2008 Japan Soft Power
2008 Japan Soft Power
2008 Japan Soft Power
Aff AT: Japan Economy NB..............................................................................................46 Aff AT: Japan NB..............................................................................................................47 Aff: Climate not key to SoPo.............................................................................................48 Aff- SoPo Low Now..........................................................................................................49
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century, http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/japanamerica_security_alliance_prospects_for_the_twentyfirst_century_t he/) This is not to say that the Kissinger-Kahn-Gallois prediction will never come true. The further the time horizon is extended, the greater the chances that their forecasts might materialize. What realist theory emphasizes is the potentially powerful impact on Japan of the rise of formidable rivals in the region like China, a unified Korea, or a revanchist Russia. Power shifts involving Japan and its Asian neighbors could turn out to be the most dangerous fault line in Asia. A power inversion, if one took place, could touch off largescale tremors. Japan might move to acquire military power. Whether such tremors lead to a system-shaking earthquake will depend on a number of factors, not the least of which is JASA's viability. If JASA remains effective, Japan may choose to continue relying the U.S. security umbrella. As long as Japan is comfortable about entrusting its security to JASA, the alliance ought to obviate the need to "go it alone." If JASA is terminated, however, and Japan feels threatened by a powerful Asian neighbor, Japan is likely to embark on a crash program of rearmament. A lot will depend on the nature of the security threat. China's acquisition of a power projection capability is by itself not necessarily a threat; but the combination of an enhanced military capability and uncertainties about Chinese intentions would be worrisome. US withdrawal would result in Japanese nuclearization and militarization. Khalilzad RAND Corporation 1995 (Zalmay, Losing the Moment? The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring, Lexis) Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan
is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and stillsignificant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces.
23
24
25
. The United States should also offer India tangible rewards for acceding to Kashmir self-determination subject to safeguards to prevent Kashmiri freedom from threatening Indias national security interests: support for permanent Indian membership in the Security Council; grandfathered nuclear status under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the ending of sanctions for Indias 1998 nuclear tests; and, closer military ties that would strengthen Indias hand in its border and companion quarrels with China. Only the United States can midwife a Kashmir solution. And the strength of its national security, human rights, and international law interests implicated clearly justify an unstinting effort
inclusion of its leadership in all Kashmir negotiations. The United States should appoint a person of an international standing , like President George H. Bush or President Nelson Mandela, to be a special envoy on Kashmir
26
27
28
premise that a healthy Japanese economy serves America's economic and geopolitical interests. Despite its decade-long stagnation, Japan remains the largest economy in Asia, America's third-largest trading partner, and its major ally in the Asia-Pacific region.
Economic collapse causes nuclear war Cook, Retired Federal Analyst for the U.S. Treasury Department, now a writer and consultant, 2k7 (Richad, June 14th, "It's Official: The Crash of the U.S. Economy has begun," Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5964 ) Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than face the economic music . The classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to World War II . Conditions in the coming years could be as bad as they were then. We could have a really big war if the U.S. decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have it in the chops. If they don't want our dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes?
29
do not cross to another, from, for example, trade or finance to politics or security. This is especially true for Japan, which is still the most important U.S. ally in the region. It has been seen recently that unresolved and bitter trade disputes with
Japan can adversely affect the U.S.-Japan security relationship. n6 This does not mean that trade problems are not serious or should not be aggressively pursued: it does mean that a broader range of U.S. officials needs to be involved with each set of issues.
30
31
XTN Japanese SoPo is key to its economy David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <This leaves open the question of how Japanese popular culture will ultimately matter in Asia, even if one starts [rom the assumption that its entertainment industries will continue to grow and even dominate. In one possible view, consumers watchingJapanese video games, listening to.J-Pop songs, or displaying a poster of pop star Matsuura Aya on their walls are cogs in the "culture industry" (see, e.g., Adorno 19~Jl). The spread of Japanese convenience stores or fast-food chains like Hoka-Hoka Bento in Indonesia (iHainichi Shimbun 2004) prove nothing more than do the ubiquitous Kentucky Fried Chicken shops in the region. These examples represent little other than the ability of Japanese firms to sell their mass-produced icons and ditties to an increasingly and depressingly global market. This might be good for Japanese firms and, if properly managed, for the overall Japanese economy, but its political benefits for Japan are likely negligible.>
32
33
34
35
36
37
WHAT if China and Taiwan were to come to blows, will the neighbourhood go up in flames too?
