UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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The Authors Guild, Inc., Association of American :
Publishers, Inc., et al., :
:
Plaintiffs, :
: Case No. 05 CV 8136-DC
v. :
:
Google Inc., :
:
Defendant. :
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LIBRARY ASSOCIATION COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

I. Description of Class Members and Introduction.

The American Library Association (ALA) is a nonprofit professional organization

of more than 67,000 librarians, library trustees, and other friends of libraries dedicated to

providing and improving library services and promoting the public interest in a free and

open information society.

The Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL), the largest division

of the ALA, is a professional association of academic and research librarians and other

interested individuals. It is dedicated to enhancing the ability of academic library and

information professionals to serve the information needs of the higher education

community and to improve learning, teaching, and research.

The Association of Research Libraries (ARL) is a nonprofit organization of 123

research libraries in North America. ARL’s members include university, public,

governmental, and national libraries. ARL influences the changing environment of

1
scholarly communication and the public policies that affect research libraries and the

diverse communities they serve.

Collectively, these three library associations (the Library Associations) represent

over 139,000 libraries in the United States employing over 350,000 librarians and other

personnel. The Library Associations are both authors and publishers of books, and thus

fall within both sub-classes of plaintiffs.

The Library Associations do not oppose approval of the Settlement. The

Settlement has the potential to provide unprecedented public access to a digital library

containing millions of books. Thus, the Settlement could advance the core mission of the

Library Associations and their members: providing patrons with access to information in

all forms, including books. However, the digital library enabled by the Settlement will be

under the control of Google and the Book Rights Registry. Moreover, the cost of

creating such a library and Google’s significant lead time advantage suggest that no other

entity will create a competing digital library for the foreseeable future.

The Settlement, therefore, will likely have a significant and lasting impact on

libraries and the public, including authors and publishers. But in the absence of

competition for the services enabled by the Settlement, this impact may not be entirely

positive. The Settlement could compromise fundamental library values such as equity of

access to information, patron privacy, and intellectual freedom. In order to mitigate the

possible negative effects the Settlement may have on libraries and the public at large, the

Library Associations request that this Court vigorously exercise its jurisdiction over the

interpretation and implementation of the Settlement. Indeed, in its order approving the

Settlement, the Court should make clear that it intends to oversee the Settlement closely.

2
Below, the Library Associations explain their concerns with the Settlement, and how the

Court’s oversight can ameliorate those concerns.

II. The Settlement Creates An Essential Facility With Concentrated Control.

The Settlement allows Google to offer services that appear to further the mission

of libraries by providing people in the United States with unprecedented online access to

books. At no cost, and from the convenience of her home, school, or workplace, a

Google user will be able to search millions of books for responsive terms. Depending on

the nature of the book, the user will see up to fifteen continuous pages each time the term

appears, and up to 20% of the entire book.1 The Settlement also allows Google to sell to

consumers perpetual online access to the full text of individual books, with at least 80%

priced below $10 for an initial period.2 Additionally, the Settlement permits Google to

offer institutional subscriptions, which would provide authorized users within an

institution full text access to millions of books.3

The institutional subscription is the feature of the Settlement most relevant to the

broad range of libraries. College and research libraries, for example, are a target market

for the institutional subscriptions because faculty and students performing serious

research are among the largest and most likely populations to demand the ability to

search and read the full text of not commercially available books.4

1
Settlement Agreement at § 4.3(b)(i)(1).
2
Id. at § 4.2(c).
3
Id. at § 4.1.
4
Google is obtaining the copyrighted books that it is scanning from major U.S. research
libraries, and these collections were originally assembled to support the teaching and
research missions of affiliated institutions of higher education. This underscores the
probable high demand at academic libraries for institutional subscriptions. Additionally,
this emphasizes that Google will be able to offer the service permitted by the Settlement

3
 In the extensive discussion about the Settlement since it was announced, many

observers have noted possible deficiencies with the institutional subscription database

(ISD), the set of books available through the institutional subscription. Because the

Settlement allows the rightsholder of a work contained within another rightholder’s book

to exercise his rights under the Settlement independently, a book in the ISD may lack

important parts of the printed book.5 A book in the ISD might be missing an essay,

poem, short story, foreword, chart or table that appears in the printed version. Similarly,

because the Settlement does not apply to pictorial works, Google will black out

photographs and illustrations with a different rightsholder from the book’s rightsholder.

