IELE LNG Safety and Security1
IELE LNG Safety and Security1
IELE LNG Safety and Security1
October 2003
LNG Safety and Security - 1 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary .................................................................................... 5 Introduction .............................................................................................. 7 Safety Considerations in LNG Operations ....................................................... 9 LNG Properties and Potential Hazards .......................................................... 12 LNG Properties .................................................................................. 12 Types of LNG Hazards ........................................................................ 17 How Is a Safe, Secure LNG Value Chain Achieved? ........................................ 19 Brief Overview of the LNG Value Chain.................................................. 20 The Current LNG Value Chain in the U.S................................................ 20 Application of Safety Conditions to the LNG Value Chain .......................... 26 Conclusions ............................................................................................. 42 Appendix 1: LNG Frequently Asked Questions............................................... 44 Appendix 2: Descriptions of LNG Facilities .................................................... 56 Appendix 3: LNG Regulations ..................................................................... 60 Appendix 4: Who Regulates LNG in the U.S.? ............................................... 63 Appendix 5: Risk Perception....................................................................... 69 Appendix 6: Major LNG Incidents ................................................................ 73 Appendix 7: Glossary of Terms, .................................................................. 80 Appendix 8: Conversion Table .................................................................... 81
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Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Properties of Liquid Fuels ........................................... 14 Table 2. Autoignition Temperature of Liquid Fuels........................................... 16 Table 3. LNG Facilities in the U.S. and Japan.................................................. 71 Table 4. Major LNG Incidents....................................................................... 77
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This publication is undertaken through a research consortium established at the Institute for Energy, Law & Enterprise, University of Houston Law Center, Commercial Frameworks for LNG in North America. Sponsors of the consortium are BG LNG Services, BP Americas - Global LNG, Cheniere Energy, ChevronTexaco International Gas Group, ConocoPhillips Worldwide LNG, Dominion Energy, El Paso Energy, ExxonMobil Gas & Power Marketing Company, Freeport LNG, Sempra Energy Global Enterprises, Shell Gas & Power, Tractebel LNG North America/Distrigas of Massachusetts. The U.S. Department of Energy-Office of Fossil Energy provides critical support and coordination with other federal agencies and commissions. The Ministry of Energy and Industry, Trinidad & Tobago participates as an observer. Members of the technical advisory committee include American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), CH-IV International, Lloyds Register, Project Technical Liaison Associates (PTL), and Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO). Quest Consultants provided additional input. This report was prepared by Dr. Michelle Michot Foss, Executive Director, IELE; Mr. Fisoye Delano, Senior Researcher; Dr. Grcan Glen, Research Associate; with assistance from Ms. Ruzanna Makaryan, graduate student research assistant. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the University of Houston. Peer reviews were provided by LNG consortium advisors, UH faculty, and other outside experts. LNG Safety and Security - 5 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
This report defines and explains how LNG safety and security is achieved, based on our extensive review of technical and operational data. Safety in the LNG industry is ensured by four elements that provide multiple layers of protection both for the safety of LNG industry workers and the safety of communities that surround LNG facilities. Primary Containment2 is the first and most important requirement for containing the LNG product. This first layer of protection involves the use of appropriate materials for LNG facilities as well as proper engineering design of storage tanks onshore and on LNG ships and elsewhere. Secondary containment ensures that if leaks or spills occur at the onshore LNG facility, the LNG can be fully contained and isolated from the public. Safeguard systems offers a third layer of protection. The goal is to minimize the frequency and size of LNG releases both onshore and offshore and prevent harm from potential associated hazards, such as fire. For this level of safety protection, LNG operations use technologies such as high level alarms and multiple back-up safety systems, which include Emergency Shutdown (ESD) systems. ESD systems can identify problems and shut off operations in the event certain specified fault conditions or equipment failures occur, and which are designed to prevent or limit significantly the amount of LNG and LNG vapor that could be released. Fire and gas detection and fire fighting systems all combine to limit effects if there is a release. The LNG facility or ship operator then takes action by establishing necessary operating procedures, training, emergency response systems and regular maintenance to protect people, property and the environment from any release. Finally, LNG facility designs are required by regulation to maintain separation distances to separate land-based facilities from communities and other public areas. Safety zones are also required around LNG ships. The physical and chemical properties of LNG necessitate these safety measures. LNG is odorless, non-toxic, non-corrosive and less dense than water. LNG vapors (primarily methane) are harder to ignite than other types of flammable liquid fuels. Above approximately -110oC LNG vapor is lighter than air. If LNG spills on the ground or on water and the resulting flammable mixture of vapor and air does not encounter an ignition source, it will warm, rise and dissipate into the atmosphere. Because of these properties, the potential hazards associated with LNG include heat from ignited LNG vapors and direct exposure of skin or equipment to a cryogenic (extremely cold) substance. LNG vapor can be an asphyxiant. This is also true of vapors of other liquid fuels stored or used in confined places without oxygen. There is a very low probability of release of LNG during normal industry operations due to the safety systems that are in place. Unexpected large releases of LNG, such as might be associated with acts of terrorism, bear special consideration although the consequences may well be similar to a catastrophic failure. In the
2
The term containment is used in this document to mean safe storage and isolation of LNG. LNG Safety and Security - 6 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
case of a catastrophic failure, emergency fire detection and protection would be used, and the danger to the public would be reduced or eliminated by the separation distances of the facility design. LNG operations are industrial activities, but safety and security designs and protocols help to minimize even the most common kinds of industrial and occupational incidents that might be expected. LNG contains virtually no sulfur; therefore the combustion of re-gasified LNG used as fuel has lower emissions of air contaminants than other fossil fuels. In crude oil producing countries, as a general move towards lessening the environmental impact of oil production, a larger percentage of the associated natural gas is being converted to LNG instead of being flared. In many instances, this choice reduces the environmental impact of the continuous flaring of large quantities of natural gas, while also capturing this valuable resource for economic use. Thus, LNG development can have significant environmental and economic benefits. Our review of the LNG industry safety and technological record, engineering design and operating systems and the standards and regulations that governing the design, operation and location of LNG facilities indicates that LNG can be safely transported and used in the U.S. and North America so long as safety and security standards and protocols developed by the industry are maintained and implemented with regulatory supervision. The UH Institute for Energy, Law & Enterprise LNG web site, http://www.energy.uh.edu/lng, provides links to other industry, government and public information sources.
Introduction
This briefing paper is the second in a series that describes the liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry its technology, markets, safety, security, environmental considerations, and the increasingly important role that LNG may play in the nations energy future. The first paper, Introduction to LNG, introduced the reader to LNG and briefly discussed many of the topics related to the LNG industry. This second paper deals with safety and security aspects of LNG operations. A third paper, North America Supply-Demand Balances and Energy Security: a Role for LNG? will provide an in-depth analysis of why more LNG may be needed to meet U.S. energy demand. All three papers, plus additional information, will be included in a complete fact book, Guide to LNG in North America. For a quick review of main LNG facts, please see Appendix 1, LNG Frequently Asked Questions. LNG has been transported and used safely in the U.S. and worldwide for roughly 40 years. The U.S. has the largest number of LNG facilities in the world, scattered throughout the country and located near population centers where natural gas is
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needed.
Our analysis of data on LNG safety and security indicates an excellent This strong safety record is a result of several factors. First, the
industry has technically and operationally evolved to ensure safe and secure Technical and operational advances include everything from the engineering that underlies LNG facilities to operational procedures to technical competency of personnel. Second, the physical and chemical properties of LNG are such that risks and hazards are easily defined and incorporated into technology and operations. Third, a broad set of standards, codes and regulations applies to the LNG industry to further ensure safety. These have evolved through industry This report experience worldwide and affect LNG facilities and operations everywhere. Regulatory compliance provides transparency and accountability. defines and explains how LNG safety and security is achieved, based on our extensive review of technical and operational data. Our conclusion is that LNG can continue to be transported, stored and used safely and securely, as long as safety and security standards and protocols developed by the industry are maintained and implemented with regulatory supervision. It is in the best interest of the industry, regulators and the general public that this goal be achieved so that the benefits of natural gas can be realized for consumers. By converting natural gas to LNG, it can be shipped over the oceans and great distances from the countries where it is produced to those where it is in demand. Natural gas is used in homes for cooking and heating, in public institutions, in agriculture, by industry and to generate electric power. Natural gas is important not only as a clean source of energy, but also as a feedstock for the petrochemical industry to produce plastics, fibers, fertilizers, and many other products. In this briefing paper, we discuss safety and security aspects of LNG. To prepare this report, we examined information on the physical properties of LNG, the safety record of LNG facilities and ships, the impact of the LNG operations on the environment and regulations and agencies concerned with safety and environmental protection in the LNG industry. Members of our team have visited LNG facilities in the U.S. and Japan. From this comprehensive review, we have
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concluded that LNG has been and can continue to be used safely. and security infrastructure. This report outlines
As shown in strategies,
Figure 1 below, there is a continuous improvement of LNG safety, environmental technologies, recommendations and key considerations employed by the LNG industry, and by regulators and public officials charged with public safety and security. Figure 1. Continuous Improvement of LNG Safety, Environmental and Security Infrastructure
Industry Standards
Safety,
Design/Technology
Regulations
Cleveland incident has influenced safety standards used today. Indeed, during the past four decades, growth in LNG use worldwide has led to a number of technologies and practices that will be used in the U.S. and elsewhere in North America as the LNG industry expands. Generally, multiple layers of protection create four critical safety conditions, all of which are integrated with a combination of industry standards and regulatory compliance, as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2. Critical Safety Conditions
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS SEPARATION DISTANCE INDUSTRY STANDARDS/REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
Industry standards are written to guide industry and also to enable public officials to more efficiently evaluate safety, security and environmental impacts of LNG facilities and industry activities. Regulatory compliance should ensure transparency and accountability in the public domain. The four requirements for safety primary containment, secondary containment, safeguard systems and separation distance apply across the LNG value chain, from production, liquefaction and shipping, to storage and re-gasification. (We use the term containment in this document to mean safe storage and isolation of LNG.) Later sections provide an overview of the LNG value chain and the details associated with the risk mitigation measures employed across it.
