The Nordic Countries and Africa

The Nordic Countries and Africa
– Old and New Relations
Edited by
Lennart Wohlgemuth
Indexing terms
Aid policy
Development aid
Trade
Africa
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
Language checking: Elaine Almén

© the authors and the Nordic Africa Institute 2002
ISBN 91-7106-505-9
Printed in Sweden by Elanders Digitaltryck AB, Göteborg 2002
Contents
Preface ............................................................................................. 4
Karl Eric Ericson
Denmark and Africa – Past and Present Relations ........................... 5
Steen Christensen
Africa in Finnish policy – deepening involvement .......................... 15
Juhani Koponen and Hannu Heinonen
Iceland’s Policy on Africa .............................................................. 29
Thórdis Sigurdardóttir
Norway’s Africa Policy .................................................................. 34
Arne Tostensen
Swedish relations and policies towards Africa ............................... 42
Lennart Wohlgemuth
Tables ............................................................................................ 52
About the Authors ......................................................................... 54
Preface
In September 2002 the Nordic Africa Institute celebrated the 40th anniver-
sary of its founding. The Institute could then look back on a long period of
engagement in Africa and a constant commitment to increasing the knowl-
edge on Africa in the Nordic countries.
In 1962 when the Institute started its activities the general knowledge
on Africa in the Nordic countries was limited. The Institute worked on
many levels: publishing booklets in Swedish on the developments in differ-
ent parts of Africa for a general public, arranging conferences for research-
ers and “experts” (the few that existed at that time), distributing modest
travel grants for field research, to mention but a few of its numerous activi-
ties.
Throughout its existence the Institute has gradually changed its activi-
ties and adjusted to new needs and demands articulated by its different
target/interest groups: students and researchers in the Nordic countries,
development agencies, foreign ministries, the media, NGOs, etc. The knowl-
edge about Africa has increased. At the same time the governments in all
the Nordic countries have over the last four to five decades cooperated on
different levels with African countries through what has been called devel-
opment aid, development assistance, development cooperation, partnership,
etc.
When looking back at the past 40 years it was decided it would be
challenging to reflect the activities of the Institute against the role Africa
has played in the politics, trade, etc. of the five Nordic countries. With that
in mind we invited one representative from each Nordic country to give an
account of how their respective countries have dealt with Africa over the
years (in some cases even over the centuries) but with an emphasis on the
period since the founding of the Institute.
The diversity of the authors’ backgrounds and fields of specialisation is
reflected in their contributions to this volume, as is the fact that they were
given a rather free hand to decide upon the content and form of their ac-
counts. Two of the invitees are researchers, one has his background in poli-
tics. The other two contributors have long experience from administration
of development assistance. However, they all have one thing very much in
common: their long experience from, and deep engagement in, Africa’s de-
velopment, both of which emerge clearly from their individual presenta-
tions.
Karl-Eric Ericson
Denmark and Africa – Past and Present Relations

Steen Christensen
The African Paradox American colonies in the 18th century lamented

To most Danes, Africa is a paradox. On the one Britain’s reduction to “a miserable little island as
hand Africa is the Africa of one of Denmark’s most insignificant as Denmark or Sardinia” (Nye 2002).
revered authors, Karen Blixen. Her “Out of Af- But Denmark had not always been a “miser-
rica” with its declaration of love for the beauti- able, little, insignificant country”. In the inter-na-
ful Kenyan Ngong Hills (“The landscape had not tional politics of Europe, Denmark was in the 17th
its like in all the world.”), and the loving descrip- century a power to be reckoned with, although
tion of the Africans she encountered has formed not among the first rank of nations. And the 17th
an impression of an Africa in harmony with its century was precisely the time when Danes for the
beautiful nature and the setting for a romantic love first time ventured into Africa.
story.
On the other hand Africa is also seen as the
Denmark and the Gold Coast
continent ravaged by internecine strife, seemingly
unending civil wars, the marginalization and lack It was the dramatic change of power structures
of participation in globalization, the increasing and trade relations in the North Atlantic region
failure of states, famine, destitution, abject pov- during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) that
erty, illiteracy, malaria, and the more recent prompted the Danish king, Christian IV, to seek a
scourge of AIDS, which characteristically has hit more prominent place in the European inter-na-
the African continent harder than any other con- tional system. This attempt was made in competi-
tinent. Africa, then, is, in the public perception, a tion with Sweden. The Danish adventure on the
continent struck by most of the world’s most ad- Guinea Coast was directly linked to this new situ-
verse circumstances and stuck in a quagmire. ation. A Dutch merchant, Willem Usselinx, who
When the heavyweight boxer Muhammad Ali had started the Dutch-West Indian Company in
in the 1970s fought his now famous “rumble in 1621, but who had fallen out with his compatri-
the jungle” with George Foreman in the then ots, approached King Christian IV to obtain his
Zaïre, he is reported to have exclaimed as he saw support for a competing company.
the poverty and deprivation of the Congolese peo- However, Christian IV turned him down, and
ple on the way from the airport: “I am happy that he offered his services to the Swedish king Gustav
my ancestors escaped on the slave ships!” That Adolf II, who gladly accepted. Christian IV coop-
one of the most degrading human experiences, the erated instead with a Danish based Dutch mer-
slave trade, can, albeit ironically, be seen as a posi- chant Jan de Willum. The reason for this was
tive experience, puts the extent of the despair of clearly to not alienate the merchants in Copenha-
independent Africa into perspective. gen, and to not challenge the Dutch Company,
So, “the essence of Africa” in the words of which would have created problems with the Neth-
Ryszard Kapuzinski, “is its endless variety” erlands. He had to retain good relations with both
(Kapuzinski 1998:30). It is both beautiful nature, the merchants based in Copenhagen and the Neth-
amazing wildlife, and the hardest living conditions erlands in order to fulfil his ambitions of entering
on earth. the Thirty Years’ War.
What, then prompted, in the first place, a small Denmark’s entry into the Thirty Years’ War was
country in the northernmost part of Europe to disastrous and led to defeat. Consequently, Chris-
engage in relations with this great far away conti- tian IV had to tackle an imminent threat of Swed-
nent? ish-North German trade cooperation. He tried to
In his stimulating book, The Paradox of Ameri- counter this threat by giving trade protection and
can Power, Joseph S. Nye quotes the British poli- privileges to merchants in the new Holstein city
tician Horace Walpole who after Britain lost its of Glückstadt. At the same time he had to balance
—5—
Steen Christensen
his favours between the merchants in Glückstadt African labour was essential, and this need formed
and Copenhagen. He solved this by giving mer- the basis for the Danish entry into the slave trade.
chants in both cities the right to trade on the The latter half of the 17th century thus saw the
Guinea Coast. The first ship for Guinea thus de- slave trade becoming the most important export
parted from Glückstadt in 1649. activity from the Gold Coast. The importance of
The tense situation between Denmark and the slave trade was emphasized by Governor
Sweden had, however, not been resolved, and while Lorentz on St. Thomas in 1696: “All other trade
the new Danish king, Frederik III, in 1657 pre- is nothing in comparison with this slave trade.”
pared for war against Sweden, he hired a dissatis- (Nørregaard 1996:138).
fied Swede, Henrik Carlof, and gave him permis- But even though this Gold Coast slave trade
sion to attack the Swedish forts on the Guinea became ever more important, it still remained of
Coast. In cooperation with the Netherlands, he minor overall significance. It is estimated that less
succeeded briefly in conquering the Swedish fort than one per cent of the total slave trade was con-
Carolusborg. The Dutch aided the Danes, not out ducted on Danish ships. Overall it is assessed that
of sympathy, but because they considered the the share of the slave trade that emanated from
Danes less of a threat than the mightier Swedes. the Gold Coast was between 5 and 15 per cent
In the meantime, the Danes had build forts and (Justesen 1980:344).
trade stations on the coast, most notably Christians- This period saw the end of the economic
borg and Frederiksborg Castles. However, the growth period in the 1770s which had been caused
Danish influence did not reach beyond the coastal by the Danish neutrality during the European wars
areas, even after the first treaty with the Africans which were raging, which had created beneficial
in 1659. circumstances for Danish trade. But in 1782 the
The alliance with the Dutch was shortlived. The warring nations had entered into peace negotia-
Dutch became more occupied with an emerging tions, which resulted in peace treaties in 1783. This
greater threat, the British Africa Company. The “threatening” peace agreement made the Baltic-
Dutch feared that the British would ally themselves Guinean Company, which then had the monopoly
with the Danes in order to gain a foothold on the on the trade on the Guinean coast, suggest to the
coast, and thus the Dutch reverted to an aggres- government in 1783 that it should scale down its
sive policy against the Danish forts. This was, tem- activities. With the growing economic problems,
porarily at least, resolved with the peace treaty of and the discussions which were beginning – espe-
Breda in 1667. In the power struggles on the coast, cially in Britain – about the ethics of the slave trade,
the Danes chose to support the British who in 1664 attention was to a smaller degree turned to at-
occupied the Dutch fort Cabo Corso and renamed tempts at colonising the Gold Coast, i.e. using the
it Cape Coast Castle. The Danish alliance with African labour in the colony instead of exporting
the British is probably the reason why Denmark it. A Doctor Paul Erdman Isert, who had visited
with its very limited resources was able to cling to both the West Indies and the Gold Coast wrote to
its African possessions for generations. the government:
Seen in a European perspective, the trade which Why were our forefathers not so sensible as to
originally was based on gold, was slow to start, establish plantations in Africa with sugar, coffee,
and never really took off. In the mid 17th century chocolate and other necessities? There you could have
two to three ships annually reached the Gold had plenty of workers at better conditions!…But
Coast. But by the 1670s no more than one ship Africa is still the continent where by establishing
annually reached Christiansborg Castle. plantations, you could gradually stop the despicable
However, things were soon to change. The la- export of Negroes from their fertile homeland. (Erd-
bour shortage in the West Indies, Brazil and the man Isert 1985, Jonassen 1985). *
American tobacco state of Virginia, ignited a rush Following Isert’s initiative attempts were made to
for African slave labour. With the slave trade and farm on the coast. Isert himself was, however, not
the triangular trade, a new phase was entered, successful. All he achieved was to plan Frede-
where the acquiring and selling of slaves gradu- riksnobel, a plantation, before he died in 1789.
ally overtook gold as the most important economic Attempts were also made to grow cotton, and a
activity on the Gold Coast.
Denmark had earlier acquired the West Indian
islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix and St. Jan. To *
Translations of quotations from Danish references are made
the plantation owners a steady supply of cheap by the author.
—6—
Danish botanist Peter Thonning was dispatched tact, staving off the challenges from its increas-
to assess the viability of growing various crops. ingly self-confident southern neighbour, Germany.
The slave trade was coming to an end. The fi-
nance minister Ernst Schimmelmann, who inciden-
tally was the owner of a gun factory, plantations Development assistance
in the West Indies and a sugar refinery in Copen- When Europe after the second world rose out of
hagen, was well aware of the British debate on the ashes, international relations again began to
abolishing the slave trade and commissioned a take on prominence. To many, especially younger
study to prepare Denmark for the new situation. people, it was necessary to do the utmost to pre-
This resulted in an ordinance in 1792 abolishing vent another devastating war. A group of young,
the slave trade. The ordinance banned all trade in idealistic Danes in 1944 established Freds-
slaves as of 1803. In the meantime all nations had vennernes hjælpearbejde (The Friends of Peace
the right to import slaves to the Danish West In- Relief Organization), formed by three organiza-
dian Islands. This, though imperfect ordinance, tions, Vennernes Samfund (The Friends’
made Denmark the first slave trading nation to Society),‘Aldrig Mere Krig (Never More War) and
abolish the slave trade. Kvindernes Internationale Liga for Fred og Frihed
Why did Schimmelmann take this initiative? It (The Women’s International League for Peace and
was probably a mixture of motives. A series of Freedom). The organization changed its name in
moral and humanitarian arguments were enumer- 1949 to Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke (MS) (Danish
ated in the ordinance. But the economic consid- Association for International Co-operation) (Juul
erations were no doubt of greater importance. The 2002). In the beginning MS concentrated its work
slave trade just was not paying off. As we have to Europe. It was only at the end of the 1950s
seen attempts were concurrently made at a proper that the developing countries began to appear in
colonisation, but this made no great headway. The the public debate. This naturally coincided with
local circumstances, the African political environ- the discussions on decolonisation. MS at that time
ment in particular, was not conducive to planta- initiated its first projects in the third world, in
tion activities. And by 1811 local wars had virtu- Ghana and India.
ally stopped the colonisation attempts. With the Today MS is one of the major Danish non-gov-
slave trade being phased out, and no great success ernmental organizations. One of its successful
with local plantations, the countdown for the achievements over the past decades has been the
colony was beginning. recruiting of volunteers to work in developing
After 1792 serious considerations were given countries, particularly in Africa. MS has its own
to selling the possessions on the Gold Coast, but training centre in Arusha, Tanzania, where the
it would take another half century before this was volunteers are prepared for the difficult circum-
finalized. The sale was delayed partly because stances, they are about to encounter, Kenya, Zim-
some still dreamed about seeing the colonisation babwe, Lesotho, Zambia etc.
work, and partly because of the war with Britain The government also at an early stage showed
1807–14. During the Vienna Congress the Dan- an interest in being involved in technical develop-
ish foreign minister suggested to his British coun- ment assistance. The Social Democratic govern-
terpart Lord Castlereagh a sale of the colony. ment in 1950 initiated a project to look into de-
The asking price was, however, unrealistically velopment assistance under the aegis of the United
high: 50,000 pounds. At the same time the Dan- Nations. The following year, the new liberal-con-
ish government tried to play France against Brit- servative government established a “government
ain. France was interested in acquiring the pos- committee for technical assistance under the UN”.
sessions, but Britain would not allow that, and At this early stage it is worth noting that the re-
finally the sale was settled for a mere 10,000 sults of the discussions about development assist-
pounds. And thus in 1850, the Danish colonial ance were unanimous among all the political par-
presence in Africa came to an end. ties. They had not yet been politicised. The con-
So just before the great scramble for Africa was servative foreign minister Ole Bjørn Kraft ex-
about to begin, Denmark quietly exited Africa as pressed it in this way:
a colonial power, a reflection of its reduced status
We all know that deprivation and want and the fee-
among the European powers, no longer a power ling of oppression and despair are the breeding
to be reckoned with. In the ensuing century Den- grounds of war. There is a vivid understanding in the
mark was kept busy keeping its own territory in- West that you do not obtain the goal that we strive
—7—
Steen Christensen
for as long as large parts of the world’s population assistance only to the poorest countries, with a
live on or under subsistence level. (Folketingstidende GDP below about 2,100 USD per capita). The
1951, quoted in Kelm-Hansen:21). new allocation under the so called MIFRESTA
In this first phase a joint Nordic initiative was also heading (short for miljø, fred, stabilitet: environ-
being considered, but the UN alternative was pre- ment, peace and stability) made it possible to also
ferred. However, this was soon to change. The support countries, which had demonstrable prob-
driving forces behind the interest in development lems with the environment, for instance the newly
assistance were MS and DUF (The Danish Youth industrialising countries in Asia, but whose GDP
Council, an umbrella organization, grouping po- was above the 2,100 USD. This extra support
litical and non-political youth organizations). In grew rapidly during the tenure of the Social
these organizations a wish soon developed to also Democratic government, 1993–2001, but was
carry out bilateral Danish projects in the develop- scaled down under the first budget of the new
ing countries, and not just to give support through Liberal-Conservative government.
the UN. The development assistance from the begin-
Politically there was support for the idea of a ning and to this day, has broadly speaking been
Danish bilateral programme, and on March 19, divided into two almost equal parts (with varia-
1962 the first law concerning development assist- tions over the years, but basically stable): bilat-
ance was enacted. It is noteworthy that the struc- eral assistance (state to state, support of non-
ture and the basic principles that were then made governmental organizations, support of volun-
the basis of Danish development assistance have teer programmes, business programmes etc), and
changed very little to this very day. The changes multilateral assistance through the various UN
have mainly been corrections to stream-line the specialised agencies (UNDP, FAO, WFP, ILO,
organization (such as separating the technical as- UNESCO, to mention but a few), and after the
sistance department as an independent unit within accession of Denmark in 1973 to the EEC (later
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and adapting the the EU) also through the EU programmes, par-
policies to the current thinking and choice of words ticularly through participation in the Lome (later
with the changing fashions in development vo- Cotonou) agreements with the ACP countries
cabulary. Some observers ascribe this continuity (African, Caribbean, Pacific countries).
to “a combination of the basic motives of interest The basic principle of Danish development
in giving aid and the permanence of the actors assistance has popularly speaking been, and re-
involved in policy-making on aid” (Rye Olsen mains, to support the “poorest people in the poor-
1999). est countries”. This objective has then meant that
The law was passed unanimously in parlia- a very substantial part of Danish development
ment, and entailed the establishing of a larger dis- assistance has been directed to the poorest con-
cussion forum (Ulandsrådet – The development tinent – Africa.
council), and a steering committee (Ulands- Very early the discussions about development
styrelsen), consisting of nine members, who were assistance became concerned with the element of
to discuss more detailed development strategies democracy and in the jargon of the 1990s: good
and individual projects and advise the minister. governance. At this stage – in the 1960s – there
From the beginning, the aim of the political par- was an understanding that developing countries
ties was that Denmark should fulfil the aim set up could naturally not be measured by the same
by the UN of donating 1 per cent of GDP (later standards as the developed countries in this re-
this ambition was scaled down to the present tar- spect.
get of 0.7 per cent) in development assistance. I think there very often is reason to wonder why the
However, since finances were often tight, the Western world shows such intolerance over people
march towards this goal became long and ardu- and events in the developing countries, because they
ous, and first at the beginning of the 1990s did there do not fulfil our norms of democracy, do not
fulfil our norms of government. We can see, what
Denmark surpass the 1 per cent mark, and was
development, what tension lies in Africa – latest in
even before the elections in 2001, quickly on the
Nigeria – in Asia, in Vietnam and in Kashmir, and
way towards 1.5 per cent. Besides the ordinary
we must face the fact, that we need a wholly new
development assistance, the Social Democratic and different yardstick, building on the cultural and
government introduced additional allocations historical background. (Niels Mathiasen, later mi-
from 1993 that were not covered under the strict nister of culture, Folketingstidende 1951, qouted in
rules of the development assistance (i.e. giving Kelm-Hansen:88–9).
—8—
Surprisingly, in view of the present political de- majority rule in Portuguese Africa and Southern
bate, the Liberal Party foreign affairs spokesman Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe). At the UN General
Per Federspiel concurred in this assessment: Assembly in 1963, foreign minister Per Hækkerup
applauded the arms sanctions against South Af-
…we cannot demand that these countries shall develop
democratically. I do not think that they have the rica, but stressed that this was not enough. He
qualifications for it. Unfortunately it has been gave the undertaking that the Danish government
demonstrated that in many of these countries the most would support an action-oriented policy in order
healthy form of regime in fact is a temporary military to “create a real democratic, multiracial society
dictatorship. (Folketingstidende 1951, quoted in of free people with equal rights for all individuals
Kelm-Hansen) irrespective of race”. He later followed this up by
In the more ideological climate in the 1970s, where setting aside 250,000 DKK for the victims of apart-
the division between left, right and centre became heid with special emphasis on education of young
more pronounced, and political views became South Africans particularly those in exile.
more radicalised, the development assistance also This was the beginning of a Social Democratic
came under fire, both from the left and right, and inspired policy, that later would be the subject of
the consensus that had reigned until then cracked. some of the most acrimonious debates over Dan-
On the left, development assistance was criticized ish foreign policy (apart from the debate over the
for being the extended arm of imperialism. A typi- EEC in the early 1970s and security policy in the
cal example of this line of thinking was a book 1980s) in the post World War II period. It was to
published in 1975 (Arnfred 1975). The book split the usual Danish consensus over foreign
roundly condemned Danish development assist- policy and create a battlefront between on the one
ance for assisting the Danish business community hand the centre-left and on the other the liberal-
instead of the peoples of the developing countries. conservative parties.
Take for example this quote: “A striking example The support to the victims of apartheid – as
of this is the assembly factories for electric bulbs, the support to the individuals and the liberation
that exist in Asia and Africa. They only use one movements came to be known – was at the begin-
local component: a vacuum!” (Annerstedt & ning modest, and only focused on South Africa.
Gustavsson 1975:13). On the right – as will be But even during the centre-right government of
seen below – the liberal government tried in 1973 Hilmar Baunsgaard, 1968–1971, the support was
to undercut the assist-ance to the liberation move- continued. In the light of the later uncompromis-
ments. Knud Vilby, who for many years has domi- ing debate it is interesting to note that the Liberal
nated the Danish development debate lamented Party foreign minister Poul Hartling even approved
this climate and rightly pointed to the detrimental support for two liberation movements, MPLA of
effects: Angola and Frelimo of Mozambique.
The Danish development assistance has over The Danish support was given after advice
the last couple of years become very technocratic, from an advisory committee, popularly known as
and it has often been cut by various governments. the antiapartheid committee, consisting mainly of
The cause of this is among other things that the non-governmental organizations. The Danish sup-
Danish left wing has been strongly critical of the port was given – unlike the Swedish and Nor-
development assistance, at the same time as the wegian – exclusively through other organizations,
right wing, especially formulated by the Progress either UN organizations or private non-govern-
Party, has rejected all development assistance. mental organizations. No aid was given directly
(Annerstedt & Gustavsson 1975) to the liberation movements.
This division in the political debate has per- At the Social Democratic party congress in
sisted to this day, albeit in a less confrontational 1969 a resolution was carried that gave explicit
manner, but is clearly behind the cuts that were support to the liberation movements, and in 1971
made by the new Danish Liberal-Conservative when Jens Otto Krag again formed a minority
government in 2002. Social Democratic government, his foreign minis-
ter K.B. Andersen substantially increased the sup-
port to the liberation movements. In the financial
The acrimonious debate over support year 1971 (the last year of the liberal-conserva-
to the African liberation movements tive government) the support was 700,000 DKK.
Very early on Danish governments condemned the K.B. Andersen immediately raised this to 6.5 mil-
apartheid regime in South Africa, and called for lion DKK. This amount grew steadily and reached
—9—
Steen Christensen
under the Social Democratic-Liberal government minister Ove Guldberg decided to confront the
in 1979 25 million kr., and in the last financial issue of support to the liberation movements. He
year of the appropriation to the liberation move- acknowledged that there was no majority in fa-
ments (1993) it amounted to 94.6 million DKK. vour of abolishing the support to the liberation
The total amount spent over the twenty-year pe- movements, so instead he decided to change the
riod amounted to 975 million DKK. administrative praxis. Instead of letting the non-
This may sound to be a considerable amount, governmental organizations channel the support,
but in reality it was only a minor proportion of he suggested that the support thereafter should be
the substantial means allocated to development channelled through the UN. At the same time he
assistance from Denmark during the same period. intimated that the reason for this suggestion was
But in spite of this, the policy of supporting the that the support had been used for purposes that
liberation movements was soon subjected to heavy were not included in the terms of reference for the
attacks from the Liberal and Conservative parties. support, i.e. arms for the guerrillas. Consequently
The government was attacked for allegedly sup- he did not wish to support the liberation move-
porting communists and thereby indirectly being ments, but exclusively individual victims of apart-
stooges of Moscow. A conservative member of heid. The fate of the proposal hinged on the votes
parliament wrote thus about the support to the of the Christian People’s Party, which supported
liberation movements: the appropriation, but had been vaguely sceptical
Does the Social Democratic Party really believe about some of the procedural practices. However,
that Denmark stands any chance of competing when Guldberg was not able to produce evidence
with the Soviet Union and the GDR in these new to support his claim that the support was abused
countries, if the communist movements get into and was used for arms purchases, the Christian
power? It is high time that this odd piece of Dan- People’s Party finally sided with the centre-left,
ish foreign policy is taken away from the left wing and the foreign minister’s proposal was defeated.
of the Social Democratic party.” (Fischer 1978) This did not stop the barrage of criticism from
A Conservative Party spokesman categorically the liberals and conservatives. It only stopped
announced that “Danish assistance will inevita- when the Liberal Party briefly joined the Social
bly support the Marxist guerrillas”. He also Democratic Party in a major coalition (1978–79).
branded the leader of the PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral The Liberal chairman and foreign minister
as “a communist of a Moscow conviction” (Peter Henning Christophersen then claimed that the lib-
la Cour 1976 and in his pamphlet in 1978). The eral opposition to the support for the liberation
so-called Progress Party (a populist party repre- movements was solely of a financial nature. The
sented in parliament from 1973) was even more reality was that the discussion about the support
categorical. An MP stated that “The first of May to the liberation movements had become domes-
hysteria with hackneyed phrases about freedom tic policy more than foreign policy. This can among
is meant to make way for support from the peo- other things be witnessed by the positions of the
ple to increased appropriations to the communists’ former liberal leader and prime minister Poul
wars of aggression in Southern Africa.” (Junior Hartling when he became UN High Commissioner
1978). Foreign minister K.B. Andersen, who was for Refugees. During a visit to the liberation move-
constantly at the receiving end of strong verbal criti- ments in Lusaka (Jyllandsposten 17/12 1978) he
cism from the opposition, writes in his memoirs: stated that “Denmark has a very good name down
here”, and that the support to the liberation move-
My constantly repeated argument was that we did
not do the Western democracies any service by turning ments was not used for arms. “Not only the po-
our back on the liberation movements. That would litical leaders and administrators in the frontline
precisely push them into the arms of Moscow. And states that I have visited have expressed their grati-
how could we anyway dream of demanding demo- tude over the attitude of Denmark and the other
cratic governments in societies, that because of illite- Nordic countries. Also in the liberation movements
racy, oppression, poverty and political lack of free- you meet the same attitude. They know well that
dom did not stand a chance to undergo a democratic we are against apartheid…”
development in our sense. (Gyldendal 1983:14–5). So, after this conflict in the 1970s, criticism
After the chaotic parliamentary elections in 1973, subsided, the support continued and was in-
which turned Danish politics upside down, a lib- creased, and the political debate turned to a dis-
eral government was formed (based solely on 22 cussion of sanctions against South Africa.
MPs from the Liberal Party). The new foreign
— 10 —
Sanctions against South Africa? Danish development policy at the

