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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, April 22, 1942
INFORMATION BULLETIN
No. 12
MIS 461
I

NOTICE
1. Information Bulletins, which have replaced Tentative Lessons Bulle-
tins, have a dual purpose: (1) to provide all officers with reasonably con-
firmed information from official and other reliable sources, and (2) to serve
as material for lectures to troops.
2. Nondivisional units are being supplied with copies on a basis similar
to the approved distribution for divisional commands, as follows:
INF DIV CAV DIV ARMD DIV
Div Hq 8 Div Hq .......... 4 Div Hq ------- 11
Rcn Troop ---- I 1 Ord Co ----- --- 1 Rcn Bn 1
Sig Co ....... 1 Sig Troop 1 Engr Bn 1
Engr Bn....... 1 Rcn Sq ------- 1 Med Bn ... ...1
Med Bn....... 1 Engr Sq....... 1 Maint Bn ----- 1
QM Bn.... 1 Med Sq 1 Supply Bn . .....
1
Hq Inf Regt, I ea 3 QM Sq .... 1 Div Train Hq ---- 1
Inf Bn, 1 ea ... 9 Hq Cav Brig, 2 ea_ 4 Armd Regt, 4 ea_ 8
Hq Div Artv_____ 1 Cav Regt, 4 ea___ 16 FA Bn, 1 ea . .3
FA Bn, 1 ea -- 4 Hq Div Arty ---- 1 Inf Regt . ......
4
FA Bn, 1 ea --- 3
30 32
34
Distribution to air units is being made by the A-2 of Army Air Forces.
3. Each command should circulate available copies among its
officers. Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided
(1) the source is stated, (2) the classification is not changed, and (3) the
information is safeguarded. Attention is invited to paragraph 10a, AR
380-5, which is quoted in part as follows: "A document * * * will
be classified and * * * marked restricted when information contained
therein is for official use only, or when its disclosure should be * *
denied the general public."
4. Suggestions for future bulletins are invited. Any correspondence
relating to Information Bulletins may be addressed directly to the Dis-
semination Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

457557--42 1
 CONTENTS

Page
SECTION I. Japanese Landing Operations near Pakhoi, China -_-------- 5
1. Introduction ---- ---------------- --------------- 5
2. Plan of Landings ---------.. ...
....... 7
II. Japanese Army Troop Transports...--------------- 19
1. Tonnage Calculations and Probable Troop-Carrying
Capacities ----- ....----- -- - - - -- - - - - 19
III. Special Notes on the Use of Field Artillery ----------- ------ 23
1. On Bataan Peninsula -.-------------------- 23
2. In the Malayan Campaign ------------------------- 23
IV. Japanese Tactics in Malaya ----------- - ------------------ 25
1. General -------------------- 25
2. Fifth Column ----------------- ------- ----- 26
3. Camouflage ----------------------------------- 26
4. Blitz Parties ----------------------------------- 27
5. Air Tactics --------- -------- ------ ------- - 27
6. Lessons on Airdrome Defense ---------------------- 28
7. Points To Be Emphasized ----------------------- 28
V. Japanese "Flying Columns" .----------------------
- ----- 30
1. Introduction --------------------- --- ---- 30
2. Missions ------------------ - ------------ 30
3. Composite Elements ------------------- 30
4. Long-Distance Reconnaissance Columns ------------ 31
5. Resisting "Flying Columns" ....................... 32
VI. Japanese Equipment and Tactics -------------------- 33
1. Equipment _------------------------------ 33
2. Tactics ------------------------------------- 34
3. Fifth Column Activities ...------------ 35
4. Countering Japanese Night Operations.......... 36
5. Effect of Concentrated Fire on the Japanese __------ 37
ILLUSTRATIONS
Cover Design. Type "E" Landing Boat.
Observe: 1. Machine-gun turret; 2. Airplane type propeller,
which enables the boat to traverse shallow and weed-
infested water. (See MID Information Bulletin No. 7,
January 24, 1942, fig. 6 and pp. 2-3.)
Page
FIGURE 1. Sketch Map Showing Landing of Nakamura Detachment ---- 7
2. Map of Nanning Area -................................. 20
3. Probable Composition of a Japanese Mobile Mixed Brigade___ 38