Moreover, a rightsholder can remove a book from Google Book Search, or

exclude it from the ISD.6 Likewise, Google is obligated to include in the ISD only 85%

of the books it scans into the ISD.7 Thus, the ISD will not include a complete set of in-

copyright, not commercially available works.8

Notwithstanding these deficiencies in the ISD, an institutional subscription will

provide an authorized user with online access to the full text of as many as 20 million

books. Students and faculty members at higher education institutions with institutional

subscriptions will be able to access the ISD from any computer -- from home, a dorm

room, or an office. Accordingly, it is possible that faculty and students at institutions of

higher education will come to view the institutional subscription as an indispensable

only because research libraries have invested significant resources in preserving out of
print books.
5
Settlement Agreement at § 3.5(b)(i).
6
Id. at § 3.5.
7
Id. at § 7.2(e)(i).
8
Under the Settlement’s default rule for commercially available books, Google cannot
include them in the ISD unless their rightsholders permit Google to do so.

4
research tool. They might insist that their institution’s library purchase such a

subscription. The institution’s administration might also insist that the library purchase

an institutional subscription so that the institution can remain competitive with other

institutions of higher education in terms of the recruitment and retention of faculty and

students.

The settlement of copyright class action litigation might well have been the only

feasible way this research tool could have been created. A class action settlement

provided perhaps the most efficient mechanism for cutting the Gordian knot of the huge

transactions costs of clearing the rights of millions of works whose ownership often is

obscure.9 However, the class representatives and Google structured the Settlement in

such a manner as to give them enormous control over this essential facility.10 This is not

surprising, given their economic interests. Indeed, precisely because of their economic

interests, it is unlikely that they would have agreed to a structure that did not grant them

such control.

To be sure, nothing in the Settlement prevents another entity from undertaking a

mass digitization effort similar to Google’s. But given the enormous cost of such an

effort, and Google’s significant lead time advantage (Google has been digitizing in-

copyright books since 2004), no other entity is likely to so in the near future. 11 Hence,

9
Many of these books are “orphan” works – works whose rightsholders cannot be
identified or located even after a diligent search by a potential user.
10
Technically, there are two related essential facilities: Google’s ISD and the block of
copyrights managed by the Registry. The Registry enables the creation of the ISD by
licensing the copyrights to Google.
11
In theory, another entity could embark on a library project like Google’s, precipitating
a class action that could be settled on terms like this Settlement. Alternatively, Congress
could enact a compulsory license, and appropriate funding to a consortium of libraries to
launch a mass digitization undertaking. Neither of these are scenarios are likely. If

5
there is no foreseeable threat to the control Google and the Registry have over this

essential research facility.

It is entirely possible that the Registry and Google will not abuse their control

over the market for institutional subscriptions. In fact, the differing business models of

Google and the Registry suggest that the two might exist in competitive tension with one

another. However, as likely consumers of this essential research facility, the Library

Associations cannot overlook the possibility that the Registry or Google might abuse the

control the Settlement confers upon them. Abuse of this control would threaten

fundamental library values of access, equity, privacy, and intellectual freedom.12

III. The Settlement Could Limit Access to the ISD.

The institutional subscription could evolve into an essential research facility, but

in the absence of any meaningful competition, the Registry and Google can set the price

of the subscription at a profit maximizing point beyond the reach of many libraries.

The Settlement establishes detailed procedures by which Google and the Registry

will set the price for institutional subscriptions. The Settlement provides that the

economic terms for the institutional subscriptions will be governed by two objectives:

“(1) the realization of revenue at market rates for each Book and license on behalf of

Rightsholders and (2) the realization of broad access to the Books by the public,

including institutions of higher education.”13 Moreover, “Plaintiffs and Google view

Google continues on its current path with the Library Project, other entities will have
little incentive to enter the market so far behind Google. And if Google abandons the
Library Project, other entities will question the economic viability of such an endeavor.
12
Although some of the libraries partnering with Google in the Library Project
participated in some of the Settlement discussions, this handful of libraries did not
represent that larger the library community.
13
Settlement Agreement at § 4.1(a)(i).

