CHAPTERIII INDIA AND THE ASEAN : HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By the early centuries of the Christian era, many of Southeast Asian Countries and India were a part of the world-trading network. Though this period was marked by the domination of Indian Ocean by Roman trade, it also witnessed the establishment of trade relations between India and Southeast Asia. It also presents an analysis of relations behind the increased economic activities between India and Southeast Asia from 5-6th century onwards and the resultant socio-political, economic and cultural impact of this relationship on the region. Southeast Asia has been portrayed and referred as the Golden Island or Golden Peninsula or Yavadipa or Suvarnadipa in the Indian literature from the early centuries A.D. Apart from Ramayana, the Buddhist Jataka fables also mention about Southeast Asia. The initial contact with the knowledge of Indian cultural tradition came through the Southeast Asian sailors. India and ASEAN countries Cultural Relationship India had contacts with most of the South-East Asian countries from the earliest period of history. The geographical names of the territories of South-East Asia exhibit Indian influence on them. Sanskrit and Pali had been the language of culture and administration in some of these countries. Many localities of the region bear distinct Indian names. As for example, the very word Indonesia means the Indian islands. Java has been identified by some scholars as Java Dvipa-the island shaped like basely Corn,
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mentioned in the Ramayana. Suvarna Dvipa has been identified with Sumatra. According to Poerbatjoroko a well-known Javanese scholar, between seventy and eighty per cent of the words of Javanese language are either pure Sanskrit or of Sanskritic origin.
1

Bahasa Indonesia has got 12% of the Sanskrit vocabulary, the very word Bahasa has its Sanskritic origin from Bhasa.2 Similar examples of distinct Indian influence in the customs, languages, dances, religious beliefs and patterns of behaviour, may be had in most of the South-East Asian Countries. M.C. Chagla, a Former Indian Minister in his inaugural address at a Seminar on India and South-East Asia in 1966, had aptly remarked:
They (the delegates from South-East Asian Countries) must look upon India as second home because there is lot indeed which unites India with the South-East Asian countries and for want of expression I would rather call it a bond-the bond of Sanskritic culture.3

Buddhism Buddhism is India's greatest gift to East Asia, and indeed to the world. Blending with local traditions, it is the dominant religion in Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim. It survives in one form or another in China, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, and it is one of the officially recognized religions in predominantly Muslim Indonesia. Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha or Enlightened one) was born to wealthy Nepalese family and he gained enlightenment in Bodh Gaya in India. He preached widely in what are now Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Southern Nepal. He probably spoke Prakrit, a colloquial dialect of Sanskrit. In the third century BC, his teaching

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gained favour with Ashoka, the great Maurya emperor and Budhism spread far and wide. Buddhism also spread from India by sea. Seafaring traders and missionaries from India carried Hindu-Buddhist ideas to the elites of Southeast Asia. Two concepts in particular found ready acceptance in the region: universal Kingship and the fusion of Kingship and notions of divinity.4 Mandalas (circles of kings) corresponded to the overlapping Kingdoms and diffused political power characteristic of early Southeast Asia.5 Mandalas found expression in sophisticated world maps depicting the entire cosmos and the terrestrial world through the prism of Buddhist thought. By 500 A.D., Sankskrit had become the hall mark of civilization in much of Southeast Asia and was frequently the official language of the court. It showed up in the names of both cities and rulers. The names of more than 30 Cambodian kings end with the suffix varman, bastion. The great maritime Kingdom in Southern Sumatra, Srivijaya, was named after a king named Vijaya, Victorious. Another Indian legacy visible today is the Sanskrit element in many Southeast Asian languages, together with the Indian origin of the alphabets in which those languages are written. The greatest of Indonesian nationalist leaders, President Sukarno, wrote in a special article in The Hindu on January 4, 1946, In the veins of every one of my people flow the blood of Indian ancestors and the culture that we possess is steeped through and through with Indian influences. Two thousand years ago, people from your country came to Jawadvipa and Suvarnadvipa in the spirit of brotherly love. They gave the
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initiatives to found powerful Kingdoms such as those of Sri Vijaya, Mataram and Majapahit. We then learnt to worship the very God that you now worship still and we fashioned a culture that even today is largely identical with your own. Later we turned to Islam; but that religion too was brought by people coming from both sides of the Indus.
6

Ramayana and Mahabharta The two epics of India-Ramayana and Mahabharata-occupied special position in traditional literatures of many countries of Southeast Asia region. Ramanayana is not only the epic of India; it is also the national epic of Indonesia. It had been a perennial source of inspiration in the past and continues to exercise its charm and fascination even today. The simple story of Rama and Sita has been told and retold a million times in innumerable ways in different parts of the archipelago. The Ministry of Information and Culture organized the First International Ramayana Festival in Jakarta in August-September 1971. Scholars and artists from India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia participated in this unique Seminar, whose objective was to promote deeper cultural understanding among nations. Four years later, in 1975, New Delhi picked up the threads and on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of Tulsidas's Ramcharitmanas, the Sahitya Akademi convened theatre of an international seminar are on very Asian closely variations related. of The Ramayana. The tradition of Ramayana theatre in India and the South-East Asian Ramanayana is performed in many forms.

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In Thailand Rama's story has been painted, engraved or performed with great popularity and enthusiasm. The people are so respectful and fond of this story that although Buddhism is their national religion, their king call himself Rama and from ancient times Ramayana is performed as the royal dance drama. The Ramayana story is painted or engraved in some of their famous Buddhist temples. In Malaysia, the Ramayana performance tradition has been mainly oral. Malaysian Ramayana is called Hikayat Seri Ramo (Story of Rama). The oral tradition of Ramayana is so strong that it has been mixed up with indigenous myths and legends. In Laos also, Rama's story is very popular. It can be seen in different forms-dance, music, visual arts and the Ramayana dance drama. The Kampuchean Ramayana is called Ramker or Ramkriti and is available in both prose and poetry. Burma or Myanmar is a Buddhist country but the Ramayana tradition is quite popular here too.
7

The Southeast Asian leaders themselves acknowledged their cultural indebtedness to India. Prince Sihanouk on the occasion of inauguration of Jawaharlal Nehru Boulevard in Phnom Penh on May 10, 1955, said: When we refer to two thousand year old ties which united us with India, it is not at all a hyperbole. In fact, it was about two thousand years ago that the first navigaters, Indian merchants and Brahims brought to our ancestors their gods, their techniques, their organization. Briefly, India was for us what Greece was to the Latin Occident.
8

