LP Briefing - Piracy - Gulf of Aden

LOSS PREVENTION
22 April 2009 BRIEFING

Loss prevention briefing for North of England Members SHIPS
Piracy – Gulf of Aden

Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 2
Pirate tactics .......................................................................................................................................................... 2
International response .......................................................................................................................................... 3
Organisations involved ......................................................................................................................................... 3
Planning ................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Reporting procedures ........................................................................................................................................... 6
Ship routeing ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
Vulnerable shipping .............................................................................................................................................. 9
Group protection ................................................................................................................................................... 10
Other preventative measures ............................................................................................................................... 11
Once pirates are on board .................................................................................................................................... 13
Action in the event of military response ............................................................................................................. 14
Charterparty and bill of lading obligations ......................................................................................................... 14
Further Information ............................................................................................................................................... 14
Appendix 1: Best Management Practice to deter piracy ................................................................................... 15
(Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia)
Disclaimer The purpose of this publication is to provide a source of information which is additional to that available to the maritime industry
from regulatory, advisory, and consultative organisations. Whilst care is taken to ensure the accuracy of any information made available no
warranty of accuracy is given and users of that information are to be responsible for satisfying themselves that the information is relevant and
suitable for the purposes to which it is applied. In no circumstances whatsoever shall the Association be liable to any person whatsoever for
any loss or damage whensoever or howsoever arising out of or in connection with the supply (including negligent supply) or use of information.
Unless the contrary is indicated, all articles are written with reference to English Law. However it should be noted that the content of this
publication does not constitute legal advice and should not be construed as such. Members should contact the Association for specific advice
on particular matters.
1
North of England P&I Association, The Quayside, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 3DU, UK
Tel: +44 191 232 5221 Fax: +44 191 261 0540 Email: [email protected] Website: www.nepia.com
Copyright © North of England P&I Association 2009

