Viacom v. YouTube

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

VIACOM INTERNATIONAL INC., COMEDY PARTNERS,
COllliTRY MUSIC TELEVISION, INC.,
PICTURES CORPORATION, and BLACK
ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION LLC,
Plaintiffs,
07 . 2103 (LLS)
against-
OPINION
YOUTUBE, INC., YOUTUBE, LLC, and
GOOGLE INC.,
Defendants.
x
Defendants having renewed ir motion for summary
judgment, s Opinion responds to the Apri 1 5, 2012 direction
of the Court of Appeals, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676
F.3d 19, 42 (2d Cir. 2012), ng to
. allow the parties to ef the following issues,
with a view to permitting renewed motions for summary
judgment as soon as practicable:
(A) Whether, on the current record, YouTube had
knowledge or awareness of any specific infri s
(including any clips in suit not express noted in
this opinion) ;
(B) Whether, on current record, YouTube willfully
itself to specific infringements;
(C) Whether YouTube had the "right and ability to
control" infringing act ty wi thin the meaning of
512 (c) (1) (B) i and
1
Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS Document 452 Filed 04/18/13 Page 1 of 24
.;.,
(D) Whether any clips in- t were syndicated to a
third party and, if so, whet such syndication
occurred "by reason of t storage at the direct of
user" within the meaning of 512 (c) (1), so that
YouTube may claim the protection of the 512(c)
harbor.
Familiari with the COUyt of Appeals opinion, and my
opinion at 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) is assumed.
(A)
WHETHER, ON THE CURRENT RECORD, YOUTUBE HAD KNOWLEDGE
OR AWARENESS OF ANY SPECIFIC (INCLUDING
ANY CLIPS-IN SUIT EXPRESSLY NOTED IN THIS
Pursuant to the first item, I requested the ies to
report, for each cl in- t, "what pYecise infoymation was
given to or Yeasonably apparent to YouTube identi the
locat or site of the infri ng matter?" (Tr. Oct. 12, 2012,
p. 29) YouTube submitted a list of 63,060 clips in- t, claimed
it nevey yeceived notices of any of those
s, and challenged aintiffs to fill in the blanks
specifyi how they claim such notice was given.
In its response, Viacom stated that
It has now become clear that nei ther side possesses
the kind of evidence that would allow a clip by-cl
assessment of knowl Defendants apparent
are unable to say which clips-in- t they knew about
and which they did not (which is hardly surprising
:Viacom's Jan. 18, 2013 !'1em. Of Law In Opp. ':0 Def.'s Renewed Mot. for Summ.
J. ("Viacom Opp.").
2
....
given the volume of material at issue) and apparent
lack ewing or other records that could establish
these facts. (Viacom Opp. p. 8, fns omitted)
Viacom recognizes
"
that acom has led to come
forward with evidence establi ng YouTube I s knowl of
specific cl in suit." (Viacom Opp. p. 9)
That does not matter, Viacom says, because it is not
Viacom's burden to prove notice. Viacom argues that YouTube
claims the statutory safe harbor as a defense, and t fore has
the burden of est ishing each element its affirmat
defense, including lack of knowl or awareness Viacom's
clips-in suit, and has not done so. Plaintiffs' thesis is
st clearly and simply: "If there is no evidence allowing a
jury to separate the cl -in suit that Defendants were aware of
from those were not I there is no basis applying the
sa harbor affirmat de to any of the cl
II
(Viacom
Opp. p. 2)
Plaintiffs elaborate (Viacom Opp. pp. 8 9):
The Second Circuit vacated this Court's
summary judgment regarding actual knowl or
awareness because "a reasonable juror could conclude
that YouTube had actual know 1 of specific
inf ng act ty, or was at least aware of facts or
circumstances from which specific infringing act ty
was It Viacom, 676 F. 3d at 34. It remanded
a further assessment of the evidence relating to
whether this knowl extended to Viacom's clips-in
sui t. Id. It has now become clear t neither side
possesses the kind of evidence that would allow a
clip by-cl assessment of actual knowl
3
Defendants ly are unable to say which ips-
suit they knew about and whi they did not (which
is hardly surprising given the volume of material at
issue) and apparently lack viewing records that could
est ish these facts. It llows, given t
appli e burden of proof, that they cannot claim the
512(c) sa harbor-e ially in light of the
uminous evidence showing that the Defendants had
considerable knowl of the cl s on their website,
including Viacom-owned mat al.
