9 Two Variable Optimization
9 Two Variable Optimization
9 Two Variable Optimization
OPMT 5701
= 10 2x = 0 10 = 2x x=5 and y = 25
This gives us a set of equations, one equation for each of the unknown variables. When you have the same number of independent equations as unknowns, you can solve for each of the unknowns. rewrite each equation as y = 2x 10 x = 2y 10 substitute one into the other x = 2(2x 10) 10 x = 4x 30 3x = 30 1
x = 10 similarly, y = 10
The two partials,fxx , and fyy are the direct eects of of a small change in x and y on the respective slopes in in the x and y direction. The partials, fxy and fyx are the indirect eects, or the cross eects of one variable on the slope in the other variables direction. For both Maximums and Minimums, the direct eects must outweigh the cross eects
which is the measure of the direct versus indirect strengths of the second partials. This is a common setup for checking maximums and minimums, but it is not necessary to use the Hessian.
which is the function of four variables: p1 , p2 , q1 ,and q2 . Using the market demand functions, we can eliminate p1 and p2 leaving us with a two variable maximization problem. First, rewrite the demand functions to get the inverse functions p1 = 56 4q1 p2 = 48 2q2 Substitute the inverse functions into the prot function
2 2 = (56 4q1 )q1 + (48 2q2 )q2 q1 5q1 q2 q2
Solve the rst order conditions using Cramers rule. First, rewrite in matrix form 10 5 q1 56 = 5 6 48 q2 3
where |A| = 35
56 5 48 6 = 2.75 q1 = 35 10 56 5 48 = q2 = 5.7 35 Using the inverse demand functions to nd the respective prices, we get p 1 = 56 4(2.75) = 45 p 2 = 48 2(5.7) = 36.6 From the prot function, the maximum prot is = 213.94
Next, check the second order conditions to verify that the prot is at a maximum. The various second derivatives can be set up in a matrix called a Hessian The Hessian for this problem is 10 5 11 12 = H= 5 6 21 22 The sucient conditions are |H1 | = 11 = 10 < 0 (First Principle Minor of Hessian) |H2 | = 11 22 12 21 = (10)(6) (5)2 = 35 > 0 (determinant) Therefore the function is at a maximum. Further, since the signs of |H1 | and |H2 | are invariant to the values of q1 and q2 , we know that the prot function is strictly concave.
Then the prot function for a competitive rm is = P q wL rK or 1 1 = P L 2 + P K 2 wL rK First order conditions 4 P = Market Price w = Wage Rate r = Rental Rate
1. 2.
L k
= =
1 P L 2 w 2 1 P K 2 r 2
=0 =0
General Form P fL w = 0 P fK r = 0
Second order conditions (Hessian) LL = P fLL = 4P L 2 < 0 3 KK = P fKK = 4P K 2 < 0 LK = KL = P fLK = P fKL = 0 or, in matrix form P 3 LL LK 0 4 L2 H = 3 P KL KK = K 2 0 4 P 3 L2 4 P 3 K 2 4
3
Dierentiate rst order of conditions with respect to capital (K) and labour (L) =Therefore prot maximization Example: If P = 1000, w = 20, and r = 10 1. Find the optimal K , L, and 2. Check second order conditions
0>0
which in this case, is the Cobb-Douglas function Q = La K b where a and b are positive parameters. If we further assume decreasing returns to scale, then a + b < 1. For simplicity, lets consider the symmetric case where a = b = 1 4 Q = L4 K 4 Substituting Equation 3 into Equation 1 gives us (K, L) = P L 4 K 4 wL rK The rst order conditions are
L K
1 1 1 1
The sucient conditions for a maximum are that |H1 | < 0 and |H | > 0. Therefore, the second order conditions are satised. We can now return to the rst order conditions to solve for the optimal K and L. Rewriting the rst equation in Equation 5 to isolate K 3 1 P 1 L 4K4 = w 4 w 3 K = ( 4p L 4 )4 Substituting into the second equation of Equation 5
3 P 1 L 4 K 4 4
This system of equations dene the optimal L and K for prot maximization. But rst, we need to check the second order conditions to verify that we have a maximum. The Hessian for this problem is 2 3 3 # " 7 1 3 LL LK )L 4 K 4 P 1 L 4K 4 P ( 16 1 2 3 3 4 3 1 7 H= = KL KK P 4 L 4 K 4 P 16 L 4 K 4
3 1 L 4K4 w = 0 =P 1 41 1 3 = P 4 L4 K 4 r = 0
= P4
1 4
4
w3 L2 = r
P
4
1 4
4w 3 L4 p
4 3 4
=r
Taking advantage of the symmetry of the model, we can quickly nd the optimal K
1 P 3 K = ( r 4 w 4 )2 4
Firm 1
q2 2 q1 2
gives us two equations and two unknowns. The solution to this system of equations is the equilibrium to the Cournot Duopoly Game. Using Cramers Rule
c 1. q1 = a3 b c 2. q2 = a3 b Market Output q1 + q2 =
2(ac) 3b
If y = AB y = A/B y = Ab
NOTE: ln(A + B ) 6= ln A + ln B (b) derivatives IF y = ln x y = ln (f (x)) (c) Examples If y = ln(x2 2x) ln x y = ln(x1/2 ) = 1 2 3. The Number e if y = ex then if y = ef (x) (a) Examples y = e3x 3 y = e7x y = ert
dy dx dy dx dy dt
T HEN dy 1 =x dx dy = f (1x) f 0 (x) dx T hen 1 dy/dx = (x2 (2x 2) 2x) 1 1 dy/dx = 2 x = 21x
U x2
If we rearrange to get dx2 /dx1 dx2 U1 a x1 = = = U dx1 U2 b x2 The MRS is the Absolute value of
dx2 dx1 U
: MRS = a b
Find dx2 /dx1 dx2 U1 (2x1 + x2 ) = = dx1 U2 (3x2 2 + x1 ) The MRS is the Absolute value of
dx2 dx1
: (2x1 + x2 ) (3x2 2 + x1 )
MRS =
Rearrange to get
iv) and
U c1
= U1 =
1 c1
dc1 =
c1
dc1 c1 dc1 +
U x2
= U2 =
dU = Rearrange to get
c2
1 c2
dc2 =
c2
dc2
dc2 = 0
MRS =
c2 c1
10