per-
sonnel are cleared from the intervening area. The cordon
controls n.ll movements into and out of the encircled area.
(2) Announcement is made to the insurgents by such means as
loudspeakers and leaflets, that the n.rea will be attacked
at a given time unless they lay down their arms, return
their hostages safely, and surrender peacefully. Amnesty
and protection may be offered to those who surrender prior
to the attack.
(8) Maneuver and fire elements attack at the stated time and
clear the area as rapidly as possible, with a minimum of
killing and destruction of property. The cordon remains
in place to maintain security, support the attack by fire where
possible, and receive prisoners and rescued hostages from
the attacking elements.
( 4:) If the area is large it is divided into sectors for control pur-
poses. As each sector is cleared, the cordon moves in to
exclude it; close surveillance of cleared areas is maintained
in case underground passageways are used as escape routes.
Succeeding sectors are attacked and cleared one at a time
(fig.4:).
Cordon and screening posts; one block out.
Crosshatch is barricaded area.
lettered subsectors are reduced in turn.
High buildings (1 and 2) are seized first.
Jt'igurr, 4. Urtlucing barricaclctl 1 t r b a 1 ~ arr,a.
31
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CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMEN.T OF FORCES
29. General
rr.. The opmationnJ area, military forees, civil forces, and the popu-
lation must. be organized to pmvide-
( l) Military or civil area administration.
( 2) St.n.t.ic security posts and combat bases.
( 3) Security detachments fot protecting ctitical mil ita.ry and
civil instu.lla.t.ions, essential routes of comnnmieation, and
key communities.
(4) Tusk forces for conducting police operations against. umlN-
ground elements.
(5) Task forces for conducting combat. operations against.
rilln, elements.
(G) Civil self-defense units for individual villagt.s and
small towns.
b. The operational area. is subdi vidl'<.l int.o geographie scetors, or
sectors coinciding with internal polit.ical :mbdivisions. Spl'citic sec-
tor rpsponsibility for administ.rat.ion ttnd loc1tl operations should he
atTang-<d fo1 dt'lt.gal ion to a. .siugle authority-eithet military or civil.
c. Static security posts ar<' Pst.ablished t.o protect insta1lat.ions, ront.es
of communication, and eommunit ies: maintain cont.ml in rural
and as hases for local renet.ion operations. No att.em pt. is tnnde to
cordon or <'.over an area wit.h strong points ns this immobilizes forces,
surrenders the initiative to the irregular fotce, and invit<s defeat
in detail. Static security posts are organized to be as sel f-suflieient
as possible, reducing dependence on vulnel'ltble laud routes of
commun icu.tion.
d. Combat buses are established as needed to facilitate administra-
tion and support of company and battalion-size eombat units. Com-
bat bases are located within ot are immediately adjacent to the units'
area of operations and are placed within t'stablished static security
posts when practicable. A combat base is moved as often us is neces-
s:uy to temain within effective striking range of guerrill:t elerrwnts.
Air and ground vehicles are employed extensively for deployment :t11d
support of troops to reduce the number of required combat bases.
e. All static security posts and combat bases are :ts both
tactical and administrative entities to facilitate local security, ra.pid
assembly, administration, and discipline.
l
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30. Military Forces
a. The initinl force assigned to combat ~ n hregular force mnst be
adequate to complete their elimination. Initial assignment of insuf-
ficient forces may ultimately require use of a larger force than would
have been required originally. The size and composition of the forre
will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the civilian atti-
tude, and the hostile irregular force. Historically, required forces
have ranged from a company to a large field army. Organization will
usually require the forming of battalion or battle group size task
forces which will be given an area responsibility (fig. 5).
I
~
Q & HQ
I
[@]
r
EB
I I
I I
~ 6
Combat
Support
I I
0
[iJ
105mm How
Augmentation Teams
Intelligence
(CIC, FOI, IPW)
Armored
Carrier
Psychological Warfare
(loudspeaker, leaflet, radio,
news, and press)
Civil Affairs
Signal
Aerial Resupply
Military Police Det
, . .., ...
I
ciJ
Truck
I

I I
Composite
Flgure 5. T1Jpe ta1k fMce organization ( llattalion or battle or_oup).
33
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b. Infantry, armored c:tvalry, and airborne units are the TOE units
hest suited for combat against guerrillas. IIowen:-r, many other mili-
tary unit.s, when rccquippPd a11d rcttained, can bP PlllployPd l'lil'l'Lively.
r. In war situations, combat units wit.hdLawn from the line
for rt'st. and rehabilit:ttion, ot frrsh units preparing for commitment
should not be assigned a eounterirregular force mis;;;ion except in
l'tnergenctes.
rl. ,A mobile force is based at each static security posr and combat
base which is capable of rapidly engaging reported hostile elements
ot tPinforcing- ot.her frit.ndly forces. This force, called a ''reaction
forep," rang<'s in from a. 1'<\inforced platoon to a l'<'infmrPd com-
pany :lllcl is capable of rapid movement by foot, t.nwk. or aircraft.
'' The PXtt'nsive use of patrols is to assist. in local S('curity
of inst.n.llations and to locate and keep the it'l'('g'Uiar force on the
defensive.
( 1) Patrols are used in urban and rural tuens to augment. or re-
phwe civil police and their functions. These patrols may
vary from two men to a squad in size. :Military police units
are ideally suited for employment in such n role and light
combat units are quite capable of performing the same func
4
t.ions with I itt.le additional training.
(2) Hrgular rombat. patrols are formed and employed in a con-
manner and for harassing operations in areas of
extensive guerrilla activity.
(3) combat patrols are employed in difficult terrain
some distance from static security posts and combat bases.
a.re notmaiJy delivered into the objective area by air-
craft. combat patrols must be capable of
ing- g-uerrilla. tactics and remaining committed from 1 to 2
weeks, being supplied by air for the period of commitment,
and equipped to communicate wit.h base. aircraft, nnrl :tdja-
eent patrols. Such pat.rols may vury from squad to company
in size and have the mission of conductiug harassing opera-
tions and making pln.rmed senrches of the ruea so that it. leaves
no secure :ueas in which guerrillu. forces can rest, r('orgnnize,
and tru.in. The effectiveness of an extended combat patrol
mu.y be increased immeasurably by appropriate civilian u.ug-
mentation to include local guides, trackers, and representa-
t.ives of the civil police or constabulary.
31. Civil Forces and Local Individuals
a. To minimize the requirement for military units, maximum assist-
ance is sought from, and use is made of civil police, paramilitary units,
and local individuals who t\re sympathetic to the friendly e:mse. The
use and control of such forces is predicated upon national and local
34
policy agreements and suitable to satisfy l'l'quire-
ments. Carrful Pvaluation is made of their <':tpabilitit-s and limita-
as to rPa I izc t hPi r full Ptl'ect ivPJH'S:'l.
b. \Vltcn policy and the permit, local individuals of both
sexes who had experience or training ns soldiers, police, or guer-
rillas, should lm organized into auxiliary police, and village srlf-de-
fense Those without such PxperiPnce may be employed indi-
vidually as laborers, informants, propaganda agrnts, guards, guides
and trackers, interpreters and translators.
r:. Civil forces will usually require assistance and support by the
military force. Assistance is normally required in an advisory capac-
ity for organization, training, and the planning of operations. Sup-
port is normally required in supplying arms, ammunition, food, trans-
portation, and communication equipment.
d. Local and regional police are employed primarily to assist in
establishing and maintaining order in urban areas. Local police are
most effective in areas which are densely populated.
e. The local defense of communities against guerrilla raids for sup-
plies and terroristic attack may be accomplished in whole, or in part,
by organizing, equipping, and training self-defense units. Self-de-
fense units are formed from the local inhabitants and organiza.t.ion is
based on villages, counties, and provinces. A self-defense unit must bo
capable of repelling guerrilla attack or immediate reinforcement must
be available to preeludc loss of supplic."l and ectuipmcnt. to guerrillas.
f. Gendarmerie or other national paramilitary are particularly
effective in the establishment and maintenance of order in rural and
remote areas. Because of their organization, training, and ectuipmcnt,
they may :dl-:>o be employed in small scale combat operations.
g. Friendly guerrilla units that have operated in the same a. rea ns
the hostile guerrilla units arc usually willing to as:-;ist in the counter-
guerrilla Ptl'ort. Stt<'h units may be eH'ectivPiy t>mployed in extended
combat patrol h:uassing missions. In addition, lllembers of friendly
guerrilla. units ean serve :t!:i traekers, guide:-;, interpreters, translators,
and espionage agents, and can man observation posts ami warning sta-
tions. 'Vhen friendly guerrilla units arc Pmployed, they must be sup-
ported logistieally and should he subordinate to the military force
commander who maintains control and communication by furnishing
a. liaison party to remain with the friendly guerrilla force, and hy con-
trolling the furnished. Special forces operational detach-
ments are ideally suited for this purpose.
35
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CHAPTER 4
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Section I. INTELLIGENCE
32. General
a. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is mandatory for Rnc-
eessful operations against irregular forces. The irregular force is
normally ever changing, compttrtmented, and difficult to identify, and
it usually conducts extremely effective int.elligence and counterintel-
ligence programs. In consequence, a larger number of intelligence
and counterintelligence personnel are often needed than would be re-
quired for normal combat operations. The nature of the enemy, the
tactical deployment of troops, and the presence of both friendly and
hostile civilians in the area dictate modification of normal collection
procedures.
h. Intelligence activities are characterized by extensive coordination
with, and participation in police, detection, and penetration type
operations such as-
( 1) Renrch and seizure operations.
(2) and opetating checkpoints and roadblocks.
(3) Documentation of civilians for identification with cnntr:tl
files.
( 4) Censorship.
( 5) Physical :tnd l'lect.mn ie surveillance of suspects and meet-
ing places.
(6) Maintenance of extensive dossiers.
(7) Use of funds and supplies to obtain infmmat.ion.
(8) Intensive interrogation of captured guerrillas or under-
ground suspects.
c. The conduct of intelligence operations of this nat.ure requires
an intimate knowledge of local customs, languages, back-
ground, and personalities. Indigenous police, security. military and
organizations are usually the best. avaihtble source of
personnel having this knowledge. Individual eivilian liaison per-
sonnel, interpreters, guides, truckers, and clandestine agents are
normally required. Key personnel must be trained in the pmper use
of indigenous liaison personnel and interpreters. The loyalty and
reliability of such persons must be firmly established and periodic
cheeks made to guard against their subsequent defection.
36

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d. Special effort is made to collect information that will lead to the
capture of irregular force leaders, since they play n vital part in main-
taining irregular force morale and efl'ectivcness.
f?. Only when the military forces' knowledg-e of the terrain begins to
approach that of the irregular force can it meet the g-uerrillas and the
underground on equal terms. Terrain information is eontinuously col-
lected and processed, and the resulting- intelligence is promptly dis-
seminated. Current topographic and photo maps are maintained anrl
reproduced. Terrain models are construeted and used to brief sta tl's
and troops. Military map coverage of the area will frequently he in-
adequate for small unit operations. Intelligence planning should pro-
vide for suitable substitutes such as large seale photo Par-
ticulnr effort is made to coiled in formation of-
( 1) Areas likely to serve ns guerrilla hideouts. Such arens
usually have the following dmrncteristics:
(a) Difficulty of access, us in mountains, jungll'S, or marshes.
(b) Concealment from air reconnaissance.
(c) Covered withdrawal routes.
(d) Located within 1 dais foot movement of sma1l settle-
ments that could provide food, intelligence, information,
and warning.
(e) Adequate water supply.
(f) Adjacent to lucrative targets.
(2) Roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting sus-
pected or known guerriJla areas.
(3) Roads and trails near friendly installations and lines of
communications.
( 4) Location of fords, bridges, and ferries across water barriers.