The is ingenious, but its foundation is an
anachronistic, pre Digit Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) ,
concept. Title II of the DMCA (the Online Copyright
Infringement Li lity Limitation Act)2 was enacted because
ce providers perform a useful function, but the great
volume of works aced by outsiders on t ir platforms, of whose
contents service provi were generally unaware, might
well contain copyright-i ringing material which the service
provider would mechanic ly "publi " thus ignorant incurring
liabili r copyright law. The problem is cle
illustrated on the record this case, whi establi s that
"
. site traffic on YouTube had soared to more than 1 billion
ly video views, with more t 24 hours of new video uploaded
to the site every minute", 676 F.3d at 28; 718 F. Supp. 2d at
518, and the natural consequence that no ce provider d
possibly be aware of the contents of such video. To
17 U s.c. 512
4
encourage qualifi service provi rs, Congress in t DMCA
established a "safe harbor
n
ect the se ce provider from
monetary, unct or other table reI ief for i ngement
of copyright in the course of se ce such as YouTube' s . The
Act places the burden of notifying such service provi of
l ngements upon the copyright owner or s It
requires such notif ions of claimed infringements to be in
writing with specified contents directs that deficient
notificat shall not be considered dete ng whether a
service provider has actual or constructive knowl Id.
(3) (B) (i) . As stated the Senate at pp. 46-47, House
Report at 55 56 see 718 F. Supp. 2d at 521)
Subsection (c) (3) (A) (iii) requires that the copyright
owner or its authorized agent provide the service
provider with information reasonably sufficient to
permit the service provider to identify and locate the
allegedly inf ng material. An example of such
ficient information would a copy or cription
of the legedly inf ing material and the URL
address of the location ( page) which is all to
conta the infringing mat al. The of this
provision is to provide the service provider with
adequate information to find address the allegedly
ringing mat expeditiously.
Viacom's argument that the volume of material and "the
absence of record evidence that would allow a jury to decide
which clips-in suit were specifical known to senior YouTube
executives
ll
(Viacom Opp. pp. 9 10) combine to deprive YouTube of
the statutory safe harbor, is extravagant. aintiffs'
5
assert, nei ther side can termine the presence or absence
speci f ic infri s because of the volume of material, that
merely demonstrates the sdom of the 1 islative requirement
that it be the owner of the copyright, or his agent, who
identifies the infringement by giving the service provider
notice. 17 U.S.C. 512 (c) (3) (A) . The system is entire
workable: In 2007 Viacom it f gave such notice to YouTube of
infringements by some 100, 000 vi s, which were taken down by
YouTube by the next business day. See 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 at
524.
Thus, the burden of showing that YouTube knew or was aware
of the specific infringements of the works in sui t cannot be
shifted to YouTube to sprove. Congress has termined that
the burden of identifying what must be taken down is to be on
the copyright owner, a determination which s proven
practicable in practice.
aintiffs' acknowl that they lack "the kind of
evidence that would allow a cl -by clip assessment of ac
knowledge" (Viacom Opp. p. 8) suppl ies the answer to item (A)
aintiffs lack proof that YouTube had knowl or awareness of
any specific infringements of cl -in suit.
So the case turns to whether there are substitute
ents.
6
(B)
WHETHER, ON THE CURRENT RECORDS, YOUTUBE WILLFULLY
BLINDED ITSELF TO SPECIFIC INFRINGEMENTS
In general, the law has long included the doctrine of
"willful blindness. /I As the Court of Appeals st in this
case (676 F.3d at 34-5)
"The principle will
tantamount to knowledge is y
NJ Inc. v. Inc., 600 F.3d 93,
novel.
u
110 n.16
is
Cir. 2010) (collect cases) i see I n ~ e Aimster
., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)
is knowl in copyright law .
as it is the law ly.U). A person is
"will ful bl ind" or engages in "conscious avoidance"
amounting to knowledge where the person "'was aware of
a high probability of the fact in dispute and
consciously avoi irming fact. '" United
States v. na-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 2d
Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Rodri 2, 983
F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir.1993)); cf. Global Tech
Inc. v. SEB S.A., --U.S.---, 131 S. Ct.
