BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 14-119

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

4 MAY 2012

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORCE

PROTECTION (FP)

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at

www.e-Publishing.af.mil for downloading and ordering.

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

OPR: AF/A2DX Certified by: AF/A2D

(Brig Gen Mark W. Westergren)
Pages: 28
Supersedes: AFI 14-119, 15 August 2007

This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-1, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning, Resources and Operations and AFPD 14-2, Intelligence
Rules and Procedures, and incorporates guidance from Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-104,
Oversight of Intelligence Activities, AFI 14-105, Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities,
AFI 14-202 Volume1, Intelligence Training, and AFI 14-202 Volume 2, Intelligence
Standardization/Evaluation Program, AFI 14-202 Volume 3, General Intelligence Rules, and
AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense. This publication provides guidance to support force protection
mission execution, encompassing peacetime through wartime intelligence operations. It applies
to Active Duty (AD), Air Force Reserve (AFR), Air National Guard (ANG), and Department of
the Air Force (DAF) Civilian personnel assigned to Air Force (AF) intelligence functions and
activities. This publication does not address all missions or responsibilities of AF Intelligence
units that perform specialized force protection functions (i.e., Contingency Response Groups
[CRG], Security Forces Groups [SFG] in expeditionary settings). Specific guidance for those
units will be found in AFI 14-2 Volumes for CRG/SFG. In accordance with (IAW) Title 10
responsibilities, requirements to meet the guidance of this publication fall on the gaining
MAJCOM or the host base for support to ANG, and tenant ANG units. Submit change
recommendations using an AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication, to the
OPR who in turn will submit to AF/A2 Policy via AF/A2Policy@pentagon.af.mil. This
publication may be supplemented at any level, but all direct supplements must be routed through
the OPR prior to certification and approval. AF/A2 is the approving authority for deviations.
All deviations must be contained in a command supplement. Approval for deviations will be in
the form of a command supplement or waiver. Waivers will be considered if compliance will
 2 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

adversely affect mission accomplishment, exceed local capabilities or require substantial

expenditure of funds at a location where forces will be removed or relocated in the near future.
Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are
maintained in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of
Records, and disposed of IAW Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS)
Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at
https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm. This publication may require the
collection and/or maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act (PA) of 1974. The
authority to collect and/or maintain records prescribed in this publication are Executive Order
9397, Numbering System for Federal Accounts Relating to Individual Persons, November 22,
1943 and Amendments to Executive Order 9397, Numbering System for Federal Accounts
Relating to Individual Persons, November 18, 2008.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This publication updates changes in FP that relate to increased defensive postures to guard
against threats posed by terrorists worldwide. Major changes include: the introduction of the AF
standardized definition for FP, as found in AFDD 3-10, Force Protection, the addition of a
reference that highlights the enhanced role of AF/A2 with regard to terrorist-related
contingencies; incorporation of Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) training requirements;
clarification of intelligence roles and responsibilities for Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and
host units, changing the MAJCOM annual report due date; and updating references, terms and
definitions.

Chapter 1OVERVIEW 4
1.1. All Airmen are subject to threats whether in the continental United States
(CONUS), outside the continental United States (OCONUS) or deployed to
expeditionary bases. ............................................................................................... 4
1.2. Antiterrorism is one element of FP, which is a collection of actions taken to
prevent or mitigate hostile acts against Department of Defense (DoD) personnel,
resources, facilities and critical information. ......................................................... 4
1.3. Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) is analyzed, all-source intelligence
information that, when integrated or fused with other FP information, provides an
assessment of the threats to DoD missions, people or resources. .......................... 4
1.4. Fused FP information and assessments provide the best-available picture of the
intent and capability of terrorists or extremists, criminal entities and enterprises,
Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (FISS), opposing military forces and,
in certain instances, environmental/medical hazards, infrastructure vulnerabilities,
and insider threats. ................................................................................................. 4
1.5. Adhering to guidance in DoDI 2000. ..................................................................... 4
1.6. Intelligence supports FP directly through unit deployments, readiness training,
mission planning support, and threat analysis. ...................................................... 5
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 3

Chapter 2ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 6

2.1. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). ..................................... 6
2.2. Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) of the Air Force for Logistics, Installations and
Mission Support (AF/A4/7) and Director of Security Forces AF/A7S. ................. 6
2.3. Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) (AF/A2) and Director for ISR Strategy, Doctrine and Force Development
(AF/A2D). .............................................................................................................. 6
2.4. MAJCOM Intelligence Responsibilities: ............................................................... 7
2.5. Host Unit (In-garrison) Intelligence Responsibilities. ........................................... 10
2.6. Expeditionary Intelligence Responsibilities. .......................................................... 14
2.7. Tenant Unit Intelligence Responsibilities. ............................................................. 18

Attachment 1GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 20

 4 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW

1.1. All Airmen are subject to threats whether in the continental United States (CONUS),
outside the continental United States (OCONUS) or deployed to expeditionary
bases. Asymmetric threats and hazards, including those from insiders (as addressed in AFDD 3-
10), will increasingly challenge US personnel, facilities and assets. Note: The USAF definition
of FP includes all hazards, but this expanded definition does not expand the Intel support mission
to include all hazards. Understanding how these threats and hazards affect the mission is the first
step toward developing an effective FP program that will help commanders assess their ability to
deter, pre-empt, negate or mitigate hostile actions or events.
1.2. Antiterrorism is one element of FP, which is a collection of actions taken to prevent or
mitigate hostile acts against Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, resources, facilities
and critical information. A commanders FP program should be designed to integrate all
available information for its best possible application. Intelligence operations can assist
commanders in this effort by providing threat information to drive the planning and execution of
FP activities. Accomplishing this requires a change to our AF culture, thus affecting the ways
commanders use and deploy intelligence personnel, products and services, and challenging our
intelligence analysis paradigm to include support to ground-based operations. Intelligence
personnel must be organized, trained and equipped to support the FP mission and FP customers.
They must also be poised to help protect personnel, resources, critical assets and information
from threats that could destroy, damage or compromise the capability of the AF to perform its
assigned missions.
1.3. Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) is analyzed, all-source intelligence information
that, when integrated or fused with other FP information, provides an assessment of the
threats to DoD missions, people or resources. FPI is proactive and drives FP decisions in
support of the commanders intent.
1.4. Fused FP information and assessments provide the best-available picture of the intent
and capability of terrorists or extremists, criminal entities and enterprises, Foreign
Intelligence and Security Services (FISS), opposing military forces and, in certain
instances, environmental/medical hazards, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and insider
threats. Intelligence personnel must be organized to provide credible support and trained to
understand and anticipate FP requirements. They must also be equipped with the right tools to
support FP customers at all echelons.
1.5. Adhering to guidance in DoDI 2000. 16, Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, FP assessments
are performed collaboratively by intelligence, Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI), and security forces (SF) personnel and in cooperation with several other entities.
These entities include operations, weather, medical, communications, etc. FP customers include
all personnel from commanders to airmen, but more tailored, specialized support can be provided
to: commanders, aircrews, SF, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), civil engineers, medical
personnel, antiterrorism officers (ATO), Phoenix Ravens/flyaway security teams, AFOSI, threat
working groups (TWG), antiterrorism working groups (ATWG), integrated defense working
groups (IDWG), base defense operations center (BDOC), CRG, or other associated units. FP
information assessments should include all relevant information.
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 5

