Cracker Safety
Cracker Safety
Gas Crackers
Plant/location NAGOTHANE/RIL(ex-IPCL) GANDHAR/RIL(ex-IPCL) PATA/GAIL Capacity in 000TPA. 400 400 400
2
220
NCU & AU
800
Steam Cracking
TMTPA
C4HU PGHU BEU 142 541 168
Licensor
CBI Lummus, CBI Lummus GTC,USA
Recycle furnace
267 class-6 remote isolation valve ( XV ) provided through out NCU & AU
Heat Exchanger Overpressure Protection external fire, thermal expansion, blocked outlet, and tube rupture
provision of safety interlock Systems with suitable redundancy
To prevent major process operating upsets from threatening the physical integrity of process equipment usually by mitigating the extent of pressure and/or temperature deviations. To protect against temperature excursions outside of the mechanical design envelope of process equipment SIL-3 interlock system provided for flare load mitigation
Two independent effluent relief systems have been provided for handling effluent relief vapors:
cold dry flare system for handling liquid /vapor below 4C wet flare system for handling liquid /vapor above 4C Separate liquid vaporiser & superheater provided in the dry flare system
A low temperature alarm sounded as the overhead line temperature fell to 0 F, and the thermocouple went bad. at a value of -13 F With the cold flare drum overhead line running below its minimum design temperature of -10 F, the pipe ruptured resulting in loss of hydrocarbon containment The hydrocarbon released found an ignition source, resulting in an explosion and fire
7
Firebox explosions during lighting of burners Light up procedures must be followed Over temperature in furnace convection & radiation section
Excessive firing rate Partial trip provided at loss of feed Low or no flow rate in selected coils Minimum lock provided in dilution steam supply direct injection of medium pressure steam provided
Minimum lock provided at BFW feed C/V Furnace trip provided at low flow of BFW / Low level at steam drum
9
Switch to backup fuel can cause a rapid increase in firing causing over heating of the coil
Fire from coil outlet due to thermowell erosion Rotation of thermowell after 3 decoking cycle is recommended
10
TLV/DV system provided along with mechanical link To prevent hydrocarbon backup to firebox by maintaining sufficient back pressure
allows the heater to be isolated in the unlikely event of a heater radiant coil rupture To protect the overpressurization of radian coils & TLE tubes
11
Hazard for runway reaction due to excess hydrogenation & polymerization reaction
Emergency shut down valve provided for immediate hydrogen cutoff & releasing the inventory to flare
Provision for immediate nitrogen purge in all the reactors to cool down the reactors Auto cutting provision provided in liquid recycle standby pumps in case of liquid /Mixed phase hydrogenation rectors
12
Lowest temperature handled in cold box is -165 C Piping and vessels in Coldbox are made of aluminum Internally insulated with loosePerlite (very high insulating value)
Over chilling of the cold box outlet piping due to loss of heating media
interlocks are provided to isolate the subject piping with two out of three voting logic for protecting possible embrittlement
13
Keeps air and moisture out of cold box Nitrogen minimizes hydrocarbon accumulation if a small leak
for
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15
Drill Gate
16
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Avoid excessively good fractionation In DePropaniser Likely if design reflux flow is maintained at reduced plant capacity. Reflux should always be reduced in proportion to the tower feeds. C4s in overhead is evidence that MAPD is not conc
18
Inadequate vent capacity Non engineered changes Not following good operating practices/procedures
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THANK YOU
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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TLV/DV CHANGEOVER
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