71, 179 L. . 2d 1167 (2011) (applying the
willful blindness doctrine in a ent inf ngement
case). Writ in the trademark i ringement context,
we have held that "[aJ service provi is not
permi t ted will blindness. When it has reason to
suspect users its service are infringing a
protected mark, it may not sh ld itself from learning
of the particular infri ng transactions by looking
the other way." Tif ,600 F.3d at 109.
The Court recognized that:
S12(m) is explicit: DMCA safe harbor protection
cannot be tioned on affirmative monitoring by a
service provider. For that reason, S12(m) is
incompati e with a broad common law duty to monitor
7
- - ~ ~ - = ~ - - - - - - ~ ~
blindness
2060, 2070
or otherwise out l ing act ty sed on
awareness that ingement may be occurring.
Id. at 35. Nevertheless, willful blindness is not t same as
an affirmative duty to monitor, and the Court held ibid. that
the willful blindness doct may be ied,
in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge
or awareness ific instances of l ringement
under the DMCA.
Applying t doctrine, however, requires at tent ion to its
scope. In imputing knowl the will ly sregarded fact,
one must not impute more knowledge than the fact conveyed.
Under appropriate circumstances imputed knowledge the
willful -avoided fact may impose a duty to make further
inquiries that a reasonable person would make but that
depends on the law governing the factual situation. As shown by
Court of Appeals' discuss of " flags," under the DMCA,
what disqualifies service provider from the DMCA's
protection is blindness to "specific and identifiable instances
of infringement." 676 F.3d at 32.
As the Court of Appeals held id. at 30-31)
In particular, we are persuaded that the basic
operation of 512(c) requires knowl or awareness
of specific infringing act ty. Under
512 (c) (1) (A), knowledge or awareness one does not
disqual ify the service rather, the provider
t gains knowledge or awareness of infringing
activity ret safe-harbor ection if it "acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material." 17 U.S.C. 512(c) (1) (A) (iii) Thus,
nature of removal obI ion i tsel f contemplates
8
knowledge or awareness specific inf nging
materi because expeditious removal is poss e only
if the s ce provider knows h parti arity which
ems to remove. I to require expedit
removal in the absence of specific knowledge or
awareness would be to mandate an amorphous igat
to "t commercially reasonable steps" in response to
a generalized awareness of infringement. Viacom Br.
33. a view cannot be reconcil with the
language of the statute, which requires
"expeditious[]" action to remove or di e "the
mate al" at issue. 17 U.S.C. 512(c) (1) ) (iii)
(emphasis added) .
Here, examples prof by aintiffs (to which they
claim YouTube was willful blind) give at most information that
infringements were occurring with part ar works, and
occasi indications of promising areas to locate and remove
specific locations of infringements are not supplied:
at most, an area of search is identified, YouTube is le to
find inf ing cl
3
As st in UMG v.
- .........~ ~ . - . - - - - - - ............ - ~ - - - - -
Shelter tal Partners LLC, No. 10-55732, 2013 WL 1092793, at
*12 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) ("UMG 111/),
Although t parties agree, in retrospect, that at
times there was infringing material available on
Veoh's services, the DMCA recognizes that service
providers who do not locate remove infringing
materials they not specifi ly know should not
suffer loss of safe protection.
Plaintiffs often suggest that YouTube can readi locate the infringements
by us its own identification tools. It had no to do so. The Court
of s explicit held that "YouTube cannot be excluded from the safe
harbor by dint of a decision to restrict access to its proprietary search
mechanisms.
N
676 F.3d at 41.
9
The Karim memorandum states infringing cl some
well-known shows "can still be " but does not i ify the
specific cl saw or where found them. Wilkens
declaration tted by pIa iffs asserts that re were over
450 such cl on YouTube at time! and some of
them contai the infringing matter seen by Mr. m. To find
them would re YouTube to locate and review over 450 clips.
The DMCA excuses YouTube from doing that s Under
512(m), in the appli e section of t DMCA shall be
const to require !s "affirmat seeking facts
indicating infringing activi
"
Mr. Karim!s memorandum s not tie his ervations to any
specific clips. Application of the e of will
bl ss to his memorandum thus does not e knowledge or
awareness infringement specific cl suit! out of
450 1 e candidates. Nor does any example tendered
by aintiffs.
As Court of s stated (676 F.3d at 34)
definition! current cl in suit are at issue
in s litigation. Accordingly! we vacate the
ing summary j and instruct District Court
to determine on remand whether any specific inf s
of which YouTube knowledge or awareness correspond to
the clips-in-suit in these actions.