1.6. Intelligence supports FP directly through unit deployments, readiness training,

mission planning support, and threat analysis. Intelligence also supports the Integrated
Defense (ID), Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM), and indirectly, the Emergency
Management elements of the FP mission. Outside the CONUS, intelligence collection activities
target foreign adversaries. Within the CONUS, however, AFOSI works with federal, state, tribal
and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify, exploit and neutralize criminal,
terrorist and foreign intelligence threats to the USAF, DoD, and US Government (USG).
Generally, intelligence personnel provide the following support to FP operations:
1.6.1. Indications and warning (emerging crisis situations).
1.6.2. Current intelligence (adversary intentions, courses of action).
1.6.3. General military intelligence (adversary Order of Battle [OB], cultural awareness
information).
1.6.4. Near-real-time/real-time situational awareness and understanding.
1.6.5. Intelligence preparation of the operating environment (IPOE) (adversary capabilities
and tactics, techniques and procedures [TTPs], terrorist group historical background and
intent, SIPRNET and SCI message traffic, finished intelligence, terrain analysis, route
analysis, man-portable air defense system [MANPADS]/stand-off weapons footprints, cyber
threat, etc.). Note: This can be performed at all CONUS and OCONUS locations. Refer to
AFI 14-104, paragraphs 10 and 12.
1.6.6. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), target intelligence (maps, charts, imagery, target
studies, and target folder development and, if appropriate, Measurement and Signature
Intelligence (MASINT).
1.6.7. Combat assessment (pre-/post-mission briefings/debriefings, mission assessments).
1.6.8. Scientific and technical intelligence (weapon characteristics, capabilities,
vulnerabilities, limitations and effectiveness).
1.6.9. FPI-related commanders critical information requirements (CCIR), develop priority
intelligence requirements (PIR) and essential elements of information (EEI). Note:
Although collection management is usually limited to OCONUS locations, CCIRs and PIRs
may be generated within the CONUS, but IAW AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), CONUS
PIRs are the responsibility of AFOSI.
1.6.9.1. This AFI should not be interpreted as authorization for intelligence personnel to
collect and maintain information on US persons without an authorized mission to do so.
Refer to AFI 14-104 for complete guidance regarding collection, processing, exploitation,
dissemination and retention of information with respect to US persons.
1.6.9.2. While Intelligence Oversight (IO) policy restricts collection of information on
US persons to units with an authorized mission, it should not be interpreted as excluding
FPI-responsible intelligence personnel from receiving, viewing, fusing, analyzing or
passing such information to the proper entity (SF or AFOSI) responsible for mitigating
the threat. In most matters regarding US persons information, intelligence personnel
will defer to AFOSI in its role as a designated counterintelligence (CI) component.
 6 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

Chapter 2

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). AFOSI has the responsibility
for initiating and conducting all counterintelligence investigations, operations, collections, and
other related activities for the AF. In CONUS, AFOSI coordinates these activities, when
appropriate, with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Outside the US, AFOSI
coordinates these activities with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the FBI, and other CI
elements. Organizations may request AFOSI products and services from their servicing AFOSI
Field Investigative Region (FIR)/Detachment (Det). Refer to AFI 71-101 Volume 4,
Counterintelligence, for the full scope of responsibilities.
2.2. Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) of the Air Force for Logistics, Installations and Mission
Support (AF/A4/7) and Director of Security Forces AF/A7S. Serves as the primary advisor to
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) for FP and ID and acts as the approval authority for
FP and ID guidance. SF is responsible for ID operations, synchronizing protection and defense
efforts against all threats and hazards to AF installations. The SF squadron commander is the
Defense Force Commander (DFC) and primary advisor on ID operations and installation security
for the installation commander, and employs security force/ID force personnel to execute
security operations. Refer to AFPD 31-1, Integrated Defense and AFI 31-101 for the full scope
of responsibilities regarding ID.
2.3. Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
(AF/A2) and Director for ISR Strategy, Doctrine and Force Development
(AF/A2D). AF/A2 and AF/A2D will:
2.3.1. Provide policy for planning, programming, training, and budgeting resources
necessary to ensure the AF has the capability to collect, analyze, produce and disseminate all-
source intelligence information to support FP operations.
2.3.2. Coordinate on AF, DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) policies affecting FPI.
2.3.3. Coordinate, as necessary, on the production of substantive intelligence for the
Secretary of the Air Force, operations planners and their staff. Maintain awareness of all-
source intelligence affecting AF security/FP posture and be prepared to recommend COAs to
senior leaders.
2.3.4. Maintain the ability to crosstalk with Services Higher Headquarters (HHQ),
MAJCOMs and AFNORTH, as needed, during CONUS/OCONUS contingencies (i.e., major
terrorist attacks).
2.3.5. Represent the AF in Director of National Intelligence (DNI), DoD and IC venues on
matters of intelligence and collaborate with HQ AFOSI (SAF/IGX) and AF/A7S on FP
information, policy, processes and assessments.
2.3.6. Review existing and emerging ISR systems capabilities to assess their potential for FP
mission support.
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 7

2.3.7. Maintain FPI website located at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/a2/force_protection/default.aspx (Secret-level) or
http://www.intelink.ic.gov/sites/a2/force_protection/default.aspx (Top-Secret level).
2.4. MAJCOM Intelligence Responsibilities: Coordinate FP-related products (i.e., daily
intelligence summaries, terrorist handbooks, threat documents and briefings, etc.) and services
with appropriate AFOSI regions, MAJCOM security forces and Operations personnel,
appropriate HHQ critical asset risk management assessors, etc., to deconflict work
responsibilities and ensure that customer requirements are satisfied. Note: If a MAJCOM or
installation is responsible for a tenant unit without assigned intelligence personnel, ensure proper
support is provided and documented in a MOA, and reviewed regularly to ensure support meets
requirements.
2.4.1. Planning and Direction: Organize, train, and equip forces. Establish guidance for,
program for, allocate resources for, and provide management for all command FP-related
intelligence requirements. MAJCOMs should tailor the responsibilities listed in this
paragraph based upon FP customer requirements, location and mission/area of operation.
2.4.1.1. Send copies of MAJCOM supplements to this AFI to AF/A2DX.
2.4.1.2. Develop and implement an intelligence support to FP program in coordination
with the supported Combatant Command (COCOM) air components, AFOSI Region, and
MAJCOM staff elements (e.g., A3, A5 and A7).
2.4.1.3. Establish MAJCOM policy on FPI, to include coordinating on policies at both
MAJCOM and HHQ levels, and incorporating processes and guidance for FP legal
considerations, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and IO reviews.
2.4.1.3.1. Delineate responsibilities and roles of subordinate headquarters
intelligence organizations. Component Numbered Air Forces (C-NAFs) will address
specific FPI requirements based on their COCOM air component roles, and
MAJCOMs can include the roles in their respective AFI 14-119 supplements.
2.4.1.3.2. Ensure subordinate organizations incorporate FPI exercise activities with
intelligence scenario injects and requirements, as appropriate.
2.4.1.3.3. Establish procedures to rapidly receive, evaluate, analyze and disseminate
all relevant intelligence threat data with AFOSI, SF and other Staff FP elements.
2.4.1.3.4. In coordination with AFOSI, analyze all-source intelligence and provide
warning to FP customers including subordinate units and commanders, both in
garrison and in transit.
2.4.1.3.5. Ensure procedures are established to track IC terrorism threat levels,
terrorism warnings, alerts and advisories.
2.4.1.3.6. Participate in the MAJCOM ATWG, TWG and other working groups
described in AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), as applicable.
2.4.1.3.7. Incorporate real-world and exercise lessons learned, trends and best
practices into FPI tactics, techniques and procedures within the MAJCOM Area of
Responsibility (AOR).
8 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