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Primary Containment. The first and most important safety requirement for the industry is to contain LNG. throughout the value chain. Secondary Containment. This second layer of protection ensures that if leaks or spills occur, the LNG can be contained and isolated. For onshore installations dikes and berms surround liquid storage tanks to capture the product in case of a spill. In some installations a reinforced concrete tank surrounds the inner tank that normally holds the LNG. Secondary containment systems are designed to exceed the volume of the storage tank. and berms. Safeguard Systems. In the third layer of protection, the goal is to minimize the release of LNG and mitigate the effects of a release. For this level of safety protection, LNG operations use systems such as gas, liquid and fire detection to rapidly identify any breach in containment and remote and automatic shut off systems to minimize leaks and spills in the case of failures. Operational systems (procedures, training and emergency response) also help prevent/mitigate hazards. Regular maintenance of these systems is vital to ensure their reliability. Separation Distance. Federal regulations have always required that LNG facilities be sited at a safe distance from adjacent industrial, communities and other public areas. Also, safety zones are established around LNG ships while underway in U.S. waters and while moored. The safe distances or exclusion zones are based on LNG vapor dispersion data, and thermal radiation contours and other considerations as specified in regulations. Industry Standards/Regulatory Compliance. No systems are complete without appropriate operating and maintenance procedures being in place and with ensurance that these are adhered to, and that the relevant personnel are appropriately trained. Organizations such as the Society of International Gas As will be explained later, double and full containment systems for onshore storage tanks can eliminate the need for dikes This is accomplished by employing suitable materials for storage tanks and other equipment, and by appropriate engineering design
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Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO), Gas Processors Association (GPA) and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) produce guidance which results from industry best practices. The four conditions described above for safety, along with industry standards and regulatory compliance, are vital to continuing the strong LNG industry safety performance. They are essential if LNG is to play an increasing role in the U.S., both for energy security and to protect the flow of economic benefits from LNG to our society as a whole.
LNG Properties
Natural gas produced from the wellhead consists of methane, ethane, propane and heavier hydrocarbons, plus small quantities of nitrogen, helium, carbon dioxide, sulfur compounds and water. LNG is liquefied natural gas. The liquefaction process first requires pre-treatment of the natural gas stream to remove impurities such as water, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and other sulfur compounds. By removing these impurities, solids cannot be formed as the gas is refrigerated. The product then also meets the quality specifications of LNG end users. The pretreated natural gas becomes liquefied at a temperature of approximately -256oF (-160oC) and is then ready for storage and shipping. LNG takes up only 1/600th of the volume required for a comparable amount of natural gas at room temperature and normal atmospheric pressure. Because the LNG is an extremely cold liquid formed through refrigeration, it is not stored under pressure. The common misperception of LNG as a pressurized substance has perhaps led to an erroneous understanding of its danger.
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LNG is a clear, non-corrosive, non-toxic, cryogenic3 liquid at normal atmospheric pressure. It is odorless; in fact, odorants must be added to methane before it is distributed by local gas utilities for end users to enable detection of natural gas leaks from hot-water heaters and other natural gas appliances. (methane) is not toxic. Natural gas However, as with any gaseous material besides air and
oxygen, natural gas that is vaporized from LNG can cause asphyxiation due to lack of oxygen if a concentration of gas develops in an unventilated, confined area. The density of LNG is about 3.9 pounds per gallon, compared to the density of water, which is about 8.3 pounds per gallon. Thus, LNG, if spilled on water, floats on top and vaporizes rapidly because it is lighter than water. Vapors released from LNG as it returns to a gas phase, if not properly and safely managed, can become flammable but explosive only under certain well-known conditions. Yet safety and security measures contained in the engineering design and technologies and in the operating procedures of LNG facilities greatly reduce these potential dangers. The flammability range is the range between the minimum and maximum concentrations of vapor (percent by volume) in which air and LNG vapors form a flammable mixture that can be ignited and burn. Figure 3 below indicates that the upper flammability limit and lower flammability limit of methane, the dominant component of LNG vapor, are 5 percent and 15 percent by volume, respectively. When fuel concentration exceeds its upper This flammability limit, it cannot burn because too little oxygen is present. concentration is approximately 100 percent methane.
situation exists, for example, in a closed, secure storage tank where the vapor When fuel concentration is below the lower flammability limit, it cannot burn because too little methane is present. An example is leakage of small quantities of LNG in a well-ventilated area.
Cryogenic means extreme low temperature, generally below -100oF LNG Safety and Security - 13 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
In this situation, the LNG vapor will rapidly mix with air and dissipate to less than 5 percent concentration. Figure 3. Flammable Range for Methane (LNG)
100%
Flammable
Too Lean - Will Not Burn
A comparison of the properties of LNG to those of other liquid fuels, as shown in Table 1 below, also indicates that the Lower Flammability Limit of LNG is generally higher than other fuels. That is, more LNG vapors would be needed (in a given area) to ignite as compared to LPG or gasoline. Table 1. Comparison of Properties of Liquid Fuels
Properties Toxic Carcinogenic Flammable Vapor Forms Vapor Clouds Asphyxiant Extreme Cold Temperature No No Yes Yes Yes, but in a vapor cloud Yes LNG No No Yes Yes Same as LNG Yes, if refrigerated Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Gasoline Fuel Oil Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
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Properties Other Health Hazards Flash point4 (F) Boiling point (F) Flammability Range in Air, % Stored Pressure Behavior if Spilled None -306 -256 5-15
LNG
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) None -156 -44 2.1-9.5 Pressurized (atmospheric if refrigerated) Evaporates, forming vapor clouds which could be flammable or explosive under certain conditions.
Gasoline Eye irritant, narcosis, nausea, others -50 90 1.3-6 Atmospheric Evaporates, forms flammable pool; environmental clean up required.
Fuel Oil Same as gasoline 140 400 N/A Atmospheric Same as gasoline
Atmospheric Evaporates, forming visible clouds. Portions of cloud could be flammable or explosive under certain conditions.
Source: Based on Lewis, William W., James P. Lewis and Patricia Outtrim, PTL, LNG Facilities The Real Risk, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New Orleans, April 2003, as modified by industry sources.
Methane gas will ignite only if the ratio or mix of gas vapor to air is within the limited flammability range. sparks. An often expected hazard is ignition from flames or Consequently, LNG facilities are designed and operated using standards
and procedures to eliminate this hazard and equipped with extensive fire detection and protection systems should flames or sparks occur. The autoignition temperature is the lowest temperature at which a flammable gas vapor will ignite spontaneously, without a source of ignition, after several minutes of exposure to sources of heat. Temperatures higher than the autoignition With very high temperature will cause ignition after a shorter exposure time. instantaneous.
temperatures, and within the flammability range, ignition can be virtually For methane vapors derived from LNG, with a fuel-air mixture of about 10 percent methane in air (about the middle of the 5-15 percent flammability
"Flash point" means the minimum temperature at which a liquid gives off vapor within a test vessel in sufficient concentration to form an ignitable mixture with air near the surface of the liquid. OSHA 1910.106. http://www.ilpi.com/msds/ref/flashpoint.html LNG Safety and Security - 15 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
limit) and atmospheric pressure, the autoignition temperature is above 1000F (540C). This extremely high temperature requires a strong source of thermal radiation, heat or hot surface. If LNG is spilled on the ground or on water and the resulting flammable gas vapor does not encounter an ignition source (a flame or spark or a source of heat of 1000F (540C) or greater), the vapor will generally dissipate into the atmosphere, and no fire will take place. When compared to other liquid fuels, LNG vapor (methane) requires the highest temperature for autoignition, as shown in the Table 2. Table 2. Autoignition Temperature of Liquid Fuels Fuel LNG (primarily methane) LPG Ethanol Methanol Gasoline Diesel Fuel Autoignition Temperature, oF 1004 850-950 793 867 495 Approx. 600
Source: New York Energy Planning Board, Report on issues regarding the existing New York Liquefied Natural Gas Moratorium, November 1998
Questions about LNG safety often demonstrate how LNG is confused with other fuels and materials. Our first briefing paper, Introduction to LNG, explains the differences between LNG and substances like liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and natural gas liquids (NGL). LNG is also quite different from gasoline, which is refined from crude oil. All of these fuels can be used safely as long as proper safety, security and environmental protections are in place. In the U.S., we fill our cars and trucks with gasoline, use LPG (propane) in our backyard grills, and methane to heat our homes hundreds of millions of times each day, and serious safety incidents are rare. We transport and store all of these fuels and, again, safety and security incidents are rare.
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In summary, LNG is an extremely cold, non-toxic, non-corrosive substance that is transferred and stored at atmospheric pressure. It is refrigerated, rather than LNG itself poses pressurized, which enables LNG to be an effective, economical method of transporting large volumes of natural gas over long distances. little danger as long as it is contained within storage tanks, piping, and equipment designed for use at LNG cryogenic conditions. However, vapors resulting from LNG as a result of an uncontrolled release can be hazardous, within the constraints of the key properties of LNG and LNG vapors flammability range and in contact with a source of ignition as described above.
warm up, returning the liquid to a gas. Initially, the gas is colder and heavier than the surrounding air. It creates a fog a vapor cloud above the released liquid. As the gas warms up, it mixes with the surrounding air and begins to disperse. The vapor cloud will only ignite if it encounters an ignition source while concentrated
Much of the material in this section is taken from the New York Energy Planning Board Report on Issues Regarding the Existing New York Liquefied Natural Gas Moratorium, November 1998. LNG Safety and Security - 17 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
5
intended to minimize the probability of a release and subsequent vapor cloud having an affect outside the facility boundary. Freezing Liquid. If LNG is released, direct human contact with the cryogenic Containment systems surrounding an LNG
storage tank, thus, are designed to contain up to 110 percent of the tanks Containment systems also separate the tank from other equipment. Moreover, all facility personnel must wear gloves, face masks and other protective clothing as a protection from the freezing liquid when entering potentially hazardous areas. This potential hazard is restricted within the facility boundaries and does not affect neighboring communities. Rollover. When LNG supplies of multiple densities are loaded into a tank one at a time, they do not mix at first. Instead, they layer themselves in unstable strata within the tank. After a period of time, these strata may spontaneously rollover to stabilize the liquid in the tank. As the lower LNG layer is heated by normal heat leak, it changes density until it finally becomes lighter than the upper layer. At that point, a liquid rollover would occur with a sudden vaporization of LNG that may be too large to be released through the normal tank pressure release valves. At some point, the excess pressure can result in cracks or other structural failures in the tank. To prevent stratification, operators unloading an LNG ship measure the density of the cargo and, if necessary, adjust their unloading procedures accordingly. LNG tanks have rollover protection systems, which include distributed temperature sensors and pump-around mixing systems.6 Rapid Phase Transition. When released on water, LNG floats being less dense than water and vaporizes. If large volumes of LNG are released on water, it may vaporize too quickly causing a rapid phase transition (RPT).7 Water temperature and the presence of substances other than methane also affect the likelihood of an
Welker J. R. and Sliepcevich C.M., Radiation, Heat Flux, and Overpressure in LNG Tanks, Proceedings of the International Conference on LNG Importation and Terminal Safety, Boston (1972).