6
these two objectives as compatible, and agree that these objectives will help assure both

long-term revenue to the Rightsholders and accessibility of the Books to the public.”14

The Settlement also contains “parameters” Google and the Registry will use to

determine the price of institutional subscriptions: the pricing of similar products and

services available from third parties; the scope of the books available in the ISD; the

quality of the scan; and the features offered as part of the subscription.15

Pricing will be based on the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) users. 16 The

FTE pricing can vary across different categories of institutions. These categories include:

(1) corporate; (2) higher education institutions; (3) K-12 schools; (4) government; and (5)

public libraries. Lower prices can be charged for discipline-based subsets of the ISD.17

Google has the responsibility for proposing an initial pricing strategy consistent

with the objectives outlined above that will include target retail prices for each class of

institution for access to the entire ISD and the discipline-based collections. Prices in the

initial pricing strategy period will be based on “then-current prices for comparable

products and services, surveys of potential subscribers, and other methods for collecting

data and market assessment.”18 Google will collect data comparing the target retail prices

with the prices for comparable products and services, and will provide this data to the

Registry. After Google submits the initial pricing strategy to the Registry, Google and

14
Id.
15
Id. at § 4.1(a)(ii).
16
For higher education institutions, FTE means full-time equivalent students. Id. at §
4.1(a)(iii).
17
Id. at § 4.1(a)(v).
18
Id. at § 4.1(a)(vii).

7
the Registry will negotiate its terms for up to 180 days. If Google and the Registry do not

reach agreement, the dispute will be submitted to binding arbitration.19

The Library Associations appreciate that the Settlement identifies “broad access

to the Books by the public, including institutions of higher education” as one of the two

objectives of the economic terms for the institutional subscription. Moreover, Google’s

current business model, based on advertising revenue, suggests that Google will have the

incentive to negotiate vigorously with the Registry to set the price of the institutional

subscription as low as possible to maximize the number of authorized users with access

to the ISD. Nonetheless, Google’s business model, at least with respect to the

institutional subscription, may change, and at some point in the future it may seek a profit

maximizing price structure that has the effect of reducing access.

Significantly, the predominant model for pricing of scientific, technical, and

medical journals in the online environment has been based on low volume and high

prices. Major commercial publishers have been content with strategies that maximize

profits by selling subscriptions to few customers at high cost. Typically these customers

are academic and research libraries. Therefore, the Registry and Google may seek to

emulate this strategy in the market for institutional subscriptions.

The Settlement’s provisions concerning the pricing of the institutional

subscription contain several other troubling features that increase the likelihood of this

outcome. First, the Settlement states that the price of the institutional subscription will be

based in part on the prices of “comparable products and services….” Although there are

no comparable products or services to an online database of in-copyright, not

19
Id. at § 4.1(a)(vi)(4).

8
commercially available books, the Registry or the arbitrators might erroneously treat

online journals as comparable products. In this event, the institutional subscription would

become cost prohibitive for most libraries. The annual subscription for some scientific,

technical, and medical journals can exceed $20,000 per journal. A university library

spends an average total of $ 4.3 million a year for online journal subscriptions.20 If

journal subscriptions are “comparable” to the institutional subscription, and a library pays

$ 4.3 million for access to 31,000 journals,21 one can only imagine the price the Registry

might insist upon for a subscription to millions of books.

Second, the Settlement provides for a dispute resolution mechanism with respect

to the pricing of the institutional subscription only to Google and the Registry. The

Settlement does not explicitly set forth a process by which a library or other potential

purchaser of an institutional subscription can challenge whether the pricing of this

essential facility created by the Settlement meets the objective of “broad access to the

Books by the public.”

IV. The Settlement Will Heighten Inequalities Among Libraries.

The “digital divide” in this country is already too deep, and the pricing of the

institutional subscriptions could make it even deeper. In the absence of the price

discipline afforded by competition, only those higher education institutions with the

greatest resources would be able to afford an institutional subscription without

dramatically cutting other library services.

Compounding this inequity is the differential pricing the Settlement allows for

different categories of institutions. While this price discrimination could promote

20
Association of Research Libraries, ARL Statistics 2006-2007 50-51 (2008).
21
Id. at 31.

9
economic efficiency by setting the price at the point that meets the demand within that

category, it could lead to bizarre results from a societal perspective. Google will conduct

surveys among potential subscribers,22 and might learn that the higher education

institutions have a much stronger demand for institutional subscriptions than K-12

schools. The low demand for institutional subscriptions at K-12 schools might cause the

price of an institutional subscription for that category to fall so low that many K-12

schools could afford to purchase the subscription. Meanwhile, higher education

institutions in the same communities might not have the resources to pay the higher

demand-driven prices charged to that category.

