RULE 70 + PARTITION CASE DIGESTS REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

<PMB>

Held: Wilfredo had been in prior physical possession of the property; the petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth. Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto. Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable." Possession in ejectment cases "means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law." In a forcible entry case, "prior physical possession is the primary consideration." A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him." The party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror. The recovery of possession of real property is a real action that is not extinguished by the death of a party. The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased. This judgment entitles the winning party to: (a) the restitution of the premises, (b) the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, and (c) attorneys fees and costs. Wilfredo was holding the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure possession was also disputed before his death, along with the de facto possession. Without need, however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution. What actually survives under the circumstances is the award of damages, by way of compensation, that the RTC originally awarded and which the CA and this Court affirmed. The heirs of Wilfredo shall succeed to the computed total award under the rules of succession, a matter that is not within the authority of this Court to determine at this point.

G.R. No.171555 April 17, 2013 EVANGELINE RIVERA-CALINGASAN vs. WILFREDO RIVERA, et. al. BRION, J.: Facts: Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several parcels of land in Lipa City, Batangas. When Loreto died, his heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her one-half share of the conjugal estate. All the properties were adjudicated in favor of the spouses daughters while Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a reservation of his usufructuary rights during his lifetime, such fact being annotated on the certificate of titles. Almost a decade later, Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. claiming he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land with a building used for his furniture business. Taking advantage of his absence due to his hospital confinement, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. took possession and caused the renovation of the building on the property. Petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., with the aid of armed men, barred him from entering the property. Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights and that another action between the same parties is pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 (an action for the annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo). The MTCC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, the latter affirmed the MTCCs findings for lack of cause of action. However, upon reconsideration, the RTC ordered the eviction of the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc finding Wilfredos renunciation of his usufructuary rights could not be the basis of the complaints dismissal since it is the subject of a pending litigation and upheld Wilfredos prior possession and subsequent dispossession of the property. However, the RTC again modified its decision by absolving Star Honda, Inc. from any liability finding no evidence that Star Honda, Inc. participated in the dispossession. The CA affirmed the RTCs findings. During the pendency of the case, however, Wilfredo died and was substituted by his second wife. Issue: Who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior physical possession of the property?

G.R. No. 183858 April 17, 2013 HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONvs. SPOUSES CARLOS AND ELIZABETH ABACAN

SERENO, CJ.: Facts: Petitioner Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired a parcel of land located in Malolos City. HTRDC commenced a complaint with the DARAB for cancellation of emancipation patents against some of the occupants of the land which was granted by the provincial adjudicator and affirmed by the DARAB. During the pendency of the DARAB case, the occupants possession was tolerated. HTRDC then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTCC of Malolos against the occupants alleging that despite both verbal and written demands to vacate the property, the occupants have failed to do so. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of HTRDC and later ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Meanwhile, the provincial agrarian reform officer (PARO) filed an action for annulment of sale against HTRDC. Respondents motion to stay execution on the ground that a supervening event had transpired was denied by the MTCC. The MTCC issued an Alias Writ of Execution and an Alias Special Order of Demolition. Respondents moved to quash both writs on the ground that the Emancipation Patents had been issued in their favor during the pendency of the case. As such, they argued that they had now acquired ownership of relevant portions of the subject property. The MTCC denied their motion. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and held that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. Issue: Whether or not the respondents subsequent acquisition of ownership was a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment Held: No, the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the parties respecting title to the land or building. (Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of a real property covered by a transfer certificate of title. They claim that sometime in 1990, out of tolerance and permission, they allowed respondent Faustinos brother, Felix, and his wife, Rosita, to inhabit the subject property at Ayala Heights, Quezon City. Faustino agreed to sell the property to Felix on condition that the title shall be delivered only after Felix and Rositas payment of the full purchase price, and after respondents settlement of their mortgage obligations with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). However, Faustino later agreed to deliver in advance an incomplete draft of a Deed of Absolute Sale, which had not yet been notarized. While respondents themselves drafted the deed, the parties again agreed that the document would only be completed after full payment. Respondents later sent a demand letter to petitioners asking them to vacate the premises but petitioners refused to do so, prompting respondents to file a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Quezon City. In their Answer, petitioners presented a copy of a completed Deed of Absolute Sale claiming that respondents had sold the property for P3,130,000, which petitioners had paid in full and in cash on the same day. Due to respondents refusal to surrender the title to them as buyers, petitioners were allegedly constrained to file an action for specific performance with Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC. The MTC gave weight to the Deed of Sale presented by petitioners and dismissed the Complaint. The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC while the CA later reversed the lower courts and rules that a mere plea of title over disputed land cannot be used as sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession. Issue: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it ruled on the validity of a notarized Deed of Sale in a summary ejectment action Held: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of ownership in unlawful detainer cases and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties respective evidence deserves more weight. Trial courts must necessarily delve into and weigh the evidence of the parties in order to rule on the right of possession.