The impact on the region will depend on the intensity of the conflict. Broadly speaking, the Chinese strategists have postulated three scenarios. BLOCKADE: LOSERS AND WINNERS AT THE bottom of the scale is a low-intensity conflict, with Beijing using minimal force to bring an increasingly assertive and independence-minded Taiwan to heel. It will mount a blockade on the island with the limited political objective of getting the Taiwanese back to the negotiation table for a peaceful settlement. No missile will be hurled, neither a physical occupation. Since the use of force is limited to enforcing the blockade, loss of life and property will be kept to the minimum. In such a scenario, the United States will not feel compelled to get involved other than to make some form of token protest. Once that is done and Beijing has made its point, Washington is expected to pile on the pressure on Taiwan to accept the "one China" principle. The negative impact will mainly be borne by the Chinese themselves while other countries in the region might even gain in the short run. Right now, the entire Greater China region is enjoying one of its best moments in history in terms of economic growth.
A cross-strait conflict, even at the lowest end of the intensity scale, will suffice to truncate, if not to reverse, the steep GNP growth trends of the past few years.
Other than the quantifiable losses from disrupted trade flows, there is also the longer-term damage to consider. For example, it took Taiwan almost three decades to establish itself as the third largest producer of information technology (IT) products in the world. It is now the island's single largest foreign exchange earner. The Sept 21 earthquake last year demonstrated the risk involved in Taiwan's dependence on the IT industry. A few days of power blackouts disrupted chip-manufacturing operations on the island, which in turn sent prices of these components soaring worldwide. Not surprisingly, a scramble followed for alternative sources of supply. A blockade lasting three months will devastate the industry in Taiwan. Similarly, it has taken China more than two decades to establish itself as the second largest recipient of private direct investment. In recent years, such investment has amounted to more than 20 per cent of China's total capital formation. A capital outflow will follow if there is trouble across the strait. Other than China and Taiwan, Japan's economy is likely to be hurt too if the blockade disrupts its "life-line" -the sea lane through which flows its supplies of oil and other commodities. Though no physical loss will be incurred, the blockade will force up prices across the board as Japan is so dependent on this sea lane. The Asean region stands to gain in the short run. Those with strong IT industries, like Singapore and Malaysia, will carve a big slice from what was previously Taiwan's share. Similarly, as investment flees China, the Asean countries might be able to intercept this flow and benefit thereby. Politically, the blockade is likely to provoke Sino-phobia in the region. Japan's rightwing forces will seize this golden opportunity to demand a revision of the post-war Constitution prohibiting its rearmament. Asean countries having territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea will beef up their defence budgets. Ethnic Chinese population in these countries may have to contend with increased suspicion or worse as Sino-phobia rises. The US stands to gain. So long as its stays on the sidelines, it does not lose the Chinese market. At the same time its defence industry gains as countries in the region start stocking up on arms in anticipation of trouble. DESTROYING THE TAIWAN MILITARY
THE medium intensity scenario postulates a situation in which Beijing wages a war against Taiwan .
The objective here is to obliterate its military capability which is seen as underpinning its independence movement.
Taiwan is brought to its knees but only after widespread death and destruction have been inflicted on the island and the coastal provinces of China.
The outcome: In this scenario, the US while feeling obliged to support Taiwan militarily is not party to a full-scale war with China. Washington's primary concern would be to keep it to a "limited war" to prevent hostilities from spinning out of control. Limited though it may be, the war will set back the economies of China and Taiwan by at least two to three decades. All the short-term gains enjoyed by the Asean countries in the low-intensity scenario will be nullified as the conflict intensifies. In this medium-intensity scenario, no one gains. Politically, all countries are forced to take sides. This decision is particularly hard to make in those countries having a sizeable ethnic-Chinese population.
