RULE 18: PRE-TRIAL Filoil Marketing Corporation vs Dy Pac & Co.

(1988) FACTS: Filoil commenced an action for collection of sum of money with interest against Dy Pac on the ground that the latter fails to pay, notwithstanding repeated demands, the amount due to it for petroleum products bought on credit. At the hearing set, neither Dy Pac nor its counsel appeared. Filoil was allowed by the City Court of Manila to proceed ex parte. The said court rendered a decision on the same date ordering Dy Pac to pay Filoil. Dy Pac appealed to CFI Manila which immediately set the case for pre-trial. It ruled that: []plaintiff and defendant, who are hereby ordered to prepare a stipulation of facts based on their exhibits already marked and submit the same to the court the parties are warned that if they cannot submit the stipulation of facts, the Court will dismiss the appeal. CFI Manila dismissed the case for failure of the parties to submit the required stipulation of facts and ordered the immediate return of the records to the City Court for execution. ISSUE: Whether or not the case can be dismissed on the ground that the parties failed to submit a stipulation of facts. RULE: No. There is no law which compulsorily requires litigants to stipulate at pre-trial on the facts and issues that may possibly crop up in a particular case, upon pain dismissal of such case. The process of securing admissions whether of facts or evidence is essentially voluntary, since stipulations of facts, like contracts, bind the parties thereto who are not allowed to controvert statements made therein. Courts cannot compel the parties to enter into an agreement upon the facts. Where the parties are unable to arrive at a stipulation of facts and do not reach an amicable settlement of their controversy, the court must close the proceedings and go forward the trial of the case. The CFI Manila committed serious error in dismissing Dy Pacs appeal from the City Courts decision solely on the ground that the parties failed to comply with the order. Rodolfo Paredes, Tito Alago, Agripino Baybay vs. Ernesto Verano and Cosme Hinunangan (2006) FACTS: In Civil Case 2767, a compromise was entered into regarding the complaint for the establishment of a right of way. Hinunangan granted a 2m-wide right of way in favour of Paredes, Alago and Baybay in consideration of P6,000.00. A complaint for specific performance with damages was filed by Hinunangan on the ground that Petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the compromise agreement. Petitioners denied the allegation contending that respondents were not actual residents of the barangay and that the lot covering the passage of right of way was sold by Hinunangan to

Paredes. Petitioners filed a MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD. Pre-trial was set on April but was reset on June. However, it did not push through either because none of the parties appeared. On Nov, the RTC was informed of a proposed settlement. The case was reset to January 2004. On January, private respondents and their counsel were present. Petitioners were also present but not their counsel. RTC allowed respondents to present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendants counsel to appear. ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of counsel for petitioners at the pre-trial, with all petitioners themselves present, is a ground to declare them in default RULING: No. Absence of counsel at pre-trial does not ipso facto authorise the judge to declare them in default. Sec. 4, Rule 18 imposes duty on litigating parties and their respective counsel to appear at pre-trial. Sec. 5 penalizes the failure to appear of either plaintiff or defendant but not of their counsel. A judgment of default against one who failed to attend at pre-trial or even to file an answer implies a waiver only of their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegation but not all their other rights.

Erlinda Guanzon vs Andrew Arradaza, Francisca Maidin, Erlinda Lebita (2006) FACTS: Arradaza boarded a jeepney owned and operated by Maidin and Lebita. Following the jeepney was a dump truck registered in the name of Guanzon. The two vehicles collided. Arradaza sustained injuries. Despite several demands, Maidin and Lebita failed to reimburse Arradaza of the actual damages he incurred. Arradaza filed a case against Maidin and Lebita. The latter filed their answer arguing that it was the truck driver who was at fault. Therefore, Guanzon, being the employer, failed to exercise the diligence of a god father in selecting and hiring the driver. Summons were served to Guanzon through substituted service via a certain Susan Ador. Guanzon failed to file an answer and was declared in default. 2 years later, Guanzon filed a MTD on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her because of the defective service of summons. MeTC adjuged in favour of Arradaza. Guanzon appealed to the RTC Manila. RTC affirmed the MeTC decision. Appeal to the CA was also denied. ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of summons on Guanzon. RULING: Yes. The motor vehicle registration of the truck is under the name of Guanzon with address at Manresa, QC. The service of summons therein failed because Guanzon was not known in the said address. Upon inquiry with the SEC, it was found out that Guanzon was the director of Guanzon Lime Devt Company with address at Caloocan. Service of summons was effected there through Susan Ador, of suitable age and working in the premises.

The service of summons upon petitioner first attempted by personal service, and subsequently by substituted service more than meets the requirements set by the Rules of Court.

of his authority. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executor judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

ROMEO J. ORDOEZ, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. ALFREDO J. GUSTILO, in his capacity as presiding judge of Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVI, Cavite City, Municipality of Rosario, Cavite, former Mayor Calixto D. Enriquez of Rosario, Cavite, and Valeriano Espiritu of Mabolo, Bacoor, Cavite, Respondents FACTS: Espiritu filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Enriquez to enforce their agreement in a Reclamation Contract. Enriquez claims that said action was barred by the statute of limitations the contract has been substantially amended, modified and supplemented; and plaintiff has not performed his reciprocal obligation. Ordonez, barangay captain in Cavite, along with 7 other officials filed an Answer in intervention alleging that no actual reclamation was done by Espiritu. Trial court set the case for pre-trial. All litigants including intervenors, with their respective counsels were present. RULE 19 INTERVENTION LUISA LYON NUAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUAL, and ANITA NUAL HORMIGOS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EMMA LYON DE LEON in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors HELEN SABARRE and KENNY SABARRE, EDUARDO GUZMAN, MERCEDEZ LYON TAUPAN, WILFREDO GUZMAN, MALLY LYON ENCARNACION and DORA LYON DELAS PEAS, respondents. (1993) Emma Lyon filed a case against petitioners for partition and accounting of a parcel of land. Private respondents claim that the land has been in possession of Luisa since 1946 and made no accounting of the income derived therefrom despite demands. CFI judged in favour of respondents and ordered the partition. CA affirmed said order. Mary Martin filed a MTQ the order of execution contending that not being a party to the aboveentitled case, her rights and interests, ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in said case; that the order is unenforceable in so far as her rights are concerned. Trial court dismissed the MTQ and directed the partition. However, the board of commissioners to effect the partition found out that Mary is indeed an heir and her name appears on the TCT. The lower court then, issued an order directing Emmas counsel to furnish the court with the names of all the heirs entitled to a share. Respondents filed a motion for clarification as to whther the partition of the property is to be confined merely among the party plaintiffs and defendants to the exclusion of Mary. The lower court issued an order directing the inclusion of Mary as co-owner. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary as co-heir considering that she was not a party in the case and that the decision has long become final and executor RULING: No. Judgment may no longer be modified in any respect. Upon its finality, the judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification he will make will be in excess Intervenors asked the court if they can be allowed to present their evidence to prove their defense. Hearings were set where the vice mayor and vice governor testified. Principal litigants, however, filed a compromise agreement with the court which approved it. Thus, the decision became immediately final and was duly executed to the satisfaction of principal litigants. Intervenors filed a motion to set aside the compromise agreement but were denied by the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in preventing the intervenors from further presenting their evidence in support of their answer in intervention RULING: No. A judgment approving a compromise agreement is final and executor. All pending issues will become moot and academic once a compromise agreement by the parties is approved by the court. The compromise agreement and decision had in effect resolved the issue raised by the intervenors in this case.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Manila Branch 39, RAYCOR AIRCONTROL SYSTEM, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,* respondent. (1990) FACTS: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metropolitan) in whose favor a deed of chattel mortgage was executed by Good Earth Emporium, Inc. (GEE) over certain air conditioning units installed in the GEE building, filed a complaint for replevin against Uniwide Sales, Inc. (Uniwide, for brevity) and the BPI Investment Corporation and several other banks collectively called BPIConsortium, for the recovery of the possession of the air-conditioning units or in the event they

may not be recovered, for the defendants which acquired the GEE building in an auction sale, (to) be required, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the unpaid obligations on the units. Metrobank alleged that the air-conditioning units were installed on a loan of P4,900,000.00 it extended to Good Earth Emporium & Supermarket, Inc. in its building located at Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, after the land and building had been foreclosed and purchased on June 3, 1983 at public auction by the defendants, except Uniwide, and in order to secure repayment of the loan, a deed of chattel mortgage was constituted over the personal properties listed in the deed which included the airconditioning units. Raycor Air Control Systems, Inc. filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging' it has a direct and immediate interest on the subject matter of the litigation such that it will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment' and attached the 'Intervention Complaint'. The intervention complaint was admitted by the lower court. MBTC and BPI Consortium filed a joint MTD the complaint. It was dismissed. private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, claiming it was not furnished with copy of the joint motion for dismissal and that it received the order of dismissal only on April 4, 1988. The trial court granted the MR of the intervenor. Petitioner, MBTC, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals contending that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing, per its order of June 2, 1988, the intervention suit to survive despite the dismissal of the main action and also in admitting, per its order of January 11, 1989, the amended complaint in intervention. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the intervention to survive despite dismissal of the main action. RULING: No. There was no final dismissal of the main case. The reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of the intervenor is proper. An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the original suit and to prosecute it to judgment. The right cannot be defeated by dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff after filing of the petition.

A consortium of private banks which had granted credit facilities to EYCO, among them, Union Bank, convened to map out their collective collection options. The formation of a management committee (ManCom) to represent the creditor banks was agreed upon in that meeting. Subsequently, Union Bank decided to break away from the consortium and, without notifying its members, filed a slew of civil cases against EYCO. Makati RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment and levy on attachement were annotated to certain titles of EYCO. Union Bank, without awaiting for the SECs ruling on its motion to dismiss SEC Case No. 09-975764, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to nullify what it tagged as the precipitate September 19, 1997 SEC suspension order and its creation of the ManCom. CA rendered a decision declaring Union Ban kguilty of forum shopping.

Makati RTC issued, in Civil Case No. 97-2184, an Order dated August 17, 1998 thereunder indefinitely suspending the proceedings in that collection suit until further orders. The SEC Hearing Panel, on the other hand, over the objection of the consortium of EYCOs creditor banks, approved, on December 18, 1998, the rehabilitation plan prepared by the Strategies and Alliance Corporation for EYCO. Meanwhile, the SEC en banc issued an order finding Concepcion as EYCO liquidator. He filed a motion to intervene in the RTC Makati. It denied Concepcions motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 97-2184 on the ground of lack of standing to intervene, his appointment as Liquidator being, according to the court, of doubtful validity. ISSUE: Whether or not Concepcion is entitled to intervene. RULING: Yes. To warrant an intervention, 2 requisites must concur: Movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and Intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of parties. Concepcion is the duly appointed liquidator of EYCOs remaining assets, as such, has a legal interest in the matter being liquidated.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANILO CONCEPCION (2007) EYCO Group of Companies[4] (EYCO or EYCO Group) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a PETITION for the declaration of suspension of payment, appointment of a rehabilitation receiver/committee and approval of rehabilitation plan with an alternative prayer for liquidation and dissolution of corporations. The SEC Hearing Panel, by an order of September 19, 1997, directed the suspension of all actions, claims and proceedings against EYCO, et al. pending before any court, tribunal, board or office.