2
 SECTION I

JAPANESE LANDING OPERATIONS NEAR PAKHOI, CHINA

1. Introduction
a. Comment by Admiral Hart.-In a recent statement Admiral Thomas C.
Hart, former commander of the United Nations' naval forces in Far Eastern
waters, declared that the effective use of coordinated air, sea, and ground forces
is one of the principal reasons for current Japanese successes. Admiral Hart's
comments are quoted in part as follows:
"The accurately timed, carefully planned surprise attacks of the enemy, which
have given them such a tremendous initial advantage, are a brilliant example
of naval and aerial coordination .... Aircraft took a very forward part.
The enemy has been able to employ land-based planes throughout all his advances.
In most instances, the planes which have played so vital a part in the enemy's
success were of the Japanese Naval Air Service-mostly land planes. The
enemy was adept in their use--as we found them to be with other weapons as
well. Japan's long war with China had provided much experience in amphibious
warfare. She prepared her blows long in advance, evidently with thoroughness,
and the surprise element gave her forces a tremendous advantage. ...
". .. This war is for us an amphibious war. It requires all the armed serv-
ices acting jointly, and for that reason it is the toughest kind of war, technically,
to wage."
b. Comment on Pakhoi Operations.-The Japanese landing operation order
quoted in this section was captured by the Chinese during the fighting around
Nanning, Kwangsi, in November 1939. It was prepared in the office of the
military attach6 in China. The order is concerned with the landing operations
of the Nakamura Detachment, which was commanded by a major general of that
name. A study of it will give an insight into some of the tactics employed by
the Japanese in the recent Far Eastern conquests. In view of recent Japanese
successes, the following points may be noted with particular interest:
(1) The Japanese made no reconnaissance of the areas they had selected for
landing operations until the actual landings began-on the theory, no doubt,
that such reconnaissance would reveal the point selected for the landing. How-
ever, the Japanese had undoubtedly made reconnaissances of the landing areas
in months past by the use of Japanese agents or Fifth Columnists.
(2) A study of the various landing points and movements shows that the
Japanese used flanking and infiltration tactics similar to those used later in the
Malayan campaign.
(3) Naval aircraft closely supported the landing operations, seeking out enemy
defenses, movements, and strength.
(4) The importance of identification of friendly troops without confusion was
emphasized by the Japanese. It will be noted that instructions were given units

3
 to display their "Rising Sun" flags toward the sky in order that Japanese air
forces would not mistake them for Chinese troops.
(5) That the Japanese live off the areas they invade so far as possible is borne
out by instructions issued to commanding officers directing the procuring of all
the supplies possible locally-"to reduce transportation costs," as the Japanese
put it. When the Japanese landed, they carried enough rations to supply each
soldier for 6 days.
(6) The instructions given in appendixes Nos. 4 and 5 relative to collection and
dissemination of intelligence information are very thorough and give a good insight
into Japanese intelligence techniques. Of particular interest are the instructions
showing the reconnaissance expected of naval planes.
(7) It should be borne in mind that the number of troops opposing the Japanese
in this instance provided them with relatively little resistance.
c. Japanese Strength.-The approximate strength of the Nakamura I)etach-
ment was as follows:
Headquarters 21st Infantry Brigade, 5th Division (10 officers and enlisted
men).
21st Infantry Regiment (3 battalions, each with 4 rifle companies and 1
machine-gun company-2,716 officers and enlisted men).
Brigade and regimental detachments:
Infantry gun (75 officers and enlisted men).
Signal (60 officers and enlisted men).
One battery of Field Artillery (about 175 officers and enlisted men-4
guins, 4 sections, headquarters detail, combat train).
One battery of Mountain Artillery (about 175 officers and enlisted ien--
4 guns, 4 sections, headquarters detail, combat train).
One engineer company (about 170 officers and enlisted men---4 platoons).
One mounted platoon (about 20 officers and enlisted men--2 squads).
Medical troops (about 60 officers and enlisted men).
d. Base of Operations.-The landing was based on Sanya Bay* and for the
attack on Nanning two other detachments (Oikawa and Tatsumon) are mentioned.
These latter also are believed to have been units of the Japanese 5th Division.
e. Outline of Plan.-The Japanese plan is broken down into the following
subheads:
(1) Object.
(2) Disposition of the landing party.
(3) Movement of transports.
(4) Reconnaissance in the vicinity of the landing areas.
(5) Landing operations.
(6) Coordination of naval aircraft.
(7) Antiaircraft and light control.
(8) Signal commurnication.
(9) Rations.
(10) Miscellaneous.