There lS no ng of willful indness to specific
ingements of cl in suit.
10
(C)
WHETHER YOU'::'UBE HAD THE "RIGHT AND ABILITY TO CON'::'ROL"
INFRINGING ACTIVI'::'Y WITHIN THE MEANING OF 512(c) (1) (B)
servlce provi lS presumed by the DMCA to the
ability to remove (or access to) material post on its
website, and to exercise that function in its daily business,
including removal of ringing mate in response to take-
down notices Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37) So the ability to
"control infringing activity," even without knowledge of
more" just ordinary power over speci ics, means "
der's website (id. at 38). The Court what on the
s perce two pointers toward what "something of
more" is (ibid.) e omitted) :
To date, only court has found that a service
provider had right ability to control
infringing act under 512 (c) (1) (B) . In Perfect
10 Inc. v. Ventures Inc., 213 F. 2d
...- - ~ ' - - - - - - - ............. - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - -
1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002), the court found control where
service insti tuted a moni toring program
by which user websites rece "detailed instructions
regard [ing] issues of 1 appearance, and
content." Id. at 1173. service also
forbade cert types of content and refused access to
users who iled to comply with its instructions. Id.
Similarly, inducement of copyright infr under
Metro-Gol Studios Inc. v. Ltd. ,
545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 162 L. Ed.2d 781
(2005), which "premises liability on purposeful,
culpable expression and conduct," id. at 937, 125 S.
Ct. 2764, also rise to the level of control
under 512 (c) (1) (B) . Both of these es involve
a service der exert substantial influence on
the act ties of users, without neces - or even
11
frequently acqui knowl of ific
infringing activity.
Ninth Ci tin UMG 111,2013 WL 1092793, at *19,
following Viacom, held that
in order to have " ability to control,"
t service provider must "exert[] substantial
influence on the act t of users." "Substantial
influence" may include, as the Second Circuit
suggested, high levels of control over activities
users, as t. Or it may lude purposeful
conduct, as in Grokster.
The concept is that a provider, even without
knowledge of specific infringing activity, may so influence or
partic e in that act ty, while gaining a financ benefit
from it, as to lose the safe harbor. By its example of
extreme Grokster case as what "might also rise to the I of
control under 512 (c) (1) (B)" (676 F.3d at 38), t Viacom Court
of Appeals intact its "first and most important"
determination (id. at 30) that the DMCA requires "actual
knowledge or awareness facts or circumstances that indicate
specific and identifiable instances infringement" before
disqualifying a ce provider from t sa harbor id. at
32) As quoted above, Ninth Circuit requires "high levels
of control" over activities of users as in or
"purposeful conduct" as in Grokster. It found those elements in
Columbia Indus. v. No. 10 55946, 2013 WL 1174151, at *20
(9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2013), where the record was
12
replete th instances of Fung act ly encouraging
by urging his users to both upload and
particular
to
works, providing
assistance to those watch copyrighted
fi helping his copyrighted materi
onto DVD.
213 F. Supp. 2d at 1170, 1173, 1182,
ce der presented both its f and its users as one
affiliat network of websi tes a "unified brand,"
In
it users "extensive ce" and "detailed instructions"
on content, prescreening submissions and refusing access to users
"until comply with its ctates" "to control the quali of
, /I
The court d it thus partic its
exercised the users' ringing act site
"
ng more" id. at 1181 1182)
But the governing e must remain clear: of
prevalence of infring ty, and welcoming it, s not
its f forfei t the safe To forfei t that, provider
must influence or partic in the infringement.
Thus, where the ce provider's influence s not "take
form of prescreening content, rendering ext ens advice to
users regarding content ting user content," Wolk v. Kodak
Network Inc. , 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),
or where the se ce r lists items for sale by users but
"is not actively invo in the listing, ng, sale and
livery of any item, " ckson
13
v. Inc. , 165 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001), and "does not preview products
to ir listing, does not edit the product de ions,
does not suggest prices, or otherwise involve itself the
sale," Corbis v. Amazon.com Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
- - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - -
1110 (W.D. Wash. 2004) , its influence on users is not
partic ion in their infringing acti vi and s not amount
to the red "control" beyond normal abili of
service provi r to ide what appears on its platform.
The plaintiffs claim that the "something more" this case
is establi by YouTube's llingness that its service be used
to infringe, and by YouTube 's exercise of "ul t e editorial
judgment and control over the content lable on the site"
(Viacom Opp. p. 42)/ as shown by
, s
cisions to remove
some but not a 1 infri ng material, by its ef s to
and faci itate search of appearing on the site,
by its ement of rules prohibiting, pornographic
content.
The plaintiffs begin with evidence to its
sition, YouTube reached internal cisions which i ringing
materials to i ify remove from the site
4
to avoid looking
4 YouTube employees used various methods to manually review submissions for
infringements (see RSUF ~ ~ 63-66, 126 127, 269, 272-273). There is
no evidence that any YouTube emp viewed and failed to remove any
particular infringing clip in suit while conducting such reviews (see Part A
above at p. 6).
14
ze
"Ii a dumping ground copyrighted st fff and "becomi
another boys or stupi "
(E-mails Jawed Karim,
Steve , and Chad Hurley Sept. 3, 2005) or "Bittorrent"
(E-mail from Chad Hurley to Steve Chen and Karim dated
June 26, 2005), without ri drops in "site traffic and
virality" (E mails between Jawed Karim, Steve Chen, and Chad
Hurley 3, 2005) YouTube's decided
to "take down whole movies, ff "entire TV shows, like an entire
family guy sode" (id.), "South Park, and full I anime
episodes," "nudity/porn and any death videos," but to leave up
"music
"
"news programs," (E-mail from Brent Hurley to
Cuong Do dat Nov. 24, 2005),
"
s, commercials" (E-mails
between Jawed Steve Chen, and Chad Hurley dated 3,
2005), and " cl ips (Conan, Leno, etc.)" (E- I from Jawed
Karim to Steve Chen dated 1, 2005) . then
"disabled communi flagging for "
(Viacom Opp. at
41), declined to develop a feature "to send automated email
alerts to owners when illegal content was oaded"
(Viacom 2010 Br. at 11), and ly stopped arly
monitoring its site for infringements, iding instead "to keep
substantially all infringing videos on the si te as a draw to
users, unless and until YouTube rece a 'takedown notice'
from the actual copyright owner identifying a specific
15
infringing clip by URL and demanding its removal from the site
R
id. at 7).
Plaintiffs further claim that Google "adopt YouTube's
copyright policy" (Viacom Opp. p. 41) of primarily waiting to
receive takedown notices before removing infringing materi
5 in
order to "\ grow playbacks to 1b/ day [one Ilion per day]' If
(Viacom 2010 Br. at p. 17), gain advertising revenue, and enter
licensing agreements on favorable terms with content owners
including Viacom. For certain owners (including Viacom), the
defendants streamlined the notification process by providing
access to YouTube's Content Verification Program, which "allowed
content owners to check boxes to signate individual videos for
take down" (RSUF ~ ~ 214-215). But YouTube would only use
digit fingerprinting software, which automatically blocks
submissions matching "reference abases of fingerprints of
copyrighted works
ll
prior to their becoming available for publ
view ~ ~ 283, 285), to filter "videos infringing the works
5 Plaintiffs claim that the defendants "manually screened narrow subsets of
YouTube videos" for infringing material (RSUF ~ 273), i. e., videos uploaded
by applicants to and participants in YouTube's Director Program and its User
Partner Program. Both programs offered certain perquisites to original
content creators, and YouTube appears to have monitored such clips to ensure
that participants were in fact uploading their own content and not
content created by others .). YouTube also monitored its site for
infringements us hash-based identification technology, which ffs
claim could only remove clips "exactly identical in every respect to a video
clips that YouTube had previous removed pursuant to a takedown notice," and
thus blocked only a limited subset of infringing clips id. at ~ 274).
16
content owners who agreed to licensing and revenue
sharing deals with YouTube"
6
(id. , 295) Thus, plaintiffs
conclude, ess they were awarded a content license,
Defendants re to prevent illegal upl ng and imposed the
entire burden on Viacom and other studios to search
24/7 for infri clips" (Viacom 2010 Br. at p. 28).