G.R. No. 185518 April 17, 2013 SPS. FELIX AND ROSITA CHINGKOE vs. SPS. FAUSTINO AND GLORIA CHINGKOE SERENO, C.J.:

G.R. No. 172588 March 13, 2013 ISABEL N. GUZMAN vs. ANIANO N. GUZMAN BRION, J.: Facts: Petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao City a complaint for ejectment against her children Aniano N. Guzman and Primitiva G. Montealto. The petitioner alleged that she and Arnold N. Guzman owned the 6/7th and 1/7th portions, respectively, of a 1,446-square meter parcel of land in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan; the respondents occupied the land by tolerance; the respondents did not comply with her written demand to vacate the property; and subsequent barangay conciliation proceedings failed to settle the differences between them. Respondents countered that the petitioner transferred in a document all her property rights in the disputed property, except her usufructuary right, in favor of her children, and that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping since she already raised the issue of ownership in a petition for cancellation of adverse claim against the respondents, pending with Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. The MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the land with a right to its possession and that the petitioner committed no forum shopping. The RTC ruled for the respondents and set aside the MTC ruling. Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the petition on technical grounds and also held that the petitioner cannot validly claim that the respondents occupied the properties through mere tolerance since they were co-owners of the property as compulsory heirs of Alfonso Guzman, the original owner. Issue: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioners petition for certiorari Held: No; the RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the petitioners transfer of rights, even if it had not been raised as an error. Under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the appeal based on the entire record of the MTC proceedings and such pleadings submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. Nonetheless, even without this provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent. The matter of the petitioners transfer of rights, which was in the records of the case, was the basis for the RTCs decision.

Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, hence, it is a special civil action with a special procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the question of entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. Thus, any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional, made solely for the purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Accordingly, any ruling on the validity of the petitioners transfer of rights is provisional and should be resolved in a proper proceeding.

G.R. No. 174436 January 23, 2013 JUANITA ERMITAO vs. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS PERALTA, J.: Facts: Respondent and petitioner, through her representative, lsabelo R. Ermitao, executed a Contract of Lease wherein petitioner leased in favor of respondent a 336 square meter residential lot and a house standing thereon located at Doa Vicenta Village, Davao City. The contract period is one (1) year, which commenced on November 4, 1999, with a monthly rental rate of P13,500.00. Pursuant to the contract, respondent paid petitioner P2,000.00 as security deposit to answer for unpaid rentals and damage that may be cause to the leased unit. Subsequently, respondent received information that petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap (Yap) and that the same was already foreclosed with Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered. Yap's brother later offered to sell the subject property to respondent for which the latter bought from Yap for P950,000.00. A Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties wherein it was indicated that the property was still subject to petitioner's right of redemption. Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap as well as the sheriff's provisional certificate of sale. Pending final resolution of the suit, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA were unanimous in sustaining the presumption of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subject property.The MTCC, the RTC, the CA, and SC also sustained the validity of respondent's purchase of the disputed property from Yap. Issue: Who, between petitioner and respondent, is entitled to possess the subject property?

Held: The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. In

unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which provides that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply as in the present case. Petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered moot when the period of redemption expired without petitioner having redeemed the subject property, for upon expiration of such period petitioner lost his possessory right over the same. Hence, the only remaining right that petitioner can enforce is his right to the rentals during the time that he was still entitled to physical possession of the subject property.

