Days of Infamy

The Future Is Calling (Part Three)

© 2003 by G. Edward Griffin
Revised 2007 November 8

COLONEL HOUSE
As we re-activate our time machine, we find ourselves in the presence of one of the
most colorful and mysterious figures of history. His name is Colonel Edward Mandell
House. House was never in the military. The title of Colonel was honorary, granted by the
Governor of Texas in appreciation for political services. He was one of the most powerful
men in American politics and, yet, virtually unknown to most Americans today. He was the
personal advisor to Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt. He was close to the Morgan banking
dynasty and also to the powerful banking families of Europe. He attended school in England
and surrounded himself with Fabians. His father, Thomas, was an exporter in the Southern
states and also a lending agent for London banks, which preferred to remain anonymous. It
was widely believed that he represented the Rothschild consortium. Thomas House was one
of the few in the South who emerged from the War Between the States with a great fortune.
Colonel House was what they called a “king maker” in Texas politics. He personally
chose Woodrow Wilson, the most unlikely of all political candidates, and secured his
nomination for President on the Democratic ticket in 1912. It was House who convinced the
Morgan group, and others with power in politics and media, to throw their support to
Wilson, which is what enabled him to win the election and become the 28th President of the
United States. House was certainly a member of the Round Table and possibly a member of
its inner circle. He was a founder of the CFR.
In 1912 he wrote a novel, entitled Philip Dru Administrator. It was intended to
popularize the Fabian blueprint for converting America to collectivism using the Fabian
strategy of working slowly as a turtle and secretly as a wolf in sheep’s clothing. The hero of
his story is Philip Dru, who is a fictionalized version the author, himself: a quiet,
unassuming intellectual, working behind the scenes advising and controlling politicians who
are easily purchased and just as easily discarded. Speaking through Dru, House describes his
political ideal as: “socialism as dreamed of by Karl Marx.”1 Dru’s socialism, of course, was
the Fabian version. It was to have gentle and humane qualities to soften its impact and set it
apart from the Leninist version called Communism.
Like all collectivists, House spoke eloquently about defending the poor and the
downtrodden, but in reality, he had great disdain for the masses. In his view, they are too
stupid and lazy to take an interest in their own government, so it’s up to the professionals to
do that for them. Speaking through the fictional character of Senator Selwyn, House says:
The average American citizen refuses to pay attention to civic affairs,
contenting himself with a general growl at the tax rate, and the character and
inefficiency of public officials. He seldom takes the trouble necessary to form the
Government to suit his views. The truth is he has no cohesive or well-digested views,

1 Philip Dru, Administrator (New York: Angriff Press, 1912) p. 45.

1
 it being too much trouble to form them; therefore, some such organization as ours is
essential.1
Philip Dru foments civil war, leads an uprising against the old order, captures control
of the government, becomes a dictator with the grateful support of the people, is given the
title Administrator of the Republic, scraps all constitutional restrictions against government
power, establishes a progressive income tax, creates a national banking cartel, 2 annexes
Canada, conquers Mexico, invites European nations to participate in world government, and
ushers in a glorious new age of collectivism. This was not just a fictional story for
entertainment. House described this book as an expression of his own “ethical and political
faith.”3
The reason this is important is that the ethical and political faith of Col. House now is
the ethical and political faith of American leadership – and it started with Woodrow Wilson.
In his memoirs, President Wilson said: “Mr. House is my second personality. He is my
independent self. His thoughts and mine are one.”4
George Viereck was an admiring biographer of Colonel House and approved of
almost everything he did. This is what Viereck said:
For seven long years, Colonel House was Woodrow Wilson’s other self. For
six long years he shared with him everything but the title of Chief Magistracy of the
Republic. For six years, two rooms were at his disposal in the north wing of the
White House. It was House who made the slate for the Cabinet, formulated the first
policies of the Administration, and practically directed the foreign affairs of the
United States. We had, indeed, two presidents for one! … He was the pilot who
guided the ship.5
THE WAR TO MAKE THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY
As we contemplate a member of the Rhodes secret society, occupying two rooms in
the White House, virtually in control of American foreign policy, our time machine finally
brings us to World War I. Since our main topic today is war, we must prepare now to
comprehend the events we are about to see in terms of the strategy for using war to smash
the world to bits and then remold it closer to the hearts desire.
The sinking of the Lusitania was the event that, more than any other, motivated the
American people to accept the necessity and the morality of getting into World War I. Prior
to that time, there was great reluctance to participate in a war that had little to do with

1 Ibid., pp. 199, 200.

2 It must be remembered that Philip Dru was published in 1912. The U.S. income tax and Federal
Reserve System were then in the drafting stages and being promoted by House, Wilson, J.P.
Morgan, and other collectivists in Washington. The income tax and Federal Reserve were passed
into law the following year, 1913.
3“The Historical Significance of the House Diary,” by Arthur Walworth, Yale University Library,
http://www.library.yale.edu/un/house/hist_sig.htm. Also “An Internationalist Primer,” by Wlliam
Grigg, The New American, September 16, 1996,
http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/1996/vo12no19/vo12no19_cfr.htm.
4Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New York: Houghton Miffflin Co., 1926),
Vol. 1, p.114.
5 George Sylvester Viereck, The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel

House (new York: Liveright Publishers, 1932), p. 4.