The question of economic boycott came to domi- threshold of the 21st century
nate the discussions about the relations towards As mentioned earlier, Danish development policy
southern Africa, when the debate about the sup- has changed fairly little. There is still a division
port to the liberation movements subsided. For between multilateral and bilateral aid. However
many years there was a consensus that sanctions the parliamentary elections in 2001 suddenly
against the South African regime were necessary. changed the developmental environment. The Lib-
But it was considered they would be most effec- eral Party entered the elections pledging to cut
tive if the sanctions were all encompassing and development assistance in order – as it was stated
were passed by the UN. This changed in the 1970s. in their election programme – to give more re-
The triggering factor was the import of South Af- sources to the health sector, particularly the hos-
rican coal. The centre-left political parties wanted pitals. The election result turned Danish politics
to stop the coal import by the electricity company, upside down, and gave a straight right wing ma-
ELSAM, whereas the liberal-conservative parties jority for the first time in Danish history. There-
argued along the lines of Karl Kjeldgaard: “I do fore, for the first time in decades, the smaller cen-
not for one minute believe that conditions in South tre parties, who in the Danish parliamentary sys-
Africa will either improve or deteriorate if we use tem normally hold the balance of power, and who
Russian or Polish coal instead of South African have always supported development assistance,
coal.” (Karl Kjeldgaard, MP, the Conservative became unimportant, as the government had a
People’s Party, in Jyllandsposten 24/6 1978) None- clear cut right wing majority with the support of
theless parliament in May 1978 passed an ordi- the Danish People’s Party. Consequently, the
nance asking ELSAM to “if possible buy coal in budget for 2002 cut 1.5 billion DKK from the
other countries than South Africa.” development allocation.
Sanctions again came to the fore of the politi-
cal debate during the Liberal-Conservative gov-
ernment (1982–1993). In 1986 a majority in Par- Partnership 2000
liament (excluding the government) passed uni- The Danish Parliament has not – unlike Sweden –
lateral trade sanctions against South Africa. This discussed a particular Danish policy towards Af-
is probably the foremost initiative in the Nordic rica. Parliament, however, in October 1999, at the
struggle against apartheid, where Denmark took initiative of the then Social Democratic govern-
the lead. ment, decided to review Danish development as-
A final round of polemics concerning sanctions sistance in the light of the new challenges facing
were strangely enough initiated just before South the world community, in particular globalization
Africa was in the precarious transition from apart- and AIDS. The following discussions that success-
heid to majority rule. Liberal-conservative voices fully attempted to include broad circles of inter-
were raised in favour of lifting sanctions, even ested participants in the developing dialogue, re-
before the final transition had been finally negoti- sulted in a new Danish development strategy,
ated and still hung in the balance. But the major- called Partnership 2000.
ity in Parliament stuck with the argument which This revision of the existing policy was, as
Nelson Mandela put forward: “To remove sanc- mentioned, made in the light of the rapid change
tions now is the same as disarming us in the mid- in the world due to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
dle of the decisive battle.” (Quoted in Schori consequent opening of new societies to market
1992:297). So sanctions stayed in place until the forces, and the ensuing globalization, which has
transition had been finally approved by the first dealt a new set of cards. This is not the place to
free parliamentary elections. discuss the merits and drawbacks of globalization,
I think it is fair to say that the discussion con- but only to point out that the fact of globalization
cerning sanctions also took on a domestic politi- at the moment does present, especially Africa, with
cal angle. In government, the Social Democrats negative consequences. That grand old man of so-
had been hesitant to introduce uni-lateral sanc- called realistic foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, in
tions, but when a Liberal-Conservative govern- his recent book, reflects on some of the negative
ment did not have a foreign policy majority, this effects of globalization. He rightly points out that:
was made use of. “The very process that has produced greater
wealth in more parts of the world than ever be-
— 11 —
Steen Christensen
fore may also provide the mechanism for spread- for Africa, and singled out two main themes: AIDS
ing an economic and social crisis around the and the proliferation of armed conflict. “A few
world.” (Kissinger 2001:213). The book, pub- years ago we thought that a new era had dawned
lished before September 11, 2001, uncannily pres- in Africa. An era of peace and prosperity. Today
aged what would happen in the wake of an eco- we see that our optimism was premature. Violence
nomic recession. “Whenever a recession happens and use of military force often seem to be the first
– especially a prolonged one – globalization is choice of many African leaders. This ‘culture of
likely to spread its consequences quickly around violence’ is deeply troubling.” And he then inserted
the world.” (Kissinger 2001:213). I am sure that a note of cautious warning:
they see his point in Argentina and Zimbabwe. I know of course that the media picture of an
And he also foresaw what is happening right now Africa constantly torn by conflict is not at all true.
in Africa: “A permanent worldwide underclass is But I am often confronted with this image when I
in danger of emerging, especially in developing meet ordinary Danish citizens. Danes in general
countries, which will make it increasingly diffi- support development assistance to Africa. I sense,
cult to build the political consensus on which do- however, a growing disbelief in the usefulness of
mestic stability, international peace, and globali- spending Danish taxpayers’ money in countries
zation itself depend.” (Kissinger 2001:230). where killing and destruction of both people and
During the preparation for this new policy a resources are common.
broad range of interested parties were invited to Finally, he emphasized the importance of civil
participate in the discussion, and several regional society and “a very close connection between pro-
seminars were held which included representatives moting democratisation and public participation
of the recipients. At such a conference in Dar es and achieving reduction of poverty. Therefore it
Salaam, the then minister for development assist- is essential to give the poor and the women a
ance Jan Trøjborg outlined the thinking behind voice.”
Partnership 2000. What is noticeable about his The policy here presented by the minister, also
presentation of what in many respects focuses became the policy adopted by Parliament as Part-
Danish policy on new areas, is that he nonethe- nership 2000.
less mentioned that: Partnership 2000 underlines that the policy is
In essence you will have noticed, the main prin- a continuation of the law on development assist-
ciples and objectives of Danish development policy ance of 1971, thus emphasizing the continuity. The
remain the same. The principle of poverty-orien- aim of Danish development assistance is still to
tation and the crosscutting themes of gender, en- combat poverty. “A solution of the poverty prob-
vironment and human rights and democrati-sation lems in developing countries is a condition to fur-
stay at the centre of Danish development policy. ther a global sustainable development.” It puts
So, in a new environment of change, it was emphasis on the equal participation of men and
necessary to also stress the continuity of the basic women, the preservation of the environment, re-
principles. He then emphasized that the concept spect for human rights and democracy. It also notes
of partnership is not a new invention. that “Danish development policy is an integrated
It is the fundamental premise of our existing part of Danish foreign policy, where the promo-
strategy that development assistance can only be tion of joint security, democratic rule and human
effective when based on the ownership and lead- rights and the creation of economic, social and
ership of our partner countries. But partner-ship environmental sustainability are the main aims.”
is a two way street. Real partnership is all about It goes on to stress the wish for a “genuine” part-
mutual obligations. And it is equally important nership with the developing countries. Among the
that our partners give high priority to poverty new challenges are enumerated: globalization, the
reduction, to sound economic policies, to good prevention of violent conflicts, children and young
governance and to respect for human rights. people as a resource in the development process,
On the question of globalization he chose to and how to prevent and cure HIV/AIDS.
emphasize the opportunities for growth and de- The instruments to carry the revised policy
velopment, which are also inherent in the concept. through remain basically the same. The division
And he praised many African countries for hav- between multilateral and bilateral assistance re-
ing taken the first steps to adapting to the new mains basically unchanged. In 1999 the bilateral
international environment. assistance was 49.4 per cent, the multi-lateral as-
He then touched upon the specific challenges sistance 46.5 per cent (the rest being administra-
— 12 —
tion). And in the current four year planning term of August 2002. In a time when the September 11
until 2004, no change was foreseen (DANIDA occurrences have made politicians worldwide re-
1999). flect that increased development assistance may
The bilateral assistance was planned in Strat- be one road to take in order to prevent further
egy 2000 to be concentrated on activities in 20 outbreaks of terrorism and have taken the initia-
specifically appointed so called programme coun- tive to increase development assistance, the Dan-
tries, 13 of these in Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, ish government has chosen to take another road.
Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozam- The budget of 2003 further reduced Denmark’s
bique, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zim- development assistance to 0.8 per cent, a sorry
babwe). contribution to the demands of an international
Part of the bilateral assistance is the support world order.
to non-governmental organizations. About 17 per
cent of the bilateral assistance is thus channelled
through NGOs. There exist framework agree- Some concluding remarks
ments with a smaller number of NGOs which can Historically, Denmark’s relations with Africa have
administer more freely in accordance with sub- been and remain of marginal importance. Trade
mitted applications, than other NGOs which have is negligible, and the number of people visiting
to apply for every project. Contrary to the system the continent is, though increasing, all the same
in Norway and Sweden there is no requirement limited. Denmark has of late received a number
for its own contribution on the part of the apply- of refugees from Africa, primarily from Somalia,
ing organisation. and the integration of the Somalis does present a
The multilateral assistance goes to a number problem or rather a very great challenge, but them
of multilateral organizations, especially a number apart, very few Africans have settled in Denmark,
of UN specialized agencies, such as the UNDP, and the number of Somali refugees are insignifi-
UNESCO, FAO, ILO etc. Since accession to the cant in relation to the much larger population of
EEC in 1973, Denmark has participated actively Turkish and Pakistani extraction residing in Den-
in the ACP cooperation, and tried to influence the mark. The main Danish link with Africa is consti-
contents of this cooperation. In a broader spec- tuted by development assistance.
trum, Danish EU assistance only amounts to 6-7 The problems Africa faces today are so im-
per cent of the entire Danish budget. Right from mense that they cannot be solved by the continent
its inception the Lomé Convention introduced alone without outside assistance. This assistance
some of the elements that have later come to be will have to come both in the form of increased
core concepts of Danish development assistance, development assistance, but also in the form of
such as “partnership” and “mutual interdepend- increased trade and higher commodity prices (cof-
ency”, and in the Mid-Term Review in 1995 of fee is today cheaper in the Western super-markets
Lomé IV significant changes were introduced such than in 1974!). Maybe even more important would
as the mentioning of democracy and human rights be non-interference in the internal affairs of Afri-
(Rye Olsen 1999). can countries by Western powers and private in-
In November 2001 political power shifted in terests that have so far shamelessly exploited the
Denmark to a Liberal-Conservative government weaknesses of African states, most notably in the
with the support of the Danish People’s Party, Great Lakes Region, where minerals have been
which consistently has called for dramatic reduc- stolen from the people by outside forces, African
tions in Danish development assistance. As men- neighbours and European fortune hunters alike.
tioned the budget for 2002 included a reduction And the net result so far is about four million Af-
of 1.5 billion DKK. The cuts in the multilateral rican victims.
assistance primarily hit the UN organizations (the In the wider perspective it must also be in the
EU assistance being covered by agreements). Spe- self-interest of the Western world to resolve the
cialized UN agencies such as the UNDP, UNESCO, poverty and injustice that today is prevalent in
ILO were cut fairly dramatically. In the bilateral Africa. The present situation is the breeding
assistance it was decided to phase out the support ground for violence and anger. So far, surprisingly,
for three African countries entirely, on account of Africa has not been angry with the West. But will
a poor record on corruption and bad governance; that last as large parts of Africa experience pov-
Eritrea, Malawi and Zimbabwe. erty and deprivation, wars, plunder of natural re-
The budget for 2003 was presented at the end sources and outside interference?
— 13 —
Steen Christensen
In conclusion let me again quote Joseph S. Nye the Scandinavian states have political clout that is
who in his book discusses the impact of various greater than their military and economic weight,
countries’ foreign policy and convincingly argues because of the incorporation of attractive causes
for the importance of “soft power”: “And some such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their
countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and definition of national interest.” (Nye 2002:10).
References
Annerstedt, Jan & Rolf Gustavsson, 1975, “Imperialismens Justesen, Ole, 1980, “Kolonierne i Asien og Afrika”, in Ole
nye former” in Arnfred, Niels et al., Hvem hjælper Feldbæk & Ole Justesen, Kolonierne i Asien og Afrika,
hvem? En kritisk bog om Danmarks u-landsbistand. Politiken.
Arnfred, Niels et al., 1975, Hvem hjælper hvem? En kritisk Juul, Kjeld, 2002, Mod nye grænser. Fra europæisk
bog om Danmarks u-landsbistand. København. genopbygning til ulandssamarbejde 1943–1963,
Cour, Peter la, 1976, Berlingske Tidende 5/8. Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke.
Cour, Peter la, 1978, Danmarks hjælp til såkaldte Jyllandsposten 24/6, 1978
“frihedsbevægelser”– bistand til undertrykte eller Jyllandsposten 17/12, 1978
undertrykkere? Forlaget Pluralisme. Kapuzinski, Ryszard, 1998, The Shadow of the Sun. My
DANIDA, 1999, Den rullende 5-årsplan 2000–2004, African Life, London.
December. Kissinger, Henry, 2001, Does America Need a Foreign
Erdman Isert, Paul, 1985, “Breve fra Guinea og Vestindien, Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, New
1788”, in Gyldendal, Belyst ved eksempler fra de York.
danske tropekolonie. Nye, Joseph S., 2002, The Paradox of American Power
Fischer, Viggo, 1978, Kalundborg Folkeblad 3/7. (Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone),
“Folketingstidende 12/12/1951”, 2000, in Christian Kelm- Oxford.
Hansen, Det koster at være solidarisk. Nørregaard, Georg, 1996, Guldkysten. Vore gamle
Socialdemokratisk u-landspolitik, 1945–2000, tropekolonier. København 1966.
København. Rye Olsen, Gorm, 1999, “The Bureaucratic Politics of
Gyldendal, 1983, I alle de riger og lande. Oplevelser i Lacking Visions: The European Union and Lomé V”,
70’ernes udenrigspolitik. Conference on Civilisation, Regional Integration and
Jonassen, Niels, 1985, “Europæisk kolonialisme før Democratic Governance: Challenges for the European
imperialismen 1750–1850”, in Gyldendal, Belyst ved Union, Bruxelles 2 and 3 December.
eksempler fra de danske tropekolonie. Schori, Pierre, 1992, Dokument inifrån: Sverige och
Junior, Jørgen, 1978, “Dansk harikiri (sic) i Afrika” in storpolitiken i omvälvningarnas tid, Stockholm.
Berlingske Tidende 10/5.
— 14 —
Africa in Finnish policy – deepening involvement