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war.
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire.
opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape . The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.
And the conflagration may not end there as Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of
38
Impact-Chinese-Japanese
A strong alliance deters Chinese aggression and ensures Taiwanese stability Self, 01-- senior associate at the stemson center, (Benjamin L., Chapter 12: The China Problem, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security of Taiwan, 2001, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=RESSpecNet&fileid=C8D09CBF-3F88-F467-B52A01842714CA38&lng=en) // HBG As discussed above, the United States and Japan share a basic interest in preserving the status quo regarding Taiwan itself, pending the emergence of an environment more conducive to Peaceful Resolution. Thus, the number one priority for the two countries in regard to Taiwan is to: Preserve separate status of Taiwan at minimal cost. Minimal cost means more than the costs associated with direct military deterrence of China, to say nothing of military conflict with China. It must also include avoiding a breakdown of cooperation with China in areas of vital interest. The U.S. and Japan share vital interests in several areas of cooperation with the PRC. To be brief, these are: Supporting a constructive regional role for China on the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea. Avoiding turmoil or oppression within China. Preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced military technologies (AWACS, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, encryption, etc.)The allies also share interests and values that impel them to seek some transformation in the character of the PRC regime: Advance the rule of law in both economic and political arenas. Promote respect for human rights. Support the rise of pluralism and gradual democratization. Policy Tools for Maintaining the Security of Taiwan The allies have available to them a wide range of tools with which to advance these interests. Typically these are considered in two groups: military options for deterrence or defense; and economic, cultural, and other interactions for engagement. Diplomacy straddles the divide, as it can either signal to China that military pressure on Taiwan will lead to confrontation or assure China that the allies have no intention to support Taiwans independence. The alliance itself, properly understood as a broad-based partnership rather than a purely military one, can serve as an umbrella to approach China. In particular, it can contribute to stability in the area around Taiwan, embodying both the deterrence function and the reassurance function. The following elements include those that are traditionally considered alliance functions as well as those that have in the past been conducted outside the rubric of the alliance but could conceivably be folded in. U.S. forward-deployed forces U.S. use of SDF bases and Japanese civilian facilities Joint operations with Japan Self-Defense Forces Support for Taiwans defense capability through arms sales and cooperation Strengthening Taiwans economic and political development Confidence-building measures, including military-to-military dialogue U.S.-based forces Trilateral or multilateral dialogue, including political exchange Arms control Trade and investment agreements, especially the World Trade Organization (WTO) Scientific, cultural, and other cooperation, including peaceful space development. Recommendations for Advancing Alliance Interests in China/Taiwan Always place them in the context of broader regional interests. A narrow focus on Taiwan leads to simplistic linkage of tools to aims without sufficient consideration of larger but extraneous factors. The alliance is clearly the greatest interest of the United States and Japan in the region, and although defense of Taiwan is also a major interest, it would be a mistake to unnecessarily put the alliance at risk for the benefit of Taiwan. The U.S.-Japan alliance is our strongest asset, but a clear and direct role for it in defense of Taiwan may not be the best solution to the military threat to Taiwans security. Establishing such a role would overlook the second-order ramifications, such as increased politicization of defense policy in Japan at a time when Tokyo is finally overcoming decades of stagnation and defense allergy. Because Japan is largely unwilling to sacrifice relations with China over this issue, it may be impossible to make the alliance stronger if it is seen as only for Taiwans defense. While we should be confident that Japanese national interests are much more clearly in maintaining the alliance if push comes to shove, we should also recall Tokyos deer in the headlights response to the Persian Gulf crisis. Hoping to minimize damage to Japan-China relations, Tokyo may dawdle even in the face of disaster. Again, although the political elite strongly supports the alliance, there is probably enough caution to cause paralysis. If Japan does make China angry and Tokyo must not be afraid to do that might not the deterioration in ties with China embolden Taiwan to move even more briskly toward solidifying its separate status, enabling the very crisis we are hoping to prevent? The point here is emphatically not to argue against using the alliance as the basis for approaching China. In fact, the very opposite is intended. The U.S.-Japan alliance must come first in our regional policy formulation, and then a strong, common U.S.-Japan posture can assert control over the flow of events and policy positions. What this means to argue against is the notion that Japan can be used, after policies are decided in Washington, as an adjunct to U.S. power. This is the tradition and it has been easy to do
39
Impact-Chinese-Japanese