That evi proves YouTube business reasons
much of "burden on Viacom and the other s s to
search YouTube 24/7 for inf ing clips." That is where it lies
the safe (Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41) :
As previous noted, 512( provides that safe
harbor protect cannot conditioned on "a service
der moni ng its ce or affirmatively
seeking facts indicating l nging activi except
to the extent consistent a standard technical
measure compl ng with the sions of ion
(i).1f 17 U.S.C. 512(m) (1) (emphasis ). In
other words, the safe harbor sly discla any
affirmative toring requirement to the
extent that monitori comprises a "standard
t cal measure" within the meaning of 512 (i) .
ch
ing to accommodate or ement a "standard
cal measure" exposes a service r to
lity; re l to provi access to sms by
a service provider affirmatively its
own network no such resul t . In this case, the
class plaintiffs make no that the content
i ification tools implemented by YouTube constitute
"standard techni measures,u that YouTube would
exposed to 1 ility under 512(i). For that
Plaintiffs make the same argument YouTube's
metadata search , which could conduct automated searches at
regular intervals for videos matching provided by content owners
(RSUF ~ 299).
of
17
reason, cannot be excluded from t safe
harbor by dint of a decision to restrict access to its
proprietary mechanisms.
YouTube's decisions to restrict its monitoring efforts to
groups of l lng cl like its isions "to
rest ct access to its proprietary mechanisms," do not
excl it from the s harbor, ess of their mot ion.
ntiffs' rema evidence control goes no
than normal funct of any service provider, shows
nei icipation in, nor coercion of, user ingement
act
PIa iffs point out that YouTube's search technol
facilitat access to ing material by suggesting terms
for users to add to their query, which assists "users in
locat ringing by providing variations
complete name or content owner of a copyr work even
the user not typed 's or owner's 1 name" (id. ~ ~ l
338-339) , by present viewers wi links to cl
"'related' to a video that a user watches" id. at ~ 334), whi
"likely will rect" a user viewing "an i ng cl ip from a
major media company like acorn" to "oth.er s lar infri ng
videos" at ~ 335) But evidence so establish.es
YouTube's technologies are an "automat system"
"users alone se" to view infringing content, that YouTube
18
does "not participate ln those decisions," and that YouTube
therefore does not control the infringing activity. Capitol
Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)
The only evidence that YouTube may have steered viewers
toward infringing videos is as follows: YouTube employees
regularly selected clips to feature "with conspicuous
positioning on its homepage" (RSUF ~ 331), and on two occasions
chose to highlight a clip-in-suit. YouTube asserts, without
contradiction, that the creators of the work contained ln the
first clip-in-suit, "the premiere of Amp' d Mobile's Internet
show 'Lil' Bush,'" made the clip available on YouTube, and that
YouTube featured the second clip-in-suit, "a promotional video
from comedy group Human Giant entitled "Illuminators!,"' on its
homepage at the request of Human Giant's agent (id. ~ 332). No
reasonable ] ury could conclude from that evidence that YouTube
participated in its users' infringing activity by exercising its
editorial control over the site.
Thus, during the period relevant to this litigation, the
record establishes that YouTube influenced its users by
exercising its right not to monitor its service for
infringements, by enforcing basic rules regarding content (such
as limitations on violent, sexual or hate material) , by
19
facilitating access to all user stored material rega ss
without actual or construct knowledge) of it was
infringing, and by t its site for some
material and assist some content owners in their efforts to
do the same. is no that YouTube induced its
users to submit inf ded users with detailed
tructions about what content to upload or edited their
content, prescreened ssions for quali ty, steered users to
infringing videos, or se interacted with infringing users
to a point where it might be said to participated in their
infringing activity.
As the Ninth Circuit stat in UMG III, 2013 WL 1092793, at
*19, regarding Veoh, another online atform for user-submitted
s:
In this case, Veoh's interactions with and conduct
toward its users did not rise to a level. As
recognized, "(a) all infringing
on Veoh's systemj (b) Veoh the
remove such material j (c) d have
and did implement, filteri systemsi and
could have searched entially
content. II UMG II, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
are not equivalent to the
activi ties found to consti tute substantial I uence
in t and Grokster. Nor has UMG, in its initi
or supplemental briefing to this court, poi to
ot dence raising a genuine issue of materi
fact as to whether Veoh's activities involved
"some ng more than the ability to remove
access to mat als posted on a service
ite./I Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (quot
Matz
al resided
to
(d)
circumstances
ock
Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627,
20
635 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25,2011)); cf. v. Demand
Media Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2503 (PKC) , 2012 WL 2189740
(S.D.N.Y. June 13,2012) (citing the y ~ ~ ~ C ? 1 " [ 1 examples
and holding, "No evidence s a conclusion that
the defendant exerted such close cont over content
posted to [the website]. Bas on the evidence
at summary judgment, no e j d conclude
that the defendant exercis over user
submissions sufficient to remove it from the safe
harbor provision of section 512 (c) (1) (B) .") .
YouTube did not have the and ability to control
infringing activity within ng 0 f 512 (c) (1) (B) .
(D)
WHETHER ANY CLIPS IN SUIT WERE SYNDICATED TO A THIRD
PARTY AND, IF SO, WHETHER SUCH SYNDICATION OCCURRED
"BY REASON OF THE STORAGE AT THE DIRECTION OF THE
USER" WITHIN THE MEANING OF 512 (c) (1) , SO THAT
YOUTUBE MAY CLAIM THE PROTECTION OF THE 512(c) SAFE
HARBOR
The Clips del to zon Wireless were not clips-
suit.
There was no ot instance in which, as in the zon
Wireless agreement, YouTube manually selected videos which it
copied, took f the YouTube system, and delivered by hand so
that the rec ient make them available from its own
system.
YouTube has entered into licenses with Apple,
Panasonic, TiVo and AT&T under which YouTube provided access to
material stored on its system at the direction users
21
transcoding, to a accessible by third party mobile and
s lar technology, all of the stored on YouTube's
system. As explai in YouTube' s ef in of its
mot (Dec. 7, 2012, p. 52)
YouTube's syndication agreements merely give users
alternative ways to view videos users have s
on YouTube's system. They reflect the reality t
today connect to online ces not just
personal computers, through an
singly broad range of devices, including mobile
tablet computers like Ie's iPad
Internet-enabled television sets. To ensure
users can watch uploaded to YouTube no matter
hardware they has ente
into licenses wi providers that
allow users of those ces to access videos direct
from YouTube's system. Solomon Decl. ~ 3i
Opp. Ex. 325 (36:24-37:9, 39:713j Schwartz
Ex. 9 (23:13-25:9lj VRYCS , ~ 324-327. Because
can ayed on such are s
in proper file format, 's system
automatically transcodes user-uploaded deos into
formats compatible various thi party devices.
Solomon Opp. Decl. ~ 3i Schwartz Ex. 9 (48: 11-16,
57 : 2 2 2 ) VRY C S ~ ~ 3 2 0 , 330. 's standard
syndication 1 icenses invol ve no manual select
of Vl by YouTube, the videos accessible via
the t -party devices at all times rema stored on
and accessed only from YouTube's system.
This
"
cation
U
serves the purpose of 512(c) by
"providing access to material stored at the rection of users,H
676 F. 3d at 40, quoting UMG I, 620 F. .2d at 1092,
entails nei manual selection nor del of videos. As
YouTube argues (Defs.' Br. p. 53), the syndication does
nothing more than two functions that the
Second Circuit has found to be ected by
22
the sa harbor: (1 ) "transcoding" "in a
different encoding in order to r the video
Vl e over the Internet to most usersi" and (2 )
pI back videos "in response to user request.
II
points outl without cont ction that
l
online service providers have equivalent licensing agreements.
Plaintiffs argue that the
critical feature of these thi party syndication
deals that takes them outside the scope of the safe
is that were entered into sua sponte
YouTube for its own business purposes
l
and not at the
rection of users. was acting sua
in its own self-interest and for its own
ial benefit in ente 0 all of these
l
iness transactions. (Viacom pp. 51-52)
On t contrarYI t critical feature of these transactions
is not the identity of the party i tiating them but that they
l
are steps by a se ce provider taken to make user stored videos
more ly access e (without intervent from its
em to those us contemporary hardware. They are therefore
cted by the 512(c) safe
CONCLUS ON
Each of the above issues being concluded in favor of
defendants the renewed motion for summary judgment is
ed.
The CI shall enter judgment that defendants are
ected by the safe- provisions of the D
l
23
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 512(c) from all of
plaintiffs' copyright infringement cIa and accordingly
dismissing the complaint, th costs and disbursements to
defendants according to law.
So red.
DATED: New York, New York
April 18, 2013
l ~ L. S;'..j,..."
"--'--"'--
LOUIS L. STANTON
U. S. D. J.
24

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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