The legendary Finnish cartoonist Kari once pro- ish Africa scene was driven by Christian mission-
duced a drawing of what he reckoned must have aries converting pagans and doing good in the re-
been the shortest telegram in the world. It was mote Ambomaa. Even when more mundane busi-
from the long-time Finnish president Urho K. ness interests and political motivations and con-
Kekkonen, known as UKK, to his colleague Dan- siderations became conspicuously involved as in
iel Arap Moi in Kenya and said: “MOI UKK”– the Republic of South Africa, it has been suggested
“Moi” meaning “Hello” in casual Finnish. One that Finnish policies have been unusually strongly
could be forgiven for thinking that a treatise on influenced by moral arguments emanating from
the place of Africa in the policies of Finland must the civil society.1
qualify for the prize for the shortest study in the To put such arguments in a broader perspec-
world – so peripheral has been the place Africa tive, we need to be clear about what the “Africa”
has occupied in Finnish policies. Contacts have we are speaking of is. Like Karen Blixen who had
been infrequent, and their essential content seems “her” Africa, there have been several Finnish
all but exhausted in UKK’s one-sided message to Africas. We have started to understand that Af-
Moi. Yet this would be a premature conclusion. rica as an object of humanitarian intervention, co-
Throughout the decades, Africa has exerted an lonial assault, and post-colonial knowledge for-
irrestible pull on Finnish policy-makers and forced mation was the product of a complex historical
them to make choices that have not always been process of what is nowadays called invention and
easy. imagination and it was something that was done
Of course, there can be no question of the pe- by Europeans and Africans alike.2 Africa as a con-
ripheral and secondary nature of African issues in crete missionary field, or aid or business partner
Finnish policy-making. For obvious reasons of ge- for Finnish, or any real-world, participants inevi-
ography, history and culture, Africa could not have tably has different co-ordinates and a more lim-
been a core area for Finland in foreign policy or ited, time- and spacebound existence than that vast
trade. Direct contacts have been few and far be- land mass we call Africa. For the purposes of this
tween and much policy-making has been domi- paper, we have quite arbitrarily redivided Africa
nated by perceptions and images rather than an into three big chunks which we think have been
immediate encounter with the African everyday of most relevance for the Finnish policy point of
conditions. Even after the contacts have intensi- view: South Africa, Namibia, and the rest.
fied and knowledge has accumulated, Africa as a
policy objective has largely been seen through the
lenses of others, the colonial and post-colonial South Africa: trade and moralism
powers. This said, Africa has continuously figured The key country in African-Finnish official rela-
in Finnish policies and often done so in quite com- tions has been South Africa – although in a very
plex ways, bringing its realities to bear on Finnish different way in different phases. At first, South
policy-making.
What is perhaps most strange is that the Finn- 1
See Timo-Erkki Heino, “Politics on Paper. Finland’s South
ish interests and policies in Africa appear to have Africa Policy, 1945–1991”, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Research
been animated and informed by humanitarian and Report no. 90, Uppsala 1992 for South Africa; and Iina Soiri
and Pekka Peltola, Finland and National Liberation in Southern
moral considerations to a greater extent than else- Africa, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1999, for Southern
where. In recent history, two main factors have Africa more broadly. Much of the historical empirical data in
dominated the Finnish relations to Africa: the ra- this paper on South Africa and Namibia is taken from these
two basic studies: the interpretations are ours.
cial conflict in Southern Africa and development 2
To get into the discussion, see e.g. V. Mudimbe, The Invention
aid – both subjects highly charged with value con- of Africa, 1994 and Jean and John Comaroff, Of Revelation
tent. Before the age of apartheid and aid, the Finn- and Revolution, Chicago, 1991, ch. 3.
— 15 —
Africa was one of those “Neo-Europes” to which sentation, South Africa was a priority outside
European immigration flows, trade and investment Europe. No less than five honorary consulates
naturally gravitated. From the 1950s onwards were established there in 1925: Cape Town, Jo-
South Africa was progressively turned into an in- hannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth, and East
ternational outcast as the Nationalist regime in London. After the Great Depression had forced
Pretoria devised ever more elaborate ways of keep- an intensified search for new markets a consulate
ing the races hierarchically apart at the same time was established in Pretoria in 1937: this was the
as racial barriers in the rest of Africa were coming first permanent Finnish mission in Africa.
down. In the new international set-up dominated The Finnish exports to South Africa were pro-
by the post-colonially race-conscious United Na- portionally at their height from 1925 to 1939
tions, it became necessary for every government when they approached 1.5 per cent of the total
to take a stand on South Africa’s apartheid, some- value of all Finnish exports. Significant as such,
thing which the Finns with their supposedly non- South Africa was also the largest single overseas
moralist foreign policy found more difficult to do market for Finnish sawn timber. Moreover, trade
than the other Nordics. At present, a new phase with South Africa was advantageous to Finland’s
has set in, apartheid having been relegated into national economy as the exports always greatly
the dustbin of history. South Africa is a major exceeded the imports. During the same period, the
development co-operation partner and the bud- South African share of Finnish imports represented
ding hope is that in the not so distant future it a tiny 0.06 per cent – wool and fruits were not
will again prove a good trade and investment part- much to match the flows of sawn timber and the
ner. beginning of paper exports.
The relations between the two most distant
countries in the same time zone grew so warm
Building up a relationship
that after the Soviet frontal assault on Finland,
The Finnish-South African relationship has his- South Africa, no doubt recalling that dozens of
torical depth far exceeding that with the rest of South African Finns had volunteered to fight on
Africa and going even beyond that with neighbour- the Boer side, provided considerable military help
ing Namibia. Finland started to trade with South to the fiercely resisting Finns in the Winter War of
Africa when both were in a politically subjugated 1939–40. In accordance with a League of Nations
position: Finnish sawn timber, used for mine sup- resolution, South Africa sent 25 airplanes and a
ports and fruit crates, was exported to South Af- considerable amount of cash to Finland. South
rica by British agents from the middle of the 19th African wine growers even donated 24,000 litres
century. Meanwhile, more than one thousand im- of brandy, although the bottles somehow ended
migrants crossed the wide seas from Finland to up in the Finnish Embassy in London and the
South Africa before World War One, mainly to frontline soldiers were left fighting thirsty.
take up work in the Johannesburg mines. Though Later during the war years, when the Finns
many migrants were short-term and their num- joined the Germans to take revenge on the Rus-
bers were small compared with the hundreds of sians, South Africa as a British dominion had to
thousands who went to North America this nev- declare war on Finland. The practical conse-
ertheless represented a major subsidiary flow of quences were non-existent, and the episode was
Finnish overseas migration. actively forgotten after the war. The first fully-
Whereas the Finnish immigration did not plant fledged Finnish diplomatic legation on the Afri-
a sizeable and vociferous population of Finnish can continent was established in Pretoria in 1949
origin in South Africa, trade relations not only while the head of the South African legation to
continued but intensified and were completed and Sweden was accredited to Finland in 1955. Hon-
driven further by political contacts. Due to the orary consulates were reopened by the early 1950s
infrequence and limited nature of other contacts, and filled mostly by agents of Finnpap, the Finn-
the state and capital became unusually intimately ish Paper Mills Association which had established
interwoven in the Finnish-South African relation- a sales office in Cape Town in 1952. Sawn timber
ship. Finnish diplomatic representation in South was increasingly replaced by paper, and later
Africa was geared to promote Finnish exports. metal-industry products whereas fruits remained
Although the greatest of economic restrictions the major import. Quantitatively, the trade did not
were in place when newly independent Finland quite reach its previous proportions but contin-
was building up its network of diplomatic repre- ued to be in surplus for Finland. From 1946 to
— 16 —
1966, South Africa’s share of Finnish exports was tice of the Finnish people but Finland did not think
0.74 per cent and of imports 0.27 per cent. it was the business of the UN to interfere. In the
famous formulation of Kekkonen, Finland was to
be “doctor rather than judge”.
Friends disunited After the Sharpeville massacre in 1961 and the
Against this background of a decades long build- international outcry following it, such an ultra-
up of amiable relations and vested interests, the neutral line became impossible to sustain, though
Finns felt in an awkward position when they real- the Finns tried their level best. They only aban-
ized that having been belatedly accepted into the doned it for good in 1966 when for the first time
United Nations in 1955, they were expected to they voted for a resolution condemning racial op-
take a critical stand on the way the Nationalist pression in South Africa and recommending the
government was treating its non-White majority Security Council to make use of economic sanc-
and was holding on to Namibia, or South West tions. Yet they continued to abstain in votes pro-
Africa, despite the UN’s attempts to take over the posing more concrete action. This new line may
territory. In 1958 when the Finnish delegates par- not have been unconnected with the emerging, and
ticipated for the first time in the discussions on ultimately unsuccessful, drive of Jakobson, then
the South West African issue in the General As- the Finnish UN representative, for the post of the
sembly they explained that the relations between Secretary General of the UN. Be that as it may, in
Finland and South Africa were most friendly and the same year, 1966, Finland started humanitar-
satisfactory and Finland’s contribution to the is- ian assistance to the victims of apartheid and for
sue would take place in a spirit reflecting these the first time contributed to the UN Trust Fund
good relations. On the big issue of the day as to for South Africa. At that stage, a new left-domi-
whether apartheid represented the internal busi- nated government was sitting in Helsinki and Finn-
ness of the country which was beyond the UN’s ish civil society had awakened. Small but vocifer-
competence or whether the human rights prin- ous student groups were organizing campaigns and
ciples of the UN charter gave other members rea- a visible group of young radicals was demanding
son to intervene, Finland first joined the non-in- a “new foreign policy”. The Seamen Federation
terventionist side. (Merimies-Unioni) led by the legendary Niilo
To deal with the situation, high officials re- Wälläri embarked on a boycott of the state alco-
sponsible for Finland’s new global policy devel- hol monopoly Alko selling Kap Brandy, known
oped a policy doctrine of what was called neu- on the street as “Lumumba” (a revealing indica-
trality but might also be called balanced inaction. tor of the level of confusion in African political
After the war, Finland had had to bite the bullet geography in Finland!).
and accept a special relationship of peaceful co- From 1966 to 1987 when the Parliament of
existence with the Soviet Union. Part of maintain- Finland unanimously adopted the South Africa Act
ing this delicate relationship was that the Finns prohibiting trade with South Africa the history of
were not to criticize Soviet misdeeds on moral Finnish-South African relations followed the same
grounds, such as the violent crushing of the Hun- pattern. With the despair of the non-White peo-
garian uprising in 1956: everything had to be done ple growing inside South Africa and Pretoria re-
to keep popular emotions down inside Finland. sponding with new refinements of everyday op-
To counterbalance this, it was argued, Finland had pression and occasional massacres such as those
to refrain from criticizing others on moral grounds in Soweto in 1976, international pressure to in-
too. As Max Jakobson, a major official responsi- fluence the South African government through
ble for the policy, later explained “when, for rea- boycott action was stepped up. In Finland, fresh
sons of political realism, we did not want to pass campaigns were organized in which also the Lu-
moral judgements on actions taken by govern- theran state church increasingly participated. Par-
ments near to us, we avoided them in the name of liamentarians pestered the ministers with awkward
consistence even when the scene of the crime was questions. But the influence of the wood indus-
far away, for instance in South Africa…”.3 As tries outweighed this and official Finland dragged
Jakobson, himself a Jew, stated in the UN in 1959, its feet, giving in only gradually, step by step.
racial discrimination did violate the sense of jus- Apartheid was being ever more clearly condemned
in words and a sports boycott was introduced in
the early 1970s. Direct aid to the African National
3
Max Jakobson, 38. kerros. Helsinki, 1983, pp. 58-59. Congress, ANC, was started in 1977. The sums
— 17 —
involved were trifling and it was emphasized that Search for a new basis
the support was strictly for humanitarian pur- A collateral casualty was the Finnish policy doc-
poses. It took until 1985 before new investments trine of balanced inaction. To save the remnants
were banned. of it, the idea of South African exception-alism
Meanwhile, trade – the overwhelmingly most was introduced. The situation in South Africa was
consequential factor in Finnish-South African reso bad that the normal “realist” state logic could
lations – continued and even temporarily in- not be applied there, it was argued. Whereas many
creased. From 1967 to 1985 South Africa’s share countries in the word practised discrimination of
of Finnish exports, consisting increasingly of pa- one kind or another, South Africa was, after all,
per machinery instead of paper products, fluctu- the only one where such discrimi-nation had been
ated around 0.5 per cent, reaching 0.68 per cent written into the books of law. Others saw it more
in 1984, although imports showed a gradual de- as sour grapes. Finland’s relations with South Af-
cline from the level of 0.2 per cent towards 0.1 rica had “stopped being foreign policy in the
per cent. One of the principles now introduced to proper sense on the word,” Keijo Korhonen, a
make a case for Finnish behaviour was that of uni- former high Foreign Ministry official in Kekkonen’s
versality of trade and the Finnish insignificance. confidence, argued “They have become a new di-
The articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs mension of domestic and party politics and simul-
and Trade (GATT) forbade unilateral discrimina- taneously an important instrument for foreign
tion of individual parties to the GATT agreement, political masturbation…”.5
and, in any case, as long as the other countries One could argue that Finland’s South Africa
continued to trade, uni-lateral Finnish action policy was shot through with irreconcilable con-
would make no difference except harm the Finns tra-dictions all the way along. The line separating
themselves, the long-time Foreign Minister Paavo a “moralist” from “non-moral” stand on an issue
Väyrynen (Centre Party) argued. A trade embargo like apartheid was so thin that it disappeared into
could be based only on a UN Security Council thin air: it overlooked that moral issues and feel-
resolution.4 Whereas the Finns had no problem in ings are facts of life influencing human action as
joining the South African arms embargo in 1977 much as flows of trade and machinations of power
as it was decided by the Security Council, or the politics do. Here, as in many other second-ary
previous Rhodesian trade embargo, unilateral foreign policy issues the line of the leading clique
sanctions against South Africa were a different of the Foreign Ministry had been to follow the
matter. other Nordics, in order to keep up a foreign policy
Yet Finland ended up in declaring such a uni- profile of a Western, that is non-Soviet, block
lateral trade embargo in June 1987. It was pre- country. Väyrynen expressed it sublimely when he
ceded by similar action by other Nordic countries said that on the issues of boycotting South Africa
and by a blockade of Finnish transport workers. Finland had been “in the second coach of the first
In 1985 the Nordics had decided to implement train”.6 Yet Finland’s policy was supposed to be
more farreaching sanctions against South Africa, non-moralist while the other Nordics openly let
the Finns complaining that the proposed meas- moral feelings influence their policies and in Fin-
ures were “technically complicated” to apply. In land the same feelings spurred the civil society into
October 1985 the Transport Workers’ Union action. The “realists” themselves well understood
(AKT), led by the maverick Risto Kuisma, decided that the strengthening of feelings of international
to start a blockade of goods to and from South solidarity and building up an inter-national sys-
Africa, an action that gained wide support and tem based on respect of human rights was very
soon reduced direct trade between the two coun- much in the interests of a small nation in the posi-
tries to a trickle. But indirect trade continued, and tion of Finland.7
new campaigns were mounted to stop it. When While Finland was the last Nordic country to
laws prohibiting all trade with South Africa went impose trade sanctions on South Africa it was also
into effect in one Nordic country after another, the first to lift them, in 1991. The minor contro-
starting in Denmark in December 1986, the Finn- versy following this was quickly forgotten when
ish government finally bowed to pressure to in- South Africa moved to majority rule in 1994 and
troduce similar legislation.
5
Keijo Korhonen, Mitalin toinen puoli, Helsinki, 1989, p. 93.
6
Quoted in Heino, op.cit., p. 90.
4 7
Heino, op.cit., pp. 69, 86. Jakobson, op. cit., p. 60.
— 18 —
faced entirely different challenges. Finland started clear who “Namibia” was and to what extent the
bilateral aid there in 1995 although it was too Namibians reciprocated to such a basically patri-
wealthy to be officially included among the main archal attitude. Tensions kept on being generated
co-operation partners. The 1997 Africa policy beneath the sunny surface. During the Namibian
document stated that Republic of South Africa is independence struggle, Finns took great pride in
the most important co-operation partner in sub- their non- and anti-colonial background. After all,
Saharan Africa for Finland. It is also the only Af- Finland never had colonies: it had been a colony
rican country which Finnish ministers have vis- itself, first under Swedish rule, and from 1809 to
ited quite frequently. The top leaders of the two 1917 a Grand Duchy of Tsarist Russia. Yet this
countries decided in 1998 to continue Finnish aid had not prevented many Finns having a rather
after the interim phase and even increase it. It has “colonial” mentality in their dealings with Afri-
been agreed, however, that the programme is tem- cans. The post-colonial aid relationship was
porary and will be phased out by 2010. In the marred by the unequal starting point emanating
longer term, Finland’s interests in South Africa are from the inequality of resources and a reluctance
more oriented to political co-operation and, again, to tackle some sensitive issues.
furthering Finnish exports. ICT (information and The issues the Finns confronted in Namibia
communication technology) is seen as the new bore a superficial resemblance to those they faced
growth sector. with South Africa but in fact they went deeper as
their own involvement was so much deeper. There
From Ambomaa to Namibia: is no doubt that from the 1970s onwards the over-
whelming majority of the relevant Finnish actors
special relationship transformed
– from missionaries to government officials – sin-
Finnish relations with Namibia have necessarily cerely supported Namibian independence and
been entangled with the relations with South Af- were relieved when it was finally achieved in 1990.
rica, yet they have a quality and history of their Underlying this unity of purpose there were two
own. Among the “real” African countries Namibia major unresolved issues: those of representation
is the one with which Finland has had a very spe- and interference. Who was entitled to represent
cial relationship – or at least the Finns like to think the Namibian people in their struggle and who
so. This is mainly because of the long presence had the right to interfere in the doings of those
and cultural influence of Finnish mission-aries who claimed to be the rightful representatives?
there, most conspicuously reflected in the Finn- Obvious questions as they were, confronting them
ish-sounding first names of many older-generation was nevertheless evaded for as long as possible.
Namibians. More recently, many Finns played an What made it complicated was exactly the his-
active role in the long drawn-out independence tory behind it all. It took quite some time before
process of Namibia, notably Martti Ahtisaari who the bulk of the missionary opinion accepted that
later became the President of Finland. After inde- Namibians were ready to govern themselves. The
pendence, Namibia, despite its mineral-based first missionaries had started to work in 1870 in
wealth, became a major recipient of Finnish aid. Ambomaa, that is Ovamboland in northern Na-
Lately, however, the relations have turned sour, mibia, well before the German colonialists had set
and it has now been decided that the Finnish foot there; and they had formed good working
bilteral aid programme to Namibia is to be phased relations with both the German and the subsequent
out within a few years. The special relationship is South African colonial administration. During the
obviously being transformed although probably German period, they had been in a key position
not disappearing. as political and spiritual mediators between the
colonialists and the local rulers and peoples. Un-
Independence struggle: der South African rule, their political role dimin-
representation and interference ished but they were for a long time essential in
providing the greater part of education and health
In retrospect, the relationship was always more
care. The missionaries naturally maintained their
complex than it appeared in glib speeches and dec-
own identity but could not avoid being influenced
larations on either side in its heyday. Whereas the
by the surrounding “colonial situation” aggra-
Finns innocently felt that they “had sort of adopted
vated by official segregation. “Are there any
that far-away corner of the world”8 it was not quite
among us,” a former missionary wondered, “who
8
Jakobson, op.cit., p. 65.
— 19 —
have not been guilty of feelings of false superior- Later, the Nationhood Programme covering the
ity – or artificial camaraderie…?” 9 UN assistance to Namibia was established follow-
When SWAPO (South West African Peoples’ ing a Finnish initiative and was co-ordinated by
Organization, the main liberation movement and Finns.
the present ruling party) was formed in 1960, the The Finns had not always been so keen to in-
first reaction among Finnish missionaries was over- terfere. A revealing historical episode, and the first
whelmingly negative. The attitude changed only time when Africa figured in official Finnish for-
during the 1960s. In the early 1970s the balance eign policy, was played out shortly after Finnish
of the missionary opinion had tilted in favour of independence. A delegation consisting of local
independence. Three factors contributed to the notables turned up in the office of the State Secre-
change. One was the irresistible wave of independ- tary of the newly independent Finland, K.G.
ence north of the Limpopo and the outside pres- Idman, and proposed that Ovamboland should be
sure brought by it. The second was that the local made a Finnish colony. Finnish missionaries had
Ambo-Kavango church that had grown from the done so much good there and the German Empire
Finns’ own work took an unequivocal stand for was obviously collapsing, they pointed out. The
independence. Third, when the guerrilla war was more realistically-minded Secretary turned the
started in 1966, low-key as it was, the warfare proposal down immediately, observing later that
methods graphically revealed the nature of the “Finland would not have had any practical ben-
South African state to the missionaries. When efit from the country and the only consequence of
“victims of strange accidents, frightened people our possessing it would have been the investment
who were not even able to tell what had happened of considerable amounts of money in a country,
to them” began to appear in mission hospitals, which we would have probably lost sooner or later
the Finnish missionaries realized that people were anyway”.11
being tortured in detention. Their conclusion was, Only in the 1960s were the Finns ready to in-
“South Africa is a police state” (Väisälä). vest some money in a country they could not im-
Meanwhile Finnish officials at the UN head- agine ever gaining. As for the issue of representa-
quarters in New York, frustrated by the endless tion, they took the UN General Assembly decla-
stream of resolutions “which were not even meant ration of SWAPO as the “sole authentic representa-
to be implemented” (Jakobson)10 but which they tive of the Namibian people” as their cue. Other
had themselves joined, stepped up efforts to search Namibian groups were politely turned down. Fin-
for what they thought would be a more workable land started to give direct aid to SWAPO in 1974
solution acceptable to all parties. Namibia, as a when Sam Nujoma visited Finland. At first the
former League of Nations mandate was in inter- sums were very modest and destined mainly for
national law in a very different position from South education but they grew and diversified. In 1975,
Africa: it was hard to deny that it belonged to the a scholarship programme was initiated under
UN’s jurisdiction. The question was what to do. which more than 60 Namibian students were
The Afro-Asian majority in the General Assembly brought to Finland to study topics ranging from
had for years produced resolutions to make South nursing to geology. Funded by Finnida and ad-
Africa relinquish the territory and hand it over to ministered by Finnchurchaid, the students were
the UN’s administration. Major Western countries selected by SWAPO and the Finns in co-operation.
were unhappy and tried to seek a compromise ac- In 1983, all assistance to Namibia/SWAPO was
ceptable to South Africa. Jakobson, as the Finn- fashioned into a Namibia Education, Health, Nu-
ish UN representative, was part of this search as trition and Research Programme which included
the chairman of the South West Africa Commit- in addition to scholarships production of educa-
tee established in 1966. He initiated the legal pro- tion materials and funding to the UN Institute for
cedure whereby the International Court at The Namibia.
Hague finally managed to declare that the South Perhaps the most visible of all Namibia-related
African mandate of Namibia had indeed expired. Finnish activities was Ahtisaari’s work for Nami-
bian independence. This has been the source of
special pride to the Finns and it was not least due
9
This and the following quotations are from the account of a
former missionary, Marja Väisälä, “Suomalainen lähetystyö”,
in Kimmo and Marja-Liisa Kiljunen (eds), Namibia – viimeinen 11
siirtomaa, Helsinki, 1980, pp. 246–247. K.G. Idman, Maamme itsenäistymisen vuosilta, Porvoo, 1953,
10
Jakobson, op.cit., p. 62. pp. 305–306.
— 20 —
to the publicity resulting from it that he in 1994 of being spies. It appears many were tortured and
was catapulted to the position of President of the some killed.13
Republic as an outsider sponsored by dissident The Finns, and other donors, were not una-
Social Democrats. However, it is not quite clear ware of what was happening inside SWAPO but
what his contribution ultimately was: to what decided not to interfere. It was evidently feared
extent he was an international civil servant duti- that if SWAPO had formally disintegrated, it
fully executing the orders of his superiors and how would have played into the hands of South Af-
much independent leeway he exercised and to rica. During the 1976 crisis when some SWAPO
whose benefit.12 At first he walked on tip-toe with dissidents were detained in Zambia, some of the
the difficult double role of being at the same time fugitives sought refuge in the Lusaka house of a
the African-sponsored UN Commissioner for Finnish official, Kari Karanko, but otherwise the
Namibia and the Special Representative of the UN support went on as before. When accusations
Secretary General for Namibia after this post was about prison camps in Angola began to circulate,
created in 1978 to execute the Western sponsored an international fact-finding mission went to in-
independence plan endorsed in the UN Security vestigate the matter but came back empty-handed.
Council Resolution 435 in 1978. Opting for the For the Finns, the policy of non-interference in
latter, he became involved for much longer than the internal affairs of SWAPO was a natural ad-
many had imagined. It took more than ten years aptation of their general line. “The liberation
before mutual suspicions could be cleared and the struggle is not the most democratic phase in the
plan was implemented. The process was marred life of an organisation”, Ahtisaari later explained.14
in its final stages in April 1989 by a bloody deba- Finland continued the direct support to SWAPO
cle. Ahtisaari gave the South African troops sta- until 1989. When it was discontinued it was not
tioned in Namibia the green light to confront because of concerns about human rights inside
SWAPO soldiers who had crossed the border from SWAPO but because the political process based
Angola. Although sending in armed combatants, on Resolution 435 had reached a stage where it
evidently to establish a showy presence in the an- was no longer feasible to prop up one party.
ticipation of elections, was a breach of existing
agreements and showed poor judgement from the Transforming the relationship
side of the relevant SWAPO leadership, a lot of
In this way, several sensitive issues which were
bitterness was bound to remain. Apparently hun-
never properly confronted were carried into the
dreds of SWAPO men were killed: the loss of life
relationship between independent Namibia and
during these fateful days probably exceeded that
Finland. The beginning was bright, to be sure.
in all the guerrilla war prior to it.
Despite recriminations after the April 1989 kill-
SWAPO had been frustrated at having been left
ings, the Namibian settlement plan remained on
on the sidelines during the long negotiation proc-
track, leading to elections in late 1989 and to full
ess and had tried to bolster up its tattered image.
independence on 21 March 1990. New Namibia
Its position was tricky indeed. While it had been
was firmly in the hands of SWAPO. In the first
treated as the sole representative of the Namibian
elections, SWAPO gained 57 per cent of the votes,
people by the UN and the donors, it had not been
which had grown to 76 per cent in 1999, and
given any special treatment in the peace plan based
Nujoma easily made it to President. The bulk of
on the UN Resolution 435. What made it worse
SWAPO’s support came from Ovamboland. For a
was that the movement was internally split and
while Namibia seemed to become an exemplary
the leadership was maintaining control with in-
African democracy. A promise made back in 1976
creasingly repressive measures. Whereas in an ear-
that Namibia would be taken as a major recipient
lier showdown in 1976 the main dissidents had
of Finnish aid could finally be realised. The Finn-
been given the opportunity to go into exile, in the
ish aid programme started with a considerable
1980s perhaps up to 2,000 SWAPO members were
volume, and Finland became one of the major do-
rounded up in prison camps in Angola, accused
nors in Namibia. Most Finnish aid went into
health, education, water and the environment.
12
Cf. e.g. Chester Crocker’s account, The High Noon in
13
Southern Africa, New York and London, 1992, with Finnish There are several works on this today although the subject
hero stories, such as Soiri and Peltola, op.cit. and Hannu remains officially uninvestigated. This short account is based
Heikkilä, Martti Ahtisaari. Kansainvälinen tie presidentiksi, on Soiri and Peltola, op.cit., pp.125–131.
14
Helsinki, 1997. In an interview with Soiri and Peltola, op. cit., p. 184.
— 21 —
Lately, however, cracks have appeared and the In addition to South Africa, it was the other area
relationship has started to go sour. In African that attracted some worker migration in the early
terms, mineral-rich Namibia is a relatively well- 19th century. Some 150 young Finns, like their
off country and in 1997 it was decided that the more numerous counterparts from Sweden, were
Finnish aid programme would be gradually phased drawn to King Leopold’s violent venture. They
out. There was little need to reconsider the deci- went right into the heart of darkness, working as
sion when oligarchic traits were intensified inside captains and engineers on boats plying back and
Namibia and the government became involved in forth along the River Congo. Otherwise the Finn-
wars in Angola and Congo. Finnish aid disburse- ish-African relationships before World War Two,
ments have been in steady decline during the past the high noon of European imperialism in Africa,
few years. Political relations are no longer as close were very haphazard: some diplomatic interaction
as they used to be, after Namibia asked Finland with Ethiopia and Liberia in the League of Na-
to call its ambassador home from Windhoek. No tions, a missionary here and a traveller there. Af-
public explanation was offered but the ambassa- ter the war, the winds of change began to be felt.
dor in question was known as a straightforward Larger groups of Finnish missionaries went to a
and vocal man who did not hide his displeasure number of new places from Angola to Tangan-
on ventures such as Namibia’s involvement in yika and elsewhere in East Africa. Yet what trans-
Congo. He also happened to be the same Finnish formed these relations was the advent of aid.
official who had once hid SWAPO dissidents in
his home in Lusaka, Karanko.
The rise and fall of Finnish aid
Finland has decided it will not appoint a new
ambassador to Namibia, and the embassy will be Finnish aid, a relative late-comer, was from its very
headed by a chargé d’affaires. This can be seen as start heavily concentrated to Africa as this was
a sign that the embassy may be closed after the the common Nordic line in the early 1960s. Tan-
development co-operation programme has been zania quickly became the major partner. The
terminated in 2007. What will happen after that Nordics had collectively ended up there when
is anybody’s guess: NGO co-operation will no looking for a suitable recipient for intensifying
doubt be continued and some more “economic in- their aid efforts.15 At that time, Africa seemed to
teraction” is hoped for. The special relationship present a notable opportunity for co-operation: a
will look rather different without the heavy state giant awakening. Tanzania – still Tanganyika –
backing. was picked out because of the appeal of the mod-
eration of Julius Nyerere’s policies, its develop-
mental potential and the fact that there was no
The rest: the flag follows aid need to try to speak French there. There were more
What makes it justifiable to treat the rest of Af- than 50 Nordic missionaries in the country, some
rica summarily as one residual category for Finn- of whom lobbied strongly for Nyerere. The Nor-
ish policies is that the Finnish relations with other dic Tanganyika Centre was constructed in 1963–
countries and areas in Africa have not only been 67 and run by a Nordic staff until 1970 when it
even less developed but they have been formed on was handed over to the Tanzanian state as the
a different logic. Some beginnings to historical Kibaha Educational Centre as a “gesture of hu-
links have been present there as well but one fac- man brotherhood” (Nyerere). The first bilateral
tor has become dominant in determining these group of Finnish volunteers, called the Develop-
relations: development aid. In Finnish relations ment Corps (kehitysjoukot) was dispatched in
with Africa, the flag followed aid more often than 1967. Soon, other forms of aid which gained popu-
the other way around. It is only very recently, due larity in Finnish development co-operation such
to pressures emanating from the demands of the as the use of development “experts” and consul-
Finnish membership of the European Union (EU), tancy companies, and soft loans called Develop-
that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) has ment Credits were pioneered in Tanzania.
made attempts to forge a comprehensive Finnish Tanzania’s rise and long pre-eminence was due
strategy for Africa also comprising other, i.e. non- to the Nordic factor. Meanwhile, Finnish diplo-
aid related issues, but without convincing success matic missions had been established elsewhere, in
so far.
One of the few places with which some his- 15
This historical sketch draws on Juhani Koponen, “Finnish
torical links, now all but forgotten, exist, is Congo. aid to Tanzania – still afloat”, FAD Working Paper, 1/2000.
— 22 —
countries that seemed more important from the more emphasis was placed on their openness to
more general, political or economic point of view: foreign capital than the extent of poverty or the
in Cairo (1957) which was more oriented towards drive for social equality. Egypt and Kenya were
the Middle East than Africa, Lagos (1963), the elevated to the “main recipients” category in 1979.
capital of the most populous and commercially Even when in 1982 a number of least developed
most promising of the emerging West African na- and other poor countries were listed by a Cabinet
tions, and Addis Ababa (ambassador accredited decision care was taken that they were sites for
in 1965) which had become the seat of the Or- on-going Finnish project activities. African coun-
ganization of African Unity. The original idea was tries then included were Ethiopia, Somalia, the
that diplomatic representation would direct aid Sudan and Mozambique. In the late 1980s Finn-
to countries such as Ethiopia and Nigeria. In prac- ish aid to Africa was at its widest. Besides the listed
tice it was the opposite that happened: after aid “main recipients” aid-funded projects were under-
relations were initiated they drew diplomatic mis- taken in several countries, some of them in Cen-
sions after them. Aid to the countries where the tral (Burundi) or Western Africa (Senegal).
new embassies were situated did not take off as Also here, the issue of interference emerged al-
expected. Work in Ethiopia started very sluggishly though in a rather different manner than in Na-
and the attempts to assist Nigeria were given up mibia. The official Finnish line at the beginning
after a few years due to the unwieldy and corrupt was to respect the sovereignty of the recipients in
working environment. Meanwhile, commercially the conduct of their internal affairs. After the do-
more promising countries such as Kenya and Zam- nor had made its choice of partners, it was not to
bia were added to the recipients to counterbal- interfere in the policies of the latter. In practice,
ance poor and now “socialist” Tanzania and new this line was also stuck to as long as it resonated
diplomatic missions were established where aid reasonably well with the commercial ambitions
was flowing to, first as preliminary aid adminis- of Finnish aid and projects which were satisfac-
tration posts which in due course were elevated tory in this respect could be agreed upon. But when
into fully-fledged embassy status. In this way Fin- African economies came to the brink of collapse
land established embassies in Dar es Salaam in the early 1980s and the Bretton Woods Institu-
(1971), Lusaka (1976) and Nairobi (ambassador tions, IMF and the World Bank started to push
transferred from Addis Ababa in 1977). structural adjustment as a condition for continu-
Finnish aid funds grew very slowly during the ation of their support, Finland and other bilateral
whole of the formative period in the 1960s and well donors had to make up their mind, about whose
into the Nordic-national phase in the 1970s when side they were ultimately on.
the Nordic countries, especially Sweden, provided The earliest, and the most decisive, battle was
the role model. In 1977, the share of development fought in Tanzania.17 With its early assistance, Fin-
aid of the Finnish GNI was still only 0.16 per cent – land and the other Nordics had lent their support
one of the lowest in Europe. But then the growth to the Tanzanian policy of ujamaa socialism and
accelerated so that in the latter part of the 1980s it self-reliance. It had appeared to be an honest at-
was the most rapid of any Western donor country. tempt to build a modern African society. In the
The international aid target was reached and even early 1980s it was clear that whatever the moral
exceeded in 1991 when Finnish aid rose to its unique appeal of ujamaa, economically it did not work.
peak of 0.80 per cent – only to be drastically cut the When the crisis set it, Finland and the other Nor-
in years thereafter. dic countries, after some soul-searching, accepted
There were many reasons for this growth; one the gist of the Bretton Woods analysis and threw
being that the use of the funds reflected more com- their weight behind it. The ultimate roots of the
mercial than developmentalist considerations.16 problem were seen not as external, as claimed by
Projects were planned with an eye to maximising the Tanzanians, but internal, stemming from the
Finnish deliveries and implementation was en- wrong policies pursued by the government. The
trusted to Finnish consultancy companies. When main culprit was identified as too much state con-
new countries were added to the recipient list, trol and interference in the economy. This was to
be corrected by the standard package of devalua-
16
The analysis here draws on Juhani Koponen, “Between
developmentalism and instrumentalism. An interpretation of 17
For a more extensive analysis, see Koponen, “Finnish aid to
the history of Finnish aid”, FAD Working Paper, x/1999.
Tanzania – still afloat”, FAD Working Paper, 1/2000.
— 23 —
tion, liberalization and privatisation. After the tion. A major principle was to downsize develop-
change of heart of the Nordic countries, the Tan- ment co-operation programmes in long-term part-
zanian government had few options other than to ner countries – although the decline first hit Finn-
swallow its pride and endorse the conditionalities ish disbursements to multilateral agencies most
imposed in 1986. severely. However, although the Finnish economy
After the turnabout in Tanzania, it was easy bounced back from the doldrums, no correspond-
for Finland to support structural adjustment poli- ing change happened in the relative size of the
cies elsewhere in Africa, as they became topical in Finnish aid. It has remained on the level of roughly
one country after another. Gradually this amount- 0.34 per cent of the GNI ever since. Certainly, in
ed to a major policy shift and adoption of a new absolute terms the Finnish development co-opera-
doctrine where conditionality and interference, tion budget increased appreciably every year dur-
now called dialogue, are rather seen as necessary ing the latter part of the 1990s, with the high
ingredients than something to be shunned. growth rates of GNI. Nevertheless, funds are still
nowhere near their former level, even in absolute
terms (the appropriation was 480 million euro in
Mainstreaming Africa
2002). This indicates that the policy relevance of
Finland’s policy on Africa underwent a consider- development co-operation for Finland has changed
able change during the 1990s. Aid funds were during the 1990s. The economic factors that forced
slashed and the MFA felt the need to reduce the Finland to decrease the co-operation budget no
heavy reliance of its policy on aid. It started what longer exist, but funds have not fully recovered.
it regarded as ‘mainstreaming’ Africa as a part of
‘normal’ foreign policy. It now considers develop- EU membership
ment co-operation only as one of the ‘tools’ of At the same time, Finland became a European
Finnish foreign policy in Africa, and puts more Union member, something that profoundly
emphasis on developing other dimensions of for- changed Finland’s approach to development co-
eign relations with African countries. At least four operation as well. During the Cold War period it
factors, partly inter-related, affecting this main- had been important for Finland to identify itself
streaming can be identified, in chronological or- as a member of the Nordic community. Aiming at
der: cuts in aid, the EU membership, new policy the same level of development aid with the rest of
outlines and administrative restructuring. The the Nordic countries was therefore considered to
most consequential of these is no doubt the EU be necessary. The end of the Cold War and mem-
membership to which all the others are in one way bership in the EU completely changed Finland’s
or another related. international position, and it became more impor-
tant for Finland to identify itself as a member of
Cuts in aid the EU. Therefore, it is no longer considered
In the early 1990s Finnish aid funds were drasti- worthwhile to aim at the same volume of aid as
cally cut. From their peak of 0.80 per cent of GNI the other Nordics, but rather to keep at the aver-
in 1991, Finnish aid disbursement rapidly declined age level of the EU.
to 0.31 per cent in 1994 (in absolute terms this The EU membership also added a new, explic-
meant a decline from over 633 million euro to itly political dimension to Finnish Africa relations.
some 255 million). This occurred at a time when Whereas previously Finland had a limited number
Finland was suffering from the worst depression of handpicked countries with which it maintained
in its modern economic history, caused by a com- aid-driven bilateral relations and followed what
bination of botched liberalisation of the financial happened in them, during their first years in Brus-
markets and the collapse of the Soviet Union that sels the Finns realised that this would not do. Par-
put an end to the so-called clearing trade between ticipation in EU decision-making required that
the two countries which was beneficial to the Finland had more extensive knowledge of Afri-
Finns. The peak in the aid-GNI ratio had been can affairs, as African affairs are on the agenda in
reached only when the Finnish GNI had gone into the EU almost daily. That gave an impetus to Fin-
decline because of the on-setting depression and land to attempt to create a comprehensive policy
this decline was steep indeed. on Africa, which had a greater emphasis on the
The even sharper decline in the funds avail- political dimension than previously. The strength-
able for development co-operation forced MFA ening of the political dimension of bilateral rela-
to rethink its approach to development co-operations and increasing political dialogue with Afri-
— 24 —
can countries are seen to increase Finland’s possi- then their operational implications thought
bilities to influence EU decision-making. Thus, the through. How this will work in practice is another
EU is the single most important thing that has af- thing – one of the present writers has recently put
fected the diversification of Finland’s policy on Af- forward a strong critique of the internal incoher-
rica. ence of the documents and the new development
policy doctrine inherent in them and doubted their
New policy outlines potential to give a firm direction to action. Ac-
These changes required new policies and strate- cording to this critique, the documents, though
gies, with an aim to clearly organise relations be- clearly predicated on a market-friendly and basi-
tween different foreign policy instruments, and cally neo-liberal logic, contain elements from con-
guarantee that the requirements of EU member- flicting discourses, and the ends and the means
ship could also be fully met in Finland’s Africa tend to get blurred in them.18
policy. So far this policy work has been mainly
conducted on a more general level, and has pro- Administrative restructuring
duced three government decisions-in-principle MFA implemented an organisational reform in
concerning Finland’s policy on relations with de- 1998, mainly to be better prepared for Finland’s
veloping countries in general. These documents EU presidency in 1999. Previously the Ministry
are: Decision-in-principle on development co-op- had been divided into three separate departments
eration (the Cabinet, September 12, 1996), Fin- (political, economic and development co-opera-
land’s Policy on Relations with Developing Coun- tion) that were responsible for the relations with
tries (the Cabinet, October 15, 1998) and Opera- single countries in their respective fields. In the
tionalisation of Development Policy Objectives in organisational reform operational responsibility
Finland’s International Development Cooperation for Finland’s foreign policy was given to regional
(the Cabinet, February 22, 2001). For Africa es- divisions in all the different sectors. This of course
pecially, MFA has not yet prepared a comprehen- also served the change in Finland’s foreign policy
sive strategy. The only relevant document in this on Africa and other developing countries, because
respect is from 1997 and is called The principles the new regional divisions were also able to har-
and guidelines of Finnish foreign policy in sub- monise the use of development co-operation with
Saharan Africa. However, it is not a real strategy other instruments more efficiently.
paper, but rather a basic description of the inter- MFA itself considered the organisational re-
national environment where MFA operates in sub- form to have been successful, especially in devel-
Saharan Africa. opment co-operation, in a report on the tasks and
A gradual change in the Finnish foreign policy resources of the Finnish Foreign Service presented
concerning developing countries can be traced to Parliament. It is seen to have enabled a more
from the more general documents. The first deci- extensive and effective consideration of political
sion-in-principle was a response to the declining and economic factors in project planning. In prac-
relevance of development co-operation and the tice, the organisational reform was a prerequisite
challenges brought about by the EU membership, for the operationalisation of changes in Finland’s
and it attempted to define a new role for aid in policies that were made during the 1990s.
the Finnish foreign policy. In the 1998 outlines, Despite the “mainstreaming”, it is clear that
the objective was to harmonise the use of differ- in practice Africa continues to have very little po-
ent instruments in Finland’s policy on developing litical relevance for Finland. This is reflected in
countries. And finally, the objective of the last the administrative resources. The two units respon-
document was to consider what practical and op- sible for sub-Saharan Africa at MFA are relatively
erational implications previous documents should small compared to other Scandinavian countries
have on Finland’s actual policies (the original Finn- and Finland also has fewer diplomatic missions in
ish title of the third decision-in-principle should the region. Although Finland has established dip-
read “Operationalisation of policy on relations lomatic relations with all independent African
with developing countries”). countries, it maintains a permanent official pres-
This stream of policy papers clearly demon-
strates that Finland’s foreign policy on develop-
18
ing countries has changed from the previous rather Juhani Koponen with Lauri Siitonen, “Finland – aid and
identity”, Paper presented at the EADI seminar on “Perspectives
pragmatic ad hoc approach to a more strategic on European development co-operation”, Nijmegen, 3 to 5 July,
approach, where objectives are first set out and 2002.
— 25 —
ence in far fewer of them. At the moment Finland instruments should also be used, which is in line
has four ambassadors accredited to sub-Saharan with the decisions-in-principle. Political dialogue
Africa: in South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Ni- should be extended to cover all areas of sub-Sa-
geria. In addition, there are embassies that are haran Africa and deepened, because this helps to
headed by chargé d’affaires in five countries: Ethio- promote Finland’s own national interest in the EU
pia, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozam- forum. Many problems that have a global reach –
bique. Of these, the Harare embassy is to be closed meaning problems such as climate change, organ-
down whereas the one in Maputo will be upgraded ised criminality, the spread of drug abuse, HIV
to have an ambassador as its head. South Africa and other epidemics – can best be tackled at their
continues to be the only sub-Saharan country that roots in Africa, which also serves the purpose of
has an embassy in Finland. guarding the Finnish national interest.
Limitations in the political dimension of bilat- One goal above the others is the “promotion
eral relations with African countries could be taken of economic interaction” as stressed, in particu-
as increasing the importance of EU in this respect. lar, in the 1998 decision-in-principle. There ap-
Since EU is a global actor and has a strong pres- pears to be some confusion about what is actually
ence in all African countries, it is also a channel meant by this. Some suspicious critics have taken
through which Finland in principle can pursue its it as a disguise for pursuing Finnish economic in-
own goals in Africa. At the present stage of the terests. In sub-Saharan Africa, however, South
integration, however, the practical possibilities for Africa is the only country that can be taken to
this are rather limited if compared to those that have any more general significance for the Finn-
bilateral political dialogue offers. ish economy. Rather it appears that the objective
of Finland’s policy in Africa in this respect is not
so much steered towards promotion of its imme-
New policies
diate economic interests, but supporting the ad-
What then does Finland want to achieve with its justment of African countries to the world
new policies, whatever the available resources? economy. That is, as a good EU member, official
The above mentioned decisions-in-principle define Finland is working not so much for its national
the main objectives of Finland in Africa too. The capital but for the spread of capitalism in general.
primary goal of Finland’s policy on Relations with There is a strong belief in the ultimate benefits of
Developing Countries is, according to the 1998 globalisation and the market economy underly-
decision-in-principle “to promote peace, co-opera- ing the new Finnish development policy doctrine.
tion and welfare and to combat threats to these For poorer countries and people the integration
values in a world of deepening interdependence into the world economy is presented as the solu-
between nations”. The stated objectives of Fin- tion: the real danger is seen in their exclusion.
land’s policy on developing countries are also listed A problem – quite apart from the issue whether
more broadly as follows: the underlying analysis is convincing – is that the
– Promotion of global security means available in bilateral relations for reaching
this objective are rather limited, apart from aid
– Reduction of widespread poverty
and the political ‘dialogue’ buttressed by it. In
– Promotion of human rights and democracy countries that Finland is assisting, the partners are
– Prevention of global environmental problems expected to share the Finnish goals and themselves
– Promotion of economic dialogue take the responsibility for finding the means to
reach them. Finland will give support to them in
The MFA officials are instructed to take these ob-
reaching the mutually agreed goals. The policy
jectives into account in all aspects of Finland’s re-
goals are underwritten by a soft conditionality: if
lations with African countries. Some more tangi-
a partner lacks “commitment” to the common
ble principles are outlined in the 1997 document
goals, the co-operation with it needs to be “re-
concerning Finnish foreign policy in sub-Saharan
considered”.
Africa. The first objective here is to diversify rela-
But apart from to aid, the means available are
tions with all African countries. No state in sub-
very limited. Political dialogue conducted by dip-
Saharan Africa can in the future be only a recipi-
lomatic missions has relevance, especially because
ent of development aid, the document says. Fur-
Finland’s influence has increased through the EU
thermore, development co-operation will be only
membership. But to make it matter, it needs back-
one of the foreign policy tools in Africa, and other
ing from aid, and economic interaction as such
— 26 —
has so far had next to no significance. Finland has effectiveness. Mozambique is now a major such
tried to promote investment promotion and pro- country in Africa; it has been picked out as one of
tection treaties but this, too, has happened in coun- the two countries where Finnish aid will in the
tries with an aid relationship. In 2001 such a treaty next few years be considerably increased (Vietnam
was concluded with Tanzania, and negotiations being the other). Tanzania, which continues to be
for a similar treaty with Namibia are almost fin- in terms of accumulated volume by far the biggest
ished. These treaties will have little real signifi- recipient of Finnish aid anywhere, has lost its ac-
cance in increasing, for example, investments and tual predominance and been reduced to one of the
trade with these countries. They can be seen to main partners. Together with Ethiopia it is now
have more political relevance as well as symbolic placed in the ‘business as usual” category, mean-
value in Finland’s effort to diversify relations with ing that no immediate changes are expected in the
its long-term partners. Some support has also been present relationship. Namibia, until recently the
given to the training of African officials for tough third largest recipient in Africa, is going to be
international trade negotiations. phased out, as we saw above. Zambia and Kenya
More important instruments in the economic are in danger of totally disappearing from the bi-
field as well may therefore be provided by the lateral partners. They have been placed under spe-
multilateral forums. The EU and the new Cotonou cial surveillance and their performance, especially
agreement are naturally the most important ones their political development, will be carefully as-
in this respect for African countries. However, the sessed. On the other hand, new countries may join
MFA has taken a rather passive stand; it does not in. The possible inclusion of Burkina Faso after
appear to have much faith in Finland’s possibili- the present experimental phase would include the
ties to affect the EU’s trade policies in relation to French-speaking West Africa.
African countries. The same applies to such influ- As for aid modalities, Finland has continued
ential multilateral forums as the World Trade Or- to be mainly engaged in project aid. Most projects
ganisation, WTO. in longer-term partner countries are carried out in
Thus, in spite of attempts at diversification of the forestry, rural development, health, and water
the instruments used in bilateral relations, Finn- and sanitation as well as education sectors. A
ish bilateral relations with African countries still change has come about in projects, however. With
in practice rely heavily on development aid. The the drastic cuts in aid funds, large infrastructure
only obvious exception is Nigeria where an em- and industrial projects relying on Finnish deliver-
bassy is in place although the establishment of a ies and manpower have given way to smaller and
development co-operation programme was given softer activities employing more local resources.
up long ago. The embassy in Lagos, soon to be The project mode seems to be carrying on for the
transferred to the “new” capital Abuja, also has a moment although there is much talk about, and
wider regional function. It is the only Finnish dip- some actual movement towards, a shift to the fash-
lomatic mission in the whole of West Africa. Oth- ionable sector-wide approaches (Swaps) and di-
erwise Finland has development co-operation pro- rect budget support under the World Bank and
grammes running at the moment in ten sub-Saha- IMF-sponsored Poverty Reduction Strategy proc-
ran countries. Six of them – Ethiopia, Kenya, esses. But it has been made clear that Finland will
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia – participate in such strategies only if the partner
are long-term partner countries and all have a country is considered to possess adequate capac-
Finnish embassy. With other partners (Malawi, ity and be committed to good governance. Other-
South Africa, Burundi and Burkina Faso) co-op- wise, direct sectoral or budgetary support is not
eration is more limited, varying from one pilot yet considered possible.
project in Burkina Faso to a broader programme Finland has also introduced a new instrument,
in South Africa. which aims to enhance democracy, human rights
The policy is to further concentrate on fewer and good governance in partner countries.
partner countries and larger country programmes, Through funds for local co-operation the Finnish
as spelled out in the Operationalisation document. embassies in the partner country can directly fi-
In practice this means “picking out the winners”: nance various small scale NGO and other civil
programmes will be expanded in those countries society projects. Previously separate cultural funds
where the government is showing what the do- were incorporated into these in 2000. The aim
nors regard as commitment to development and continues to be to encourage direct contacts be-
which can present tangible results in development tween cultural institutions, organisations and in-
— 27 —
dividuals rather than promote official cultural ex- be for Finland more like the others, “the rest” in
change within the framework of cultural agree- terms of this paper, and will increasingly be treated
ments. with the same criteria as them. But there are fac-
tors which are likely to keep the propensity to in-
terfere high everywhere. One is that the major
Conclusions force now fashioning Finnish policies including
We have argued in this paper that although Af- those on Africa is the EU, whose mission includes
rica has been peripheral and had very little politi- the propagation of its supposedly superior eco-
cal or economic relevance for Finland, it has at- nomic system and “European values”. Another is
tracted the attention of Finnish policy-makers and that the relations between Finland and Africa will
forced them to take a stand on issues which they still be pre-dominantly based on aid. Despite the
otherwise might have preferred to eschew. In fact, attempts of the MFA to “mainstream” Africa as a
the Finnish-African relations have brought for- part of ‘normal’ foreign policy and diversify the
ward some of the most important and vexing is- “instruments” used in bilateral relations, so far
sues in the conduct of international relations – such there has been little advance not related to aid.
as those of the weight given to humanitarian and And although the dominant aid ideology empha-
moral considerations vis-à-vis the more immedi- sizes partnership and “ownership”, the reality of
ate political and economic interests as well as those aid continues to be intervention.
of the nature of sovereignty and the legitimacy of Africa may well provide a litmus test for the
interference in relationships based on intervention new strategic thrust in the Finnish policy-making.
from the outset. Whereas the Finnish policy-mak- As we argued above, the previous rather pragmatic
ers have often done their best to evade such sensi- manner of policy-making has given way to a more
tive issues, unsure of how to tackle them, the is- strategic approach in Finnish policies on develop-
sues have persisted not least because of the un- ing countries. Documents have been issued in
equal basis of the relationship. One could even which the attempt has been made to think out the
argue that a reason why they have stood out so means in relation to the ends. But the potential of
clearly is the very peripherality of Africa for Fin- such strategy documents to give firm direction to
land – there have been no weightier factors interaction has been challenged with reference to their
fering in between. debatable premises and internal incoherencies. As
If there is one major trend emerging in the Finn- should be clear from this paper, Africa has always
ish-African relations, it is the increasing and deep- refused to be fitted into the neat categories of the
ening Finnish involvement in African internal affairs. Finnish foreign policy thinking and the Finns have
From protesting against apartheid and support- been forced to confront Africa’s realities when
ing Namibian independence Finland has gone on considering their options. Africa’s potential to
to take a stand on the policies of the African gov- produce policy surprises is hardly over now when
ernments with whom it co-operates. In the future, Finland is no longer working alone and ad hoc
this may change now when apartheid is gone and but trying to think strategically as part of a novel
Namibia is independent. These two countries will political power unit in the making.
References
Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Koponen, Juhani, “Between developmentalism and
Revolution, Chicago 1991. instrumentalism. An interpretation of the history of
Crocker, Chester, The High Noon in Southern Africa, New Finnish aid”, FAD Working Paper, x/1999.
York and London, 1992. Koponen, Juhani, “Finnish aid to Tanzania – still afloat”,
Heikkilä, Hannu, Martti Ahtisaari. Kansainvälinen tie FAD Working Paper, 1/2000.
presidentiksi, Helsinki, 1997. Korhonen, Keijo, Mitalin toinen puoli, Helsinki 1989.
Heino, Timo-Erkki, “Politics on Paper. Finland’s South Mudimbe, V., The Invention of Africa, 1994.
Africa Policy, 1945–1991”, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Soiri, Iina and Pekka Peltola, Finland and National
Research Report no. 90, Uppsala 1999. Liberation in Southern Africa, Nordiska
Idman, K.G., Maamme itsenäistymisen vuosilta, Porvoo Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1999.
1953. Väisälä, Marja, “Suomalainen lähetystyö”, in Kimmo and
Jakobson, Max, 38. kerros. Helsinki 1983. Marja-Liisa Kiljunen (eds), Namibia – viimeinen
siirtomaa, Helsinki, 1980.
— 28 —
I c e l a n d ’s P o l i c y o n A f r i c a
Iceland’s Policy on Africa