*Sanya Bay is located on the southern end of Hainan Island, approximately 215 miles east of the mouth
of the Yuhung River, where the landing operations began.

4
 To

50,000

YAMCHOW BAY
(CHINC.OO BY)

Tsnlqt.op.n

Toonch.orge '~
To So,-yAday, Hainn Island

FIGURE 1.-Sketch map showing landing of Nakamura Detachment.

2. Plan of Landings
The Japanese order dealing with the landing operations is as follows:
"a. Object.-This Detachment will land by force on X date, the right column
in the neighborhood of Chinchit'ang (see figs. 1 and 2) and the main body in the

5
 area north of Wench'ungshants'un. After landing at these two places, the De-
tachment will proceed rapidly to the Tiwots'un-Yungkoutsun line, and, arriving
at this line, will make preparations for a further advance towards the line joining
Namahsu and Hsinhsu, south of Nanning.
"As soon as the troops land, an advance party will be sent with dispatch in the
direction of N* (Nanning).
"b. Disposition of Landing Party (see Appendix No. 1)
"c. Movement of Transports
"The transports assemble at M (Sanya Bay, Hainan Island) at 12 o'clock
on the fourth day before X day (the landing date). They leave from that place
in the morning two days later and anchor at the 2d anchorage about 6 miles south-
east of C (Ch'ishayu), at 4 o'clock a. m. on the X day.
"The transports will proceed, as soon as the first landing group has marched
off, to the 4th anchorage (southeast of D (Lungmen)).
"d. Reconnaissance in the Vicinity of the Landing Areas
"No reconnaissance will be made in the neighborhood of the landing
places while the Detachment is still aboard ship.
"e. Landing Operations
"(1) The first landing group will commence landing operations at 7 o'clock
on X date. After they take to the landing boats, they follow the guidance of
naval boats to the mouth of B (Yuhung River) where the Advance Party and the
Right and Left Columns will land simultaneously.
"(2) The second and subsequent landing groups will then move to the 4th
anchorage on board the transports and effect landing operations there.
"(3) For the landing order and the allotment of boats, see appendix No. 2.
"(4) A boat detail, consisting of a number of river boats from each transport
will sail upward from the 2d anchorage to the places of landing, as shown in the
sketch map (fig. 1).
"f. Coordination of Naval Air Force
"(1) Reconnaissance by naval planes will be made after, but not before,
the commencement of landing operations.
"(2) In the support of the landing operations, naval aircraft will attack
enemy troops and positions.
"(3) It is important that first-line troops clearly mark their locations. To
avoid attacks by friendly planes, the patrols and smaller units are required to
identify themselves with Rising Sun flags displayed toward the sky.
"(4) Aircraft will refrain from bombing villages around the landing
places unless such action is tactically required.
"g. Antiaircraft and Light Control
"(1) Antiaircraft
"(a) Naval vessels and planes will repulse any enemy air attack
that may be encountered in the course of the operation.
"(b) Transport crews will not make use of their "self-defense"
armament unless the convoy ships have opened fire and only upon order of the
convoy commander.
*See Appendix No. 3 of the order, page 14, for all abbreviations of places mentioned in this order.