Hashemi H.T., West H. H. and Sliepcevich C.M., LNG/Water Explosions: A Distributed Source, Proceedings of the 27th Annual Petroleum Mechanical Engineering Conference (1972). LNG Safety and Security - 18 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
RPT. An RPT can only occur if there is mixing between the LNG and water. RPTs range from small pops to blasts large enough to potentially damage lightweight structures. Other liquids with widely differing temperatures and boiling points can create similar incidents when they come in contact with each other. Earthquakes and Terrorism. The unexpected risks of earthquakes and terrorism are discussed in Appendix 5: Risk Perception.
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Gas Field
Liquefaction Facility
LNG Tanker
Vaporizers
To Pipeline System
Producing Region
Source: CMS Energy
Consuming Region
Storage is a major focus for safety and security. Once natural gas is liquefied, it is stored before shipment or loaded directly into the ship. LNG ships are required to have double hulls by regulation (International Maritime Organization) to facilitate safe transportation by sea. LNG receiving terminals and re-gasification facilities store LNG before it is re-gasified for pipeline transportation.
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constructed since the 1970s, LNG importation is not as familiar to the U.S. public as it is in other countries. Low levels of LNG industry activity over the years and our lack of familiarity with this fuel have several implications. First, new LNG import facilities constructed in the U.S. will benefit from the expertise gained elsewhere regarding materials and technologies used to construct LNG storage tanks for onshore receiving terminals, ideas for offshore receiving and re-gasification facilities, and new ship designs. Second, operating practices at both existing and new LNG facilities reflect knowledge gained from experience. Third, our regulatory framework benefits from the new technologies, materials and practices that are being shared worldwide. Fourth, public education is critical for LNG and its properties to be better understood. Most LNG facilities in the U.S. are peakshaving liquefaction and storage facilities, satellite storage facilities or marine import terminals. Only one facility in the U.S. is a baseload liquefaction facility.
Figure 5. LNG Liquefaction Facility in Kenai, Alaska
Baseload LNG liquefaction facilities take a natural gas feed and pre-treat and refrigerate it until it becomes a liquid that can be stored at atmospheric pressure. or more LNG trains, These large include and The gas LNG LNG
liquefaction
systems, transfer
liquefaction facility located in Kenai, Alaska and owned jointly by ConocoPhillips and Marathon (shown in Figure 5) is the only baseload liquefaction export facility in the U.S., exporting LNG to Japan. No liquefaction export facilities are contemplated for the Lower 48 States. remain so in the future. The U.S. is now a net importer of LNG and will probably
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Figure 6. A Peakshaving Facility Peakshaving LNG facilities, as shown in Figure 6, liquefy and store natural gas produced during summer months for regasification and distribution during the periods of high demand, usually on cold, winter days. In the U.S., local distribution companies (LDCs) have used LNG for peakshaving during high demand periods for more than 60 years. This process has
Source: CHIV International
provided secure and reliable supplies of natural gas for use during periods of peak demand.8
Perhaps
most
visible, given the number of plans to expand (see to capacity Introduction LNG), are LNG
baseload
receiving and storage facilities (2), and vaporizing facilities and supporting utilities (3), (see Figure 7). The marine baseload LNG re-gasification terminals in the
Cates, Rusty, International Gas Consulting, Inc., LNG - Hedging Your Bets, LNG: Economics & Technology Conference, January, 2003. LNG Safety and Security - 22 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
continental U.S. are as follows (see Figure 8 below): Elba Island, Georgia (El Paso Corporation); Everett, Massachusetts (Tractebel); Cove Point, Maryland (Dominion Energy); and Lake Charles, Louisiana (Panhandle Energy, a Southern Union company). Figure 8. Baseload Receiving and Re-gasification Facilities in the U.S.
Distrigas , Tractebel Everett, MA Sendout: Storage:
(Bcf) (MMcf/d)
Current
Current
Expanded
715 3.5
Storage:
2,541 18.8
3,006 24.4
Current
Expanded
Current
Expanded
Storage:
750 5.0
1,000 7.8
Storage:
630 6.3
1,200 9.3
Current
Expanded
Storage:
446 4.0
806 7.3
Source: CMS
When it comes to increasing supplies of natural gas beyond the critical base of domestic production, the key components are baseload receiving terminals and regasification facilities, and liquefaction facilities at the international supply source. The critical link between these two components of the LNG value chain is shipping. According to LNGOneWorld, there were 145 existing LNG ships, as of Sept. 2003, with 56 on order.9 Eight LNG ships have been delivered in 2003, and orders for eight more have been placed. About 20 percent of the fleet is less than five years old. New LNG ships are designed to transport between 125,000 and 150,000 cubic meters (m3) of LNG,10 or about 2.8-3.1 billion standard cubic feet of natural gas. Various ship yards have begun designing larger LNG ships with a capacity greater than 200,000 m3. The use of larger ships, which enable LNG value chain economics
10
LNGOneWorld: http://www.lngoneworld.com/LNGV1.nsf/Members/Index.html. Typically, LNG ship size is designated by cubic meters of liquid capacity. LNG Safety and Security - 23 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
to improve and facilitate a larger supply base for the U.S. and other importing countries, is critical in determining how new baseload receiving terminals are designed as well as how existing facilities will be expanded. A typical ship measures some 900 feet in length, about 150 feet in width and has a 38-foot draft. LNG ships can be less polluting than other shipping vessels because they can burn natural gas, but may also substitute or supplement with fuel oil as an additional source for propulsion. In the U.S., our LNG systems include a large number of smaller satellite storage facilities (shown in Figure 9) that allow natural gas to be located near areas of high demand and stored until the gas is needed. These facilities must also be operated safely and securely. Satellite LNG facilities have only storage and re-gasification Some of these units perform satellite equipment, but no liquefaction units.
peakshaving duties, while others are dedicated to vehicle fuel transfer systems. LNG is usually delivered from marine terminals or peakshaving facilities to the satellite facilities by truck (shown in Figure 10). Figure 9. A Satellite Storage Facility and Figure 10. An LNG Truck
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There are about 240 LNG facilities worldwide. The U.S. has the largest number of those with 113 active facilities. Natural gas is liquefied and stored at about 58 facilities in 25 states, including 96 connected to the U.S. natural gas pipeline grid. Massachusetts alone accounts for 14 major satellite facilities, or roughly 40 percent of all satellite facilities in the United States, and New Jersey has five satellite LNG facilities, the second highest in the U.S. Figure 11. U.S. LNG Facilities Storage Capacity
2% 18%
80%
Figure 12. U.S. Regional LNG Storage Deliverability According to the U.S.
Energy the
Administration
Pacific 440 Mmcf/D Mountain 1 190 Mmcf/D California None Mountain 2 None West South Central None West North Central East North 750 Mmcf/D Central 920 Mmcf/D
storage capacity of LNG peakshaving and satellite facilities in the Lower 48 States as of mid-2001 is 86 billion cubic feet (Bcf). LNG peakshaving and satellite storage account
Source: IGC
11
U.S. EIA: U.S. LNG Markets and Uses, January 2003. LNG Safety and Security - 25 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
for 80 percent of U.S. LNG storage capacity (see Figure 11), but it is only two percent of the total natural gas storage capability in the Lower 48. For example, in addition to LNG peakshaving and storage, domestic natural gas production is stored in underground caverns or depleted natural gas fields, which together account for the overwhelming proportion of natural gas storage capacity. Despite the relatively low percentage of total gas storage capacity represented, the high daily deliverability of LNG facilities (see Figure 12) makes them an important source of fuel during winter cold snaps. LNG facilities can deliver up to about 11 Bcf/day, or the equivalent of 14 percent of the quantity of gas supply that can be delivered from underground storage locations in the U.S.
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
International standards and rules define containment with respect to types of structures and technologies in use. We use the term containment in this Safe use of LNG, or any document to mean safe storage and isolation of LNG.
cryogenic substance, requires an understanding of how materials behave at cryogenic temperatures. For example, at extremely low temperatures, carbon steel
LNG Safety and Security - 26 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
loses its ductility and becomes brittle. The material selected for tanks, piping, and other equipment that comes in contact with LNG is critical. The use of high nickel content steels, aluminum, and stainless steels is costly but necessary to prevent embrittlement and material failures. and for other LNG applications. Figure 13. Conceptual Design of Storage Tanks Several design LNG engineering features storage tanks High alloy steels composed of nine percent nickel and stainless steel typically are used for the inner tank of LNG storage tanks
ensure the safety of (see Figure 13). LNG typically is stored in double-walled at
(where required by code)by (where required
tanks The
atmospheric
pressure.
code)
storage tank is a tank within a tank, with insulation between the walls of the tanks.
Source: Shell
tanks, the outer tank is generally made of carbon steel, it provides no protection in the event of the failure of the inner tank it holds the insulation in place. cryogenic service. inner tank, in contact with the LNG liquid, is made of materials suitable for It has a flat metallic bottom and a cylindrical metal wall both built of materials suitable for cryogenic temperatures (usually nine percent nickel steel). Pre-stressed concrete and aluminum have also been used for inner tanks. The inner tank bottom rests on a rigid insulation material, such as foam glass. The strength of the total tank must withstand the hydrostatic load of the LNG. This hydrostatic head determines the thickness of the inner tank side walls. The tanks also have an insulation layer with a flat suspended deck supported by an outside domed roof vapor barrier or outer tank (often made of carbon steel). All new tank
LNG Safety and Security - 27 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
piping designs are through the roof of the tank to avoid siphoning of the full content of the tank in case of piping failures.
Figure 14. Single Containment Tanks
A single containment tank (shown in Figure 14 at left) for LNG is a tank system comprised of an inner tank and an outer container. The engineering design requires only the inner tank to meet the low temperature
Source: Williams
ductility the
requirements The
for outer
storage
of
product.
container of a single containment storage tank serves primarily to retain insulation and vapor. It is not designed to contain LNG due to leakage from the inner tank. Storage tanks may also use double or full containment designs as described in the following section on Secondary Containment. In double or full containment, the outer tank is designed to contain the full amount of the inner tank in case of a failure of the inner tank. Engineering design for safety also applies to LNG ships. An onboard containment system stores the LNG, where it is kept at atmospheric pressure (to keep air from entering the tank) and at -256oF (-160oC).
Source:
Existing LNG ship cargo containment (Moss) design design account account for for 52 46
systems reflect one of three designs. As of June 2003: Spherical Membrane percent, and Self-supporting structural prismatic design account for about 2 percent. percent of the existing ships, about
Figure 15. A Spherical Tank Ships with spherical tanks are most readily identifiable as LNG ships because the tank covers are visible above the deck (see Figure 15). Many ships currently under construction, however, are membrane type ships. The membrane and prismatic
LNG Safety and Security - 28 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
ships look more like oil tankers with a less visible containment tank structure above the main deck. Figure 16. LNG Lagos - Membrane Type LNG Carrier
Source: NLNG
The cargo containment systems of membrane-type LNG ships (see Figure 16) are made up of a primary container, a secondary containment and further insulation.
The primary container is the primary containment for the cargo. cargo insulation materials include polyurethane, polyvinyl
It can be foam,
constructed of stainless steel, invar (36 percent nickel steel). The most common chloride polystyrene and perlite. Nitrogen is placed in the insulation space. Because
nitrogen does not react with other gases or materials, even minor leaks can be detected by monitoring the nitrogen-filled insulation space for the presence of methane.
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
Secondary containment provides protection beyond the primary containment. This applies both to storage tanks at receiving/re-gasification terminals as well as LNG ships. A dike, berm or dam impoundment usually surrounds a single containment tank located onshore in order to contain any leakage in the unlikely event of tank
LNG Safety and Security - 29 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
failure.12 This system allows any released LNG to be isolated and controlled. The dikes are designed to contain 100 percent to 110 percent of tank volume and to be high enough so that the trajectory of a leak at the upper liquid level in the tank will not overshoot the edge of the dike. Most of the existing LNG tanks at U.S. Single containment tanks peakshaving facilities and marine import facilities are single containment with secondary containment provided via impoundments. spill area of the dike impoundment.
Figure 17. Double Containment Tanks
require larger land areas for LNG storage facilities because of the larger potential
A double containment tank (illustrated in Figure 17) is designed and constructed so that both the inner tank and the outer tank are capable of independently refrigerated liquid. contains
Source: ALNG
the normal
the
operating conditions. The outer tank or wall is intended to contain any LNG The majority of LNG storage
leakage from the inner tank and the boil-off gas.13 tanks.
tanks built recently around the world are designed as double or full containment
Similar to a double containment tank, a full containment tank is designed and constructed so that both the inner tank and the outer tank are capable of
Source: CHIV International
independently containing the stored LNG. The inner tank contains the LNG
12 British Standards Institution (BSI) BS 7777: 1993 Parts 1: http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5C39A0F.HTM. 13 British Standards Institution (BSI) BS 7777: 1993 Parts 1: http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5C39A0F.HTM. LNG Safety and Security - 30 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
approximately three feet of concrete is one to two meters away from the inner tank. The outer tank supports the outer roof and is intended to contain the LNG.14 The tanks are designed in accordance with international LNG codes (EMMUA 147,15 EN 1473). The full containment tank is less susceptible to damage from external forces. Full containment LNG tanks, with reinforced concrete walls and roofs can be found in Japan, Korea, Greece, Turkey, Portugal (see Figure 18). Hackberry, Louisiana. The safety records of the onshore LNG facilities around the world demonstrate that the primary containment of the LNG tanks is safe, because secondary spill containment systems installed around all of the tanks, have never been required to hold liquid. LNG operators also are required to provide containment and design of troughs to direct the flow of LNG to a drain sump in a safe location in those process areas where an LNG spill could occur, such as in transfer piping or LNG truck loading areas and vaporization units. Cameron LNG, LLC proposed a full containment LNG tank system for the new LNG terminal in
For LNG ships, regulations concerning a secondary barrier depend on the type of construction of the storage tanks. It may be a complete secondary containment mechanism for membrane design ships that is equivalent to the primary barrier. In the case of ships with independent tanks, such as the spherical and structural prismatic design systems, the secondary barrier is a splash barrier with a drip pan at the bottom from which accumulated liquid
14 British Standards Institution (BSI) BS 7777: 1993 Parts 1: http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5C39A0F.HTM. 15 U.K. Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA), 1986, http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5C85DD9.HTM. LNG Safety and Security - 31 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS
All LNG facilities are designed to comply with spill containment requirements. They have extensive safety systems to detect LNG releases using a number of gas detectors (for methane), ultraviolet or infrared fire detectors, smoke or combustion product detectors, low temperature detectors and detectors to monitor LNG levels and vapor pressures. Closed-circuit television systems monitor all critical locations of LNG facilities. Emergency shut down systems can be activated upon detection of leaks, spills, or gas vapors. similar. While there are different types of designs for LNG facilities, health, safety and environmental (HSE) considerations are generally Various codes and standards (see Industry Standards and Regulation section) ensure that the chances of a release are minimal, as is its volume if a release occurs. LNG transfer lines are designed to prevent releases. Should there be a failure of a segment of piping at an LNG facility, a spill of LNG or leak of gas vapor could occur. An LNG spill from a transfer line is very unlikely due to the design requirements for equipment, such as use of proper materials of construction, minimal use of bolted flanges and rigorous testing of LNG piping. Gas and fire detectors throughout the facility activate alarms and foam systems to ensure rapid dispersion or containment of gas vapors and any fire hazard. Fire detection sensors at LNG facilities would sound an alarm and immediately begin a shutdown procedure. Foam, dry chemical and/or water would be dispersed immediately from automated firefighting systems. with very little smoke. If there is an ignition source, then a pool fire would develop at the liquid LNG release point. LNG vapor burns The LNG quickly evaporates due to the heat of the If a release of LNG goes unignited for a period of surroundings and the flame.
time, then a vapor cloud can form. If ignited, a vapor cloud burns back to the
LNG Safety and Security - 32 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
source of the release. The speed of burn depends on conditions such as the size of the release and weather conditions. LNG ships are designed with a double hull. as separate ballast. This design provides optimum
protection for the integrity of the cargo in the event of collision or grounding as well Separate from the hull design, LNG ships have safety equipment to facilitate ship handling and cargo system handling. The ship-handling safety features include sophisticated radar and positioning systems that enable the crew to monitor the ships position, traffic and identified hazards around the ship. A global maritime distress system automatically transmits signals if there is an onboard emergency requiring external assistance. The cargo-system safety features include an extensive instrumentation package that safely shuts down the system if it starts to operate outside of predetermined parameters. Ships also have gas and fire detection systems, and nitrogen purging. Should fire occur on a ship, two 100 percent safety relief valves are designed to release the ensuing boil off to the atmosphere without over-pressurizing the tank. LNG ships use approach velocity meters when berthing to ensure that the prescribed impact velocity for the berth fenders are not exceeded. When moored, automatic mooring line monitoring provides individual line loads to help maintain the security of the mooring arrangement while alongside. When connected to the onshore system, the instrument systems and the shore-ship LNG transfer system acts as one system, allowing emergency shutdowns of the entire system from ship and from shore. LNG ships and facilities have redundant safety systems, for example, Emergency Shutdown systems (ESD). parameters. A redundant safety system shuts down unloading operations when the ship or unloading facility is not performing within the design
LNG Safety and Security - 33 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
SEPARATION DISTANCE
In the U.S., regulators regulate setbacks or protection distances for LNG storage and other facilities. The federal safety standards on LNG facilities are found in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 49, Part 193.16 Setbacks are important for protecting surrounding areas should the unlikely release of LNG or a fire occur at an LNG facility. The regulations specify that each LNG container and LNG transfer systems have a thermal radiation protection zone beyond the impoundment area.17 Each onshore LNG container or tank must be within a secondary dike or impoundment area. These thermal radiation exclusion zones must be large enough so that the heat from an LNG fire does not exceed a specified limit for people and property. The thermal radiation exclusion zone must be owned or controlled by the operator of the LNG facility. The code also specifies how the thermal radiation The Gas Research Institute (GRI) distance is calculated for each LNG facility.
computer model or a similar model is to be used and wind speed, ambient temperature and relative humidity producing the maximum exclusion distances are to be applied subject to other detailed provision of the regulation. Similar to the provision for thermal radiation protection, the U.S. federal regulation 49 CFR Part 193 specifies that each LNG container and LNG transfer system must have a flammable vapor dispersion exclusion zone around the facility that is owned or controlled by the facility operator. The vapor dispersion exclusion zone must be large enough to encompass that part of the vapor cloud which could be flammable. The code specifies how the flammable vapor dispersion distance is calculated for each LNG facility. In order to account for irregular mixing of the vapor cloud, the regulation designates the vapor cloud hazard area as the area where the average gas concentration in air is equal to or greater than 2.5 percent (half of the lower flammability limit of methane). irregular mixing. This provides a margin of safety to account for The regulation also specifies other parameters including
16 17
49 CFR Part 193: http://cfr.law.cornell.edu/cfr/cfr.php?title=49&type=part&value=193. The term impoundment is used in the LNG industry to identify a spill control design that will direct and contain the liquid in case of a release. Earthen or concrete dikes may provide impoundment surrounding an LNG container. LNG Safety and Security - 34 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
dispersion conditions that should be used in computing the dispersion distances. Computer models are used to calculate dispersion distances. prevent exposure to fire or thermal radiation. Safety zones differ for ships in transit as opposed to ships in port. Port safety Under U.S. regulations, protection distances are to be calculated specific to each location to
zones are established by the USCG and port captain, based on the specific risk factors at a given terminal. There are two purposes for safety zones for LNG ships to minimize collision while the ship is underway, and at berth to protect surrounding property and personnel from hazards that could be associated with ignition. In the U.S., the use of safety zones around LNG ships began in 1971 at the Everett Terminal in Boston Harbor. Safety zones are established based on the specific circumstances, including navigational requirements, in a specific area. Figure 20. Safety Zone at Cove Point In some ports, the USCG may require a tug escort and specified safety zones around LNG ships when a ship is underway to a U.S. receiving terminal. USCGs minimize intention is disruption The to to
Tugs assist in
the safe docking of LNG ships. Figure 20 shows an example of a safety zone around the LNG tanker at Cove Point LNG terminal.
LNG Safety and Security - 35 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fossil Energy: http://www.fe.doe.gov/. U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC): http://www.ferc.fed.us/. 20 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG): http://www.uscg.mil/uscg.shtm. 21 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT): http://www.dot.gov/. 22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): http://www.epa.gov/. 23 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: http://www.fws.gov/. 24 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: http://www.usace.army.mil/. 25 U.S. Minerals Management Service: http://www.mms.gov/. 26 U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: http://www.noaa.gov/. 27 U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA): http://www.osha.gov
19
18
LNG Safety and Security - 36 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
State, county and local (municipal) agencies also play roles to ensure safe and environmentally sound construction and operation of LNG industry facilities. Local agencies also provide support for emergency response that might be needed beyond what an LNG facility might provide. Appendix 4 discusses in more detail the role of regulatory authorities with respect to the LNG industry. Federal, state and local jurisdictions impose and enforce numerous codes, rules, regulations, and environmental standards on LNG facilities. These are designed to prevent or minimize the impact of a leak or spill by minimizing the quantity spilled, containing any spill, and erecting barriers between potential spills and adjacent areas. In short, they both reflect and establish the four conditions for LNG safety and security. With industry interaction and in light of international industry best practices, the industry also creates its own codes, rules, regulations and environmental standards. In this way, policies and regulation for LNG safety and security can reflect state-ofthe-art technologies and operational practices based on performance history and extensive research and development, design, and testing. In the U.S., federal regulations are provided in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).28 The following regulations and standards/codes provide guidelines for the design, construction and operation of LNG facilities. See Appendix 3 for details. 49CFR Part 193 Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards 33CFR Part 127 Waterfront Facilities Handling Liquefied Natural Gas and Liquefied Hazardous Gas NFPA 59A29 Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) NFPA 57 Standard for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Vehicular Fuel Systems API 620 Design and Construction of Large, Welded Low Pressure Storage Tanks
28 29
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/index.html. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA): http://www.nfpa.org/. The NFPA began developing NFPA 59A in 1960 by a committee of the American Gas Association and was adopted in 1967. LNG Safety and Security - 37 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
The worldwide LNG value chain could not develop without the evolution of international standards that can apply to LNG operations wherever they are located. Because LNG use has grown faster outside of the U.S. than it has domestically over the past several years, much research and development, design, and testing activity has occurred in other countries. Countries that rely extensively on LNG to meet their energy needs such as Japan, South Korea, and some European nations or countries that have extensive LNG production like Australia have had to make considerable investment in policies and regulations that support a safe and secure LNG industry. European standards include the following. EN 1473 - The European Norm standard EN 1473 Installation and equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas - Design of onshore installations evolved out of the British Standard, BS 777730 in 1996. EN 1160 Installation and equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas General Characteristics of Liquefied Natural Gas. EEMUA 14731 - Recommendations for the design and construction of refrigerated liquefied gas storage tanks. International rules and norms also provide oversight for LNG ships. available to protect ships and the public. operations other than LNG ships. In addition,
within the U.S., the USCG and other agencies enforce a number of regulations Some of these apply to shipping (The USCG has long experience with shipping
operations for a myriad of energy fuels, chemicals, and other materials, all of which pose a variety of potential risks and hazards, as does recreational boating.) 33 CFR 160.101 Ports and Waterways Safety: Control of Vessel and Facility Operations. 33 CFR 165.20 Regulated Navigation Areas and Limited Access Areas: Safety zones.
30
British Standards Institution (BSI) BS 7777: http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5C39A0F.HTM. 31 U.K. Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA) http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5C85DD9.HTM, 1986 LNG Safety and Security - 38 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
33 CFR 165.30 Regulated Navigation Areas and Limited Access Area: Security Zones.
With regard to environmental standards, all LNG facilities must meet applicable regulations for air, water, and other health and ambient environmental protections. Proposals for new LNG facilities must incorporate environmental assessments to determine overall impact of the facility and its operation. Before LNG projects are implemented, studies must be carried out, including: assessments of siting requirements; baseline biological and land use surveys and impact analyses; facility process design; evaluations of the operational constraints and hazards associated with the facility, terminal facilities, and shipping of LNG including earthquake tolerance; compatibility of LNG facilities with current and projected uses of waterways and adjacent lands; assessment of potential risks to the public near prospective sites; and Assessment of potential effects of facility construction and operation on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. The studies involve analyses of oceanographic, navigational, and meteorological conditions to determine whether access by LNG ships is feasible and safe, and whether operation of existing facilities along the waterways would be affected. A new LNG facility would be considered a potential new source of air pollution and would require approval of a regulatory agency responsible for monitoring air quality. Upon receipt of approval, the project would be monitored for compliance with all quality rules, regulations and standards. The impact of new emissions on air quality, if any, would be compared to existing air quality levels. Air emissions that result from combustion of vaporized LNG as a fuel, for example in vehicles or vaporizers or for electric power generation, represent the primary
LNG Safety and Security - 39 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
environmental impacts associated with increased LNG use. reflects a demand for natural gas.
generally has lower emissions of carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), non-methane volatile organic compounds (VOC), and fine particulates (less than 2.5 microns in size). In addition, natural gas has lower emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and toxic, heavy metals.32 Since the liquefaction process requires removal of all impurities from the produced natural gas, LNG actually has lower air emissions than natural gas when it is produced. eliminating sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. There are secondary sources of emissions associated with power facilities on site (which must have separate permits), LNG ships, and other marine vessels (e.g., diesel dredgers, USCG security vessels, and tugs). The diesel and bunker fuels used to operate the vessels cause most emissions from marine vessels. LNG is a source of environmental benefits. When natural gas is burned for power generation SO2 emissions are virtually eliminated and CO2 emissions are reduced significantly compared to other fuels such as coal and fuel oil, which require scrubbing or other technologies to remove SO2 or carbon reduction strategies such as sequestration to deal with CO2. In some crude oil producing countries like Nigeria, where there are few alternatives for use or disposal of the natural gas that is produced with crude oil, some of the gas that would otherwise be flared is instead converted to LNG. This reduces the environmental impact of the continuous flaring of large quantities of natural gas. To end flaring is a goal for the producing industry and institutions like the World Bank. These initiatives have contributed to the increased interest in LNG as a means of using valuable natural gas resources and contributing toward sustainable development. The sulfur content of LNG is near zero,
32
New York Energy Planning Board, Report on Issues Regarding the Existing New York Liquefied Natural Gas Moratorium, November 1998. LNG Safety and Security - 40 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
Industry organizations help to coordinate interaction between the LNG industry, the agencies and authorities charged with creating and enforcing rules and regulations for LNG facilities. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards for the construction and operation of all ships.
33
has developed
codes govern the design, construction and operation of specific ships, including LNG ships, and, when ratified, are adopted and incorporated into the individual flag state regulations. In the U.S., the USCG has adopted the applicable IMO standards and codes in regulations covering U.S. flag ships. The USCG inspects LNG ships when in U.S. port, regardless of their flag state for compliance with these codes. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) codes recommend additional security measures relating to ships and port facilities personnel and operational requirements. By July 1, 2004, as with other critical fuels and products, all LNG
ships and terminals worldwide will have specific security plans in place as required by the IMO and the USCG. The LNG ship Berger Boston (which is under long-term charter to Tractebel LNG North America) is the first vessel in the world to receive the new ISPS certification. The certification was received in June 2003. Maritime Classification Societies provide the means by which LNG shipping operators can demonstrate that they have established clear, practical, technical standards that
34
address
the
protection
of
life,
property,
and
the
natural
environment.
LNG ships using IMO standards as a minimum. They can, on behalf of Flag States, certify existing proven technologies and methods of construction and have assisted in gaining approval for the development of new technologies so that they can be tested and then built. Some of the societies that classify LNG ships include American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Bureau Veritas (BV), Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and Lloyd's Register of Shipping (LR).
International Maritime Organization (IMO) http://www.imo.org. Sember, W.J. ABS: Development of Guidelines for Classification of Offshore LNG Terminals, GASTECH 2002, Qatar, Oct. 2002.
34
33
LNG Safety and Security - 41 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
LNG regulations and industry standards complement each other. They apply to the design, construction, and operation of LNG facilities and have been developed by using best engineering practices and incorporating many years of operating experience.
Conclusions
As mentioned in our Introduction to LNG, LNG has been handled safely for many years and the industry has maintained an enviable safety record. Engineering and design and increasing security measures are constantly improved to ensure the safety and security of LNG facilities and ships. As of Sept. 2003, the global LNG industry comprises 17 export (liquefaction) facilities, 40 receiving (re-gasification) terminals, and 145 ships, altogether handling more than 110 million metric tons of LNG every year. LNG has been During that safely delivered via ocean-going transport for more than 40 years.
time there have been more than 40,000 LNG ship voyages, covering more than 60 million miles, without any major incidents involving a major release of LNG either in port or on the high seas. LNG ships frequently transit high traffic density areas. For example, in 2000, one LNG cargo entered Tokyo Bay every 20 hours, on average, and one LNG cargo a week entered Boston harbor.35 Appendix 5 provides extensive details on documented incidents in the LNG industry as well as background on some of the kinds of concerns, such as the impact of earthquakes on LNG facilities that the industry must protect against. In the study by the New York Energy Planning Board of November 1998, carried out to inform the New York state governor and legislature on whether to extend or modify the 1978 moratorium on siting new LNG facilities, a major finding was: Given its physical and chemical properties, LNG is as safe as other currently available fuels. Since 1980, there have been only seven facility or ocean tanker accidents worldwide and four vehicle related accidents in the United States, with no
35
Phil Bainbridge, VP BP Global LNG, LNG in North America and the Global Context, IELE/AIPN Meeting University of Houston, October 2002. LNG Safety and Security - 42 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
fatalities, which compares favorably with the safety record of facilities for competing fuels.36 As a result of this report and review, in 1999 the moratorium was allowed to expire for areas outside of New York City. Reviews such as the one conducted in New York in 1998 and the extensive body of information and evidence that documents LNG industry safety records and practices support our conclusion that risks and hazards associated with LNG and LNG industrial facilities are manageable. be associated with acts of terrorism. They also show that LNG industry safety Overall, LNG safety is inherent in the practices contribute toward reduced potential for catastrophic events such as might properties of LNG, the technologies and operating practices that have evolved on the basis of understanding these properties, and regulatory requirements. Future publications of the UH Institute for Energy, Law & Enterprise mentioned in this paper and the complete Guide to LNG in North America will provide extensive information to those interested in U.S. energy trends and security; LNG industry and market developments. The IELE web site, http://www.energy.uh.edu/lng provides links to industry, government and public information sources. Companies with LNG operations maintain active public information offices, as do the federal agencies charged with regulatory and policy oversight.
36
New York Energy Planning Board, Report on issues regarding the existing New York Liquefied Natural Gas Moratorium, November 1998. LNG Safety and Security - 43 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
1959, the world's first LNG tanker, The Methane Pioneer, a converted World War ll liberty freighter containing five, 7000 Bbl aluminum prismatic tanks with balsa wood supports and insulation of plywood and urethane, carried an LNG cargo from Lake Charles, Louisiana to Canvey Island, United Kingdom. This event demonstrated that large quantities of liquefied natural gas could be transported safely across the ocean. LNG has also been used as a vehicle fuel since the mid 1960s.
Sources of the materials used in this section include: 1. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center, http://www.afdc.doe.gov/altfuel/natural_gas.html. 2. Applied LNG Technologies, http://www.altlngusa.com/ngf_lng.htm. 3. Australia LNG, http://www.australialng.com.au/. 4. BG Group, http://www.bg-group.com/group/LNG_2001.htm. 5. BP LNG, http://www.bplng.com/. 6. CH-IV, http://www.ch-iv.com/lng/lngfact.htm. 7. Chive Fuels, http://www.lng-cng.com/chivefuels/liquefiednaturalgas.htm. 8. Crystal Energy, LLC, http://www.crystalenergyllc.com/index.html. 9. Dominion Cove Point, LNG, http://www.dom.com/about/gas-transmission/covepoint/faq.jsp. 10. El Paso, http://www.elpaso.com/business/LNG_FAQ.shtm. 11. North Star Industries, http://northstarind.com/lngfaqs.html. 12. Ras Laffan Industrial City, http://www.qp.com.qa/raslaffan/rlc.nsf/web/introlngfacts#. 13. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), http://www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/lng.asp. LNG Safety and Security - 44 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
37
Can difference between foreign LNG and U.S. pipeline gas cause any problem?
Foreign LNG sometimes has a higher heating value than typical U.S. pipeline natural gas. However, LNG terminal operators measure heating values and respond with a number of techniques, such as blending, dilution, or adding an inert component, which insures compatibility with U.S. pipeline gas. The fact that foreign LNG has been imported for over 25 years into Boston and Lake Charles and then mixed into the U.S. pipeline network without incident proves that this is not a significant safety issue.
LNG Safety and Security - 45 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
What is the difference between LNG, CNG, NGL, LPG, and GTL?
It is important to understand the difference between Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), Natural Gas Liquids (NGL), Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), and Gas to Liquids (GTL). composition of these products. Figure 21. Typical Composition of LNG, NGLs, CNG, GTL, and LPG Figure 21 shows the difference in typical
Butane
LPG
Pentane
GTL 0 20 40 60 80 100
LNG is made up of mostly methane. The liquefaction process requires the removal of the non-methane components like carbon dioxide, water, butane, pentane and heavier components from the produced natural gas. CNG is natural gas that is pressurized and stored in welding bottle-like tanks at pressures up to 3,600 psig. Typically, CNG is the same composition as pipeline quality natural gas. NGLs are
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made up mostly of molecules that are heavier than methane like ethane, propane, butane. LPG is a mixture of propane and butane in a liquid state at room temperatures. GTL refers to the conversion of natural gas to products like methanol, dimethyl ether (DME), middle distillates (diesel and jet fuel), specialty chemicals and waxes.
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the same way, LNG will stay at near constant temperature if kept at constant pressure. This phenomenon is called autorefrigeration. As long as the steam (LNG boil off vapor) is allowed to leave the tea kettle (tank), the temperature will remain constant. This boil off is captured by the LNG facilities and ships and used as fuel or sent to the pipeline grid.
Is LNG safe?
LNG has been safely handled for many years. The industry has maintained an The safe and excellent safety record, especially over the past 40 years.
environmentally sound operation of these facilities, both ships and terminals, and the protection of these facilities like other critical parts of the energy
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infrastructure -- from terrorist activities or other incidents are a concern and responsibility shared by operators as well as federal, state and local authorities across the U.S. Onshore LNG facilities are industrial sites and, as such, are subject to all rules, regulations and environmental standards imposed by the various jurisdictions. These same or similar concerns apply to natural gas storage, pipeline transportation, distribution and consumption of natural gas.
storage of cryogenic liquids was fully understood, however, there was a serious This incident virtually stopped all development of the U.S. LNG industry for 20 years. In addition to Cleveland, there are other U.S. incidents sometimes attributed to LNG. A construction accident on Staten Island in 1973 has been cited by some parties as an "LNG accident" because the construction crew was working inside an empty LNG tank. In another case, the failure of an electrical seal on an LNG pump in 1979 permitted gas (not LNG) to enter an enclosed building. A spark of indeterminate origin caused the building to explode. As a result of this incident, the electrical code has been revised for the design of electrical seals used with all flammable fluids under pressure.
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resulted in engineering data that permit the LNG facility designer to configure very reliable LNG fire control systems.38,39
LNG to burn, it must be released, vaporize, mix with air in the flammable ratio, and be exposed to an ignition source. From an environmental standpoint there is very little smoke associated with an LNG fire.
H. H. West, L.E. Brown and J.R. Welker, Vapor Dispersion, Fire Control, and Fire Extinguishment for LNG Spills, Proceedings of the Spring Technical Meeting of the Combustion Institute, San Antonio (1975). 39 Fire Protection Handbook, Volume II, Gulf Publishing, Houston (1983).
38
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What are the public safety issues related to LNG? Flammable Vapor Clouds
If LNG is released, the resulting LNG vapors (methane) will warm, become lighter than air, and disperse with the prevailing wind. Cold LNG vapor will appear as a white cloud. If a source of ignition is present where LNG vapors (methane) exist at a 5%-to15% concentration in the air, the vapor cloud will burn along a flame front toward the source of the fuel. It should also be noted that LNG vapors do not catch fire as easily as those of other common fuels such as gasoline or propane, and LNG vapors dissipate more easily, meaning that potential hazards can persist longer for other fuels than for LNG.
Fires
If LNG is released in the presence of an ignition source, a fire will result from the continuous evaporation of the LNG contained within the impoundment. Since this fire would burn with intense heat, firefighting and other safety equipment is installed at terminals and onboard ships to help manage an incident.
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"Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards" are found in Title 49 CFR Part 193.
Aside from design features, are there additional safety measures for LNG ships?
To ensure safety for transportation of LNG, the USCG requires safety zones around LNG ships. The safety zones prohibit entry by other ships thereby helping to eliminate the possibility of a collision of an LNG ship with another ship. In fact, the concept of a safety zone is not confined to shipping. Like the safety zones applied in operating aircraft, and even our cars, LNG safety zones allow a safe stopping
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distance in the event that another ship loses control. A USCG escort boat manages the safety zone around a ship. The USCG uses safety zones to centrally manage and coordinate shipping traffic in coordination with port authorities. well-managed crews, shipping risks are well managed. Through the use of strict operational procedures, putting a priority on safety and well-trained,
LNG, is considered to be a greenhouse gas and may add to the global climate change problem if released into the atmosphere.
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Marine Facilities. The LNG dock facilities are designed to berth and unload LNG
from ships. Tugboats provide assistance when berthing. The dock is designed to accept a specified size range of LNG ships.
Figure 22. LNG Jetty with Unloading Arms - ALNG
LNG
Receiving
and
Storage
LNG
terminal.
LNG at atmospheric pressure. LNG is a cryogenic fluid, and it is not stored at high pressures, so an explosion of LNG from overpressure is not a potential hazard. The issues regarding LNG storage tanks apply both to the liquefaction and regasification facilities because the storage tanks are of the same design. New technologies could enable offshore LNG storage and re-gasification. Offshore LNG
receiving facilities have not yet been built, but engineering and economic
feasibility are under development in the U.S. and elsewhere. The various proposals for offshore LNG receiving facilities in the U.S. include: 1) Port Pelican, proposed by ChevronTexaco, to be located off the southwestern Louisiana coastline; 2) a conversion of an existing offshore oil and gas platform proposed by Crystal Energy
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that is located 11 miles from Ventura County, California into an LNG receiving/regasification terminal; 3) BHP Billiton Cabrillo Deepwater Port, a Floating Storage and Re-gasification Unit (FSRU) off the California coast, approximately 21 miles offshore Port Hueneme and 4) Energy Bridge, a modified LNG tanker/reThe USCG currently is gasification/subsea buoy system developed by El Paso Energy Corporation (which also has an initial permit filing for offshore Louisiana). developing necessary regulations for these kinds of facilities. Research and development is also being conducted on the feasibility of offloading and storing LNG in salt caverns, which would eliminate the need for storage tanks.40 Types of LNG Storage Tanks
Above-ground tanks
Above-ground tanks have been the most widely accepted and used method of LNG storage primarily because they are less expensive to build and easier to maintain than in-ground tanks. There are more than 200 above-ground tanks worldwide, and they range in size from 45,000 barrels to 1,000,000 barrels (7,000 m3 to 160,000m3). In Japan, Osaka Gas is building the worlds largest above-ground tank (180,000m3), using new technologies for pre-stressed concrete design and enhanced safety features, as well as a technology for incorporating the protective dike within the storage tank (see description of full containment systems in section Secondary Containment).
40
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LNG
Figure have
23)
are
completely
design
minimizes
but
ground surface can then be landscaped to improve the aesthetics of the area.
Figure 24. In pit LNG storage tank
insulating materials and dry nitrogen gas fills the space between the inner and outer tanks. See Figure 24 for an example of an in pit LNG
Source: SIGTTO
storage tank.
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Open Rack (ORV) and the Submerged Combustion (SCV). Other types include Shell & Tube exchanger (STV), Double Tube Vaporizer (DTV), Plate Fin Vaporizer (PFV), and Air Fin Vaporizer (HAV).
Figure 25. Open Rack Vaporizer
Open Rack Vaporizer (ORV) (shown in Figure 25) uses source. outside vaporizes Baseload
Source: www.spp.co.jp
seawater of the of
as
its heat or
stainless steel heat exchanger panel and inside panel. Peak operations use
vaporizers with circulating heated water. ORV has the following special features: Simple construction and easy maintenance; High reliability and safety.
Figure 26. Seven Submerged Combustion Vaporizers, Lake Charles, La., Terminal
Submerged Combustion Vaporizer (SCV) uses hot water heated by the submerged combustion burner to vaporize LNG in the stainless tube heat exchanger. the vaporizer for emergency SCV or (shown in Figure 26) is applied mainly to peakshaving operation, but it is also used
Source: www.cmspanhandlecompanies.com
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41
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA): http://www.nfpa.org/. The NFPA began developing NFPA 59A in 1960 by a committee of the American Gas Association and was adopted in 1967. LNG Safety and Security - 60 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
European standards include the following. EN 1473 - The European Norm standard EN 1473 Installation and equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas - Design of onshore installations evolved out of the British Standard, BS 777742 in 1996. for the design. EN 1160 Installation and equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas General Characteristics of Liquefied Natural Gas contains guidance on properties of materials commonly found in LNG facility that may come into contact with LNG. EEMUA 14743 - Recommendations for the design and construction of refrigerated liquefied gas storage tanks. This document contains basic recommendations for the design and construction of single, double and full containment tanks for the bulk storage of refrigerated liquefied gases (RLGs) down to -165C, covering the use of both metal and concrete materials. It is a standard for the design of onshore LNG terminals. This standard is not prescriptive but promotes a risk-based approach
Regulations applicable to LNG ships include: 33 CFR 160.101 Ports and Waterways Safety: Control of Vessel and Facility Operations. This U.S. federal government regulation describes the authority exercised by District Commanders and Captains of the Ports to insure the safety of vessels and waterfront facilities, and the protection of the navigable waters and the resources therein. The controls described in this subpart are directed to specific situations and hazards. 33 CFR 165.20 Regulated Navigation Areas and Limited Access Areas: Safety zones. A safety zone is a water area, shore area, or water and shore area to which, for safety or environmental purposes, access is limited to authorized persons, vehicles, or vessels. It may be stationary and described by fixed limits, or described as a zone around a vessel in motion. It is commonly used for ships
42 43
U.K. Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA) http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5C85DD9.HTM, 1986
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carrying flammable or toxic cargoes, fireworks barges, long tows by tugs, or events like high speed races. 33 CFR 165.30 Regulated Navigation Areas and Limited Access Area: Security Zones. This section defines a security zone as an area of land, water, or land and water that is so designated by the Captain of the Port or District Commander for such time as is necessary to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility, to safeguard ports, harbors, territories, or waters of the United States or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States. It also determines the purpose of a security zone -- to safeguard vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities from destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of a similar nature in the United States and all territory and water, continental or insular, that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Generally, it covers ships with flammable or toxic cargoes, cruise ships, naval ships, and nuclear power facilities and airports.
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Onshore/Marine
Federal Agencies The Department of Energy Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) The Department of Transportation (DOT) The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) U.S. Minerals Management Service U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Offshore
Federal Agencies The Department of Energy The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) The Department of Transportation (DOT) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service National Oceanic Administration and Atmospheric
U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
State & Local Agencies Departments of environmental protection Fire departments Police
Non-Governmental Regulators/Standards Organizations The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) The American Petroleum Institute (API) The American Concrete Institute (ACI) The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
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Federal, state, and local authorities have the power to regulate the construction and operation of LNG facilities. Federal regulation of the industry is by far the most All governmental entities have some ability to Determination of jurisdiction between Both states and the U.S. comprehensive, and there is a separate regulatory requirement for the construction and operation of LNG facilities. regulate each phase of a facilitys life. Congress may regulate activities.
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construction. FERC can approve or reject the location of all LNG import and export facilities prior to construction. One step of the review process requires a safety review and analysis of the design. The design of LNG facilities must conform to the National Fire Protection Associations (NFPA) LNG standards, such as NFPA 59A. FERC also regulates the modification and expansion of LNG onshore facilities. FERC prepares an Environmental Assessment (EA) or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for all onshore facilities as part of the certification process to construct or operate an LNG facility. construction of the project. In addition to evaluating environmental concerns, FERC reviews the engineering design of the facility and monitors
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The standard also incorporates, by reference, technical standards developed by a number of other professional organizations, such as American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)44, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)45, the American Petroleum Institute (API)46, the American Concrete Institute (ACI)47, and the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)48. (A complete list of these organizations appears in the last chapter of the NFPA standard.) The NFPA is not empowered to enforce compliance with its codes and standards. Only regulatory bodies or political entities that have enforcement powers can set the standards that the NFPA creates to regulate the industry. An example is when FERC uses the NFPA standards in their safety review of LNG facilities.
44 45
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) http://www.asme.org/ American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) http://www.asce.org/ 46 American Petroleum Institute (API) http://api-ec.api.org 47 American Concrete Institute (ACI) http://www.aci-int.org/ 48 American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) http://www.astm.org LNG Safety and Security - 68 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
Terrorism
Unexpected risks are, of course, different from routine risks with regard to uncertainty about whether or when they could take place. There must be a general enforcement of security to protect all types of facilities and public places, including LNG operations, from acts of violence. With respect to unexpected risks such as terrorism, a system of safeguards is already in place. LNG tanks, whether on ships, on land, or offshore, require exceptionally large amounts of force to cause damage. Because the amount of energy required to breach containment is so large, in almost all cases the major hazard presented by terrorists is a fire, not an explosion. If an aircraft crashed into an LNG facility, the impact would almost certainly cause a fire fueled initially by the aircraft fuel. may also ignite the LNG, causing a larger fire at the facility. It Emergency fire
detection and protection at the LNG facility/ship would be used in such an event.
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Danger to the public from this type of event would be reduced or eliminated by the separation distance of the facility. Rigorous siting reviews coupled with separation and distance requirements in U.S. safety codes49 minimize risk to the public from land-based facilities. According to the opinion of Project Technical Liaison Associates, Inc. (PTL), LNG land-based facilities are sited to very stringent design and construction codes and standards. These codes require that worst-case accident scenarios be used in the siting and design of these facilities.50 The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) which by Federal law has the responsibility for implementing safety regulations that apply to LNG marine operations in the U.S. is now part of the new U.S. Department of Homeland Security. For all vessels of special interest, including LNG ships, the USCG enforces strict measures towards terror threat protection. Measures taken to prevent terrorism on LNG facilities and ships worldwide include inspections and patrols, action plans for security breach, and emergency communication systems as well as intelligence gathering. as passenger ships, oil tankers, containerships etc. These same measures are also used at other critical facilities, operations and ships - such
Earthquakes
When estimating the risk of LNG projects, the companies involved in LNG facilities consider the danger of strong ground movements and failures due to seismic activity, liquefaction and landslides in the area. The seismic design requirements are outlined in the NFPA 59-A 2001. Major earthquakes can cause severe damage if the facilities are not designed to withstand such events, so the companies conduct regional and site-specific studies to see if the areas are seismically active. These factors are then taken into account during planning and design stages. The design of LNG tanks can accommodate regional seismic activity in locations of potential risk.
49 50
There are no known incidences of LNG storage tank failures due to seismic
49 CFR Part 193: http://cfr.law.cornell.edu/cfr/cfr.php?title=49&type=part&value=193 Lewis, James P.; McClain, Sheila A. Project Technical Liaison Associates, Inc. (PTL): LNG Security: Reality and Practical Approaches, LNG: Economics & Technology Conference, January 2003. LNG Safety and Security - 70 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
activity. In fact, in 1995, none of the LNG storage tanks in the Kobe, Japan area were damaged during a 6.8 earthquake on the Richter scale. Japan is one of the worlds largest users of LNG and has many LNG storage tanks. Table 3 shows the different LNG facilities in the U.S. and Japan. Japan is also one of the more seismically active areas of the world. Damage to its LNG facilities from the most severe earthquakes has been limited to that of natural gas pipelines. The UH IELE has a separate case study on Japans long experience with LNG and safety record.51
Japan**
22 26
48 **as of 1998
Maritime Incidents
The history of the LNG industry has shown that maritime incidents with severe LNG releases are very rare. grounding. Over the industrys 60-year history of 40,000 voyages, there has never been a spill from a ship into the water from either a collision or LNG ships are well designed and well maintained, which reduces the chances and severity of incidents. Their designs prevent breaching of cargo tanks and involvement of multiple tanks in accidents. Potential hazards could come from ignition of LNG pool fires or a vapor cloud.
Operational Incidents
Operational incidents - incidents resulting from human error, equipment failures, or both can occur in any industry and any facilities. In the LNG facilities, it could
51
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happen during unloading, storage, vaporizing and pipeline transmission or other stages of production. Such errors could result in a spill or a fire. LNG facilities and ships have advanced monitoring and control systems that make an incident unlikely to occur compared to other releases. significant damage. Consequences of the majority of potential incidents would be contained on site and managed before they could result in
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safety record based on the diligent industry safety analysis and the development of appropriate industrial safety regulations and standards. Below is a brief description of significant incidents that have occurred at LNG facilities.