Prior to independence of India few nationalist leaders had opportunity to acquaint themselves about the problems of the
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South East Asian countries. The Brussels Congress of the oppressed nationalities in 1927 provided an occasion for the meeting of the leaders fighting against colonialism. Indian leaders came in contact with South East Asian freedom fighters and discussed about the Dutch and French colonial exploitations. Nehru, the then Secretary General of Indian National Congress had an opportunity to meet the Indonesian and the Indo-Chinese delegates. Nehru evinced keen interest especially in the Indonesian representatives in understanding the Indonesian people, their names, their religion and their culture.
9

India's independence was one of the greatest landmarks of contemporary world history. Its real significance did not lie only in the fact that one of the largest countries in the world won its legitimate right to shape its own destiny but also that this event brought about unique and far-reaching changes in the worldpower-structure. It started a chain reaction for the break-up of the colonial system and paved the way for the emergence of a purposeful and mediating role of independent Afro-Asian nations. This role eventually contributed to super-power oriented worldpower-structure. India's emergence as an independent nation came about at a time when the world was becoming ominously divided between two Cold War blocs headed respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union. India's nationalist leaders, particularly J.L. Nehru viewed the bipolar world as a threat to global peace and stability. The main objective of Indian Foreign Policy were listed by India's first Prime minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru as:

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...the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any power or groups of powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial and disputed issue; the liberation of subject peoples; the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual; the elimination of racial discrimination; and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which affect the greater part of the world's population.
10

Indian Foreign Policy objective strongly emphasised on anticolonialism, anti-racialism and international peace, not only for normative reasons but for the practical necessity of promoting the nation's economic development Southeast Asia has always been integral part of the Indian consciousness is borne out by the fact that the countries of Southeast Asia so comprehensively embraced Buddhism in all its aspects. This cultural and spiritual affinity became inseparable in part of their ethos and way of life. Successive Indian Kings and kingdoms from the first century AD and even before the beginning of fifteenth century, had regarded Southeast Asia and the lands lying beyond as vital for their own strength, security and sustained development. This intricate and abiding web of relationships in turn contributed significantly to India's sense of security in an extended neighourhood in which India is neither seen as an alien power nor as a country with colonial past. The relationship spanning nearly 2500 years founded and nurtured on mutual interest and security in which both partners costantly enriched and reinforced each other. With the advent of the British in India the struggle for influence between European powers that ensured all over Southeast Asia, suspended the continuous interaction that
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existed between India and the region. Southeast Asia itself was carved up into areas of influence by the major colonial powers, viz, the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese. India's cultural and commercial interaction with this region was therefore subordinated to the political and strategic considerations of the great powers. This left the Indianized states of Farther India free to nurture, develop and evolve a distinct cultural personality of their own, albeit heavily influenced by their long association with India and China.
11

The geographical location of India is such that she becomes pivotal to the regions of South and South-East Asia. If one has to consider any question affecting any of these regions Mr. Nehru said, India inevitably comes into the pictures, and whatever regions you may have in mind, the importance of India cannot be ignored.12 Because of this Central position, India is the meeting ground between the various trends and forces, and between the East and the West. For these reasons, said Mr. Nehru, India has to play a very important role in Asia, whether she likes it or not. After the Second World War, Burma was a British province, virtually an exclusive Indian market and India was heavily dependent on Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Indochina, for oil, tin, rubber, rice and timber. However there have been curious fluctuations in Indian Trade figures with South-East Asia. In 1950-51 India imported 50 percent of its rice, 17 percent of its petroleum, 8 percent of its metals and 4 percent of its timber from Southeast Asia. In 1951-52, it dropped down to 7 percent. It is argued that the decline was due to India's seeking and forging closer economic ties with the Western capitalist countries. It is
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interesting to speculate as to what extent were these fluctuations due to indifference or lack of interest on the part of the Government of India and to what extent they resulted from political turmoil, instability in the South East Asian states or the directives of powerful colonial interests acting in the region. It should not be overlooked that until 1957 only Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia were independent. The two Vietnams were nominally so and the civil war severely disrupted their economies. Even Burma, Philippines and Indonesia were disturbed by sporadic or chronic insurgencies. Strategic and economic considerations apart Indian Interest in South East Asian also drives from the presence of a large number of Indian immigrants scattered in different states. It is estimated that Indians in South East Asia number over 2 millions. Although colonies of Indian traders had been founded in South East Asian countries thousands of years ago; the Indian immigration became large scale only when the European powers established and extended their control in the region towards the end of the 19th century. Indentured Indian labour was transported to Burma and Malaya to work on sugar, tea, coffee and rubber plantations or in mines, docks and railways. The labour force was followed gradually by traders and professionals. With the passage of time the Indians came to occupy an important place in the economic life of the country of their adoption.
13

Much of the interaction between Indian and maritime Southeast Asian economies were driven by interest in the trade of the South China Sea and Eastern Seas of Indonesia. Thus, the Southeast Asian trade was entirely dependent upon the Indian
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Ocean and South China Sea. In the first three centuries of the Christian era, the trading relations with India was established by the distribution of Roman-Indian Rouletted pottery at a few coasts including North coasts of Java, Bali and the coast of central Vietnam. The Southeast Asian trade is well documented after seventh century onwards. The seventh and eighth centuries AD witnessed expansion in volume of Asian Sea trade involving maritime Southeast, due to Chinese interest and parallel rise in the demand from the prosperous centres on the East Coast of India. In India's relations with South-East Asian countries, India has several plus points. Historically Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos and Cambodia have been deeply influenced by Indian political ideas, religion, art and language. The spread of Indian cultural influences, leading to the cultural enrichment of Southeast Asian countries, constitute a glorious chapter in Southeast Asian and Indian history alike. Indianised Kingdoms like Funan, Sri Kshetra, Pagan, Khemer, Sri Vijaya, Sailentra and Majapahit, Angkar, the familiar Indo-Sanskritic and Lara vocaboluary Djon ggrong; in Thai language and Bahasa Indonesia; architectural monuments like Pagan, Borobudur literary masterpieces like Ramakein, Amaramala, Arjuna Vivaha and Bharata Yudha, the Wajang Kulit are based on the Ramayana and Mahabharata traditions; the living Indian traditions in the island of Bali-all these are testimony to the courage and zeal of Indian princes, priests, poets, merchants and artisans. India, since her Independence, may even during the period of struggle for Independence, has visualized an Asian Union based on Asianism comprising the countries of Asia. This idea was equally
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shared by countries, like Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon, to name but a few, of the region. It was in this background that India convenened the first Asian Relations Conference in 1947. But the Indian experience of the Conference diplomacy of general type was not very encouraging. Jawahar Lal Nehru believed that the Middle East and Southeast Asia, both were geopolitically connected with India. As early as March 8, 1949, Nehru said, this in the Constitutional Assembly, Look at the map. If you have to consider any question concerning
Southeast Asia, you cannot do so without India. While the Middle East may not be directly connected with Southeast Asia, both are connected with India.
14

Asian Relations Conference The Asian Relations Conference was held at New Delhi from March 23 to April 2, 1947, under the aegis of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). Then a New Delhi based non-government organisation engaged itself in projecting India's viewpoint on regional and global issues.
15

Nehru had said while delivering a speech at Bombay August 22, 1946: We have no doubt that, if we do meet, the Conference will not put an end to the world's troubles. The Conference will help to promote good relations with neighbouring countries. It will help to pool ideas and experience with a view to raising living standards. It will strengthen cultural, social and economic ties among the peoples of Asia. The data papers presented at the Conference will constitute valuable documents and the discussions on them will, we hope, throw out suggestions for practical policy".16 Thus there were broadly two objectives the holding the Conference: To promote cooperation among the people of Asia: and secondly to understand
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Asia's problems, social, economic and political. The inaugural address by Jawahar Lal Nehru had set in motion the tone and tenor of the Asian Relations Conference. Nehru's speech were around four main elements which interalia included: emphasis on the need for Asian unity; the proclamation of Asia's arrival on the international scene; the necessity of avoiding the articulation of anti-western sentiments and the need for increased regional cooperation.17 Explaining the rationale behind India hosting the Conference, Nehru stated that the idea of convening such a Conference had been mooted concomitantly by many countries of Asia. It was the result of a widespread urge and an awareness that the time had come for us, people of Asia, to meet together, hold together and advance together. Nehru was aware that the idea of holding the Conference was not a vague desire but a compulsion of events which prompted all to think alike. Nehru asserted that there were common problems between Asia and the Pacific, particularly in the Southeast Asian region. He laid emphasis on the need to work together to find a solution to these problems. Nehrus emphasis on Universal Freedom could be seen as an ideological basis for future cooperation in Asia. For S.W.R.D Bandaranaike at Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) who had sent a message to the Conference, the Asian Relations Conference was only the beginning of something much greater-a federation of free and equal Asian countries.18 Shutan Sharia, Prime Minister of Indonesia,
19

expressed

the

hope

that

the

Conference would exercise great influence in bringing together the people of the Asian countries.

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The Chinese delegate on April 2, 1947 carved out the idea for establishment of a permanent organization Asian Relations Organization (ARO). Bandung Conference 1955 Bandung Conference of 24 Asian-African countries, held at Bandung in Indonesia from April 18 to 24, 1955, was an important landmark in India's policy towards South-East Asia. The emergence of free Asia in world affairs was a development of tremendous significance which had changed the entire pattern of world politics. The Indian Prime Minister and the other Asian leaders constantly reminded the Western Powers to keep this reality in their mind before deciding the matters relating to the continents of Asia and Africa. Nehru played a unique role in consolidation and development of the concept of Asian unity. India played a dominating role in Bandung Conference. Besides other things, the five principles of peaceful co-existance were included in the final communique of the Conference. China was successfully introduced as a peaceful, friendly and respected member of the Asian-African Community after great efforts on Indias part. The Indian Prime Minister and his delegation tried their best to remove misunderstanding regarding Chinese intentions. A number of meetings were arranged between Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai and the South-East Asian leaders. It was the result of Indian efforts that Cambodia and Laos proclaimed their adherence to Non-Alignment and China gave assurance to them to adopt the principles of peaceful co-existence as the basis of mutual relations with her neighbours. Indonesian government signed an agreement with the Chinese Government on the question of
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citizenship of Chinese people living in Indonesia in April 25, 1955. Thus, it appeared at that moment that India was able to commit China to the principles of peaceful co-existence and thereby had succeeded in providing an alternative non-military strategy to ensure peace and security in South-East Asia by applying a selfimposed moral check on her aggressive intentions. From Indian point of view, Bandung Conference was a great diplomatic success and an event of historic importance. The objective of Bandung Conference were promoting good will and cooperation among Asian and African countries. However, according to Wivilian J. Barnds, other important, if unspoken, purposes were: getting to know other nations and leaders, giving Asia a more active role in world Affairs, and taking advantage of China's professed peaceful intention to bind Beijing to a peaceful policy.
20

Although the Soviet Union was not invited to the

Bandung Conference, Moscow was in favour of it, anticipating that it would take an anti-Western tone. While Washington did not oppose it, it was unenthusiastic about it, fearing it would follow the course hoped for by Moscow. China's participation at the Bandung Conference provided its premier Chou En-Lai a golden opportunity to make friends with Pakistan. In his two meetings with the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali during the Conference, the Chinese Premier held out an assurance that Beijing understood the fear and aspirations of Pakistan and that Pakistan's membership of the defence pacts was not directed against China. While inviting China to the Bandung Conference, Nehru might have been nursing the hope that Premier Chou would endorse his stand on regional and global
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issues just out of sheer gratitude, thereby helping in the elevation of Nehru's status as the undisputed leader of Asia. But it proved otherwise, Chou En-Lai not only hogged the limelight but also signaled that, China was a serious contender for the leadership of Asia. Nehru faced further setbacks when some countries even spoke in favour of military pacts for collective security, thereby undermining the Indian Prime Minister's advocacy of a policy of non-alignment.21 The Bandung Conference was also significant in the sense that the South-East Asia once again stood between the two traditional contestants, China and India for the first time in the twentieth century after a long gap of time. Both the Asian gaints had age-old relations with the people of the region. The Indian intercourse with the region in the past was mainly economic and cultural, devoid of any political domination or ambition, whereas, Chinese expansion had clear imperialistic overtones. Whatever may be the past record of the two countries, the countries of the region were provided with an alternative choice to look for guidance and assistance for the solution of their problems and need. In order to win the friendship of South-East Asian countries and to isolate India, China embarked upon vigorous competition in the subsequent years. Despite India's keen interest in peace, stability and security of South-East Asia, India was not in a position to render the kind of economic assistance which most of the SouthEast Asian countries were in need of. Whatever assistance or help she could extend was essentially a matter of gesture rather than substantial contribution to the development of their national

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economies. Besides, weak economic condition, adherence to the policy of non-alignment was another serious limitation. On India's part which perhaps restricted her activities in the region, Bandung Conference was a great event for Indonesia. Indonesian leaders were proud of the fact that their country was potentially the most powerful country of South-East Asia and had a glorious historical background. Bandung Conference brought Indonesia into the limelight as she was the host country and her Prime Minister was chosen to be the Chairman of the Conference. It had boosted the ego of the Indonesian leaders and for them it was the first step on the road to leadership of Asian-African world. Bandung Conference of 1955 may also be considered a watershed in India's relations with South-East Asia as a whole. From then, it is generally regarded that a sort of stagnation developed in her relations with countries of the region and her global involvement became more evident in her foreign policy. It was also believed that Government of India tended to take the friendship and goodwill of the South-East Asians for granted and did not take any concrete steps to keep it alive and progressing. It is also felt that India did not bother to do anything to arrest the trends which were going against the interests of the country in some of the South-East Asian countries during the period. It is even felt that the acceptance of the Chairmanship of the International Control
22

Committee

(ICC)

on

Indo-China

was

motivated, primarily, by her desire to perform an international responsibility.

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South-East Asian Countries and military Pact SEATO A military pact for collective security better known as Manila Treaty was signed to create South-East Asia Treaty (SEATO) in August 1954. Coming in the wake of the Geneva settlement it seemed doubly sinister. Just when the contemplated peace area seemed possible, an anti-Communist collective defence system was being erected. The inclusion of the territories of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as protocol states in the treaty was apprehensive about the effects of the treaty in which western powers played a major role thereby ensuring their domination over Asian countries in a new form. These reservations led India to denounce SEATO vehemently. The US for its part, showed scant respect towards the newly formed International Control Commission designed to supervise a truce. In short, neither country endorsed the respective mechanisms to safeguard peace in Indochina. The new developments in International politics, and particularly, the changing pattern of power-relations between China and Russia, between America and Russia, between India and Pakistan, between India and China, the escalation of the Vietnam War and the rivalries among the countries of South and South East Asia, had, on the other hand, affected the regional politics of South and South East Asia, and, on the other hand, opened up new prospects for initiatives in the field of developing closer cooperation with the countries of the regions. A few countries of South East Asia with their matured diplomatic experiences, the impact of the new power configuration and due to their domestic compulsions began to give serious thoughts on giving the old concept of regional

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cooperation a concrete organisational shape for dealing with their common social, cultural and economic problems. India and regional co-operation in South East Asian Countries The revival of Interest in regionalism was noted in the debates of Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) when in 1960 it passed a resolution favouring regional economic cooperation for trade and industries to which India was a party. India welcomed the formation of the Association of South East, (ASA), 1961. This was the first regional organisation established by the states of the region on their own initiative. India, though not its member, yet found in it, the possibility of a wider regional organisation for mutual co-operation in social, cultural, and economic fields. But because of the growing differences between the Philippines and Malaysia and between Indonesia and Malaya (now Malaysia) on the issue of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, chances of the development of any cohesive regional organisation were becoming remote. As India was supporting the proposed Federation of Malaysia and her own relations with Indonesia and the Philippines were far from friendly India was not in a position to retrieve the situation and help in the development of the ASA. India became a founder-member of the Asian Development Bank, 1966, and considered it as an
23

encouraging augury for the growth of economic cooperation amongst the countries of this region.

India welcomed these developments as further steps leading towards a broad based regional organisation. She herself began to accord a higher priority to the region of South East Asia in her foreign and economic planning perspectives. This was, noticeable
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(1)

in

convening

Conference

of

her

Ambassadors,

High

Commissioners, Consuls of sea region to discuss India's future relationship with the countries of South East Asia and the fresh diplomatic steps necessary for achieving greater economic, social and cultural spheres, (2) in resorting to personal diplomacy;24 (3) by giving economic content to the policy of non-alignment and friendship.25 She tried to diversify her trade and economic relations. (4) and by building up her own military image and by playing the role of a dominant partner in the sub-system of the balance of Power more effectively. This emphasis on regional cooperation for trade and industries was voiced by Mrs. Indira Gandhi while inaugurating the 22nd session of the ECAFE on March 22, 1966, at New Delhi when she said that We value regional co-operation not because Asia or the ECAFE is in opposition to any other part of the world, but because we have common tasks and common dreams.
26

Indo-Pak War and Reaction of ASEAN Countries During the Indo-Pak war in 1965, India received passive support from Singapore and Laos, Malaysia was at first neutral but ultimately she lent strong support to India and, as a consequence, Pakistan severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia. The leaders of most of the South-East Asian countries were non-committal on the Kashmir question. Of course, Prince Souvana Phouma of Laos was reported to have expressed his willingness to support India on the Kashmir question, as related by Hem Barua, one of the six members of the Indian delegation visiting Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, after the Indo-Pak war.27 The IndoPak war had it worst effect on Indo-Indonesian relations. In
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September, thousands of Indonesians demonstrated outside the Indian and the US embassies. Later the protest rally turned really violent. On that occasion Soekarno was reported to have said that he appreciated the actions of the Jakarta youths in their condemnation of India as an aggressor against Kashmir and Pakistan.
28

In a resolution, the Provisional People's Congress of

Indonesia urged President Soekarno to aid Pakistan against India. The Mahadatual Ulema Party, an Islamic Party of Indonesia, announced that it was organizing volunteers to fight India in Kashmir. said: It is the obligation of all nations belonging to the new emerging forces to give help to Pakistan to face India's aggression.
30 29

It

seemed

that

Soekarno

also

tried

to

create

international public opinion against India. He was reported to have

The Government of North Vietnam took an unambiguous stand in favour of Pakistan. It blamed the US for the scheming of the war between India and Pakistan. China also gave an ultimatum to India, threatening to open a second front in Ladakh and Sikkim against India. The Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman strongly condemned the Chinese ultimatum to India and declared in Kuala Lumpur on September 20, 1965 that any intrusion by China into Indian territory would be considered an aggression by his country. He said that we will not hesitate to condemn as much as we did in 1962. Singapore's sympathies also lay with India as Premier Lee Kuan Yew said on September 9, 1965 that his country had sympathy with India in the Indo-Pak war because India is a friend of Singapore. Among other South-East Asian countries the Philippines and Thailand
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tried to remain neutral on Indo-Pak war. Their attitude was also evident in the common attitude of the SEATO, which assured that it would not involve itself in the India Pakistan war. During his visit to Malaysia and Singapore in May 1967, Indian Foreign Minister Chagla had, indeed said, We will be very happy to have bilateral arrangements with Singapore, with regard to trade, commerce, and economic co-operation. But if Singapore chooses to join any regional cooperation, we will be happy to join such a grouping, if other members want India to do so. If others want to have a small grouping, India will be very happy to remain outside and help such a grouping-India does not want to dominate any regional grouping.
31

During the period of 1966-68 India signed direct bilateral agreement for technical and economic co-operation with Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) rather than through the ASEAN. During her visit to Malaysia, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, firmly reiterated India's support to regional cooperation in Asia. She also suggested that regional cooperation in Southeast Asia would be made viable only on broader regional basis. The main purpose of Indira Gandhi's visit was to discuss the increased economic and technical co-operation among the countries of Southeast Asia. India tried for membership of the ASEAN, but the proposition remained totally unacceptable as the ASEAN Declaration did not provide for any country from outside Southeast Asia region to be eligible for membership. It is also believed that at that time the ASEAN countries had a fear of being

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dominated by a big country like India if they made India a member of that organization. During Indira Gandhi's tenure the Americans were forced to withdraw their troops from Indo-China region. Southeast Asian region witnessed the miserable failure of the American Policy of containment of communism. These international events affected India's Foreign Policy and attitude towards Southeast Asia as well Indira Gandhi attached due importance of developing relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. In May, 1968 Mrs. Indira Gandhi obliquely referred to the possibility of India and other nations of the region joining the ASEAN at a suitable date when she said that We seek to promote mutual understanding leading to agreement. We seek cooperation and the establishment of positive, creative and mutually profitable bilateral relations. And we hope that these will expand in measure that we gain mutual trust into wider regional cooperation. In pursuance of this India had established trade33 relations with the member-states, forged new bonds of social and cultural contacts and entered into mutually profitable joint venture agreements in the field of certain industries.
34 32

Speaking in Lok Sabha on February 1969 Dinesh Singh, Minister for External Affairs declared:, India is fully aware of her role and position in South-East Asia.
35

However Indian contribution

to the debate on the important political and strategic subjects in the region has been negligible. Declaration of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, freedom of navigation in the Malacca Straits, neutralization of South East Asia and the formation of ASEAN were developments of significance. But Indians remained on the
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periphery. They were passive spectators rather than interested participants. At Lusaka Non-Aligned Nations Conference in 1970, India together with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Laos, besides others, agreed to exert special efforts for the adoption by the UN of the declaration of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. India also co-sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 2832 XXVII, designating the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace for all time. From South East Asia, Indonesia, Khmer Republic, Laos and Malaysia supported this Resolution. ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur on November 19, 1971 arranged a Conference after deliberations where a declaration was signed seeking neutralizations of South East Asia. The declaration expressed the determination of ASEAN countries to exert initially the necessary effort to secure recognition of, and respect for South East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference from outside powers.
36

Speaking on the concept of neutralization in Southeast Asia, Swaran Singh the then foreign minister of India stated on May 4, 1972: The Government of India holds the view that the South East Asian region should be free from great power influence.
37

President

V.V. Giri during his visit to Malaysia also reiterated on March 5, 1973 Indian support for the Kuala Lumpur Declaration.
38

Indo-Soviet Treaty and Reaction of ASEAN Countries Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation was signed at New Delhi on August, 9, 1971. It was the direct result of the extra-ordinary circumstances prevailing at that time in the Indian sub-continent having serious implications
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for India's

security. Considered from this point of view the conclusion of IndoSoviet Treaty was a remarkable achievement of Indian foreign policy. But the dramatic conclusion of the treaty aroused tremendous reaction at home and abroad including South-East Asia. While the Indian public opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of it, the press reactions outside India raised a number of questions about its nature and implications for Indian foreign policy, for example, whether India abandoned the policy of non-alignment and whether it was a defence pact or a mutual defence Treaty, so on and so forth. The source of all debate and criticisms rested on three articles of the treaty dealing with military aspects of the cooperation between two countries i.e. Articles VIII, IX and X. Article IX was the central point in the entire controversy.
39

The South-East Asian countries, majority of which are noncommunist and pro-west in their international outlook, viewed the Indo-Soviet treaty with a sense of surprise. In addition to these assessments the Indo-Soviet treaty was widely commented upon by some of the regional newspapers in South-East Asian countries. The Straits Times (Singapore) observed that India's first treaty involving any commitment to mutual defence was a reversal of India's fundamental opposition to any military agreement, plainly changed the conceptions of India's diplomatic strategy which had been unquestioned since independence. The treaty marked India's passage from neutrality to the sphere of Soviet influence.
40

Tamil Nesan (Malaysia) observed When the policy of nonalignment is gaining strength in several countries including Malaysia, it is rather shocking that India, which is one of the
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countries responsible for that policy should now choose to disregard it.... It is indeed unfortunate that India has now entangled herself in the Cold War of the big powers.
41

The Djakarta Times, an English Newspaper of Indonesia considered the treaty in its editorial on August 11, 1971, Worthy of special attention because it was likely to affect the future of Indo-Pak sub-continent and possibly the whole Asia. It held that the Treaty had widened and depeened the gap that separates India and Pakistan and divided the sub-continent into distinct parts, one going under Moscow's influence and the other Peking.
42

The Thai

daily, The Nation, too expressed similar views and cautioned India and Pakistan to avoid blunders otherwise Bangladesh might be converted into a Vietnam as a result of the Treaty. It observed that military solution of Bangladesh was not possible just as was the case of Vietnam in South-East Asia.
43

On the basis of print media observations, it can be concluded that there was deep-rooted apprehension among the South-East Asian Countries about the possibility of increased Soviet involvement in Asian affairs as a result of the treaty. They also thought that it would enhance the super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. The South-East Asian Countries like the Western countries felt that India had forsaken the path of nonalignment and had become a Soviet client. South-East Asia and difference on Bangladesh Issue The trouble in East Pakistan was the off-shoot of the deep seated dissatisfaction in the hearts of Bengalis against the west Punjab dominated Pakistan Government for its discriminatory policies in social, economic and political fields. The immediate
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reason of discontent was denial of political power which they should have got according to the results of the first ever general elections held in December 1970. In the elections the Awami League secured sweeping victory against the People's Party of Pakistan. But Because of Bhutto's (leader of PPP) unco-operative attitude, President Yahya Khan, postponed the session of National Assembly due to meet on March 3, 1971. In protest, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Awami League leader launched a civil disobedience movement. General Tikka Khan was appointed Governor of East Pakistan to control the situation which deteriorated very fast and Bangladesh was proclaimed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as an independent state on March 26, 1971. On the same day Awami League was banned by the Pakistan Government. The outbreak of civil war in Pakistan created gigantic social and economic problems for India. Approximately, 9, 899, 305 refugees had taken shelter in India between March 26 to December 16, 1971.
44

maintenance of refugees was a great financial burden

on India. Pakistan wanted to drive out Hindus from East Pakistan who were mostly the supporters of the Awami League. India left no stone unturned to find a political solution to the problem through peaceful means, though there was tremendous domestic pressure in favour of taking military measures. Despite this, Pakistan declared war against India on December 3, 1971. India recognized Bangladesh on December 6 and launched military action to help Mukti Bahini (Bangla Army) on December 16, 1971, the Pakistani army surrendered to the Indian army and Bangladesh was formally established.
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Some ASEAN states however, preferred to wait for a cue from major powers before making their move clear on recognizing Bangladesh as an independent state. The Singapore Prime Minister, Mr. Lee's statement in this respect was typical. He said: At the moment, besides India no other leading power has accorded recognition to Bangladesh. I think, we ought, therefore, to let countries, with much more sophisticated foreign offices, to work the sums out; then perhaps we should look into the matter.
45

The Thai Government maintained strictly non-committal position by not making any official statement regarding Indo-Pak conflict. But, on the refugee question the Thai Government felt that the UN should help to bring about solution of the enormous problem faced by India. However, in the event of Indo-Pak conflict, it stopped supply of fuel to Pakistan for military purposes.
46

Burma

also stopped fuel supply to Pakistan after March 25, 1971 because she did not want to be involved in the internal situation of Pakistan. Burma was the first South East Asian country to recognize the Republic of Bangladesh on January 13, 1972. Indonesia seemed to be inclined to play a mediatory role between India and Pakistan. President Suhar held a meeting of his cabinet on December 6, 1971 to discuss the Indo-Pak crisis. Next day he stated that while he was willing to act as a mediator between the two countries, the two warring parties should realise the consequences of war. He reminded them that war is not the only way to achieve the solution.
47

Malaysia's attitude towards

Bangladesh episode was more or less similar to that of Indonesia. The Malaysian Government tried to adopt strictly neutral position over the Indo-Pak conflict. Bangladesh episode significantly pointed
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to one fact that India stood in better position in South-East Asia than she was in October 1962 and September 1965. Towards Forging Close Ties with ASEAN India's in 1974 arranged a peaceful nuclear explosion. It was felt in the South-East Asian Countries that Indian explosion could have significant implications for the region. President Marcos of the Philippines in his address to the Bali Summit of ASEAN in February 1976, while taking note of global geo-political factors having implications for South-East Asia, observed: To these quadamirates we should perhaps add India which acquired the capability of becoming a nuclear power. This is also a situation over which ASEAN has no control.
48

He thought that as a result of

acquisition of nuclear capability by India, her interest may converge in South-East Asia as that of USA, USSR, China and Japan.
49

At the fall of Mrs. Indira Gandhi it was hoped that the proSoviet tilt in the Indian foreign policy would go and that would help India to better her relations with ASEAN countries very fast. In Its first major foreign policy review the Janata Government expressed its eagerness to cultivate closer and meaningful cooperation with the South-East Asian Countries. The External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee was reported to have said, in August 1977, in a Conference of the Indian envoys of the region that in the past, priorities accorded to that area had not been adequate. He added that economic exchange would constitute a major part of Indian foreign policy formulations in respect of the region.
50

In keeping with this policy statement, a Conference of the Indian envoys accredited to East and Southeast Asia was convened
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in New Delhi in August 1977. Opening the Conference the Prime Minister, Mr. Desai set the tone by stating that it was unfortunate that India had been rather negligent about cultivating strong ties with its neighbouring region. He stressed that the assembled envoys should try to improve India's image in the region.51 The main thrust of this Conference were Japan, China, ASEAN and Vietnam. There were two sides to the forging of ties with the ASEAN countries, according to the envoys. One concerned ASEAN's eagerness to pursue a dialogue with India in the field of commerce and industry and the other dealt with coordinated planning of ASEAN to locate and plan such projects. The joint ventures were there as starters although their record of success had been a mixed one. In this connection the President of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr. D.P. Poddary urged the Commerce Ministry and the Chambers of commerce to study the items which had been suggested by the ASEAN secretariat for a system of mutual prefacer. He was confident that some of these items could be handled by Indian firms by setting up joint ventures in the ASEAN region.
52

Apart from the economic strategy the envoys

discussed the political and diplomatic aspects of the Southeast Asian scene in which India faced some problems. India did not quite know how to approach the two halves of Southeast Asia without complicating its ties with either. It was obvious that the Indochina states were keen for India to play a major role in their economic development and were not too perturbed by India's moves towards the ASEAN.

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Eventually, the ASEAN side responded with a modest gesture by sending the ASEAN Secretary General Datuk Ali Bin Abullah on an exploratory mission to New Delhi in November 1978. After this preliminary contact it took more than one and half years for the first ASEAN India Official-Level meeting to take place. The first ever official-level meeting between the five ASEAN Director Generals and the Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was held in Kuala Lumpur on May 15-16, 1980.53 The ASEAN Secretary General reffered to the meeting as a landmark in promoting cooperation between ASEAN and India. India outlined the possible areas of economic cooperation with ASEAN. The ASEAN countries were disappointed with the Janata Government for its lack of outright condemnation of Vietnamese action in Kampuchea. Things worsened when Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980 and she went a step ahead of the Janata Government in extending recognition to the Vietnam and backed Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea on July 7, 1980. This despite the fact that the ASEAN countries in general, and Malaysia in particular (first significant visitor to India after Indira Gandhi's return to power was the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammad in January 1980) had specifically pointed out that India's recognition of the Kampuchean regime would cause great disappointment of the ASEAN five.
54

At the meeting of the

Commonwealth Heads of Government of Asian and Pacific region held in September 1980, the Premier of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, had also expressed much displeasure about the Indian Policy on Kampuchea and Afghanistan. As regards Afghanistan, he said that he did not agree with Mrs. Indira Gandhi on the reasons for the
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Russian intervention. Lee Khan Yew obviously had India in his mind when he said that recognition did not earn legitimacy for a puppet regime (Heng Samrin).
55

The Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers

Conference held in New Delhi in February, 1981 also made it clear that the problems of Kampuchea and Afghanistan remained the sore point in the relations between India and the ASEAN. After recognising the Heng Samrin regime, India did try to mend fences with the ASEAN countries. Though it hosted two important Non-Aligned meets in Delhi in 1981 and 1983 it kept the seat of Kampuchea vacant in NAM when the conflict over who represented that country, Samrin or Pol Pot, arose. Indira Gandhi undertook an official tour of the Philippines in October 1981. The main feature of Indira Gandhi's then policy towards the ASEAN was that in the face of the hurdle of Indo China the path of a vital relationship with ASEAN as a whole, it was better to improve bilateral relations with individual ASEAN countries. As Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared in Manila, We consider ASEAN an important factor in ensuring the peace and stability of this sensitive area. With its immediate neighbours, India's policy has been one of seeking bilateral solutions through patient discussion.56 In fact, during a press conference in Manila, when she was asked about whether India would join the ASEAN if invited, Mrs. Gandhi replied, well, I do not think I can give an answer to that now. But I can say that our relationship with the individual countries of ASEAN has improved. And we want to improve it further.
57