6
 "(2) Light control
"(a) Ordinary light control regulations govern during the nights
the transports remain in M (Sanya Bay).
"(b) The emergency (combat) light control regulations will be in
effect as soon as the transports leave M (Sanya Bay), whether under way or at
anchor.
"(c) Ordinary light control again after X date.
"h. Signal Communication
"To be executed as per 'The Detachment's Signal Plan' in a separate book
and also 'The Provisions of the Signal Contact Agreement'.*
"i. Rations
"(1) During the landing operations troops will bring with them the day's
noon meal.
"(2) After landing, they will depend upon the field rations brought along
by their respective units.**
"(3) In spite of the fact that rations will be forwarded through the divi-
sional headquarters, the troops will make as much use as possible of the local pro-
duction in order to reduce transportation cost.
"(4) The troops will carry the fixed quantity of ammunition to be later
replenished by the divisional transport service.
"j. Miscellaneous
"(1) Gas masks will be left at the place of landing, to be cared for by special
details from each unit. These will be forwarded to the front when transportation
facilities are available.
"(2) All other mat6riel left behind at the landing place will be in charge of
men from the unit concerned for custody and protection. This will be forwarded
to the front, when feasible.
"(3) Abbreviations for place and feature names used in the present cam-
paign are shown in Appendix No. 3.

Appendix No. 1

"LANDING DISPOSITION OF NAKAMURA DETACHMENT

(Major General Nakamura, commanding)

"THE ADVANCE PARTY:

"Commander: Major Higashi
"Troops: 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (less 2d and 3d Companies and one
platoon of machine-gun company)
One squad of mounted platoon
One platoon of engineer company
Signal detachment
Two folding boats

*These were not found with the captured order.

-*The iron and field rations and those in the heavy baggage total 6 days' supply.

7
 "Transports: Taian Maru (tonnage 5,500) and Ishin Maru (tonnage 4,955)
"Landing
Place:* The neighborhood of Huangwuchungyu on the left bank of
Yuhung River.
"Action: Sail upward along Yuhung River to the neighborhood of Huang-
wuchungyu and land there by force. Then march rapidly
toward the area south of N (Nanning) via the route Huangwu-
chungyu-Natai-Tassuyu-Tatanghsu-Namahsu. Reconnoiter
enemy positions in that area and cut the traffic of Yung River
(south of Nanning) at the same time.
"THE RIGHT COLUMN:
"Commander: Major Morimoto
"Troops: 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry (less 11th Company)
Half of Regimental Infantry Gun Detachment
One mounted squad
One platoon of engineer company
Signal detachment
"Transports: Tomiura Maru (tonnage 3,821), Tateishi Maru (tonnage 3,800),
and Yuki Maru (tonnage 3,170).**
"Ianding
Place:
"Action: Troops on board Tomiura Maru** land at the western flank of
Chinchit'ang, the rest in the vicinity of Wench'ungshants'un.
1. Immediately after landing, send a detachment in the direction
of Szemaoping and (about 3 miles northeast of Tiwots'un) to
reconnoiter the enemy stationed at Ch'inhsien.
2. The main body will occupy the Kaochingling area after land-
ing, then move with dispatch to the neighborhood of Tiwots'un
and occupy it. Any enemy attack will be repulsed, in order to
facilitate the landing of the Detachment's main body.
3. The Right Column will advance on Hsinyu by way of Tiwots'-
uIn-Hsiaotulgyul-Kulgjtungyu-Hsinyt. For this reason, the
fording point across Yuhung River should be definitely reconnoi
tered. The advance will be authorized in another order later.
"THE LEFT COLUMN: (Major General Nakamura, commanldinlg)
"1. Headquarters Detachment:
"Troops: Headquarters of the 21st Infantry Brigade Signal Detach-
ments
"Transport: Taito Maru (tonnage 4,400)
"Landing
Place: Area north of Tateng.
"Action: Halt for the time being where landed. When the first line
troops have marched off and the subsequent troops have com-
*See figures 1 and 2 for places mentioned in landing operations.
**These vessels also carry materiel and troops of the Left Column.