2.4.1.4. Evaluate and recommend improvement areas for subordinate unit FP programs
during staff assistance visits IAW MAJCOM/A2 procedures.
2.4.1.4.1. Analyze, advocate and staff subordinate units' intelligence resource issues
(e.g., manpower, security clearances, systems, facilities and information/production
requirements). Coordinate personnel Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
access and SCI facility requirements with the supporting Special Security Office
(SSO).
2.4.1.4.2. Assess subordinate unit intelligence organizations ability to receive,
evaluate, analyze, and disseminate all relevant data on terrorist/extremist activities,
trends, and indicators of imminent attack.
2.4.1.4.3. Assess subordinate unit intelligence organizations ability to assist AFOSI
in fusing security forces, law enforcement, and CI data with all-source intelligence.
2.4.1.4.4. Assess subordinate unit intelligence organizations ability to establish
requests for intelligence and collection requirements in support of FPI fusion and
analysis.
2.4.1.4.5. Evaluate subordinate unit intelligence organizations application of Staff
Assistance Visits (SAV), Vulnerability Assessments (VA), Operational Readiness
Inspections (ORI), Unit Compliance Inspections (UCI), Nuclear Surety Inspections
(NSI), etc., intelligence-related observations, findings, and best practices.
2.4.1.4.6. Evaluate subordinate unit intelligence organizations support
to/collaboration with AFOSI, security forces, medical, and other military elements, as
required, during development of AFOSI annual DTAs and other applicable
documents, such as Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessments (refer to AFI
71-101 Volume 4).
2.4.1.5. Advocate fielding of automated intelligence systems and related training,
connectivity and maintenance of systems. Establish and coordinate system requirements
with subordinate and gained organizations.
2.4.1.6. Ensure that adequate mission planning materials are available IAW AFI 14-105
or applicable AFI 14-2 (MDS), Volume 3 and AFI 14-202, Volume 3.
2.4.1.7. Establish compliance criteria that give clear guidance on unit programs and their
expected results.
2.4.1.8. Provide intelligence FP Unit Type Code (UTC) management and inform the Air
Staff Functional Manager of any FP UTC-related problems, as applicable. Provide
assistance addressing contingency or exercise-related manpower, equipment and
communication requirements. Provide list of minimum requirements for mobility
equipment.
2.4.1.9. Assist AFOSI FIR/Det (refer to AFOSIs AFI 71-101, Vol 4) and supported
COCOM in development of threat assessments.
2.4.1.10. IAW AFI 32-3001, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program, MAJCOMs that
have responsibility for EOD shall provide threat support and products for EOD programs.
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 9

2.4.1.11. Obtain customer feedback on intelligence products and services and

disseminate feedback to originating publishing unit/agency. Use the feedback to
implement changes or create new products to meet customer requirements.
2.4.1.12. Provide AF/A2, via AF/A2DX, an annual report describing MAJCOM FPI
programs for the previous calendar year, NLT 1 March of each year. This report will
help identify intelligence FP issues to influence policy and decision-making efforts. In
the report, provide a summary of the MAJCOM FPI program/strategy; significant
negative trends (e.g., items that either occur in multiple units or have a significant
negative impact on the conduct of FP) and actions taken to address them; significant best
practices identified in the previous year (e.g., products, processes); and issues for AF/A2
consideration that are beyond MAJCOM ability to correct or implement.
2.4.1.13. Manage FPI collection and requirements.
2.4.1.13.1. Develop MAJCOM FP-related PIRs in coordination with AFOSI and in
cooperation with SF and FPI customers to drive both theater and national ISR and CI
collections. Coordinate with theater and national intelligence organizations and
submit collection requirements and production requirements to satisfy MAJCOM
PIRs.
2.4.1.13.2. Advocate enhanced production requirements of SECRET collateral-level,
tear-line reporting to ensure the widest possible dissemination of FP threat
information.
2.4.1.13.3. Oversee FPI training support.
2.4.1.13.3.1. IAW AFI 14-105 or applicable AFI 14-2 (MDS) Volumes 1-3, and
AFI 14-202 Volumes 1 and 3, MAJCOMs provide written guidance on
requirements for unit external and internal intelligence FP training, initial FPI
training and, if applicable, mission qualification training and continuation
training. Intelligence personnel should receive certification, to be determined
locally, as external and internal intelligence trainers. Trainers must be certified in
areas on which they provide instruction prior to conducting training.
2.4.1.13.3.2. Provide subject matter expert (SME) support to Utilization and
Training Workshops (U&TW) to ensure intelligence technical school and
advanced skills training curricula prepare intelligence professionals to fulfill FPI
responsibilities.
2.4.1.13.3.3. In coordination with FP customers, integrate the use of and/or
update intelligence into FP customers training courses, as applicable (e.g.,
Security Forces formal training courses and Regional Training Centers [RTCs],
AT Level II Courses, Counter-Threat Operations Course, etc.).
2.4.1.13.3.4. Support the commands annual review of its AT Level II Course
Curriculum.
2.4.1.13.3.5. Update individual training records to reflect FP training IAW AFI
36-2201, Air Force Training Program.
2.4.1.13.3.6. Annually, solicit formal unit intelligence FP training requirements
(i.e., AT Level II, AF FP Intelligence Formal Training Unit (IFTU), etc.) for the
 10 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

subsequent year and coordinate requirements with appropriate agencies.

2.4.1.13.3.7. Annually, provide a MAJCOM-sponsored list of recommended FP
training opportunities to increase subordinate units' awareness of available
training courses, and forward the list to AF/A2DX for inclusion on the FPI
website.
2.5. Host Unit (In-garrison) Intelligence Responsibilities. Host units are all organizations
with base operating support (BOS)/FP responsibilities for their in-garrison location.
2.5.1. Provide adequate in-garrison planning and direction.
2.5.1.1. Develop, implement and execute an FPI support program as an integral part of
the installation commanders FP program. The program will identify which mission
elements and functional areas, both at home and/or deployed, require intelligence support
to perform their FP functions and tailor intelligence products to meet customer needs.
2.5.1.1.1. Unless FPI is the individual's primary duty, the Senior Intelligence Officer
(SIO) will appoint, in writing, a primary and alternate officer, non-commissioned
officer (NCO), civilian and/or contractor to provide intelligence support for FP.
Designated personnel will have the appropriate security clearances consistent with the
levels of the base/organization facilities. Where feasible, designated personnel will
have access to Top Secret (TS), SCI, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Control System
(HCS) and Gamma (G) accredited work centers and information. It is advisable that
an experienced intelligence professional be the primary designee to insure that the
designee has the scope of knowledge needed to be truly effective.
2.5.1.1.2. SIOs must ensure the unit manning document (UMD) reflects sufficient
numbers of positions and reflects the need for access to SCI, in order to accomplish
the FPI mission.
2.5.1.1.3. Where authorized, intelligence personnel assigned to FP billets, FP UTCs
or designated to support the base/unit FP program will attend the AF FP IFTU. Work
training requirements through the base/unit training manager or as directed by
MAJCOM/A2.
2.5.1.1.4. Designated personnel will participate in unit/base ATWGs, TWGs,
FPWGs, and other functions (e.g., IDWG, IFC, TIFC, base defense operations
center), as appropriate.
2.5.1.2. Provide relevant intelligence threat information, products and services to
subordinate units, to include geographically separated units (GSUs), units without an
organic intelligence capability, AFRC-associated units and tenant units IAW MAJCOM
guidance.
2.5.1.3. Maintain sufficient communications and current POC listings to allow rapid
contact with AFNORTH, MAJCOMs and units.
2.5.1.4. Plan, program, budget, validate, and manage all intelligence FP requirements for
the installation and subordinate units.
2.5.1.5. Oversee FP training for intelligence personnel, including assigned/attached AF
Reserve Component personnel, civilians, and contractors.
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 11