2
American interests. However, when the Lusitania left New York Harbor on May 1, 1915,
with 196 Americans on board and was sunk six days later off the coast of Ireland, it became
the cause celebre that moved the American consciousness into a war mood against
Germany. Americans were outraged at a nation that could viciously and cold-heartedly
attack a peaceful passenger ship.
What is not well known about that piece of history is the role played by J.P. Morgan.
As you recall, the CFR was described by Professor Quigley as a front for J.P. Morgan and
Company. We must remember that Morgan was, not only a founding member of the CFR,
he was also a member of the Round Table, the inner group directing it, so how does Morgan
fit into this?
During World War I, the Morgan Bank was the subscription agent for war loans to
England and France. These countries had exhausted their financial resources to continue the
war against Germany. So they came to the United States and asked J.P. Morgan – who was
culturally closer to Britain than to America – to be their agent for selling war bonds. The
House of Morgan was happy to do that, and it floated approximately $1.5 billion in war
bonds on behalf of England and, to a lesser extent, for France.
Morgan was also the contract agent for these countries when they purchased
materials and supplies from American firms. That means he had a wonderfully profitable
revolving door in which he received a piece of the action as the money went out of the
country as loans and again, when it came back into the country, for the purchase of
materials.
As the war progressed, Britain and France were facing the increasing possibility of
defeat. The Germans had unleashed a surprise weapon – the submarine – that was new to
warfare in those days, and they were sinking the ships that carried food and other necessities
to the British Isles. The Germans were literally starving the British into submission who, by
their own estimate, at one point said they had only about seven weeks of food left.
For the British, there was only one salvation, and that was to have the Americans
come into the war to help them. But on the American side, there was a different agenda.
What would happen to that $1.5 billion in war loans if Britain and France lost the war? The
only time war loans are repaid is when the nation borrowing the money wins the war. Losers
don’t pay off their bonds. So Morgan was in a terrible fix. Not only were his friends in
England in dire danger, he and all his investors were about to lose $1.5 billion! A very
serious situation, indeed.
The U.S. Ambassador to England at that time was Walter Page. Page was more than
just an ambassador. Among other things, he was a trustee to Rockefeller’s General
Education Board. It was in that capacity that he played a role in shaping educational policies
to promote collectivism in America. Page sent a telegram to the State Department, and this
is what he said,
The pressure of this approaching crisis, I am certain, has gone beyond the
ability of the Morgan financial agency for the British and French Governments….

3
 The only way of maintaining our present preeminent trade position and averting a
panic is by declaring war on Germany.1
Money was not the only motivator for bringing the United States into war. We must
not forget that the Ameican players in this drama dreamed of world government based on
the model of collectivism, and they saw war as a great motivator to move society in that
direction. They looked forward to the creation of the League of Nations when the fighting
was over and knew that the only way for the United States to play a dominant role in
shaping that world body was to be a combatant. The only ones who divide the spoils of war
are the victors who fight the war, and it was that reality that fired the imaginations of House,
Wilson, and even J.P. Morgan.
THE STRATEGY TO GET THE U.S. INTO WAR
And so, there were different motivations and different agendas for pushing the
United States into war. Colonel House became the coordinator for all of them. He went back
and forth across the Atlantic and consulted with the Round Tables in both England and
America. He arranged a secret treaty on behalf of President Wilson to bring the United
States into the War. The reason for secrecy was that the Senate would never have approved
it. There was still strong public opposition to war and, had it been revealed that Wilson was
engaging in a secret – and unconstitutional – treaty to get the U.S. into war, it would have
been politically disastrous to his Administration.
George Viereck, in his book, The Strangest Friendship in History – Woodrow Wilson
and Colonel House, said this:
Ten months before the election, which returned Wilson to the White House
because he ‘kept us out of war,’ Colonel House negotiated a secret agreement with
England and France on behalf of Wilson, which pledged the United States to
intervene on behalf of the Allies. If an inkling of the conversation between Colonel
House and the leaders of England and France had reached the American people
before the election, it might have caused incalculable reverberations in public
opinion.2
How did they do it? How did these wolves in sheep’s clothing maneuver the United
States into war? It was not easy, and it came about only after extensive planning. The first
plan was to offer the United State as a negotiator between both sides of the conflict. They
would position the U.S. as the great peacemaker. But the goal was just the opposite of
peace. They would make an offer to both sides that they knew would not be acceptable to
Germany. Then, when the Germans rejected the offer, they would be portrayed in the press
as the bad guys, the ones who wanted to continue the war. This is how the plan was
described by Ambassador Page in his memoirs. He said:
Colonel House arrived … full of the idea of American intervention. First his
plan was that he and I and a group of the British cabinet … should at once work out a
minimum programme of peace—the least that the Allies would accept, which he

1Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page &
Co., 1923), p. 11 (Internet edition), http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/memoir/Page/Page
14.htm.
2 Viereck, pp. 106–108. This matter is discussed in The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan Vol. II.

pp. 404–406.
4
 assumed would be unacceptable to the Germans; and that the President would take
this programme and present it to both sides; the side that declined would be
responsible for continuing the war…. Of course the fatal moral weakness of the
foregoing scheme is that we should plunge into the War, not on the merits of the
cause, but by a carefully sprung trick.1
AGGRAVATE, INSULATE, FACILITATE
The trick eventually evolved into something far more dramatic than peace
negotiations. It called for three strategies in one. They were: aggravate, insulate, and
facilitate.
The first stage was to aggravate the Germans into an attack, literally to goad them
until they had no choice but to strike back. Much of this was implemented from the British
side. Churchill established the policy of ramming German submarines. Prior to that, there
was a code of naval warfare called the Cruiser Rules requiring that, when a warship
challenged an unarmed merchant ship, it would fire a shot across its bow. The merchant ship
would be expected to stop its engines and it would be given time for the crew to get into
lifeboats before the ship was sunk. It was a small humanitarian gesture in the middle of
warfare. That is the way it was done until Churchill, as Lord of the Admiralty, ordered all
merchant ships, regardless of circumstances, to steam full speed directly toward German
submarines in an attempt to ram and sink them. This eliminated the distinction between
merchant ships and war ships. From then on, all merchant ships had to be considered as war
ships, and Germany abandoned the policy of firing warning shots.
When that happened, those seeking to bring the United States in the war had a
heyday. Editorializing through the British and American press, they said: “See how evil
these Germans are? They sink unarmed ships and don’t even give the crews a chance to get
off! It is our moral duty to fight against such evil.”
Churchill ordered British ships to remove their names from the hulls and to fly the
flags of neutral nations, especially the American flag, so the submarine captains couldn’t tell
what nationality the ships really were. He wanted Germans to torpedo American ships by
accident. It was his strategy to do whatever possible to bring the United States into war, and
the sinking of an American ship would be an excellent way of doing so.2
There was plenty of goading from the America side as well. The United States
government consistently violated its own neutrality laws by allowing war materials to be
sent to Britain and France. Munitions and all kinds of military-related supplies were
blatantly shipped on a regular basis. In fact, the Lusitania, on the day it was sunk, was
loaded with military arsenal. The Germans knew all along that this was going on. The
people in Washington knew it as well. By openly violating their own neutrality laws, they
were doing everything possible to aggravate Germany into an attack.