( 5) Location of all small settlements and farms in or ncar sus-
pected guerrilla areas.
(6) When force elements are known or suspected to
have contact with an external power: location of areas suit-
able for airdrop or landing zones, boat or submarine rendez-
vous, and roads and trails leading into enemy-held or neutral
countries friendly to the irrebrular force.
f. Dossiers on leaders and other key members of the irregular force
should be maintained and carefully studied. Frequently the opera-
tions of certain of these individuals develop a pattern which, if rec-
ognized, may aid materially in the conduct of operations against
them. Efforts are made to obtain rosters and organization data of
irregular force elements. The names and locations of families, rela-
tives, and friends of known members are desired. These persons :up
valuable as sources of information, and traps can be laid for other
members contacting them. In communities friendly to guerrillas,
some persons are usually engaged in collecting food and providing
37
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other aid such as furnishing drops and safe houses for gum-
rilla couriers. Every effort is made to discover nnd apprehend such
persons: howm'er, it may be preferable in cel'tain cases to delay their
an-est in order to wa.tch their activities and learn the identity of theit
contacts. It is sometimes possible to recruit these persons as inform-
ants, thereby gaining valuable information conce.n1ing the irregular
force organization and its communication system.
33. Overt Colledion
a.. A large part of the intelligence required for operntions against
i rregnlat forces is provided by intelligence personnel, troop units,
and Hpcciu.l informn.tion services assisted by civilian agencies and
i ndi vidn:tls.
b. Reconnaissance and surveillance is an indispensable part of
operations against the guerrilla. elements. Great care must be exN'-
cised, however, so that such activities do not alert the guerrillns and
warn them of planned operations. Reconnaissance missions, when-
ever possible, should be assigned to units with a. routine mission which
is habitually executed in the area and which they can eoutinue at the
same time in ordet not to arouse the suspicions of the guerrillas of
forthcoming opemtions. Extensive use is made of aerial SlllTPillance
using all types of sensors, with means for speedy exploitation of the.
interpreted results of such coverage.
c. Evcty soldier is an intelligence agent and a countel'intelligence
agency when operating against an irregular force. Each man must
he observant and alert to everything he sees and hears. He reports
anything unuslt:tl which concerns the eivil population and the ir-
1-egular force, no matter how trivial.
34. Covert Collection
Co\'Ct't. eollcct.ion menus are a. necessary source of in format ion.
g,cry effm't is made to infiltrate the irregular force with friendly
Indigenous agents are usually the only indhiduals capable
of infiltmting an irregular force. Such agents are carefully screened
to insure that they are not double agents and t.hat they will not. relate
infol'Jnation gained about friendly forces to the inegular force. The
most intensive co\ert opetntions possible must be developed consistent
with time, available means, and established policy. Agents are re-
cruited among the local residents of the opemt.ional area. They have
an intimate knowledge of the local populace, conditions, and terrain,
and often have prior knowledge of, or connections with members of
the irregular force.
35. Counterintelligence
a. In-egulnr forces depend primarily upon secrecy and surprise to
compensate for the superior combat power a vailnble to the countering
31
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military force. Since the degree of surprise achieved will depend
largely on the effectiveness of the intelligence gained by the
force, intensive effort must be made to expose, thwart, destroy, or
neutralize the irregular force inteJligence system.
b. Counterintelligence measures may include-
( 1) Background investigation of personnel in sensitive assign-
ments.
(2) Screening of civilian personnel employed by the military.
( 3) Surveillance of lmown or suspected irregular force agents.
( 4) Censorship or suspension of civil communications.
( 5) Control of civilian movement as required.
( 6) Checks on the internal security of nil installations.
(7) Indoctrination of military personnel in nll aspects of security.
(8) The apprehension and reemployment of irregular force
agents.
(9) Security classification and control of plans, orders, and re-
ports.
c. Counterintelligence operations are complicated by the degree of
reliance which must be placed on local organizations and individuals,
the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members
of the population, and political considerations which will frequently
hinder proper counterintelligence operation.
Section II. LOGISTICS
36. Supply and Maintenance
a. Supply planning lacks valid experience data for the wide variety
of environments in which these type operations may occur. Consump-
tion factors, basic loads, stockage levels, and bases of issue must he
adjusted to fit the area of operation. Simila1 factors must be devel-
oped for civil forces which may he supported in whole or part from
military stocks. The possible need for special items of material must
be taken into consideration early.
b. Local procurement should be practiced to reduce transport at ion
requirements.
c. It frequently will be necessary to establish and maintain stockage
levels of supply at echelons below those where such stockage is nor-
mally maintained. Static security posts and combat bases are ex-
amples of localities where stockage will be necessary on a continuing
basis.
d. The military force must be prepared to provide essential items
of supply to civilian victims of irregular force attack, isolated popu-
lation centers, and groups which have been relocated or concentrated
for security reasons. These supplies may initially be limited to class I
. .
39
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items and such other survival necessities as nwdical supplies. clot.hing,
constrnct.ion materials, and fuel.
e. of the distribution of indigenous s11pplies dPst.itw<l
for civilian consumption is As.'iemhly, and iss11o
of those itPms to be used by the civilian population whieh could he
used by irr<'gnlar forces must be strictly controlled. Local civilians
arc PmployPd in these functions to the maximum Pxtent possible,
but in some situations nil or part of the effort may fall on the military
agencies. Civil affairs units are organized and trained for this pnrposr.
f. Security of supply installations is mom critical than in no1nml
combat operations. Not only must supplies he consenNl for friendly
consmnpt.ion, but their use must be denied t.o irregular force elPnwnts.
Supply personnel must be trained and equipped to prot.('ct, supplies
against itregulat force attack, and guard against pilferage of sup-
plies by the civilian population.
g. Preventive maintenance should receive emphasis because the very
nature of operations precludes the use of elnbomte maintenance sup-
port. Time is required before and after each mission to effect repair
and replacement.
h. Direct support units (DSU), or elements thereof, must provide
rapid maintenance support at each static security post and combat
base. Although emphasis is upon repair by replacement (direct ex-
change), effort is made to repair items without complete o\erhanl or
rebuild. Stocknge of float items is planned to insure that only fast-
moving, hiA"h-mortality, and combat essential items n,re stocked.
1:. Emergency repair teams, elements of the DSU, are employed to
meet special requirements usually experienced in reaction and harass-
ing operations. DSU teams nccompnny the combat elements and
provide on-the-spot minor repair and limited direct exchange.
37. Transportation
a. Special transportation problems result primurily from-
(1) Abnormal distances between static secmity posts, combat
bases, and combat units operating in the field.
(2) Difficult terrain and lack of signal communications in undet-
developed areas where operations against guerrillas are apt
to occur.
(3) The probability that movements of troops and supplies will
be subject to attack, harassment, and delay.
b. Organic transportation means may require augmentation from
both military and local sources. Dependent upon the conditions under
which the command is operating, provision of adequate transportation
may require such measures as-recruiting indigenous bearer units for
man pack operations, organizing provisional animal pack units, to in-
clude the necessary logistical support, and exploitation of available
40
-
waterways and indigenous land transportation to include railway and
highway rquipment.
c. Security will normally be provided all surface movPment.s. Ap-
propriate measures include-intensive combat training of drivers and
the arming- of vehicles involved, aircraft route reconnaissance, and
provision of convoy escorts.
d. Aircraft will frequently be the most effective means of resupply
because of their speed, relative security from grmmd attack, and lack
of sensitivity to terrain conditions. Army aviation and aviation of
other services nrc utilized. The terrain, tactical situation. and landing
area availability may require employment of parachute delivery as
we11 as air-landed delivery.
38. Evacuation and Hospitalization
a. Medical service organization and procedures will require adap-
tation to the type operations envisioned. Medical support is com-
plicated by-
(1) The distances between the number of installations where
support must be provided.
(2) The use of small mobile units in independent or semi-
independent combat operations in areas through which
ground evacuation may be impossible or from which aerial
evacuation of patients cannot be accomplished.
(3) The vulnerability of ground evacuation routes to
ambush.
b. Measures that may overcome the complicating factors are-
( 1) Establishment of aid stations with a treatment and holding
capacity at lower echelons than is normal. Such echelons in-
clude static security posts and combat bases. Patients to he
evn.euutcd by ground transport will be held until movement
by n secure means is possible.
( 2) Provision of sufficient air or ground transportation to move
medical elements rapidly to establish or reinforce existing
treatment and holding installations where patients have been
unexpectedly numerous.
( :1) :Maximum utilization of air evacuation. This indudes hot h
scheduled and on-call evacuation support of statie installa-
tions and combat elements in the field.
( 4) Provision of small medical elements to support extended
combat patrols.
( 5) Assignment of specially trained enlisted medical personnel
who are capable of operating medical treatment facilities
for short periods of time with a. minimum of immediate
supervision.
( 6) Formation of indigenous litter bearer teams.
41
. I
(7) Strict supervisiOn of sanitation measures, maintenance of
individmtl medical equipment, and advanced first aid train-
ing throughout the command.
( 8) Increased emphasis on basic combat training of medical serv-
ice personnel; arming of medical service personnel; and usa
of armored carriers for ground evacuation where fe!lSible.
(9) Utilization of indigenous medic!tl resources and capabilities
when available and professionally acceptable.
39. Construction
a. The underdeveloped tmnsportation system and the difficult ter-
min conditions nol'mal to areas in which operations against inegular
forces may be conducted will frequently l'equire greater light. eon-
struction than normal combat operations by a similar size command.
b. Construction planning should pt'Ovide for-
( 1) Combat bases, static security posts and their defenses.
(2) An adequate gtound transportation system.
(3) Extensive airstrips, airfields, and helicopter pads to support
both Army aviation and aviation of other services.
( 4) Essential construction of resettlement areas.
( 5) Required support to the local population in civic action proj-
ects.
c. The scope of the construction effort requires maximum exploita-
tion of local labor and materiel resources. Combat units also may be
required to participate in the construction of both for their
own use and for use by the local population.
Section Ill. SIGNAL COMMUNICATION
40. General
a. The extreme dispersion of units in operations against irregular
forces places u, strain on communications means throughout u. com-
mand. The distances t.o be covered are greater than the normal area
communication responsibility. Augmentatiou by signal and
equipment am invariably required to answer basic needs.
b. Radio communication is the primary means, and radio nets are
established between all echelons and as needed between military and
civil agencies. Ground-air radio communication is established for
a.ll airborne, airmobile, and air-supported ground operations.
c. Radio relay and retransmission stations are often required. Air-
ctuft ma.y be used effectively for temporary relay of radio traffic to
support a specific short-term action. Ground relay stations must be
protected against irregular force raids and sabotaJ.,TC and should be
locttted when possible in areas or installations which are already
secured so us to reduce the requirements for guards.
42
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d. \Vire communication 1s used to the maximum extent within
areas and installations. wire communication in
unsecured areas is extremely vulnerable to irregular force action
and normally will he 1mrrliable. \Vhen wire lines extend into
m1securrd areas and ha,ve to be employed, maintenance crews must
be accompanied by security guards. A widely used guerrilla tactic
is to cut lines and then booby trap the area or ambush the wire
maintt"ll:lllCe crC\V.
Visual means of communication can be employed efl'ectively
hrt \VPPn small units to sHpplt'HH'nt radio communication :mel for
ground-to-air and marking. The use of flags, lights. smoke,
pyrotechnics, heliographs, and panels finds considerable application
in such operaJions.
f . .l\Iessenger service between installations or units is limited to
air messenger service and motor messengers who travel with security
guards or armed convoys. Individual messengers are prime targets
for irregular force attack.
g. Police, public, and commercial facilities, and private radio sta-
tions and operators are utilized when possible within policy :mel
security requirements.
h. Pigeons may be used to ba<."k up electrical means of communica-
tion and as a primary means by isolated individuals such as intelli-
gence agents.