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal. Upon reaching the Court of Appeals, the court dismissed the appeal ruling that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership and not anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Issue: Who, between the parties, has the right to possession of the disputed properties

Held: One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court." In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. A title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession. However, questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case. The evidence shows that respondents have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioners father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding. Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial

G.R. No. 183822 January 18, 2012 RUBEN C. CORPUZ vs. Sps. AGUSTIN SERENO, J.: Facts: Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City. The parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name an Original Certificate of Title was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives. Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises. Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971. Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

MeTC dismissed Union Banks ejectment complaint. It found that Union Banks cause of action was based on a breach of contract and that both parties are claiming a better right to possess the property based on their respective claims of ownership of the property and therefore the appropriate action to resolve these conflicting claims was an accion reivindicatoria, over which it had no jurisdiction. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Makati City affirmed the MeTC. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. Issue: Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over an ejectment case if the cause of action is based on a breach of contract Held: Yes. In any case involving the question of jurisdiction, the Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded by the litigant through the allegations in his complaint. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to expiration or termination of the right to possess. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the action must be filed "within one (1) year after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." Under Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, "when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession." Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, however, states that "the judgment shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building." The authority granted to the MeTC to preliminarily resolve the issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession ultimately allows it to interpret and enforce the contract or agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. To deny the MeTC jurisdiction over a complaint merely because the issue of possession requires the interpretation of a contract will effectively rule out unlawful detainer as a remedy. The right to possess the property was extinguished when the contract to sell failed to materialize. While admitting that it suspended payment of the installments, Maunlad Homes contended that the suspension of payment did not affect its right to possess the property because its contract with Union Bank was one of sale and not to sell; hence, ownership of the property has been transferred to it, allowing it to retain possession notwithstanding nonpayment of installments. The terms of the contract, however, do not support this conclusion. Where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to sell."

G.R. No. 190071 August 15, 2012 UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC. BRION, J.: Facts: Union Bank, as seller, and respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. ( Maunlad Homes), as buyer, entered into a contract to sell involving the Maunlad Shopping Mall for P151 million, P2.4 million of which was to be paid by Maunlad Homes as down payment with the balance to be paid over a 180-month period. Under the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes to take possession of the property and to build or introduce improvements thereon. The parties also agreed that if Maunlad Homes violates any of the provisions of the contract, all payments made will be applied as rentals for the use and possession of the property, and all improvements introduced on the land will accrue in favor of Union Bank. In the event of rescission due to failure to pay or to comply with the terms of the contract, Maunlad Homes will be required to immediately vacate the property and must voluntarily turn possession over to Union Bank. When Maunlad Homes failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank sent the former a Notice of Rescission of Contract, demanding payment of the installments due within 30 days from receipt; otherwise, it shall consider the contract automatically rescinded. Maunlad Homes failed to comply. Hence, Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a letter demanding payment of the rentals due and requiring that the subject property be vacated and its possession turned over to the bank. When Maunlad Homes continued to refuse, Union Bank instituted an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court ( MeTC) of Makati City. Maunlad Homes resisted the suit by claiming, among others, that it is the owner of the property as Union Bank did not reserve ownership of the property under the terms of the contract. By virtue of its ownership, Maunlad Homes claimed that it has the right to possess the property.

G.R. No. 170509 June 27, 2012 VIEGELY SAMELO vs. MANOTOK SERVICES, INC. BRION, J.: Facts: Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of land situated at Tondo, Manila. The respondent entered into a contract with the petitioner for the lease of a portion of the lot. The lease contract was for a period of one (1) year, with a monthly rental of P3,960.00. After the expiration of the lease contract, the petitioner continued occupying the subject premises without paying the rent. The respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok, sent a letter to the petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises and pay compensation for its use and occupancy but petitioner refused. The respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Manila. In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had no right to collect rentals because the subject premises are located inside the property of the Philippine National Railways (PNR). She also added that the respondent had no certificate of title over the subject premises. The petitioner further claimed that her signature in the contract of lease was obtained through the respondents misrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she is now the owner of the subject premises as she had been in possession since 1944. The MeTC, decided in favor of the respondent. Upon appeal, the RTC set aside the MeTCs decision and dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and reinstated the MeTC judgment ruling that the petitioner is now estopped from questioning the right of the respondent over the subject property as a tenant cannot controvert the title of his landlord or assert any rights adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves. Issue: Held: Who has a better right of possession over the premises Respondent has a better right of possession over the subject premises.

