International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol.

17(2), 281287

DEBATE Reply to Glendinning

Self-reflexivity is a feature of continental philosophy that is sometimes disparaged, but it seems appropriate to begin this Reply by reflecting upon the exchange of views that Simon Glendinning and I have been engaged in. Prompted by the initial publication of Glendinnings The Idea of Continental Philosophy (2006), my first response to this book, Continental Philosophy and Chickening Out, attempted to offer a philosophical justification for the use of the umbrella term continental philosophy, to which Glendinning has eruditely replied; I now add my own further reflections. It is interesting to note that this very reply-to-reply structure is sometimes lampooned when continental philosophers offer characterizations of analytic practices, and it is certainly a much rarer practice in continental journals. That need not suggest that analytic philosophy alone is a dialogue of reason, as Jonathan Cohen implies in his book of that name (Clarendon, 1986), but rather that there are some important methodological and practico-institutional differences between the traditions that also bring with them normative questions like: What form should a philosophical debate take? How important are such debates for the future of philosophy? What conditions currently impoverish the likelihood of genuine debates? Of course, Glendinning would correctly point out that even this very thin characterization of the practices of analytic and continental philosophy assumes that there is something philosophically distinctive about continental philosophy as a tradition. And, as he rightly insists, establishing that the latter is not like the former is not sufficient to show the philosophical unity of continental philosophy, since there are infinitely many ways in which a philosophy might be unlike analytic philosophy. In this respect, let me concede that some of my remarks on science in the above essay, fleeting as they were, do fall victim to the problem of under-prediction that Glendinning discerns in the work of Critchley and now myself. To say that continental philosophy of science is generally quite distinct from analytic naturalism does not provide much by way of a description of what is distinctive about continental philosophy since there are, again, many ways in which one might not be an analytic naturalist.

International Journal of Philosophical Studies ISSN 09672559 print 14664542 online 2009 Taylor & Francis http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/09672550802707283

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Likewise, my slightly weaker contention that there is a significant difference between continental philosophys critical and transformative engagements with science and the deferential relationship to the best (or ideal) findings of the sciences in much analytic philosophy (which helps with various other family-resemblance features to give it a minimal unity) is still to define continental philosophy by exclusion. I take Glendinnings point here, but this was a relatively minor part of my above essay, where I centrally argue that continental philosophys quasi-unity revolves around methodological considerations (especially an investment in transcendental arguments) and what I termed its temporal turn. As far as I can see the former claim is not addressed by Glendinning, so let us begin with my claim regarding the temporal turn as a unifying feature of continental philosophy. For him, such a description has a restricted validity in accounting for a subset of continental philosophy (essentially Heidegger and the poststructuralists), or as a strategic/political move, but it is simply not sufficient to capture the philosophical diversity of thinkers usually thought to be part of this tradition. Indeed, he implies that I symptomatically omitted the list of proper names that he and Critchley provided to underscore this point about continental philosophys radical diversity: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Freud and Buber, Heidegger and Adorno, Lacan and Deleuze. Perhaps, however, this charge can be made less plausible if I can begin to show that these philosophers do not present an insurmountable challenge to my account, and if it is also noted that all of the figures except Buber, Adorno and Kierkegaard are mentioned in my above paper (albeit sometimes not in much depth). As I suggest there, it seems to me incontrovertible that Hegel, Freud, Lacan, Heidegger, and Deleuze have important things to say about time, and, moreover, that these reflections are fundamental to their more general philosophical projects. The work of Adorno is implicitly referred to in the discussion of critical theory, and while I confess I dont know much about Buber, it is interesting to observe that Michael Zanks Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry states: Among Bubers early philosophical influences were Kants Prolegomena which he read at the age of fourteen, and Nietzsches Zarathustra. Whereas Kant had a calming influence on the young mind troubled by the aporia of infinite versus finite time, Nietzsches doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same constituted a powerful negative seduction (2007). Zank suggests that this early concern characterized Bubers work throughout his career, and the reference to Kant and Nietzsche is also important here. As I note in the above essay, it is Kant who begins the temporal turn (according to Heidegger), and it is Nietzsche who argues that all ressentiment is resentment of the present (the now) and who claimed that the notion of the eternal return was his greatest idea. Zank contends that another of Bubers central concerns is the relationship between time and the other, and this has likewise been a prominent theme in continental philosophy (e.g. Merleau282

