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. FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF FAUSTO C. IGNACIO,
namely MARFEL D. IGNACIO-
MANALO, MILFA D .. IGNACIO-
MANALO AND FAUSTINO D.
IGNACIO,
Petitioners,
-versus-
HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND
TRUST COMPANY, SPOUSES
PHILLIP AND THELMA
RODRIGUEZ, CATHERINE,
REYNOLD & JEANETTE, all
surnamed ZUNIGA,
Respondents.
G.R. 177783
Present:
SERENO, C.J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
-JAN 2 3 .2013 ,
}(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - -- -- - ----------}(
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the Decision
1
dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution
2
dated May 2,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73551. The CA
reversed the Decision
3
dated June 15, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ofPasig City, Branch 151 in Civil Case No. 58980.
2
The factual antecedents:
Designated additional member per Raffie dated January 14, 2013 vice Associare Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes who recused himself from the case due to prior action in the Court of Appeals.
Rollo, pp. 47-70. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Member of this Court)
with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Enrico A. Lanzanas concurring.
Id. at 71-72.
Records, Vol. 2, pp. 405-416. Penned by Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 177783

In August 1981, petitioner Fausto C. Ignacio mortgaged two parcels
of land to Home Savings Bank and Trust Company, the predecessor of
respondent Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company, as security for the
P500,000.00 loan extended to him by said bank. These properties which are
located in Cabuyao, Laguna are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
(T-40380) T-8595 and (T-45804) T-8350 containing an area of 83,303
square meters and 120,110 square meters, respectively.
4

When petitioner defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation,
respondent bank proceeded to foreclose the real estate mortgage. At the
foreclosure sale held on J anuary 26, 1983, respondent bank was the highest
bidder for the sum of P764,984.67. On February 8, 1983, the Certificate of
Sale issued to respondent bank was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna. With the failure of petitioner to redeem the foreclosed
properties within one year from such registration, title to the properties were
consolidated in favor of respondent bank. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-8595
and T-8350 were cancelled and TCT Nos. 111058 and 111059 were issued
in the name of respondent bank.
5

Despite the lapse of the redemption period and consolidation of title in
respondent bank, petitioner offered to repurchase the properties. While the
respondent bank considered petitioners offer to repurchase, there was no
repurchase contract executed. The present controversy was fuelled by
petitioners stance that a verbal repurchase/compromise agreement was
actually reached and implemented by the parties.
In the meantime, respondent bank made the following dispositions of
the foreclosed properties already titled in its name:
TCT No. 111059 (Subdivided into six lots with individual titles TCT Nos.
117771, 117772, 117773, 117774, 117775 and 117776)
A. TCT No. 117771 (16,350 sq.ms.) - Sold to Fermin Salvador and
Bella Salvador under Deed of Absolute Sale

4
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 59-70.
5
Supra note 3 at 107-109, 118-119, 255-259.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 177783

dated May 23, 1984 for the price of
P150,000.00

B. TCT No. 11772 (82,569 sq.ms. subdivided into 2 portions

1) Lot 3-B-1 (35,447 sq.ms.) - Sold to Dr. Oscar Remulla and
Natividad Pagtakhan, Dr. Edilberto Torres
and Dra. Rebecca Amores under Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 17, 1985 for the
price of P150,000.00
2) Lot 3-B-2 covered by separate title TCT No. 124660 (Subdivided
into 3 portions

Lot 3-B-2-A (15,000 sq.ms.) - Sold to Dr. Myrna del Carmen
Reyes under Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 23, 1987 for the price of P150,000.00

Lot 3-B-2-B (15,000 sq.ms.) - Sold to Dr. Rodito Boquiren under
Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 23, 1987
for the price of P150,000.00

Lot 3-B-2-C (17,122 sq.ms.) covered by TCT No. T-154568 -

C. TCT No.117773 (17,232 sq.ms.) - Sold to Rizalina Pedrosa under
Deed of Absolute Sale dated J une 4, 1984 for
the price of P150,000.00

The expenses for the subdivision of lots covered by TCT No. 111059
and TCT No. 117772 were shouldered by petitioner who likewise negotiated
the above-mentioned sale transactions. The properties covered by TCT Nos.
T-117774 to 117776 are still registered in the name of respondent bank.
6