Chinese military spending and economic growth guarantees conflict without a stronger U.S. Japan alliance Okazaki, 2 -- ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand, research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute, 3-4-2002, Lexis //HBG
By most accounts, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States have changed the world. U.S. public opinion--which has exerted a decisive influence on the course of world events in the 20th century--is leading the country toward, on the one hand, a resurgence of patriotism and displays of comradeship among its compatriots and, on the other hand, interventionism, as opposed to isolationism, in foreign relations. This is noticeably reflected in U.S. President George W. Bush's Jan. 29 State of the Union address. Here, one reservation is made by saying "most accounts," because public opinion is by nature unpredictable, and no one can say how long this new U.S. tendency will continue. Worthy of note in connection with this is that some countries are little affected by changes in the United States. A case in point is China, which has formed a microcosm unto itself throughout history. The fate of the world this century will depend considerably on the future of China as well as the new posture of the United States. A week before the terrorist attacks, Newsweek spotlighted China in its Sept. 3 edition, calling it "China Inc." an obvious pun on what Japan was called at one time--"Japan Inc." The two-page illustration depicted China as a huge red octopus spreading its tentacles over the globe. This was an image that struck a nerve in news centers the world over. The Sept. 11 attacks turned the media's attention away from China for some months. After the war against terrorism passed a critical stage, the Jan. 30 issue of the Japaneselanguage version of Newsweek put the focus back on China, this time playing up the danger that Chinese economic aggression poses to Japan. On the cover was a giant blue fire-breathing dragon. If not for the events
China's economic growth must surely rank as one of the wonders of the modern world, but the problem is that it has resulted in more harm than benefit to neighboring economies. And its increasing strength threatens to destabilize the power balance in the Asian region in the long run.
triggered by Sept. 11, the glare of the world's media would have been trained on China throughout the autumn as Beijing readied itself to join the World Trade Organization. Economic wonder. Last summer, critics around the world began warning of the menace posed by China after it posted its economic figures for the first half of the year 2001. The data showed that China was the sole winner in trade competition on the international market. Whether it can keep up the pace is an open question, and predictions abound on the future of the Chinese economy. One school of thought insists that the dragon cannot keep breathing flames for long. Adherents to this theory point to a range of factors that could work to slow China's high economic growth: internal tension within the socialist economic system; constraints due to environmental pollution; public demand for democratization, which is expected to rise as a result of economic development and a subsequent decline in the central authority of the ruling party. There may be some substance to these predictions, and they certainly cannot be ruled out. However, it seems that the probabilities of such developments will be more or less lower than the chances of the Chinese economy continuing to expand for the foreseeable future. Since no one can really predict the future, it is more expedient for us to confine our attention to those things that may directly affect Japan. This is in line with the dictates of "senyu-koraku"--wise men worry ahead of common people and
, the risk that China will enter a stagnant phase in both economic and military strength should by rights worry Chinese the most. It is not Japan's business to butt in on things that are not our concern, although we may deal with such problems as and when they affect us. It would be reckless for us to be complacent, assuming that China's high economic growth is bound to stop in the near future. I have long been convinced, from a macroeconomic point of view, that the Chinese people have a high potential for achieving sustainable growth. China has a population
enjoy themselves afterward. In other words of 1.2 billion and a long list of accomplishments that include one of history's most advanced civilizations and a succession of great dynasties. Each individual member of this highly talented society has been striving to be richer tomorrow than today ever since the launching of the reform policy in 1978. China's economic growth is assured as long as its growth potential, which is based on low labor costs, is retained. China's 'multiplier effect' For the past 20 years since the open-door policy and reforms began, an army of several hundred thousand Chinese have been graduating from universities every year to join the country's more advanced workforce. Also, intellectuals who fled in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident have acquired business and engineering expertise on the international market and are returning home. Add to these factors the low cost of labor, and it is evident that few countries can compete successfully with China. But there is a problem. China's neighbors are concerned about its high economic growth, which they see as damaging, instead of beneficial, to their own
The increase in China's economic might also mean the flight of investment funds away from Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, causing their own industries to suffer. Of course, no business deal takes place without both parties profiting. But even then, the degree to which a country ultimately benefits from such a deal is governed by the so-called multiplier effect--the degree to which business profits raise gross domestic product. The multiplier effect varies greatly depending on who receives the initial investment.
