University Presentations for William Swan: William Swan was the lead economist for Boeing Commercial Airplanes

1996-2005. He forecast air travel among all regions of the world for 20 years forward. This is the basis for Boeings long-range plans, and for the annual Current Market Outlook document, which is an industry standard forecast. As a aviation economist, Dr. Swan was responsible for understanding both the fundamentals of forecasts for country GDPs and also the mechanisms by which economic and industry developments cause air travel growth. Before joining Boeing, Dr. Swan worked at both United Airlines, American Airlines, and Hull Trading, a stock index options market maker. He was involved in operations research and strategic planning. Dr. Swans educational background includes a Ph.D. in Transportation Systems from M.I.T and time spent on the research staff of M.I.T.s Flight Transportation Lab. His undergraduate work was in Aeronautical Engineering at Princeton University. He also holds an appointment as a Visiting Professor at Cranfield University. Currently Dr. Swan is associated with Seabury Airline Planning Group, a small consulting and investment firm.

Three Mistakes We Made In Forecasting For over 40 years Boeing has published an annual forecast for the growth of air travel world wide. Current Market Outlook has become a standard reference for planners in government and industry. Major methodological changes in the forecast occurred in mid-1990s. These were a result of rethinking the data, methods, and models. It turns out standard approaches over-emphasized the effect of GDP. On the other hand, statistics found a convincing and cogent link between trade and travel, even though the data appeared entirely random. Finally, a startlingly simple approach established the hitherto elusive link between travel and service quality. This talk is a light-hearted review of the things we did wrong and fixed, and the things we are still worried about. It provides a bittersweet contrast between the ways of industry and academia. As a bonus we introduce Occams Toothbrushan entirely new, hopelessly backwards, and entirely unpublishable way industry does hypothesis testing, but doesnt realize it. (PPT only) Misunderstandings about Airline Growth Consolidation is a myth. Data suggest that the airline industry is not consolidating. Competition is either increasing or almost constant, depending on the type of measurement. Hubs are here to stay. A hub is an airport where many of the passengers are connecting to ongoing flights. The reason hubs are here to stay is that half the O-D travel in the world is in markets too small to be served nonstop. Fortunately, small markets are willing to pay. Hubbed carriers economic strength is observable in the US ticket price data. Growth has not lead to bigger airplanes. The trend in airplane size has been flat to declining, since 1985. The evidence is the same in all regions of the world and has been strong and persistent. Smaller is good: Big airplanes spend more time on the gate and turn slower, increasing system costs. For small airplanes, value is created by frequency. Noise is lower, per seat, in small planes than big. Finally, congestion as a driver towards large airplanes affects only
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the smallest designs. The share of the largest size shows significant decline. Fares are declining very little. Industry real yields have been declining at 2-3% a year, but cost savings do not need to match this pace. Longer trips and leisure markets both have lower yields, so yield can change as the mix changes, even while fares are stable. Data show flat business fares and leisure fares declining by 1% per year. Cost savings continue to match the decline in fares. Jets, high-bypass engines, revenue management, travel agency fees, and competitive wages have each had their turn in reducing costs. Todays focus is on industrial engineering airport processes. Tomorrow may see more direct flight paths with fewer ATC delays. Plan the future. A trend is a projection of past developments. A forecast is a trend where you know the reasons why. A good forecast does not change the trend, unless it has a reason why the underlying causes are changing. The future is different again from a forecast. The future is what we try to make happen, after we understand how things work. (PPT and paper) Airline Evolution A review of routes, fares, competition, regulation, bankruptcy, startups, and generally how the airline industry evolved, based on personal involvement in each of these aspects from a academic, airline, and aircraft manufacturer viewpoints. (PPT but no paper) Airline Route Developments: The Unexpected. Airline route networks can carry growing traffic volumes by using larger airplanes, by adding frequencies on existing routes, and by adding new routes. The natural expectation has been that growth will come in all three dimensions in the listed order of importance. The last 15 years of route growth suggests otherwise. Growth has been accompanied by little change in airplane sizes, and new routes have been nearly as strong a development as added frequencies on existing routes. It seems that network growth patterns cannot be anticipated based on simple intuition alone. Such unexpected results require substantial evidence in support plus some explanation of the reasons why. This paper offers some data and some explanations that begin the discussion. (many PPT versions, but no paper) Consolidation in the Airline Industry People commonly perceive that the airline industry is consolidating. By this they mean there are fewer and fewer airlines. It is true that numbers of major airlines have disappeared from the competitive marketplace. It is also true that numbers of other airlines have grown newly significant. A common and useful measure of the degree of competition is the Herfindahl. The intuitive version of this measure represents the number of competitors of equal size that would produce the same degree of competition as is measured in the market. Herfindahls for the number of airlines operating in major markets have been flat or rising, not falling. Numerical evidence does not support the idea that competition is diminishing to any significant degree. Consolidation in the form of mergers or takeovers of failing carriers may be part of the birth-and-death process expected in a competitive market place (PPT and paper) Prices, Fares, and Yields The most common measure of airline fares is average yield, which is the ratio of revenues to passenger-kilometers. This paper demonstrates that changes in yield overstate changes in fares. This is done first with a small numerical example, and second by comparison between US yield and ticket sample data. Average yield declines in part because long-haul travel is growing faster than short-haul, and leisure travel is growing faster than