From an international point of view, the status of of trade, politics or culture. However, over the last
Africa is weak and there are many indications that few years, relations with the continent have gradu-
the continent is becoming more and more eco- ally strengthened resulting in the opening of the
nomically and politically marginalized. It is true, first Icelandic embassy in Africa – in Mozambique
of course, that there has been economic and po- in 2001. Currently no African state has an em-
litical progress in many African countries during bassy in Iceland.
the last decade and generalizing about a whole Iceland rates low in comparison with other
continent is obviously always suspect. The fact, Nordic countries in terms of official contributions
however, remains that the results of the reform towards development cooperation. Iceland allo-
programmes of the past years have not lived up to cates what amounts to 0.12 per cent of the do-
expectations and that the vast majority of Afri- mestic product towards development aid. How-
ca’s inhabitants still live in dire poverty under ever, Icelandic development aid is completely un-
unacceptable social conditions. Africa remains the tied, which is generally argued to be a more effi-
poorest continent and rather than reversing that cient way to deliver assistance and more benefi-
trend it seems to be lagging further behind the rest cial for the recipient countries. A review of Ice-
of the world. There are many, often complicated, land’s development affairs, conducted by experts
reasons behind the fact that so many African states on behalf of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in
have not managed to ensure their citizens the Iceland, is currently in process and will be final-
standard of living taken for granted in many other ised by the end of 2002. The review will evaluate
parts of the world. Obviously, the African states Iceland’s development policy for the last five years
must themselves tackle the situation and turn this and look to the future.
development around. However, it remains the re- There is no one explanation at hand for why
sponsibility of the international community to join Iceland’s contributions towards development co-
in the struggle against poverty and make a contri- operation are comparatively modest. It may be
bution towards successful economic, political and pointed out, however, that general discourse on
social development on the African continent. This development cooperation in Iceland and the is-
applies to small countries like Iceland no less than sues never seem to have gained momentum
it does to other industrialized countries. amongst the political parties, or for that matter at
grass root level. The size of the country, with only
300,000 inhabitants maintaining an expensive
Icelandic Development Policy welfare state, may well have something to do with
Africa has always been an important factor in Ice- this apparent lack of interest in development is-
landic development policy. Icelanders have been sues. Another reason may be that the Icelandic
granting development aid for approximately 30 school system has never placed much emphasis
years and the aid has always been primarily tar- on teaching about the world outside the Western
geted at Africa. The Icelandic development policy hemisphere. Furthermore, because of the country’s
on Africa is based on the basic principles of alle- geographical location and its relative isolation the
viating poverty and promoting sustainable eco- inhabitants in general have had fewer opportuni-
nomic development, the responsible use and pro- ties to get to know different cultures than their
tection of resources in the countries targeted by neighbours have. However, polls show that the
the development aid, along with work based on majority of people in Iceland favours development
strengthening the democratic tradition and human cooperation and appeals for humanitarian assist-
rights. ance through funding are usually well received by
Outside the arena of development aid, Iceland’s the public.
relations with Africa are minimal, be it in terms
— 29 —
The Division of Icelandic development assistance by allowing Icelandic com-