interests. Indeed, for Southeast Asian nations, Chinese manufacturers are their direct competitors. Moreover, the higher the growth rate of a country, the larger its multiplier effect. Let's say a Japanese company invests in China and both the Japanese and its Chinese partners make 1 million dollars from the venture. While the growth in gross domestic product on the part of the investor's country, Japan, is limited to 1 million dollars in the deal, the GDP of China, with a large multiplier effect, stands to gain much more. No way of reversing
. If Japanese companies operating in China are obliged by Chinese policy to channel their profits into new investments in China, this will result in a net flow of cash to China. Furthermore, as more Japanese companies shift their production bases to China and close plants in Japan, the multiplier effect in Japan on the firms' profits will be on the minus side. In this way, Japanese industry is becoming hollowed out. Furthermore, foreign companies in China have encountered an endless list of troubles, such as Chinese authorities' fickle interpretation of economic regulations, arbitrary commissions charged on foreign companies' profits, noncompliance with contract provisions, copyright violations and failure to make payments. However irrational Chinese business practices may seem to outsiders, I have noticed these
trend irregularities may be fairly rational when seen from the point of view of the Chinese. China understandably wants to obtain technical know-how from abroad. It is also understandable that, once the Chinese acquire the relevant expertise, they will not want foreign companies continuing to profit from the Chinese market. This is just what such countries as Japan and South Korea have done in the past. In the postwar era, Japan imported a wide range of manufacturing technologies from the United States, but hardly any U.S. manufacturing companies are making money in Japan today. Like many other countries, China strives for independence in all but a
China may have been fascinated by the Japanese style of running department stores. However, if they became familiar with the system, they may no longer be willing to allow Japanese department store chain operators to continue making profits in China. There is no way to halt the expansion of the Chinese economy, just as there was no way for the United States to reverse Japan's growing economic strength from the 1960s to the 1980s--a trend the United States accurately anticipated, but could not prevent. Ensure balance of power. There can be no doubt that China's military spending will inevitably be boosted. In any country, the allocation of the budget is a hard-fought battle between government organizations, with the spoils going to the most powerful bodies. In China, this means the military, having an overwhelming say in the government, will continue to receive the lion's share of the budget. Military spending in China will probably double before the next decade, quadruple in the next 15 years, and balloon 10-fold 30 years from now. It is worth recalling former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's brilliant analysis of the situation in Europe just before World War I.
handful of specialized fields for which it has to depend on foreign countries. For example, Kissinger says peace in Europe in the 19th century was maintained by a balance of power between the region's five major nations, none of which had any clear military advantage. However, Germany proceeded to make remarkable gains in economic strength, upsetting the balance of power without changing national boundaries, he notes. In much the same way, China will continue to make drastic increases in its national strength, and this
Strengthening Japan's alliance with the United States is the only way in which Washington and Tokyo can cope with this situation. Suppose that Japan resolves the impasse over its right to exercise collective self-defense, allowing itself to fully commit militarily to achieving goals common to Japan and the United States under the bilateral alliance. This would enable a balance of power effective enough to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution in the Asian region for at least the next 20 to 30 years. It is, of course, meaningless to try to reverse a predominant economic trend by economic measures. Japan should be gratified to see improvements in the living standards of our neighbor, China, after it suffered miseries for so many years as it lagged behind the mainstream of modernization in the 19th century . It would therefore be adequate for Japan if it is able to maintain peace in Asia by paying due attention to changes in the regional balance of power that are bound to result from China's economic progress.
will gradually but inevitably upset the balance of power in Asia.