Introduction
Since the beginning of 2008 more than 70 piracy attacks have taken place off the coast of Somalia and the
number of vessels hijacked by pirate gangs has increased to more than 40 with over 500 mariners taken hostage.
While this region was known to be volatile and subject to piracy incidents for a number of years, a new political
force emerged in Southern Somalia during 2006 with an apparent mandate to eradicate local pirate activity.
The Union of Islamic Courts, known as the UIC declared war on local pirates, and achieved significant success,
threatening those caught with punishment under Sharia law. However, in December 2006 Ethiopian forces were
involved in an interim challenge to the rule of the UIC which saw the Islamists forced into a northerly retreat
leaving Mogadishu in the control of an interim government vulnerable to the influence of local militia, thought to
have been associated with piracy attacks prior to 2006.
The resurgence of these local militia groups is thought to be partly responsible for the increasing frequency and
severity of recent piracy activity.
As an interim measure to reduce the number of attacks, merchant vessels are being advised to follow a transit
corridor, monitored by a multinational naval force.
Pirate tactics
For a number of years pirate activity appeared to be restricted to the coastal waters of Somalia and between
Socotra and the Somalia mainland.
Towards the end of August 2008 it became apparent that pirate vessels were extending their area of operation
and migrating further out into the Gulf of Aden. Attacks appear to be clustered around the key shipping lanes on
the northern side of the Gulf of Aden and are most prevalent
around the passage across the gulf between Bossasso and Al
Mukalla. Operating from „mother ships‟ they attack shipping
from speedboats, armed with guns and rocket propelled
grenade launchers.
Vessels suspected of being used as mother ships are thought
to be trawlers that include the vessel „Burum Ocean‟ pictured
opposite and the „Arena‟ or „Athena‟ pictured below.
Burum Ocean Source: (Coalition forces) Arena or Athena: Source: (Coalition forces)
The MSCHOA website now recommends that, unless unavoidable, ships keep at least 600 nautical miles from the
Somali coastline and when routing north/south consider keeping East of longitude 60E until East of the
Seychelles.
Tel: +44 191 232 5221 Fax: +44 191 261 0540 Email: [email protected] Website: www.nepia.com 2
International response
UNSCR 1838 (2008), adopted on 7 October 2008, commends the activities of contributing States to combating
piracy within the Gulf of Aden and reaffirms the UN‟s concerns for the security of World Food Programme
deliveries to Somalia. The resolution calls upon interested States to take an active role in the fight against piracy
on the high seas off the coast of Somalia.
On 2 December 2008 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution UNSCR 1846 (2008) to strengthen
international efforts to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia by expanding the mandate of States and regional
organizations working with Somalia officials.
European Union
In November 2008, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a
European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and
armed robbery off the Somali coast. The EU Naval task force EU NAVFOR ATALANTA commenced operations
on 9 December 2008.
Organisations involved
The following paragraphs summarise the principal organisations involved and their contributions to date.
United Nations (UN)
Following the adoption of UNSCR 1846 (2008) on 2 December, States and regional organizations cooperating
with the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) may for a period of twelve months, enter Somalia‟s
territorial waters and use “all necessary means” -- such as deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, as well as
seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms and related equipment used for piracy -- to fight piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the Somali coast, in accordance with relevant international law.
States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities were also requested to provide the Security
Council and the Secretary-General with a progress report on their actions within nine months.
International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
The IMO has been working to combat piracy since 1983, when its Assembly passed a resolution calling on
governments to take urgent measures to prevent and suppress acts of piracy in or adjacent to their waters.
To provide accurate and up-to-date statistics on the nature and extent of the problem IMO also called on its
members and non-governmental organisations in consultative status, such as ICC/IMB, BIMCO and ICS, to
submit details of all attacks of which they become aware.
From these reports, IMO produces monthly and annual summaries highlighting the high-risk areas.
Following a joint meeting with industry representatives on 10 October 2008, the IMO called for sustained
coordination between all naval forces operating in the area and for clear rules of engagement that would enable
military assets to intervene effectively to protect shipping.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialised division of the International Chamber Of Commerce
(ICC). It is a non-profit making organisation, established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight against all types
of maritime crime and malpractice.
One of the IMB‟s principal areas of expertise is in the suppression of piracy. Concern about the alarming growth in
the phenomenon led to the creation of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in 1992. The Centre is based in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. It maintains a round-the-clock watch on the world‟s shipping lanes, reporting pirate attacks to
local law enforcement and issuing warnings about piracy hotspots to shipping.
Vessels are requested to contact the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre as part of the reporting procedures when pirate
activity is suspected (see reporting procedures).
Coalition Maritime Forces
Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF) operating in the Middle East region are made up of forces from approximately 20
nations and conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) to help make the maritime environment more secure.
CMF have designated four separate Task Forces and assigned them geographic areas of responsibility (AORs):
CTF 150 – operate in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean.
CTF 151 – operate in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.
CTF 152 – operate in the Central and Southern Arabian Gulf.
CTF 158 – operate in the Northern Arabian Gulf.
CTF 150, 152 and 158 were created to contribute to operation Enduring Freedom and tasked with conducting anti
terrorism activities, preventing smuggling, creating lawful maritime order and conducting MSO to help develop
security in the maritime environment.
CTF 151 – was set up at the beginning of 2009 specifically for counter-piracy operations and will relieve CTF 150
in order that they can concentrate on the deterrence of destabilizing activities, such as drug smuggling and
weapons trafficking.
The remit of CTF forces includes;
Protecting Sea Lanes of Communication - Under international maritime conventions, CMF ensure security and
safety in international waters so that all commercial shipping can operate freely while transiting the region.
Visiting Vessels - CMF intercept vessels that are suspected of links to terrorist activity or maritime crime. This is
intended to detect, deter and deny terrorists or criminals the illegal use of the maritime environment.
Protection of Maritime Infrastructure - CMF provide assistance with training and information sharing with allies for
the protection of key maritime infrastructure in the region. This infrastructure is vital for realising much of the
region‟s economic wealth and interference or damage to it can significantly impact upon the global economy.
Deter and Disrupt Piracy - CMF answer calls for assistance against pirates.
Assist Mariners in Distress - CMF have a longstanding tradition of helping mariners in distress by providing
medical or engineering assistance and a search and rescue capability.
Interaction with Commercial Operators and the Wider Maritime Community
Maritime Radio Calls - CMF routinely broadcast relevant information for mariners on Channel 16, which may be
supplemented by more specific requests for information on Channel 72 about illegal or unusual activity that may
have been observed. These broadcasts also include contact information for the Coalition in the event of mariners
noticing any suspicious or dangerous activity.
Approach and Assist Visits - During transit through the Gulf, ships may be approached and hailed by CMF ships.
This is part of an ongoing effort to provide assistance to the maritime community and to deter illegal activity.
Ships should be prepared to respond with flag and vessel registration details as well as routine information
concerning cargo, port of origin and intended destination.
European Union military coordination action in support of UN Security resolution 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO)
The main purpose of the EU coordination Cell is to support the actions of Member States that deploy military
resources in theatre and to facilitate their availability and operational action.
The Cell also coordinates the provision of support for escorts of the World Food Programme's humanitarian
convoys, working in close cooperation with the different organisations present (in particular, the United Nations,
the African Union, the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Maritime Organisation and shipowners'
organisations).
ATALANTA Operation
EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP facilitates an EU military operation in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008),
1816 (2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council. In addition to the mission
contributing to the protection of WFP vessels, the ATALANTA force contributes to the protection of vulnerable
merchant vessels from acts of piracy and armed robbery up to 500 nautical miles off the Somali coast and
neighbouring countries.
Protection for merchant vessels will be based on a case by case evaluation of needs, measures that can be
adopted include the use of force to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end, acts of piracy in the
area.
In support of EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, EU NAVCO has launched the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
(MSCHOA) to plan and coordinate EU assets in the Gulf of Aden and liaise with a range of military forces
operating in the region.
The MSCHOA website should be used as a resource for companies to obtain advice for masters and report vessel
movements and incidents in an electronic format at;
http://www.mschoa.org
UK Maritime Trade Operations

The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) office in the Middle East acts as the first point of contact for industry
liaison with CMF. The day-to-day interface between masters and the military is provided by UKMTO, who talk to
the ships and liaise directly with MSCHOA and the naval commanders at sea. The UKMTO require regular
updates on the position and intended movements of ships, they use this information to help the naval units
maintain an accurate picture of shipping. Transit reports and notifications of attack should be made by ships‟
masters to the UKMTO in the Middle East as described in „Reporting procedures‟.
Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO)
The Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) is an element of US NAVCENT based in Bahrain and exists to exchange
information between the US Navy and the commercial maritime community within the NAVCENT AOR. By
extension, this includes acting as a conduit for CMF information focused on the safety of shipping and supporting
the commercial maritime community by publishing Advisory Bulletins to notify the community of developments in
port-entry requirements and USN or CMF operations or incidents that may affect commercial maritime affairs.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Following an informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers on 9/10 October 2008 the NATO Standing Naval
Maritime Group, made up of seven vessels was deployed to the region. Assets assist with securing the safe
movement of World Food Programme vessels and also contribute to the anti-piracy measures being implemented
by coalition forces.
Planning
Risk assessment
Prior to transiting the area, the owner and master should carry out their own risk assessment to assess the
likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks on the ship based on the latest available information. The outcome
of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery and will mean combining
statutory requirements with supplementary measures to combat piracy.
Company crisis management procedures should consider appropriate measures to meet the threat of piracy by
adopting IMO and other industry recommended practices as appropriate to the particular circumstances and ship
type. Prior to transit of the region it is recommended that the crew should be thoroughly briefed and participate in
a drill prior to the vessel arriving in the area.
Review the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP) as required by
the International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS) to counter the piracy threat.
Reporting procedures
EU NAVFOR ATALANTA
In order to have access to alert messages from the Maritime Security Centre, and to ensure that vessels‟
movements are tracked, companies must first register with the MSCHOA and complete the online „Vessel
Movement Form‟ in the registered users area of the MSCHOA website: www.mschoa.org. Registration requires
validation and this may take up to two days to process.
The MSCHOA can also be contacted on:
Tel: +44 (0) 1923 958545
Fax: +44 (0) 1923 958520
Email: [email protected]
Advanced notice of the passage plan is required by the naval authorities so that they can identify vulnerable
vessels and plan suitable protection. The MSCHOA may ask vessels to make adjustments to passage plans to
conform to MSCHOA routeing advice.
UK Maritime Trade Operations (MTO) Middle East
The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Middle East, operate a Merchant Vessel Voluntary Reporting
Scheme. Ships of any flag or ownership should report to the UK Royal Navy Maritime Trade Operations team
preferably 3 - 4 days before passing the coast of Somalia or entering the Gulf of Aden and at the following
reference points:
a Suez for vessels entering or leaving the Region via the Red Sea
b 5S for ships entering or leaving the Region via the Indian Ocean (SOUTH)
c 78E for ships entering or leaving the Region via the Indian Ocean (EAST)
The initial report should contain the following:
 Ship Name
 IRCS (International Radio Call Sign)
 Flag
 IMO number
 MMSI
 Inmarsat telephone number including satellite prefix
 Telex and fax number
 Email address
 Name of Company having day-to-day management
 Type of Ship
 Date/time of current position, course and speed
 Itinerary in the region with route way points and destination port(s)
 British personnel onboard (if any)
Subsequently, ships are requested to report their noon positions and speed, actual departure times and estimated
arrival times at ports and destination when outward bound from the defined area. All timings are requested in UTC
and the preferred method of communication is email:
Tel: +971 50 552 3215
Fax: +971 4 306 5710
For further information or to join the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, please contact MTO Middle East:
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC)
In the event of suspected pirate activity vessels are advised to contact the UKMTO in the first instance and follow
this up with a report to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre.
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Tel + 60 3 2078 5763
Fax + 60 3 2078 5769
IMB Maritime Security Hotline
In addition to the piracy reporting centre in Kuala Lumpur, IMB also operate a maritime security hotline as a
confidential communication procedure that will enable seafarers and others in the shipping industry to report any
suspicious information regarding maritime crime, including terrorism, to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre.
This service is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week and is accessible from any location worldwide.
Tel: +603 2031 0014
Immediate Verbal Reporting of Suspect Pirate Activity (VHF, Radio, Mobile or Sat phone)
MSC (HOA) has issued advice on the correct reporting format to be used by vessels when verbally reporting
suspect pirate activity. Whilst the format is not prescriptive, its use will enable the pertinent information to be
relayed to naval assets in the most efficient manner so that it can be acted upon expeditiously. It is requested that
immediate reports of suspect pirate activity cover the 7-Line reporting format as seen below.
LINE 1: Who is the originator of this information?
LINE 2: Date & time (Zulu) of Incident.
LINE 3: Latitude & Longitude of Incident.
LINE 4: Estimated True Course and speed of suspect vessel(s).
LINE 5: Brief vessel(s) description (length, colour, type, bow shape).
LINE 6: List all of the triggers below that can be seen or heard:
Name of vessel (state if it is missing), number of personnel on board, weapons, ladders, grappling hooks, fishing
equipment, provisions (fuel/oil tanks), AIS transmission, navigation lights irregular or off at night, response to VHF,
items being thrown overboard
LINE 7: Brief description of activity.
Ship routeing
All ships inside the GoA are strongly urged to:
 Use the IRTC transit corridor when transiting the Gulf of Aden and follow MSCHOA GT advice and timings
as described below.
 When transiting to the east of Somalia, consider navigating to the east of Madagascar, East of 60E, or (for
guidance) maintain a distance of more than 600 nautical miles from the coast.
 Not pass between the island of Socotra and Somalia.
 Stay at least 50 nautical miles to the north or east of the coast of Socotra.
 Ships should avoid entering Yemeni Territorial Waters while on transit. This is for reasons of customary
international law, as it is not possible for international military forces (non Yemeni) to be able to protect ships
that are attacked inside Yemeni waters.
Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC)
While coalition ships have previously conducted routine operations as part of the CTF 150 presence in this region,
the establishment of the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) is intended to focus efforts to counter
destabilizing activities and improve security in support of the International Maritime Organization‟s (IMO) ongoing
efforts for a long term solution.
The Transit Corridor provides:
a. A straight track.
b. A separation of east and westbound traffic, thus improving navigational safety.
c. Passage through the centre of the GOA, keeping shipping clear of the Yemeni and Somali coasts. It is
anticipated this will make it more difficult for the pirate skiffs to use the Yemeni coast to support their operations.
The Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor is contained within the latitude and longitude coordinates listed
below:
12 00N 045E, 14 30N 053E
11 55N 045E, 14 25N 053E
11 53N 045E, 14 23N 053E
11 48N 045E, 14 18N 053E
The IRTC is shown in green for westbound transits and red for eastbound transits. Westbound ships should bias
themselves to the northern portion of the corridor, and eastbound ships to the southern portion. The old corridor is
depicted in purple.
Each lane is 5nm wide and is separated by a 2nm buffer zone. The eastbound lane begins at 045º East between
11º 48‟ North and 11º 53‟ North. The lane is oriented along a straight line course of 072º degrees and terminates
at 053º East between 14º 18‟ North and 14º 23‟ North. The westbound lane begins at 053º East between 14º 25‟
North and 14º 30‟ North. The lane is oriented along a course of 252º degrees and terminates at 045º East
between 11º 55‟ North and 12º 00‟ North.
A force of coalition navy warships is patrolling the area, and aircraft are providing support in the airspace above.
Vessels are strongly recommended to coordinate their voyage plan with EUNAVFOR/UKMTO and/or US MARLO
Bahrain (see „Reporting procedures‟).
Vulnerable shipping
EU NAVFOR ATALANTA will assist with the identification of merchant vessels that are especially vulnerable to a
successful pirate attack so that, where possible, they may be provided with additional protection. To achieve this,
companies are requested to give as much information as possible about the vessel and the intended transit as
early as possible via the secure section of the MSC-HOA website
In light of the pirates‟ increased resolve and adaptability MSC(HOA) encourage additional precautions and risk
assessments. Vessels such as passenger liners, luxury yachts, pleasure craft, sailboats, and ships carrying
dangerous cargo or otherwise deemed to be high value assets should conduct a full risk assessment prior to
planning transits through high-risk areas, especially in cases where speed and manoeuvrability limitations and low
freeboard make a ship particularly vulnerable. In conducting such an assessment, owners and masters of such
vessels should be prepared for possible attack and be prepared to employ measures to ensure the maximum
possible defence. All passengers and crew should fully understand the risks associated with transiting these areas
and be fully briefed on the procedures required to protect themselves in the event of an attack. Masters should
remain in contact with the UKMTO and the United States Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) to the maximum extent
possible.
Group protection
There is significant value in ships being closely grouped for mutual protection. A steady stream of traffic through
the IRTC presents a greater number of opportunities for the pirates to target vessels for hijack. Vessels grouped
together, transiting key threat areas at times known by coalition forces to be least favoured by pirates, significantly
increases the ability of assets to provide protection.
Gulf of Aden Group Transits
EU NAVFOR is encouraging merchant vessels to conduct their passage through the IRTC in groups based on
their transit speed. Known as Gulf of Aden Group Transits (GOA GT), participating vessels should pass through
the east and west extremities of the IRTC Points (Alpha 11º 50'N - 045º 00'E) and (Bravo 14º 28'N - 053º 00'E) at
the times prescribed below and transit the IRTC at the published speed.
Following the Group Transit protocol will enhance mutual protection, optimise coordination of military assets in
support and facilitate merchant vessels in avoiding the higher risk piracy areas during the most vulnerable time of
the day. Military assets (Naval with Air support) will be strategically deployed within the area to best provide
protection and support to merchant vessels.
Transit times for vessels proceeding at 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18kts are as follows:
Time to enter Time to enter Time to enter Time to enter
corridor corridor corridor corridor
eastbound eastbound westbound westbound
Speed (Kts) (Z) (Point A) (Local) (Point A) (Z) (Point B) (Local) (Point B)
10 0100 0400 1500 1800
12 0530 0830 2100 0001
14 0830 1130 0100 0400
16 1100 1400 0530 0830
18 1300 1600 0700 1000
The IRTC is not marked or defined by visual navigational means, nor is it intended to be a dedicated traffic
separation scheme but in order for warship patrols to be effective, vessels transiting the GOA are strongly
recommended to adhere to these guidelines. Notwithstanding this recommendation, all vessels should at all times
comply with the International Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea.
Group Transits are not, repeat NOT convoys. Vessels should enter the IRTC at the time designated for the
intended passage speed, even if this means they are, or appear to be, the only vessel in the Group Transit for that
speed. Generally speaking you will not be accompanied by a warship. The Group Transit timings are designed to
ensure that Warships can provide a level of protection to all vessels in the transit corridor, focusing on those areas
that are known to represent the greatest risk.
Transit at the group transit speed but remain aware of the ship‟s limitations. (Current advice for example is that if
your maximum speed is 16 knots, consider joining a 14 knot GT and keep 2 knots in reserve.)
If you do not intend to follow a GT through the corridor maintain full sea speed through the high risk area. (Current
advice is that if the maximum speed of the ship is more than 18 knots, then do not slow down for a GT, maintain
speed).
Other preventative measures

The importance of maintaining a continuous 360º lookout is critical for early identification of suspicious craft and
alerting coalition forces in sufficient time to intervene before pirates can board. Being able to distinguish between
genuine fishing skiffs and suspicious craft can often reduce unnecessary alarm and reduce the number of false
alerts. Fishing skiffs are most often 8-10 metres long and shaped with a traditional raised prow. A crew of 4/5 fish
for Tuna using “long lines” and are known to pursue fish at speeds of up to 25 knots over an erratic course (not
dissimilar to the type of movement you might expect from a pirate skiff), they often operate in fleets of 15 to 25
vessels during hours of daylight only.
Pirate skiffs are considered to have a more modern hull form with a straight gunwale and will attempt an attack by
approaching a targeted vessel from the port quarter in anticipation that the ship‟s lookout will be stationed on the
starboard bridge wing.
Once close enough to board, attack skiffs position themselves on each quarter of the vessel to deter crew from
carrying out evasive zig zag manoeuvres. This will often be accompanied by automatic rifle fire and RPG rocket
attacks. These aggressive tactics are designed to scare the crew members into surrendering their ship, crews that
have been able to continue with evasive manoeuvres during this period have reported pirates will often withdraw
and seek out a more submissive vessel to pursue.
Statistics show that the vast majority of attacks take place during daylight hours. The transit corridor extends for
some 480 nautical miles resulting in a passage time of almost 34.5 hours for a vessel maintaining a 14 knot
ground track speed. Some part of the passage will therefore by necessity have to be conducted during daylight
hours. Between Longitude 47º and 50º East is considered by some to be particularly dangerous, vessels with low
freeboard and a maximum speed of less than 15 knots are considered to be most vulnerable and may wish to
consider transiting this area during hours of darkness.
Provide deck lighting only as required for safety. Lighting in the shadow zones around the ship‟s hull may extend
the area of visibility for lookouts, but only where consistent with safe navigation (current naval advice is to transit
with navigation lights only).
Joint War Committee
The Joint War Committee of the International Underwriting Association (IUA) and Lloyd‟s Market Association
(LMA) recently published a circular containing some examples of best practice as advised by security specialist
AEGIS. These recommendations included:
 A contact liaison number for use when attacked, preferably posted in the wheelhouse, so they can call for
help. This should form part of a revised standard operating procedure which should also include emergency
drills so the crew know how to react when confronted with a suspicious approach or an attack.
 As soon as the vessel enters the area, contact should be made with naval units and other vessels. The
human eye remains the best form of initial defence and so transiting vessels should employ a 24hr standing
watch and all available radars should be used and constantly monitored. Keep photographs of pirate “mother
ships” on the bridge and report immediately to UKMTO and the IMB PRC if sighted (see „Reporting
procedures‟).
EU NAVFOR
 Be aware of the sea areas and ports affected by piracy and armed robbery (the IMB's PRC broadcasts
regularly to ships in the IOR and AOR regions. See Live Piracy Map from the IMB website).
 Vessels should comply with the International Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea at all times; navigation
lights should not be turned off at night. Masters should follow guidance given by the flag State authority.
 Whenever possible avoid high risk areas, or select a route away from areas of high frequency attack.
 Proceed at maximum speed with critical machinery fully operational.
 SOLAS permits the master the discretion to switch off AIS if he believes that its use increases the ship‟s
vulnerability. However, to provide naval forces with tracking information within the GoA it is recommended
that AIS transmission is continued but restricted to ship‟s identity, position, course, speed, navigational status
and safety related information. Off the coast of Somalia current naval advice is to turn it off completely. This
should be verified with MSCHOA.
 Taking into account manning levels, ensure that ship routines are adjusted sufficiently in advance to ensure
well-rested and well-briefed crew are on watch and sufficient watch-keepers are available.
 Keep a good lookout for suspicious craft, especially from astern. Most attacks have occurred from the port
quarter.
 Use light, alarm bells and crew activity to alert potential pirates that they have been detected.
 Whilst measures should be taken to prevent Pirates boarding, the safety of crew and passengers is
paramount.
 Follow the procedures laid down in your Ship Security Plan and identify a safe area within your vessel
(locked down accommodation / engine room).
 Endeavour to establish radio silence (VHF and UHF handsets) from 18 hours prior to entering the high risk
area (except in case of emergency or for navigational reasons).
 No work should occur outside the accommodation unless essential.
 Fire pumps should be set running and hoses pressurised with water spray discharged overboard in highest
risk quarters.
 Endeavour to operate at least two generators and at least two steering motors.
 Man the Engine Room.
 Check all ladders and outboard equipment are stowed or up on deck. If the ship has a comparatively low
freeboard, consider the possibility of extending the width of the gunwales to prevent grappling hooks from
gaining hold.
 Consider the use of dummies at the rails to simulate additional lookouts. However, if ship design creates
lookout black spots and the security assessment identifies this risk then it may have to be covered by
manpower.
 In case of emergency coalition warships can be contacted on VHF Ch.16. Backup Ch.08.
Additional measures
The following additional measures are commercially available to increase a vessels self protection. Their
effectiveness and reliability cannot be confirmed and their use remains the decision of individual ship
owners/operators.
 Barbed wire/physical barriers around stern / lowest points of access.
 Use of physical barriers to protect the bridge watchkeepers (Kevlar / sandbags or equivalent).
 Electrified fencing (not recommended for oil tankers or gas carriers).
 High intensity lighting.
 LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device).
 Consider issuing night vision optics
The use of private security firms to provide ship safety coordination teams to assist with the implementation of non
lethal protection measures ranging from placing anti piracy devices onboard, to coordinating communications
within a merchant vessel transit group. The use of armed guards is not recommended.
In the event of an attack
 Follow contingency plan.
 Activate the Emergency Communication Plan, call in order of priority:
The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Middle East.
The Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA).
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB).
 Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SAAS), which will alert your Company Security Officer.
 If the Master has exercised his right to turn off the Automatic Identification System (AIS) during transit of the
piracy area, this should be turned on once the ship comes under pirate attack.
 Sound emergency alarm and make a PA announcement „Pirate attack‟.
 Make a „Mayday‟ call on VHF Ch 16 and Ch 8 (monitored by military vessels).
 Send a distress message via the DSC (Digital Selective Calling) system and Inmarsat-C as applicable.
 Muster all crew in a defined safe area inside the accommodation.
 Carry out small zigzag manoeuvre, not more that 7-10 degrees rate of turn to maintain speed. Avoid creating
a lee for the pirates, if possible increase their exposure to the wind/waves.
 Increase or maintain speed if possible. Evidence from failed attacks is that the pirates will give up if unable to
board within 30 - 45 minutes.
 Contact details and pre prepared messages should be established as part of anti piracy measures.
Extract from PSA Notice to Mariners from NAVCENT in Bahrain (24 September 2008)
The following self-protective measures have proven to be effective:
 Demonstrate a willingness to defend yourself. Do not present an attractive target for attack and do not
surrender immediately at the first sign of a threat.
 Maintain a full visual and radar watch throughout transit, provide extra lookouts if possible, especially during
daylight hours, avoid transiting near small boats whenever possible and actively watch for developing rules of
the road situations and take early action to increase CPA‟s.
 Manoeuvre to remove any lee from either side of ship (sea state dependent) when under attack. If
engineering or other technical problems cause reduced speed, immediately activate defensive measures to
reduce vulnerability.
 Adopt aggressive defence measures before boarding and revert to passive defence measures once pirates
are on board, take all precautions detailed for speed and manoeuvre. Active defensive measures should be
considered, including employment of professional security teams.
If a ship comes under attack, report immediately to UKMTO, broadcast attacks immediately and adjust speed and
manoeuvre. Activate all available defensive measures and do not immediately surrender upon approach of
suspected pirate boats. Attacks have been thwarted in several cases where defensive measures were used.
The bridge should have a number of contact details readily to hand including the Company Security Officer,
regional maritime military reporting centres and the International Maritime Bureau. The Company Security Plan
and Ship Security Plan (both ISPS requirements) should also list the company's established Standard Operating
Procedures in the event of emergency, including the details of those to be contacted in the event of an emergency
developing.
The local reporting centres, such as MARLO - Bahrain or UKMTO - Middle East, are NCAGS (Naval Cooperation
and Guidance to Shipping) organisations and, as such, have been specifically designated as the information
exchange point between military forces and commercial vessels. Contact should be made with one of them when
approaching the Gulf of Aden. These offices can then contact the military units if necessary.
Once pirates are on board

Before pirates gain access to the Bridge the crew should inform UKMTO, MSCHOA and if time permits the
Company. The master will have to ensure that the tension on board is diffused, this could be done by cooperating
fully with the hijackers and offering no resistance.
 The safety of crew, ship cargo and environment should be of paramount importance to the master.
 If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated, then the main engine should be stopped, all way taken off if
possible and the ship navigated clear of other ships.
 The crew should be instructed not to confront the pirates at any time. They should remain calm and co-
operate fully with the pirates.
 Ensure all crew, other than bridge team, stay together in one location, and keep crew moral high at all times.
 If in a locked down safe area, ensure internal protection/cover is available in case the pirates attempt to force
entry. Keep clear of entry point/doors and portholes/windows – do not resist entry.
 As far as possible regular meal patterns, personnel hygiene and regular exercise should be maintained to
remain alert, fit and calm under the stressful conditions.
 It is quite possible that the pirates who hijacked the ship do not stay and guard the ship while at anchor.
 Guards will probably rotate, it is therefore important to be friendly and cooperative to all.
 The crew should be thoroughly briefed as to what is expected of them in the unfortunate event of being
hijacked.
From experience, pirates generally use the English language in their communications and demands although not
all speak the language fluently. In previous cases, the pirates have "employed" third-party, non-pirate fluent
English speakers from ashore to conduct negotiations under the direction of the pirate-leader.
In the Gulf of Aden some of the pirates are known to use the stimulant drug "khat" (spellings vary). This may make
initial attempts at cooperation difficult if the pirate is in the drugged, euphoric state, although some of the other
crew members may not be users of the drug.
Identification of pirates from the legitimate local fishermen is not easy.
Action in the event of military response

In the possible event of military action being taken upon a merchant vessel during a piracy incident, seafarers are
advised to keep low to the deck, cover their heads with their hands (always ensure hands are visible and not
holding anything) and make no sudden movements unless directed by friendly forces.
 Be prepared to answer questions on your identity and status onboard.
 Crew should be advised NOT to use cameras with flash at any time when any military action is underway.
 Be aware that English is not the working language of all naval units in the region.
Charterparty and bill of lading obligations

Members‟ legal position under their charterparties and/or bills of lading will be dependent on the terms of the
relevant charterparty/bill of lading (as applicable), the factual circumstances applicable when the contract is/was
concluded and the factual position when any dispute arises. As such, Members who have concerns about their
rights and obligations under current or imminent contracts should contact the Association for advice.
Piracy Clauses for Charterparties
The current situation in the Gulf of Aden has prompted both BIMCO and Intertanko to consider standard piracy
charterparty clauses for use by their Members.
Intertanko, following a meeting of their documentary committee during December 2008, have published standard
clauses covering both time and voyage charterparties. BIMCO have now published their Piracy Clause for Time
Charter Parties. The purpose of the clause is to remove the ambiguity that existed under the CONWARTIME War
Risk Clause with regards to the timing of an incident or where trading pattern or circumstances change over a
period of a time.
Please click here for a copy of the clause which is free to download from the BIMCO website.
If considering the use of any of these clauses for new fixtures Members should first contact a member of the
Association‟s FD&D department to discuss the details of their situation.
Further Information
United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 1816 (2008)
EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (10/11/08)
Joint War Committee Circular – Defensive measures for vessels
IMB website: www.icc-ccs.org/prc
MSCHOA website: www.mschoa.eu/
UKMTO website: www.rncom.mod.uk/templates/MaritimeOperations.cfm
OCIMF – Practical Measure to Avoid Deter or Delay Piracy Attacks
Documents released by the IMO related to acts of piracy
Convention and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988
MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 – Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Recommendations to Governments)
MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 - Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Guidance to shipowners and ship operators)
Resolution A.979(24) - Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships In Waters Off The Coast Of Somalia
MSC.1Circ.1233 - Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships In Waters Off The Coast Of Somalia
These supporting documents contain a significant amount of information on existing recognised procedures to
help combat piracy attacks, in particular members are advised to ensure that masters and crew are familiar with
MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 and MSC/Circ.1233.
Appendix 1: Best Management Practice to deter piracy

(Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia)
In an effort to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia various industry bodies including the
International Group of P&I Clubs have published a best practice document. This has been incorporated into this
Loss Prevention Briefing.
Click here to download a copy of „Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the
Coast of Somalia‟ or go to: http://fin.nepia.com/modules/assetlibrary/z_extra/getAsset.php?type=file&id=1660.

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LOSS PREVENTION

22 April 2009 BRIEFING

Piracy – Gulf of Aden

Copyright © North of England P&I Association 2009

UK Maritime Trade Operations

Other preventative measures

Once pirates are on board

Action in the event of military response

Charterparty and bill of lading obligations

Appendix 1: Best Management Practice to deter piracy

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