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Ponty, Levinas), perhaps starting with Hegels very influential thematization of the masterslave dialectic and the more general struggle for recognition that is fundamental to Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford, 1979). We will come back to this, but what about the other omission from my above paper, Kierkegaard? Perhaps it will suffice to note that Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton, 1992) is arguably primarily concerned with the manner in which the genuinely religious life involves a contradiction between temporal existence and eternity, as well as the manner in which the choice, or leap of faith, occurs at an instant in which time (lived time) and eternity are envisaged to intersect. Consequently, I think that my claim about a temporal turn, which traces roots in Nietzsche, Marx, Kierkegaard, Kant, and others, is stronger than Glendinning alleges. He says: It may well be that post-structuralists and this new wave have ploughed the furrow of a temporal turn that distinguishes it from most analytic philosophy today, and I explicitly accept in the book that confining the title to the new wave is a coherent and understandable strategy. However, with respect to the post-Kantian line of thinkers who are undoubted contributors to the texts that make up the primary works of Continental philosophy, we should not regard that strategic arrogation as showing up the unity or even quasi-unity of a distinctive Continental tradition. (p. 280 above). Contrary to Glendinning, I think that reading such post-Kantian figures in relation to a temporal turn is not merely a strategic appropriation of these eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts; we can see clear evidence of these claims in the texts of the vast majority of the usual suspects. That said, I am prepared to accept that such an interpretation is conducted with the benefit of hindsight and involves a relationship to these texts and thinkers that is irremediably altered by concerns that became more prevalent in the twentieth century. Not only is this hermeneutically inevitable, but it is also precisely why I restrict my claims to a meaningful continental tradition to the early twentieth century and the work of Husserl, Bergson, and Heidegger, alleging that their work constitutes a temporal tipping point, but not a moment of radical rupture from what precedes it. But even if Glendinning is right that my approach threatens to reduce to a kind of anachronism in relation to the past, imposing this temporal inflexion on historical figures whose preoccupations were really very different, it is nonetheless the case that a meaningful tradition with philosophical unity can be partly based on a projection, and I would suggest that such an interpretation/projection is central to twentieth-century continental philosophys relationship with 283

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earlier post-Kantian philosophers. It is also worth remembering that the incipient analytic movement at the start of the twentieth century had its own historical heroes and enemies, and involved highly selective readings of Hume, Kant, Mill, and others. The fact that analytic philosophys emergence was sometimes supported by a wilful relationship to the history of philosophy and often motivated by socio-political concerns that may have been unconscious or in the background does not mean that the twentieth-century phenomenon of analytic philosophy has no philosophical unity. I thus remain a little concerned about Glendinnings rather strident distinction between justifying an attribution of philosophical unity and socio-political/ strategic matters, as well as what I take to be his somewhat one-sided deployment of this rigorous distinction. To make this latter claim more perspicuous, it is useful to consider his endorsement of Peter Osbornes suggestion that there is no such thing as a primary text in continental philosophy. For Osborne and Glendinning: As a genre of more-or-less pure reception/interpretation, what we call texts in Continental philosophy is work that mediates the relation of the primary texts of Continental philosophy to another philosophical culture rather than philosophising with/out of/about them in a historically primary way. (Glendinning, 2006: p. 123). Various things might be said here. Firstly, one might contest that Osbornes distinction between primary philosophy and interpretive/mediative philosophy accurately captures the state of play in contemporary continental philosophy, or it might even be contested in principle by claiming that all philosophy is mediated and mediating. Even if one assented to either of these claims, however, it might still be contended that on a scale that involves a continuum rather than a binary opposition Osbornes (and Glendinnings) diagnosis remains fundamentally correct. If this is the claim, I am prepared to concur in part. Certainly this mediatory role is part of the situation with continental philosophy (especially in Anglophone countries) as it is practised today, and it can sometimes be a problem in regard to specific areas or philosophers. But, by the same token, it also seems to me that there are a lot of philosophers who genuinely do work in continental philosophy in a manner that problematizes Osborne and Glendinnings neat distinction between works of CP and works on works of CP (hermeneutic mediators). I dont think I can convince Glendinning of that here, but having countenanced Osbornes strong line (albeit one with which many analytic philosophers would concur), Glendinning backs away somewhat and leaves the burden of proof with the continental philosophy avower. My worry with this gesture, and the fact that it leaves hanging in the 284