8
 pleted landing, push on to Kuangyungstun. The Brigade
Telegraph Company will radio communication with the
Advance Party and the Right Column. The Signal Com-
pany will maintain radio communication with divisional
headquarters.
"2. Advance Guard:
"Commander: Major Miyamoto
"Troops: 2d Battalion less 7th and 8th Companies and half (one
platoon) of the Machine-Gun Company
"Landing
Place: North of Tateng
"Action: After landing operations have commenced (the boats con-
tinue sailing up the river), the advance guard will be placed
under the direction of Unit Commander Miki.
"3. Main Body:
"Commander: Major General Nakamura
"Troops: 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (2d and 3d Companies and 1
Machine-Gun Company)
2d Battalion, 21st Infantry (7th and 8th Companies and X
Machine-Gun Company)
3d Battalion, 21st Infantry (11th Company)
l/2 Regimental Infantry Gun Detachment
Signal Detachment
2d Battery of 5th Field Artillery Regiment
One battery of Mountain Artillery
One company (less two platoons) of 5th Engineer Regiment
Medical detachment, one stretcher company and a number of
medical personnel.
Tonnage
"Transports: Taian Maru -.. .....-. .......
5, 500
Ishin Maru .. ..............- 4, 955
Yuki Maru... ................ 3,168
Tateishi Maru__ *-..------- . -. ..3, 800
Tomiura Maru_ 3, 820
Kokushin Maru .- . .............
4, 000
Kotsui Maruti - ...............- 4, 000
Fukuyo Maru___ ................ 5, 463
"Landing
Place: Area north of Tateng
"Action: A. 21st Infantry:
1. The 21st Infantry and the advance guard will sail up the
river to the north of Wench'ungshants'unl and land there by
force. Part of this detachment will be sent with dispatch
to occupy the area near Nanshetsun and up to Yungkoutsun
in cooperation with the Right Column. The main body will
assemble in the vicinity of Kuangyungtsun.

457557°-42 -2 9
 2. Occupy Maolingyu with a detachment carrying out flank
protection on the right bank of Yuhung River with special
vigilance toward Fangcheng. As soon as the first landing
group passes Maolingyu, this detachment returns to the
main body.*
3. Part of the infantry troops with engineer troops attached
will land near Huangwuchungyu in the wake of the Advance
Party to perform river reconnaissance and protect the main
body when crossing the river.
4. The 21st Infantry will be under Major General Nakamura's
direct command after landing.
5. The Left Column will advance on Namayu along the same
route taken by the Advance Party.
B. Artillery:
1. Having occupied a position near the landing place, the
mountain artillery will prepare coordinating fire for both
columns. In case that no opposition is encountered, this
unit will assemble near the landing place and prepare to
advance with the main body.
2. The field artillery (2d battery) will limber up at the landing
place and await orders to advance.
C. Engineering troops:
1. A detachment will be detailed to make necessary repairs at
the landing place and to assist building in an artillery posi-
tion.
2. The remainder will reconnoiter and repair the route to
Huangwutsun and also prepare for river-crossing action
(across Yuhung River).
D. Medical Service:
1. One detachment will maintain a dressing station in the
neighborhood of the landing place.
2. The remainder will advance with the main body.
"REMARKS: Boundary between columns:
The line from the northern end of Kaoching Island to the fork
road about 1f/2 miles west of Szemaoping, and to Chinhualing
(about 3 miles east of Huangwutsun), will form the boundary
between columns.

*According to the maps, the Japanese consider the west bank as the "right" bank, and this flank column
passes west of Maolingyu and marches northward.