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business. Both effects depress yields even when prices are not changed. Data suggests that business fares have been flat, while discount fares have been declining. (PPT but no paper) New Perspective on Fleet Planning Recent insights from world-wide data show weak correlation of airplane size with market size, past airplane size used, or new market entry. This presentation presents the evidence and attempts to put past fleet planning models in perspective. A tentative model is presented that could explain the otherwise demoralizing lack of pattern in fleet trends. (PPT but no paper) How Airlines Compete. Airlines compete in city-pair markets. Each airline in the market plans a schedule of departure times and offers a series of fares. The fundamentals of airlines competing are this: customers choose based on price and time, and those customers who find both airlines equal choose based on secondary characteristics we call quality. This simple model of the demand side leads to some compelling consequences on the supply side. The discussion below starts with the simplest possible model, and then adds several levels of realism to that foundation. Along the way, discussions trace the effect of the market reality on competing airlines. (PPT and paper) Pricing and Yield Management (PPT but no text paper): HISTORY development over the last 20 years PRICING why several prices for tickets YIELD MANAGEMENT making pricing work TYPE OF FARES 4 basic kinds BUSINESS FARES high value travel COACH FARE the posted fare DISCOUNT FARES tourists and vacations PROMOTIONAL FARES low fares to stimulate travel PRICE ELASTICITY traffic changes when fares change DILUTION the problem of everyone getting the lowest fare VOCABULARY "bucket," "authorization," and "nesting" USING THE RESERVATIONS SYSTEM an example of yield management FORECASTING DEMAND combining data and knowledge OVERBOOKING adjusting for No Shows SUMMARY OF YIELD MANAGEMENT

Spill Modeling for Airlines (Slides in Word, not PPT) Spill models estimate average passenger loads when demand occasionally exceeds capacity. Such models have been in use for over 20 years. The shape of the distribution of demand is discussed from both theory and observation. Sources of variance are identified and calibrated. Measurement problems and techniques are discussed. Two alternate spill formulas are presented. A model revision responds to changes in process caused by computer reservations systems and revenue management. The concept that spill losses should be valued at discount fares is discussed. The recapture of spilled demand is presented as well as when such a phenomenon is relevant. Comparison of various sources of error is included. Finally, the use of spill models in reverse to imply demand from load is shown to have poor accuracy. The paper is meant to offer to the literature a reference for basic use. It is the result of 20 years involvement in spill model derivations, calibrations, and applications. (Word slides and papers)