40
Impact-Chinese-Japanese
China wants a strong alliance because it keeps Japanese militarism in check, they don't perceive alliance as hostile Zagoria& Rivlin, 97 -- *Professor of government and Director of the National Committee on American Foreign Policys Project ** Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations and Professor Emeritus of Political Science (Donald, Benjamin, Revitalizing the USJapan Alliance, May 1997, www.ciaonet.org/conf/bun03/bun03d.html) //HBG No matter what the United States and Japan claim to have had in mind in strengthening the alliance, it is critically important to understand how the alliance, and especially the recent moves to revitalize it, is perceived by other countries. While the United States and Japan are in no way beholden to the views of other countries, it is necessary to be aware of the impact these changes will have on specific countries and the region as a whole. It is obviously necessary, but far from easy, to distinguish between a countrys rhetorical criticism that changes in the alliance will inevitably engender, and a countrys perception that such changes are inimical to its national security interests. To provide a deeper understanding of regional views on the USJapan alliance, the organizers of the conference invited representatives from several East Asian countries to participate as well as several American and Japanese scholars familiar with attitudes in East Asia. China: Of all East Asian countries, China has the most at stake with respect to any changes in the US Japan relationship. For many years, Chinese leaders viewed the alliance as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and also as a major impediment to the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Chinese analysts now believe that the security alliance will be directed against China. This view was strengthened due to the timing of the USJapan Joint Security Declaration which was in announced in April 1996, within a few weeks of the Taiwan Strait crisis. The original plan was for the Declaration to be issued in the fall of 1995, but it was delayed because President Clinton was forced to postpone his visit. The timing of the Declaration probably led to a considerable Chinese overstatement of the Declarations alleged anti-Chinese intent. A Chinese commentator at the meeting analyzed Chinas thinking about the USJapan alliance. Chinese academics, he said, can be divided into two groups. The majority believe that the USJapan alliance is "in part" directed against China because the basic US policy toward China is "engagement" with an "element of containment." But a "growing minority" believes that the USJapan alliance is directed mainly against China. Officially, the Chinese scholar said, the Chinese government has adopted a wait-and-see attitude and the future of the debate will depend on US policies and actions. He added that his own conclusion from recent developments was that there had been no basic change in the Chinese position on the alliance. China accepts the alliance if it checks Japan from going it alone and from becoming militaristic, and if the alliance contributes to peace and stability, and if it is not directed against China. Chinese leaders face a dilemma. If the United States were to end the alliance and withdraw from East Asia, then China would lose the buffer between itself and Japan. Without this buffer, Japan might well decide to increase the size and capabilities of its military. Sooner or later, the two East Asian powers could confront one another. Given the technological superiority of Japanese industry and the massive revenues on which it can draw, the Chinese would be hard put to compete with Japan in a regional arms race and it would divert resources away from economic modernization. Such a scenario is clearly not in Chinas interest. China could, on the other hand, acquiesce and allow Japan to take on more responsibility within the alliance framework. But this choice could also work against Chinese interests in the long term. While the current talks on revising the Guidelines on USJapan Defense Cooperation involve only limited changes in Japans responsibilities, it is possible that this is only the first step in what could be an ongoing effort to expand Japans capabilities within the alliance framework. If so, China faces the prospect of confronting an alliance in which Japans role is gradually expanding. This scenario was lent greater credence during the Taiwan Strait crisis, when two US aircraft carriers anchored off Taiwan while Japanese Maritime Security Agency patrol boats were sent to the region south of Okinawa. Given its desire to focus on economic growth and modernization, China has no wish to antagonize the United States or Japan. If China is to develop, access to US and Japanese markets, technology and capital are essential. Access, in turn, depends on the perception that China is not a threat to East Asian stability and prosperity. Should that perception be altered by sufficiently egregious actions, China could be the target of serious economic retaliation. But the influence of nationalistic attitudes cannot either be discounted. Given Chinas recent history, no leader can afford to vacillate on territorial or other issues that have a deep emotional component. If the United States and Japan were to take action to claim the disputed Senkaku Islands, or to defend the claims of Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea or to support separatist trends on Taiwan, Chinese leaders would find it difficult not to act. At present, Chinas interests are best served by a peaceful regional environment and it would prefer that all potentially explosive issues, such as territorial disputes, are shelved until it has the power and influence to gain a favorable outcome. In the meantime, Chinese leaders would prefer to see a trilateral regional security system emerge in which they are accorded the status and respect that the United States and Japan enjoy.