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air the charge of hermeneutic textualism against continental philosophy (which is only partially true), is that the burden of proof suddenly seems both higher than it ought to be and higher than it actually seems to be when Glendinning accepts that analytic philosophy constitutes a philosophical tradition. Most of us can (and should) happily accept that there is a vital distinction between science and pseudo-science (say, astrology or creationism), but that does not deny the possibility that defenders of the former might overstate their critical case against the allegedly problematic and deviant variety by suddenly holding the latter to higher standards of proof than are applied in the former case. Popper did this in relation to science (as Kuhn and others pointed out), and Glendinning shows that analytic philosophy did this in fortifying the notion of a continental other in the late 1950s. In this case, my worry is that Glendinning, no card-carrying analytic and a very good philosopher at that, seems to repeat a related gesture in a more contested domain. Certainly, the question what philosophy is, and what it should be, is notoriously problematic. While he is not attempting to besmirch continental philosophy in any way, there is an insistence upon precise criteria for claims to unity in the case of continental philosophy that is not so apparent in the other case. He says, What we want is something like an idea or approach or distinction (or whatever) that is operative in much of Continental philosophy (see p. 274 above). This call for precision is a salient reminder to those of us who uncritically assume that there is a meaningful way of seeing continental philosophy as a tradition (albeit a fractured one), but if such precision is required, then it needs to be applied to the idea of analytic philosophy too. What is the idea, or approach, or distinction, that is operative in analytic philosophy? Analytic philosophers do not agree on any one approach or distinction obviously enough just look at the flurry of respondents to Cohens thesis regarding the dialogue of reason (The Dialogue of Reason: Clarendon, 1986) or Michael Dummetts thesis (Origins of Analytic Philosophy: Harvard, 1996) regarding the linguistic turn. Less controversially, if we use a family-resemblance criterion that involves multiple overlapping threads rather than looking for any single essence (as with Hans Glock), what are the relevant-family resemblance threads, enough of which will make you an analytic philosopher? In this respect, Glendinning rather uncritically borrows from Glocks list: (1) linguistic turn; (2) rejection of metaphysics; (3) philosophy does not equal science; (4) reductive analysis; (5) formal logic; (6) science oriented; (7) argument; (8) clarity. And yet Glock himself in his recent book What Is Analytic Philosophy? argues that a list of family resemblances is not sufficient on its own, and needs to be supplemented by awareness of, and some minimal investment in, paradigmatic figures (e.g. Russell, Moore, etc.), which, of course, relies on a sociopolitical inheritance of tradition (Cambridge, 2008: pp. 215, 219, 223). If we ignore the latter, which Glendinning suggests is not part of a properly 285