Keeping up the trend, in March 1984, Mr. Natwar Singh (the senior most official in the Foreign Ministry), visited Malaysia and Singapore and stated that, notwithstanding
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differences over

Kampuchea, India was interested in improving its ties with ASEAN.58 The Thai permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kun Asa Sarasin visited India in November 1984. The visit was intended to lay the groundwork for enhanced
59

mutual

understanding which could lead to a greater role for India and the Soviet Union to promote peace in Southeast Asia. The Annual

Report of MEA admitted that the strain in relations had led to a break down in high level contacts between India and ASEAN between 1980-85.
60

Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister in 1984, was very realistic in his approach. He actively pursued a policy to strengthen seriously and enhance South-South cooperation. Naturally, he attached importance to India's relations with the countries in Southeast Asia. He visited Vietnam in 1985 and some other countries of Southeast Asia to forge friendly ties. Vietnam also invited India for economic and technical cooperation on large scale. India's policy towards this region was basically to fulfill two objectives. First to promote the mutual economic interests and Secondly to reduce the intensity of great-power rivalries. This could be possible only when the countries in South and Southeast Asia developed a common outlook strategically and politically. Rajiv Gandhi made his minister of state for External Affairs, Natwar Singh shuttle between the ASEAN capitals and those of Vietnam and Kampuchea (1985-88) to stress the common points for successful negotiations. That Singh was heared patiently everywhere was made possible because, while on the one hand India had the confidence of Vietnam, on the other, its relations with
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ASEAN had improved perceptibly, during the later years of Indira Gandhi. It was not without importance that after a long gap, Thailand's Foreign Minister, Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsilla visited India in March 1985. Rajiv Gandhi then visited Indonesia and Thailand in October 1986. In fact, his trip to Thailand was the first ever by an Indian head of the government since independence. During Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Bangkok in October 1986, his Thai counterpart, General Prem Tinsulanonda, urged India to use its immense prestige and moral influence to help bring about a political solution of the Kampuchean question in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions.
61

Following General Prem's suggestion that India could use its diplomatic influence to resolve the Kampuchean issue, Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, embarked on a shuttle diplomacy to promote a consensus between Vietnam and the ASEAN states towards reaching a negotiated settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. Mr. Singh visited the ASEAN states in March 1987. Prior to that he visited Vietnam in January 1987 followed by another trip to Hanoi and Bangkok in July 1987. Following his talks in Hanoi, Mr. Natwar Singh indicated that Vietnam, after the Communist Party's Sixth Congress in December 1986, was showing significant sign of flexibility. He observed that Vietnamese were serious about withdrawal of troops from Kampuchea by 1990, but were understandably keen to ensure that a future government in Kampuchea would not be anti-Vietnam.
62

In July 1988, India

hosted a meeting of the NAM group on Kampuchea. Cuba, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Zimbabwe participated in the meeting. The group recommended that a special envoy be sent to get in touch
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with the four Kampuchean factions to ascertain their views on possible settlement of the conflict. India co-chaired the first committee, which dealt with the establishment of an International Control Mechanism in Paris in August 1989. Indian Naval Activities and ASEAN ASEAN states in general and Indonesia in particular felt ill at ease with the flurry of Indian naval activities. The Indian navy acquired twenty nine warships. India launched its first indigenous submarine built with West German collaboration, in October 1989. With its naval base at Vishakhapatnam and at Port Blair, Andaman, India was seen by Jakarta as extending its subcontinental policeman role further east. Responding to India's extended profile, Thailand justified its acquisition of some Chinese made frigates and considered buying a European-designed helicopter carrier. It even whimsically proposed joint naval exercise with Japan to safeguard regional security reportedly, with the Indian threat in mind.
63

In his speech after inducting the nuclear powered submarine, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi observed: When we look back into our history, two lessons are apparent. One is that the defence of India requires our undisputed mastery over the approaches to India by the sea. The second is that while those who have conquered India through land were eventually absorbed and assimilated into our society, those who conquered us from the sea ruled us as alien masters and therefore had to be rejected. If we are to keep the destiny of India in our hands, we must have full control of the waters around us.....
64

119

Thus the successive Indian governments had to repeatedly stress the point that India was strengthening its naval power only for self-defence and not for aggression. Even the non-Congress government that assumed office in November 1989 under the premiership of V.P. Singh highlighted the same rationale to the ASEAN countries. For instance, Singh, while replying to a question on India's Military build-up in Kuala Lumpur, said that India had never been aggressive even out of necessity; and whenever its forces had crossed the national borders they had always gone back.
65

It was odd that Indian leaders had to reiterate their

country's desire to live in peace with its maritime negihbouring when there had been no precedence of any aggressive behaviour in the past. It was a measure of policy failure on India's part that it allowed itself to be viewed so negatively by the states in its neighbouring region. However, after the initial dithering India decided on a damage-control exercise. Adopting a more rational approach and sensing the necessity to convincingly articulate its aims in the Indian Ocean region India offered to hold Joint Naval exercise with the ASEAN states. Thus it may be summed up in the end that though there had been very old historical, cultural and economic ties between India and the countries of the South East Asia region, yet a number of issues were there which resulted in the development of negative perceptions on both sides. However the developments in last two decades of the 20th century resulted in the forging of closer links between India and ASEAN.

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REFERENCES 1. Quoted in Hindustan Standard (Calcutta), December 30, 1962. C.D. Paliwal, India-Indonesia-a Cultural Exchange,

2.

Indonesian Independence Day Souvenir 1975, Indonesian Embassy, New Delhi, See in Asis Kumar, Majumdar, South-

East Asia in Indian Foreign Policy: A study of Indias Relations with South-East Asian Countries from 1962-82, Naya Prokash, Calcutta, 1982, p.21.
3. 4. Ibid. Ellen I. Frost, India's Role in East Asia: Lessons from cultural and Historical Linkages, RIS Discussion Paper, January 2009, pp. 4-5. 5. 6. ibid, p.5. V. Suryanarayan, Indian Cultural Influences in Indonesia, Dialogue, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, p. 137. See also Sukarno, Upsurge in Asia: Common Bonds of Freedom, The Hindu, January, 4, 1946. 7. Emunirathnam Reddy, India's cultural Relations with Southeast Asia: Retrospect and Prospect, Monograph-XII, Centre for Studies on Indochina and South Pacific, Sri Venkerteshwara University, Triupati (AP), pp.3-5. 8. Induya Awasthi, "Ramayana Performances in India and South-East Asia", Indian Horizons, Vol. 49, No. 394, 2002, pp. 109-19. 9. S.N. Mishra, India-the Cold War Years, South Asian Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1994, p. 164.

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10.

Quoted in T.M.P. Mahadevan, Indian Philosophy and the Quest for Peace, in Paul F. Power, India's Non-alignment Policy, D.C. Heath, Boston, 1967, pp. 2-3. See also Kripa Sridharan, The ASEAN region in India's Foreign Policy, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1996, p. 18.

11. 12.

A.N. Ram, Historical Perspectives, Seminar, 487, March 2000, P. 26. India and Asia, Nehru's speech in the constituent Assembly, September 1946, March 1949 and April 1961, India's Foreign Policy-Publication Division, New Delhi, p.22.

13. 14.

V. Suryanaranyan, "Indo-ASEAN Matrix", Journal of India Ocean Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1999, p.235. See in Vishal Singh, India and Southeast Asia, International Studies, July-December 1978, pp. 593-600., and V. Suryanarayan, India and Southeast Asia India Quarterly, July-September, 1978, pp. 263-77.

15.

This conference was attended by delegates from Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Burma(Myanmar), China, Laos, Egypt, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Korea Siam Iran, (then (Thailand), Kampuchea, undivided), Ceylon(Sri Kazakhstan, delegation, the Kirghizstan, Philippines,

Malaya(Malaysia), Mongolia, Nepal, the Palestine Jewish Lanka), Tajikistan, Tibet, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. An Invitation to attend the Conference was extended to Japan but it was not permitted to do so by the occupation authorities there. Observers from Australia and New Zealand also participated. Jawaharlal Nehru was the moving spirit behind this Conference.
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16.

Quoted in Eric Gonsalves (ed.), Asian Relations, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 37-38. See also Prakash Nanda, Rediscovering Asia-Evolution of Indias Look-East policy, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 107-108.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Sisir Gupta, India, and Regional Integration in Asia, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, p. 34. Eric Gonsalus, op. cit., p. 41. Ibid, p. 44-57. William J Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, Praeger Publisher, New York, 1972, p. 138. These countries were: Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Thailand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Vishal Singh, India and South-East Asia, in Bimal Prasad (ed.), India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, p. 218.

23. 24.

Selected speeches of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, 1966-69, p.338. In 1968-69, Mrs. Indira Gandhi went on a tour of South East Asian Countries; a few countries were visited by President V.V.Giri.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Kuldeep Nayar, India after Nehru, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1975, p. 130. Selected speeches of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Jan 1966-August 1969 Common Tasks, p. 322. The Times of India, December, 1965. Quoted in The Hindustan Times, September 10, 1965. Ibid, September 12, 1965. Quoted in L.P. Singh, Dynamics of India-Indonesia Relations, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 9, pp. 655-66.
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31.

Quoted in K.P. Saxena, Cooperation in Development: Problems and Prospects for India and ASEAN, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1986, p. 53.

32. 33. 34.

Selected Speeches of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, January 1966 to August 1969, p. 455. India's trade with South East Asians Countries started increasing at the rate of 25% per year. At that time India had 26 Joint Ventures in Malaysia, 6 in Thailand, 2 in Indonesia. Birla was to start a coconut oil mill in the Philippines where already a Textile mill was functioning in Joint Collaboration.

35.

Lok Sabha Debates, Series 4, Vol. 24, February 26, 1969, Col. 48. The statement was made when the government's attention was drawn to a speech by Tan Sri Ghazail Bin Shafie, Permanent Secretary, Minister of External Affairs, Malaysia on December 10, 1968 about India's role in South East Asia.

36.

See the text of the ASEAN Declaration on the Neutralisation of the South East Asia, November 1971, in Foreign Affairs (Malaysia) Vol. 4, no. 4, December 1971, pp. 57-59. See also V. Suryanarayan, Neutralization of South-East Asia: Problems and Perspective, Indian Quarterly, Vol. 31, No.1, January-March 1975, pp. 46-61.

37.

Lok Sabha Debates, May 4, 1972, Vol.14, Col. 9-10. The Strait Times, Singapore, March 6, 1973, See also Ramesh Dixit,

38.

South East Asia in India PolicyProblems of with a Neighbouring Region, Radha

Relationship

Publications, New Delhi, 1998. p. 67.

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39.

For detail see A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations. 1947-1972, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1985, p. 136.

40. 41. 42.

The Straits Times, August 10, 1971. Mirror of Opinion, August 11, 1971, p. 5. See also Kripa Sridharan, op. cit., p. 86-87. N.M. 228. Ghatate (ed.), Indo-Soviet Treaty Reactions and Reflections, Indian Publishing House, New Delhi, 1972, p.

43. 44.

Ibid, p. 227. S.S. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent to Shimla Agreement, New Delhi, 1981, p. 133. See also Saroj Pathak, India and South-East Asia- A Study of Indian perspective and Policy since 1962, Atma Ram & Sons, Delhi, 1990, p.139.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

The Straits Times, January 10, 1972. The National Herald, August 25, 1971. The Times of India, December 8, 1971, see also The Djakarta Times, December 8, 1971. Asian Recorder, April 1-7, 1976. The Hindu, February 24, 1976. The Times of India, September, 2, 1977. The Times of India, August 24, 1977. Financial Express, December, 21, 1977. For details of the first official-level meeting between ASEAN and India, in Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 1980, pp. 162-66. John W. Garver, China-India Rivalry in Indo-China, Asian Survey, Vol.27, No.11, November 1987, pp. 1207-8. The Statesman, 29, July 1980.
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56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

For details of Gandhi's visit to Manila, in Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XXVII, No. 10, October 1981, pp. 291-99. Ibid, p. 296. IDSA New Review of Japan, Southeast Asia, and Australia, January-July, 1984, pp. 103-4. IDSA New Review, October, 1984, p. 441. See Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1985-86, p. 12. Hindustan Times, October 20, 1986. Asia Week, March 15, 1987, pp.12-13, See also Kripa Sridharan, op. cit., p.167. P. Lewis Young, India's Nuclear Submarine Acquisition: A Major Step towards Regional Dominance, Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), November 1988, pp.4-18. See also Times of India, March 28, 1989.

64. 65.

Rajiv Gandhi, Statements on Foreign Policy, January-March 1988, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, p. 18. Quoted in Kripa Sridharan, op. cit., p. 177.

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