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Fewer Departures Mean More Noise at Airports The combination of certified noise limits and departure caps at airports moves airlines to use larger airplanes and lower frequencies to serve travel demand. However, the best available measures of noise annoyance suggest that large airplanes contribute more annoyance per passenger carried than more flights with smaller airplanes. These observations hold true based on allowable certificated noise levels. They are even more true based on trends in actual noise outputs. The conclusion is that moving to smaller airplanes and more frequencies, particularly within the larger long-haul fleets will reduce noise far more than departure limits. If these results prove true, market mechanisms based on contribution to noise annoyance is an effective way to reduce ground impacts. The current pattern of certification limits on airplanes and departure caps at airports may actually increase noise. (PPT and paper; fairly short) Consolidation in the Airline Industry. People commonly perceive that the airline industry is consolidating. By this they mean there are fewer and fewer airlines. It is true that numbers of major airlines have disappeared from the competitive marketplace. It is also true that numbers of airlines have grown newly significant. A common and useful measure of the degree of competition is the Herfindahl. The intuitive version of this measure represents the number of competitors of equal size that would produce the same degree of competition as is measured in the market. Herfindahls for the number of airlines operating in major markets have been flat or rising, not falling. Numerical evidence does not support the idea that competition diminishing. Consolidation in the form of mergers or takeovers of failing carriers may be part of the birth-anddeath process expected in a competitive market place. (PPT and paper) Aircraft trip cost parameters: A function of stage length and seat capacity This paper disaggregates aircraft operating costs into various cost categories and provides background for an engineering approach used to compute a generalized aircraft trip cost function. Engineering cost values for specific airplane designs were generated for a broad number of operating distances, enabling a direct analysis of the operating cost function and avoiding the problems associated with financial reporting practices. The resulting data points were used to calibrate a cost function for aircraft trip expenses, varying in seating capacity and distance. This formula and the parameter values are then compared to econometric results, based on historical data. Results are intended to be used to adjust reported costs such that conclusions about industry structure, based on cost regressions, correctly account for differences in stage lengths and capacities. A CobbDouglas cost function is also computed, providing elasticity parameters for both economies of density, through seat capacity, and distance. The usefulness of the results for route network design draw from the simple planar connection between frequency, capacity and costs. Although the Cobb-Douglas function is no less accurate, it is generally much less convenient for subsequent analysis. (PPT and paper)

Presentations not yet prepared as slides, but paper exists

demand outcomes. Sources have proposed both Gamma and Normal shapes for these distributions. Data suggests that a model combining both distributions is appropriate. The model explains when the Gamma shape will dominate and when the Normal will determine the shape. One consequence of this understanding is that Gamma shapes are probably better for revenue management and Normal for spill modeling. However, it takes a compound process combining the two to generate all the observed characteristics of various cases.

Airline Jet Fuel Hedging: theory and practice Most international airlines hedge fuel costs, but the theoretical justification is weak. This paper explores the nature and extent of airline fuel hedging and asks why airlines hedge. The availability of hedging instruments is first discussed, with the most liquid markets in crude and exchange traded contracts. Aviation fuel contracts are possible, but with counter-party risk. Most major passenger airlines with sufficient cash and credit now hedge at least part of their future needs. Hedging does protect profits against a sudden upturn in crude prices caused by political and consumer uncertainty leading to slower economic growth. However, if higher oil prices are induced by strong economic growth and oil supply constraints, hedging increases volatility with hedging gains reinforcing improved profits from higher traffic and improved yields. If hedging does not reduce volatility, it may still have an accounting role in moving profits from one time period to another, insure against bankruptcy and signal the competence of management to investors and stakeholders. Copies of most of these can be downloaded from: http://www.sauder.ubc.ca/Faculty/Research_Centres/Centre_for_Transportation_Studies/ William_Swan_Publications

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