Development Aid panies and individuals to export their expertise in
the fields of energy and fisheries to, for example,
Iceland’s official participation in development co-
Africa.
operation was initiated in the early seventies and
Iceland’s official development aid is only to a
was at that time mainly confined to funds being
very small extent channelled through non-govern-
allocated to international agencies and a few Nor-
mental organizations. There are a few Icelandic
dic cooperation projects, with little direct Icelan-
organizations that work in the field of develop-
dic participation. Since the year 1981 Iceland’s
ment aid and disaster relief, but contrary to the
official bilateral aid has been coordinated by the
situation in the neighbouring countries, those or-
Icelandic International Development Agency
ganizations are mostly independently funded. The
(ICEIDA). In recent years roughly one third of
largest and best known of such organizations in
Iceland’s official development aid has gone to the
Iceland are the Icelandic Red Cross Society and
agency.
Icelandic Church Aid.
Approximately 60 per cent of Icelandic devel-
opment aid goes towards multilateral projects.
Roughly 30 per cent of the total aid is earmarked
The Icelandic International
for a few international bank agencies such as the
Development Agency (ICEIDA)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD), of which Iceland is a founding ICEIDA has now operated for two decades as the
member, the International Development Associa- agency was founded by an Act of Parliament in
tion (IDA), the Organization for Economic Co- 1981. According to the Act the Agency shall pro-
operation and Development, the International Fi- mote cooperation between Iceland and develop-
nance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral In- ing nations. The goal of such cooperation shall be
vestment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Among the to support the governments of these countries in
projects that Iceland actively participates in is the improving their economy and thus participate in
HIPC project, whose goal is to write off the debt strengthening social progress and political inde-
of the world’s poorest countries. Iceland is also pendence within the framework of the United
part of the Nordic Development Fund, which Nations. ICEIDA is an autonomous agency under
grants loans for and funds development projects the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and is governed
in Africa and elsewhere. A little less than 30 per by a politically nominated board, elected by Par-
cent of the total aid then goes to a number of liament for a term of four years, except for the
United Nations agencies, either towards their op- chairperson, who is nominated by the Minister
erating activities or for specific projects run by for Foreign Affairs. The board is entrusted with
those agencies, as well as towards refugee and dis- the responsibility for the general policy of the
aster relief. The United Nations University (UNU) agency by the Minister, and also has an advisory
is one of the specific UN projects that Icelanders role to the Minister in terms of Iceland’s policy on
help fund, and furthermore, two of the Universi- development issues. The Minister also appoints
ty’s departments are located in Iceland, i.e. the the agency’s director who is responsible for the
UNU Geothermal Training Programme and the agency’s day-to-day business. The financial con-
Fisheries Training Programme. tributions to the agency are decided upon each
Many industrial nations have offered aid in the year in Parliament’s general budget. The agency
form of subsidized loans and high-risk loans for operates in accordance with a long term plan for
companies based in developing countries. That the years 2000-2004 and its activities are currently
form of aid was initiated in Iceland in the year focussed on four African countries: Malawi, Mo-
2001 under the name of Vidskiptathroun (Busi- zambique, Namibia and Uganda. From the outset
ness Development). The goal of this initiative is the basic principle of ICEIDA’s operations has been
to strengthen the business activities and market- to focus its activities on countries suffering from
ing of Icelandic companies in the developing world acute poverty and to focus on those parts of soci-
and with that in mind the emphasis falls on Af- ety worst affected by it. The fight against poverty
rica and those states targeted by Icelandic devel- is thus the agency’s main goal. The agency has set
opment aid. In this respect, a new reinforced Ice- priorities, which were last updated in 1995 and
landic Consultancy Trust Fund was recently emphasize the following issues:
founded with the aim of strengthening Icelandic
— 30 —
– The development cooperation shall help peo- ants of their countries, even if poverty in its worst
ple to be self-sufficient, in particular by trans- manifestations, accompanied by social disintegra-
fer of knowledge and professional skills. The tion and lack of food, is seldom as serious there
cooperation shall promote: sustainable devel- as it can be in the urban areas. Aid given to such
opment; protection of the environment and communities strengthens the rural and village com-
natural resources; progress of the productive munities of the countries in question, which in it-
sectors; equality of individuals; democracy and self is important in these times of increasingly rapid
human rights. urbanization.
– It is important to improve the living conditions In 1997 a change of emphasis occurred in the
of the poorest. The circumstances of women activities of ICEIDA. That year the government
and children are often neglected in the grant- of Iceland agreed to triple its contributions to
ing of development aid. ICEIDA shall endeav- ICEIDA for the term 1999–2003, and thus the
our to make certain that its development as- operations of the agency have increased signifi-
sistance will be beneficial to as many as possi- cantly. That same year an overall review of the
ble and does not adversely affect the living con- agency’s operations was conducted and in its wake
ditions of the recipient people. it was decided to expand into new sectors, in par-
ticular those of health and education. Most Afri-
– Emphasis shall be placed on cooperation with
can states are facing an enormous health challenge,
the least developed countries as evaluated by
which has only increased after the AIDS epidemic
competent institutions.
hit the continent. Lack of education is also one of
– Development assistance shall be given prima- the most serious problems facing the continent.
rily in areas in which Icelanders have special For these reasons the decision was made that
knowledge and experience, which can be trans- ICEIDA would emphasize those issues in particu-
ferred, by teaching and training. lar. The health and education sectors are also im-
portant in terms of building human resources,
which in and of itself is one of the most important
Where Does the Aid Go?
development goals. The agency has, however, not
All the way from its founding, the agency has al- abandoned the fisheries sector and many of the
most exclusively focussed its activities on Africa. agency’s new projects aim at strengthening the fish-
ICEIDA’s first projects were based in the Cape ing communities through supporting other aspects
Verde Islands, which was the agency’s sole coop- of the communities. With this in mind new projects
eration country until 1988, but from that year have mainly focussed on adult education and
onwards other countries in the southern part of health care.
Africa were added. The cooperation was mainly
in the field of fisheries and for a very long time
almost every project ICEIDA was involved in was How Does ICEIDA Work?
in the field of fisheries, marine research and the The theory and practice of development aid has
training of seamen and fish-processing personnel. changed dramatically over the years. The meth-
This is no surprise as the fish sector is what Ice- ods, ideas and goals of development aid are al-
landers are best known for and where they con- ways open for revision and ongoing critical dis-
sider themselves to have valuable knowledge to course takes place within the field itself. Lately a
offer others. The fish resources of many African great deal of criticism has been directed at project
states have been over-fished by foreign fleets over based development aid which has been accused of
the years and early on ICEIDA adopted the posi- being donor driven. By now, most development
tion that it would aid coastal states and other fish- agencies have redesigned their operations and are
ing countries in Africa to develop their fisheries increasingly basing their policymaking, budget
sectors with the goal of exploring the sector to estimates and activities on aid towards whole sec-
the fullest, both in terms of using it to achieve tors of the community rather than on specific
foreign exchange and in terms of obtaining fish projects. The role of the recipient has likewise been
for domestic consumption, without either of these rethought and today includes increased responsi-
in any way compromising the fish stocks. An im- bility for every stage of the planning and imple-
portant issue in this respect is that the fishing com- mentation processes. The basic idea is to base the
munities are often fringe communities and the fish- development work on the goals that the locals have
ermen are frequently among the poorest inhabit- set for themselves.
— 31 —
So far, Icelandic development cooperation has ICEIDA has in recent years followed the lead
mainly been project based. However, in the choice of most other development agencies in working
of projects the overall programme of the sector towards the goal of integration in its projects, es-
involved has increasingly been taken into consid- pecially in the field of gender equality. The agen-
eration, and the projects themselves have been cy’s current long-term plan mentions such inte-
planned in order to fit into the development goals gration goals. Many of the agency’s smaller
of each partner country. The main reason for the projects have been designed with this goal in mind.
project bias of ICEIDA’s development aid is prob-
ably how small the agency is. Compared to most
other official public agencies the Icelandic one is Experiences Gained from
microscopic in size and its size and ways of oper- Development Cooperation
ating are in many ways better compared to non- As mentioned above Iceland’s contributions to-
governmental organizations than its international wards development aid are very small and this has
sister-agencies. always restricted operations, both in terms of
It should, however, not be forgotten that choice of projects and cooperation countries. Ice-
project-based aid has its benefits. The main ben- landers took their first steps in independent de-
efit being the perspective it allows. Projects are velopment aid in the Cape Verde Islands. Those
usually clearly demarcated and designed to solve projects bore the mark of inexperience and the
well-defined problems. There is typically a clear results were varied. During the 20 years of
agreement as to what the development agency ICEIDA’s operations Icelanders have learnt from
provides and what remains the responsibility of experience and undeniably gained valuable knowl-
the cooperation partner. Projects are usually de- edge on how to manage development cooperation.
signed around a pre-established time frame, often ICEIDA has at various times cooperated with other
only comprising a few years, and the results are development agencies on individual projects and
supposedly easily measured. An agency providing assumed responsibility for specific sectors of the
project-based aid generally becomes quite visible work. Independent evaluations have regularly been
and its agents are responsible for, and in control conducted on the activities of ICEIDA, both as
of, the capital flow and implementation process, regards individual projects and its whole opera-
which makes mismanagement of funds less likely tion. In most instances the agency has received
to happen. Still, the question remains whether that good reviews for its part in development projects,
kind of aid contributes towards permanent sta- both its own and those on which it has cooper-
bility and development in the cooperation country ated with others, although those evaluations have
involved. also identified certain problems.
Another characteristic of Icelandic develop- The results of development aid must always
ment aid is its emphasis on technical advice. The be looked at in conjunction with what the coop-
change in emphasis which has taken place in many eration partners are doing and in terms of their
development agencies towards placing less empha- own development experiments. Thus it is impor-
sis on long term technical advisors and more on tant for ICEIDA, as it is for any development
local people and technical advisors hired for the agency, to adjust its aid to the situation in, and
short term has yet only partially managed to make the goals of, the cooperation countries. The goals
its mark on the way ICEIDA operates. Icelandic of development projects are mostly to strengthen
long term technical advisors work on most of the the policy and the goals that the locals have set
projects the agency is involved in and are usually for themselves so that these result in better living
responsible for the implementation of those conditions and better services for the citizens of
projects, although situations do exist where they the society in question. Therefore it is very impor-
simply work as advisors to the locals. The rea- tant that those involved in development coopera-
sons behind this are, among others, that the ca- tion are ready to learn from experience, to listen
pacity of many of the agencies and bodies that to the point of view of the locals and that they are
ICEIDA cooperates with simply does not allow committed to constantly trying to improve their
for things to be done in any other way. Finally, ways of working in order to create conditions con-
according to the Icelandic Act which governs the ducive to change for, and in cooperation with,
agency, ICEIDA shall always oversee all of the those on the receiving end of development aid.
projects it sponsors. The law governing the agency
is 20 years old today and needs revising.
— 32 —
References
Dagbjartsson, B. 2001. Throunarsamvinnustofnun Islands: http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is Skyrsla utanrikisradherra
Agrip af 20 ara sogu. In Frettabref um throunarmal No. um althjodamal, 2002. Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
29, April 2001. Reykjavik/ICEIDA. Iceland.
http://www.iceida.is Principle and priorities of ICEIDA. Sigurdardottir, T. 2002. Ny sjonarmid i throunarsamvinnu.
The Icelandic International Development Agency. In Frettabref um throunarmal No. 30. June 2002.
Reykjavik/ICEIDA.
— 33 —
A r n e To s t e n s e n
Norway’s Africa Policy

Arne Tostensen
Introduction gelisation (Jørgensen 1992). More than a thou-

African affairs have never occupied a central place sand Norwegian missionaries recruited through
in Norway’s official foreign policy.1 This fact re- the Norwegian Missionary Society have spent con-
flects both Africa’s marginal economic and politi- siderable periods in these African territories over
cal place in Norway’s foreign relations and the a 150-year time span. Their numerous letters and
continent’s geographical remoteness as seen from reports home, as well as the organised dissemina-
the North. Moreover, Norway has no colonial past tion of their experiences through various publica-
and no strategic interests to defend on the African tions, newsletters and newspapers gradually cre-
continent. Indeed, for those and other reasons, it ated a certain awareness of the so-called ‘dark
may be argued that Norway to this day has never continent’ in Norwegian society.
really had a conscious and coherent Africa policy. The second area of African exposure stems
Apparently, for a small country there was no from whaling in the Antarctic and the Southern
perceived need to formulate such a policy. An at- Atlantic. In the former half of the 20th century
tempt to do so was made in the late 1990s but it Norway was one of the largest whaling nations in
came to naught.2 As a result, what may be con- the world. Ports on the southern shores of the
strued to be Norway’s Africa policy is a patch- African continent – notably in South Africa, Na-
work of diverse elements, haphazardly put to- mibia, Angola, Gabon and Mozambique – served
gether more by default than by deliberate policy- as bases for processing plants and sources of pro-
making. More than anything else, aid relations visioning for the whaling expeditions (Tønnessen
have predominated in the interactions between 1967, pp. 432–474). Due to the over-exploitation
Norway and Africa.3 of the whale populations, however, the Norwe-
gian whaling industry has by now virtually col-
lapsed.
A historical flashback The third point of contact was that, as citizens
Historically, three types of interaction have formed of a major shipping nation, scores of Norwegian
Norway’s relationship with Africa: mission work, sailors in the merchant marine have over the years
whaling, and shipping. Each in its own way has made numerous visits to ports of call along Afri-
contributed to shaping official Norwegian policy ca’s long coastline. Although their encounters with
towards Africa, yet differently and variously in Africa were generally limited to coastal towns, they
successive epochs. did represent significant contact points, which
The earliest relations with the African conti- have contributed to providing images of Africa –
nent involved missionary activity, first in South whether accurate or not – to the Norwegian popu-
Africa (in present-day KwaZulu-Natal) from the lation. The commercial shipping interests have
1840s, and later in Madagascar, Cameroon, Tan- exerted considerable influence over Norway’s re-
zania, Ethiopia and Mali as the main fields of evan- lationship with African states in this policy sphere.
Even though Norway was never a colonial
1
power, many Norwegians in private capacities
In this article, Africa refers to the countries south of the Sa-
hara. However, a significant North African matter deserves took part in scientific expeditions, and some were
attention. During the Algerian liberation war against French recruited for positions in the civil service, the trans-
colonialism, the official Norwegian position was rather lame, port system and the military in the Belgian Congo.
even cowardly.
2
Interview with the Norwegian Ambassador to Kenya, Kjell Norwegians served as judges in the Congo and
Harald Dalen, Nairobi, 10 May 2002. Before his posting to Egypt, a considerable number emigrated to South
Nairobi, Dalen served as the Africa advisor in the Ministry of
Africa and several other African countries where
Foreign Affairs for six years.
3
To some extent, this article draws on Tjønneland (1997). they ran plantations (Eide and Vaa 1986, pp. 362).
— 34 —
N o r w a y ’s A f r i c a P o l i c y
Contemporary relationships equipment. Imports include bauxite, copper-