41. Communication Equipment
a. Additional radios are required in most situations to meet basic
communication requirements. H is seldom that additional telephone.
teletype, or facsimile means wilJ be needed.
b. Additional requirements for equipment are determined based
on the distances between units, tmrain, and the operations plan as
follows:
(1) Short-range, portable FM radios for ground-to-ground and
ground-to-Army aircraft communications.
(2) range, portable and mobile AM radios for ground-
to-ground communication.
(H) Short-range, portable radios for ground-to-Air
Force or Navy aircraft communication.
( 4) Appropriate radio relay stations.
(5) Signaling flags and lights.
( 6) Panel sets for ground-to-air signaling and marking.
42. Communication Procedures
a. Irregular forces normally possess neither the sophisticated equip-
ment nor the training required to conduct communication intelligence
operations or electronic countermeasures. Nonetheless, normal com-
43
municat.ion security precautions must. be practiced since an irrt"guiar
force must he credited with the eapabilit.y of tapping wire circuits,
monitoring radio transmissions, and receiving information from a
sponsoring power or a conventional >nemy force that can conduct.
communicat.ion intelligence operations.
b. All conunnnication facilities are considered important bugets
by irregular fmces nnrl must be protected from sabotage or guerri ll:t
attack, hot.h from within n.nd without..
43. Electronic Countermeasures
wpll-developed irregular forcafi normally depend on radio
communieu.tion for communicating with a power and for
eontml and eoordinntion bet\\'een major elenwnt.s. ln addition, mdios
and radar LeaeollH mu.y be employed Ly un irregular force to communi-
cate wit.lt and to guide resupply nitcmft, boats, und submarines. Max-
imum etf01t is made to: Intercept transmissions for communication
intelligence purposes, locate irregular force elements by direction
finding, deceive or mislead by false tmnsmissions, locate rendezvous
points and drop or landing zones used for resupply missions, or jam
their radio transmissions when desirable.
Section IV. SUPPORT BY OTHER SERVICES
44. Air Force Support
a. Air Force units can assist in the conduct of operations by pre,ent-
ing air delivery of leaders, couriers, equipment, and supplies by a.
sponsoring power; by aerial resupply and other logistic support func-
tion:;; by deli v<'ring airborne fmces to gain tactical surprise; and by
conducting dose air support., interdiction, nir defense, and tactical nit
reconnaissance. us required.
b. ( 'lost ail' support and lltu.y be difficult to provide
and of little vn.lue because of the guerrilla capability for disper'Sion,
etl'eet.i ve <:unouflage, moving and fighting at night, and his tactics of
clinging to his enemy or of mingling with the populace. Satisfactory
results can be aehieved, however, when air support can react promptly
and attack observed guerilla elements under the guidance of forward
ail' controllers, either on the ground or airborne over the objective
area.
c. 'Veil developed guerrilla forces may have a limited air defense
capability which when carefully concealed and moved often, can re-
duce t.he effectiveness of air supp01't. Another possible capability of
gu(>.rrillas is the use of deceptive radio navigation transmitters or other
deception measures to misdirect aircraft. Because of such possibilities,
intelligence reports are carefully screened for indications of chanws
in guerrilla. capabilities.
44
-
.
45. Navy and Marine Support
a. Na ny Fo,rt'S. Navy forces can assist in operations ngninst ir-
n.gular forcP:-; by disrupting such irregular force supply channels as
arc maintainPd by coastal craft: by providing sea transport for rapid
concentration of ground forces when opportunities are presented to
attack gllC'ITi lla formations in areas contiguous to the sea; by shore
bombardment to assist ground operations in areas adjacent to the sea:
and by preventing the seaward escape of irregular force elements.
Navy forces ean also provide seaborne resupply and other logistic
support functions.
b. ill nPinc Forces. Marine forces can assist in operations against
irregular forces by conducting operations both on the ground and in
the air in a mamwr similar to both Army and Air I ~ .. orcc forces.
45
. , j
.:-1
CHAPTER 5
TRAINING
46. General
a. All troops committed to operations ag-ainst irregular forces must
be trained to appreeiate the effectiveness of irregular forces and the
active and passive measures to be employed. Troops must be indoc-
t rinat p<{ never to undPtTate guerrillas. To look down on guerrilla
forces as infcriot\ poorly Pquipped opponents breeds c.arclessness
which can n'sttlt in spverc
b. Training for operations against incgulat forces is integrated
into field PX.'rciscs au<lmamuv.'l'S as well as in individual and small
unit. training progmms. Aggressor fore' t n.ctics in training exercises
should inelude irrrgular activities, both covett and overt. Normn.l
individual and small unit t mining should f'mphasizc-
( 1) Physieal conditioning.
(2) Tactics and trclmiques appropriate to urban arf'as. moun-
tains, deserts, swamps, and jungles.
( :l) Tactics and techniques of C BR wadare.
( 4) Extended eombat patrol opetations utilizing only such sup-
plies as ean be transported by the patrol.
( 5) Immediate reaction to unexpected combat situations.
(G) gmployment of Army aviation, to include techniques of
airmobile assault and loading.
(7) Aerial resupply by Army and Air Force aircraft to include
and landing r.one marking and materiel r.'co\ery tech-
ruques.
(8) Nightoperations.
(V) Techniques of raids, ambushes, ruses, and defrnsin\ and se-
eurit.y mNtsUt'.'S against these types of opemtions.
( lO) l{iot eonti'Ol to include employment of chemical agents.
( 11) Police-type patroling and Ute operation of roadblocks and
checkpoints.
(12) Crosstl'a.iuing on all communications equipment an1ilable
within the t.ype unit and in communication techniques.
(13) Crosstraining on all individual and crew set,ed light. weap-
ons available within the t.ype unit.
( 14) 1\farksmanship.
( 15) Target identification.
c. \Vhen the characteristics of the area of opemtions and the irregu-
lar forces are known, further specialized training is required in such
specially applicable subjects as-
46
( 1) The use of animal transport for weapons and logistical sup-
port.
(2) 1\fovement techniques, fieldcraft, and improvisation for fight-
ing and living in mountains, jungles, or swamps .
(a) Cold-weather movement including ski and sled operations.
( 4) Utilization of \Vater means to g-ain access into areas occupied
by irregular forct's.
(f)) Survival techniques to indude manner and technique of liv-
ing ofi' the land for short periods.
(t>) fndoctrination in the ideological and political fallacies of the
resistance movement.
( 7) Cross-eountry movement at and under adverse weather
.onditions to include tracking a,nd land navigation.
( 8) Police-type techniques, counterintelli-
gence, and interrogation measurrs.
(H) Convoy escort and security.
( 10) Advanced first aid, personal hygiene, and field sanitation.
( 11) trse and detection of mines, demolitions, and booby traps.
( 12) Small-unit SOP immediate-action drills.
d. Prior to entry into an area of operations, all troops must receive
an orientation on the nature of the terrain n.nd climate, unusual health
hazards, customs of the population, and their relations with the civil
population.
e. Training for specific operations often requires detailed rehearsal.
Rehearsals are conducted in a manner which will not compromise
actual operations, but are conducted under like conditions of terrain
and time of 'day or night.
47. Morale and Psychological Factors
a. Troops employed against irregula.t forces are subjected to morale
and psydtological pressures ditl'cnmt. from those normally present in
regular combat operations. This is particularly true in cold war
situations and results to a large degree from-
( 1) The ingrained reluctance of the soldier to take repressive
measures against women, ehildrcn, and old men who usually
are activo in bot.h overt and eovert irregular activities or who
must be resettled or conecntmtcd for sceurity reasons.
( The of Holdien; with certain stated objectives
of the resistance movement such as re1ie.f from oppression.
(a) of the irregular force due to reported or observed irreg-
ular force atrocities and eonversely, the impulse to take
vindictive retaliatory measures beeausc of such atroeities.
( 4) The ehn.racteristics of the operations to include-
( a) The difficulty in realizing or observing tangible results in
arduous and often unexciting operations.
(b) The primitive living and operating conditions in difficult
terrain.
(c) The long periods of iuactivit.y which may occur when
troops are assigned to static Hecurity duty.
( 5) Inexperience in and subversive tactics.
(6) Ingrained dislike of clandestine and police-type work.
47
;.
I
'_ ...... ''" . , . . . l
b. Soldiers who are untrained in such operations are prone to
bewilderment when faced by irregular force tactics and the intense
political and ideological feelings of hruerrillas.
c. Commanders at all echelons must carry out, on a continuing basis,
an indoctrination, education, and training program which will effec-
tively offset these morale and psychological pressures. In addition,
t.he training program must insure that troops impress the local pop-
ulace witlt their soldierly ability, courtesy, and the neatness, efficiency,
and security of their person, camps and installations.
BY Onmm oF TifF. Sr.crmTAHY OF nm AHMY:
G. H. DECKER.
Official:
Oeneral, United Ntatf.R Arm11,
011-ief of Staff.
R. V.
Major Oeneral, Un#e'd States Army,
The Adjutant (/-eneral.
Distribution :
48
Active Armv: 'l'o be distributed in accordance with DA 11'orm 12-7 require:-
ments for I!'M 31-series ( unclas) ; plus the following formula:
CofSa (2,
VCofSA (2)
DCSPER (5)
ACSI (5)
DCSOPS (5)
DCSLOG (5)
ACSRC (2)
CUSARROTC (2)
Cofl!, (2)
OoA (2)
CRD (2t
CNGB (2,
CA (2,
TJAG (2)
TAG (2)
TIG (2)
CofCll (2)
CINFO (2)
TPMG (5) _
Cl\III (2)
USASA (2)
Tech Stf, DA (u)
Adm & Tech Stf Bd ( 2)
ARADCOM ( r,)
l\fDW (2)
Seventh US Army ( 10)
l
1
JUSA ( 10)
Corps (10)
Tllv ( 10)
Hde (u)
Brr; (rit
un (u)
Uo/Btry (2)
U SAINTS ( 223)
VSASWS (250)
HSACGSC (1500)
NO: Htnte AG (3) : units-Hame us A<'tln Army (>XC<'[It allowance iH on<>
eopy for ('neb unit.
USAR: ns Active Army.
l'or C'K(Jlanutiou of abhrevint:ions used, see AR 320-r..O.
US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OffiCE, lUI
r.;
I
I
I
- Feed-MuualJO-lt Anhq B vom 18.3.1 970,
vorn Generalstabschef der US-Annee
General w. c. W'e;st:mordand. ' '
""""". zuFM3o-J1
FM3Chlt -
...............
-Geheimofient-Sondereaultu
Kapltelt. - EinflihnmK
Kapitd 2. ffmtergrund
'
Notwendickeit politisdtuF!exibilitit >
Charakwistische Schwao;bst.&en hllle.rhalb der -,'
-Rcgierungm dcr Gasclinder
Kapkd 3. Aufpben des US-MilitirgeheUndienstes
Identifizien>ng besondercr Zielgruppw
Erk=nen der Schwadmdlen im Gasdand
Eingreifen des US-Militirgeheimdienstes
Kapitel4. Leitlinien des Gchcimdienste>
Allgemeines
Agentenrekrutierung
Verteilerliste
Kapitel!.
Einleitung
Unterstiitzung durch US-BUrger im Ausland
Unterwanderung Rebellenhewegung
Agenten fUr Spezialeinsiitze
Voneile des US-Militilrgeheimdierutes
Dieser al.o Streng Geheim klassifiziertc Anbang FM 30--31B zahlt
aufgrund seines bo,hsensiblen Inhalts nicht zu den giingigen Aus-
gaben der FM-Serie.