10
Appendix No. 2

BOAT ASSIGNMENT
I~~~~~~ot
LANDING ORDER Boats
allotted
AT
IN fame of Vessels
First Landing Group* Second &Subsequent Landing
Groups ** Large Small

(Brig Hq); 2nd Bn Hq; Remainder personnel. Taito

5th & 6th Cos X2 of horses and mat6riel. Maru.
MG Co; One Signal
Sqd; Part of Brig Inf
Gun Det;
(Regt Hq); One Signal ..- ditto -------.-.-.-- Taian
Sqd; 1st Bn Hq; 1st Maru
& 2nd Cos; % of MG
Co; One Mtd Sqd
3d & 4th Cos; % of Regt ..- ditto --------.-.-.- Ishin
Inf Gun Det, Part of Maru
Brig Inf Gun Det; &2
Y of 1st MG Co; One
0
Plat Engr Co; One p
Mtd Sqd 01o
7th & 8th Cos; 1{ of 2nd ----- ditto -------0M Y a k i
-.-.--
MG Co 7'2 of Regt Inf & S; 2d F A Battery ;3 Maru
p
Gun Det; One Plat
Engr Co z20
o
3d Bn Hq; One Signal ...- ditto --------
---- C) Tomiura
Sqd; 9th & 10th & one sec of 2d Btry Maru
Cos; 2 of MG Co; X
C)

Part of Brig Inf Gun

Det
11th & 12th Cos; Y2of 3d ..-- ditto ---------
---- Tateishi
MG Co; One Plat of One sec of 2d Btry; Maru
Engr Co; Medical per- Main body of Medical
sonnel Personnel
1 Engr Platoon Consist- Remainder personnel, Fukuyo
ing of Brigade horses & materiel Maru
Construction
River crossing and
units
One section of the moun- 3 section of the Moun- Kokutsu 413
tain Battery tain Battery Maru

Notes: *Time of landing operations: 7 a. m. on X date at the mouth of Chinchow Bay.

**Time of landing operations: afternoon of the same day at Lungmen.

11
Appendix No. $
"ABBREVIATIONS FOR PLACE NAMES USED IN THE
PRESENT CAMPAIGN
"Abbrevatiot Place Name "Abbreviation Place Name
A ----- Mouth of Chin River* G...... Chinchow
B ---- _ Mouth of Yuhung River L...... Haikow (Hainan Island)
C----- Ch'ishayu M ---- Sanya Bay (Hainan Island)
D ____ Lungmen N ---- Nanning
E -.-.-- Southern shore of Peihai T...... Peihai (Kwangtung)
F.-- - Chinchow Bay K..... Hainan Island
*Not referred to in the body of the order.

Appendix No. 4

NAKAMURA DETACHMENT'S PLAN FOR COLLECTION

OF INTELLIGENCE
Nakamura Det Hq
November 9, 1939
Object: To collect promptly all essential information required for the
attack of strategic points in the environs of Nanning.
1. Information required:
Ist Period (for landig 2dPeriod (for
landingd
Period
(preparatory
action) period) 3d Period (for attack of N)

1. waterway condi- 1. road destruction 1. re enemy de-

tion of Yuhung & enemy situation fense near N.
river & enemy sit- along Huangwu- 2. road condition
uation along it. chungyu - Tassu- of N-Pinyang
2. re enemy near yu - Tatangyu - and N-Wuming.
H uangwuchungyu Namayu - N. (To 3. re N airdrome.
especially road and be reported in the 4. re telegraph and
fording condition. course of advance) telephone lines
2. any enemy posi- near N.
tion near Namayu
& on right bank
of Yung R. to the
west of N.
3. re the fording
point across Yung
R. & river crossing
material.