41
Impact-Chinese-Japanese
East Asia is stretched thin. Keeping relations strong is critical to stop another world war. Telegraph, 05 (Anton La Guardia, The clouds of nuclear war are still hanging over Hiroshima, 03/08/05, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2005/08/03/do0301.xml, AG) In Asia, however, wartime resentments of Japan are still acute. Several anti-Japanese riots broke out in China last spring, tolerated by the authorities, after the publication of new textbooks seen as playing down Japanese atrocities. Even a democratic country such as South Korea harbours a deep resentment of Japan, and there have been protests in Seoul over the status of islands claimed by the two countries. It is difficult to see Asia's leaders standing side by side any time soon to remember the fallen as Europe's leaders do for joint commemorations of the Second World War. The idea of a major new war, seen as unthinkable in Europe, is far from outlandish in Asia. Academics now compare the growing Sino-Japanese competition for natural resources and economic dominance to the contest between Germany and Britain at the start of the war-blighted 20th century. North Korea test-fired ballistic missiles over Japanese territory in 1998. Three years later, the Japanese coastguard chased and sank a North Korean spy ship. Last year Japanese ships and planes tracked a Chinese submarine snooping in territorial waters. As China devotes much of its new wealth to modernising its armed forces, the likeliest flashpoint is Taiwan, a former Japanese colony. China has made no secret of its readiness to resort to force to stop the island from seceding formally, and the US is committed to defending Taiwan. It is unlikely that Japan could escape involvement. Indeed, one scenario is that China could emulate Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor with a pre-emptive strike on US forces in Okinawa. Japan has started to flex military muscles atrophied by decades of pacifism. Its forces are developing the ability to operate at greater distances and the war-renouncing constitution has been stretched to the limit with deployments in East Timor, the Indian Ocean and now the "reconstruction" mission in southern Iraq. Japan is demanding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council alongside the victors of the Second World War. Even in Hiroshima, some Japanese have started to talk of the ultimate taboo: developing a nuclear deterrent. Strong relations are key to continued Chinese growth. IIPS, 8 (Institute for International Policy Studies, A New Chapter in JapanChina Relations, 4/23/08, http://www.iips.org/jcr/jcre.pdf, AG) Although China is currently flourishing as a state (with the Olympic Games and the World Expo imminent), it faces a number of intractable problems, in relation to internal politics, the environment, water resources, and energy, among other issues. How well China handles these problems will affect the nations fate in the long term and will also have important implications globally. As Chinas neighbor, Japan should strongly encourage China to actively address these problems, and shouldif China so requestsfully cooperate with China to resolve them, chiefly through the provision of soft assistance, such as technology and expertise. In particular, given that natural resources and conservation of energy are national issues for China, it would be desirable for Japan to make full use of its relevant technology and its experience in these spheres in China as well.
42
43
44
45
Even though Japan is decreasing incentives, the market is growing and the cost of electricity is cheap. Lynch, 8 Financial Consultant (J. Peter, What America Needs Now 2008, 7-2-08, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/recolumnists/story?id=52929, AG) In Japan, there is a similar set of government guarantees and incentives that have been in effect for a number of years (since 1992). They were dropped each year to reflect technical advancements and were eliminated in 2005. Despite the annual drops in incentives, the market is still growing at 20% plus per year and as a result, on-grid solar electricity in Japan is now CHEAPER than retail fossil fuel electricity. In short, Japan has moved forward quickly with a well-planned program, including incentives and widespread consumer education and in less than 10 years has made solar electricity a success in Japan and has made Japan the worldwide solar electricity leader.
46
47
48
49