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philosophical justification, is what is left really sufficient to justify the deployment of the term analytic philosophy as connoting any kind of philosophical unity? If we are going to be puritans about this (as I think Glendinning is in relation to continental philosophy at least), it seems that wed have to say no. Firstly, argument and clarity are very vague and ambiguous terms, and all of the other resemblance criteria are hotly debated and contested; some even seem to be mutually exclusive. So, while analytic philosophers may think that they are working within a tradition, unless a better theory is given about what this consists in then it seems that we are obliged (if we follow Glendinnings logic) to conclude that the primary works of analytic philosophy are not necessarily the primary works in analytic philosophy, just as Glendinning alleges is the case with continental philosophy. Now, I dont myself want to endorse this conclusion. I am a bender in Glendinnings terms, which will shortly be explained, and I agree with Glock that a combination of family-resemblance criteria and matters concerning inheritance of a canon allow us to call analytic philosophy a tradition with philosophical unity. I also want to accept that the practice of conditionalization in the name of inferential connectivity lends credibility to the idea that there is more of a unity in this tradition than the continental one, at least in methodological practice if not in metaphilosophical reflections about that practice. But the point of the foregoing analysis is to suggest that Glendinnings standards for what is required to constitute a philosophical tradition are somewhat unevenly applied. In fact, I wonder if Glendinning (and Osborne) make the classic mistake, thematized so well by psychoanalysis, of attributing to the other (in this case analytic philosophy) the unity that they themselves desire. Contrary to them, I want to maintain that continental philosophy possesses sufficient philosophical unity to comprise a tradition. As I have explored here, my view is that the temporal turn is the strongest resemblance criterion, along with the methodological preparedness to use transcendental arguments, which are, of course, generally eschewed in the analytic tradition. But, for the sake of the argument with Glendinning, let me bite the bullet and provide a list of family resemblances that I think underwrite a loose philosophical unity in continental philosophy. In no particular order: (1) wariness about aligning philosophical method with common sense (including folk psychology); (2) temporal turn; (3) abiding interest in thematizing inter-subjectivity; (4) anti-representationalism about the mind (this includes what we might today call computational and functionalist models); (5) methodological investment in transcendental arguments; (6) deep concern with the relationship between style and content; (7) critical and transformative (rather than deferential) relation to science. While some of these features are negative rather than positive, few continental philosophers will not exhibit a majority of them. If anything they are more specific than Glocks criteria, encompassing both topical and methodological features, and yet they are still loose enough to 286

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avoid the risk of sinking the undoubtedly radical differences between the various theorists labelled continental. When these features are combined with factors concerning inheritance of a tradition (in this case, Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger, among others), it seems to me that continental philosophys claims on a distinctive philosophical tradition are not significantly worse off than the claims for analytic philosophy. In concluding, however, I would like to make another concession to Glendinning. He is right to say that The Idea of Continental Philosophy is existential as much as diagnostic. He poses a problem that all of us in philosophy ought to grapple with, and that is particularly pressing for continental philosophers whether to be an ender or a bender, in his eloquent terms. An ender is the one who knows that (what is in any case obvious) that the very idea of a Continental tradition is contentious or even perverse and so will be inclined to work with a certain lack of interest in securing or maintaining the idea of the analytic/Continental distinction (Glendinning, 2006: p. 119). Indeed, they will not even try to problematize the distinction directly. The distinction is said to be tiresome, over-determined, so the ender just endeavours to work without it. On the other hand, a bender demands that we acknowledge the de facto, real-world gulf or, at the very least, real-world gulf-effects, holding apart many whose work is marked by a serious interest in (among others) the usual suspects and many analytic philosophers. And the bender is (at least on occasion) willing to appropriate the title continental philosophy in order to do so. Glendinning suggests that these two responses, that of the ender and the bender, struggle within the breasts of everyone who has becomes a serious reader of the usual suspects (p. 120). While he ultimately sides with the ender, my own contingent answer to this existential situation is that one can (and should) be a non-essentialist bender, examining the methodologies and normative understandings of the value of philosophy exemplified by particular practices in philosophy, which at least in my view of continental philosophy do combine to form a cluster of family-resemblance criteria. While metaphilosophy happens within each so-called tradition, the questions are truncated and we thus need to do more comparative metaphilosophy, asking questions like what is the value of a given philosophical method, and what would the other(s) contest in it? While no long-term coming together or union is foreseeable, certainly not in the immediate future, we can at least hope for continuing encounters, for not being blinded by the allure of one particular approach. I hope that that will be the future for both continental philosophy and its other. La Trobe University

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