Baguinat Brief
Baguinat Brief
Baguinat Brief
Branch 18, of Malolos City Bulacan dismissing plaintiff- appellants petition to declare her marriage with defendant-appellee null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity and the order dated March 19, 2012 denying the motion for its reconsideration. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS Defendant Danilo failed to file an answer, thus, we are constrained to depend on the plaintiff-appellants version of facts, to wit: Plaintiff-appellant Rosario Baguinat and defendant- appellee Danilo Baguinat were married on April 12, 1987 in Gatbuca United Methodist Church. It is evidenced by the Certificate of Marriage marked as annex A of the petition. During their marriage, they begot three children, namely: Paul Robin C. Baguinat, born on January 26, 1988, Dyan Rizzi C. Baguinat, born on November 6, 1995, and Aiyanna Ysabelle C. Baguinat, born on October 6, 2005. A few weeks after their marriage, defendant Danilo was diagnosed with lymphoma. He underwent chemotheraphy for one year. The following two years, he remained unemployed despite recovery from his illness. He relied mainly on the support of her mother and siblings for his financial needs. Plaintiff-appellant Rosario started experiencing physical and emotional abuse in the hands of defendant Danilo after the birth of their first born, Paul Robin. There was an instance when defendant Danilo slapped Rosario when the former got furious when Rosario asked in to attend to their crying son. There were also those times when defendant Danilo would force plaintiff-appellant Rosario to have sex with him. It is for these reasons that Plaintiff-appellant Rosario felt that defendant Danilo do not have the capacity to cope u with the demands of marriage and parenthood. Defendant Danilo was also unhelpful, insensitive and irresponsible for not minding the many needs of the family. After 20 years of living with her irresponsible husband, plaintiff-appellant finally had enough and decided to file a petition for the nullity of their marriage. In support of her prtition she had herself examined by a physician/psychiatrist Valentina del Fonso Garcia. Dr. del Fonsa Garcia concluded that because of plaintiff-appellants narcissistic- avoidant manifestations and obsessive compulsive features, her relationship with defendant Danilo, who has a dependent-depressive personality, could no longer work. They could no longer perform essential marital obligations. ISSUE Whether the Honorable Trial Court committed an error in dismissing the petition for the nullity of marriage on the ground of Psychological Incapacity. ARGUMENTS The appellant contends that the honorable trial court erred in not granting the petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage of plaintiff-appellant The contention has no merit.
The determination Psychological incapacity warrant the declaration nullity of marriage should made by considering totality of the pieces evidence presented and facts and circumstances of case.
Borrowing the jurisprudence properly cited by the Honorable trial court, it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested . The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The breakup of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. (Republic vs. CuisonMelgar, 486 SCRA 177). Thus, any doubt should be made in favor of the validity o the marriage (Hernandez vs. CA, 377 Phil. 919) It is for the above stated reason that our courts usually frown upon cases involving nullity of marriage. If it believes that there is still hope to revive the marriage, the court will not grant the action for its nullity. However, the courts takes into consideration instances when preserving the marriage will only cause great suffering to the parties and would rather make the relationship self-destruct. Thus, our laws provide for a leeway where the husband and wife may successfully receive the courts favor for the nullity of their marriage. This leeway is that which is provided in Article 36 of the Family code, to wit: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. An action for the declaration of nullity of marriage founded on the ground of psychological incapacity is hard to prove because as mentioned earlier, the general rule is for the validity of the marriage. This was made more burdensome and stringent by the guidelines for the application of article 36 enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. CA and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, to wit: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable . Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellant took the services of Dr. del Fonsa Garcia to have herself and her husband examined for purposes of psychiatric evaluation. This was done to strengthen and prove her claim of psychological incapacity between her and defendant Danilo that would warrant the declaration of their marriage null and void. Upon careful reading of the appellants brief, it appears to us that appellant based all her assignment of errors on alleged misappreciation of the psychiatric evaluation and expert testimony offered on the part of the honorable trial court. However, we are of the opinion that the Honorable trial court, did the right thing in not confining itself within the four corners of the psychological evaluation and expert testimony presented as evidence in the case at bar. Contrary to the contention of the plaintiff-appellant, the Honorable trial court was not satisfied with the concreteness and sufficiency of the Psychological evaluation to warrant the nullity of the marriage. Instead it has properly considered all other circumstances surrounding the case. As stated in the case of Ting vs. Velez, 582 SCRA 694: The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. To support the immediately preceeding cited jurisprudence, the Supreme Court stated in the case of Republic vs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case . Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. The Honorable trial court, in this case, after considering the circumstances surrounding the case, even found the real reason behind the filing of this petition. The trial court took pains in properly weighing the findings of the psychiatrist and the facts alleged and the circumstances present. In fact, it must be commended for being able to see through the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff-appellant. The exact words of the trial court: As to the psychological incapacity of Rosario, this court holds that this has not been sufficiently proven. Her failure to fulfill her marital obligations was just her manifestations of her determination to file this petition. This was supported by quoting the statement made in the psychological evaluation: She (Rosario) opined that counseling will no change her mind; that there is no room for reconciliation. It appears to us that, the conflicting characterization manifested by both parties is nothing more than an excuse to have their marriage annulled. The primary source of their determination to have their marriage annulled was mainly founded on their unwillingness to save the marriage. It is even proper to conclude that they only took advantage of their differences to convince the court that such manifestation were tantamount to psychological incapacity. For us, the Honorable trial court has appropriately decided the case at bar based on the totality of evidence rule instead of focusing so much on the Psychological evaluation. As evidenced by the exact words of the trial court of their decision which states: To recapitulate, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that the parties are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations. Though petitioner may be finding frustration and misery, however, an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. Borrowing the words of the Supreme Court in Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngco, 441 SRA 422, there are situations like this, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
Psychological incapacity does not exist in the case at bar. Admittedly, there is no exact definition of psychological incapacity, but we must remember what the Supreme Court has enunciated in the case of PerezFerraris vs. Ferraris, 495 SCRA 396: As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. (emphasis supplied) In addition to this, it was also stated in the fifth enumeration of the guidelines to be followed in applying article 36 of the family code in the case of Republic vs. CA and Molina, 268 SCRA 198: 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (emphasis supplied) In the case at bar the trial court