2.5.1.6. Allocate, assign and manage all intelligence FP personnel resource requirements,
to include exercise and/or contingency tasking.
2.5.1.7. Coordinate on all MAJCOM and local policies, and associated supplements
affecting intelligence support to FP (i.e., AFI 31-101, AFI 14-104, etc.).
2.5.1.8. Ensure GEOINT requirements are identified IAW AFI 14-205, Geospatial
Information and Services (GI&S) and sufficient stocks are maintained for training and
readiness, deployment and employment. Units must refer to theater guidance for
additional GI&S requirements prior to deployment.
2.5.1.9. Adhere to requirements and policies contained in AFI 16-201, Air Force Foreign
Disclosure and Technical Transfer Program, for disclosing classified and controlled
unclassified (i.e., For Official Use Only [FOUO], tech orders, schematics, etc.) FP
military information to foreign nationals. All classified and controlled unclassified FP
military information must be reviewed and approved by a properly designated disclosure
authority before release. Contact the MAJCOM Foreign Disclosure Office for guidance.
2.5.1.10. At a minimum, conduct annual periodic reviews (in conjunction with AFOSI)
of written FP guidance to ensure currency, accuracy, appropriateness and applicability.
2.5.1.11. Review installation ID/AT plan at least annually and write an intelligence
annex to identify all required intelligence support and information requirements.
2.5.1.12. Ensure unit personnel and assigned IMAs are fully qualified to fill FP mobility
slots, to include SCI eligibility requirements. Coordinate SCI requirements with the
appropriate SSO.
2.5.1.13. Establish and document procedures for providing intelligence products and
services to FP customers.
2.5.1.14. In coordination with AFOSI and the Security Forces Squadron:
2.5.1.14.1. 1 Analyze all-source intelligence information for impact on unit mission and
rapidly disseminate threat information to subordinate and lateral units, HHQs and other
appropriate agencies.
2.5.1.14.2. Analyze all-source intelligence information focusing on enemy activities,
capabilities, tactics, weapons, intentions and probable COAs throughout the Base
Security Zone and provide support to FP customers through products and briefings.
Note: For a thorough explanation of the Base Security Zone and the associated term
Base Boundary, see AFPD 31-1 and AFI 31-101. Intelligence FP-support efforts
must be focused on these areas.
2.5.1.14.3. Establish procedures to track IC threat levels, threat warnings, alerts and
advisories for threats at the home station, in deployed locations, or while in transit to
deployed locations (based on approved FP plans submitted by assigned/attached
units).
2.5.1.15. Ensure continuity books are maintained (either electronic or hardcopy).
Continuity books should include:
2.5.1.15.1. Appointment memo (for additional duty position).
12 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

2.5.1.15.2. AFI 14-105 or applicable AFI 14-2 (MDS) Volumes 1-3, AFI 14-202
Volumes 1-3, AFI 14-119, AFI 10-245 and MAJCOM supplements.
2.5.1.15.3. AF Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-10.1, Integrated Base
Defense.
2.5.1.15.4. Copies of intelligence FP products or templates (e.g., maps, overlays,
MANPAD footprint, briefings).
2.5.1.15.5. Local operating instructions (if applicable).
2.5.1.15.6. Vulnerability assessment benchmarks.
2.5.1.15.7. Local TWG charter.
2.5.1.15.8. Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (as appropriate).
2.5.1.15.9. FP customer requirements.
2.5.1.15.10. Intelligence portion of the installation ID/AT plan.
2.5.1.15.11. Installation and COCOM threat assessments.
2.5.1.15.12. FP CCIR and PIR list.
2.5.1.15.13. FP point of contact list.
2.5.1.15.14. IO Policy (e.g., AFI 14-104).
2.5.1.15.15. LOAC guidance.
2.5.1.16. Document FP lessons learned and update FP programs appropriately.
2.5.1.17. Coordinate intelligence exercise activities and requirements supporting
installation exercise objectives. Ensure scenarios facilitate a practical simulation of FP
intelligence functions and include realistic mission area threats, including, but not limited
to those posed by transnational terrorists and other opposing military/para-military forces.
Effective FP scenarios should, at a minimum, also include input from AFOSI and
Security Forces. Ensure intelligence support to exercise scenario development addresses
FP processes, as prescribed by AFI 14-105 or applicable AFI 14-2(MDS) Volume 3, or
AFI 14-202 Volume 3.
2.5.1.18. Support/participate in assessments, inspections and lessons learned programs to
identify and document FPI findings, observations and best practices; update FP programs
appropriately.
2.5.1.19. Support the annual development of AFOSI DTAs. AFOSI may request
intelligence support to ensure the DTA includes analysis of transnational/foreign terrorist
TTPs, weapons (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yield explosives
[CBRNE], small arms, rocket propelled grenades [RPGs], MANPADS, improvised
explosive devices [IEDs]), capabilities, activities, history, intent and probable COAs.
2.5.1.20. Periodically publish and disseminate an accession list to FP customers
incorporating all new, incoming FP/terrorism reference materials (e.g.,
websites/products).
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 13

2.5.1.21. Provide intelligence support and related activities (mission briefing, targeting,
mission planning, GI&S support, FP threat updates, etc.) to transient units, as required.
2.5.1.22. IAW HHQ and MAJCOM guidance, assess and report each year on unit
intelligence support to the FP program.
2.5.1.23. Actively solicit FP customer feedback to improve intelligence support
processes, products and services.
2.5.2. Host Unit (in-garrison) Collection and Requirements Management.
2.5.2.1. Assist commanders in writing installation FP PIRs with AFOSI, ATWG, TWG ,
IDWG and DFC, when applicable. Assess how well FP PIRs are being satisfied to help
guide intelligence and CI collection efforts. Monitor and evaluate reporting against FP
requirements.
2.5.2.2. Manage production requirements program IAW HHQ and MAJCOM guidance,
as appropriate. Exhaust internal, theater, and national automated resources to accomplish
intelligence FPI support functions before forwarding requirements to outside agencies.
Validate unit collection and production requirements, and forward through appropriate
channels.
2.5.3. Host Unit (in-garrison) Training Support.
2.5.3.1. Solicit and consolidate formal/special FP training requirements for all assigned
and attached intelligence personnel.
2.5.3.2. IAW AFI 14-105 or applicable AFI 14-2 (MDS) Volume 3, AFI 14-202
Volumes 1-3 and MAJCOM guidance, establish an installation FP-focused intelligence
training program tailored to the units mission, weapon system, projected contingency or
AEF tasking and base/deployment locations.
2.5.3.2.1. Coordinate with AFOSI and FP customers to identify training requirements
and develop an appropriate FP threat awareness program tailored to the units
mission. Training programs should consider: 1) threat knowledge (as it applies to
integrated defense), 2) visual recognition, 3) personnel recovery and 4) collection and
reporting. Examples of FP threat awareness training topics include:
2.5.3.2.1.1. Terrorist TTPs, capabilities, activities, intentions.
2.5.3.2.1.2. Current threat, terrorism threat levels, advisories, alerts, warnings.
2.5.3.2.1.3. Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (as appropriate) and
Worldwide Asymmetric Threat to AF Installations, Personnel and Resources.
2.5.3.2.1.4. MANPADS, RPGs, IEDs, CBRNE, rockets/mortars, small arms.
2.5.3.2.1.5. FP legal considerations (IO, Rules of Engagement) and the impact on
OCONUS vs. CONUS operations.
2.5.3.2.1.6. Locating FP threat data sources.
2.5.3.2.1.7. Post-mission debriefing requirements and procedures.
2.5.3.2.1.8. Intelligence support to FP capabilities and limitations.
 14 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

2.5.3.2.2. Document how the FP threat awareness training program will be

conducted.
2.5.3.2.3. Provide a written evaluation of the FP threat awareness program to the
appropriate leadership elements at the end of each annual training cycle.
2.5.3.3. Establish an internal FP intelligence-training program. IAW MAJCOM
guidance, establish minimum qualifications that must be met for intelligence personnel to
receive certification as FP threat awareness trainers. Ensure these trainers are certified in
areas on which they provide instruction prior to the commencement of training. Actively
solicit customer feedback to ensure that trainers meet program requirements.
2.5.3.3.1. Ensure all intelligence professionals who perform FP duties receive initial
FPI training (when and where authorized) through the AF FP IFTU, as well as all
appropriate additional training (e.g., AT Level II, Foreign Disclosure, security control
markings, etc.), as required by DoDI2000.16. Ensure training qualifies intelligence
personnel to perform their readiness and employment duties. All assigned
intelligence personnel must participate in the Intelligence Internal Training (IIT)
program. Ensure personnel unable to attend scheduled program events receive and
document make-up training that covers all missed subjects.
2.5.3.3.2. Individual training records shall be updated to reflect FP intelligence
training IAW this publication and local instructions.
2.5.3.3.3. Internal FPI training programs should address all elements addressed in
para. 5.1.3.2.1 above, as well as the following:
2.5.3.3.3.1. FP-focused predictive analysis (e.g., IPOE) and tailored threat
assessments.
2.5.3.3.3.2. AFOSI, TWG, ATWG, fusion and BDOC roles/responsibilities.
2.5.3.3.3.3. Support to FP planning, programming and operations.
2.5.3.3.3.4. Support to VAs, ORIs, UCIs, NSIs, and exercises.
2.5.3.3.3.5. Support development of the installation DTA and develop an
understanding of the Integrated Defense Risk Management Process (IDRMP).
Note: Training should be provided by the DFC staff.
2.5.3.3.3.6. Identification and use of FP threat data sources.
2.5.3.3.3.7. Detailed review of FPI legal considerations (IO, Rules of
Engagement).
2.5.3.3.3.8. Familiarization with FP policy documents.
2.5.3.3.3.9. FP CCIRs, PIRs and customer requirement.
2.5.3.3.3.10. An understanding of the interaction between Intel and AFOSI
roles/responsibilities.
2.6. Expeditionary Intelligence Responsibilities. This chapter applies to units and /or
personnel deploying in support of an AF FPI mission/operation. Responsibilities within this
section should be tailored to meet the needs of the deployed location based upon the mission,
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 15

environment (permissive/hostile), threats, location, etc. Since expeditionary circumstances

cannot be pre-determined, all deploying intelligence personnel must be adaptable to the
environment. The SIO and intelligence personnel must be prepared to perform the duties listed
below, and be prepared to coordinate terrorism-related and FISS products and services with
AFOSI to deconflict responsibilities and thus ensure that customer requirements are satisfied.
2.6.1. Expeditionary Pre-deployment
2.6.1.1. Monitor unit tasking and Operations Plans (OPLANs)/Contingency Plans
(CONPLANs) and advise intelligence personnel of significant changes and their impact.
2.6.1.2. Ensure adequate mobility, reception planning and preparedness for intelligence
activities and personnel.
2.6.1.3. Identify intelligence personnel and equipment needed to support tasked FP
UTCs. Act as the focal point for intelligence Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)
requirements in tasked UTCs and any deployment orders.
2.6.1.4. Monitor the Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force schedule to ensure the
ability to fulfill commitments and manage personnel resources. Ensure that personnel
postured against the FP Intelligence UTCs are fully trained and qualified to fill mobility
slots.
2.6.1.5. Ensure that current written checklists or procedures are available to provide
required support for mobility, reception, intelligence systems, communications
architecture, Temporary Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility requirements and
intelligence tasking(s).
2.6.1.6. Submit pre-deployment FP intelligence requirements to servicing MAJCOM and
coordinate necessary requirements with the appropriate theater and deployed SIOs.
2.6.1.7. Ensure FPI GI&S products needed to meet requirements are identified and
sufficient stocks are maintained for training and readiness, deployment and employment.
Units must refer to theater guidance for additional GI&S requirements prior to
deployment.
2.6.1.8. Coordinate SCI requirements with the supporting SSO.
2.6.1.9. Ensure intelligence personnel provide briefing support IAW HHQ and
MAJCOM directives. Briefings must incorporate the latest intelligence information
tailored to the audience including appropriate FP information, and coordinated with
security forces and AFOSI to ensure a total FP pre-deployment assessment is available to
all who will deploy.
2.6.1.10. IAW AFI 31-101, support security forces to ensure tasked UTCs maintain
current deployment folders for locations under assigned Operational Plan (OPLAN)
taskings. Deployment folders should include country data, maps, and threat estimates.
2.6.1.11. As an extension of the FPI role, ensure FP personnel recovery responsibilities
are fulfilled IAW theater and MAJCOM guidance (e.g., Isolated Personnel Reports
(ISOPREPs), Evasion Plans of Action (EPAs), and personnel recovery materials).
2.6.2. Expeditionary Collection and Requirements Management.
16 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

2.6.2.1. In coordination with TWG, IDWG, BDOC, or base defense operations assist
commanders in developing installation PIRs. In coordination with FP customers,
continually assess how well FP PIRs are being satisfied to help guide intelligence and CI
collection efforts. Monitor and evaluate reporting against FP requirements.
2.6.2.2. Manage a priority requirements program IAW MAJCOM and theater guidance,
as appropriate. Exhaust internal, theater and national automated resources to accomplish
intelligence support functions before forwarding requirements to outside agencies.
Validate unit collection and production requirements and forward to appropriate
validation authority.
2.6.2.3. Develop a collection plan, task organic ISR assets and coordinate with theater
intelligence collection managers to employ ISR assets and capabilities, where applicable.
Ensure de-confliction with AFOSI.
2.6.3. Expeditionary Employment.
2.6.3.1. Develop, implement and execute an FPI program as an integral part of the
Wing/Base/Installation/Defense Force Commanders FP Program.
2.6.3.2. Allocate, assign and manage all intelligence FP personnel resources. In a
deployed environment, the deployed SIO will utilize the FP Intelligence UTCs (if
possible) to provide qualified intelligence personnel to meet FP requirements.
Intelligence personnel supporting FP operations and missions may be tactically controlled
by the supported commander and administratively/operationally controlled by the
installation/wing SIO.
2.6.3.3. Determine appropriate intelligence requirements/tasks with FP customers and
coordinate support with AFOSI. Typical requirements could include: identification of
enemy COAs and impact of asymmetric threats on air operations based on IPOE and
trends/event/link analysis; conducting MANPADS threats indirect/direct fire
assessments; providing CBRNE, IEDs, ambush and kidnapping information; providing
intelligence assessments; supporting the construction of targeting packages/target studies,
route analyses, media/document exploitation; managing EEIs and production
requirements; maintaining intelligence databases, systems and SSO programs; identifying
unit support requirements and providing adhoc threat training; or similar requirements.
2.6.3.4. Conduct pre-mission briefings to support security forces during guard mount,
and prior to ground patrols, convoy operations, counter-threat operations, and weapons
storage area missions.
2.6.3.5. Conduct pre-mission briefings to support EOD operations. Develop procedures
to assure that EOD activities produce timely reports that include all perishable, critical
information of intelligence value.
2.6.3.6. Debrief FP and outside-the-wire operations IAW MAJCOM/theater directives
and develop procedures to ensure ground teams provide timely reports that include all
perishable, critical information of intelligence value, including FP information. Debrief
EOD operations and review EOD post-blast analysis reports for potential FPI.
Coordinate with AFOSI to ensure access to their post-mission personnel for debrief, as
appropriate.
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 17

2.6.3.6.1. Ensure critical debrief information is disseminated rapidly to all

appropriate organizations (e.g., AFOSI, DFC, ATO).
2.6.3.6.2. Follow up all voice reports with written documentation to ensure collected
information is reintroduced into the intelligence cycle IAW HHQ/theater directives
(e.g., mission report [MISREP], intelligence report [INTREP], spot report
[SPOTREP], Intelligence Summaries [INTSUM], Situation Reports [SITREP]).
2.6.3.7. Develop quality control procedures to guarantee standardization and accuracy of
situation/OB displays for FP considerations.
2.6.3.8. Ensure all organization FPI functions are equipped with the required GI&S,
imagery and target material products to support briefings, mission planning, staff support
and employment operations.
2.6.3.9. Ensure pre-planned missions are updated to reflect the latest available
intelligence information affecting the mission, including FP updates, and are planned to
minimize the threat and enhance survivability.
2.6.3.10. Ensure FPI personnel assigned to mission planning functions understand their
responsibilities concerning LOAC and Information Operations.
2.6.3.11. Coordinate with FP customers to identify training requirements and develop an
appropriate FP threat awareness program.
2.6.3.12. Participate in the TWG and other related functions (e.g., ATWG, BDOC,
EMWG).
2.6.3.13. Analyze all-source intelligence for impact on unit missions and rapidly
disseminate threat information to FP customers, subordinate and lateral units, HHQs and
other appropriate agencies, in coordination with AFOSI.
2.6.3.14. Incorporate threat information into FP planning and operations.
2.6.3.15. Establish procedures to track and disseminate IC terrorism threat levels,
terrorism warnings, alerts and advisories in coordination with AFOSI.
2.6.3.16. Ensure current FP checklists, templates, or procedures are available for
expeditionary operations to include, as a minimum:
2.6.3.16.1. Intelligence support to mission planning.
2.6.3.16.2. OB displays.
2.6.3.16.3. Briefing and Debriefing procedures.
2.6.3.16.4. Reporting (e.g., mission report [MISREP], intelligence report [INTREP],
spot report [SPOTREP], Intelligence Summaries [INTSUM], Situation Reports
[SITREP]).
2.6.3.16.5. Automated intelligence systems operations and passwords.
2.6.3.16.6. Operational Security (OPSEC) requirements and procedures.
2.6.3.16.7. Threat awareness training.
 18 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

2.6.3.17. Ensure that contingency continuity books are maintained. Continuity books
should include:
2.6.3.17.1. Appropriate policy guidance for the expeditionary environment (e.g.,
AFI 14-119, AFI 10-245, AFI 31-101, AFI 14-202 Volumes 1-3, AFTTP 3-10.1, plus
Theater/COCOM/ Component intelligence guidance, IO and LOAC policy).
2.6.3.17.2. Local operating instructions (if applicable).
2.6.3.17.3. Expeditionary TWG charter.
2.6.3.17.4. Copies of intelligence FP products or templates (e.g., maps, overlays,
briefings).
2.6.3.17.5. Intelligence portions of the installation AT plan or applicable document.
2.6.3.17.6. Installation and command threat and vulnerability assessments (e.g.,
DTA).
2.6.3.17.7. FP EEI, CCIR, and PIR list.
2.6.3.17.8. FP point-of-contact list.
2.6.3.18. Document FP lessons learned and update FP programs appropriately.
2.6.3.19. Support AFOSI in the development of the DTA IAW AFI 10-245. AFOSI may
request intelligence support to ensure the DTA includes analysis of transnational/foreign
terrorist TTPs, weapons (including CBRNE, small arms, RPGs, MANPADS, and IEDs),
capabilities, activities, history, intent and probable COAs.
2.6.3.20. Adhere to requirements and policies contained in AFI 16-201 for disclosing
classified and controlled unclassified (i.e., FOUO, tech orders, schematics, etc.) military
information to foreign nationals. All classified and controlled unclassified military
information must be reviewed and approved by a properly designated disclosure authority
before release. Contact MAJCOM/theater Foreign Disclosure Office for guidance.
2.6.3.21. Ensure intelligence/FPI is incorporated into installation plans, at the direction
of the installation commander.
2.6.3.22. Actively solicit feedback from wing/installation and subordinate FP customers
to improve intelligence support processes, products and services.
2.6.3.23. Provide input to theater-level databases of record, ensuring the timeliness,
accuracy and completeness of the data IAW theater and C-NAF A2/Combined Air and
Space Operations Center Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division
(CAOC ISRD) directives.
2.7. Tenant Unit Intelligence Responsibilities.
2.7.1. The host unit with BOS responsibilities, whether AF or Joint, provides for the force
protection of the installation and personnel.
2.7.2. Tenant units must insure they are included on their host installations FP plan through
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and that they are on distribution/notification schedule
for threat information. The MOA should define the relationship and the tenant FP
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 19

requirements, especially if the tenant performs a mission or possesses a system that could be
at risk to FP threats.
2.7.3. In the event that the host unit does not have an organic intelligence capability and the
tenant unit does, tenant intelligence must be prepared to provide FPI support to the host unit;
the relationship and requirements defined through MOA.
2.7.4. Tenant units are responsible for providing FPI support to their tenant unit leadership
and personnel. Tenant units will:
2.7.4.1. Coordinate with the installation ATO to ensure processes/procedures are in place
and documented in the installation ID/AT plan to receive, process, or correlate threat
warnings/information.
2.7.4.2. Brief tenant staff, aircrews and other appropriate parties on the installation DTA,
as required.
2.7.4.3. In coordination with local AFOSI Regional offices, or local CI functions (CID,
NCIS, etc.), provide tenant staff, aircrews and other FP customers pre-deployment
terrorist-related threat information and FISS information.
2.7.4.4. Support tenant unit SAVs, ORIs, Vas, UCIs, NSIs, exercises, etc., as required.
2.7.4.5. Document tenant unit activities (e.g., continuity book).
2.7.5. While not all the requirements defined in this AFI apply to all tenant units, it should
be understood that the role of intelligence in force protection is critical and every effort
should be made to guarantee that no gaps exist in support to force protection and the mission.