Respondent did not give the petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the lease contract and the latter continued enjoying the subject premises for more than 15 days, without objection from the respondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor, there can be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract. An implied new lease was therefore created pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code. Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered to be from month to month, in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 185091 August 8, 2010 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRIMO MENDOZA and MARIA LUCERO ABAD, J.: Facts: Paninsingin Primary School (PPS), a public school operated by the DepEd, has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school but two lots thereof were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas). The Mendozas caused the 2 lots to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots of which the Register of Deeds issued new titles for in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo. Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for the other lots. Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property. The Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property. When PPS declined to do so, the Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. The MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republics immunity from suit. The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republics consent was not necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it. The RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. Upon appeal, the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and on its permanent improvements thereon. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public school Held: A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration

"An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved. Thus, when the relationship of lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful detainer case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question of ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might throw light on the right of possession.

or its notice. Title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible. No one may acquire it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership. That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas title. The Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title. Otherwise, there is little evidentiary weight as proof of ownership. The RTC has the power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas right to just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.

Regional Trial Court (RTC), and to stay execution of said judgment, private respondent filed a supersedeas bond with the MeTC. The RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment. The RTC granted petitioners motion for the immediate execution of the RTC Decision but the CA subsequently issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereto. Issue: Whether the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the immediate execution of the RTC judgment is proper Held: It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that "the judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom." However, on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require. Even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. Where the action is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except in cases of manifest abuse. Be it noted that for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules of Court do not require that the act complained of be in clear violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy. When exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if there are circumstances necessitating such action. Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.

G.R. No. 154152 August 25, 2010 LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. ARTURO LEDESMA PERALTA, J.: Facts: Petitioner filed an ejectment case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) against private respondent Ledesma, alleging that despite expiration of the contract of lease executed between them and demands to vacate subject premises and pay rentals therefor, the latter failed to comply with such demands. Private respondent countered that he had paid the rentals over subject premises and petitioner no longer had the right to possess the property as it had been foreclosed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Private respondent further pointed out that subject premises had in fact been in the possession of the DBP since March or April of 1997, so since that time, it was with the DBP that he made arrangements for his continued occupation of the subject premises. The MeTC then rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondent to surrender possession of subject premises to petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the

G.R. No. 174042 July 9, 2008 CITY OF NAGA vs. HON. ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: Macario A. Mariano and Jose A. Gimenez were the registered owners of a 229,301square meter land covered by a transfer certificate of title located in Naga City. The land was subdivided into several lots and sold as part of City Heights Subdivision (CHS). The officers of

CHS offered to construct the Naga City Hall on a two (2)-hectare lot within the premises of the subdivision. Said lot was to be designated as an open space for public purpose and donated to petitioner in accordance with the rules and regulations of the National Urban Planning Commission. CHS amended its offer to five hectares, which, through Resolution No. 89, the Municipal Board accepted. Mariano and Gimenez thereafter delivered possession of the lots described as Blocks 25 and 26 to the City Government of Naga (city government). Eventually, the contract for the construction of the city hall was awarded by the Bureau of Public Works through public bidding to Francisco O. Sabaria, a local contractor. This prompted Mariano and Gimenez to demand the return of the parcels of land from petitioner. On assurance, however, of then Naga City Mayor Monico Imperial that petitioner will buy the lots instead, Mariano and Gimenez allowed the city government to continue in possession of the land and constructed the Naga City Hal. It also conveyed to other government offices portions of the land which house the NBI, LTO, and Hall of Justice, among others. After the death of Mariano, Danilo D. Mariano, as administrator and representative of the heirs of Macario A. Mariano, demanded from petitioner the return of Blocks 25 and 26 to CHS but to no avail. Respondent thus filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City, Branch 1.The MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the citys claim of ownership over the lots posed an issue not cognizable in an unlawful detainer case. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTC decision and directed petitioner to surrender physical possession of the lots to respondents with forfeiture of all the improvements, and to pay P2,500,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the land; P587,159.60 as attorneys fees; and the costs of suit. Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review with Very Urgent Motion/Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with the Court of Appeals. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion to Issue Writ of Execution which the CA denied. The RTC issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal. Issues: (1) Whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy to contest the disputed order, resolution, and notices (2) Whether petitioner was guilty of forum-shopping in filing the instant petition pending the petition for review before the Court of Appeals (3) Whether RTC Judge Montenegro committed grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal (4) Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Held:

(1) Yes. As a rule, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against an RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Under the present circumstance however, the Court took cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts for while it has been held that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the grant of a writ of certiorari, nevertheless such requirement may be dispensed with where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government. Under Section 1(c) and (f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order and an order of execution, respectively. An interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. Such is the nature of an order granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction; hence, not appealable. The proper remedy, as petitioner did in this case, is to file a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition under Rule 65. (2) No. Under the Same Objective Standard, the filing by a party of two apparently different actions, but with the same objective , constitutes forum- shopping. Here, the special civil action of certiorari is an independent action. The ultimate purpose of such action is to keep the inferior tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or relieve parties from arbitrary acts of the court. In contrast, the petition for review before the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 involves an evaluation of the case on the merits. (3) No. Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is pertinent: SEC. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Thus, the judgment of the RTC against the defendant in an ejectment case is immediately executory. Unlike Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules, Section 21 does not provide a means to prevent execution; hence, the courts duty to order such execution is practically ministerial. Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the RTC and decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require.
(4) Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking

cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except in cases of manifest abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules of Court do not require that the act complained of be in clear violation of the rights of the applicant. What the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy. This situation is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts. In the present case, the appellate court should have deferred resolution on the application until the RTC has decided on the motion for execution pending appeal. Moreover, nothing in the rules allow a qualified execution pending appeal that would have justified the exclusion of the NBI, City Hall and Hall of Justice from the effects of the writ.

Years thereafter, Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705. The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Emilia instituted a Complaint for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and damages. The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for partition, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages is hereby ordered dismissed whereas the affidavit of selfadjudication, deed of sale and the transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 were declared null and void. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707 and declared Lot No. 707 to be owned by Emilia, pro indiviso share; Felipa, pro indiviso share; and Hilaria, pro indiviso share. Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707 (2) Whether or not the respondents right to demand for partition is barred by acquisitive prescription or laches (3) Whether or not respondent is entitled to the eastern half of Lot No. 707 Held: (1) Yes. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Agripina and Carolina, as legitimate heirs of Eulalio , became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio. Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share, however, passed on to her daughter Carolina when the former died. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself an entire property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui non habet. As co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner.

G.R. No. 151334 February 13, 2013 CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION vs. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA REYES, J.: Facts: The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958. Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan was originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by an OCT issued in his name. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina). Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, Emilia. Soon thereafter, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased parents and also executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa. Upon Emilia and her familys return from the U.S., and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.

(2) No. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before the alleged prescriptive period began to run. When Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust was created by force of law and the two of them were considered a trustee of the respondents undivided share. As trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. (3) Yes. Under the Old Civil Code which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcelas marriage, Lot No. 707 was their conjugal property. When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Marcelas rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio. Under Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, Eulalio was entitled only to the usufruct of the lot while the naked ownership belonged to Agripina. When he remarried, Eulalios one half portion of the lot representing his share in the conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the other half were brought into his second marriage with Faustina. When Eulalio, portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her share in the conjugal partnership. The remaining were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and Eulalios children, Carolina and Agripina. However, Faustina is only entitled to the usufruct of the third available for betterment. The usufructuary of Eulalio over the portion inherited by Agripina earlier was merged with her naked ownership. Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 which represents her share in the conjugal partnership and her inheritance from Eulalio were in turn inherited by Carolina including Faustinas usufructuary rights which were merged with Carolinas naked ownership. Therefore, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8 pertains to Carolina. Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8 portion of the subject lot. Since the Deed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the eastern portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia instead of Agripinas entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited by Agripinas nearest collateral relative, who, records show, is her sister Carolina.

10