Similarly, the public access service terminals that provide free access to the ISD

could exacerbate inequalities. A single public access service terminal may satisfy the

needs of a lightly trafficked branch of a public library system. But a single terminal

would be insufficient for colleges and most library branches. If those colleges and

libraries could not afford the institutional subscription, their users would be worse off

than the patrons of the lightly trafficked branch.

To be clear, the Library Associations are not objecting to Google’s offer to

provide free public access service terminals. Rather, we are pointing out the disparities in

access that might emerge if institutional subscriptions are too expensive. 23

22
Id. at § 4.1(vii).
23
The Settlement heightens inequalities among libraries in other ways. It makes a free
public access service terminal available at public libraries and higher education
institutions, but not K-12 libraries. Id. at § 4.8(a)(i). Additionally, remote access to the
ISD without special Registry approval is available only to higher education institutions,
not other categories of institutional subscribers, including public libraries. Id. at §
4.1(a)(iv). Finally, 83% of public libraries do not have sufficient terminals to meet
existing needs; they certainly will not have enough terminals to access the ISD
effectively, either through an institutional subscription or the public access service. See

10
 V. The Settlement Does Not Protect User Privacy.

Privacy is one of libraries’ core values; libraries do not monitor the reading habits

of their patrons. Indeed, 48 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect

library records from undue intrusion at the expense of privacy, requiring in general a

subpoena before a publicly funded library can disclose records with personally

identifiable information.24 The Settlement, by contrast, does not specify how Google and

the Registry will protect user privacy. Because Google will provide consumers who have

purchased a book with perpetual online access to the book,25 it must keep records to

ensure that the consumer’s access persists over time, particularly as the consumer uses

different computers to access the book. But the Settlement is silent concerning what

information Google will retain concerning the consumer, how it will use the information,

and what measures it will take to protect the information’s security.

The Settlement also contains few details about user information in the

institutional subscription context. Because only authorized users will be able to access

the ISD, Google may have the ability to determine which user is accessing which book in

the ISD. Moreover, the Settlement states that when a user prints out pages of a book in

the ISD, Google will include a visible watermark which displays encrypted session

identifying information “which could be used to identify the authorized user that printed

the material or the access point from which the material was printed.”26 Here, too, the

Denise M. Davis, et al., Libraries Connect Communities: Public Library Funding &
Technology Access Study 2007-2008 29 (2008).
24
See http://www.library.cmu.edu/People/neuhaus/state_laws.html.
25
Settlement Agreement at § 4.2.
26
Id. at § 4.1(d).

11
Settlement does not indicate whether Google will retain this information, how it will use

the information, and what measures it will take to protect the information’s security.27

The Settlement’s silence concerning user privacy stands in stark contrast to its

detail with respect to the measures Google and fully participating libraries28 must take to

protect the security of their digital copies of books. Google and fully participating

libraries must develop a security implementation plan that meets the requirements of the

Security Standard set forth in an attachment to the Settlement Agreement.29 The

seventeen-page Security Standard addresses topics such as: (1) security management,

including security awareness, designation of a security representative, and incident

response; (2) identification and authentication, including user identification and

authentication, and authentication and password management; (3) access controls,

including account management, access approval process, and access control supervision;

(4) audit and accountability, including logging and audit requirements, marking of image

files, and forensic analysis; (5) network security, including electronic perimeter, network

firewall, device hardening, network security testing, remote network accessing, and

encryption of digitized files; (6) media protection, including media access, media

inventory, media storage, and media sanitization and disposal; (7) physical and

27
Likewise, the Settlement says nothing about user privacy in the public access service
context.
28
Fully participating libraries are libraries that will provide Google with in-copyright
books to scan in exchange for a receiving from Google a digital copy of each book the
library provides. A fully participating library must sign an agreement with the Registry
that releases the library from copyright infringement liability for participating in the
Library Project and that restricts what the library can do with the digital copies it receives
from Google. Settlement Agreement at § 1.58.
29
Id. at § 8.2(a).