Das fM 30--31 beinhaltet Anleitungen iiber Lehre, Taktiken
und Vorgehensweisen zur Unterniinung von
Subilisierungsmal!nahmen des U5-Militiirs im gesounten Vei-teidi-
gungsbereich. Ucsprilnglich zur extensiven Verbreitung geplant,
wurde sein Inhalt ausschlieBlich auf Angelegenheiten beschriinkt,
die gemeinsoune Operarionen der USA m.t dem Gasdand bnref-
fen, die der Stabilitiitssicherung dienen soHen.
Das FM 30-31B hingegen bezieht sich auf die Geheimdienste
des Gosdandes als Zielobjekte des US-M.litiirgeheimdienstes. Es
wiederholt nicht die allgemeinen Leitlinien des Geheimdierutes,
wie sie z. B. in FM 39--31 und FM 30--31Adargelef:!wurden. Sein
Nutzen ist allein darauf beschr.inkt, die GeheimdienSle des Gast-
landes als mOgliche Operationsgebiete fiir den Geheimdierut her-
auszustellen. Gleichzeitig werden verschiedene Vorgehensweisen
zur Bescluffung von Informationen iiber das Gasdand aufgezeigt,
die auf anderen Mineln ils dern offenen Kampf gegen die Auf-
st3.ndischen basieren und den Interessen entgegenkommen.
Solche Spezialoperationen sind strikt geheimzuhalten, da sich
eine Verwicklung des US-Militiirs in Angelegenheiten des Gast-
landes allein auf die Kooperation bei der Niederschlagung von
Aufstiinden oder der Androhung bcschriirtkt. Die Tata-
che, daR die Beteiligung des US-Militilrs weitaus riefer greift. darf
unter keinen Urnstiinden bekannt werden.
Mit dem Begriff k.ann innerha!b die-
ser Ergiinzung und gemiill dem Kontext folgendcs gemeintsein:
'- Die :.u.tiindige Org:misarion dos Ga.,lande fiir interne Vertei
digungsmaBnahmen.
b. Das Militar des G ... dandes im allgemeinen.
c. Weitere Organisationen des Gasdandes neben dern Militiir, z. B.
die Polizei oder andere zivile Sicherheindienste, nationale und
VerwaltungskOrperschaften sowie Propagandaorganisa-
uonen.
Mit anderen Wonen: Der US"Militiirgeheimdienst tr3gt weidiiufig
unterstiitzend zu einer priizisen Bescimmung der gegen die Auf-
stiindischen geriehtet.en Kriifte des Gasdand"' bei, sowohl in be-
zug auf dessen eigenes Potential als auch in Relation diesen Poten-
tials zu den Miiglichkeiten d.r US-amerikanischen Politik. Trotz
der Verfolgung speziell mililiriscfler Ziele sollten tiefer greifende
Aspekte des lnteresses d.r USA nicht vernach!Ossigt werden,
wann immer sich die Gelegenheit biete<, diese zu fOrdem.
Die Verteilung dieser Ergiinzung istotrikt auf die in der Venei-
lerliste Genannten begrenzt. lhr lnhalt darf auf GeheiB der in die-
ser Lisle Genannten an Peroonefi ihres Venrauens weitergeleitet
werden, wenn diese aufgrund ihrer Stellung und ihres Einflusses
auf das Gelingen der Operation inwirken kOnnen. Wann immer
sich die MOglichkeit bietet, sollren detaillierte Anweisung.::n auf
Basis dieser Ergiinzung miindlich weitergegeben werden, wobei
der extrem heikle Charakter dieser Angelegenheit betont werden
mWJ.
Kapitell.
Hintergrund
1. Allgemeine
Wie in FM 30-)1 angedentet, baben jiingste AufstOnde entweder
in Entwicklungsl3.ndern oder in 1ungen Nationen stattgefunden,
die vormals Kolonien wai'fn.
Da, US-amerikani.d1.c Engagement in diesen weniger ent-
wickdten und von Aufstand hedrohten Nationen ist Teil d..,- welt-
Verwicklung der USA in den Kampf gegon den Kommu-
nismus. Die Rebellion mag andere als komm\lllistische Urspriinge
haben, beispielsweise stammesbedingte, rassische, religi&e oder
regional bedingte Differenzen. Wo auch immer die Griinde liegen,
der Aufsund selbst bietet dem Kommunismus Gdegenheit zur In-
filtration, was bei einem Mangel an effektiven Gegenmal!nahmen
zu eiuer erfolgreichen kommnistischen Machtiibernahme fiihren
kann. Maagebliches Kriterium fiir die Art und den Grad des US-
amerikani>chen i.r doe von der Rogierung de<
G .. rlandes vertretene Poition gegeniiber dem Kommunismus
eineneits nnd den Interesoen der USA andererseits.
2. Notwendigkeit politischor Flexibilitiit
Aus vern:hiedenen Griinden :rind weder das US-amerikanische
Militiir noch andere US-Geheini.dienste nnwiderruflich dazu ver-
pflichtet, irgendeine Regierung des Gastlandes zu unrerstiitzen:
a, Eine von den USA nnterstiitzte Regieruug kann im Kampf
gegen einen kommunisWchen oder ko:nmunistisch inspirienen
Anfstand aufgrund mangelnden Willens oder fehlender Durch-
sch!agskroft Schwiichen zeigen.
b. Sie kann sich selbst aufgrund der Nichtbeachtung grundlegen-
der notionaler Strukrnren kompromittieren.
c. Sie kann sich zu extrem nationalistischen Verhaltensweisen hin-
reiBen lassen, die mit den US-amerikanischen lnteressen unver-
einbar sind oder ihnen schaden.
Snlche Faktoren k.Onnen eine Situation hervorrufen, in der US-
arnerikanisehe Interessen einen Wechsel der Re;:ierungsauorich-
rung erlorderlich machen, der es dem Gmland erlaubt, konstruk-
t.ivere Voneile aus der Unterstiitznng und
Anleitung zu ziehen.
W:ihrend gemeinsame Mollnahmen Zltt Niederschlagung eines
Aufstands und bevorzugt im Namen von Freiheit,
Ger.chtigkeit und Demokratie durchgeflhrt wcrden, behiilt sich
die US-Regierung einen breiten Ermessen,.pielraum vor, urn zu
cntscheiden, welcheo Regime ihre voUe Unterstiitzung verdienr.
Nur wenige der unterentwickelten Liinder bieten einen frucht-
boren Grund fiir Demokratie im weitesten Sinne. Unter Einflull
der Regierung, sei es durch Oherzeugung oder schiirfere, Eingrei-
fen, miissen umf .. sende Wahlen vonngetriehen wenien, denn au-
tokratische Fiihrung.straditionen sind so tief verwurzdt, daS sich
der Wille des Volke$ nur selten ausrnachen ]ilk
GrundsOtzlich kommt es dem Interesse der USA an weltweitem
Ansehen mehr entgegen, wenn Regierungen, die US-amerikani-
sche Umerstiitzung erhalten, demokratische Prozesse aufweisen
oder zumindest den Anschein einer Demokntie wahren. Eine de-
mokratisehe Struktur ist daher zu o.h.Jl
sie den grundlegenden einer antikommnnistischen
Haltung entspricht.
3. Charakteristische Schwach.uellen innerhalb der Regierungen
der G .. t!iinder
Soweit die US-Politi.k bwoffen ist, mull die Aufmerksarnkeit
aufgrund der oben genannten Gesicht5punkte auf bestimmte
Schwachstellen gelenkt werden, die den meioten unterentwickd-'
ten Nationen innewohnen:
a. Als K.onsequenz ibrei unterentwickelten Status, ihrer jiingeren
Unpriinge oder von beidem zeign Regime, die von Aufstiin-
den bedroht werden, gewiihnlich Symptome der Entwunelung
und lnstabilitlit. lhre politischen sind hiiufig nnerfabren,
stehen in offenem Widerspruch zueinander und sind korrupt.
Fiihrer mit aulkrordentlichen QualitOten sehen sich hl.ufig mit
einem den modemen Anspriichen ungeniigend angepollten so-
wie mit ineffizientem und umerbezahltem Personal hcsetzten
Regierung.sapparat konfront:ien, was ihre Anstrengungen oft
zunichte macht.
b. Diese Schwiichen hi<"len Miiglichkeiten zur weitliiufi gen Kon-
taktaufnahme zwischen Regieruugangestellten im Geheim-
dienst und den Aufstiindischon. In Anbetracht der chronischen
Instabiliri:t dieser Regime ist unter denjenigen, die sie umer-
stiitzen, der Wunsch nach einer Abicherung gegen einen miig-
licherweise totalen oder reilweisenSieg der Rebellion weit vcr-
breitet.
c. Bei inneren Konflikten in Entwicklungslindern nehmen meist
beide Seiten fUr sich in Anspruch, jeweils den wahren nationa-
lcn lnteressen zu folgen. Hiiufig jed<>eh verschaffen das enonne
Ausrnaf! und die offene Zursch..usteliung der US-arneri.kani-
schen Untersnitzung den Aufstindischen einen psychologischen
Vorteil, da die Regierung als Marionmenregime blodgeste!lt
wird. Daraus resultieren gewOhnlich 1nwachsende antiameri-
kanische Gefiihle, sowohl unter der Beviilkerung im allgemei-
nen als auch unter den inklwive des
Milit>rs. Gleich ob das Militiir der Regierung untergeordnet ist
oder oie dominiert, in der Regel <piegelt ihrom Ch.orokter
wider und teilt ihre Schwiichen.
Das Interesse der amerikanischen Armee am Militiir des Gasdan-
des ist nicht auf dessen Professionalitit ausgerichtet, sondern hat
weitaus g..O!!ere politische Bedeutung. moisten jungen, in
der Entwicklung begriffenen Nationen spielt das Militiir einewe-
sentliche politische Rolle, deren Bedeutung zunimmt, so bald sich.
ein Regime mit einem bewaffneten Aufnand konfromiert sieht,
der militiirische Gegenrnal!nahmen erforderlich macht.
3. Kapitel
des US-Militiirgeheimdienstes
4. Idencifizierung besonderer Zielgruppen
Der US-Milit>rgeheimdienst befindet sich in einer Position, die
es ihm erlaubt, lnfonnationen iiber weite Bereiche d<'l" Regie-
rungsaktivitiiten des Gastlandes zu beschaffen. Das Hauptinter-
esse des US-Militiirs liegt darin, seine geheimdienstlichen An-
strengungen zum Zweck internet Veneidigungsmal!nahmen auf
das Militiir des Gastlandes sowie damit verbundene Organisatio-
nen zu richten.
Besondere Zielgruppen innerh.alb des Milit>rs des Gastlandcs
tellen Mitarbeiter in besonderen Positionen dar, z. B.:
a. Einheiten auf nationalerund lok.aler Ebene, mit denen der US-
Militi.rgeheirndienst direkt zusarnmeru.rbeitet.
b. Einheiten auf nationaler und internarionaler Ebene, iiber die
der US-Milit>rgeheimdierut rnittels seiner aktiven Kontakte
weitere produktive Kontakte iiber die Gl'eiiZen dcr iiblichen
militiirischen Aktividiten hinaus erschlieflen kann.
c. Lokale Einheiten, mit dencn der US-Mi!itiirgeheimdienst we-
der in direktem noch indirektem Kontakt steht und die daher
besonders anf<illig fUr die polirische Einfltillnahrnelok.aler auf-
stiindischer Kriifte sind.
d. Mobile. Einheiten, wie etwa Spezioleinheiten und Langstrek-
ken-Aufkliinmgspatrouillen, die in Gebieten operieren, die teil-
weise oder nur zeirweilig unter der Komrolle der Aufstiindi-
ochen sind, und die dahcr chcnso Ieicht von clchcn Einf!U..sen
betroffen sind.
Zusitzlich zum Militiir des Gastl .. ndes und seiner Ausrichtung auf
interne Veneidigungsstrategien mui! die Aufmerksamkeit auch
auf den Pohciapparat gerichtet werdtn.
stehen der lok.alen Beviilkerung in der Regel
oilier als das Militiir und sind daher sow.ohl profunde Infocma-
tionsquellen als auch ein erhiihtes Sicherheitsrisiko. Das Sicher-
h.eitsrisiko kann akut aufrreten, wenn Polizeibeamte zum Militiir-
dienst eiuge:zogen und durch unsachgemiil! ausgebildetes Personal
ersetzt werdcn.
0f'.._erationen des US-Militiirgeheimdienstes, die auf. die eben
genannteO. Zielgruppen ausgerichtet sind, verfolgen unterochiedli-
che Absichten:
a. Sie sollen milit.irische Einh.eiten des Gastlandes vor der Infil-
tration und EinfluGnahme dun:h Elemente schUtzen, die mit
den Aufstindischen sympathisiercn oder den USA gegeniiber
eine feindliche Gesinnung vemeten.
b. Sie sollen verhindern, dal! AngehOrige des Gasdand-Militiiro
ve<SUchen, ihre eigene Zukunft zu sichern, indcrn sie aktive
oder passive Kontakte zu den Anfst.indischen knUplen.
c. Sie sollen Korruption und lneffizienz innerhalb des Gasdand-
Militiirs auf ein ertriiglich<$ MaB reduzieren.
d. Sie sullen zur Fiirderung von Offizieren des Gastland-Militiirs
beitragen, die den USA gegeniiber nachwei;lich loyal sind.
c. Sie sollen ihre Protektion auf aile Geheimdienste des Gastlan-
des ausweiten, die in den Bereich US-militargcheimdienstlicher
Verantwortung fallen.
Urn diese Ziele erreichen zu kiinnen, mii.ssen die friihzeitige Er-
kennung von Schwachstellen in Gastla.ncl-Geheimdiensten sowie
MOglichkeiten eines rechtzeitigen Eingreiferu des US-Militiirge-
heimdienstes gewihrleistet sein.
5 . .Erkennen von 5chwachstellen im Gasdand
Zu den Syrii.ptomen, die Schwachstellen in
sten anzeigen und deren Untersuchung und Erkennung soWie das
Eingreifen des US-Militiirgt:heimdien$tes e:rforderlich machen,
ziihlen folgende:
a. Politische U=uverl.'is.sigkeit, z. B. eine gleichgiiltige Halnmg
gegeniiber der Regierung, Sympathien zu den Aufnandischen,
offenkundige mit den Aufstiindischen.
b. Eine antiamerikanische Einst.dlung, die durch den EinfluR auf-
stiindischer Propo.ganda hervorgerufen wird, von periinlichen
oder arbeitsbedingcen Unstimmigkeiten zwischen
von Organisationen des Gasd.tndes und denen amerikanischer
Organisationen oder von der zu offensichtlichen Priienz .uneri-
kanischen Personals in der Rolle des Smiorpanner. herriihrt.
c. Blutsverwandtschaft, die Angehiirige der Regierung des Gast-
landes mit den Aufstiindischen verbindet. Es ist cine iibliche
Praxis innerlulb der Familie, ihre Loyaliciit vorsiitzlich auf die
R.egiemng und die Aufsciindischen zu so dal! egal
welche Seite gewinnt, immer Kontakt zum pohu..,hen
Lager hiilt. Diese Blut$bande spielen gerade unter Polizeiein-
heiten eine wichtige Rolle, die hiiufig in den eigenen Wohnge-
bieten eingesetzt und daher dem Druck durch ihre Familien
und Freunde besonders ausgesetxt sind.
d. Kormption, die den einzelnen dem Druck aufst.indischer
mente aussetzt und, wenn sie iiberhand nimmt, das Offendiche
Vemauen in die Regierung unterminiert, was wiederum der
Ausbreirung der Rebellion zuarbeitet.
e. Ineffizienz, die ab einem bestimmten Mall den gewohnten
Handlungsablauf deran beeinflufit, dall sie in gewis.ser Weise di-
rekt dem Feind zuarbeitet. Auch hierdnrch kOnnen Sympathien
fur den Aufstand entstehen. Dies ist eine wohlbekannte Form
regierungsinterner Sabotage, die sich relativ einfach dun:hfiihren
und, wenn iiberhaupt, nur sehr schwer nachweisen lii!lt.
6. des US-Militiirgeheimclienstes
Der US-Militargeheimdienst muf! darauf vorhereitet sein, entspre-
chende Mallnahmen vorzrnchlagen, fiir den Fall, daB die Syrnpto-
me der Schwachstellen lange genug existieren, urn wirksamen
Schaden anzuricht.en. Sokhe Mal!nabmen ki>nne" gegen ein-
ulne Personen richten oder darauf ausgerichtet sein, Druck auf
Gmppen, Organisationen und, in letzter lnstanz, auf die Regie-
rung des Gastlandes selbst auszuiiben.
Der US-Militiirgeheirndienst ist gehalten, die Kooperacion mit
der entsprechenden Autoriciit des Gastlandes anzustrebcn, die
Strafmal!nahmen gegen BUrger des Gasd.tndes einleiten kann. Die
Zusammenarbeit kann jedoch in Bercichen problematisch wor-
den, in denen abweichende oder widerspriicbliche Ziele ange-
>trebt werden. In diesem Fall mull der US-Mi!iu.rgeheimdienst
die Hal tung der USA gegeniiber den widerstrebenden Kr.iiften im
Ganland veneidigen.
Dieser Konfliktbereich entstcht moistens dann, wenn sich Straf-
rnallnahmen geg:en einzelne richten, uie durch persiinliche, politi-
sche oder biirokratische Verflechtungen geschiitzt sind.
die darauf ausgerichr.et sind, Gt:heitndienste des
Gasdondes oder sogar die Regierung selbst zu beeinflussen oder
unter Druck zu setzen, setzen voraus, dal! die lnteressen der USA
gefilidet sind. Der Situation angemesscne Mallnahmen kOnnen
offizieUer oder inoffizieUer Notur
Offizielle Handlungen sind im Zwarnmenhs.ng mit den in die-
sem Dokumcnt diskutienen Thernen nicht relevant. lnoffizielle
Handlungen, die der Geheimhaltung obliegen, fallen unter die
gemeinsame Verantwonlichkeit dos US-Militiirgeheimdiensr.es
und anderer USGeheimdienste.
4. Kapitel
Leitlinien des Geheimdienstes
7. Allgemeines
Der Erfolg intemer Stabilisierungsprczesse, die im Rahmen inter-
nor Verteidigungsstrategien durch don US-Militiirgeheimdienst
gefOrdertwerden, hiingt zu grof!cn Teilen vom gegenseitigen Ver-
stiindnis des U5-Peroonals und des Peroonab der Geheimdienste
des Gasdandes ab.
Wie hooh der Grad wechse!seitigen Einvemehmens zwischen
dem US-Penono! und dem Persona! des Gast!andes auch ist, die
Miiglichkeit, Mitarbeiter der Geheimdienste im Gasdand fiir cine
Agententiitigkeit zu gewinnen, ist cine wesentlich ver!ii!llichere
Basis fiir die Liisung der Probleme des US-Mi!itiirgeheimdien-
stes.
Das Anwerben fiihrmdcr d<> G..,tL.nd-Geheim-
dienste als Langzeit-Agemen ist daher besonders wichtig.
8. Agentenrekrutierung
Filr die speziellen Belange des US-Militiirgeheimdienstes stellt das
Offizierskorps einen besonders geeigneten Bereich dar, urn Milar-
beiter anzuwcrben. In vie! en unterentwid.elten Landern Stammen
die Militiiroffiriere aus wohlhabenden Verhiiltnissen, sind auf-
grund ihces fami!iiiren Hintergrund.s und ihrer Ausbildung kon-
servativ und daher anti"revo!mioniiren Lehren gegeniiber offen
eingestdlt. Ihre Mitarbeit als pra-amcrikanische Lang:zeit-Agen-
ten ist besondecs wiehtig, da sie hiiufig eine entscheidende Rolle
bei der Kursbestimmung der Entw.ck.lung in von ihnen vertrete-
nen Liindern spielen.
Hin.ichtlich der Anwerbung von Langu.it-Agenten verdienen
AngehOrige folgrnder IV.tegorien besondere Bedeutung:
a. Offiziere, die aus Familien stammen, die seit langem wirtsch:Ut-
liche und kulturelle Be>.iehungen mit den Vereinigten Staaten
und ihren Alliierten pflegen.
b. Offiziere, die Gelegenheit batten, sich mit US-militiirischen
Trainingsprogrammen vertraut zu machen, ins!Yesondere dieje-
nigen, die in den Vereinigten Stuten selbst ausgebildet worden.
c. die fiir bestimmte Posten innerholb des Gasdand-
Geheimdienstes aus.rwOhlt worden. Ihnen gebiihrt besondere,
wenn nicht exklusive Beachmng.
Gemiil! den Direktiven des Ansbildungspersonals in US-Trai-
ningslagern mi.is.en die in Unterpunkt 2 ( ) benannten Offiziere
genauestens iiberpriift worden, und zwar hinsichtlich ihrer politi-
schen Loyalitiit, ihrer Unempfiinglichkeit gegeni.iber der kommu-
nistischen Ideologic ur.d ihrer Treue gegcni.iber den demokrati-
schen Idealen dcr Vere:nigten Staaten. Der geheimc Anhang des
abschlieilenden Trainingsrnp<Jm i.iber jeden Offizier eines Gast-
landes, der ein US-Trainingsprogramm durchlaufen hat, enthiilt
eine Bewertung i.iber dessen Aussichten und MOglichkeiten, als
Langzeit-Agent des US-Militiirgeheimdienstes tiitig zu sein.
Fragen beziiglich d01 Anwerhung werden in FM 30-31A aus-
fiihrlicher behandelt, worin die allgemeine Doktrin zur Handha-
bungder (HUMINT) daq;elegt und msgearbeJ-
tet ist. Die dort beschriebenen Direktiven solhen bei Rekrutie-
rungsmallnahmen hinzugezogen werden, welche die Bcteiligong
von Geheimdiensten vc-rsehen, die der Regierung des Gastlandes
nahestehen.
9. Unterstiitzung durch US-BUrger im Au, land
Der US-Militiirgeheimdienst mull die mOgliche Mitarbeit von US-
Biirgcrn, die in den Gastliindern arbeiten, einerseits als direkte ln-
formationsquellen, andererseits aber auch als offizidle oder inof-
fizielle Mittler bei der Anw01bung von Biirgem des Gastlandes als
beriick.sichtigen. Zu dies en benanmen US-Bi.ir-
gern Uihlen Beamte, die fiir einen and01cn als den US-Militiirge-
heimdienst tiitig sind, sowie Geschiftsleute und Repnisentonten
der Masocnmedien.
10. Unterwanderung der Rebellenbewegung
In FM 30-31 wurde die Notwendigkeit betont, daf\ Geheimdien-
ste des Gastlandes die aufstiindische Bewegung im Hinblick auf
eine erfolgreiche Gegenbewegung durch das Einschleusen von
Agenten unterwandern. Es wurde deudich gemacht, daB die Ge-
fahr besteht, dallaufSeiten der Aufstiindischen stehende Agcnten
die grollen Organisatimen des Gastlandes, staatliche BehOrden,
die Polizei und Einheiten dos militiirischen Geheimdienstes mit
der Absicht infihrieren, geheime lnformacionen zu sammeln.
Ebenso wurdo klar herausgearbeitet, dall, wenn die Geheimdienste
der Gastliinder nur Informarionen iiber pro-rebelli-
sche Agenten in-Bcreiden, in denen dcren H.tigkeit bekannt ist,
besitzen, dies ein Hinweis sein kann, daJl es dicsen Agenten be-
reits erfolgrcich gdungen ist, die Geheimdienste des
zu unterwandeTTI. Sie befinden sich romit in der Position, Schntte
der Regierung vorwegzunehmen. . .
In diesem Zusammenhang sollte der US-Milicirgeheuru:hensr
zwei grundsiitzl.iche Aktionsminge verfolgen:
a. Er sollte dahingehend arbeiten, die Agenten zu identifizieren,
die durch Geheirndienste des Gast!andes, die fiir die interne Si-
cherheit zustindig sind, in die aufstiizldische Bewegung "0ge-
schleust wurden, wn die Arbeit dieser Agenten der gehennen
Kontrolle durch den US-Militiirgeheimdienst zu unterstellen.
(Die Vo11:ehensweise wird in diesen Fiillen von
schenden Gegebenheiten im jeweiligen Land abhing1g sem.)
b. Er so\lte versuchen, vertrauenswiirffige Agenten in die Fiih-
rungsschicht der Aufstindischen einzuschleusen. Hi":'hei roUte
insbesondere das Geheimdienstsystem der Aufstindischen be-
achtet werden, das gegen die Geheimdienste des Gast!andes ge-
richtet ist. Achten Sie hierbei besonders dorauf, dall Infonna-
tionen iiber das Personal dieser Geheimdienste, die aus aufstin-
dischen Quellen stammen, von gro6em Wert sein kOnnen, urn
ein angemessenes Verha.lten des US-Mi!iti.rgeheimdienstes zu
gewiihrleisten und rechtzeitige M:U!nohmen einzuleiten. urn die
Interessen der USA zu fOrdern.
11. Agenten fur Spezialeinsiitze
Es kann vorkommen, dall die R.egierungen der Gascliinder
gegeniiber dem K.ommunismus oder cer kommunistisch .insp!-
rierten Unterwanderung Passivitit oder Unent.schlossenhm
gcn und gemiiJ! den dor US-Geheimdienste mit
ungeniigender Schlagkraft reagieren. Moist ent.stehen solche
tionen wenn die Aufstindischen zeirweilig auf Gewalt verz1chten
und somit einen Vorteil zu venchaffen hoffen, da sich die
Fiihrungskrafte des Gostlandes in falsc:1er Sicherheit wiihnen. In
solchen Fii!len sollten dem US-Mi!itOrgeheimdienst aile Mittel zur
Verfiigung stehen, gezielte Operationenzu starten, die sowohl die
Regierungen der Gasdinder als auch riie 6ffendichkeit von der
Gefahr einer Rebellion und der Norwendigkeit eines Gegenan-
griffs iiberzeugen.
Zu diesem Zweck sollte der US-Militiirgeheimdienst alles dar-
an setzen, Agemen mit Spezia.lauftrigen in die aufstindische Be-
wegung einzuschleusen, wdche die Aufgabe haben, spezidle Ak-
tionsgruppen innerhalb der radikaleren Elemente der Bewegung
zu bilden. Ent.,eht eine der oben genanntcn Situarionon, sollten
diese durcb den US-Militii'"l:eheimdien" kontrollienen Gruppen
eingesetzt werden, urn je nach Lage des Falls entweder gewahfrei
oder auch einzugreifen. Die.se Operationen kOnnen
rolche beinhalten, die in FM JQ-3\ a1s l'hasen 1J und III eines
Aufstande.s bezeichnet werden.
In Fii.llen, in denen ein Einschleusen solcher
Agenten in die Fiihrungsriege der Rebellen nicht durchgefiihrt
Werden konnte, kann es, urn die oben genannten Ziele zu
chen, hilfreich sein, die Mitarbeit exvem linksgerichteter Orgoni-
sationen fiir die eigenen Zwecke zu nutz.en.
12. Vortei\e des US-Militiirgeheimd.ienstes
Auf dem Gebiet der Hum,.,. lntel!.gence (HUMINT) geniel!en
Mitarbeiter des US-Milir;:rgeheimdienstes den Vorteil, in viden
Bereichen direkt mit ihnen Gleichg"'tellten innerhalb der Ge-
heimdierur<rruktur des Gastlandes zusammenzuarbeiten. Auf-
grund ihrer in der Regel besseren Ausbildung, Sachkenmnis und
Erfahrung sind sie beronders qualilizien, besseren Nutzen aus
einer solchen Kooperation zu ziehen, auch wenn sie mit Personal
zusammenorbeiten, dos ihnen vom Ring her Uberlegen ist. Diese
enge Kooperation ermOglicht es dom US-Militiirgeheimdienst,
einen umfossenden und detaillierten Oberblick iiber die Struktur
des nationalen Geheimdi<m!ltes zu erhalten.
In FM 30-31 wurde erwabnt, daB die Einrichtung von National
Internal Defense CO(>rdination Centm (NIDCC) und Area Co-
ordination Centers (ACC) ers<rebenswert ist, urn Geheimdienst-
operationen, Administntion und Logistik in das gemeinsame
Bemiihen zu integrieren, eine Problom]O.ung beziiglich der Re-
bellion zu erreichen.
Die vorliegende Empfehlung wurde awgearbeitet, urn die Ef-
fektivitOt a.ntirebellischer Anmengungen im Gasdand zu verbes-
sern. Sie kann dem US-Militiirgeheim:iienst ebenfalls als Leitfaden
fiir dos Eindringen in die rnilitOrische Fiihrung de, Gasclands die-
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\
EA/st jn-1--'------r--,---__j
Z7 Janunry 1978
(b) (1)
(b) (3)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004
Jlotontla1 C-:lt:..'!lunlst on luli:m
-l l'o ens et PCi"i""U'rC!J
and fvidoncc
(if!'IJturunt problcns that arho cot'lDunist
partldpat ion ln tho s:ovornmcmu of iaro
partly by tbo dlfforont institutional positions
uf th6 two countrltts within tho NATO allhncoJ
as a of intogrntod military
ttructuro, direct l:t.cos!i to sonsitlvo NATO intoillgonco,
dcfonso plJtns, an.l plannlnt lnforr.s:stlon. Any
potential (or to this tnforrn:ttion, ovc:n
l! scor'llinzly unlikely in cl rcumstancos. of lirlli.tcd part lei-
pstlon in tho lt3lian governacnt, prob3b1y wouid result
ln a cutoff of koy inforMation .and planninz data to lt31Y
and ihus a 5h3rp of JtalianNATO dofcno cooperation.
I .
---- -- ..
. ... -r------------ .. -. -
I
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! I Q_vlllunco on tho defense pollcios of tha I Ullan
and French CoJlllunist part les comes fTora tho public

record of statements nnd of tho parties[
ttonlicting pressures to ruintain thoi r Man lst-
L__ ____ ___J
Leninist and at tho snme time appeal to a
wido spectrum of Kcst opinion often causes the
Communists to ,.5trnddle tho fenco" on defense 'issues--
a poor basis for JudSirll what their perninJ _policies
would we offer the following prtJ
liminary thoughts 'concerning I talyLI ______ ___.J
_QtalrJ
A segment of Italian society is reserved in its
support for NATO and I tali an do fen so policies, and Coaaun is t
(PCI) on defense quustions arc shared by
and other parties of tho Left. On some issues, tho
I
. I
. ' .
J:.
rei has !tUp;>ortcd tho Christian OollloCntic J';uty
tho taken hy other leftist nd opposi-
tion to 2ovornmenL's defense and NATO Issues
is led not by tho PCI but by Atcamc. tho
chalnun of tho !louse Dofcnso Cornmhr.lon.
chief effect of a PCI involvcmnnt ln the
Italian p,overnmGnt (for control of two or three
non-sensitive nlnistrics concerned with Jtalinn internal
matters) would likely be a of restrictive trends
nffoctlng Italy's defonso establish11enj) and,
by uxtonslon, Jc'a!ian cooperation with NATO arul tho US.
includo: incrcasin&lt Parliamentary control
over military Dnd policy docislons; a
skr.ptical approach toward nuclear and
a tendency to distinguish between Italian and
needs on the one hand and those of u,no on the other--.
especially with roferenco to which arc
by the US or appear prlnarily to benefit the US. <frcsumably.
with a fon11al share in the P.CJ would more :lctivcly
work to l'laco !>ympathetic :md "reliable" persons in illlpor-
tant postslncludinc senior =ilitary ;he
r.ovornr:tt!'ntD .
(Lt nevertheless is unlikely that the PCI would a.ttoapt
to undcrr.tinc nilitary discipline or cap:.bilitics, or to
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politici:" Ocl rllilitary to an OAtcut tfa;1t '<CiuJ,f hD\'U
t Jd \ C f { t
In roce;nt yciAt!lo, tho I'Cl Ja;t'il !Jehuv"d
tmurJ tltc ndlltnry l}lc .1 JllHty -which fully
.S(,I!W dny to "control the ltnrers.j While bJcUng
to lmprovo living conditions nnd And
to trcucthcn rfthts and
regulations, tho Party
tary dhclplino.
critical 'upport of protest
Involving officon that havo been
hr left-win& frinr.<7 &r'>ups. Horoovar, tho
PCJ has supported of fuud, for military
Dodernlzatlon prozrRs, uhcn Jobs
at !itnkc. l'Cf par] frc;qucnt ly ion
sped fie dafo.rtso noods or and 'nll they
do}uying of Which
had not yet com.ittcd to have
not played an obstructioni:a roJo. (!o the c.xtcnt th:st
('
th,. PCJ h:t!O neutralized military iiS a sources of
lt to have succeeded bi
tho hulk uf military officers, like other Italians. th&t
PCI invohc,.ent in tho zovarnmont Is a) inovitahlo, and
bJ not dang<!'rous)
c.,..
L__ __
....
_.J ---- - . -.. . --

.. ,
'
I
G tloe PCI wcro to hnlsubst nt in I control in tloo
covornnwnt, Doro farr<.'achln;: chttnr.os arc possihlc. Tlw
in tho ncar-torn by a PCI OVernmcnt
lH.cly lo hc1wi ly dependent on the Attltudus artd pol iclcs
of JlATO allico;. The Party !4tdd th:H it fully
In tho Alliance und would
cnrry out tll coiMiitmcnts. It would probably roviow very
cnrafully any now or additional cor:udtacnts in the li&ht
'
of lt> rumpllcutcd attitude5 to\l::JTJ tho division.
Europunn us to Atlantic orientation, its oppo1l
tlon to nuclear woapan5, nnd s:5J {!ut it would
he reluctant to withdraw units committed to
NATO close down NATO and US or renezo
on illrcadyatrced NATO wcaponr.. pror.rnl!l\. If, however, the
allios dcnr lt41lian access to classiflod Information or
down NATO in Italy, PCI tQw:trd NATO
would likoiy bo resolved, to'some kind of in
the rol:Jtion5hip:?,
~ ~ - - - ~ ~ / ~ - - - - _ - - - - - - - _ : _ -
j
-.!.----
-
i
I
\
"""
\
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2004
MEHORAliDUM
SUBJECT: The Moro Kidnaping and Italian Politics
(b) (3)
27 April 1978
1. One of the last governments headed by the veteran
Democratic politician Aldo Moro spanned period from the breakup of
the old center-left coalition in 1974 to the electori)l surge toward the
Communists in 1975. The transitional nature of Moro's government led
Italian politicians to dQb it a "bridge to the unknown. Now, the
kidnaping of the party leader by the Red Brigades terrorist organization
is forcing Italian politicians to bridge a new political abyss. The
many raised by the case could lead to fundamental changes in
the country's politics.
2. Six weeks after the kidnaping, an air of-uncertainty and
distrust pervades Italian political life. This results in part from
Moro's absenceE:no one else is equipped to play his stabilizing role in
Christian Denocratic internal politics and in the party's relatiors
-with the Cormunis@ It also reflects widespread frustration over the
government's nabi1ity to find Moro.