1 Quoted by Viereck, pp. 112–113.

2
Churchill wrote in his memoirs: “The first British countermove, made on my responsibility, …
was to deter the Germans from surface attack. The submerged U-boat had to rely increasingly on
underwater attack and thus ran the greater risk of mistaking neutral for British ships and of
drowning neutral crews and thus embroiling Germany with other Great Powers.” Winston
Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1949), p. 300. This appears on page 464
of the Barnes & Noble 1993 reprint.
5
 The second prong of the strategy was to insulate. That means to insulate the victims
from information that would have allowed them to protect themselves. You can’t have a
surprise attack if you warn the victims in advance. It was important not to let any of the
Lusitania passengers know that the ship was carrying war materials and was likely to be
sunk. They could not be allowed to know that several of its decks, normally assigned to
passenger quarters, had been cleared out and loaded with military-related supplies, including
ammunition and explosive primers. They could not be informed that they would be riding
on a floating ammunition depot.
The German embassy tried to warn American civilians not to book passage on that
ship. They placed an advertisement in fifty newspapers, mostly along the eastern seaboard,
warning that the Lusitania would be in danger, that it was heading into hostile waters, and
that Americans should not be on board. The U.S. State Department contacted all fifty of
those newspapers and strongly requested them not to publish the ad, implying that there
would be dire consequences if they did. Several papers defied the government and published
the ad anyway – which is why we know about it today. Most passengers never saw it.
SINK THE LUSITANIA!
The third prong of the strategy was to facilitate. That means to make it easy for the
enemy to strike and be successful. On the morning of the sinking of the Lusitania, Colonel
House was in Britain and recorded in his diaries that he spoke with Sr. Edward Gray and
King George. They calmly discussed what they thought the reaction of the American
people would be if the Lusitania were to be “accidentally” sunk. This is what Colonel
House wrote: “I told Sir Gray if this were done, a flame of indignation would sweep
America which would in itself carry us into the war.”
Four hours after that conversation, the Lusitania entered the war zone where German
submarines were known to be active. Designed and built by the British to be converted into
a ship of war, if necessary, she had four boilers, was very fast, and could outrun a
submarine. That means she was vulnerable only to subs that were ahead of her path, not
those to the side or behind. This greatly improved her chances for survival, especially with a
military escort running ahead. However, this was not to be her destiny. On this voyage she
had been ordered to turn off one of her boilers. She was running on three turbines instead of
four. At only 75% speed, she was now vulnerable to attack from all sides.
The Juno was a British destroyer that had been assigned to escort her through those
dangerous waters. At the last minute, the Juno was called back by the British Admiralty and
never made its rendezvous.
Inevitably, the Lusitania, running at reduced speed, and without protection, pulled
into the periscope view of the U-20 German submarine. One torpedo was fired directly mid
center. There was a mighty explosion. As the Germans were preparing for the second
torpedo, much to their surprise, there was a second explosion, and the whole bottom of the
ship blew out. Exploration of the wreckage in later years shows that it was an outward
explosion. Something inside blew up with a tremendous force, and the great ship sank in
less than eighteen minutes.
The strategists finally had their cause. This was the dastardly deed of those war-
mongering Germans who were sinking passenger ships with innocent civilians on board.
The flame of indignation was ignited and eventually it did sweep America into war on April
16, 1917. Eight days later, Congress authorized $1 billion of taxpayer money to be sent to
6
Britain and France to assist in the war effort. The next day, the first $200 million was sent to
Britain and immediately applied to the Morgan debt. A few days later, $100 million was
sent to France, and the same thing happened. It was applied to the Morgan debt. By the end
of the war, $9.5 billion had been sent to the Allies and applied to the Morgan Debt. We must
add to that the infinitely higher cost of American blood sacrificed on the alter of
collectivism in a war supposedly to make the world “safe for democracy.”
It’s a twist of irony that the world really was made safe for democracy – when one
realizes that the word democracy is a synonym for one of the pillars of collectivism. It is the
embodiment of the concept that the group is more important than the individual, and it is
that rationale that allowed Round Table members on both sides of the Atlantic to plot the
death of innocent civilians as a small price to pay for the greater good of the greater number.
WORLD WAR II
We are back in our time machine now and find ourselves at the beginning of World
War II. The parallels to World War I are striking. Britain, again, was losing the war with
Germany. The president of the United States, again, was a collectivist surrounded by
Fabians and Leninists. The primary difference was that the center of gravity in the CFR was
swinging away from the Morgan group and toward the Rockefeller group. Other than that,
things were pretty much the same. Colonel House was still a presidential advisor, but his
rooms at the White House now were occupied by Harry Hopkins. Hopkins was not a
collectivist agent of the Fabians; he was a collectivist agent of the Soviets. The American
people were still opposed to war; and, once again, there were secret arrangements at the
highest levels of government to maneuver the United States into war without the voters
suspecting it. The strategy was to get the Axis powers to strike first, all the while convincing
the American people that their leaders were opposed to war. It was almost an exact repeat of
the ploy used in World War I.
On October 30, 1941, in a campaign speech in Boston, FDR made this amazing
statement: “And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I will give you one more
assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are
not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” FDR repeated that pledge many times, all the
while working behind the scenes to get the United States into war.
The President’s speechwriter at that time was Robert Sherwood, who later became a
famous author and playwright. On this topic, Sherwood said: “Unfortunately for my own
conscience, I happened at the time to be one of those who urged him to go the limit on this,
feeling as I did, that any risk of future embarrassment was negligible as compared to the risk
of losing the election.” Sherwood said that, while they were discussing the contradiction
between the President’s words and his deeds, Roosevelt replied: “Of course, we’ll fight if
we’re attacked. If someone attacks us, then it isn’t a foreign war, is it?”1 There, in a single
sentence, was the basic strategy. If the United States could become the victim of an attack,
then the American people would respond to patriotic instincts and clamor for war. The only
question remaining was how to bring this about.
Orchestrating events to create the appearance of being the victim of an unprovoked
attack is a common ploy of collectivists, regardless of whether they are Fabians,

1 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Bantam Books, 1948, 1950), Vol.1,

pp. 235, 247.

7
Communists, or Fascists. Hermann Goering was the second-in-command of the Nazi regime
in Germany, reporting only to Hitler himself. At the end of World War II, he was among
those who were imprisoned and sentenced to death at the Nuremberg Trials for war crimes.
The prison psychologist was Gustave Gilbert, a German-speaking intelligence officer in the
U.S. military. In his book, Nuremberg Diary, Gilbert describes a conversation with Goering
in which he explained this classic hallmark of collectivism:
Sweating in his cell in the evening, Goering was defensive and defeated and
not very happy over the turn the trial was taking. … We got around to the subject of
war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common
people are very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.
“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged. “Why would
some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get
out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the common people
don’t want war; neither in Russia, nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter
in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who
determine the policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along,
whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist
dictatorship.”
“There is one difference,” I pointed out. “In a democracy the people have
some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States,
only Congress can declare war.”
“Oh, that is well and good, but voice or no voice, the people can always be
brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them
they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and
exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.”1
As FDR was deceiving the voters about his war plans, the American and British
military staffs were meeting secretly in Washington D.C., working out the details of a joint
strategy. They planned, not only how to get the United States into the war, but how to
conduct the war afterward. The resulting agreement was called the ABC-1. It was
incorporated into a Navy war plan and given the code name Rainbow Number Five. We
now have a great deal of information on this plan although, at the time, it was highly secret.
The key for getting into the war was to maneuver the Axis powers to strike first to make it
look like the U.S. was an innocent victim. Their first hope was that Germany would attack.
If that didn’t work, the fallback plan was to provoke Japan.
This policy was summarized in a memorandum to FDR by Admiral Stark, Chief of
Naval Operations. He said:
It would be very desirable to enter the war under circumstances in which
Germany were the aggressor and in which case Japan might then be able to remain
neutral. However, on the whole, it is my opinion that the United States should enter
the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be
accepted…. The sooner we get in the better.2

1 G.M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1947), pp. 278, 279.
2 Sherwood, Vol. 1, p. 461.
8
 In an effort to provoke an attack from Germany, FDR sent U.S. Naval ships to escort
British convoys carrying war supplies, knowing that they would be targets for German
submarine attack. When Germany refused to take the bait, he ordered U.S. ships to actually
get into the middle of sea battles between British and German war ships. The strategy was
simple. If you walk into the middle of a barroom brawl, the chances of getting slugged are
pretty good.1
On October 17, 1941, an American destroyer, the USS Kearny, rushed to assist a
British convoy near Iceland that was under attack by German submarines. It took a torpedo
hit and was badly damaged. Ten days later, FDR delivered his annual Navy Day speech in
Washington and said:
We have wished to avoid shooting, but the shooting has started, and history
has recorded who has fired the first shot. In the long run, however, all that will matter
is who fired the last shot. America has been attacked. The U.S.S. Kearny is not just a
Navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman, and child in this nation…. Hitler’s
torpedo was directed at every American.2
When it became known that the Kearny had aggressively sought combat, the public
lost interest, and FDR dropped the rhetoric. It was time to involve Japan, and it was clear
that the drama had to involve more than one ship.
MANEUVERING THE JAPANESE INTO FIRING THE FIRST SHOT
The Secretary of War at that time was Henry Stimson, a member of the CFR. In his
diaries he said:
In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot,
we realized that, in order to have the full support of the American people, it was
desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there could be
no doubt in anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors…. The question was, how
we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much
damage to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition. 3
How was it done? It was accomplished exactly as in World War I: aggravate,
facilitate, insulate. Aggravate the enemy into an attack. Facilitate his attack to make it easy
with no opposition. Insulate the victims from any knowledge that would allow them to
escape their fate.
For many years, the government denied any knowledge of the impending Japanese
attack. But, gradually, the pieces of the puzzle began to bubble up out of the mire of secrecy
and, one by one, they have been assembled into a clear picture of the most monstrous cover-
up one can possibly imagine. The smoking gun was discovered in 1995. Author Robert
Stinnett found a memo in the Navy Archives written by Lt. Commander Arthur McCollum,
who was assigned to Naval Intelligence. The memo was dated October 7, 1940. It was

1T.R. Fehrenbach, F.D.R.’s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941 (New York: David McKay Company,
1967), pp. 252–259.
2 Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), p. 613
3 Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of
the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress (Washington, D.C., 1946), Part 11. p. 5421, as cited by
Prang. The reference is Part 11, p. 5433, as quoted by Kimmel, p. 1. Also quoted by Stinnett but
with no reference, p. 179.
9
directed to two of FDR’s top naval advisors: Captain Dudley Knox and Capt. Walter
Anderson, who was head of Naval Intelligence. This memo was approved by both men and
forwarded to FDR for action. The full text is now public information, and a photo of it
appears in Stinnett’s book, Day of Deceit; The Truth about FDR and Peal Harbor.1
The McCollum memorandum contained an eight-point plan of action to implement a
two-point strategy. The two points were: (1) Aggravate Japan into a military strike as a
matter of economic necessity and national honor on her part; and (2) Facilitate the attack by
not interfering with Japan’s preparations and by making the target as vulnerable as possible.
At the conclusion of the last point of strategy, the memorandum said: “If by these means
Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.”2
The necessity to insulate the victims from any foreknowledge of the attack was not
mentioned in the memorandum, but it was not necessary to do so. Obviously, this plan could
not succeed if the targeted victims were warned in advance. So, once again, there was the
familiar strategy: aggravate, facilitate, and insulate.
Was Japan aggravated into an attack? Consider these facts. The sale of critical goods
from the United States to Japan was suddenly embargoed; commerce was brought to a
standstill; Japan’s access to oil from the Dutch East Indies was crippled by U.S. diplomatic
pressure on the Dutch government; the U.S. closed off the Panama Canal to Japanese ships;
and Japan’s major assets in the United States were seized by the government. In other
words, the strategy advanced by Lt. Commander McCollum was followed in every detail.
There was a deliberate assault against Japan’s economy and an insult to her national honor.
A military response was predictable. The only question was when.
This is not to suggest that the Japanese imperial government was blameless in this
matter or that it was an innocent victim of circumstances. It was, after all, in Asia and the
Pacific, engaged in a massive, regional war of aggression and territorial expansion. This was
the logical consequence of its ideology of barbarism in which might makes right. However,
we must not lose sight of the role played by American leaders embracing the ideology of
collectivism. It was a case of one totalitarian ideology goading another totalitarian ideology
into a war that supposedly would lead to the greater good of the greater number.
MAKING PEARL HARBOR AN EASY TARGET
Was Japan facilitated in the attack? There is massive evidence to support that
conclusion, but we have time here for only a few examples. A Japanese spy by the name of
Tadashi Morimura was sent to Pearl Harbor under the cover of a phony political assignment
at the Japanese embassy. The FBI knew that his real name was Takeo Yoshikawa and that
he had been trained as a military officer. He had no political experience, so they knew his
assignment to a political post was a cover. They photographed him as he came off the ship.
They tracked him everywhere he went. They bugged his telephone. They knew what he was
doing every minute of the day. Often he would take a car to the top of a hill overlooking the
harbor and photograph the location of ships. Then he would use a clandestine radio to send
coded messages to Japan giving the exact grid locations for all the ships, the times of their
movements, how many soldiers and sailors were on duty, what time they reported, and what

1Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit; The Truth about FDR and Peal Harbor (New York:
Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 2000). The McCollum memorandum is on pp. 272–277.
2 Stinnett, p. 275.
10
time they left the base. All of this information was clearly of military importance and
pointed to the possibility of a surprise attack. The FBI wanted to arrest Yoshikawa and send
him home, but the Office of Naval Intelligence intervened, with White House approval,
saying: Leave this guy alone. He is our responsibility. We’ll handle it. J. Edgar Hoover, who
was head of the FBI at that time, objected strongly, and it almost erupted into a contest of
inter-agency authority between the FBI and Naval Intelligence. In the end, Naval
Intelligence had its way, and Yoshikawa was allowed to continue his mission without even
knowing he was being watched.1
Just four days before the attack, U.S. Navy Intelligence intercepted this message
from Yoshikawa: “NO CHANGE OBSERVED BY AFTERNOON OF 2 DECEMBER. SO
FAR THEY DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ALERTED. SHORE LEAVE AS
USUAL.” On December 6, just one day before the attack, this message was intercepted:
“THERE ARE NO BARRAGE BALLOONS AT THESE PLACES – AND
CONSIDERABLE OPPORTUNITY IS LEFT FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK.”2
It was bizarre. Here was an enemy agent gathering strategic information in
preparation for a surprise attack on American forces, and people at the highest levels of the
United States government were protecting him. They deliberately allowed the flow of
information to continue so the Japanese would be successful in their mission.
VACANT SEAS POLICY
Another example of facilitating the attack on Pearl Harbor is what was called the
Vacant Seas Policy. For many months, the Navy had known from what direction the
Japanese were likely to approach, what sea corridor they would use to launch their attack.
They even had conducted maneuvers simulating it themselves. One was called Exercise 191
and the other OPORD1. Because of weather patterns, sea currents, location of commercial
ship lanes, demand on fuel supplies, and other factors, they knew that the Japanese would
approach from the North Pacific Ocean in an operational area between 157 and 158 degrees
west longitude.3
This presented a special challenge. If the crew of any ship had seen a Japanese
armada steaming toward Hawaii, they undoubtedly would have used the radio to send word
ahead. They would have said: “Hey, there’s something going on here. There’s a fleet of
aircraft carriers and destroyers heading your way.” That, of course, would have spoiled
everything. Also, if the Japanese knew that their approach had been detected, they would
have lost the advantage of surprise and might have aborted their plan.
American intelligence was well aware of every stage of Japanese preparations. It was
already known that Admiral Nagumo was outfitting his carrier strike force at Hitokappu Bay
on the Japanese island of Etorofu. His progress was monitored closely, and daily reports
were sent to Washington. His ships departed from Japan and headed for Pearl Harbor on
November 25.4 Within hours, Navy headquarters in Washington initiated the Vacant Seas
directive that all military and commercial ships must now stay out of the North Pacific

1For the complete story, see Stinnett, pp. 83–118. Also John Toland, Infamy (New York:
Doubleday & Co., 1982), pp. 59, 60.
2 Stinnett, pp. 85, 109. Also Toland, p. 300.
3 Stinnett, p. 146.
4 Stinnett, pp.43–59.
11
corridor. They were diverted hundreds of miles on a trans-Pacific route through the Torres
Straits so there would be no encounter that might alert the intended victims or cause the
Japanese to abort their mission.1
The next stage in the strategy was to bring the ships of the 7th Fleet home from sea
duty and bottle them up inside Pearl Harbor. That would make them easy targets because
they couldn’t maneuver. To accomplish this over the strong objection of Admiral Kimmel,
who was in charge of the Fleet, his superiors in Washington cut back on deliveries of fuel.
Without fuel, Kimmel had no choice. He had to curtail training exercises at sea and bring his
ships back into port. In his memoirs, published in 1955, he said:
Shortly after I organized the Fleet in three major task forces, I attempted to
keep two of the three forces at sea and only one at Peal Harbor. I quickly found that
fuel deliveries were falling behind consumption. The reserves were being depleted at
a time when it was imperative to increase them. It was this fact, and this alone, which
made it necessary to have two task forces simultaneously in Pearl Harbor.2
A Congressional investigation in 1946 revealed that, just a few days before the
attack, Navy headquarters in Washington ordered twenty-one of the most modern ships in
the 7th Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor and deploy at Wake and Midway Islands. The aircraft
carriers, Lexington and Enterprise were among those ships. This not only left the remaining
Fleet with drastically reduced protection, it also meant that the ships anchored in the harbor
were primarily old relics from World War I, many of which were already slated to be
scrapped. As Secretary of War Stimson had stated in his diaries: “The question was, how we
should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much damage to
ourselves.” Sacrificing only the old and marginally useful ships was the solution to that
problem.3
INTERCEPTED CODED MESSAGES
Were the victims at Pear Harbor insulated from information that might have allowed
them to protect themselves? Could those thousands of Americans who lost their lives been
alerted in time to take defensive action? Or were they deliberately sacrificed because their
deaths were needed to create the emotional drama to justify going to war? The answer to
that question is not a pleasant one.
Throughout this time, the Japanese were using a combination of military and
diplomatic codes. U.S. intelligence agencies had cracked all of them.4 According to Homer
Kisner, who was Chief of the Pacific Fleet’s Radio-Intercept team, his men intercepted and
decoded more than a million of those messages.5 For three months prior to the allegedly
surprise attack, Navy Intelligence knew everything in minute detail. Yet, not one of those

1 Stinnett, pp. 44, 144, 145.

2 Admiral Kimmel’s Story, p. 28.
3 Stinnett, pp. 152, 153.
4 John Toland, Infamy (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1982), pp. 57, 58. Also Stinnett, pp. 21–23.
5 Stinnett, p. 58.
12
messages was ever sent to the commanders at Pearl Harbor.1 In his memoirs, Admiral
Kimmel said:
At Pearl Harbor, General Short and I knew only a small part of the political
story behind the Japanese attack. Care was taken not to send us the intercepted
Japanese messages, which told in great detail each step in the Japanese program….
For three months prior to the attack on the fleet a wealth of vital information received
in Washington was withheld from the commanders in Hawaii. The information
received during the ten days preceding the attack clearly pointed to the fleet at Pearl
Harbor as the Japanese objective, yet not one word of warning and none of this
information was given to the Hawaii commanders.2
The most important intercept of the Japanese coded messages was obtained on the
night before the attack. That message made clear even the exact hour that the strike would
come. It was to be 1:00 PM Washington time. The intercept was decoded 6½ hours before
that. It was rushed to President Roosevelt and his top military advisors for immediate action.
Their response was to do absolutely nothing. They sat on it and deliberately let the clock run
out.3
The military Chief of Staff at that time was General George Marshall, a member of
the Council on Foreign Relations. Marshall claimed that he was on horseback that morning,
riding in the park. The reason he did not take immediate action, he said, was that he didn’t
know about the intercept until he arrived at his office at 11:25 A.M. However, even then he
still had 1½ hours before the attack. He could have picked up the telephone and spoken to
the Hawaii commanders directly. He could have used any one of several military radio
systems designed for exactly such kinds of urgent communications, but he did none of those
things. According to witnesses, he read and re-read the intercept and shuffled the paper from
one side of his desk to the other while another half hour ticked away. Then, at 11:52, he
finally sent a warning to the commanders at Pearl Harbor. The method? It was a commercial
telegram sent through Western Union! It arrived six hours after the attack!4
AN ACT OF STATESMANSHIP
For many years after World War II, Roosevelt’s admirers denied that neither he nor
anyone in his administration had prior knowledge; but the evidence now is so clear that he
even facilitated the attack, no one tries to deny it anymore. The new line of defense is that
he was justified in doing so. It was an act of great statesmanship, you see, because,
otherwise, Europe would have been overrun by Hitler and, eventually, even the United
States might have been attacked. Furthermore, we had a moral obligation to come to the aid

1 There was a serious disagreement between Admiral Richard Turner and his staff over this very
issue. When Captain Alan Kirk, Chief of Naval Intelligence, objected to withholding the intercepted
messages from Kimmel and Short, he was relieved of his command. See Toland, pp. 57–60.
2 Kimmel, pp. 2,3.
3The man who personally delivered the final message to FDR in the White House was Captain
Beardall, the President’s Naval Attaché. According to Beardall, FDR read the intercept and, in
spite of the 1 P.M. deadline, showed no alarm. (See Hearings on Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 11, p.
5287 ff. as cited by Stinnett, p. 233.) This was a foretaste of President Bush’s lack of alarm when
he received information that the second plane had crashed into the Twin Towers on 9/11.
4 Stinnett, pp. 225–237. Also Toland, pp. 10, 11.
13
of our British and French brethren.1 It took great courage and wisdom, they say, for
Roosevelt to foresee this and confront totalitarianism before it became stronger. The
American people were too stupid to realize how important it was. They were too ignorant to
understand. They were too isolationist in their thinking to realize they must accept a
leadership role in the affairs of the world. So, what is a collectivist to do? You can’t leave it
to the ignorant voters to decide such important matters. There was no choice but to lie, to
deceive the American people, and ruin the careers of loyal military officers by making them
scapegoats. We had to violate our Constitution and our laws.2 It was statesmanship to kill
thousands of Americans in order to bring the stupid voters to the correct point of view.
Don’t you see? The only way to stop totalitarianism in Europe was to establish
totalitarianism in America.
Even Robert Stinnett, the man who found the McCollum memorandum, succumbed
to this insane argument. In the preface of his book, he wrote: “As a veteran of the Pacific
War, I felt a sense of outrage as I uncovered secrets that had been hidden from Americans
for more than fifty years. But I understood the agonizing dilemma faced by President
Roosevelt. He was forced to find circuitous means to persuade an isolationist America to
join in a fight for freedom.”3
One of the men who made sure that Admiral Kimmel and General Short never knew
about the decoded Japanese messages was Lieutenant Commander Joseph Rochefort, head
of the Navy’s Mid-Pacific Radio Intelligence Network. Rochefort got right to the point. He
said: “It was a pretty cheap price to pay for unifying the country.”4
Listen well, Ladies and Gentlemen. That is the voice of collectivism: 2,388 people
killed, another 1,178 wounded5 – mostly Americans –and it’s a pretty cheap price to pay for

1 That part is true, but it was an individual moral obligation, not a group obligation. In other
words, anyone who felt deeply about this was perfectly free to go to Europe and volunteer for the
British or French armies or to organize a volunteer American brigade, but no one had the right to
use force of law to conscript others into the American armed services and send them into battle
for that purpose. It is important to note that none of the master planners of this infamy ever felt a
moral obligation to put themselves into combat. That honor was reserved for others.
2 Unfortunately, it is sometimes necessary to ignore laws in time of war, especially in the heat of
battle, but the purpose of these deeds was not to win a war, it was to get into a war. The difference
is as night unto day.
3 Stinnett, p. xiii. It is undoubtedly because of this message that Stinnett’s book was accepted for

publication by Simon and Schuster and given wide distribution. Readers of the author’s book, The
Creature from Jekyll Island; A Second Look at the Federal Reserve, will recall a parallel situation in
which Simon and Schuster published Secrets of the Temple, by William Greider. Greider did an
excellent job of critiquing the Federal Reserve but, when it came to offering a solution, his
message basically was to relax and forget about it. The Fed, he said, had made plenty of mistakes
in the past, but no sweeping reforms are needed. All we need, he said, are wiser men to run it. It
makes no difference if you expose a corrupt monetary system if your solution is to do nothing
about it. And it makes no difference if you expose the infamy at Pearl Harbor if your conclusion is
that it was an act of statesmanship. Collectivists do not care about how much the public knows if
they have no realistic plan of action to bring about change. That is why they offer false leaders
(including authors) who will point with alarm at the problems of collectivism but then lead exactly
nowhere.
4The Reminiscences of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort (US Naval Institute Oral History Division,
1970), p. 163, as quoted by Stennett, p. 203.
5 Determining the Facts, Chart 1: December 7, 1941 losses,

http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/18arizona/18charts1.htm.
14
unifying the country. Anything can be justified merely by claiming that it is the greater good
for the greater number.1
As it was in WWI, the American leaders in World War II were focused far beyond
the war itself. Even before Pearl Harbor, Fabians and Leninists were drafting the structure
for a world government. It was to be called the United Nations; and, at the end of the
conflict, it would be offered to a war-weary world as “our last best hope for peace.” Most of
this work was done in the State Department Post-War Foreign Policy Planning Division,
under the direction of Alger Hiss, who actually was in both camps at the same time. Not
only was he an advisor to FDR and a former President of the Carnegie Endowment Fund
(which puts him squarely in the Fabian camp), he also was an undercover agent for the
Soviets. Hiss was the man who personally delivered the newly drafted UN Charter to the
founding meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco, and he became the first Secretary
General of that organization. If you are wondering about the significance of these facts, it is
this: After smashing the world to bits in world war for the second time, the UN became the
collectivist blueprint for remolding it to the heart’s desire.
A surface view of World War II is that it was a struggle for freedom against
totalitarianism. A deeper and more realistic view is that it was a war between three branches
of collectivism fighting for global dominance. The Fabians and Leninists teamed up against
the Fascists (with the Japanese Imperialists as a tactical secondary target). The Fascist
branch of collectivism was defeated. Ever since then, the world has been in the grip of a
struggle between the two remaining branches. It is not a battle for freedom against
totalitarianism. It is a contest to see which branch of collectivism will rule the world. While
that may have been difficult to see in the early stages of conflict, it is painfully obvious
today.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
In a moment, our time machine will deliver us to the year 2002 and the War on
Terrorism; but along the way, we must make a short stop at the year 1962. The exact date is
August 8. It is sixteen months after the Kennedy Administration had been embarrassed by a
botched invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. We find ourselves now at the Pentagon, in the
offices of General Lyman Lemnitzer who is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We
are watching as the general signs a top-secret document destined for the Secretary of
Defense who, at this time is Robert McNamara, a member of the CFR. The most important

1 A significant portion of the financial support for Nazi industry, including military production,

came from Wall Street investment houses controlled by CFR members and others who shared
their collectivist mindset. For this part of the history, see the author’s World without Cancer; The
Story of Vitamin B17, Part II (available from www.realityzone.com). When it is realized how those
collectivists in the United States who were beating the war drums against Hitler were also heavily
investing in the Nazi war machine, it becomes even more clear that the war was not about
stopping Hitler. It was about smashing the world to bits so it could be remolded to the heart’s
desire. It is sad to realize that hundreds of thousands of Americans gave their lives in this war
thinking they were fighting for freedom; but they were betrayed by their leaders. The purpose of
the war had nothing to do with freedom. It was a contest to determine which group of collectivists
would dominate the world. Soldiers were pawns on the global chessboard. Their patriotism was
used against them. They eagerly rushed into battle to defeat Nazism and Fascism, never
suspecting they were fighting on the side of Fabianism and Leninism, forces that are essentially
the same as those they fought.
15
part of this document is contained in the Appendix to Enclosure A, and the subject line of
that section reads: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba.
In the eight pages that follow, there is a detailed proposal for a covert military action
called “Operation Mongoose.” Its purpose is to create an acceptable justification for the
United States to invade Cuba. The preferred scenario is to convince the Cuban government
that it is about to be attacked and, thereby, goad it into some kind of military action, which
then could be pointed to as aggression against the U.S. It is the old, familiar strategy to
AGGRAVATE an opponent into a first strike. If that should fail, the secondary scenario is
to stage phony attacks against the American base in Guantanamo and against civilian
commercial aircraft, making it look like the work of the Cuban military. The strategy also
calls for a U.S. fighter pilot to fake being attacked by Cuban MIGs and to radio that he has
been hit and is going down. Then he is to fly to a secret installation where the tail number of
his plane will be changed so the plane genuinely will be missing from the roster.
Meanwhile, a U.S. submarine is to disperse aircraft parts and a parachute into the waters
near Cuba where they will eventually be found by search and rescue teams.
In addition to these phony attacks, covert agents are to launch real terrorist attacks
against civilians in Miami and Washington DC – with genuine casualties. The plan is to
make the U.S. appear to be a victim of unprovoked attacks by a ruthless enemy, and this will
prepare world opinion to accept an all-out invasion of Cuba as justified retaliation.
As we stand here listening to the details of this plan, we would find it impossible to
believe that such treachery is actually being contemplated by high-ranking U.S. military
officers – were it not for the fact that we are looking at the document with our own eyes. By
the way, Operation Mongoose has since been de-classified as a result of the Freedom-of-
Information Act and, if you want to read it for yourself, it can be downloaded from the
National Archives web site. 1 Here are a few excerpts taken from that document:
This plan … should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention.
Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other
seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the
necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed
at other countries as well as the United States…. The desired resultant from the
execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of
suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba
and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
Hemisphere….
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for
US military intervention in Cuba, a cover and deception plan … could be executed as
an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to
convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized….

1 This document can be downloaded from http://www.archives.gov. Click on “Research Room,”

then on “Archival Research Catalog (ARC),” then on the ARC SEARCH button, then type in
“Northwoods” in the search box, then click on “Digital Copy” on entry #1. The key information will
be found on images 136 through 142.
16
 2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and
around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban
forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform “over-the-fence” to stage attack on
base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
(4) Stage riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to
installation.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of
Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires – napathalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-
victims….
3. A “Remember the Main” incident could be arranged in several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the
Cuban waters. … The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating
the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was
taken under attack…. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation
covered by US fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent
crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national
indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area,
in other Florida cities and even in Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed
at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of
Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of
Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be
widely publicized….
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation.
Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military
drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-
86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG,
especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact….
In action item number eight, Operation Mongoose proposed an incident designed to
convince the world that Cuban MIGs had shot down a civilian commercial aircraft as it flew
near Cuba on its way from the United States to someplace in South America. It was to be a
17
chartered flight utilizing one of the air services in the Miami area that are secretly operated
by the CIA. An aircraft at Elgin Air Force Base was to be painted and numbered as an exact
replica of the commercial craft. The duplicate would be substituted for the original and
loaded with passengers who were carefully selected government operatives using false
names. The original aircraft would be converted to a drone and flown by remote control.
Both planes would rendezvous south of Florida. The document continues:
From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to
minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Elgin AFB where
arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft
to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight
plan. When over Cuba, the drone will be transmitting on the international distress
frequency a “MAY DAY” message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft.
The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be
triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western
Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying
to “sell” the incident.
The blueprint for Operation MONGOOSE is much too long to quote in its entirety,
but I think this gives you a pretty good idea of its nature. Even though the plan was never
put into action, the fact that it was even theorized and sent to the Secretary of Defense with
a recommendation for consideration is highly significant. Some will say that plans like this
should be of no concern to us. They are just paper war games, and military people are
expected to dream up all sorts of scenarios to cover every conceivable event so as to have a
prepared response ahead of time no matter what happens. That may be true, but Operation
Mongoose is not in that category. It is not a plan to react to an aggressive move by a
potential enemy. It is a plan to be the aggressor, and to conceal that fact from the world. It
undoubtedly was justified by the argument that Communist Cuba is a threat to the security
of the American people, and whatever it takes to eliminate that threat is acceptable. It is a
classic example of collectivist morality, a philosophy that declares anything to be ethical so
long as it can be said to be for the greater good of the greater number.
Communism in Cuba or anywhere else should be opposed because it is the
embodiment of collectivism. However, if we oppose the Cuban brand of collectivism by
accepting an American brand of collectivism, we will lose the war for freedom, and we will
do it to ourselves. We will not be conquered by enemies from abroad but we will be
enslaved by enemies from within.

– End of Part 3 –

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