It was not until the late 1940s after Norway had nickel, coffee and tea. From time to time ships
become a member of the United Nations Security figure in the trade statistics due to Liberia’s posi-
Council that an official political position had to tion as a ‘flag of convenience’ for Norwegian ship
be taken on a significant African question. At that owners.
time, Norway’s ambassador to the UN led the dip- Part of the trade flows is associated with the
lomatic group mediating over the status of Eritrea. aid flows, because a proportion of the aid grants
It eventually opted for incorporation into Ethio- finds its way back to Norway, despite the non-
pia as the appropriate solution. Ethiopia’s strug- tying policy. Otherwise, it is worth noting that
gle against Italian fascism and its monarchic sys- while aid-related trade predominates in Eastern
tem of government had struck a sympathetic chord and Southern Africa, most of the trade links with
and no doubt influenced the Norwegian position West Africa are purely commercial.
in this regard. The minuscule trade percentages over decades
Subsequently, membership of the UN and the in no way suggest that African trade relations
axiomatic emphasis placed on multilateral insti- would play a great role in Norway’s overall for-
tutions in the foreign policy of a small state have eign trade policy. Africa has remained marginal
largely shaped Norway’s Africa policy. Much of as a trading partner and there is nothing to indi-
the impetus has come through the UN system, cate that this situation will change appreciably in
ranging from sanctions against apartheid in South the foreseeable future.
Africa and Namibia and the racist minority re- In general, as a small economy Norway has
gime in Southern Rhodesia to decolonisation. In- not been a major exporter of capital in the form
volvement in conflict mediation in African hot of direct foreign investment. Instead, Norway was
spots has also been a spin-off from the UN. a net importer of capital until the 1990s. To the
Similarly, the emergence of policy conditiona- extent Norwegian investments have been made in
lity in aid relations has emanated from multilat- Third World countries the destinations have been
eral institutions. When relating to various UN found in Latin America and Asia, not in Africa.
Africa initiatives Norway has sought to find mid- Again, this reflects the marginality of Africa in
dle-of-the-road positions, partly because of its the world economy and also the generally poor
desire to mediate and partly due to its reluctance and unpredictable investment climate in most Af-
to challenge the great powers. Norway’s member- rican countries. Apart from mineral resources,
ship of NATO has clearly constrained its manoeu- Africa is perceived to have little to offer potential
vrability on a number of issues, most notably on investors. The markets are small and volatile, the
the decolonisation of Portugal’s African posses- skill level of the work force is low, and the physi-
sions when Portugal was also a NATO ally. cal infrastructure deficient.
Apart from the decisive influence of the UN, Recently, the above picture appears to be
the official Norwegian policy towards Africa has changing somewhat. Resource-based offshore in-
to a large extent been driven by civil society: churches, vestments related to hydrocarbons in Nigeria,
trade unions and NGOs. Overall, it seems justi- Angola, and Namibia have attracted Norwegian
fied to state that Norway has only had a conscious oil companies – initially into prospecting and later
Africa policy in the past 50 years, if at all. into production. There is reason to believe that
these commitments will be sustained and expanded
in the future.
Trade and investment In general, Norwegian business relations with
Norway’s external trade volume with the entire Africa have been characterised by ambivalence.
African continent has hovered around only one On the one hand, aid and trade relations have been
per cent—– exports slightly below and exports promoted through various schemes, particularly
somewhat above that average figure (Statistics in the 1980s. Norwegian business interests were
Norway 2000 and previous years). Among the encouraged to enter into trade and investment
African countries, South Africa accounts for the partnerships through generous support schemes
bulk of this volume. Nigeria was for many years a such as export and investment guarantees. How-
significant export market for sun-dried split cod ever, in some cases, contrary to intentions, these
and later frozen fish products. Other important efforts led to state indebtedness when private lo-
export commodities include paper and paper prod- cal counterparts went bankrupt.
ucts, artificial fertilisers, and tele-communications In some programme countries, sister industry
— 35 —
projects were set up to facilitate transfer of tech- lateral share has tended to increase slowly. The
nology and management skills. Similarly, a Gen- aid contributions through the multilateral aid sys-
eralised System of Preferences (GSP) has been put tem are an expression of the importance attached
in place to stimulate imports from developing to multilateral solutions in the overall foreign
countries, including from Africa. On the other policy: as a small country Norway must seek pro-
hand, African exporters have been met by tariff tection under the multilateral umbrella.
and quota restrictions on their key exports, in Furthermore, a Norwegian aid principle is
particular agricultural commodities that were seen long-term co-operation, in recognition of the need
as competing with Norwegian products. Most of for a long time horizon to build sustainable devel-
these barriers have since been removed; as from 1 opment from a low base. Aid flows were not to
July 2002 all exports from Least Developed Coun- fluctuate with political vagaries.
tries will enjoy duty-free access (Wiig 2002). But It has always been a matter of policy principle
other restrictions – so-called safeguard measures that Norwegian aid should be given as grants
– have been maintained in terms of the WTO rather than loans, and that it should not be tied to
(Hagen et al. 2001). Informally, environmental procurement of goods and services in Norway.
standards and harmful residues in foodstuffs are Notwithstanding this policy, the overall return
often used as pretexts for denying them full mar- flows on bilateral are considerable, at one stage
ket access. in the region of 40 per cent.7 This figure might be
lower today. By contrast, the return ratio on mul-
tilateral aid is much lower – only about 15 per
Development assistance
cent – despite considerable financial contributions
More than any other contemporary relationship, through this aid channel (Granberg 1993, p. 17).
development assistance has had a determining in- Furthermore, in the early 1970s, it was stated
fluence on Norway’s Africa policy. Two strands as a principle that the grants should be extended
of thinking have converged to form the founda- on the terms of the recipient, i.e. that the plans
tion of Norwegian aid policy since its inception in and priorities of Third World partners should form
the early 1950s: the Christian imperative of com- the basis of co-operation. Aid measures and funds
passion and charity, and the solidarity notion of were to be fitted into that set-up in a complemen-
the labour movement.4 This foundation reflects a tary fashion, not as enclaves within themselves.
broad consensus across most of the political spec- At the beginning of the 1990s a shift of em-
trum. phasis occurred. From then on the principle of
Even though the first Norwegian aid project recipient responsibility was applied. This meant
proper was located in India (Pharo 1986), on ac- that only the recipients themselves could take re-
count of Africa’s deep poverty the aid flows were sponsibility for their own development. No exter-
soon redirected to Africa. In the past four decades nal power could take charge and direct develop-
40–50 per cent of all bilateral aid has accrued to ment on the recipients’ behalf. This shift stemmed
African recipients, predominantly in Eastern and from a realisation that development by remote
Southern Africa.5 Through multi-lateral channels, control is impossible, not only impracticable.
additional funds of Norwegian origin have found It is necessary to distinguish between stated
their way to Africa. Today, the majority of the so- principles at the official level, on the one hand,
called programme countries are African.6 and actual practice, on the other. All principles
This is not the place to discuss in detail the are subject to deviation. In some cases there are
finer nuances of Norwegian aid policy. It will suf- great gaps between rhetoric and practice, even
fice to recapitulate the main operational princi-
ples as they have evolved and changed over the
decades. 7
This high percentage can partly be attributed to the sizeable
The aid budget has generally been split evenly elements of commodity support in the aid flows: artificial ferti-
lisers, telecommunications equipment, turbines for hydro-elec-
between bilateral and multilateral aid, but the bi- tric power generation, etc. The large number of technical as-
sistance personnel (TAP) also contributed to maintaining a high
return flow. As commodity assistance has diminished in vol-
ume and the TAP number reduced, the percentage may have
4
This section draws on Sørbø (1997) and Stokke (1987). decreased correspondingly. On the other hand, in tandem with
5
In the 1990s a considerable share has accrued to the Balkans. the reduction of commodity assistance and TAP in the state-to-
6
A programme country is a recipient of considerable aid flows, state aid programmes, the rise of NGOs in the total picture
the use of which is subject to negotiations and country pro- may have compensated somewhat for the loss of state-related
gramming. return flows.
— 36 —
contradictions. This became most apparent with institutional capacity.9

regard to conditionality. Although White Papers Arguably, the institutional problems are most
and other official policy documents have only oc- pronounced in the governance realm, not only in
casionally alluded to what might amount to the overt political organs but equally so in the civil
conditionality, that very term has never been used. service. Endemic corruption and limited adminis-
Still, conditionality was introduced in the early trative capability have marred aid relations with
and mid-1980s – not as a stated principle but as a African countries all along. For a long while the
visible practice. donor community shied away from these sensi-
The 1980s have been characterised as Africa’s tive issues, fearing accusations of meddling in do-
lost decade. Imprudent policies and lax financial mestic affairs à la the former colonial masters.
discipline of the euphoric 1960s and 1970s, com- However, at the end of the Cold War political
bined with an adverse international environment conditionality was placed firmly on the agenda
began to take their toll. The economic downturn by the entire donor community as a second
was felt throughout the continent and, hence, the conditionality generation (Stokke 1995a). Some
1980s saw the emergence of stabilisation and writers even went as far as audaciously declaring
structural adjustment programmes, in effect de- the ‘end of history’ after the Western, liberal form
signed by the IMF and the World Bank. In order of democracy had ostensibly triumphed (Fukuyama
to draw on the financial facilities offered by the 1992). Championing human rights became the new
IFIs, the African countries had to comply with a ‘missionary calling’. For instance, the diplomatic
host of policy conditions. Thus, the 1980s became rupture between Kenya and Norway in 1990 was
the decade of policy-based lending. widely attributed to human rights issues (Selbervik
Norway was not prepared for this shift and 1995). When diplomatic relations with Kenya were
initially resisted it by continuing its disbursal of resumed in 1994, it was largely justified in terms
funds without heeding the conditions being tabled. of providing an opportunity for advancing the
For several years there was considerable agonis- human rights agenda.
ing and vacillation over the matter, partly reflect- Commitment to the New International Eco-
ing varying views within the aid administration nomic Order (NIEO) of the 1970s is perhaps a
and other key institutions such as the central bank mere parenthesis in Norwegian aid policy. In the
and the ministry of finance. But as from the mid- interest of a more just world order, Norway sym-
1980s Norway succumbed to international pres- pathised with the demands of the G-77 in the strug-
sure and adopted macro-economic conditionality gle between North and South – along with the
as an acceptable policy.8 Later, other forms of like-minded group of Northern states. Algeria took
conditionality emerged, above all in the political the lead in promoting the NIEO and practically
sphere, e.g. democratisation and human rights all the African countries joined ranks.
observance (Stokke 1995b). An offshoot of the NIEO was a small-scale vari-
The general aid policies applied to all recipi- ant or a mini-NIEO. The idea was launched by
ents regardless of location. But it can be argued the Finnish Prime Minister at the time, Kalevi
that some of the preconditions presumed neces- Sorsa, and was often referred to as the Sorsa ini-
sary for successful implementation were less tiative, alternatively the Nordic-SADC initiative.
present in Africa than elsewhere. To accept respon- It represented an attempt to achieve the objectives
sibility for one’s own development or to comply of the grand NIEO on a modest scale (Tostensen
with externally imposed conditions presupposes 1990). The Nordic region was seen as a suitable
fairly well developed institutions. Africa, perhaps counterpart to Southern Africa. Considerable re-
more than any other continent, is deficient in such sources were committed to this venture but it pro-
duced meagre results. After about ten years it was
given up altogether and buried. It is noteworthy,
8
Hilde Selbervik of the Chr. Michelsen Institute is currently however, that the Nordic-SADC initiative derived
finalising a doctoral dissertation on the de facto policy shift in from thinking in vogue at the UN, transformed
the mid-1980s from the erstwhile position of non-conditionality into a region-to-region undertaking when the more
to an increasingly stringent form of macro-economic
conditionality associated with structural adjustment pro- ambitious global endeavour failed.
grammes. The country case under scrutiny is Tanzania. Her
work documents the ambivalence and vacillation of the aid
9
administration in this regard – torn between an empathetic at- It is perhaps ironic that institution-building entered the aid
titude towards Tanzania and the tough policy-based lending of vocabulary in response to such institutional deficiencies. Even
the Bretton Woods institutions. so, the overall principles were not modified.
— 37 —
Recently, the New Partnership for Africa’s De- When Luthuli was awarded the Peace Prize in
velopment (Nepad) was launched – a very ambi- 1961, the Norwegian public was exposed to ex-
tious plan for an African renaissance. The inten- tensive media coverage on the situation of the
tion is to raise large sums of money from external oppressed black majority in South Africa. Follow-
and African sources to resuscitate the continent’s ing the Sharpeville massacre the year before, this
economy. Africans are themselves divided over its event contributed to raising the awareness of the
feasibility, particularly in view of its dependence Norwegian people on these matters. Previously,
on external funding. The institutional precondi- this problem had attracted only limited official and
tions are also questioned. media attention. In the 1950s the official position
The Nepad document reads like a visionary appears to have been one of ‘constructive diplo-
statement, reminiscent of Kwame Nkrumah’s gran- macy’ with a view to finding workable compro-
diose pan-africanist schemes of the late 1950s. It mises with the apartheid regime through the good
also resembles the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980. offices of the UN.
The main contrast to earlier designs, however, lies The Sharpeville massacre and the Peace Prize
in Nepad’s emphasis on market-based economies for Luthuli spurred a host of civil society activi-
and the role of information technology. ties. It should also be recalled that the early 1960s
The G-7 has welcomed Nepad and declared was a period in which African decolonisation
its willingness to provide some funding. The Nor- peaked. This decade saw the first consumer boy-
wegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has politely cott of South African goods and student activism
been considering it, but taken a reticent position was intensive. The South Africa Committee, which
with respect to direct monetary support. Politi- had been formed in late 1959, received a boost
cally, however, Norway has assumed a positive with support from broad sections of society.
attitude to Nepad, however cautious. In 1963–1964 Norway served its second stint
as a member of the UN Security Council, which
provided a platform for activism. The General
Supporting the liberation struggle
Assembly had in 1962 passed a resolution calling
in Southern Africa
on all member states to impose comprehensive
Norwegian support to the national liberation sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Together
struggle in Southern Africa has formed such an with the other Nordic countries, Norway had ab-
important part of the aid relationship with Africa stained. In the Security Council Norway contin-
that it warrants a separate section.10 On the one ued its cautious line on comprehensive sanctions,
hand, policy evolution in this sphere must be seen largely on account of its expected loss in trade
in conjunction with developments at the UN and and shipping. Also, the permanent members would
Norway’s response to them. On the other hand, not accept such a tough stand; allegedly the South
independent developments within Norway, not African situation constituted no threat to interna-
least activities and pressures by civil society have tional peace and security as required by Chapter
contributed greatly to an activist Norwegian VII of the UN Charter to justify sanctions. Nor-
stance. The dialectics between these two influences way concurred with that assessment. However, an
on the overall Norwegian position must be borne arms embargo was worth considering. Short of a
in mind. comprehensive and mandatory arms embargo, a
From a modest start in the early 1970s with weaker resolution was passed in 1963 to the ef-
humanitarian and legal assistance to refugees and fect that UN member states were called upon to
victims of apartheid, support for the liberation implement appropriate measures, including sanc-
struggle gradually grew in volume and intensity tions, as far as arms supplies were concerned.
until the demise of the apartheid regime twenty Norway had a role in wording a similar reso-
years later. Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to lution – also adopted in 1963 – pertaining to the
Albert Luthuli and hosting the UN/OAU World territories under Portuguese rule. It requested all
Conference for Support of the Victims of Apart- states to refrain from rendering the Portuguese
heid and Colonialism in Southern Africa repre- government any assistance that might enable it to
sented milestones in this development. continue its policies of repression of the peoples
under its administration, and to take measures to
prevent the sale and supply of arms and military
10
This section draws extensively on Tore Linné Eriksen’s ed- equipment for that purpose.
ited volume on the subject (2000).
— 38 —
The 1973 UN/OAU conference in Oslo was a It should be recalled that the Southern African
watershed in Norwegian policy-making vis-à-vis religious constituencies were large. In addition,
Southern Africa. Not only did it give Norway a they were generally considered to be non-politi-
high profile on these matters, the conference also cal in the sense that they did not necessarily align
adopted a programme of action which committed themselves with particular political parties. The
Norway to sustained follow-up. Apart from reaf- exception was the Dutch Reformed Church in
firming commitment to basic principles, it was South Africa, which was widely perceived to be
most significant that all countries were called upon the ‘official’ church of the Afrikaners. The non-
to deal directly with the liberation movements rec- political nature of the churches provided them with
ognised by the OAU. a ‘cover’ for an array of resistance activities. These
Subsequently, direct support to liberation ranged from scholarship programmes and other
movements in South Africa, Namibia, Southern educational initiatives, legal aid, health care and
Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies was in- social relief measures, as well as human rights and
cluded as a separate budget line. After the mili- democratisation activities. This network of con-
tary coup in Portugal in April 1974 and the at- tacts was also a tremendous source of informa-
taining of independence of the Portuguese territo- tion channelled to the outside world.
ries, the relationship entered a new stage of regu- The churches were not only engaged in activi-
lar state-to-state development assistance. In 1980 ties of their own in the fields mentioned above. It
a new Zimbabwe was born and Namibia followed must be emphasised that due to their perceived
suit in 1990 as an independent nation. The last ‘neutral’ position with respect to the big issues,
bastion of white supremacy, South Africa, held the churches were used as a conduit by the Minis-
universal, non-racial elections in 1994. Only then try of Foreign Affairs to funnel money clandes-
did the Southern African region enter into nor- tinely to opposition forces inside South Africa. This
malcy as far as international relations are con- practice was highly unorthodox and shows the
cerned. close relationship between the authorities and the
Although the impetus received from the UN churches.
system was critical in the evolution of a Norwe- The third leg of the tripod in support of the
gian policy on Southern Africa, domestic civil so- liberation struggle was the trade union movement,
ciety played a major role in bolstering official ac- particularly with respect to South Africa where a
tivism. Before 1973 it was left to civil society or- sizeable working class had developed (see Vetlesen
ganisations, particularly the Norwegian Council 2000). Despite repressive legislation regarding the
for Southern Africa, to keep the national libera- rights to organise and bargain collectively, the
tion struggle in Southern Africa on the political black workers had operated clandestinely for many
agenda (Drolsum 1999, 2000). This organisation years. However, the Cold War schism in the inter-
played a key role in bringing information about national trade union movement created problems.
the struggle to the Norwegian public and in or- Due to its affiliation to the Brussels-based Inter-
ganising consumer boycotts. It also acted as an national Confederation of Free Trade Unions
important pressure group on Norwegian authori- (ICFTU) the Norwegian Confederation of Trade
ties, particularly on the sanctions issue and direct Unions found it difficult to give support to the
support for the liberation movements. main trade union federation in South Africa, the
The other major player in the solidarity move- South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU),
ment was the churches (for details, see Agøy 2000). because the latter was affiliated to the Eastern bloc.
Drawing on a long-standing relationship – dating This situation changed in the mid-1970s, not
back to the first missionaries – with counterparts because the Cold War was over yet but because
in South Africa in particular, the Norwegian the organisational structure of the South African
churches had maintained close liaisons for a cen- trade union movement changed. In response to a
tury and a half. There is no doubt that the web of series of strikes and labour unrest in the early
relations based on mutual trust that had been 1970s, the legislation governing the labour mar-
woven over the years was the mainstay and the ket was amended in a more liberal direction. This
comparative advantage of the Norwegian churches’ opened up for direct contact and support because
solidarity work; it proved invaluable. The main the new emerging confederations, notably the
organisational vehicle was the Council for Ecu- Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),
menical and International Relations – Church of decided to be autonomous of the bipolar struc-
Norway. ture at the international level.
— 39 —
The trade unions were also instrumental in no colonial past; it is not suspected by any party
mounting a consumer boycott and in making it of harbouring ulterior motives, such as strategic
effective by utilising their international contacts. or economic goals; it has a good image as a sup-
In addition, the trade unions channelled funds di- porter of decolonisation and national liberation;
rectly to various liberation movements in the it has a recognised record as a staunch supporter
Southern African region. of the UN and its constituent agencies; it has an
The above three examples of civil society or- impressive record of bilateral aid; it has a tradi-
ganisations document how important non-state tion of human rights advocacy and democracy
actors were in shaping Norwegian official policy promotion; and it has a vigilant civil society that
on Southern Africa, and the significance of their will monitor state action or inaction in a critical
complementary solidarity work as a parallel course vein. According to Egeland, these factors add up
of action. to a position of moral authority that is respected
Tore Linné Eriksen has characterised Norway by most conflicting parties in Africa and elsewhere.
as an ambiguous champion of national liberation With this ‘moral capital’ at its disposal Norway is
in Southern Africa. On the one hand, constrained thus well equipped as a mediator in deep-seated
by its membership in NATO and the UN, coupled conflicts.
with its own shipping and trading interests, Nor- As a current member of the UN Security Coun-
way often assumed a cautious stance and acted as cil, Norway has sought to put Africa on the
a moderating influence. On the other hand, pushed agenda, notwithstanding its chairmanship of the
by domestic civil society, official Norway engaged committee on sanctions against Iraq. Some two-
in political activism on this issue, sometimes in thirds of the agenda items of the Security Council
unorthodox ways. in recent years have been related to complex Afri-
can conflicts. They generally require peace-mak-
ing by means of military measures, combined with
Mediation and conflict resolution
emergency relief, long-term development efforts,
A special sphere of Norwegian relations with Af- reconciliation and peace-building.
rica consists of mediation efforts. The mass me- Besides mediating through the UN, Norway
dia coverage has projected an image of Africa as a has also emphasised the importance of strength-
conflict-ridden continent, which is not denied. ening the capability of Africans themselves to
Suffice it to mention Somalia, Sierra Leone, Libe- manage and solve conflicts. Towards that end,
ria, Southern Sudan, the Great Lakes Region, and support has been given to conflict mediation
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These are through regional and subregional African organi-
long-standing crisis areas where state structures sations such as the Organisation of African Unity
have collapsed and the parties are stubbornly pit- (OAU), the Economic Community of West Afri-
ted against each other, without apparent hope for can States (ECOWAS), the Southern African De-
workable solutions in the near future. velopment Community (SADC), and IGAD.
Norway has taken upon itself a role as media- In recent years, attention has been directed to-
tor in several conflicts spots around the world. wards long-term reconstruction and institution-
The best known include the Middle East, Guate- building, human rights observance and democra-
mala, Colombia, and Sri Lanka. Less known is tisation. Considerable aid resources have been set-
the low-key mediation efforts in the Southern Su- aside for this purpose. Support has been given to
dan, between the central government in Khartoum the administration of elections, civic education,
and the secessionist rebel movement of the Suda- and human rights promotion. In Norway, a spe-
nese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/ cial unit has been established to handle this form
SPLA). These efforts have been conducted under of assistance – the Norwegian Resource Bank for
the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority Democracy and Human Rights (Nordem) – un-
on Development (IGAD). der whose auspices election observation missions
The self-image of Norway’s comparative ad- have been mounted.
vantage in conflict mediation stems from wide- Part of the conflict scenario is the flow of refu-
spread notions well enunciated by Jan Egeland gees and asylum seekers from Africa generated by
(1988), former state secretary in the Ministry of civil strife. For some time Norway has received
Foreign Affairs. He argues that Norway as a small so-called quota refugees through the UN High
state can turn its apparent weakness into strength Commissioner for Refugees. In recent years, how-
by exploiting a number of factors. Norway has ever, a far larger number have made it to Norway
— 40 —
on their own and have been awaiting individual by design. Third, aid to African countries has pre-
vetting and assessment. A special category of Af- dominated with respect to volume and duration
rican immigrants are those who arrive as part of a in the overall relationship. Fourth, regular trade
family reunion. The policies appear to have been and business interactions with Africa have re-
tightened recently, exemplified by the introduc- mained marginal. Fifth, Norway’s commitment to
tion of DNA testing to determine the true identity the UN has had a decisive impact on policy deci-
of alleged relatives. Norway’s accession to the sions. Sixth, domestic civil society organisations
Schengen agreement is an influencing factor. have exerted considerable influence in specific
policy fields, notably in aid and support for the
liberation struggle in Southern Africa.
Conclusion These features are not likely to change in the
From the above discussion a number of main future, for two reasons: (a) Africa continues to
points emerge as the conclusion to this article. remain marginal in the world economy and in
First, it is questionable whether Norway has ever Norway’s economic relations with the outside
had a coherent official policy towards Africa. Sec- world; and (b) as seen from Norway, Africa is still
ond, to the extent a policy pattern is discernible a remote continent. If anything, the aid relation-
in the ad hoc positions on various questions over ship will be reinforced, perhaps with the added
the years it has come about rather by default than dimension of mediation and conflict management.
References
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Southern Africa: The Role of the Norwegian Churches årsakene til det diplomatiske bruddet mellom Norge og
1948–1994”. In: Tore Linné Eriksen (ed.) Norway and Kenya i 1990. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
National Liberation in Southern Africa. Uppsala: Statistics Norway, 2000, External Trade 1999. Oslo/
Nordic Africa Institute, pp. 266–335. Kongsvinger: Statistics Norway. p. 152.
Drolsum, Nina, 1999, For et fritt Afrika. Oslo: Solidaritet Stokke, Olav (ed.), 1995 (a), Aid and Political
Forlag. Conditionality. London: Frank Cass.
Drolsum, Nina, 2000, “The Norwegian Council for Stokke, Olav, 1995 (b), “Aid and Political Conditionality:
Southern Africa (NOCOSA): A Study in Solidarity and The Case of Norway”. In: Olav Stokke (ed.) Aid and
Activism”. In: Tore Linné Eriksen (ed.) Norway and Political Conditionality. London: Frank Cass, pp. 162–
National Liberation in Southern Africa. Uppsala: 200.
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Egeland, Jan, 1988, Impotent Superpower – Potent Small strategier og prinsipper” in Tore Linné Eriksen (ed.)
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Mariken Vaa (eds) Det norske samfunn. Oslo: Gjerdåker (eds) Norges utenrikspolitikk, Oslo:
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Granberg, Per, 1993, Hva får vi igjen? En statistisk analyse Gjerdåker (eds) Norges utenrikspolitikk, Oslo:
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bistandsmarkedet. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Tønnessen, Joh. N., 1967, Verdensfangsten 1883–1924. Del
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— 41 —
L e n n a r t Wo h l g e m u t h
Swedish relations and policies towards Africa

Lennart Wohlgemuth
Early Contacts During the 18th century, the great Swedish bota-
Not until after the great voyages of discovery nist, Carl von Linné, sent out a number of stu-
in the 15th and 16th centuries did the first dents on expeditions to Africa. One of the best
Swedes begin to make their presence felt in known, Peter Forsskål, went to Egypt and Anders
Africa. During this period, Sweden went Sparrman and Carl Peter Thunberg travelled to
the interior of Southern Africa after arriving in
through a process in many ways reminiscent
the Cape. Thunberg later became the father of
of what the young states of Africa are going
Cape botany, and Sparrman, after sailing with
through today.
Captain James Cook, returned to the Cape in 1775
During the 17th century the Swedish family,
and mounted new expeditions into the interior.
de Geer, of industrialists, merchants and financiers,
He wrote the first scientific description of South
originally from Belgium, and with good connec-
Africa’s fauna and made significant contributions
tions to the merchants in Amsterdam, started trade
to the knowledge of the geography of the Cape
with West Africa. They were involved in the for-
territory. When he returned to Africa in 1787, he
mation of the Swedish Africa Company in 1649
took with him plans for a Swedish colony in West
and first anchored their ships at Cabo Corso
Africa. Together with another Swede, Wadström,
(present day Ghana) in April 1650. A treaty was
he became an active campaigner against the slave
signed with King Bredewa of Futu for a Swedish
trade. On their return to Sweden via London they
colony to be established. The Swedes at Carlsborg
made statements to Parliament about their expe-
built a fort, but in 1663 it was taken over by the
riences and their opinions against the slave trade.
Futu and sold to the Dutch. The castle is still there
Their actions turned out to become one of the fac-
and is on Unesco’s World Heritage List (Blomé,
tors which turned the British public against the
1999).
slave trade. Wadström stayed in London and
Many Swedes travelled on Dutch ships at this
worked devotedly for the antislavery campaign
time. One of the first European explorers to South-
through-out Europe (Berg, 1997).
ern Africa was Olof Bergh a Swede who served
Moving to the early 19th century, a number of
with the Dutch East India Company. He arrived
Swedes had become firmly established in South
in the Cape Colony in 1676. After many expedi-
Africa, one of them, Anders Stockenström, was
tions he eventually took a seat on the judiciary.
known for his liberal ideas. In a report to the Brit-
When he retired he was wealthy and purchased
ish government, he wrote that coloureds should
Cape Colony’s first vineyard, which he named
have the same rights as whites. As a result of the
“Groot Constania”, now a museum. His son,
disapproval of the British government and the
Martinus Bergh became the first Governor of
colonists, he was forced to return to Sweden. He
Swellendam.
was however, later appointed by the British as
In order to obtain safe conduct for Swedish
Deputy Governor of the Eastern Province in the
shipping in the Mediterranean and along the west
British Cape Colony. He signed a number of trea-
coast of Africa, treaties were signed with Algeria
ties with the Africans, which disgusted the colo-
(1729), Tunisia (1736) and Morocco (1763). In
nists, and, eventually, he was forced to retire in
1731 some Swedes and a Scotsman, set up an-
London. His efforts were later rewarded and he
other trading company, the “Swedish East Asia
received a knighthood for his achievements in the
Company”. In 1773, one of their captains, Carl
Cape.
Gustaf Ekeberg became the first to chart False Bay
By the late 19th century the allegiance of many
and another Swede, Elias Giers, became the first
Swedes in South Africa became divided between
to explore the Cape Peninsula by land as far as
the Dutch and the British and consequently dur-
Cape Point (Blomé, 1999).
ing the Boer Wars, Swedes and other Scandina-
— 42 —
vains were to be found on both sides. The Swedes came to work in Congo, as a result of the
Scandinavian volunteer corps which fought on the new Belgian nation needing help with administra-
Boer side suffered very heavy losses at tion, transport, technology and defence. Because
Magersfontein in 1899. The story about “Swedes of the strong connection between the Belgian and
discovering Africa” is developed in detail in a book Swedish royal families, campaigns were organised
by Lasse Berg (Berg, 1997). to attract Swedes to Congo. The Swedes became
the third biggest European nationality in Congo
during the late 19th century, after the British and
The Missionaries the Belgians (Blomé, 1999).
From the mid-19th century, a different category During the first half of the 20th century the
of Swedes – the missionaries – dedicated their lives two world wars slowed down the attractiveness
to Africa. In addition to preaching they were also of and interest in Africa, but after the Second
concerned with practical issues and building World War Swedish attention was drawn to Kenya,
schools, hospitals and churches and engaging in and many Swedes established plantations and
agriculture and small-scale industries. The Church ranches. One world famous Kenyan-Swede was
of Sweden, the official church, dominates the pic- Baron Bror Blixen, with his Danish wife, Karen,
ture since up to 90 per cent of the population be- who wrote the famous book “Out of Africa”,
longed automatically to it at birth. However, the published in 1937.
religious history of the last 150 years in Sweden After the Second World War, before official
also encompasses the emergence of new revival Swedish aid was launched, Swedish co-operation
movements. This diversity is mirrored in the ac- targeted Ethiopia. The Swedes provided help in
tivities of Swedish missionaries (Sellström, 1999, developing the Ethiopian air force, as well as the
Blomé, 1999 and Gustafsson, 1987). legal, telecommunication and education systems.
The National Missionary Society of Stockholm Swedish doctors, nurses, lawyers, police officers,
(SELM) sent their first missionary to Massawa (in teachers and pilots etc, numbering approximately
present day Eritrea) in 1866. The first Swedish 200 moved to Ethiopia. The first bilateral assist-
Missionary Station was set up in Monkullo in ance agreement was signed with Ethiopia in 1954
1871. These early links between Sweden and for the setting up of a building technology insti-
Ethiopia later, in the 1960s, led Ethiopia to be- tute in Addis Ababa. Between 1955 and 1962
come one of the first countries to receive Swedish semiofficial aid continued to increase and more
international development aid. countries became involved. In 1962, the first gov-
The Church of Sweden has had long-standing ernment agency, Nämnden för Bistånd (NIB), was
relations with Southern Africa. Through a unique created for administering foreign assistance.
act of parliament, the Swedish Mission Board was Swedish business also began to take an inter-
founded in 1874 to spread the gospel to non-Chris- est in Africa and in 1955 two partners, Swedish
tian people. Two years later the Church of Swe- Gränges and American Bethlehem Steel, made a
den sent its first missionaries to Zululand in South huge investment in the iron-mining business, the
Africa. In 1903 their work was extended to present LAMCO consortium, in Liberia. In addition to
day Zimbabwe. The significance of the early pres- the construction of the mine, roads, railways, a
ence of the Church of Sweden in Southern Africa harbour and a town were also built. Mining ac-
for the Swedish support of the liberation move- tivities continued until 1989 when the civil war
ments cannot be underestimated. stopped further production. However, this success-
In addition to the Church of Sweden, several ful investment persuaded other Swedish private
free churches embarked upon missionary work in persons and enterprises to invest in Africa.
Africa at an early stage. In 1959, there were around
1,000 Swedish missionaries on the continent.
Outside South Africa and Ethiopia the main areas Political Support to the Liberation
of concentration were the two Congos, Kenya, Struggle in Africa1
Uganda, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zam- Without a colonial past, Sweden remained politi-
bia and Zimbabwe. The free mission involved were cally distant from Africa until after the Second
the Baptist Missionary, the Swedish Missionary
Society, the Örebro Missionary Society and the
Swedish Pentecostal Movement. Missionaries were 1
This section is to a large extent drawn from the monumental
not the only Swedes arriving in Congo. Many works of Tor Sellström (Sellström, 1999 and Sellström, 2002)
— 43 —
World War. The historical links with Africa – es- nies, Angola and Mozambique – had been formed
tablished by emigrants, explorers, scientists, mis- and the initial reactive humanitarian views had
sionaries and businessmen as discussed above – been replaced by a more proactive and militant
were, however, significant, and in the early 1960s approach. In May 1965, the solidarity movement
a growing concern for the struggles for democ- defined as one of its main objectives to “convince
racy and national independence in South Africa, the Swedish government, parliament and public
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and of support to the liberation movements in South-
Mozambique emerged (Sellström, 1999). ern Africa”. The demand for an officially declared
Swedish intellectuals and students started to boycott against South Africa was at the same time
raise their voices against the South African apart- gaining increasing support.
heid regime in the 1950s. A fund-raising campaign The issue of direct official support to the lib-
in support of the victims of apartheid was eration movements never became divisive in Swe-
launched. After the beginning of the 1960s, this den. The four Prime Ministers, representing dif-
campaign and other initiatives led, with support ferent political parties, heading the government
of the student and youth movements as well as for more than twenty years (1969–1991) were all
church representatives, to the formation of a na- for the active Swedish involvement in Southern
tional anti-apartheid committee. Broadly based Africa – all became concerned with in the 1950s
boycott campaigns against South Africa soon or early 1960s. In 1988, the ANC leader Oliver
thereafter gave birth to active local solidarity com- Tambo characterised the links between Sweden
mittees and to an involvement with the entire and Southern Africa as “a natural system of rela-
Southern African region. The emerging solidarity tions [...] from people to people […], which is not
movement was assisted by a number of books and based on the policies of any party that might be in
a wealth of articles on Southern Africa by Swed- power in Sweden at any particular time, but on
ish writers and journalists, as well as by transla- […] a common outlook and impulse”.
tions into Swedish of texts by prominent South- In addition, the exiled leaders of Southern Af-
ern African nationalists. Some of the leading na- rican liberation movements started to visit Swe-
tional newspapers – such as the liberal Expressen den and were received at the highest level of gov-
and the social democratic Aftonbladet and Arbetet ernment from the beginning of the 1960s. Often
– joined the solidarity efforts, organising fund-rais- invited by the ruling Social Democratic Party,
ing campaigns for the liberation movements in many addressed the traditional Labour Day dem-
Angola and Namibia (Sellström, 1999). onstrations. ANC’s Oliver Tambo visited Sweden
One of the first initiatives by the emerging for the first time in 1961. In the case of South
Swedish anti-apartheid movement was to offer Africa, there was thus a difference of some twenty-
study opportunities in Sweden to black students five years between the first Swedish contacts with
from Southern Africa. Many of these students rep- ANC at the highest level of government and cor-
resented nationalist organisations in their home responding contacts between ANC and the Soviet
countries and later became their leaders. The re- Union, France, Great Britain or the United States,
lations established thus proved valuable when all permanent members of the UN Security Coun-
Southern African liberation movements in the mid- cil.
1960s intensified their diplomatic contacts with The often very personal relations between
Sweden. Swedish politicians and opinion makers and the
Though it was mainly individuals and politi- Southern African leaders – as well as with Kenneth
cal organisations in the liberal political centre that Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanza-
were first active against apartheid, the humani- nia – facilitated a deeper understanding of the
tarian concerns soon found an echo in the ruling nationalist core of the liberation struggles.
Social Democratic government. As part of Swe- Significant to note is that movements with
den’s aid policy, the government decided in 1964 which Sweden first established contacts eventu-
to extend educational assistance to African – ally became victorious in their respective coun-
mainly Southern African – refugee youth. tries (ANC of South Africa, MPLA of Angola,
The constituent parts of the Swedish solidar- FRELIMO of Mozambique and ZANU and ZAPU
ity movement with Southern Africa were largely of Zimbabwe). In the case of Namibia, SWANU –
in place by the mid-1960s. A first generation of at the time aligned with ANC – initially played a
local anti-apartheid committees – extending their prominent role, but from 1966 SWAPO was seen
activities to Zimbabwe and the Portuguese colo- as the genuine nationalist representative. When
— 44 —
official assistance was granted by the Swedish (in particular Norway) such consistent support
government it was ANC, SWAPO, MPLA, was far from a trend in other parts of the Western
FRELIMO and ZANU and ZAPU – the latter sub- world. Thus between 1969 and 1994, Sweden
sequently forming the Patriotic Front – that de granted SEK 4 billion or about 700 million US
facto were recognised as ‘governments-in-waiting’. dollars as official humanitarian assistance to the
Direct official Swedish support was never chan- liberation struggle in Guinea Bissau, Angola,
nelled to competing organisations. Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South
It was only through the armed struggle that Africa. Of this amount SEK 1.7 billion went to
the liberation movements were drawn closer to direct support to the liberation movements. In sev-
the Soviet Union and/or China. Against that back- eral areas, the Swedish contributions represented
ground, it is relevant to note that the political re- almost half of their non-military expenditures
lations established in Sweden in practically all cases (NAI, 1999). In addition, the front line states sur-
preceded the military operations. Neither the tran- rounding the countries of Southern Africa became
sition to armed struggle nor the links with the priority countries in Swedish aid and received a
Communist countries, however, eroded the Swed- substantial part of all assistance granted on a bi-
ish support the Southern African nationalist move- lateral basis (Sellström, 2002).
ments already enjoyed. The scope of assistance to the liberation move-
Although the nationalist organisations enjoyed ments was however kept confidential all through
increasing support, the Swedish government in the the period due to its special nature. As a result,
mid-1960s primarily saw them as protest move- little documentation is available on this excep-
ments against racial oppression and denial of civil tional North-South co-operation. To overcome this
rights. With Palme’s dramatic entry into the for- lack of information, the Nordic Africa Institute
eign policy arena in 1965, a new generation of launched a documentation project National Lib-
Social Democrats would lead the ruling party to- eration in Southern Africa: The Role of the Nor-
wards more independent international positions. dic Countries. So far five books have been pub-
In March 1966, Palme chaired the International lished.
Conference on South West Africa in Oxford, Eng-
land. With regard to Southern Africa, it was, how-
ever, the developments at the congress of the So- Swedish African Relations on the
cialist International in Stockholm two months later Eve of the 21st Century
that decisively marked the beginning of the After more than one hundred years of missionary
reorientation. work, more than forty years of development con-
The break with the cautious past was reflected tacts as well as immigration from Africa there are
at the level of policy formulation in a number of now thousands of Swedes who have either per-
articles by a younger generation of Social Demo- sonal experience from different parts of Africa or
crats. In the era of Vietnam, the foreign policy who have personal African contacts (Övergaard,
reorientation introduced by Palme in the Swedish 1998). In a study commissioned by the Nordic
labour movement had a parallel in the liberal Africa Institute in 1998 it was estimated that some
movement and encompassed all parties but the 23,100 Swedes (out of whom 5,575 are women)
conservatives. Pushed by an active public opinion had lived and worked in Africa for a period of
and carried forward by a new generation of po- more than six months between 1960 and 1998.
litical leaders, Sweden, as the first Western coun- By adding accompanying spouses and children the
try, in 1969 launched a policy of proactive sup- total would be close to 50,000. The study only
port to the movements struggling for democracy includes documented persons and the above fig-
and self-determination in South Africa, Namibia, ure is therefore very conservative, and would if
Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. all those approached had replied to the questions
Based on that decision of the Swedish parlia- be substanially higher (Wieslander, 1999). Thus af-
ment, Swedish support to the African liberation ter having had only very few relations in 1960 when
movements gained momentum and became a ma- development aid was introduced in Sweden, today a
jor part of the aid implementation from there on- substantial group of the Swedish population is rather
wards to 1994 when South Africa as the last coun- familiar with Africa and its present development.
try in Southern Africa became independent. Apart Below follows a summary of what the relations be-
from the other Nordic countries that followed suit tween Sweden and Africa look like today.
— 45 —
1. Swedish Development Assistance Sida (Swedish International Development

Official Swedish development assistance was ini- Cooperation Agency) is the Swedish government
tiated in 1962 in a bill to Parliament, which still agency dealing with bilateral international devel-
forms the backbone of the present aid policies. opment co-operation including a major part of
The policies are in 2002, for the third time, being co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe.
reviewed. The overall goals for Swedish develop- The Parliament and Government of Sweden de-
ment co-operation have for almost 40 years been termine the economic framework i.e. the coun-
to raise the standard of living of poorer groups of tries with which co-operation will be undertaken
people in the world. The following six specific and the emphasis of that co-operation. At present,
objectives have been adopted in order to achieve Sida supports activities in almost 120 different
this overall goal (the two last having been added countries including Central and Eastern Europe.
during the nineties): The major part of resources are allocated to the
twenty or so countries with which Sida imple-
1. Economic growth ments more long-term and extensive co-opera-
2. Economic and political independence tion most of which are in Africa.
3. Economic and social equality Sida’s support is based on plans made by the
4. Democratic development in society co-operating partner countries themselves, to
which they are prepared to give considerable
5. Long term, sustainable management of natu-
emphasis and dedicate resources to. Sida’s task
ral resources and the protection of the envi-
is to carefully consider the plans, select activities
ronment
with potential for successful results and then pro-
6. Equality between men and women vide expertise and capital. Each input is carefully
With no colonial past or other political or eco- monitored and evaluated. Sida’s financing of any
nomic objectives, Sweden has, to a large extent, project ceases as soon as it operates independ-
been able to channel its support to a considerable ently. Less successful projects should be brought
degree to the poorest countries and to strengthen to an end as soon as possible rather than being
the multilateral system. Solidarity has been the redesigned.
ultimate reason for the aid allowing for relatively Sida operates via approximately 1,500 co-
high aid allocations and low tying of the aid to operating partners, most of them Swedish. These
Swedish goods and services. In the annual assess- partners consist of companies, non-governmen-
ments made by the Development Assistance Com- tal organisations (NGOs), other organisations,
mittee of OECD, Sweden has therefore been one colleges/universities and government authorities
of the most successful countries in fulfilling the which possess the expertise to make Swedish de-
overall commitments to the UN and other inter- velopment co-operation successful (Sida, 1999).
national fora (Sida, 1999). In the long run, Swedish development co-op-
Swedish aid to Africa has aimed at supporting eration aims at wider economic and social co-
the liberation struggles, the poorest countries operation mutually beneficial to all parties in-
(mainly anglophone and lusophone), and provid- volved.
ing humanitarian assistance. Regional co-opera- Every year almost 300 Swedish NGOs receive
tion between countries in Africa has also been support for development projects according to
substantially supported. the “80/20 principle” i.e. if the organisation fi-
In 1968 Sweden decided to set aside one per- nances 20 per cent of a project, Sida will con-
cent of its GDP for aid, a goal reached in 1975/ tribute the remaining 80 per cent. The major part
76. During the second half of the 1990s Swedish of Swedish humanitarian assistance is also chan-
aid decreased again to 0.7 per cent of its GDP, a nelled via NGOs. (Sida does not require any fi-
level maintained since that time (with a slight in- nancial contribution from the organisations for
crease). The total disbursement of Swedish aid was these activities.) Projects are implemented in close
SEK 13.316 billion in 1999 (0.705 per cent) of co-operation with local partners and are gener-
which 30 per cent went to multilateral aid, 6 per ally based on local popular participation – from
cent to NGOs, 12 per cent to humanitarian aid planning to implementation (Sida, 1999).
and SEK 2.945 billion to development aid in Af- Approximately one third of Sweden’s devel-
rica (38 per cent of the bilateral support) (Sida, opment co-operation is channelled, via the Min-
1999). istry for Foreign Affairs (MFA, 1997/98), to a
— 46 —
number of multilateral organisations – primarily creased difficulties in attracting finance and credit
the various UN agencies, the World Bank group, guarantees for covering exports, investments etc.
the regional development banks and the EU. Sup- (MFA, 1997).
port is provided both as core contributions to regu- Tourism, on the other hand, has been increas-
lar operations and as support to special activities. ing all through the 1990s. At present, some 30,000
Through its membership in the EU, Sweden Swedes visit sub-Saharan Africa and in particu-
contributes to extensive development co-operation larly Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa and the Gam-
activities administered by the EU Commission. bia each year. The number of Swedes visiting some
Approximately half of the EU development sup- of the traditional tourist resorts in North Africa is
port is allocated to 71 countries in Africa, the even higher. At present, however, any further ex-
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries) within pansion seems unlikely.
the framework of the Lomé Convention.
3. Other contacts between Sweden
2. Trade and Africa
In 1950 the African region’s share of total Swed- In connection with a Government investigation,
ish exports was some 3.6 per cent. Due mainly to “Partnership with Africa” all the contacts between
official interventions, as a consequence of the the different sectors in the Swedish society and
struggle for liberation and against apartheid in Africa were studied in detail and the findings re-
Southern Africa this share successively fell to just ported in papers published in connection with this
below one per cent in the first half of the 1990s investigation (SIPU-International, 1997,
(CBS, 1960), and the flow of private direct invest- Övergaard, 1998 and MFA, 1997). These studies
ments had almost ceased completely. Since the mid- include the number of official contacts (which
1990s with the abolition of sanctions against South seem to have increased substantially during the
Africa exports to the region have started to in- 1990s) the NGO activities (160 Swedish NGOs
crease again (MFA, 1997). operate in 40 of the 48 sub-Saharan African coun-
The value of exports from Sweden to Africa in tries); trade unions with all their contacts in most
the 1990s averaged some SEK 3 billion a year. African countries; cultural exchange and sports
Imports averaged about one billion during the which again have increased in the 1990s and
same period. During the last few years of the friendship and immigrant organisations (there are
1990s, exports increased rapidly while imports approximately 35,000 first generation immigrants/
remained unchanged. If Nigeria (oil) and Liberia refugees from Africa in Sweden today of whom
(shipping) are excluded, South Africa is by far the most come from Ethiopia and Eritrea (39 per cent),
major recipient of Swedish exports while South Somalia (27 per cent), Uganda (6 per cent) and
Africa and Kenya account for the largest imports the Gambia).
to Sweden from Africa (MFA, 1997). The personal relations created by development
Sweden imports raw materials, mainly food assistance, trade, voluntary cooperations and im-
and minerals, from Africa and exports processed migration have drawn Africa much closer to Swe-
products to Africa. Swedish companies with an den than only some decades ago. It is important
interest in Africa are mainly half a dozen of the to emphasise that these contacts have had a great
biggest and most internationally active companies, impact on Sweden as a country as well as on indi-
notably Ericsson, ABB, Skanska, Volvo and Scania. viduals who have had the opportunity to work
Medium-sized and small Swedish companies have, and live in different African countries. There are
with few exceptions, not engaged in the African endless accounts of people who, after some time
markets – and if they have, it has been through in Africa, develop new views and perspectives on
deliberate efforts of special forms of aid. Consul- life and work. Having been exposed to a com-
tancy firms have been especially connected to aid. pletely different working environment also en-
The reasons for Swedish companies’ very limited hances these people’s abilities to work and live in
trade with Africa is partly due to the sluggish eco- Sweden. This experience should be highly valued
nomic developments in Africa in the past two dec- and be put to use.
ades and to the limited size of the markets but
also to such factors as red tape, over-regulation
and political instability. This in turn led to in-
— 47 —
In Search of a New Partnership eration was matched by an equally deeply-felt