3. Moro was abducted just as the Christian and Communists
completed two months of delicate negotiations on a new governing formula.
Although the talks had produced an agreement under which the Communists
support Prime Minister Andreotti's minority govern-
ment in parliament, many contentious details relations between
the two parties still had not been spelled out.
4. Preoccupation with the crime has since prevented anY.one from
addressing these outstanding questions in a systematic way.
politicians do take up such issues, they will have to deal with two
emerging trends--trends that work against each other and contribute
to the confused political atmosphere. On the one hand, the emergency
nature of the situation is pushing the Christian Democrats and Communists
(8_p M 78-10174
..
toward closer cooperation. On the other hand, distrust and tensions are
growing between the two
.. :::::::i:J
member responsible for security affairs, are in
El
ct with the C
In addition,
members of the , ,
directly with their counterparts in the Communist Party_
before completing major administrative actions;)
6. At the same time, relations between the two parties are marked
by growing tension. The Communists, for example, have been pu.r:b...!...lf_,_,c,__,_l...... y __ -----,
critical of the lack of progress in the
have bluntly told Interior Mini:;ter Cossiga to move more vigo.J.ro""u...-s,ly,.----'
agdinst the terr'l)ris'.
r-1. For part, the Christian Democrats lplanning
to charge during a coming series oi local elections tna10 we
Party's antagonism toward the security years ago was the direct
antecedent of the current political violence. This is bound to touch
an nerve in the Communist Party, .which publicly admits to an
earlier complacency about left-wing violence but argues _that terrorism
has its real roots government's long neglect of fundamental social
and economic
8. The tension reflects the absence of Mora's steadying influence
both on own party and on its relations with the Communists. Moro's
fine-tuning of Christian Democratic-Communist relations was one of his
major contributions to Italian politics.
C. Increasingly, however, Italian politicians are saying the
humiliating letters Moro has written from captivity have finished
him politically, whether or not he survives physically. That conclusion
seems premature, but it will nevertheless stimulate increased rivalry
and maneuvering anx:mg Christian Democrats anxious to succeed Moro as
party chief and to assume his role as front runner in the December
presidential election. It seems likely also to encourage renewed
activity on the part of a substantial group of the Christian
Democrats who want the party to pursue a policy of confrontation with
the Communists but who were outmaneuvered by Moro in the final days.
of the crisisJ
-2-
. ; .
lu. The Christian Democrats ,have not said much officially about
relations with the Communists the kidnaping. other than to stress
their go beyond the degree of collaboration represented by
the arrangements on which the Andreotti government is based. (ut the
Christian Democrats' resolve in this regard is contingent on a
of developments, not the least of which is the outcome of the Mora
affair. If it drags on or if iiolence escalates, tougher law-and-order
measures may be required, and the Christian Democrats will need Communist
acquiesence to enact
11. Moreover, the Christian Democrats still have no realistic
alternative t:> collaboration with the Communists--a fact Uilderlined by
the recent Socialist Party congress. The Socialists--the only party
that could give the Christian Democrats a non-Communist majority--made
it clear that a return to such an alliance any time soon is extremely
unlikely.
12. The local elections set for May 14-15 will also affect inter-
party relations. The elections will involve about 10 percent of the
electorate--the first significant sampling of voter sentiment since the
Communists' unprecedented gains in the 1976 parliamentary elections.
13. As such, the contests will be studied closely for some
indications of how the .country has reacted tn '.11e of Christian
Democratic-Communist cooperation that began in a formal sense with the
installation of previous government two months after the
1976 election.
(24. If the Communists lose substantially, the Christian Democratic
hierarchy will be confirmed in its belief that the Communists' growing
involvement in government decisionmakinq has the beneficial side effect
of hurting them at the polls. But such a result would also pose a
dilemma for the Christian. Democrats, because it would cause the Com-
munists to question whether they can afford further cooperation with
Andreotti, who will clearly need their help in the months
(js. A Communist gain on the other hand--in conjunction with either
a Christian Democratic loss or a further gravitation of the voters toward
the two l3rge parties at the expense of the smaller ones--would ease some
of Communist leader Berlinguer's internal partY. problems and cause the
Christian Democrats to reassess their
16. Of the many questions raised for Italian politics by the Moro
kidnaping, the most important clearly centers on the effect the affair
-3-
is likely to have on the internal cohesion of ti1e Christian Democratic
Party and on its ability to rema1n Italy's major political force.
\il. So-far, the affair appears to have accelerated two trends
that were already threatening to immobilize the Christian Democrats.
On the one hand, it has increased the internal party tha-t Moro
worked so hard to keep in check. At the same time, it has made it even
more difficult for the Christian Democrats to credibly use anti-Communism
as a unifying force. Many Christian Democrats had become more open to
cooperation with the even before the present emergency set
in and the longer it extends the more difficult it will be for those
who remain opposed to that cooperation to make their case:r
(is. All of this seems likely to further weaken the Christian
DemQcrats' effectiveness as a governing party. And the persistence of
present trends could ultimately create a political vacuum that would
draw the Communists into gteater governmental responsibilities--even
though they are not pushing hard for t!1em at the momen:J
-4-
> :. .
... :
. l'Ouesr a en'vrsager _de''rrouve!Tes formes de -d.efense non-Conven- . .
. craac sur de .
::.-. .: a : .. .. .a::}(aye.r.s. :_ : .
. . . Je .. : rerueift d!irif:i:k.iiiicions:;; k sabotage/'-la . er-:Ja: > "'
:. .. :,:.-
. e_n eh)Jo.llatJ<:Ie,, I}e.lgtqU.e; . et : ..
. h\ement aU. .. Daneq.at:k .. Fran_ce-iacctfpa: diJ:
'.: . iemtoin!j_ .. ioiimii::.'d ;"ifi :
. .- : ..
. Ja. prljJ,aration:.111ifitai'te" .s11!;_ ce tyP.e J> ope"-. .' ..
. Qd.ant ,r_ no.tre- pays, {e Service b1fomiatio7t .'dej.
. :--Foretl_ ( SIE ..t 95 .. .1 -1a . -fea:Ji.Sadon .. :d \ine: _:
. '
dans uri cadre ;op:erad:orinel'de'-defe'rise,les_struciuiies.
', 1. ._: ' : ' - : ; ' : .:..
_ .
. -
.. : . _ _.
aires- italiennes avec celles des allies, Joit pour divelopper de
eifel initiatives de faron -autonome portieJ en avant far un pay!
'trangerm ltalie Jeptentnonale (les serwicn italieru !taient
i'accueiliir lu organiJi:ltionr US horn_ologun qui divelopperaimt
lail! du Nord du grouper dandutim. Notes d11 giniral
\.fu,-co. 8.12.51}. -
2. SCay-J3ehind et Ia partiCipation ii:aliehne_
aux organes colltgiaux de coordination du secteur,
Alors que Ia sti"ucture italienne avah<;:ait dans sa inise en
:<lace, un accord fur signe entre les services america.inS et le
5IF AR, reladf a I' organiSation er auX activites du "
:landesriO. post-occUpation, accofd communemem appele Stay-
Behind par lequilfurmt confirinhr touteJ In obligatiom-prici-
demment intervenues entre I'Italie et In USA.- Ainsi, les bases
jerees pour realiser l'opi!ratioi1 iridiqu"ee en code so-us le
nom de Gladio. Une-fois comtitlll l'organisme ciandestin de
rhtstance, ritalie fur appeleea Parriciper, a-_ hi:- demande fran-
aux rravaux du CPP (Camire Oandestin de_Planificacion)
8pl:ranr d:ins le cadre du SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied
Pow-ers EurOpe)_ Un tel org.ine erait charge d'etudier la conduire
de r a-crivire informadvo-collective en Cas de guerre,- avec une
reference particuliere aux 'rerrir'Oires sUs(eptibles d'occupation
enriemie. Dansle comire etaiem deja Erats-Unis,
la Grande-Bretagne, Ia Fran-ce, l'Alleffiagne et d'autres pays de
I'OTAN. En 1964, notre -serviCe. Informations fut_ invite a
rcjoindrC le CCA _(Comhe A:Hi;;), charge
d'etudier de rsoudre les problemes de 'cooperation entre les
diffhents pays, pour le fonctionnement des jtvasi(J1J el de
fuite. La Grande-Breragne, Ia France, les Ia Bel-
gique, les Pays-Bas, le Luxembourg et l'A!Iemag'rie de !'Ouest
apparrenaienr deja a ce com-ire.
3. L'operation Gl:adio
Sur Ia base de.r accordr.Iignb iour-ii. tour avec ies organi.ratiom
parallJ!es dn aut res nations, 1e- SIF AR inaugura 1' organisation
clandesdne a travers Ia constitution d'une structure:
- ContrO/fe par Ia structure officidle d'infonn;r;tion .
. - Forinee operant sur le territoire cui, de l'ige,
dU. Sexe ecde de bonnes possibilires
d'echapp"er a deportations et imememems.
-De gestton faole, meme de la pan: c une structure de
tommandpilenc au rcrritoire occupe.
- CoUvene par im Secret maXimal er pourcerre subdivis6e
.dans un ordonmincemtnt cellulaire pour cC::duire au minimurri
les-dommages de dysfonctiOnnemem ..
. Le r_tseau clandcitin s'articulait ainsi:
- Servii:.e informarions.
- Se.fvice sabotage.
-: proPagande er geoecak
:... SerViCe radio-communication. ..
-Service chiffres.
- ser\;ite r"ecep.tion. et. tninsfert. de 'personmis.. . . .
. ies- secteurs devai'enr opi:rer indi:pendammerii: 1es uns des
. en. cheorie, ils devaient ignorer l' existence, rac-
dUne de repli-, indiVidua-:
ilSee':par le SMD 'en .. Sardlligne.
se10n le plan d.e travail fair par le SIFAR, 1' organiSation. de
1a srrticrure':derfsistance comportair-; , ..
- Li .formation dU

direcreur a: un cours d'ins-

, truction.auprh dd::: Trainirig DiVision de l' lnrelligence SerVice ..
.. britarmique. ' ..
-I.e reciU:teffient des .chefs de rbeaU et des agents, avec le
ccincours du service .. . .
-La planificatiOn . geog/aphiqUe . et optrarionJ,elle des di(
ftrems .serviCes en -:Jtalie" sept'encrionale; .a ... raCcOrder aux
bufeaux .orerarions des forceS armees et ail Juv.i;e infd
usA.
Le ch0ix dU avec l'.ln"td!igence US. .
Aptes urie lung.ue phase de gestation en 1956, fut cOnsrituee
dans le c:l'dre du bureau .R du SIFAR, i.me .sectiOn
nement SAD SoeCiil.!es et entraffle"inent
personriel), i le S{F AR, pour !a premiere foi.r
dam son histoire, mei en reuvre le commtmdement des fori:es
.rpiciale.r et de I' appareii d'organiJation didactique et logiJtique
a leUr fonctionnement.
La seccion: dorit le responsable avait un rOle de:
de 1' operatioh Gladio : s'aniculaii: en quatre gr6upes :
l"un de sour.ien general, un autre de secretariat permanent et
d' activ.l.rion des branches un troisieme de trans-
missions,.le dernier de: suPP6n aerien, logistique et' opeTarlonlli:l.
Autre structure a la de la section: le CES (Cemre
d' Enuaiiiement Sapeurs) .
. Les !ignes directrices qui uniformisent l"activiti: de la nouvelle
;ection som :
-La romtitution de l'apparei/ directeur central et la pl;mification
generaTe.
- La .canstitution et le renfmument de Ia baJe d' eiln'alnemem,
des. instrucreurs er deS equipemems didacriques. .