52
Much of the materials in this section are taken West, H.H. and Mannan, M.S. Texas A&M University: LNG Safety Practice & Regulation: From 1944 East Ohio Tragedy to Todays Safety Record, AIChE meeting, April 2001 and CH-IV International: Safety History of International LNG Operations, November 2002. 53 Juckett, Don, U.S. Department of Energy, Properties of LNG. LNG Workshop, MD, 2002. 54 West, H.H. and Mannan, M.S. Texas A&M University: LNG Safety Practice & Regulation: From 1944 East Ohio Tragedy to Todays Safety Record, AIChE meeting, April 2001. LNG Safety and Security - 73 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
Mines, concluded that the concept of liquefying and storing LNG was still valid if "proper precautions were observed."55
caused the temperature in the tank to rise, generating enough pressure to dislodge a 6-inch thick concrete roof, which then fell on the workers in the tank, killing 40 people. The Fire Department of the City of New York report of July 197356 determined that the incident was clearly a construction incident and not an "LNG incident." In 1998, the New York Planning Board, while re-evaluating a moratorium on LNG facilities, concluded the following: The government regulations and industry operating practices now in place would prevent a replication of this incident. The fire involved combustible construction materials and a tank design that are now prohibited. Although the exact causes may never be known, it is certain that LNG was not involved in the incident and the surrounding areas outside the facility were not exposed to risk.57
never expected in this building, there were no gas detectors installed. The normal arcing contacts of a circuit breaker ignited the natural gas-air mixture, resulting in an explosion. The explosion killed one operator in the building, seriously injured a second and caused about $3 million in damages. This was an isolated incident caused by a very specific set of circumstances. The National Transportation Safety Board59 found that the Cove Point Terminal was designed and constructed in conformance with all appropriate regulations and codes. However, as a result of this incident, three major design code changes were made at the Cove Point facility prior to reopening. Today, those changes are now applicable industry-wide. Given all of the safety and security measures provided in the LNG value chain, there is a low probability of a serious incident. However the consequences of failure at land-based terminals, as with other energy facilities, can be quite large if proper safety precautions and protections are not employed. The small number of safety incidents that have occurred demonstrates the outstanding safety of the LNG industry. been made. A table at the end of this appendix lists other LNG related incidents, along with some of the critical improvements that have
repairing a natural gas fuel system leak when a combustible gas detector located onboard the vehicle sounded an alarm. Although such repairs are supposed to be performed outdoors, because of inclement weather, the mechanic did the work in a normal bus repair bay. After becoming aware of the leak, he used a switch to
National Transportation Safety Board Report, Columbia LNG Corporation Explosion and Fire; Cove Point, MD; October 6, 1979, NTSB-PAR-80-2, April 16, 1980. LNG Safety and Security - 75 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
59
override the alarm and start the bus in order to move the bus outside. However, when the bus was started, a relay in the air conditioning system ignited a flammable methane-air mixture that had accumulated in the interior of the bus. The resulting explosion blew out all of the windows on the bus as well as the roof hatches and the bellows. The mechanic was unharmed.
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formed and filled the surrounding streets and storm sewer system. Natural gas in the vaporizing LNG pool ignited.
1965
Canvey Island, UK
Yes
1965 1965
Yes Yes
Overfilling. Tank cover and deck fractures. Valve leakage. Deck fractures.
1971
Italy
NA
NA
Yes
First
documented
LNG
Rollover
incident.
Tank
developed a sudden increase in pressure. LNG vapor discharged from the tank safety valves and vents. Tank roof slightly damaged. No ignition
1973
Staten Island
NA
40 killed
No
No
Industrial incident unrelated to the presence of LNG. During Fire the repairs, vapors in associated the tank with to the rise, cleaning process apparently ignited the mylar liner. caused temperature generating enough pressure to dislodge a 6-inch thick concrete roof, which then fell on the workers in the tank.
1973
Canvey Island, UK
NA
No
Yes
Yes
Glass breakage. Small amount of LNG spilled upon a puddle of rainwater, and the resulting flameless vapor
60
Much of the materials in this section are taken from Lloyds Registers Risk Assessment Review of the Marine Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas, STD Report #3000-1-2, September 1992; West, H.H. and M.S. Mannan, Texas A&M University: LNG Safety Practice & Regulation: From 1944 East Ohio Tragedy to Todays Safety Record, AIChE meeting, April 2001 and CH-IV International: Safety History of International LNG Operations, November 2002. LNG Safety and Security - 77 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
Incident Date
Location
Ship Status
Injuries/ Fatalities
Comment
explosion, called a rapid phase transition (RPT), caused the loud "booms. No injuries resulted. 1974 1974 Massachusetts Methane Progress 1975 Philadelphia Gas Works NA No Yes NA Not caused by LNG. An iso-pentane intermediate heat transfer fluid leak caught fire and burned the entire vaporizer area. 1977 Arzew Algeria NA 1 worker frozen to death 1977 1979 LNG Aquarius Columbia Gas LNG Terminal Cove Point, Maryland Loading NA No 1 killed 1 seriously injured No Yes Yes Yes NA Yes Aluminum valve failure on contact with cryogenic temperatures. Wrong aluminum alloy on replacement valve. LNG released, but no vapor ignition. Tank overfilled. An explosion occurred within an electrical substation. LNG leaked through LNG pump electrical penetration seal, vaporized, passed through and 200 feet of the underground substation. the building. electrical conduit, entered Loading In port No No Yes Yes Yes No Valve leakage. Deck fractures. Touched bottom at Arzew.
Since natural gas was never expected in The normal arcing contacts of a circuit
this building, there were no gas detectors installed in breaker ignited the natural gas-air mixture, resulting in an explosion. 1979 Mostefa Boulaid Ship 1979 1979 Pollenger Ship El Paso Paul Kayser Ship ? Unloading At sea No No Yes Yes Yes No Valve leakage. Tank cover plate fractures. Stranded. motors Severe damage to bottom, ballast tanks, damaged, bottom of containment Ben? Unloading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures.
water
system set up. 1980 LNG Libra At sea No Yes No Shaft moved against rudder. Tail shaft fractured.
LNG Safety and Security - 78 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
Incident Date
Location
Ship Status
Injuries/ Fatalities
Comment
1980
LNG Taurus
In port
No
Yes
Extensive bottom damage. 1984 Melrose At sea No Yes No Fire in engine room. No structural damage sustained limited to engine room. 1985 Gradinia In port No Not reported 1985 1989 1990 Isabella Tellier Bachir Chihani Unloading Loading At sea No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cargo valve failure. Cargo overflow. Deck fractures. Broke moorings. Hull and deck fractures. Sustained structural cracks allegedly caused by No Steering gear failure. No details of damage reported.
stressing and fatigue in inner hull. 1993 Indonesian liquefaction facility Indonesia NA No NA NA LNG leak from open run-down line during a pipe modification project. LNG entered an underground concrete storm sewer system and underwent a rapid vapor expansion that overpressured and ruptured the sewer pipes. damaged. 2002 LNG ship Norman Lady East of the Strait of Gibraltar At sea No Yes No Collision with a U.S. Navy nuclear-powered attack submarine, the U.S.S Oklahoma City. condition. the double bottom dry tank area. In ballast Ship suffered a leakage of seawater into Storm sewer system substantially
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Middle distillates Products heavier than motor gasoline/naphtha and lighter than residual fuel oil. This range includes heating oil, diesel, kerosene, and jet kero. Mole Percent MTPA MW Mole is a short form of molecular weight. Mole fraction or mole percent is the number of moles of a component of a mixture divided by the total number of moles in the mixture. Million Tonnes per Annum. Tonnes or Metric Ton is approximately 2.47 cubic meter of LNG. Molecular Weight
Peakshaving LNG A facility for both storing and vaporizing LNG intended to operate on an intermittent basis Facility to meet relatively short term peak gas demands. A peakshaving facility may also have liquefaction capacity, which is usually quite small compared to vaporization capacity at such facility. Risk and hazard Stranded Gas Sweetening Risk and hazard are not the same. Risk means the realization of potential damage, injury or loss; hazard means a condition with potential for initiating an incident or incident. Gas that is not near a customer and therefore does not justify the construction of a pipeline. Processing to remove sulfur. Hydrodesulfurization, for instance, can produce sweet catalytic cracker materials useful for the production of fuels and chemicals. Caustic washing can sweeten sour natural gasolines to make them suitable for motor gasoline blending.
61 62
Phillips Petroleum Company, http://www.phillips66.com/lng/LNGglossary.htm. Poten & Partners, http://www.poten.com/?URL=ut_glossary.asp. LNG Safety and Security - 80 UH IELE. No reproduction, distribution or attribution without permission.
Crude oil*
From Tonnes (metric) Kilolitres Barrels U.S. gallons Barrels/day
*Based gravity. on worldwide average
Multiply by 0.90 0.73 0.026 0.021 1 0.805 1.23 1 0.025 0.02 0.14 0.12
kilolitres
307.86 264.17 42 1
49.8
tonnes to barrels
kilolitres to tonnes
Products
LPG Gasoline Distillate fuel oil Residual fuel oil
to tonnes
tonnes to kilolitres
Example: To convert FROM 1 million tons of LNG TO billion cubic feet of natural gas, multiply by 48.7 (100 million tons of LNG equals roughly 5000 billion cubic feet of natural gas).
Units
1 metric tonne = 2204.62 lb. = 1.1023 short tons 1 kilolitre = 6.2898 barrels 1 kilolitre = 1 cubic metre 1 kilocalorie (kcal) = 4.187 kJ = 3.968 Btu 1 kilojoule (kJ) = 0.239 kcal = 0.948 Btu 1 British thermal unit (Btu) = 0.252 kcal = 1.055 kJ 1 kilowatt-hour (kWh) = 860 kcal = 3600 kJ = 3412 Btu
Calorific equivalents One tonne of oil equivalent equals approximately: Heat units 10 million kilocalories 42 gigajoules 40 million Btu Solid fuels Gaseous fuels Electricity 1.5 tonnes of hard coal 3 tonnes of lignite See Natural gas and LNG table 12 megawatt-hours
One million tonnes of oil produces about 4500 gigawatt-hours (=4.5 terawatt hours) of electricity in a modern power station.
The conversion factors above are taken from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2003, which is available at http://www.bp.com/centres/energy/definitions/units.asp.
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