LARRY D. JAMES, Lt Gen, USAF

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance
 20 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

Attachment 1
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References
AFPD 10-2, Readiness, 30 October 2006
AFPD 14-1, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning, Resources, and
Operations, 2 April 2004
AFPD 14-2, Intelligence Rules and Procedures, 29 November 2007
AFPD 31-1, Integrated Defense, 28 Oct 2011
AFPD 71-1, Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence, 6 January 2010
AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), 30 March 2009
AFI 14-104, Oversight of Intelligence Activities, 23 April 2012
AFI 14-105, Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities, 3 June 2002
AFI 14-205, Geospatial Information and Services, 5 May 2010
AFI 14-202, Volume 1, Intelligence Training, 10 March 2008
AFI 14-202, Volume 2, Intelligence Standardization/Evaluation Program, 10 March 2008
AFI 14-202, Volume 3, General Intelligence Rules, 10 March 2008
AFI 16-201, Air Force Foreign Disclosure and Technology Transfer Program, 1 December 2004
AFI 25-201, Support Agreements Procedures, 1 May 2005
AFI 31-201, Security Forces Standards and Procedures, 30 March 2009
AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO), 8 October 2009
AFI 32-3001, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Program, 2 June 2011
AFI 36-2201, Air Force Training Program, 15 September 2010
AFI 71-101, Volume 4, Counterintelligence, 8 November 2011
AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 March 2008
AFMD 39, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), 6 July 2011
AFH 31-305, Security Forces Deployment Planning Handbook, 26 February 2003
AFTTP 3-10.1, Integrated Base Defense, 20 August 2004
AFDD 3-10, Force Protection, 28 July 2011
AFDD 2-0, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations, 17 July 2007
AFDD 3-27, Homeland Operations, 21 March 2006
DoD Directive 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, December 13, 2007
DoD O-2000.12H, DoD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 2004
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 21

DoD Instruction 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, December 8, 2006

DoD 5505.13E, DoD Executive Agent (EA) for the DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3), March 1,
2010
JP 3-10, Security Operations in Theater, February 3, 2010
Adopted Forms
AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication, 22 September 2009

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFAir Force
AFOSIAir Force Office of Special Investigations
AFRCAir Force Reserve Command
AFSCAir Force Specialty Code
ANGAir National Guard
ATAntiterrorism
ATWGAntiterrorism Working Group
ATOAntiterrorism Officer
BDOCBase Defense Operations Center
BOSBase Operating Support
C- NAFComponent Numbered Air Force
C2Command and Control
CBRNEChemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-yield Explosives
CCIRCommanders Critical Information Requirement
CECivil Engineers
CENTAFUS Central Command Air Forces
CICounterintelligence
COACourse of Action
COCOMCombatant Command (command authority)
CONUSContinental United States
CRGContingency Response Group
CSAFChief of Staff of the Air Force
DETDetachment (AFOSI)
DFCDefense Force Commander
DoDDepartment of Defense
 22 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

DTADefense Threat Assessment (term has been replaced in DoDI 5240.18,

Counterintelligence [CI] Analysis and Production, November 17, 2009, with verbiage related to
CI analysis products, i.e., Threat Assessment)
EEIEssential Elements of Information
EODExplosive Ordnance Disposal
FASTFlyaway Security Team
FIRField Investigation Region
FISSForeign Intelligence and Security Services
FOUOFor Official Use Only
FPForce Protection
FPIForce Protection Intelligence
FPWGForce Protection Working Group
GEOINTGeospatial Intelligence
GI&SGeospatial Information and Services
HAFHeadquarters Air Force
HCSHUMINT Control System
HHQHigher Headquarters
HUMINTHuman Intelligence
IAWIn Accordance With
IDIntegrated Defense
IDRMPIntegrated Defense Risk Management Process
IDWGIntegrated Defense Working Group
ICIntelligence Community
IEDImprovised Explosive Device
IFCIntelligence Fusion Cell
IFTUIntelligence Formal Training Unit
IMAIndividual Mobilization Augmentee
INTREPIntelligence Report
INTSUMIntelligence Summary
IOIntelligence Oversight
ISOPREPIsolated Personnel Reports
IPOEIntelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment
ISRIntelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 23

LELaw Enforcement
LOACLaw of Armed Conflict
MAJCOMMajor Command
MANPADSMan-Portable Air Defense System
MISREPMission Report
MOAMemorandum of Agreement
NAFNumbered Air Force
NCONon-Commissioned Officer
NSINuclear Surety Inspection
OBOrder of Battle
OCONUSOutside Continental United States
OPLANOperations Plan
OPSECOperational Security
ORIOperational Readiness Inspection
OSS/OSFOperations Support Squadron/Flight
PIRPriority Intelligence Requirement
RPGRocket Propelled Grenade
RTCRegional Training Center
SAVStaff Assistance Visit
SCISensitive Compartmented Information
SFSecurity Forces
SMESubject Matter Expert
SIOSenior Intelligence Officer
SITREPSituation Report
SPOTREPSpot Report
SSOSpecial Security Office
TWGThreat Working Group
UCIUnit Compliance Inspection
UMDUnit Manning Document
UTCUnit Type Code
VAVulnerability Assessment
WMDWeapons of Mass Destruction
 24 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

Terms
Administrative ControlDirection or exercise of authority over subordinate or other
organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces,
control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit
training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the
operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 0-2)
AntiterrorismDefensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property
to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces. (JP 1-02)
Antiterrorism Officer (ATO)The installation, base, regional, facility, or deploying AT
advisor charged with managing the AT Program. He/she shall be a graduate of an approved
Level II Course and be identified in writing by the installation and/or force commander.
Reference AFI 10-245.
Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG)The commanders cross-functional working group
made up of wing and tenant units. Working group members are responsible for coordinating and
providing deliberate planning for all antiterrorism and force protection issues. The ATWG
includes representatives from areas across the installation, including civil engineering,
intelligence, AFOSI, security forces, public health, bioenvironmental, disaster preparedness,
plans, communications, etc.
Base BoundaryA line that delineates the surface area of a base for the purpose of facilitating
coordination and deconfliction of operation between adjacent units, formation, or areas. (JP 1-
02)
Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC)A command and control facility established by the
base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs,
integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts and coordinates and integrates into
area security operations with the rear area operations center/rear tactical operations center.
Reference AFI 31-101.
Base Security ZoneThe battle space from which the enemy can launch an attack against base
personnel and resources or aircraft approaching/departing the base. (AFTTP 3-10.2)
Battle SpaceThe commanders conceptual view of the area and factors which he/she must
understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It
encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, and land operations that the commander
must consider in planning and executing military operations. The battle space dimensions can
change over time as the mission expands or contracts according to operational objectives and
force composition. Battle space provides the commander a mental forum for analyzing and
selecting courses of action for employing military forces in relationship to time, tempo, and
depth.
Commanders Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)An information requirement
identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two
key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements.
Contingency Response Group (CRG)An AF capability with effects that span the joint force,
the CRG serves as the first of five force modules to assess and open air bases to extend the reach
of air and space forces. They provide combatant commanders with initial Airbase Opening and
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 25

air mobility support capability during wartime, contingency, or other USTRANSCOM/AMC