.:.. La c-on.rtitutioi?. dU tranminion1 (pou'r !t.r liaho'n.r a grande
diJttmCe; Mtivlr de pro"pagande radio, tran.rmis.rion de: broutllage):
-La pl,inijicatlon des . tliment.r fondam"en:aux de l'organi-
.ration (Jku.ritf; perionne!, em'rainement, organi1ation 'it docu
inentation).
1A de cours d''entrainement a l'e:fanger de
'recole.du service US). . -- - . .
- Activition des branches op'eratiOnnelles ( 40 panni le.r-
queh :) .
6 in(orinations
6 prCJpagande
10 sabotage
6 ei: .fuite
12 guerilla .
5 uniteS .de pretes a l'ernpioi dans Ies regions srr"a-
regiques ilppdees: Etoile alPine, :Etoile marine, Rhododen<:J.fon,
Az:iltt et Genet. "
-L'entrafnement .et fa qu'alific-atian des {fimmts dn nayaux et
dn unith priteJ a .
":....La reconnaissance 'terresrre et at:rierme des zones
recueil- de la documentation (canographique, monogra-
phiqUe et phorOiraphique).
.:.- aci:ivites le cadre du CES
.. marines, 'paracnurisres; : sous-mariii'es 'er' rerni.'iiis : . :.
. . . . . . . . . .-: . . .
En t .
. operar'ql!es a .. et.'lcs uiifres: op;era:- :
. . : a. en :temps' de paix dans des;. .. .
: ... :: app.rbpriees cn.cerrees 'dans: zones d'operation:.: .. .. ..
. . . I.es en .que5i:i.oq. fure:qi enveloppes. dans:des embii:l..: .
.:- -lages spe'ciaux: ' afilt'd' en. 'asS.u'rer.la. parfaite co'nservacion :et, a
.... pa.rrir.: <k .. I963, 1a commeo\a:: . On wriiptait
.. :'. dans: ce:. des' aqnh :"po'rtables, : 'explosifs; :
. mm-'er canons de.
. 5_7- .Q'lm, Jusiis : de .. (emwi:urs-
.. ,;iselirs et dilrerems:acceS.soiies; . . .. :-:;. . ... .. .. ,
: : .. A de {it dedouvert'e par; des. ::
.. .de :Aiihiina,. :de .. ;:
itciinie,:6n. qe } 972,: a <
et :des posres.
. pr.Ochc:S du lieu ol?( il .iivaiC: er(eq.f()lii.: Les ... explosifs. furenr .-
: 'qu <;l'eP.tl.r d:e mun.itions .de .Ca:rh.poneia; :
:. ilienee.. en "t973. : .
..... H:.: .. / .; :-. .. __ . ...... -
sans doutt.' .':: .
. .. : a I'epoque ou . ' . :
. , . ... - .. aba?donnes sur !es
. . . . . lei.ir"recjperadon ir1l,p!iqti..rut demolitions: ..
. :: . .: _. .; _ ._. .... _. . _ .. ._ . = :_:_ .
.. . . . ...:. 2.(un a'{eC legerest: un".a.vec deS: . . ,
- .. pex:ables'' parce::. que . 'par uqe .extension. de. 'superfiCit: ....
... : : d\i_n: dmeriere .. , - ::- . ,::. :; .'-' - .. : ..
..... .'
. . ... 5, sur ... .. .. (GNO.J -. ::-::. :.
. .. qei > :
:. precec,iences Guerre : et
- -.. . .:. - - -- I . . : J
..
. .
. ::;
modifications radicales survenues au Service d'Information et
de securire Iralien ont conduit a reYoir les modalires de rea-
lisation de la purre non orthodoxe, fCit-ce dans le respect par
notre pays des accords internationam:.
Dans un tel contexte, Ia reduction des directives du SHAPE,
en partic'utier mr fa guerre non rmhodoxe, de janvier 1969, et lei
accord.r concftu au Iiige du COmiti ik Coordination A!liie ont
entralne Ia formation au SISMI de cadres qualifies et grades
pour instruire du personnel exteme, en cas d'invasion, sur des
operations miliraires clandestines telles que:
- Informations er propagande.
-Evasion et infiltration.
-Guerilla.
-Sabotage.
Toute Ia conduire des opharions est confiee a du personnel
du SISMI qui active une base nationale deja prete sur notre
territoire. En temps de paix, cerre base assume tgalemem des
fonctions d'entrainemem pour fa futle clandntine et les dtp/Jts
de mat!riel IOUI !e nom canventionne! de Centre d'emrainement
sapeurs et paras.
Pour les operations clandestines, il fut prevu au depart
l' enrOlement d'un millier d' elements environ parmi lesquels tme
centaine dtjd recrutfs et entraini.r pour activitb d'informarion,
de propagande, d'evasion et d'infiltration. L'entralnemenr et la
participation a des actions de sabotage et de gu&illa sent
reserves a des membres du service particu!iirement .rilectionnis.
En cas de conflit, on privoit le recrutement, au Iein de.r cadres du
Ieroice, d'un nombre indijini de partisam (.rotdats).
L'actilliti principale en tempi de paix consisu esHntiellement
J et lvmtudtemm; a recruter de.r per.ronne.r apre.r a
as.rurer de.r fonctionJ de comnwndement et de.r Clementi maftri.rant
des notions 1ptcia/n.
- L 'entrainement du per.ronnel recrut!.
-Des exercices en commun avec les un-ices a/lib.
- L'acquisition e1 Ia canservation J long terme du mat!rid.
- Le cantrfJ/e du perionnel dijJ recru# J des fin.r de JicuriN.
- L'ichange d'explrience avec lei seroices re/iiJ entre eux.
Le recrutement du persannel en quatre phaJeJ: indi-
tidualiJation, J!iection, entrafnement et contrii!e.
La lai 80. 177 pdvoit :
- L'interdiction de rer:ruter deJ sujetJ tefs que mem6reJ du Par-
lement, rlgionaux, provinciaux ou municipaux, magis-
frats, miniJtrn du culte ou journa!IJteJ.
-La poJJeiJion de quaJit1 garantiJsant une fid!Jitt scrupuleuu
aux vahurs de fa Constitution ripublhaine antijaJciJte
Bien Jflr pas de charge pinafe, ni de poluique aaiviste, ni de
participation a deJ mouvemenu extrlmiJtn qmh qu'iiJ Joinlt.
Dn contrVles rlgufien virifient fa permanence deJ exigence.r
pricities, doni le manquement implique - dam certain.r cas, ceia
.r'est produit- !'exclusion de l'organiJation.
6. Conclusion
On peur affirmer aujourd'hui que l'operarion :
-Est prevue par des directives de l'OT A.c""-1 et inseree dans la
planificarion.
-Est r6alisi:e et perfeaionnee a des fins de stcurire absolue,
Jurtout en ce qui le contrVie Jllr /'emploi du matiriel, doni
le pertonnel ne pourra entrer en poJJe.r.rion que sur /'initiative des
aut/Jrlth centrale; et par ie recoun a det modalith particuliires
qui ne toUrmt aucune initiative autonome au niveau intermldi4ir;.
-Est destinte a conrrarier d'tventuelles occupations 6trangtres-
du terriroire national susceptibles de mettre en peril les insti-
tutions democratiques ou la libre expression des droits consti-
rutionnels.
A la lurnif:re des i:vl:nements recents er signifi.catifs qui ont
bouleverse !'Europe de !'Est ... , le gouvemement limpoH de
revoir routes les dispositions en matiire de non ()rthodoxe
et de promouvoir route initiative propre a verifier, rant s= le
plan politique que sur cdui de la technique mi!itaire, i'm:tudle
utilitl et !a des systf:mes de proteCtion du territoire
national.
24.12.90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 324/201
Thursday, 22 November 1990
7. Reaffirms its support for the most comprehensive and stringent embargo as a means of
bringing pressure to bear on Iraq with a view to restoring the rule of law in Kuwait and avoiding
war:
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, European
Political Cooperation, the governments of Iraq and Kuwait and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
2. Gladio
Joint resolution replacing 83-2021, 2058, 2068, 2078 and 2087/90
RESOLUTION
on the Gladio affair
The European Parliament.
A. having regard to the revelation by several European governments of the existence for
40 years of a clandestine intelligence and armed operations organization in several Member
States of the Community.
B. whereas for over 40 years this organization has eluded all democratic controls and has been
run by the secret services of the states concerned in collaboration with NATO.
C. fearing the danger that such clandestine networks may have interfered illegally in the
internal political affairs of Member States or may still do so.
D. whereas in certain Member States military secret services (or uncontrolled branches thereof)
were involved in serious cases of terrorism and crime as evidenced by various judicial
inqumes.
E. whereas these organizations operated and continue to operate completely outside the law
since they are not subject to any parliamentary control and frequently those holding the
highest government and constitutional posts have claimed to be in the dark as to these
matters.
F. whereas the various 'GLADIO' organizations have at their disposal independent arsenals
and military resources which give them an unknown strike potential, thereby jeopardizing
the democratic structures of the countries in which they are operating or have been oper-
ating.
G. greatly concerned at the existence of decision-making and operational bodies which are not
subject to any form of democratic control and are of a completely clandestine nature at a
time when greater Community cooperation in the field of security is a constant subject of
discussion.
l. Condemns the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks and calls for
a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims and all other aspects of these clandestine
organizations. any misuse thereof, their use for illegal interference in the internal political affairs
of the countries concerned, the problem of terrorism in Europe and the possible collusion of the
secret services of Member States or third countries;
2. Protests vigorously at the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in
NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and
operation network:
3. Calls on the governments of the Member States to dismantle all clandestine military and
paramilitary networks:
No C 324/202 Official Journal of the European Communities
Thursday, 22 November 1990
4. Calls on the judiciaries of the countries in which the presence of such military organiza-
tions has been ascertained to elucidate fully their actual extent and modus operandi and to
clarify any action they may have taken to destabilize the democratic structures of the Member
States;
5. Requests all the Member States to take the necessary measures. if necessary by establishing
parliamentary committees of inquiry, to draw up a complete list of organizations active in this
field, and at the same time to investigate their links with the respective state intelligence services
and their links. if any. with terrorist action groups and/or other illegal practices;
6. Calls on the Council of Ministers to provide full information on the activities of these
secret intelligence and operational services;
7. Instructs its Political Affairs Committee to consider holding a hearing in order to clarify the
role and impact of the 'GLADIO' organization and any similar bodies;
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council. the
Secretary-General of NATO. the governments of the Member States and the United States
Government.
3. Computer industry
- Joint resolution replacing 83-2019, 2036, 2059 and 2086/90
RESOLUTION
on mass redundancies in the European computer industry, in particular at Philips, Olivetti and
Bull
The European Parliament,
A. whereas on 25 October 1990, the Board of Directors of the Philips Group announced a plan
involving 50 000 job losses, in addition to the I 0 000 already announced on 2 July, together
with the closure of production units,
B. whereas these job losses are symptomatic of a crisis affecting the entire electronics and data
processing sector in Europe: the announcement by Bull data processing systems on 7 Nov-
ember 1990 of 5 000 job losses and by Olivetti on 13 November of 7 000 job losses. together
with the buy-out of the British ICL by the Japanese Fujitsu.
C. whereas other important sectors are also threatened with drastic job losses.
D. whereas the Philips Group is participating in the European programme of research into
high-definition television and the European JESSI programme of research into the devel-
opment of a new generation of memory banks and is receiving public funds from the
Member States and the European Community for this purpose,
E. whereas the procedure that the Philips management proposes to follow involves no more
than the provision of information at national rather than at international or European leveL
F. whereas the European market is awash with products from countries where there is complete
disregard for the principles enshrined in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social
Rights for Workers and this is also undermining the European industrial-relations model,
G. whereas social dialogue is an essential feature of this model and, under the EEC Treaty, the
Commission is mandated to develop the dialogue between management and labour at
European level (Article ll8b ),
24. 12.90