In a letter addressed to respondent bank dated J uly 25, 1989,
petitioner expressed his willingness to pay the amount of P600,000.00 in
full, as balance of the repurchase price, and requested respondent bank to
release to him the remaining parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 111058
and T-154658 (subject properties).
7
Respondent bank however, turned
down his request. This prompted petitioner to cause the annotation of an
adverse claim on the said titles on September 18, 1989.
8

Prior to the annotation of the adverse claim, on August 24, 1989, the
property covered by TCT No. 154658 was sold by respondent bank to

6
Id. at 98-101 (Joint Stipulation of Facts), 118-127, 260-277.
7
Supra note 4 at 85.
8
Id. at 86.

Decision 4 G.R. No. 177783

respondent spouses Phillip and Thelma Rodriguez, without informing the
petitioner. On October 6, 1989, again without petitioners knowledge,
respondent bank sold the property covered by TCT No T-111058 to
respondents Phillip and Thelma Rodriguez, Catherine M. Zuiga, Reynold
M. Zuiga and J eannette M. Zuiga.
9

On December 27, 1989, petitioner filed an action for specific
performance and damages in the RTC against the respondent bank. As
principal relief, petitioner sought in his original complaint the reconveyance
of the subject properties after his payment of P600,000.00.
10
Respondent
bank filed its Answer denying the allegations of petitioner and asserting that
it was merely exercising its right as owner of the subject properties when the
same were sold to third parties.
For failure of respondent bank to appear during the pre-trial
conference, it was declared as in default and petitioner was allowed to
present his evidence ex parte on the same date (September 3, 1990).
Petitioner simultaneously filed an Ex-Parte Consignation tendering the
amount of P235,000.00 as balance of the repurchase price.
11
On September
7, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. Said
decision, as well as the order of default, were subsequently set aside by the
trial court upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration by the respondent
bank.
12

In its Order dated November 19, 1990, the trial court granted the
motion for intervention filed by respondents Phillip and Thelma Rodriguez,
Catherine Zuiga, Reynold Zuiga and J eannette Zuiga. Said intervenors
asserted their status as innocent purchasers for value who had no notice or
knowledge of the claim or interest of petitioner when they bought the
properties already registered in the name of respondent bank. Aside from a
counterclaim for damages against the petitioner, intervenors also prayed that

9
Supra note 3 at 110-112, 115-117,143-145.
10
Supra note 4 at 6.
11
Id. at 56-57.
12
Id. at 98-105.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 177783

in the event respondent bank is ordered to reconvey the properties,
respondent bank should be adjudged liable to the intervenors and return all
amounts paid to it.
13

On J uly 8, 1991, petitioner amended his complaint to include as
alternative relief under the prayer for reconveyance the payment by
respondent bank of the prevailing market value of the subject properties
less whatever remaining obligation due the bank by reason of the mortgage
under the terms of the compromise agreement.
14

On J une 15, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, findings [sic] the facts aver[r]ed in the complaint
supported by preponderance of evidences adduced, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and intervenors
by:

1. Declaring the two Deeds of Sale executed by the defendant in
favor of the intervenors as null and void and the Register of
Deeds in Calamba, Laguna is ordered to cancel and/or annul
the two Transfer Certificate of Titles No. T-154658 and TCT
No. T-111058 issued to the intervenors.

2. Ordering the defendant to refund the amount of P1,004,250.00
to the intervenors as the consideration of the sale of the two
properties.

3. Ordering the defendant to execute the appropriate Deed of
Reconveyance of the two (2) properties in favor of the plaintiff
after the plaintiff pays in full the amount of P600,000.00 as
balance of the [re]purchase price.

4. Ordering the defendant bank to pay plaintiff the sum of
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees

5. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant and intervenors
against the plaintiff.

Costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.
15



13
Id. at 130 -137, 144.
14
Id. at 225-232, 236.
15
Supra note 3 at 415-416.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 177783

The trial court found that respondent bank deliberately disregarded
petitioners substantial payments on the total repurchase consideration.
Reference was made to the letter dated March 22, 1984 (Exhibit I)
16
as the
authority for petitioner in making the installment payments directly to the
Universal Properties, Inc. (UPI), respondent banks collecting agent. Said
court concluded that the compromise agreement amounts to a valid contract
of sale between petitioner, as Buyer, and respondent bank, as Seller. Hence,
in entertaining other buyers for the same properties already sold to petitioner
with intention to increase its revenues, respondent bank acted in bad faith
and is thus liable for damages to the petitioner. Intervenors were likewise
found liable for damages as they failed to exercise due diligence before
buying the subject properties.

Respondent bank appealed to the CA which reversed the trial courts
ruling, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant
appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
17


The CA held that by modifying the terms of the offer contained in the
March 22, 1984 letter of respondent bank, petitioner effectively rejected the
original offer with his counter-offer. There was also no written conformity
by respondent banks officers to the amended conditions for repurchase
which were unilaterally inserted by petitioner. Consequently, no contract of
repurchase was perfected and respondent bank acted well within its rights
when it sold the subject properties to herein respondents-intervenors.

As to the receipts presented by petitioner allegedly proving the
installment payments he had completed, the CA said that these were not
payments of the repurchase price but were actually remittances of the

16
Supra note 4 at 70.
17
Rollo, p. 70.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 177783

payments made by petitioners buyers for the purchase of the foreclosed
properties already titled in the name of respondent bank. It was noted that
two of these receipts (Exhibits K and K-1)
18
were issued to Fermin
Salvador and Rizalina Pedrosa, the vendees of two subdivided lots under
separate Deeds of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by the respondent
bank. In view of the attendant circumstances, the CA concluded that
petitioner acted merely as a broker or middleman in the sales transactions
involving the foreclosed properties. Lastly, the respondents-intervenors
were found to be purchasers who bought the properties in good faith without
notice of petitioners interest or claim. Nonetheless, since there was no
repurchase contract perfected, the sale of the subject properties to
respondents-intervenors remains valid and binding, and the issue of whether
the latter were innocent purchasers for value would be of no consequence.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
appellate court.

Hence, this petition alleging that:

A.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THERE WAS A PERFECTED CONTRACT TO
REPURCHASE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT-
BANK.

B.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER DID NOT ACT AS BROKER IN
THE SALE OF THE FORECLOSED PROPERTIES AND THUS
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EXISTENCE OF OFFICIAL RECEIPTS
ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PETITIONER THAT ARE DULY
NOTED FOR HIS ACCOUNT.

C.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE

18
Supra note 3 at 52.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 177783

TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT-BANK DID NOT HAVE THE
RIGHT TO DISPOSE THE SUBJ ECT PROPERTIES.

D.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENTS-INTERVENORS ARE NOT
INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE IN GOOD FAITH.
19

It is to be noted that the above issues raised by petitioner alleged grave
abuse of discretion committed by the CA, which is proper in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
but not in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The core issue for resolution is whether a contract for the repurchase
of the foreclosed properties was perfected between petitioner and respondent
bank.
The Court sustains the decision of the CA.
Contracts are perfected by mere consent, which is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which
are to constitute the contract.
20
The requisite acceptance of the offer is
expressed in Article 1319 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and
the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A
qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
In Palattao v. Court of Appeals,
21
this Court held that if the
acceptance of the offer was not absolute, such acceptance is insufficient to
generate consent that would perfect a contract. Thus:
Contracts that are consensual in nature, like a contract of sale, are
perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. Once there is concurrence
between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter,
consideration, and terms of payment, a contract is produced. The offer

19
Rollo, p. 23.
20
Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128120, October 20, 2004, 441 SCRA 1, 18, citing
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120747, September 21, 2000, 340 SCRA 720.
21
G.R. No. 131726, May 7, 2002, 381 SCRA 681.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 177783

must be certain. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must
be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain,
unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the
proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal,
constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer.
Consequently, when something is desired which is not exactly what is
proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent
because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls
the offer.
22

The acceptance must be identical in all respects with that of the offer
so as to produce consent or meeting of the minds.
23
Where a party sets a
different purchase price than the amount of the offer, such acceptance was
qualified which can be at most considered as a counter-offer; a perfected
contract would have arisen only if the other party had accepted this counter-
offer.
24
In Villanueva v. Philippine National Bank
25
this Court further
elucidated on the meaning of unqualified acceptance, as follows:
While it is impossible to expect the acceptance to echo every
nuance of the offer, it is imperative that it assents to those points in the
offer which, under the operative facts of each contract, are not only
material but motivating as well. Anything short of that level of mutuality
produces not a contract but a mere counter-offer awaiting acceptance.
More particularly on the matter of the consideration of the contract,
the offer and its acceptance must be unanimous both on the rate of the
payment and on its term. An acceptance of an offer which agrees to the
rate but varies the term is ineffective.
26
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner submitted as evidence of a perfected contract of repurchase
the March 22, 1984 letter (Exhibit I)
27
from Rita B. Manuel, then
President of UPI, a corporation formed by respondent bank to dispose of its
acquired assets, with notations handwritten by petitioner himself. Said
letter reads:
March 22, 1984

Honorable J udge Fausto Ignacio
412 Bagumbayan Street, Pateros
Metro Manila

22
Id. at 691.
23
Manila Metal Container Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 166862, December 20,
2006, 511 SCRA 444, 466.
24
Id. at 468.
25
G.R. No. 154493, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 275.
26
Id. at 281-282 , citing Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, Supra note 20 at 19 and Marnelego v.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 161524, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 399, 408.
27
Supra note 16.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 177783


Dear J udge Ignacio:

Your proposal to repurchase your foreclosed properties located at
Cabuyao, Laguna consisting of a total area of 203,413 square meters has
been favorably considered subject to the following terms and conditions:

1) Total Selling Price shall be P950,000.00

2) Downpayment of P150,00000 with the balance
Payable in Three (3) equal installments
as follows:

1st Installment P 266,667 - on or before May 31, 84
2nd Installment P 266,667 on or before Sept. 31, 84
3rd Installment P 266,666 - on or before J an. 30, 85

TOTAL - P 800,000.00

3) All expenses pertinent to the subdivision of the parcel of land
consisting of 120,110 square meters shall be for your account.

Thank you,


Very truly yours,


RITA B. MANUEL
President

According to petitioner, he wrote the notations in the presence of a
certain Mr. Lazaro, the representative of Mrs. Manuel (President), and a
certain Mr. Fajardo, which notations supposedly represent their
compromise agreement.
28
These notations indicate that the repurchase
price would be P900,000.00 which shall be paid as follows: P150,000 end
of May 84; P150,000 end of J une 84; Balance Depending on financial
position. Petitioner further alleged the following conditions of the verbal
agreement: (1) respondent bank shall release the equivalent land area for
payments made by petitioner who shall shoulder the expenses for
subdivision of the land; (2) in case any portion of the subdivided land is
sold by petitioner, a separate document of sale would be executed directly to
the buyer; (3) the remaining portion of the properties shall not be subject of
respondent banks transaction without the consent and authority of

28
TSN, February 19, 1993, pp. 22-23.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 177783

petitioner; (4) the petitioner shall continue in possession of the properties
and whatever portion still remaining, and attending to the needs of its
tenants; and (5) payments shall be made directly to UPI.
29

The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acceptance of the
respondent banks terms and conditions for the repurchase of the foreclosed
properties was not absolute. Petitioner set a different repurchase price and
also modified the terms of payment, which even contained a unilateral
condition for payment of the balance (P600,000), that is, depending on
petitioners financial position. The CA thus considered the qualified
acceptance by petitioner as a counter-proposal which must be accepted by
respondent bank. However, there was no evidence of any document or
writing showing the conformity of respondent banks officers to this
counter-proposal.
Petitioner contends that the receipts issued by UPI on his installment
payments are concrete proof -- despite denials to the contrary by respondent
bank -- that there was an implied acceptance of his counter-proposal and
that he did not merely act as a broker for the sale of the subdivided portions
of the foreclosed properties to third parties. Since all these receipts, except
for two receipts issued in the name of Fermin Salvador and Rizalina
Pedrosa, were issued in the name of petitioner instead of the buyers
themselves, petitioner emphasizes that the payments were made for his
account. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the execution of the separate
deeds of sale directly to the buyers was in pursuance of the perfected
repurchase agreement with respondent bank, such an arrangement being an
accepted practice to save on taxes and shortcut paper works.
The Court is unconvinced.
In Adelfa Properties, Inc. v. CA,
30
the Court ruled that:

29
Amended Complaint, supra note 4 at 227.
30
310 Phil. 623 (1995).
Decision 12 G.R. No. 177783

x x x The rule is that except where a formal acceptance is so
required, although the acceptance must be affirmatively and clearly made
and must be evidenced by some acts or conduct communicated to the
offeror, it may be made either in a formal or an informal manner, and may
be shown by acts, conduct, or words of the accepting party that clearly
manifest a present intention or determination to accept the offer to buy or
sell. Thus, acceptance may be shown by the acts, conduct, or words of a
party recognizing the existence of the contract of sale.
31

Even assuming that the bank officer or employee whom petitioner
claimed he had talked to regarding the March 22, 1984 letter had acceded to
his own modified terms for the repurchase, their supposed verbal exchange
did not bind respondent bank in view of its corporate nature. There was no
evidence that said Mr. Lazaro or Mr. Fajardo was authorized by respondent
banks Board of Directors to accept petitioners counter-proposal to
repurchase the foreclosed properties at the price and terms other than those
communicated in the March 22, 1984 letter. As this Court ruled in AF Realty
& Development, Inc. v. Dieselman Freight Services, Co.
32

Section 23 of the Corporation Code expressly provides that the
corporate powers of all corporations shall be exercised by the board of
directors. J ust as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts
in his behalf, so may the board of directors of a corporation validly
delegate some of its functions to individual officers or agents appointed by
it. Thus, contracts or acts of a corporation must be made either by the
board of directors or by a corporate agent duly authorized by the board.
Absent such valid delegation/authorization, the rule is that the declarations
of an individual director relating to the affairs of the corporation, but not
in the course of, or connected with, the performance of authorized duties
of such director, are held not binding on the corporation.
33

Thus, a corporation can only execute its powers and transact its
business through its Board of Directors and through its officers and agents
when authorized by a board resolution or its by-laws.
34

In the absence of conformity or acceptance by properly authorized
bank officers of petitioners counter-proposal, no perfected repurchase
contract was born out of the talks or negotiations between petitioner and Mr.

31
Id. at 642.
32
424 Phil. 446 (2002).
33
Id. at 454.
34
Manila Metal Container Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, supra note 23 at 467-468, citing
Firme v. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 146608, October 23, 2003, 414
SCRA 190.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 177783

Lazaro and Mr. Fajardo. Petitioner therefore had no legal right to compel
respondent bank to accept the P600,000 being tendered by him as payment
for the supposed balance of repurchase price.
A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected upon mere
meeting of the minds. When there is merely an offer by one party without
acceptance of the other, there is no contract.
35
When the contract of sale is
not perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a
binding juridical relation between the parties.
36

In sum, we find the ruling of the CA more in accord with the
established facts and applicable law and jurisprudence. Petitioners claim of
utmost accommodation by respondent bank of his own terms for the
repurchase of his foreclosed properties are simply contrary to normal
business practice. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
The submission of the plaintiff-appellee is unimpressive.
First, if the counter-proposal was mutually agreed upon by both the
plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant, how come not a single
signature of the representative of the defendant-appellant was affixed
thereto. Second, it is inconceivable that an agreement of such great
importance, involving two personalities who are both aware and familiar
of the practical and legal necessity of reducing agreements into writing,
the plaintiff-appellee, being a lawyer and the defendant-appellant, a
banking institution, not to formalize their repurchase agreement. Third, it
is quite absurd and unusual that the defendant-appellant could have
acceded to the condition that the balance of the payment of the repurchase
price would depend upon the financial position of the plaintiff-appellee.
Such open[-]ended and indefinite period for payment is hardly acceptable
to a banking institution like the defendant-appellant whose core existence
fundamentally depends upon its financial arrangements and transactions
which, most, if not all the times are intended to bear favorable outcome to
its business. Last, had there been a repurchase agreement, then, there
should have been titles or deeds of conveyance issued in favor of the
plaintiff-appellee. But as it turned out, the plaintiff-appellee never had
any land deeded or titled in his name as a result of the alleged repurchase
agreement. All these, reinforce the conclusion that the counter-proposal
was unilaterally made and inserted by the plaintiff-appellee in Exhibit I
and could not have been accepted by the defendant-appellant, and that a
different agreement other than a repurchase agreement was perfected
between them.
37


35
Id. at 464.
36
Id. citing Boston Bank of the Philippines v. Manalo, G.R. No. 158149, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA
108, 129.
37
Rollo, pp. 66-67.
"
Decision 14 G.R. No. 177783
Petitioner Fausto C. Ignacio passed away on November 11, 2008 and
was substituted by his heirs, namely: Marfel D. Ignacio-Manalo, Milfa D.
Ignacio-Manalo and Faustino D. Ignacio.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Decision dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated May 2, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73551 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES 2. A. SERENQ
Chief Justice
Ch.1irpersun
ANTONIO T. CA
Associate Justice
~ ~ d ! v ~
TERESITAJ. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Tustice
'f L I
f ; ~
AMIN
Decision 15 G.R. No. 177783
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice