Tarrosa v. de Leon

TARROSA V. DE LEON, G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009 Facts: Bonifacio O.
De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. Upon payment of the full price, PHHC issued a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio, in the TCT (TCT No. 173677) his status as single. Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled. They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers title and the issuance of TCT No. N-173911, Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights over the subject property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. The Tarrosas averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC- ruled that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita, rendered judgment in favor of Anita and her children. CA- affirmed the RTC decision, save for the award of damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit which the appellate court ordered deleted Issue: Whether or not the subject property is conjugal ? Held: Yes. The Subject Property is the Conjugal Property of Bonifacio and Anita. Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which
the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendors obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The conditional contract to sell executed by and between Bonifacio and PHHC on July 20, 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the property will vest on Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale which, in turn, will be effected upon payment of the full purchase price It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void.

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TARROSA V. DE LEON, G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009 Facts: Bonifacio O.

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