12
environmental protection, including physical access authorizations, physical access

control, visitor control, and access records; and (8) risk assessment.30

Google and the fully participating libraries must submit their security

implementation plans to the Registry for approval. If Google or the fully participating

library and the Registry cannot resolve disagreements as to whether the security

implementation plan complies with the Security Standard, the parties must submit the

disputes to binding arbitration. 31 Google and the fully participating libraries must permit

a third party to conduct an annual audit of their security and usage to verify compliance

with their security implementation plan.32 Upon learning of a prohibited or unauthorized

access to the digital copies, Google and the fully participating library must notify the

Registry of the breach and attempt to cure it, e.g., block the unauthorized access.33 The

Settlement establishes a detailed schedule of monetary remedies up to $5 million,

depending on the harm caused by the breach of the security plan, the recklessness or

willfulness of the breaching conduct, the promptness of the cure, and the number of

breaches with the same root cause.34

Evidently, in the Settlement negotiations the class representatives insisted on

these measures to protect the security of digital copies of their books; but no one

demanded protection of user privacy. Users of the services enabled by the Settlement

also cannot rely on competitive forces to preserve their privacy. In the online

environment, competition is perhaps the most powerful force that can help to insure user

30
See Attachment D to Settlement Agreement.
31
Settlement Agreement at § 8.2(a)(iv).
32
Id. at § 8.2(c).
33
Id. at § 8.3.
34
Id. at §§ 8.4-8.7.

13
privacy. If a user does not like one search engine firm’s privacy policy, he can switch to

another search engine. Similarly, a user has many choices among online retailers, email

providers, social networks, and Internet access providers. The competitive pressure often

forces at least a minimal level of privacy protection.35 However, with the services

enabled by the Settlement, there will be no competitive pressure protecting user privacy.

In response to concerns raised by libraries and others, Google has stated that it

will take appropriate measures to protect user privacy. The Library Associations expect

Google, in consultation with the Library Associations and other representatives of user

interests, to meet this commitment. Google and the Registry should develop strong

policies to protect personally identifiable information, and provide users with clear notice

describing those policies.

VI. The Settlement Could Limit Intellectual Freedom.

The absence of privacy protection discussed in the previous section could have a

chilling effect on a user’s right to read because the user might fear the third party

monitoring of his or her lines of inquiry. But the Settlement could stifle intellectual

freedom in another way as well. The Settlement requires Google to provide free search

(including the permitted previews), the public access service, and institutional

subscriptions for only 85% of the in-copyright, not commercially available books it has

scanned.36 This requirement in effect allows Google to exclude over a million books

35
To be sure, there are switching costs, and many service providers have adopted a
“lowest common denominator” approach to user privacy.
36
If Google fails to meet this requirement within five years of the Settlement’s effective
date, the participating libraries and the Registry may engage a third party to provide these
services, using the digital copies Google provided to the libraries. Settlement Agreement
at § 7.2(e)(i). This provision is intended to force Google to roll out the services under the
Settlement in a timely manner.

14
from the ISD. While Google on its own might not choose to exclude books, it probably

will find itself under pressure from state and local governments or interest groups to

censor books that discuss topics such as alternative lifestyles or evolution. After all, the

Library Project will allow minors to access up to 20% of the text of millions of books

from the computers in their bedrooms and to read the full text of these books from the

public access terminals in their libraries. Although public libraries have often contended

with demands to eliminate or restrict access to specific books, any collection

management decision by a particular librarian affected only that community. Here, by

contrast, if Google bends to political pressure to remove a book, it will suppress access to

the book throughout the entire country.

Similarly, foreign governments probably will attempt to coerce Google to exclude

books the governments consider embarrassing or threatening. On numerous occasions,

foreign governments have pressured Google and other search engine firms to remove

links to websites to which the governments objected. For example, China has demanded

the removal of links to sites promoting free speech and civil liberties in Tibet; Thailand

has required the removal of websites critical of the King of Thailand; and Turkey has

requested the removal of sites that discuss the Armenian genocide. It is safe to assume

that these governments might attempt to pressure Google to exclude politically offensive

books from the ISD.37 To preempt anticipated complaints, Google might err on the side

of caution and proactively suppress entire categories of books. This, in turn, could

37
Even though Google may provide access to the services permitted under the Settlement
only to users in the United States, users in other countries can employ technologies to
deceive Google’s servers concerning their location. Thus, foreign governments would
seek to eliminate certain books from the ISD to prevent their citizens from reading them.

15
deprive students, scholars, journalists and policymakers of access to historically

significant materials.38

The Settlement also may not sufficiently safeguard intellectual freedom with

respect to the Research Corpus. The Settlement allows Google and two institutions to

host the set of all digital copies made by Google in the Library Project for purposes of

“non-consumptive research” by “qualified users.” Non-consumptive research involves

computational analysis of the books, and does not include research relating to the

intellectual content of the books. The host site has the authority to determine whether a

person meets the criteria for a qualified user, and whether her research meets the

standards for non-consumptive research.39 However, the Settlement does not provide a

mechanism for a researcher to challenge a host site’s rejection of her qualifications or her

proposed research agenda. Thus, the host sites could privilege particular lines of inquiry

while hampering others, thereby shaping the direction of scholarly research in certain

disciplines.

VII. The Settlement Could Frustrate the Development of Innovative Services.

The Settlement specifically provides that the Registry will have the power, “to the

extent permitted by law, [to] license Rightsholder’s U.S. copyrights to third parties.”40

This provision permits the Registry to license parties other than Google to provide

38
The Library Associations recognize that it is not a search engine firm’s responsibility
to uphold the First Amendment, particularly when its employees are threatened with
imprisonment by oppressive regimes. The U.S. government should play a much more
vigorous role promoting free speech internationally. In particular, the U.S. government
should aggressively support U.S. search engines against foreign governmental pressure,
and communicate unambiguously that it will not tolerate any attempts to intimidate
search engine firms into censoring politically sensitive material.
39
Id. at § 7.2(d)(xi).
40
Id. at § 6.2(b)(iii).

16
services relating to books. However, as a practical matter, the Registry can grant licenses

only with respect to rightsholders that register with it and grant it the authority to act as

their agent with respect to parties other than Google. The class action mechanism cannot

bind absent rightsholders with respect to third parties not participating in the Settlement.

Still, this provision could permit the development of competitive and innovative

services. For example, if the rightsholders of 1 million books register with the Registry,

the Registry would be able to license to Amazon.com the right to sell access to the 1

million books. To be sure, the Registry would not be able to license to Amazon the rights

to the other 20+ million books that would be in Google’s ISD.41 Still, Amazon in one

agreement with the Registry would be able to increase by 500% the titles available

through the Kindle.42 Moreover, it is possible that these 1 million titles would include

many of the most useful books to researchers, because their rightsholders are the most

likely to make the effort to register with the Registry. Thus, an institutional subscription

to the 1 million books could be valuable to some libraries, and could offer competition to

Google’s larger ISD.

Although the Settlement permits the Registry to license the rights it possesses to

third parties such as Amazon, the Settlement does not require it to do so. Nor does it

provide standards to govern the terms by which the Registry would license these rights.

This means that the Registry could refuse to license the rights to Google competitors on

41
Google’s ability to use these works could provide it with a significant competitive
advantage over other firms.
42
Currently consumers can purchase 200,000 titles for download onto the Kindle e-book.
Under this arrangement, Amazon would still have to digitize the 1 million titles.

17
terms comparable to those provided to Google under the Settlement.43 The Registry,

therefore, could prevent the development of competitive services.

Likewise, the Registry could inadequately represent the true interests of many

class members. The Settlement stipulates that the Author Sub-Class and the Publisher

Sub-Class will have equal representation on the Board of Directors, but the Settlement is

silent on who will select these board members and how class members can ensure that the

Registry will in fact advance their objectives.44 As noted above, the Library Associations

are both authors and publishers of books, and thus fall within both sub-classes of

plaintiffs. However, writing and publishing books is ancillary to the core mission of

libraries – to provide the public with access to information. Tens of thousands of

members of the Author Sub-Class are similarly situated to the Library Associations:

teachers at all levels write books not for financial gain, but to support their core missions

of education and scholarship. Many, if not most, of these class members care far more

about the potential impact of the Settlement on the advancement of knowledge than about

the modest license fees they may receive under the Settlement.45

In other words, many class members will not want the Registry to maximize its

profits; rather, they will want the Registry to maximize public access to books.

Additionally, they will want the Registry to provide broad access to all the data the

Registry collects concerning copyright ownership, thereby minimizing the orphan works

problem. Unfortunately, the Registry’s board may not reflect this diversity of

perspectives.

43
The Settlement contains a “most-favored-nation” clause, but this clause benefits
Google, not its competitors. See Settlement Agreement at § 3.8(a).
44
Id. at § 6.2(b).
45
See Pamela Samuelson, et al., Letter to the Honorable Denny Chin (April 27, 2009).

18
 VIII. This Court Can Address The Library Associations’ Concerns Through
Rigorous Oversight of the Implementation of the Settlement.

The concerns discussed above all flow from the concentration of power over the

two related essential facilities -- the ISD and the block of copyrights managed by the

Registry. Fortunately, the Settlement that created these essential facilities also contains a

means of addressing the possible abuses of the control the Registry and Google possess

over them. Specifically, the Settlement provides that this Court “shall retain jurisdiction

over the interpretation and implementation of the Settlement Agreement.”46 Thus, the

parties acknowledge this Court’s authority to regulate their conduct under the

Settlement. The Library Associations urge the Court to exercise this authority vigorously

to ensure the broadest possible public benefit from the services the Settlement enables.

In particular:

• Any library or other possible institutional subscriber must have the ability to
request this Court to review the pricing of an institutional subscription. The
Court’s standard of review should be whether the price meets the economic
objectives set forth in the Settlement, i.e., “(1) the realization of revenue at market
rates for each Book and license on behalf of Rightsholders and (2) the realization
of broad access to the Books by the public, including institutions of higher
education.”47

46
Settlement Agreement at § 17.23.
47
Id. at § 4.1(a)(i). The proposed Book Rights Registry is similar to two organizations
that collectively manage performance rights: the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). Both ASCAP and
BMI are subject to consent decrees resolving antitrust actions brought by the U.S.
Department of Justice. The ASCAP consent decree has existed, with modifications, since
1941; and the BMI consent decree since 1966. Under the consent decrees, ASCAP and
BMI must grant, on a non-discriminatory basis, either a blanket license to their entire
catalogue, or a license for the performance of a particular work. A court in this district
has continuing jurisdiction over the consent decrees, and has established a rate court to
resolve disputes concerning license fees. In proceedings before the rate court, ASCAP
and BMI have the burden of proving the reasonableness of the rates they seek.
Establishment of a rate court in this case is premature. However, this Court has the
authority to adopt the procedures necessary to ensure the fairness of the price of the
institutional subscription.

19
 • Any entity must have the ability to request this Court to review the Registry’s
refusal to license copyrights to books on the same terms available to Google.

• Any class member must have the ability to request this Court to review the
procedures by which the Registry selects members of its board of directors, and to
evaluate whether the Registry properly considers the interests of all class
members in its decision-making.

• Any user must have the ability to request this Court to direct Google to provide
the user with a list of books excluded from any of its services for editorial or non-
editorial reasons, and an explanation of why it was excluded. Google already
must provide the Registry with a list of books excluded for editorial reasons.48

• Any researcher must have the ability to request this Court to review the
reasonableness of a Research Corpus host site’s refusal to allow the researcher to
conduct a research project at the host site.

• Any user must have the ability to request this Court to direct Google and the
Registry to disclose their policies for collecting, retaining, disseminating, and
protecting personally identifiable information. Additionally, any user must have
the ability to request this Court to review whether Google and the Registry are
complying with their privacy policies.

In these comments, the Library Associations have identified certain foreseeable

problems that may require this Court’s intervention in the future. The Settlement,

however, is potentially so far-reaching that its full implications are unknowable at this

time. While the Settlement’s impact might be limited to the creation of a research tool of

use only to serious scholars, the Settlement might also lead to a restructuring of the

publishing industry and a dramatic change to the nature of libraries. The Court should

be prepared to exercise whatever oversight is necessary, for as long as necessary, to

48
Settlement Agreement at § 3.7(e)(i). The Settlement requires Google and the Registry
to compile a variety of databases. See, e.g., id. at §§ 3.1(b)(ii), 6.6(c). These databases
will have many uses, including assisting in finding the owners of orphan works.
Accordingly, Google and the Registry should make these databases publicly available.

20
 maximize the public benefit from the services enabled by the Settlement.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Ellen K. Davis

Keith Michael Fiels

Charles B. Lowry
Executive Director
Association of Research Libraries
21 Dupont Circle NW, Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 296-2296
[email protected]

May 4, 2009

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 4th day of May, 2009, I caused true and correct copies

of the foregoing comments to be delivered by overnight courier to the Clerk for the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of New York and to be served electronically on

the following counsel of record:

Michael J. Boni, Esq.

Jeffrey P. Cunard, Esq.

Daralyn J. Durie, Esq.

Jonathan Band
21 Dupont Circle NW, Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 296-5675
[email protected]