directed missions. CRG extend air mobility operations worldwide by deploying task organized
mobility teams capable of airbase assessment, initial C2, cargo and passenger handling, in-transit
visibility, quick-turn aircraft maintenance, self-protection security, air traffic control, and airfield
operations.
Counterintelligence (CI)Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities. In this AFI, CI specifically refers to information about threats to
AF installations gathered through activities conducted by the AFOSI or other service and
national CI organizations. CI analyzes the threats posed by foreign intelligence and security
services and the intelligence activities of non-state actors such as organized crime, terrorist
groups, drug traffickers, and the insider threat. CI analysis incorporates all-source information
and the results of CI investigations and operations to support a multidiscipline analysis of the
force protection threat.
Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM) ProgramFormerly known as the Critical
Infrastructure program, CARM is a mission assurance, risk-management-based program that
assures the AFs ability to execute missions and capabilities essential to planning, mobilizing,
deploying, executing and sustaining military operations that encompass Combatant Command
operational and AF Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) missions and capabilities.
Defense Force Commander (DFC)The DFC directs the planning and execution of base
defense operations and serves as the Installation Commanders primary advisor for ID. On AF
installations, the SF squadron commander is the DFC. On installations with more than one SF
squadron, the DFC is the SF commander responsible for installation security. In addition to SF
permanently assigned to the DFC, the DFC exercises TACON of the ID mission and supporting
forces. The tactical role of the DFC does not grant him/her administrative control (ADCON)
authority of supporting ID forces; however, the DFCs tactical role serves to ensure unity of
effort, cohesive communication, deconfliction of issues, and to lessen the likelihood of fratricide.
Defense Threat Assessment (DTA)An all-source assessment of threats to an installation.
AFOSI is responsible for the DTA. Reference DoD message, Standardized DoD Threat
Assessment, 22 Dec 03; AFOSI Manual 71-144 Volume 7, CI Collections, Analysis and
Production.
Essential Elements of InformationThe most critical information requirements regarding the
adversary and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with
other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision.
Flyaway Security Team (FAST)See Phoenix Ravens
Force Protection (FP)Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department
of Defense personnel (to include Active Duty, AFRC, ANG, DoD civilians, contractors, and
family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the
forces fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the
coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective
employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection
does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.
 26 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

(JP 1-02) Note: The AF definition in AFDD 3-10 deviates as: The process of detecting threats
and hazards to the AF and its mission, and applying measures to deter, pre-empt, negate or
mitigate them based on an acceptable risk; this modified definition does not expand the Intel
support mission to include all hazards (e.g., EM, bio-medical, infrastructure, weather), it is only
provided for understanding and clarity.
Force Protection InformationFused information from FP sources (CI, SF, Intel, etc.) that
provides the best available picture of the intents and capabilities of terrorists or extremists,
criminal entities and enterprises, FISS, opposing military forces, and in certain instances,
environmental/medical hazards, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and insider threats.
Force Protection Intelligence (FPI)Analyzed, all-source intelligence information that when
integrated, or fused with other FP information provides an assessment of the threats to DoD
missions, people or resources. FPI is proactive and drives FP decisions in support of
commanders intent.
Force Protection ProgramCommanders program designed to protect Service members,
civilian employees, family members, facilities, information and equipment, in all locations and
situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism,
physical security, operations security, personal protective services and supported by intelligence,
counterintelligence and other security programs.
Foreign DisclosureOral or visual transmission of information through approved channels to
authorized representative of a foreign government.
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial
information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically
referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery
intelligence and geospatial information. (JP 2-03)
InformationFacts, data, or instructions in any medium or form.
Integrated DefenseThe application of active and passive defense measures, employed across
the legally-defined ground dimension of the operational environment, to mitigate potential risks
and defeat adversary threats to AF operations. As an AF-wide responsibility, effective ID helps
ensure effective FP. Security of resources and personnel, in garrison or deployed, is an inherent
command responsibility and requires active participation of all Airman, regardless of AF
specialty, rank or position for mission success.
IntelligenceThe product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation,
analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or
potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also
applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such
activity. (JP 1-02)
Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC)The IFC is a proactive action group, either collocated or
virtually connected, whereby the Security Forces Staff coordinates with subject matter experts
(SMEs) from the Intelligence and AFOSI communities to collaborate and conduct IPOE; the
goal being to leverage information to support the timely identification of indicators and warnings
of emerging localized threats. The IFC and its products are the primary information sources that
directly support the DFC in making immediate, proactive decisions for ID planning.
AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012 27

Intelligence Oversight (IO)Program developed to ensure that government entities conducting

intelligence activities do not infringe on or violate the rights of US persons and operate within
assigned legal parameters. Reference AFI 14-104, Oversight of Intelligence Activities.
Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE)A systematic, continuous
process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to
support staff estimates and military decision-making.
Law Enforcement InformationInformation provided by any agency chartered and
empowered to enforce laws in CONUS; a state or political subdivision of the US; a territory,
possession or political subdivision of the US; or within the borders of a host nation. Law
Enforcement Sensitive (LES) information specifically refers to unclassified FOUO information
that may be used in criminal prosecution and requires protection against unauthorized disclosure
to protect sources and methods, investigative activity, evidence and the integrity of pretrial
investigative reports.
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)Intelligence obtained by quantitative
and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation,
plasma, and hydro-magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of
identifying any distinctive features associated with the emitter or sender, and to facilitate
subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. The detected feature may be either
reflected or emitted. (JP 2-0)
Operational ControlTransferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders
at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in
combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the
authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing
and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving
authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes
authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to
accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through
the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through
subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.
Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to
employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish
assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction
for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.
Phoenix Ravens/Flyaway Security Team (FAST)The Phoenix Ravens and FAST Programs
are designed to ensure adequate protection for aircraft transiting airfields where security is
unknown or deemed inadequate to counter local threats. Teams of two to four specially trained
and equipped Security Forces personnel deploy to deter, detect, and counter threats to
personnel/aircraft by performing a variety of duties (e.g., close-in aircraft security, advising
aircrews on FP measures, accomplishing airfield assessments to document existing security
measures and vulnerabilities).
Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR)Intelligence requirements for which a commander
has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision-making.
 28 AFI14-119 4 MAY 2012

TerrorismThe calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate

fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are
generally political, religious, or ideological.
Terrorism Threat LevelAn intelligence threat assessment of the level of terrorist threat faced
by US personnel and interests in a foreign country. The assessment is based on a continuous
intelligence analysis of a minimum of four elements: operational capability, intentions, activity
and operational environment. There are four threat levels: LOW, MODERATE, SIGNIFICANT
and HIGH. Threat levels should not be confused with force protection conditions. Threat level
assessments are provided to senior leaders to assist them in determining the appropriate local
force protection condition. Department of State and Department of Homeland Security also
make threat assessments, which may differ from those determined by Department of Defense.
Threat AssessmentAnalytic products produced by the OSI to address the threat posed by
espionage, international terrorism, subversion, sabotage, assassination, and covert activities.
This includes other activities that have a foreign intelligence entity (FIE) nexus. Reference DoD
Instruction 5240.18, Counterintelligence (CI) Analysis and Production, November 17, 2009.
Threat Working Group (TWG)An advisory body that meets at least quarterly or more
frequently to develop and refine terrorism threat assessments and coordinate and disseminate
threat warnings, reports, and summaries. TWG membership is determined by the commander
and typically is anchored by ATO, AFOSI, Intel, and Security Forces, but may include members
of the staff such as Medical, Communications, Civil Engineering and Operations tenant unit
representatives; and appropriate representation from local, State, Federal, and host-nation law
enforcement agencies as needed depending upon the threat. Further guidance for the TWG is
found in AFI 10-245, DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, October 2, 2006.
US PersonsThe term United States Person applies to the following: 1. A United States
citizen; 2. An alien known by the DoD intelligence component concerned to be a permanent
resident alien. A permanent resident alien is a foreign national lawfully admitted into the United
States for permanent residence; 3. An unincorporated association substantially composed mostly
of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens; 4. A corporation incorporated in the
United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
Vulnerability AssessmentA Department of Defense-, command- or unit-level evaluation of
the extent to which an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or other site
would be vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Identifies areas that could be improved to withstand,
mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism.