EN BANC

[A.C. No. 244 . March 29, 1963.] IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner. SYLLABUS 1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION TO BAR OBTAINED UNDER FALSE PRETENSES. Admission to the Bar obtained under false pretenses must be revoked. 2.ID.; REQUISITES TO BECOME ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. Before the study of law, an applicant for admission to the Bar must have DECISION BENGZON, J : After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the SolicitorGeneral who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required prelegal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially in the following particulars: (a)Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b)Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submittedin support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge; but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of U. S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. We have serious doubts about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school official. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school
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records. This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948- 1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education." (italics on "previous") Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 389 . February 28, 1967.] IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA, complainant, vs. ARMANDO PUNO, respondent. Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant. Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respond. SYLLABUS 1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; EVIDENCE OF MORAL CHARACTERS; ESSENTIAL DURING CONTINUANCE OF PRACTICE. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127 of the Old Rule of Court, now Sec. 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of that privilege (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil., 567). 2.ID.; LAWYER MUST MEET EVIDENCE QUESTIONING HIS INTEGRITY. When the lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still

maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. 3.DISBARMENT; STATUTORY ENUMERATION OF GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT CANNOT LIMIT COURT'S POWER TO SUSPEND OR DISBAR. It is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. 4.ID.; LAWYER MAY BE REMOVED FOR GROSS MISCONDUCT. Times without number, the Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil., 567, citing In re Smith, [1906] 73 Kan. 743; Balinon vs. De Leon, Adm. Case No. 104, Jan. 28, 1954, 50 Off. Gaz., 58; 3 Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, 100 Phil. 586; 53 Off. Gaz., 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). 5.ID.; LAWYERS MUST CONFORM TO HIGHEST STANDARDS OF MORALITY. It is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: ". . . The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice". DECISION REGALA, J : On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under Section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court. The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child. After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging
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respondent with immorality. The complaint recites: "That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married;' that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno'; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'Anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her pantie, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child. "That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar." The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent. A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took

complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed. This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the respondent. Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court. After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M. Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October on the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958 where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her. Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila and a certificate of

admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital. To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca, a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant. The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony. In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.) Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character. (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567) When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said: "An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the state voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him."

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan., 743; Balinon vs. de Leon, Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627) As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: ". . . The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice." Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6273. March 15, 2010.] ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J : An Information for Estafa 1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavitcomplaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court granted. 2 Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied. 3 Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for
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violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them. 4 On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager. 5 The notice was signed by respondent. At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then current Board, 6 Gerango * , complainant's predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary. On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties of their positions. 7 Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly. The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCO's By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. 8 The RD's Resolution of February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction 9 of CDA. In her present complainant 10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent: . . . PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE SAME 11 . . . DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 12 . . . DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL 13 . . . VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW 14 . . . RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS WELL 15 Despite the Court's grant, 16 on respondent's motion, 17 of extension of time to file Comment, respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him
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to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with, 18 but just the same he failed to comply. 19 The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 20 It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the following issues: 1.Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following: 1.1Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal [processes]. 1.2Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. 1.3Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. 1.4Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. 1.5Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. 2.Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyer's oath, particularly the following: 2.1support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein 2.2will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court 2.3will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same 2.4will delay no man for money or malice 3.Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 21 Respondent's counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by respondent. 22 After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position papers. 23 Complainant filed hers, 24 but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper. In her Report and Recommendation, 25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been previously suspended for six months,
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the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the complaint, however, for lack of merit. 26 On Motion for Reconsideration, 27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyer's Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws. When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer's Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same." When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Court's subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so."Sebastian v. Bajar 28 teaches: . . . Respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent's conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent's deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. 29 (Citations omitted). The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 30 he having been found to have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when he had not. 31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this time is thus called for. WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years
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from the practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez andMendoza, JJ., concur.
SIacTE

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-27654. February 18, 1970.] IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN in L- 27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT; MINUTE RESOLUTIONS NOT DECISIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION. Short resolutions or, in current Court practice, minute "resolutions," are not decisions within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petitions for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. A petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. And so, there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial. 2.ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE ON SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, MANDATORY. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). Since there is lack of notice in this regard, the Court cannot act upon said motion for it is nothing but a useless piece of paper. If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. 3.ID.; ID.; COURTS AND JUDGES NOT SACROSANCT; DUTY OF LAWYER THERETO. Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Criticism of the courts is an important part of the traditional work of the lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right.

4.ID.; ID.; NATURE AND STANDARDS OF CRITICISM TOWARDS THE COURT. The cardinal condition of all such criticism directed against the Courts or its judges that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. 5.ID.; ID.; DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERS OF THE BAR. Membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." The Rules of Court constantly remind him to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." A lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. 6.ID.; ID.; PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, WHAT CONSTITUTES. Postlitigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. 7.ID.; ID.; PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF CONTEMPT COVERS PENDING AS WELL AS DECIDED CASES. To view the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, is erroneous. The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceedings has terminated has lost much of its vitality. As expressed by Chief Justice Moran, there may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. 8.ID.; ID.; DUTY OF THE COURT, NOT ONLY TO ADMIT BUT ALSO TO DISCIPLINE AND EXCLUDE. By constitutional mandate, the Court has the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the

practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 9.ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST A MEMBER OF THE BAR. Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 10.ID.; ID.; NATURE AND EXTENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST A MEMBER OF THE BAR, DISCRETIONARY UPON COURT. The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained. RESOLUTION CASTRO, J : Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the
p

present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ". . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession." He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows: "Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's `unconstitutional and obnoxious'practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason. "Because of the tribunal's `short-cut justice,' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case. xxx xxx xxx "There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, `where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity'. xxx xxx xxx "He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court `will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions.'" (Italics supplied) Atty. Almacen's statement that ". . . our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity," was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment." The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.

Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, 1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 6, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words: "Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1966 (pp. 90-118, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1966), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time." Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus: "Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant-appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal. "Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and

Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case. "There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. "In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it `without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief.' In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza), the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue." Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the said date was ordered expunged from the records. It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28. 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to

pursue the negative act." In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument. His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers no apology. Far from being contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus: "At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: " `Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how canst thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes. " `Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.' xxx xxx xxx "Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that `he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of

the Court, that they tend to bring the entire court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law xxx xxx xxx "Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but only motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, . . . xxx xxx xxx "To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case. xxx xxx xxx "Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith. "Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: `the story is current, though nebulous as to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines.' xxx xxx xxx "We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. . . . We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality

on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with `circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom', your Respondent rise to claim his Godgiven right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech. xxx xxx xxx "The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. . . . xxx xxx xxx "What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, `O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name', we may dare say, `O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, `O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name.' xxx xxx xxx "We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses. xxx xxx xxx "The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED,. not one word was spoken or given . . . We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the impersonal state of things and nothing more. xxx xxx xxx "As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution, and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter." But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not

intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances. He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a firstimpression cogency, but fail to withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari. Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or Write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio show, 94 L. ed 562, 566: "A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result . . . "Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases. respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105, 1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take there cases. The time that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time make's review undesirable." Six years ago, in Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioner's counsel

urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon: "In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these `resolutions' are not `decisions' within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion. "By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered `dismissed'." We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which recites: "Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary. A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: "(a)When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; b)When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision." Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to

exercise its supervisory power. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated inManila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra: "The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, L-18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition." If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but also the manner in which they are handed down. Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, 4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer. 5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a

concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion." The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. 9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties. Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11 Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that "An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts." (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In articles written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see the flaws and inconsistencies of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood inEx Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641: "No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. . . . To

say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained. . . . Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657, 665). "Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench." (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216) To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty, to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196) But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts;" 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." As Mr. Justice Field puts it: ". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not

discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652) The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. "The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481) "We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967) In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents. 1.Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that: "It would be contrary to every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at the destruction of public confidence in the

judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice is the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise." 2.In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went. much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do. "The entire publication evidences a desire on the part of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public." 3.In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable said bank to keep that money." Said the court: "We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance: " 'It may be (although we do not 80 decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author.' "Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins 81 Pac. 220." 4.In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who

set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began: "Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants." Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared: ". . . Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and reject of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public." 5.In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said: "A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. . . . "Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an

abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights." In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723, 725. 6.In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said: "We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or in proper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial offices for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them protected. . . . While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the public generally, to criticize the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial offices in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticized, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct." 7.In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement: "I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or less vituperative, and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here." The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that: ". . . the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon

the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client." The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court. 8.In State ex rel Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that: "The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. . . . "The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination as of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy, wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court." 9.In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms "criminal, corrupt, and wicked conspiracies," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10.In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeal in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph: "You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got not undue advantage. . . . The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every rightminded citizen of the state to read it." The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows: "The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him due his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. `The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication.' 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d

Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto. "The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to court and judicial officers. `This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts.' Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home of elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think, entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod, supra. while the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticize rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. `Is it in the power of any person,' said the court, `by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult be taking the law in his own hands? . . . No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions.' "That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. `An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and

reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court.' Matter of Manheim, 133 App. div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 the same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in a reference to his decision: `It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80.' And it was decided that, while such misconduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be `called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney.' `If,' says the court, `counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute.' "The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having `willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney.' As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wail (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo. 237, 244, 3 Pac. 66, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 361; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481. "Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. . . ." 11.In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyze him for two years. 12.In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral

turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general, claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case. 13.In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 669, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred. 14.In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared Over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar. The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian' of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices. A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment. 1.In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that "It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,"

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed ". . . an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client . . ." 2.In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in a local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, . . . the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared: "But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded. In order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice . . . "To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the

last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices,' that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation." Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that ". . . an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)" 3.In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court With having "repeatedly fallen" into the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed: "As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blind adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making `any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court.

The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as `so-called' the `rule against splitting of jurisdiction.' " Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail. Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment. The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceedings has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule aboveadverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran. in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that there may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon: "A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends

to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed." Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post-litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 ours is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus "The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct

of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to exclude them from practice." 23 This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that ". . . whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion." 24 Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25 Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions. The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually rakes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the

Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of ad ministering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable. We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26 It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein. Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of

members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity. Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent. Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained. That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do

disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall] last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur. Fernando, J., did not take part.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-44388. January 30, 1985.] VICTORIANO BULACAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FAUSTINO TORCINO and FELIPA TORCINO, defendants-appellants. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; IN MUNICIPAL COURTS, LITIGANT MAY BE ASSISTED BY A FRIEND OR AGENT. The Rules (Section 34, rule 138 of the Rules of Court) are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Trocinos applies only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal court. Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more

stringent. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In the verification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had caused Mr. Nues to conduct the litigation and to sign the complaint in his behalf, indicating his awareness that Nues is not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the pleading to be admitted rather than dismissed. As the lower court has cited: "So it has been held that, where a pleading is not signed by the attorney as required, but is verified by the party, substantial rights have not been affected and the defect may be disregarded as against a motion to strike." (71 C.J.S. 954-955) 3.ID.; RULES OF PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, LIBERALLY CONSTRUED. Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure must be liberally construed so as to protect the rights and interests of the parties. As we stated in Paulino v. Court of Appeals (80 SCRA 257): . . . ". . . pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided . . ." 4.CIVIL LAW; ESTOPPEL; DOCTRINE OBSERVED IN CASE AT BAR. The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the relocation survey. We agree with the appellee that the appellants are now estopped on this issue because they themselves prayed in the stipulation of facts that the findings of the geodetic engineer would be bases for the decision of the court of first instance. We see no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion, in the lower courts' findings that the house of the Torcinos encroached on the lot of Victoriano Bulacan. DECISION GUTIERREZ, JR., J : The issue before us is whether or not a complaint for forcible entry and detainer should be dismissed by a municipal court on the ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar to sign and file it for him. A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino Torcino and Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed by Nicolas Nues, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff" but was verified by the plaintiff-appellee himself. The verification reads: "I, VICTORIANO BULACAN, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of Baybay, Leyte after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law thereby depose and say: "That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that I have caused the above complaint to be prepared by Nicolas P. Nues, Jr. and that I have voluntarily asked, sought and requested his aid to file, claim, prosecute, and defend in court my civil case against the defendants Faustino Torcino et al or others in connection with this case at the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte;
p

that I have read and known the contents thereon and the allegations therein are true and correct to my own knowledge. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte. s/VICTORIANO BULACAN t/VICTORIANO BULACAN Plaintiff. "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan with his Res. Cert. No. A-930280 dated Aug. 4, 1972 issued at Baybay, Leyte. s/NICOLAS P. NUES, JR t/NICOLAS P. NUES, JR. Notary Public Until December 31st, 1972. "Doc. No. 344 "Page No. 56 "Book No. VII "Series of 1972" When the defendants-appellants filed their answer, they did not question the fact that the complaint was signed by Nicolas Nues, Jr. On February 10, 1973, the municipal court issued the following order: "The contending parties are given one week time to submit the proposed compromise agreement in connection with his case. "Failure to do so will constrain this court to render judgment on the basis of the ocular inspection conducted sometime on December, 1972." Due to the failure of the parties to settle their case amicably, the court rendered a decision ordering the Torcinos to demolish and remove the portion of their house which was illegally constructed on the land of the plaintiff. The municipal court stated that there is no doubt that Victoriano Bulacan is the owner and has been in possession of Lot No. 5998 and that the lot of the defendants-appellants is on the eastern portion of said lot. The court found that the Torcinos constructed a residential house which unfortunately encroached on the lot of the plaintiff. The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Leyte. On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and therefore must be considered as sham and false. Four days later, another motion to dismiss the complaint was filed with the additional discussion that the fact that the complaint is verified, does not in itself cure the defect obtaining in the complaint. On September 24, 1973, appellee Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the motion to dismiss was not filed on time and the defenses therein were not pleaded in the answer in the municipal court and therefore, are deemed waived
llcd LLphil

and may not be raised for the first time on appeal in the Court of First Instance. The opposition also stated that the complaint substantially conforms to the Rule. On September 24, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. On December 7, 1973, when the case was called for continuance, the parties presented to the court a stipulation of facts which states and which we quote verbatim: "COME NOW, the plaintiff and the defendants duly assisted by their respective counsel and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submits the following stipulation of facts, to wit: "1.That the plaintiff and the defendants hereby agree to relocate the defendants' land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-8133 which is hereto attached. "2.That should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that the present construction particularly the wallings is beyond the lot of the said defendants as defined and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8133 then the defendants will remove any portion of the wallings that maybe inside the land of the plaintiff and vacate from the premises encroached. However, should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that the walling constructed by the defendants does not encroach even an inch on the land of the plaintiff then the plaintiff hereby agrees to the dismissal of the present case. "3.That should the Geodetic Engineer finds out that the defendants has encroach the land of the plaintiff the defendants will be the one who will pay for the services of the Geodetic Engineer and should the findings be that no encroachment were made by the defendants, then the plaintiff should shoulder the expenses of the relocation survey. "4.That parties hereby agree that Geodetic Engineer Jaime Kudera be appointed by the Honorable Court to conduct and execute the relocation survey. "5.That plaintiff and defendants hereby agree to waive the claims and counterclaims for damages. "WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court renders judgment on the basis of the above stipulation of facts." The stipulation of facts was signed by plaintiff Victoriano Bulacan, his new counsel Atty. Diego A. Cala, defendants Faustino and Felipa Torcino, and their counsel Gerardo A. Pabello. The court issued an order directing surveyor Jaime Kudera to conduct the relocation work on the basis of the stipulation. On December 17, 1983, Kudera submitted his report and on the basis of his findings, the Court of First Instance of Leyte affirmed the decision of the municipal court. The defendants appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and assigned two errors:
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I THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. II THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT ON THE DECISION APPEALED FROM. The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 7, 1976 certified the appeal to us on the ground that no testimonial or oral evidence was presented by the parties and, therefore, no factual matters are in issue in the appeal. We affirm the decision of the lower court. The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed not by the plaintiff but by one who was not a member of the bar and who designated himself merely as "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff." The appellants argue that the municipal court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. They invoke Section 5, Rule 7 which states: SEC. 5.Signature and address. Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken out as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted. (Emphasis supplied) Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 34.By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar." (Emphasis supplied) The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked
LLpr

