Pedrosa v CA (March 5, 2001) Doctrine: No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated

therein or had no notice thereof. Not having participated in the settlement, Pedrosas cause of action prescribes not in 2 years but in 4 years, on account of the fraud perpetuated upon her. NATURE: Petition for review decision of CA which affirmed RTC Ozamiz City PONENTE: Quisumbing, 2nd Division FACTS: 1946, Sps. Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina Rodriguez initiated proceedings before CFI Ozamiz for legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI granted petition. 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, Maria Elena and Rosalina (child and wife) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate, with equal portions for each. Later that year, private respondents (brothers and sisters of Miguel) filed an action to annul adoption of petitioner before CFI Ozamiz, impleading as defendants, Maria Elena and Rosalina. 1974, CFI denied petition and upheld the validity of adoption. So appeal was had to CA. While appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as representative of heirs of Miguel. Pilar had no heirs except brothers and sisters. The Deed of EJ Settlement and Partition cover 14 parcels of land with area 224,883 sq m. These were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented by Rosalina. Heirs of Miguel were given 34,250 sq m. Using Deed of EJ Settlement and Partition, respondent Rodriguezes secured RCTs and transferred some parcels to the other respondents (Chuan Lung Fai, Lilian Express inc, Victrino Detrall, Jerome Deiparine, Hubert Chiu Yulo, Pateria Lao, Lorensita Padilla and Immaculate Conception College) herein. 1986, Parties in the appeal seeking to annul the adoption of Pedrosa filed Motion to Dismiss. CA dismissed appeal but upheld validity of adoption. Thereafter, Maria Elena sent her daughter Loreto Jocelyn to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes but they refused, saying Maria Elena were not heirs since they were not blood relatives.

Petitioner then filed complaint to annul 1983 partition. Petition was later amended to include allegation that there were earnest efforts for compromise but it failed. RTC dismissed complaint. Upon appeal to CA, RTCs dismissal was affirmed on the grounds that: 1. participation of Rosalina already estopped her from questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code; 2. that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the partition would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share; 3. the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code; 4. that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed 2. whether or not said deed is valid; and 3. whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers. Argument of petitioner: 1. complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period which should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson. She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two, the party assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in her case, since she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, where we held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel. 2. respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence required before purchasing the lots in question. In the

alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code 3. Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code. Respondents arguments: 1. Action already prescribed. 2. Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. 3. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition.

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed. 2. Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her. The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena. In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held: This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate under

Held: 1. No. 2. No. 3. Not proper forum to ventitlate issue. Torrens Title cant be attacked collaterally. Ratio: 1. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that: [The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.

Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed. It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941. To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate. 3. Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. As to award for damages, Court finds them unsubstantiated. But, this does not mean she is not entitled to any. Nominal damages may be awarded to her, as her rights were clearly injured by the action of the respondents. Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages. Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this case. Thus, the grant of P100,000.00 to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the technical injury she has suffered.

DISPOSITION: CA Reversed. Petition granted. VOTE: all concur. -Ann for Kes