for African Development sense of frustration in the recipient countries. The
time for a thorough re-evaluation of the entire
1. Preparation of a New Policy basis of development cooperation had clearly
In October 1996, the Swedish government gave a come, a task made more urgent by the lacklustre
working group in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs performance of the structural adjustment pro-
an assignment to draw up proposals for “a new grammes of the 1980s and 1990s (Olukoshi &
Swedish policy towards Africa”. The expectation Wohlgemuth, 1998).
was that the report would serve as a basis for a The working group, therefore, had the task of
new, more grounded and relevant Swedish Africa developing a working document that would help
policy, which would represent a departure from to form a new basis for Sweden’s relations with
previous efforts at cooperation. post-apartheid, post-liberation Africa whilst simul-
The Swedish government’s decision to revisit taneously overcoming the main problems weak-
the Africa policy was based on two major under- ening development cooperation as an effective
lying factors. Firstly, up until the formal end of vehicle for encouraging change on the continent.
apartheid in South Africa, a central feature of One principal idea of the working group was
Sweden’s Africa policy had been its strong com- to realize its set objectives by employing an inter-
mitment to the liberation of the continent from active methodology based on dialogue between
colonisation and institutionalised racism. The lib- Swedish officials and a cross-section of Africans
eration of South Africa was, from this point of from all walks of life. This way, it was hoped the
view, both a success for Sweden’s consistent and working group would be better able to understand
principled stand against white minority rule and the African development debate, the contempo-
colonial domination as well as the end of an era rary developmental aspirations of Africans and the
in its policy towards Africa. A pressing need for African perception of the experience of Swedish
the country to develop a new basis for its rela- development intervention on the continent. The
tions with Africa emerged, given the formal end investigative assignment of the working group
of colonial rule and apartheid on the continent. thereby became a project in itself, and in time was
The second important background considera- dubbed “Partnership Africa” to emphasise the
tion was based on the fact that the period from aspiration for a new Swedish relationship with the
the late 1980s to the end of the 1990s has wit- African continent, grounded in mutual respect,
nessed growing concerns as to the effectiveness, transparency of purpose, a clear understanding of
broadly defined, of development cooperation be- shared and divergent values and an equality of
tween the countries of the North and South. This responsibilities in the conceptualisation/design,
concern has covered a wide range of areas from implementation and assessment of cooperation
the conceptualisation of development cooperation projects and programmes.
to its content and practice. At the root of the in- The working group confined its study to sub-
creasing critique of the methods of cooperation is Saharan Africa’s 48 of the continent’s 53 nations,
the widely shared view that it has, to a certain addressing itself broadly to Africa’s development
extent, failed to deliver meaningful and sustain- problems at the outset, thereafter focusing on four
able development. Indeed, what seemed to be the “basic themes”, namely:
case is that as the scope and volume of develop- 1. Africa’s democratic culture, including gender
ment cooperation increased, its effectiveness equality, security and conflict management.
tended to decline. Problems, such as increasing aid This includes the state’s role and opportuni-
dependence in the recipient countries, the failure ties to boost public-sector accountability in
of cooperation to foster the development of rel- Africa. This is crucially important to prevent
evant local technical skills, the tendency towards conflicts and create true human security;
the almost total erosion of local initiative, and the
2. Africa in the international economy. This theme
reality of aid flows tending to reinforce local power
included economic reforms, trade policy, debt
relations obstructive of democratic accountabil-
issues and poverty-reducing measures. In par-
ity, are just a few of the concerns that emerged in
ticular, experience of and opportunities for re-
critique of the history and practice of development
gional collaboration should be elucidated. Af-
cooperation (Havnevik & van Arkadie, 1996).
rica’s relations with the EU are another impor-
Increasing dissatisfaction in the donor countries
tant area;
with the poor results of several decades of coop-
— 48 —
3. Africa’s aid dependency and prospects for sible for Development Cooperation in the follow-
changed relations between Africa and other ing manner:
countries; If Africans are again to become the subjects of their
4. Relations between Sweden and Africa – cur- destiny, and not the object of somebody else’s design,
rent situation and future potential and if we are ever to approach equality in the still
(Olukoshi & Wohlgemuth, 1998). unequal relations between Africa and the world, then
it is the capacity of African societies, their govern-
To elicit ideas and experience from Africa itself, ments and people, to analyse, choose and shape that
the working group arranged two conferences, at- must be strengthened. […]
tended mainly by African delegates. The first took
Africa’s partners have not yet provided a coherent
place in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in January 1997 response on the positive changes unfolding on the
under the auspices of the African Development continent. […] This time around, the response can-
Bank and the Nordic Africa Institute and it dealt not come from them alone. This time, the response
with the African development debate in relation must intrinsically build on the actions taken and an-
to the four themes referred to above. swers given by African societies. More than ever, Af-
The second conference took place in rica’s friends need to listen and reflect on what is ac-
Saltsjöbaden, outside Stockholm in June 1997 and tually said and done in Africa. […]
dealt with examples of African reform work in Everybody speaks about partnership, but what does
the four themes ares and related this work to pos- it mean? In my view there are both qualitative and
sible contents of a Swedish policy. The proceed- methodological aspects to it. First of all, look at the
ings of the Abidjan and Saltsjöbaden meetings have qualitative aspects of partnership (Karlsson, 1998).
been published by the Nordic Africa Institute un- He then follows to list the aspects he sees as cru-
der the titles A New Partnership for African De- cial and which later were introduced into the Gov-
velopment – Issues and Parameters and Towards ernment bill as follows:
a New Partnership with Africa – Challenges and
1. A basic attitude relating to sustainability and long-
Opportunities (Kayizzi-Mugerwa et al., 1998,
terminism. There is need for a real change of atti-
Kifle et al., 1997).
tude. No partnership can thrive or survive with-
out respect for the other.
2. A Genuine Partnership 2. Openness and clarity concerning the values and
interests that govern co-operation. You cannot
Based on these conferences, as well as on substan-
engage in a partnership without sharing values.
tial and comprehensive consultations among rel-
evant and interested parties in Sweden the work- 3. An increased element of management by objec-
tives and result orientation of aid, instead of a
ing group published a report in August 1997
multitude of predetermined conditions.
(MFA, 1997), which in turn was worked into a
Government white paper, discussed and approved 4. A humble, listening attitude with respect for Afri-
can assumption of responsibility and awareness
by Parliament in June 1998 (MFA, 1997/98). The
of the local environment.
result is summarised by the working group as be-
ing that the overall objective of Sweden’s Africa 5. Clarity of resource commitments, payments and
reporting principles.
policy should be “to support processes of change
under African control that involve sustainable 6. Desire for do-ordination among the donors (MFA,
improvements in welfare for the majority of citi- 1997/98).
zens and consolidation of their democratic influ- In addition to these qualitative aspects of partner-
ence”. To that they add two supplementary ob- ship the Government Bill also added the following
jectives closely linked to the main one: “to necessary changes to be made to partnership
strengthen the long-term contacts between Swe- modalities (comments made by the author):
den and African nations and societies” and “to 1. African leadership and ownership, for exam-
promote a strong African role in the international ple, holding consultative meetings to coordi-
community” (MFA, 1997). nate donors in the capitals of recipient part-
The objectives as described above contain both ners.
a qualitative aspect based on value judgements and
2. Improved local backing and participation.
a more practical side requiring a number of con-
There must be respect for open political de-
crete actions. The first part is deliberated upon in
bate, the role of parliament, consultation with
some detail by the then State Secretary of the Min-
private enterprise and civil society.
istry for Foreign Affairs, Mats Karlsson, respon-
— 49 —
3. Improved co-ordination. Effective African of Swedish society collaborate with African part-
ownership requires good donor co-ordination, ners “in the arts, research, trade, societies and as-
preferably under the recipient country’s own sociations, the environment, etc., in roughly the
management. same way as collaboration with European or
4. Well-developed sectoral and budget support, American opposite parties takes place today. One
making the number of interactions with do- may refer to alliances between Swedish and for-
nors as small as possible and thereby manage- eign stakeholders at all levels” (MFA, 1997). This
able for the recipient. is then elaborated upon in the Government Bill
presenting a long-term focus on promoting “alli-
5. Simplified procedures, minimising the numbers
ance forging” co-operation, in order to strengthen
of reporting systems, procurement require-
contacts between Swedish and African societies.
ments, payments procedures, accounting rou-
A special emphasis is placed on the promotion
tines etc.
of trade and investments between Sweden and
6. Contractual clarity and transparency. Africa, tourism, cultural exchange, exchange be-
7. Increased coherence between different areas of tween churches and popular movements, trade
policy. Behind this term are hidden scores of unions and voluntary organisations all reflecting
issues with tremendous long-term implications. the focus on some reciprocal relationship that is a
It is not just the well-known trade and debt crucial element of partnership (MFA, 1997/98).
issues, but much else that relates to everything But in the end, the most important aspect of a
from peace and to environment, migration and partnership lies in the creation of a different and
the many issues that enable economic integra- less unequal aid relationship – a factor that the
tion globally. Government Bill dwells on in detail.
8. Rewards for progress. This is the first comprehensive policy statement
9. Extraordinary debt-relief inputs for certain on Africa directed to Parliament by a Swedish
countries. (MFA, 1997/98). government, which is an important indication of
the increased importance of Africa in Swedish
Finally this is commented by Karlsson in the fol- domestic as well as foreign policy. Will Sweden
lowing way: act in line with the important message conveyed
Donor governments may well be serious in accepting in the Government Bill and in all the reports lead-
much of the above reasoning around partnership, but ing up to that document? I genuinely hope so, and
the real proof of their intent is whether they can han- at least the people in Sweden who requested the
dle coherence in their own policies. That is why the report are sincere in their quest for change. But,
issues of global governance, and in particular global unfortunately, when such a policy has to compete
economic governance, are crucial. Stronger political with other interests, it is often too easy to forget
dialogue and leadership, better coherence of policies, even the best of intentions (Wohlgemuth, 1999).
the adequate and sustained financing of the emerging
global public sector’s institutions and operations are
intrinsically linked to workable partnerships. If these 4. Developing Partnership
new partnership ideas fail to catch on and fuel virtu- in an International context
ous circles, it may well be not just because the Afri-
Partnership between Sweden and Africa cannot
cans are not up to it, as will be presumed by so many
in the North, but because the political courage in that
only be seen in a bilateral context. All parties con-
very North is lacking. cerned are part of a larger international context
which has in the era of globalisation become in-
Ideas of this kind have been advocated by many Afri-
cans. They inspired Sweden to reassess its overall Af- creasingly important over the years. The UN plays
rica policy. That policy was to be based, not on an- a crucial role in African affairs and as a conse-
other set of consultancy reports, but on an intense quences of Sweden’s distinct multilateral profile –
listening exercise with African policy makers, academ- in common with the other Nordic countries – the
ics and civil society (Karlsson, 1998). UN has in the past and will in the future play an
important role in the relations between Sweden
and Africa. This relation will therefore also in the
3. Suggestions for concrete action future go via helping to and enhance confidence
On a practical level, partnership implies a Swed- in the UN and its purposes and activities. One way
ish Africa Policy that is guided by a long term vi- of doing so is to help place in the UN agenda is-
sion of a stronger Africa in which various sectors sues of African interest.
— 50 —
Swedish membership in the EU limits to a large and the partnership issue discussed above is there-
extent its possibilities to act bilaterally on African fore high on the Swedish agenda for inclusion in the
issues. EU thus sets rules, particularly on trade. But political guidelines of the EU. Many issues such as
perhaps more importantly it also gives Sweden a e.g. greater coherence between different policy ar-
possibility to contribute actively to the debate within eas becomes much more efficient when they are im-
EU on future relations with the countries of Africa, plemented by EU than on bilateral basis.
References
Berg, Lasse, 1997, När Sverige upptäckte Afrika. Stock- Nordic Africa Institute Conference Report (NAI), 1999,
holm: Rabén Prisma. Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in
Blomé, Göran, 1999, On Location in Africa – Images of Southern Africa and Challenges for Democratic
Swedish-African Entrepreneurship. Stockholm: Partnerships into the 21st Century, Robben Island 11–
Blomédia A. 14 February 1999, organised by The Nordic Africa
Brundenius, C., Hermele, K. and M. Palmberg, 1980, Institute, The Mayibuye Centre, and Robben Island
Gränslösa affärer – om svenska företag i tredje världen. Museum. Uppsala, Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute.
Sweden: LiberFörlag. Olukoshi, A. O. and L. Wohlgemuth, 1998, “In Search of a
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 1960, “Historical New Partnership for African Development – An
Statistics of Sweden”, 1960 and annual trade statistics, Introductory Comment” in Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S.,
1969–1999. Stockholm: Central Bureau of Statistics. Olukoshi, A. O. and L. Wohlgemuth, (eds), 1998,
Gustafsson, Ingemar, 1987, Schools and the Transformation Towards a New Partnership with Africa: Challenges
of Work: A comparative study of four productive work and Opportunities. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa
programmes in Southern Africa, University of Stock- Institute.
holm: Institute of International Education. Sellström, T., 1999, Sweden and National Liberation in
Havnevik, Kjell and B. van Arkadie, (eds), 1996, Domina- Southern Africa. Volume I: Formation of a Popular
tion or Dialogue? Experiences and Prospects for Opinion (1950–1970). Uppsala: The Nordic Africa
African Development Co-operation. Uppsala: The Institute.
Nordic Africa Institute. Sellström T., 2002, Sweden and National Liberation in
Karlsson, Mats, 1998, “For a Genuine parthership with Southern Africa. Volume II: Solidarity and Assistance.
Emerging Africa”, in Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., Olukoshi, 1970–1994. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.
A. O. and L. Wohlgemuth, (eds), 1998, Towards a New Sida, 1999, Swedish Development Cooperation, Stockholm:
Partnership with Africa: Challenges and Opportunities. Sida.
Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute. SIPU-International, 1997, Review and Analysis of the
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., Olukoshi A. O. and L. Wohlgemuth, Interchange between the Swedish Society and Sub-
(eds), 1998, Towards a New Partnership with Africa: Saharan Africa. Study for the Swedish Ministry for
Challenges and Opportunities. Uppsala: The Nordic Foreign Affairs, carried out by Birgitta Thellman Beck,
Africa Institute. Tove Strömberg, Börje Wallberg and Anna Wieslander:
Kifle, H., Olukoshi A. O. and L. Wohlgemuth, (eds), 1997, Stockholm: SIPU International.
A New Partnership for African Development: Issues Wieslander, Anna, 1999, Svenskar i Afrika. Uppsala:
and Parameters. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), 1997, Partnership with Wohlgemuth, L., 1999, “Education and geopolitical change
Africa: Proposals for a New Swedish Policy towards in Africa: A case for partnership” in King, K., and L.
Sub-Saharan Africa. Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Buchert (eds), 1999, Changing International Aid to
Affairs. Education: Global patterns and national contexts.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden (MFA), 1997/98, Paris: UNESCO Publishing/Norrag.
Africa on the Move: Revitalising Swedish Policy Övergaard, Kajsa, 1998, “Africa as Large as the Moon –
towards Africa for the 21st Century, Stockholm: and as Distant?” in Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., Olukoshi, A.
Government Communication SKR 1997/98:122. O. and L. Wohlgemuth, (eds), Towards a New Partner-
ship with Africa: Challenges and Opportunities.
Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.
— 51 —
Imports and exports to/from the Nordic countries to/from Africa, 1970, 1980 and 2000
(Million $)
IMPORT Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000
Egypt 0.0 8.2 8.0 0.0 6.9 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 5.4 0.0 4.4 77.2
South Africa 5.8 133.8 92.3 4.8 16.8 39.7 0.2 1.4 1.9 8.7 35.1 45.1 15.1 59.5 76.3
Oil producing Africa 24.5 189 21.5 0.6 30.3 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.6 167.5 5.9 6.5 836.6 110.9
Other Africa 74.8 136.1 74.6 30 135.2 174.8 0.2 2 2.5 70 79.7 363.6 140.7 183.6 86.9
Total 105.1 467.1 196.3 35.4 189.2 224.2 0.4 3.4 4.6 90.3 284.3 420.0 162.3 1084.1 351.3
— 52 —
EXPORT Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000 1970 1980 2000
Egypt 0.0 56.9 159.8 0.0 99.4 184.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.3 33.2 0.0 141.3 430.4
South Africa 16.9 57.9 113.5 19.4 51.2 313.0 0.0 0.1 2.3 15.1 96 34.4 61.9 179.8 344.2
Oil producing Africa 6.9 162.6 84.3 3.3 174.1 89.2 0.6 67.7 15.4 7.2 213.9 21.8 8.9 348.1 133.8
Other Africa 103.3 211.2 215.3 24.5 127.2 241.1 0.3 1.3 3.3 80.3 321.3 247.9 173 465.8 586.8
Total 127.1 488.6 572.9 47.2 451.9 828.0 0.9 69.1 21.0 102.6 700.5 337.4 243.8 1135 1495.3
Source: Nordic Statistic Yearbooks 1972, 1981 and 2001

The amounts for 2000 has been changed from EUR to USD according to the exchange rate 0.920920648 EUR on 1 USD.
Net ODA disbursements from the Nordic countries to Africa, 1980 and 2000
(Million $)
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000
Africa total 126.85 445.47 37.25 69.77 0.00 3.77 137.38 338.55 340.93 398.91
of which
Angola 2.33 7.67 0.03 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.10 16.59 16.92 17.12
Benin 1.59 19.52 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 2.33 0.00 0.00 0.18
Burkina F aso 3.36 24.45 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.44 0.00 1.24
Egypt 3.50 42.43 1.02 3.46 0.00 0.00 1.16 1.09 0.51 2.57
Eritrea 0.00 11.03 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.41 0.00 5.47
Ethiopia 0.06 2.56 0.25 5.66 0.00 0.00 1.00 23.57 31.43 20.72
— 53 —
Ghana 0.00 37.16 0.03 0.63 0.00 0.00 1.15 3.22 0.43 5.93
Kenya 18.13 8.42 2.62 4.04 0.00 0.00 21.05 2.89 28.35 14.20
Malawi 5.98 24.86 0.05 1.00 0.00 1.02 0.00 6.80 0.00 5.11
Mozambique 11.42 46.85 3.20 11.60 0.00 1.16 10.51 38.21 35.81 46.27
Namibia 0.00 3.71 0.00 6.59 0.00 1.05 0.00 7.16 0.00 21.06
Rwanda 0.00 1.20 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.27 0.00 14.63
South A frica 0.00 16.97 0.00 2.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.73 0.00 32.36
Tanzania 32.17 68.75 17.65 12.43 0.00 0.00 44.15 35.17 78.12 63.54
Uganda 1.69 59.81 0.17 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.39 21.00 2.42 22.65
Zambia 3.98 23.07 7.55 3.35 0.00 0.00 10.54 24.79 31.14 19.11
Zimbab we 0.89 22.45 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.00 4.52 9.77 11.47 14.79
Source: DAC and Iceida (for Iceland)

About the authors
Steen Christensen, Cand. phil. in History, Copen- sity of Aarhus, Denmark. She has worked for
hagen University, 1972; was a lecturer at the the Icelandic International Development
Esbjerg Højskole (Trade Union College), 1974– Agency (ICEIDA) since 1991 and is currently
1980; International Secretary of the Social the Country Director of ICEIDA in Malawi.
Democratic Party, 1980–1984; General Secre- She has previously taught as a part-time lec-
tary of the Social Democratic Party, 1984–1997 turer at the University of Iceland and has pub-
and since 1997 has been General Secretary of lished numerous articles on development issues
the LO/FTF Council for international Devel- in local magazines and books. She has also
opment. Since 1997 he has been Chairman of done several consultancy jobs on writing edu-
the Social Democratic Party’s Foreign Affairs cational materials for primary schools in Ice-
and Defence Committee, and since 1980 the land.
party’s representative on the council of the
Socialist International. He has written several Arne Tostensen, trained as a sociologist and is cur-
books on Africa and domestic and international rently a senior researcher at the Chr. Michelsen
social democratic topics, the latest of which is Institute in Bergen, Norway where he co-ordi-
“Mod undertrykkelse – for frihed. Social- nates a programme on urbanisation and de-
demokratiet og befrielsesbevægelserne i Afrika, velopment in Africa. He was previously em-
Latinamerika og Asien efter 1945”, København ployed at the Nordic Africa Institute. His re-
2001. search on labour migration, regional integra-
tion, urbanisation, poverty, democratisation
Juhani Koponen is Acting Professor and Head of and human rights has been conducted predomi-
the Institute of Development Studies at the nantly in Eastern and Southern Africa.
University of Helsinki where he has worked
since 1984. Prior to that he worked as a jour- Lennart Wohlgemuth has been the director of the
nalist and as a researcher at the Nordic Africa Nordic Africa Institute since 1993. Prior to this
Institute from 1981. He has published mainly he worked for many years for Sida (Swedish
on Tanzanian development history and Finn- International Development Cooperation
ish development aid. In addition his recent re- Agency), most recently as Assistant Director
search interests include issues related to glo- General and head of the Sector Department.
balization, development and global history. Between 1992 and 1998 he was a board mem-
ber of the African Capacity Building Founda-
Thórdis Sigurdardóttir has a BA from the Univer- tion and from 1989 a board member and from
sity of Iceland in Anthropology and Sociology 1993 to 1999 Chairman of the International
and an MA in Anthropology from the Univer- Institute for Educational planning (IIEP).
— 54 —

The Nordic Countries and Africa - Old and New Relations

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– Old and New Relations

Language checking: Elaine Almén

Denmark and Africa – Past and Present Relations

The African Paradox American colonies in the 18th century lamented

Sanctions against South Africa? Danish development policy at the

Africa in Finnish policy – deepening involvement

Iceland’s Policy on Africa

The Division of Icelandic development assistance by allowing Icelandic com-

Norway’s Africa Policy

Introduction gelisation (Jørgensen 1992). More than a thou-

Contemporary relationships equipment. Imports include bauxite, copper-

contradictions. This became most apparent with institutional capacity.9

Swedish relations and policies towards Africa

1. Swedish Development Assistance Sida (Swedish International Development

In Search of a New Partnership eration was matched by an equally deeply-felt

IMPORT Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden

EXPORT Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden

Source: Nordic Statistic Yearbooks 1972, 1981 and 2001

Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden

Source: DAC and Iceida (for Iceland)

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