by the Torcinos applies only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal court. In the case of Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr. (126 SCRA 190) we decided a similar issue and allowed the appearance of two senior law students as friends of the complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan to prosecute the case before the sala of Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the Municipal Court of Paraaque. Similarly, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe (55 Phil. 621) a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the City Court of Manila. Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent. In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In the verification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had caused Mr. Nues to conduct the litigation and to sign the complaint in his behalf, indicating his awareness that Nues is not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the pleading to be admitted rather than dismissed. As the lower court has cited: "So it has been held that, where a pleading is not signed by the attorney as required, but is verified by the party, substantial rights have not been affected and the defect may be disregarded as against a motion to strike." (71 C.J.S. 954-955) Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure must be liberally construed so as to protect the rights and interests of the parties. As we stated in Paulino v. Court of Appeals (80 SCRA 257): xxx xxx xxx ". . . pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided . . ." The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the relocation survey. We agree with the appellee that the appellants are now estopped on this issue because they themselves prayed in the stipulation of facts that the findings of the geodetic engineer would be bases for the decision of the court of first instance. We see no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion, in the lower courts' findings that the house of the Torcinos encroached on the lot of Victoriano Bulacan. WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Actg. C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ.,

concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23467. March 27, 1968.] AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER, for Himself and as General President, ATTY. JOSE UR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents. Jose Ur. Carbonell and for and in his own behalf as petitioner. Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent. SYLLABUS 1.ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEY'S FEES; DISPUTE MERELY INCIDENTAL TO A MAIN CIR CASE; CIR HAS JURISDICTION. The CIR has authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorney's fees, where as in this case, the said controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. This is so, because once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto. 2.ID.; ID.; INVALIDITY OF AGREEMENT THAT UNION PRESIDENT SHOULD SHARE IN THE ATTORNEYS' FEES. The alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys' fees is immoral. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. 3.ID.; ID.; STIPULATED FEES MUST NOT BE EXCESSIVE; DUTY OF COURT. Because of the inequality of the situations between lawyers and laborers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of attorney's fees based solely on contracts. Contracts for legal services between laborer and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former. Considering the circumstances of this case the 30% stipulated attorneys' fee is excessive. An award of 25% is reasonable. DECISION SANCHEZ, J : Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70ULP-Cebu. The background facts are as follows: On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager;
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Gonzalo Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent; and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its president. Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated June 30, 1956 and July 6, 1956), 2 respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957, answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed their answer dated July 12, 1957. With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial commissioner . At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared and testified. Two of these ten were permanent (regular) employees of respondent company; the remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and Brigido Casas. On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered judgment, which provides, inter alia that the two regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of seniority and other benefits which should have accrued to them had they not been illegally dismissed, with full back wages from the time of their said dismissals up to the time of their actual reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in the meantime," and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted to their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company (Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the period of their lay-off." Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962. The judgment became final. Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to determine the actual money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its Examining Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the backwages due the ten complainants. On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back wages due the ten complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on September 24, 1963. In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in the same case CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu a "Notice of Attorney's Lien." He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case 70-ULP-Cebu "since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel

thereof that he "had actually rendered legal services to the laborers who are subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to give [him], representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into consideration the length of services he rendered and the nature of the work actually performed by him." On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which in part reads: "3.That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on February 3, 1956, had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel herein, representing his Attorney's fees on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever money claims that may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement, in the local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English language are hereto attached as annexes 'A' 'A-l' hereof; 4.That subsequently thereafter, when the above entitled Case was already decided in their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are also Complainants in this Case begged from the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%) although the latter's actual services rendered was so insignificant thereof; 5.That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the President of said Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon in 1956." On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and dismissal thru a union board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective February 28, 1963. On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds for his discharge specified in the board resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated contract for attorneys' fees. On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and complainants' motions for reconsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien.

Judge Martinez' order reads in part: "(b)Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as attorney's fees; xxx xxx xxx "(d)The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the respondent company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez, and he may collect the same from the Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this order, subject to existing auditing procedure; . . ." Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4 On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order with respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to determine the matter in question, and that the award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en banc. On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964. On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the motion of June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the Cashier of the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81 representing attorneys' fees and deducting therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit. Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the ten employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court. 1.Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction. These arguments are devoid of merit. The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And, it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto. 5 Expressive of the rule on this point is this "4.It is well settled that: 'A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual

incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court has power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even though the court may thus be called upon to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as original causes of action. 'While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In re Stingers' Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136-138.) Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958, and Serrano vs. Serrano L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the court having jurisdiction over the main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise, be outside its competence." 6 To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court which renders the judgment 8 And, it has been observed that "[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or where money has been paid into court, is for the attorney to file an intervening petition and have the amount and extent of his lien judicially determined." 9 Appropriately to be recalled at this point is the recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967 A Phild. 142, 141, January 30, 1967, where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court of Industrial Relations obviously had jurisdiction over the main cases, . . . it likewise had full jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorney's fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 10

2.The parties herein join hands in one point the ten (10) successful complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22). They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees. Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30% attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and one of the 10 successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25% since "they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3, 1956 before the 48 employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of whatever amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract was signed only by 8 of the 10 winning claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union intervene in the signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract only after the receipt of the decision. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered into by the union and its officers thru its President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees shall be divided equally ("share and share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the union president. After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys' fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution of the above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of Attorney's Lien. 3.We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the attorney's fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. 4.A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit "should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." 11 Lately, we said: 12 "The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the same

is unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this jurisdiction . . . xxx xxx xxx Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe et al. vs. Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action is between the debtor and the creditor, and not between attorney and client. As courts have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract, is valid, Bachrach vs.Golingco, 39 Phil. 138." In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other successful complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the long period of time that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this judicial antidote. The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to assume that they have not reached an educational attainment comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers. Because of the inequality of the situation between laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely on contracts. 14 For, as in the present case, the real objective of the CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the complainant laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from service. While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them, still lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be paid to the laborers is not a windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow. Contracts for legal services between laborer and attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former. 5.An examination of the record of this case will readily show that an award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably compensates the whole of the legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after

all, they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the proceedings reveal the existence of an association between said attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common effort of the two. It cannot be denied though that most of those pleadings up to judgment were signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by respondent Fernandez. We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez and Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962, complained to CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor to inform him about the incidents of this case." He there requested that he be furnished "separately copies of the decision of the court and other pleadings and subsequent orders as well as motions in connection with the case." Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift in their professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" was also registered in the same court. Although filed under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other pleadings that were fled later were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of the court battle was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes to the legal services also rendered by Atty. Carbonell. For, important and numerous too, were his services. And, they are not negligible. The conclusion is inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein. As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR. 6.We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the event payment actually was made, he should be required to return whatever is in excess of the amount to which he is entitled in line with the opinion expressed herein. 15 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 10, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby remanded to the Court of

Industrial Relations with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys' fees for both. No costs. So Ordered. Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6589. December 19, 2005.] EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, complainant, vs. ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR., respondent. DECISION TINGA, J : In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October 1997, 1 Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyer's oath and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or willingly performed, promoted, or sued a groundless, false or unlawful suit, and/or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly showed disrespect to the Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) employed unlawful and illegal means to attain his ends. According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique. 2 The case was decided in favor of complainant and her co-plaintiffs, with the decision of the trial court having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and defendant's petition for certiorari denied by this Court. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondent, with his co-defendants, subsequently entered the disputed property and harvested the palay planted thereon. 3Plaintiffs were prompted to move that defendants be declared in contempt of court because of their "open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon, Jr. who is an officer of the court". 4 On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his co-defendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month imprisonment and fine. 5Subsequently, on 26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants were ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each. 6 In his Answer to Complaint dated 2 March 1998, respondent denied complainant's allegations and claimed that said complaint was a form of harassment. 7 Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of complainant. Finally, on 9 December 1998, a hearing for the reception of complainant's evidence was conducted. 8 While notices were
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subsequently sent to respondent setting the case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to respondent's failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence. 9 In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that respondent's actions with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case, were not within the bounds of law. Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of "willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same," 10 he added. Thus, according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondent's liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. 11 Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to respondent's contumacious acts are final and conclusive, respondent was found to have committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities." In Zaldivar v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, 12 it was held that the power to discipline a member of the Bar and the power to cite him for contempt are not mutually exclusive but are concurrent. Furthermore, the Report noted respondent's moves to thwart the instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: (i) his attempt to mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative to the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been terminated; (ii) his placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and (iii) failure to notify the Commission of his change of address. 13 Finding, however, that the penalty of disbarment would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the Commission recommended instead the penalty of suspension for one month. 14 As explained in the Report: A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to be contumacious is a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional attachment to the property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondent's subsequent acts, however, including those which were found to be contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month. 15 On 30 July 2004, the IBP passed a resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation, to wit: RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-376 CBD Case No. 510 Epifania Q. Bantolo vs.

Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial court which pertains to a second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month. The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken. Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. 16 Such is the situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyer's contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually punished by the lower courts. A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts 17 and to show respect to their processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him. 18 Respondent's defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 19 In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a month's suspension
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from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Jr. is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent's suspension is effective upon notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED. Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
cCSEaA

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004.] NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order." 1 In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Hueysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainant's custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, "James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al." Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant's residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. 2 Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent. Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give
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custody of their children to respondent. In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate court's resolution/order. 3 In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others. In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning. On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition 4 for the issuance of a writ ofhabeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals' Resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 5 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued. At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney's oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals' Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privilege granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country. After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBPCommission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. 6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission with the

modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years. The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals. In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious Resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, 7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. 8 Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility states: CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 9The lawyer's arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. 10 By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. Respondent's actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They
CaDEAT

constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 27.Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcunaand Tinga, JJ., concur.
TSEcAD

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120074. June 10, 1997.] LEAH P. ADORIO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City , respondent, PHILIP SEE, intervenor. King & Adorio Law Offices for petitioner. Ongkiko, Kalaw, Manhit, Acorda, Panga & Velasco Law Offices for intervenor. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; REQUESTS BY A PARTY FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS DO NOT REQUIRE NOTICE TO THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE ACTION. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, there was nothing "irregular" in the issuance of the subpoenas duces tecum. Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties to the action. No violation of due process results by such lack of notice since the other parties would have ample opportunity to examine the witnesses and documents subpoenaed once they are presented in court. 2.ID.; ID.; TRIAL; ORDER OF TRIAL; DEFENSE NOT PRECLUDE FROM PROCURING SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM DURING THE TIME OF THE

PROSECUTION'S PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES. Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases does not preclude the defense from procuring subpoenas duces tecum during the time of the prosecution's presentation of evidence. In this case, counsel for the accused felt that he needed the documents subject of the subpoenas for his crossexamination of the prosecution witnesses. Accordingly, respondent judge called a recess to enable said counsel to secure said documents from the bank officials. The order of trial was not in any way altered; counsel for the accused did not even attempt to call any of the bank officials to the stand. Under these circumstances, the resulting delay cannot be considered unreasonable nor "IRREGULAR". 3.LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; PETITIONER'S STATEMENT TENDS TO BRING THE AUTHORITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF LAW INTO DISRESPECT AND CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner's allegation that the proceedings before the trial court were "irregular" therefore lacks basis. Such statement, when read with petitioner's remark that the so-called irregularities "show the accused's control over the court and court procedure," is nothing short of contemptuous. The latter statement is particularly alarming for it implies that court proceedings are a mere farce, and the court a mere stooge, a marionette subject to the manipulation of the opposing party. It suggests that the judge was moved by consideration other than his sense of justice and fair play thereby calling into question the integrity and independence of the court. Such statement tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect and constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically: CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. . . . Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having no materiality to the case. Consequently, we rule that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt. 4.ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT; PENALTY IMPOSED IS TOO SEVERE; CASE AT BAR. We find the penalty imposed by respondent Judge upon petitioner too severe. Punishment in contempt cases are meted on a corrective principle to vindicate the authority and dignity of the courts and the administration of justice. Accordingly, we reduce the same to a fine of P200.00. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE THAT IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE THE JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT SHALL AFFECT EVEN THOSE ACCUSED WHO DID NOT APPEAL INSOFAR AS SAID JUDGMENT IS FAVORABLE AND APPLICABLE TO THEM; BY ANALOGY, SAID RULE SHOULD APPLY IN CONTEMPT CASES; CASE AT BAR While petitioner's client, Philip G. See, did not question the contempt
CEDHTa ESTCHa

order against him his motion for intervention and the accompanying motion for issuance of clarificatory order merely questioned the scope of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court the reduction of the penalty in favor of his former counsel should likewise benefit him. Under the rules of criminal procedure, the judgment of the appellate court shall affect even those accused who did not appeal insofar as said judgment is favorable and applicable to them. By analogy, this rule should apply in contempt cases. Contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense, and the mode of procedure in contempt proceedings is assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. DECISION KAPUNAN, J : This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to set aside the Order of Judge Lucas P. Bersamin 1 dated May 5, 1995 insofar as it holds petitioner in direct contempt and sentences her therefor. The dispositive portion of said order reads: WHEREFORE, the Motion For Inhibition And For Re-raffle Of Cases is hereby granted. The complainant Philip See y Go and his former private prosecutor, Atty. Leah P. Adorio, of the King & Adorio Law Offices, with address at No. 40 Landargun Street, Quezon City, are hereby found guilty of direct contempt of this Court for disrespect to the Court and its Presiding Judge and are accordingly sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) days in the City Jail of Quezon City and to pay a fine of P200.00 each. For the purpose of the execution of their sentence, complainant Philip See y Go and Atty. Leah P. Adorio are hereby directed to appear in person before the Court on May 23, 1995 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Pending execution of the sentence, the transmittal of the records to the Honorable Executive Judge, through the Office of the Clerk of Court, for purposes of re-raffle shall be held in abeyance. SO ORDERED. 2 Petitioner was counsel for Philip G. See, the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-55933 to Q-94-55957 involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22 pending before the sala of respondent Judge. 3 Pre-trial in these cases was concluded on January 16, 1995. Upon agreement of the parties, trial on the merits was set on March 8, 15 and 22, all at 8:30 a.m. 4 Unknown to petitioner, counsel for the accused filed several requests addressed to the Branch Clerk of Court for the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum requiring officials of several banks to bring before the court on March 8, 1995 at 8:30 a.m., microfilm copies of various checks. The subpoenasduces tecum were issued on February 6, 7 and 14, 1995. 5 On March 8, 1995, which petitioner supposed to be the date of the presentation
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of the prosecution's evidence, petitioner came to court and was surprised by the presence of the bank officials therein. 6 During the hearing, respondent Judge called for a recess to enable counsel for the accused to confer with the bank officers. 7 When the case was again called, the following arguments took place: Atty. Adorio: Before we call our witness, your honor, may I now make of record that I was surprised with the move this morning of all the bank officers, I was not informed about any request for subpoena to the bank officers today. No copy of such request was given to the Private Prosecutor. And I also notice, your honor, that the subpoena or rather no copy issued by this court was ever given to the private prosecutor. Atty. Rivera knows, he had already entered his appearance and he knows my address, why did he not furnish me a copy of his request for subpoena, your honor, considering that I have the right to examine his request, the materiality of his request. I would like also to make of record, your honor, why they keep it as a secret, as a rule, the opposing party must be a party to whatever paper the other party may file, it seems that Atty. Rivera is hiding something from us. Whatever he wants to ask the Court, I am entitled to know. Atty. Rivera: I don't think there is a reason or there is a need to be furnished with my request for subpoena, that is the reason why she was not furnished, your honor. Besides, my request for subpoena this morning is not a litigated motion. I made this request for advance in order that, when the defense turn to present evidence, it won't be delayed because of non-availability of these exhibits. Atty. Adorio: This is our day of presenting evidence, your honor. This is only my observation, your honor and may I request Atty. Rivera to give us all copies he submits to the Court. Atty. Rivera: May I request for particular rule for that. . . . Atty. Adorio: Your honor, copies must be given to the opposing counsel, there is a ruling on that your honor. . . . Atty. Rivera: This is not a litigated motion your honor. Court: What is the problem of Atty. Adorio? Atty. Adorio: My only observation, your honor. And may I request Atty. Rivera to give us all copies he submits to the Court. Atty. Rivera:

May I request for that particular rule for furnishing request for subpoena to the other counsel, your honor. . . . Court: What is this rule, will you cite the rule so that we can examine your protest you are insinuating to the Court that there was something here, we don't even know the request for subpoena. If anyone of my staff is . . . towards the other side, you call me I can discipline them. . . . Atty. Adorio: There was an instance, your honor, when this case was called by the Clerk for arraignment, the Clerk would say that the accused would be coming. And one time, your honor, the Court already issued an Order of arrest, and it was already past 10:00 o'clock in the morning when the accused arrived. . . . 8 Petitioner was apparently referring to an incident that allegedly occurred on July 13, 1994, the date set for the accused's arraignment. According to petitioner, the accused failed to appear in court on said date even after the third call at around 11:00 a.m. Consequently, the Court ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the confiscation/cancellation of the accused's bail bond. The clerk in charge of the record then went to the door separating the courtroom and the staff's office and whispered to someone in the office. After two minutes, the same clerk again rose from her seat, went back to the door, and announced to the Court that the accused would be late. Respondent Judge replied that the Court will wait for the accused. 9 However, on March 8, 1995, Philip See allegedly examined the record but found that the incidents which purportedly transpired during the arraignment were not reflected therein. 10 The above revelations by Atty. Adorio prompted the following response from respondent Judge: Court: Will you call everybody, all the staff inside . . . and you point to me who is that . . .? If you want me to be disqualified in these cases, you make it in writing. You file your motion to inhibit, I will disqualify myself because I don't want to hear such accusations. Any participation of my staff which I am now parading before you . . . I don't like that kind of accusation. Atty. Rivera: I will join the court. Court: Order As prayed for, the private prosecutor is hereby directed to file a Request for inhibition in writing stating the grounds. Pending consideration of the Request for Inhibition, hearing is hereby suspended.

So ordered. 11 Pursuant to said order, petitioner filed a "Motion for Inhibition and for Re-Raffle of Cases" in behalf of her client, alleging that: The filing of the request for issuance of subpoena duces tecum and the issuance of the subpoena without notice on the private prosecutor were irregular for the following reasons: [a]The pre-trial of the case had been terminated and the evidence for the prosecution was scheduled to be heard on March 8, 1995. Thus, it was plaintiff's turn to present evidence. Whatever request defendant wanted to make with the court which would affect the right of the plaintiff to present evidence on the date scheduled would therefore be of notice to private prosecutor so that no surprises would result and so that plaintiff could also prepare questions for these bank officers involved and make use of their presence. [b]The act of the Court in issuing the subpoena for the bank officers to testify on March 8, 1995 upon request of the defendant when it was not yet his turn to present evidence is disruptive of orderly court procedure and shows bias on the part of the court. It shows the control of the accused over the court and court procedure. [c]This control was also manifest on July 13, 199[4], when accused was scheduled for arraignment, when the latter failed to appear before the court despite the third call at about 11:00 a.m. The Court then issued an Order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the confiscation/cancellation of the bail bond. After this Order was given orally in open court, the clerk who took charge of the records went to the door between the sala and the office and whispered something to someone in the office. After about two minutes, the same clerk again rose from her seat and went back to the door and thereafter, she announced to the Court that the accused would be late and the accused would be arriving. The Court then said that it will wait, if Alvin Tan is coming. It is puzzling how the clerk knew that Alvin Tan would be coming when he was not even present in court. However, none of these facts appeared in the Order or in the Constancia. 12 Petitioner prayed that (1) the judge inhibit himself from hearing the criminal cases; (2) said cases be re-raffled to another court; and (3) the hearing of said cases be suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Inhibition. 13 The trial court granted said motion in an Order dated May 5, 1995. In the same order, declared petitioner and her client, in direct contempt. He explained thus: The imputation that the Court has come under the control of the accused on account of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum upon his request but without notice to the complainant or the public prosecutor is most unfair and disrespectful to the Court and is a highly irresponsible accusation on the part of the private complainant and the private prosecutor (who had meanwhile withdrawn from the case). The

issuance of a subpoena at a party's instance is not subject to prior or simultaneous notice to the adverse party of the request therefor, for, such notice is not required by the Rules of Court. The grounds for disqualification are unworthy of any consideration. The questioning by the private prosecutor of the issuance of the subpoena is unfounded and due to a misplaced sense of procedural requirements. xxx xxx xxx As far as the text and language of the motion are concerned, the Court considers them to be irresponsible and disrespectful especially the accusation that the Court had come under the control of the accused and had committed an irregularity of procedure. These statements amount to an unmitigatedly disrespectful attitude towards the Court and its Presiding Judge. They also display the dangerous tendencies of a party and counsel who probably think of themselves as beyond reproach. There is therefore no recourse but to find both the complainant and his former private prosecutor guilty of direct contempt. 14 On May 22, 1995, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. This Court, in a Resolution dated June 5, 1995, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Judge from enforcing the impugned order. A perusal of the trial court's order reveals that what respondent judge found particularly contemptuous were petitioner's statements in her motion alleging that (1) the issuance of the subpoenas duces tecum was irregular; and (2) the court and court procedure were subject to the "control" of the accused. Whether or not these statements constitute direct contempt is the issue which confronts this Court. We rule in the affirmative. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, there was nothing "irregular" in the issuance of the subpoenas duces tecum. Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties to the action. No violation of due process results by such lack of notice since the other parties would have ample opportunity to examine the witnesses and documents subpoenaed once they are presented in court. 15 Petitioner however argues that: On March 8, 1995, the prosecution was scheduled to present its first witness, the private complainant, Philip See, after a very long pre-trial period which started sometime in September 1994. The regular [as against the 'irregular'] procedure would have been for the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of evidence pursuant to Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The prosecution was not, however, able to move along, due to the presence of numerous bank officials from various banks who appeared pursuant to the subpoenas issued to them by the
cdasia

court. Moreover, the person who requested for the subpoena was the counsel for the accused. The regular or usual procedure would have been for the subpoena to be issued during the pre-trial stage or during the time that the defense is presenting its evidence and not during the time of presentation of evidence by the prosecution as what happened in this case. We do not find any merit in petitioner's contentions. Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases does not preclude the defense from procuring subpoenas duces tecum during the time of the prosecution's presentation of evidence. In this case, counsel for the accused felt that he needed the documents subject of the subpoenas for his crossexamination of the prosecution witnesses. Accordingly, respondent judge called a recess to enable said counsel to secure said documents from the bank officials. The order of trial was not in any way altered; counsel for the accused did not even attempt to call any of the bank officials to the stand. Under these circumstances, the resulting delay cannot be considered unreasonable nor "irregular ." Nor do we find anything "irregular" in the accused's arraignment. As counsel for the accused points out: . . . the fact that the Presiding Judge issued a warrant of arrest and ordered the cancellation of the accused's bond shows that he gives no special favor to the accused. And it is of common knowledge that orders like that are easily reconsidered/lifted even for excuses like traffic, ill health or failure to remember the hearing. The fact that the Presiding Judge opted to wait for the accused upon information that the latter is coming only shows that he was very aware of the common practice. Waiting saved so much of the court's and parties' time as it did away with the usual motion for reconsideration and the necessity for a resetting. . . . Court personnels [sic], practitioners and even judges know, of course that it is not uncommon for litigants, especially those coming for trial late, to call the court's office by phone. It is likewise not uncommon for litigants who follows-up [sic] matters in the office (like bailbonds, [sic] release of rulings, etc.) to get acquainted with or even become friends of court clerks, secretaries, typists, stenographers or sheriffs, in the office. . . . Besides, if the plaintiff found it necessary to have those matters stated in the Order or placed on record, there were two (2) lawyers (the private and the public prosecutors) who could have stood up and made the proper manifestations or requests. But that incident happened way back 13 July 1994 and it is only now, in their motion of 15 March 1995, that they mention the same in their vain attempt to create an issue on the impartiality and fairness of the Presiding Judge. . . . 16

Petitioner's allegation that the proceedings before the trial court were "irregular" therefore lacks basis. Such statement, when read with petitioner's remark that the so-called irregularities "show the accused's control over the court and court procedure," is nothing short of contemptuous. The latter statement is particularly alarming for it implies that court proceedings are a mere farce, and the court a mere stooge, a marionette subject to the manipulation of the opposing party. It suggests that the judge was moved by considerations other than his sense of justice and fair play thereby calling into question the integrity and independence of the court. Such statement tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect and constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically: CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. xxx xxx xxx Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having no materiality to the case. Consequently, we rule that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt. However, we find the penalty imposed by respondent Judge upon petitioner too severe. Punishment in contempt cases are meted on a corrective principle to vindicate the authority and dignity of the courts and the administration of justice. 17 Accordingly, we reduce the same to a fine of P200.00. While petitioner's client, Philip G. See, did not question the contempt order against him his motion for intervention and the accompanying motion for issuance of clarificatory order merely questioned the scope of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court the reduction of the penalty in favor of his former counsel should likewise benefit him. Under the rules of criminal procedure, the judgment of the appellate court shall affect even those accused who did not appeal insofar as said judgment is favorable and applicable to them. 18 By analogy, this rule should apply in contempt cases. Contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense, 19 and the mode of procedure in contempt proceedings is assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. 20 WHEREFORE, the Order dated May 5, 1995 issued by respondent Judge is MODIFIED in that the penalty of imprisonment for Two (2) Days and a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) imposed on petitioner Leah Adorio and intervenor Philip See is REDUCED to a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) only. The Temporary Restraining Order is LIFTED and Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-55933 to Q-94-55957 is ordered re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur. Padilla, J ., is on leave.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-36800. October 21, 1974.] JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent. ESGUERRA, J : DECISION Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Taada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit. Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar. As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool"), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs. Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Taada, but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. 46504R. The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the
p

ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and, instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages. It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will be interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines." The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers

as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice. The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Division into reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance. We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973): "A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's) reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New." This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law. Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277) was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his

complaint, apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction. To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court. Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgmenttherein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800. Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation. At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G.

R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous statements. The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica, "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision. On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed. To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that ". . . , he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He would hove followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied) This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. It contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R. Our resolution of September 4, 1913, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are

rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies." Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification (as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an allconsuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong. When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision. In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has

decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases." It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote: "The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot he civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon". While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar, he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case. With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolved, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients. To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that be is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our

democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595). As We stated before: "We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the timehonored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility. . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive" (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445) Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C.J.S. 7) We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said: "As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice" (Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C.F.I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 O. G. 6150) As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and

the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals. It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances. For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed. Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar, for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.).

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law. SO ORDERED. Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Fernando, J., did not take part.

THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045. January 19, 2010.] OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE HARUN B. ISMAEL, respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J : On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22, presided over by respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael. The judicial audit resulted in the issuance of a memorandum dated June 9, 2005 by the Office of Court Administrator (OCA) 1 directing respondent to explain his failure to decide and act on current and inherited cases, as well as to resolve incidents in various cases pending before him, within the reglementary period provided by law. 2 Respondent was likewise directed to inform the OCA if cases already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided or resolved within the reglementary period. 3 Consequently, respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing cases in his sala and confine himself to deciding or resolving cases submitted for decision or resolution. In respondent's stead, Judge Edilberto G. Absin was directed to handle active cases, other than cases submitted for decision, until respondent could comply with the directives or until he retired. The OCA likewise directed Atty. Insor A. Pantaran to explain the results of the audit, as was required of respondent. Atty. Pantaran was the clerk of court of the RTC of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22 during respondent's tenure. Atty. Pantaran complied with the June 9, 2005 memorandum in a letter dated May 19, 2006. 4 In its memorandum dated February 26, 2007, 5 the OCA noted that respondent failed to fully comply with its directives in the June 9, 2005 memorandum. Neither did he ask for extensions of time within which to comply with the subject directives. On examination of Atty. Pantaran's May 19, 2006 letter/compliance, the OCA found that respondent had partially complied with the directives of the June 9, 2005 memorandum, having already decided or resolved some of the cases he was directed to act on. Nonetheless, the OCA established that respondent committed gross inefficiency when he unduly delayed actions in a huge number of cases. The OCA recommended that respondent be fined P20,000.
p ETHaDC

Furthermore, the OCA recommended that Judge Absin be directed to decide and resolve the cases pending in respondent's sala. The OCA likewise directed the designation of Judge Loreto C. Quinto 6 as assisting judge. The factual findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, we vary the penalty imposed in the light of the circumstances of the case. It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency 7 and is not excusable. It is a less serious charge 8 and is punishable by either suspension from office without salaries and benefits for not less than one month but not more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. 9 The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. 10 Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code 11 admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases 12 within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. 13 We emphasize that the administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. 14 As aptly held in Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco:15 A judge's foremost consideration is the administration of justice. Thus, he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. . . . Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. It also undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. Decision making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a member of the bench. (citations omitted) Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, 16 this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar. 17 Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 18 and 12 19 as well as Rules 1.03 20 and 12.04 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he is FINED in the amount of P20,000. Respondent is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount of P10,000. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
SIaHTD

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4955. September 12, 2011.] ANTONIO CONLU, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRENEO

AREDONIA, JR., respondent. RESOLUTION VELASCO, JR., J : Before the Court is a complaint 1 for disbarment with a prayer for damages instituted by Antonio Conlu (Antonio) against Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. (Atty. Ireneo) on grounds of gross negligence and dereliction of sworn duty. Antonio was the defendant in Civil Case No. 1048, a suit for Quieting of Title and Recovery of a Parcel of Land commenced before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Silay City, Negros Occidental. 2 He engaged the services of Atty. Ireneo to represent him in the case. On March 16, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment 3 adverse to Antonio. Therefrom, Atty. Ireneo, for Antonio, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) whereat the recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. The CA, per its Resolution of February 10, 1997, eventually dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the appellant's brief within the reglementary period. Antonio got wind of the dismissal from his wife who verified the status of the case when she happened to be in Manila. When confronted about the dismissal action, Atty. Ireneo promised to seek reconsideration, which he did, but which the appellate court later denied for belated filing of the motion. In that motion 4 he prepared and filed, Atty. Ireneo averred receiving the adverted February 10, 1997 CA Resolution 5 only on April 25, 1997, adding in this regard that the person in the law office who initially received a copy of said resolution was not so authorized. However, the CA denied the motion for having been filed out of time. As the CA would declare in a subsequent resolution dated December 3, 1997, there was a valid receipt by Atty. Ireneo, as shown by the registry return card with his signature, of a copy of the CA's February 10, 1997 Resolution. Accordingly, as the CA wrote, the motion for reconsideration of the February resolution which bore the mailing date May 8, 1997 cannot but be considered as filed way out of time. In light of these successive setbacks, a disgusted Antonio got the case records back from Atty. Ireneo and personally filed on October 13, 1997 another motion for reconsideration. By Resolution of December 3, 1997, the CA again denied 6 this motion for the reason that the prejudicial impact of the belated filing by his former counsel of the first motion for reconsideration binds Antonio. Forthwith, Antonio elevated his case to the Court on a petition for certiorari but the Court would later dismiss the petition and his subsequent motion to reconsider the denial. Such was the state of things when Antonio lodged this instant administrative case for disbarment with a prayer for damages. To support his claim for damages, Antonio asserts having suffered sleepless nights, mental torture and anguish as a result of Atty. Ireneo's erring ways, besides which Antonio also lost
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a valuable real property subject of Civil Case No. 1048. Following Atty. Ireneo's repeated failure to submit, as ordered, his comment, a number of extensions of time given notwithstanding, 7 the Court referred the instant case, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4955, to its Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Acting on OBC's Report and Recommendation 8 dated November 23, 2000, the Court, by Resolution of January 31, 2001, directed Atty. Ireneo to show cause within ten (10) days from notice later successively extended via Resolutions dated July 16 and 29, 2002 why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment and to comply with the filing of it. In separate resolutions, the Court (a) imposed on Atty. Ireneo a fine of PhP2,000; 9 (b) ordered his arrest but which the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) cannot effect for the reason: "whereabouts unknown"; 10 (c) considered him as having waived his right to file comment; and (d) referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report, investigation and recommendation. 11 At the IBP, Atty. Ireneo desisted from addressing his administrative case, his desistance expressed by not attending the mandatory conference or filing the required position paper. On the basis of the pleadings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Ireneo liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.03 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with warning. The salient portions of the investigating commissioner's Report and Recommendation 12 read as follows: Uncontroverted and uncontested are respondent's inability to file appellant's Brief, his futile attempts to mislead the Court of Appeals that he did not personally received [sic] the resolution of dismissal. His filing of the Motion for Reconsideration five (5) months late. [sic] Aggravated by his failure to file his comment in the instant administrative complaint despite his numerous motions for extension to file the same. [sic] He is even adamant to comply with the show cause order of the bar confidant. The series of snobbish actuations in several resolution of the Supreme Court enjoining him to make the necessary pleading. [sic] By Resolution No. XVIII-2008-523, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and recommendation of the CBD. 13 We agree with the inculpatory findings of the IBP but not as to the level of the penalty it recommended. Res ipsa loquitur. Atty. Ireneo had doubtless been languid in the performance of his duty as Antonio's counsel. He neglected, without reason, to file the appellant's brief before the CA. He failed, in short, to exert his utmost ability and to give his full commitment to maintain and defend Antonio's right. Antonio, by choosing Atty. Ireneo to represent him, relied upon and reposed his trust and
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confidence on the latter, as his counsel, to do whatsoever was legally necessary to protect Antonio's interest, if not to secure a favorable judgment. Once they agree to take up the cause of a client, lawyers, regardless of the importance of the subject matter litigated or financial arrangements agreed upon, owe fidelity to such cause and should always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on them. 14 And to add insult to injury, Atty. Ireneo appeared not to have taken any effort to personally apprise Antonio of the dismissal of the appeal, however personally embarrassing the cause for the dismissal might have been. As mentioned earlier, Antonio came to know about the outcome of his appeal only after his wife took the trouble of verifying the case status when she came to Manila. By then, all remedies had been lost. It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty. 15 The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. 16 This default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively providing: CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. As if his lack of candor in his professional relationship with Antonio was not abhorrent enough, Atty. Ireneo tried to mislead the appellate court about the receipt of a copy of its February 10, 1997 Resolution dismissing the appeal in CAG.R. CV No. 50075. He denied personally receiving such copy, but the CA found and declared that he himself received said copy. The CA arrived at this conclusion thru the process of comparing Atty. Ireneo's signature appearing in the pleadings with that in the registry return card. Both signatures belong to one and the same person. Needless to stress, Atty. Ireneo had under the premises indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01, which provide: CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL

PROCEDURES. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxx xxx xxx CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. (Emphasis supplied.) We cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty. Ireneo's defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its resolution to file his comment on the basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less than three (3) extensions of time to file his comment, he simply closed, so to speak, communication lines. And when ordered to give an explanation through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-day extension. But the required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed the NBI to arrest him, he just left his last known address and could not be located. The Court's patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyer's impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect, courtesy and such other becoming conduct so essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial and speedy justice. What Atty. Ireneo has done was the exact opposite. What is clear to the Court by now is that Ireneo was determined all along not to submit a comment and, in the process, delay the resolution of the instant case. By asking several extensions of time to submit one, but without the intention to so submit, Ireneo has effectively trifled with the Court's processes, if not its liberality. This cannot be tolerated. It cannot be allowed to go unpunished, if the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice is to be maintained. And to be sure, Atty. Ireneo can neither defeat this Court's jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. 17 Manifestly, he has fallen short of the diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. xxx xxx xxx Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
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execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes. (Emphasis supplied.) A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct or for transgressions defined by the rules as grounds to strip a lawyer of professional license. 18 Considering, however, the serious consequences of either penalty, the Court will exercise its power to disbar or suspend only upon a clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the standing of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, 19 the Court penalized a lawyer who failed to file a pre-trial brief and other pleadings, such as position papers, leading to the dismissal of the case with six months suspension. In Soriano v. Reyes, 20 We meted a one-year suspension on a lawyer for inexcusable negligence, the latter having failed to file a pre-trial brief leading to the dismissal of the case and failure to prosecute in another case, and omitting to apprise complainant of the status of the two cases with assurance of his diligent attention to them. In this case, Atty. Ireneo should be called to task for the interplay of the following: his inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of Antonio's appeal, coupled by his lack of candor in not apprising Antonio of the status of his appealed case; his attempt to mislead the CA in a vain bid to evade the consequence of the belated filing of a motion for reconsideration; and, last but not least, his cavalier disregard of the Court's directives primarily issued to resolve the charges brought against him by Antonio. We deem it fitting that Atty. Ireneo be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year, up from the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This should serve as a constant reminder of his duty to respect courts of justice and to observe that degree of diligence required by the practice of the legal profession. His being a first offender dictates to large degree this leniency. The prayer for damages cannot be granted. Let alone the fact that Antonio chose not to file his position paper before the IBP-CBD and, therefore, was unable to satisfactorily prove his claim for damages, a proceeding for disbarment or suspension is not in any sense a civil action; it is undertaken and prosecuted for public welfare. It does not involve private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. 21 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. is declared GUILTY of inexcusable negligence, attempting to mislead the appellate court, misuse of Court processes, and willful disobedience to lawful orders of the Court. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED. Peralta, Abad, Villarama, Jr. * and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
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THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7062. September 26, 2006.] [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355] RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS, complainants, vs. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J : Complainants, via a complaint 1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00- 040318098, "Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents. Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al.," for Illegal Strike. By Decision of August 29, 2001, 3 Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for lack of merit. Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former position with full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement computed as follows: xxx xxx xxx
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3.CRISANTO CONOS Backwages: Basic Wage: 2/21/98-10/30/99 = 20.30 mos. P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 =P104,504.40 10/31/99-10/31/00 = 12 mos. P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69,732.00 11/01/00-8/30/01 = 10 mos. P250.00 x 26 days x 10 =65,000.00 P239,236.40 13th Month Pay: 1/12 of P239,236.40 =19,936.36 SILP 2/16/98-12/31/98 = 10.33 mos. P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22 1/1/99-12/31/99 = 12 mos. P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.50

1/1/00-10/30/01 = 20 mos. P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33 4,053.05 P263,225.81

xxx xxx xxx

7.RONALD SAMBAJON (same as Conos)263,225.81 8.FREDELYN BACULBAS (same as Conos)263,225.81 9.RENEIRO SAMBAJON (same as Conos)263,225.81 Total BackwagesP2,370,674.38

Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages including the various monetary claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney's fees of all sums owing to complainants. 4(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution. 5 In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004. 6 Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, "frustrated" the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents. In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent, together with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 045203. 7 In his Report and Recommendation 8 dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion: The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified. A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the
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grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case. All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due execution of the questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING resolution in their respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the identities of the herein complainants is not impleaded by the complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real identities of person executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim. The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of regularity unless proven otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory questioning . . . : xxx xxx xxx . . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed the despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable under the circumstances. 9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP 10 transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-226 11 filed by respondent. One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition 12 filed before the OBC, assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another. Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the present petition, in the interest of justice, this Court gives his petition due course. In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those whom he met face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27,
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2004. 13 He hastens to add though that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before Arbiter Santos. 14 Complainants 15 and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan 16 claim otherwise, however. And the Minutes 17 of the proceedings before the National Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCRNS-02-081-98, "Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute," which minutes bear respondent's and complainants' signatures, belie respondent's claim that he had not met complainants before. Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the request of his clients who "told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and waivers," heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients' interest, especially given the amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he discharged such obligation. COMM. HABABAG: But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the money of your client would go to the deserving employee? ATTY. SUING: I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call it before a precedent in February of 1998 when my client directly made settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original complainants, Your Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have a dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion, we'll let them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to say, when lawyers are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor. xxx xxx xxx COMM. HABABAG: Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos? ATTY. SUING: I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one, to witness the signing of the documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent them in that proceedings. COMM. HABABAG: My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given to you and
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yet there would be a signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release? ATTY. SUING: I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there were no complaints, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG: Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a voucher so you just rely on your precedent, is that what you mean? ATTY. SUING: Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties who are talking and it is my client who knows them better than I do, Your Honor . COMM. HABABAG: So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos office because there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release, it that clear? ATTY. SUING: Yes, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG: [You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money intended for the payment of these workers? ATTY. SUING: I did not ask. COMM. HABABAG: You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the documents? ATTY. SUING: As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG: The Quitclaim Receipt and Release? ATTY. SUING: Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of 1998. COMM. HABABAG: When you say they whom are you referring to? ATTY. SUING: I'm referring to my client, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG: They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I made one but this document, Your Honor, is only a single document where all the signatories named are present because my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that so that each of them will be there together and they will identify themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila-sila yong

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magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. . . . And when the signing took place in February of 2004 it was made for any [sic] individual, Your Honor, no longer the document that I prepared when all of the seven will be signing in one document. COMM. HABABAG: Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes? ATTY. SUING: I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there are already people there, the seven complainants plus another woman. 18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert vigilance to protect his clients' interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus: ATTY. SUING: To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s] are properly signed and that these people are properly identified and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos. 19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a compromise agreement with his clients in which he "did not participate" and from which no problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the Labor Arbiter's office "that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter." Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. 20 That should have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients' interest. But he was not and he did not. Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence." A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of
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good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client. The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence(diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. . . . 21 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied) And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag: COMM. HABABAG: May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim? MR. RODIL: Sila po. COMM. HABABAG: Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim? MR. RODIL: Si Atty. Suing po. ATTY. SUING: In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what? COMM. HABABAG: Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito? MR. RODIL: Kami yata ang gumawa niyan. COMM. HABABAG: Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang gumawa nito? MR. RODIL: Matagal na ho yan eh. xxx xxx xxx COMM. HABABAG: Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos? MR. RODIL:
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Si attorney po. ATTY. SUING: Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala ng mga dokumento? MR. RODIL: Yong mga tao. xxx xxx xxx COMM. HABABAG: Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and Quitclaim? MR. RODIL: Kay attorney po. COMM. HABABAG: Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney? ATTY. SUING: Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong. COMM. HABABAG: Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo. MR. RODIL: Opo. COMM. HABABAG: Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious tayo dito. MR. RODIL: Opo serious po. COMM. HABABAG: Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera? MR. RODIL: Opo. COMM. HABABAG: Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo? MR. RODIL: Atty. Suing po. COMM. HABABAG: Okay. ATTY. SUING: Your Honor, . . . COMM. HABABAG: Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing? MR. RODIL: Yan ang hindi ko matandaan. xxx xxx xxx 22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer
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questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted respondent's claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not theone presented at the Arbiter's Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents. As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. 23 While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character. 24 In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr. 25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession." While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order. WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED. Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
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THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6252. October 5, 2004.] JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent. PANGANIBAN, J : DECISION Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof. The Case and the Facts Before us is a verified Complaint 1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty.
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Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 2 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 3 , Canon 5 4 , and Canons 12.07 5 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise: ". . . In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a) make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. "Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats." 6 On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, 7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer. 8 He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed. He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija some of whom were older practitioners indicate the affiants' residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents. As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 9 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation. As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that
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lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondent's clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice." Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit 11 of the two police officers who had assisted them. Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant. After receipt of respondent's Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o'clock in the afternoon. Notices 12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001. 13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o'clock in the afternoon. On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply 14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The latter's Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001. 15 It also received complainant's Letter-Request 16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution. The CBD received complainant's Memorandum 18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any. The IBP's Recommendation On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI2003-172 19 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioner's Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiant's residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation 20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."
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The other charges violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The Court's Ruling We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent's Administrative Liability Violation of the Notarial Law The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. 21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded." 22 Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public. 23 These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements. In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, 24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows: "The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument." For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, 25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest. It is clear from the pleadings before us and respondent has readily admitted that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
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Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija. We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law. We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondent's clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses' Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainant's brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint. As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that as counsel for the affiants he was not required to comply with the certification requirement. It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. 26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. 27 It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes. Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws. 28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public. Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. 29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as
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an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. 30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case. Lawyer as Witness for Client Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent's clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client." Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states: "Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except: a)on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like; b)on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel." Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, 31 except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship. 32 The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients. "Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer's client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful."33 Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case. 34 Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively
TIcAaH

liable for the following reasons: First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latter's life and liberty are at stake. 35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law. Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present by all fair and honorable means every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law. 36 The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents. Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. 37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. 38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases. No Proof of Harassment The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability. 39 It is not the self- serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latter's allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
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WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ ., concur. Carpio Morales, J ., is on leave.