12
 __ ·
tl l

1st Period (for landing 2d Period (preparatory

action) period) 3d Period (for attack of N)

1. re enemy situation 1. road destruction Same as above.

in vicinity of land- & enemy position
ing place of Hq. of along Tassuyu-Ta-
21st Inf., esp. fea- tangyu-Namayu.
sibility of roads for 2. road damage on
p passage of wagons Tatangyu-Na-
0 and horses. chenyu* - Shiht-
2. Yungkoutsun- zukou*-N road.
a) Huangwutsun rd. 3. situation near Na-
V
3. re enemy advanc- mayu & on right
X
ing northward from bank of Yung R.
E-4 A..
o Fangcheng, if any. south of N; any en-
Q
D) 4. re river condition emy positions
>
CI) near Huangwu- there.
chungyu & any 4. crossing point of
C.
C) fording material. Yung River.
Ci)
cc
I
Q
CU
0

C1) 1. enemy situation 1. enemy situation 1. re enemy de-

.Gq
near Chinchitang near Takangyu & fense near Chi-
o
Q
Ci)
& river & terrain Hsiaotungyu. entaoyu east of
near landing place. 2. condition of Tak- N.
p 0 2. enemy situation at angyu-Hsiaotung- 2. condition of N -
E C
X) Chinchow. yu - Hsinyu Road. Yungchun road.
0o 3. damage to bridges 3. enemy positions 3. waterway of
1W between Chinchow near Hsinyu. Yung River.
& Chinchitang. 4. enemy situation 4. enemy situation
E- 4. condition of tele- near Lingshan (to near Puts in,
C) graph & telephone be reported by Chientaoyu,
H lines. spies). Liangtangyu
5. condition of Yung & Yungchun
river fording point, (by spies).
& fording mate- 5. condition of tele-
rial. graph & tele,
phone line.

*These villages are not shown on the maps.

2. Methods of collecting intelligence:

a. By scouts.
b. From prisoners, especially captured higher ranking officers.

13
 c. Local press.
d. Annuals and other literature in occupied towns.
e. Aerial reconnaissance.
f. Captured enemy's documents.
g. Estimate and judgment.
3. Notes for the submission of reports:
a. As soon as something of importance is learned, report it
even in part, by radio or other means. Don't wait for
the complete text.
b. That which is intended for record will be compiled into a
connected thesis for oral or written report.
c. Any data, topographical or military, that is not immedi-
iately needed for the present campaign may be reported
after the campaign is over.
d. Sources should be mentioned in the report.
e. In sending reports by radio, observe the "Nakamura De-
tachment's Signal Correspondence Agreement".
4. Remarks:
a. All units are required to obtain and report, aside from that
listed above, information of important military or
topographical nature.
b. The boundary for the collection of intelligence for the two
columns is as follows:
The line joining Chinhualing (about 3 mi. east of
Huangwutsun, see map), Lotzuyu,* Ssupingyu,* Taleitsun
(6 mi. west of Hsinyu), and Ssu * (4 mi. southeast of Nan-
ning), is included within the area for the Left Column.
Appendix No. 5

"RECONNAISSANCE EXPECTED OF NAVAL PLANES**

(Based on the 5th Division's plan

for the collection of intelligence)
"Data desired Whom to inform
"1st Period: (Landing date: approximately Nov. 15)
"1. Enemy situation in the vicinity of the land-
ing places: B, C, D.***

'These villages are not shown on the maps.

'*See figure 2 for map prepared by the Military Intelligence Service to aid in the interpretation of the
Japanese aerial reconnaissance.
"'*B-Nakamura Detachment; C= Oikawa Detachment; D = Tatsumon Detachment.

14
 a. Any enemy troops?
"2. Any enemy troops marching southwestward
from Hsiaotungyu?
a. Are the enemy forces near Takangyu and Report first to Nakamura
Hsiaotungyu pushing toward B? Or Det, next to divisional
are they making defensive prepara- intelligence officer.
tions? Or are they retreating? If
they are retreating, to which direction?
"3. Enemy situation in the vicinity of Fang- Report first to Oikawa
cheng Det and the Cav Det,
a. Any enemy positions near Fangcheng? next to divisional intel-
b. Are enemy troops advancing toward C? ligence officer.
Or toward B?
"4. Enemy situation near N and their transpor-
tation activities, especially whether or not
they are preparing to retreat.
a. Is the enemy near N advancing south-
ward?
b. If so, toward which side of Nakamura Inform the two Dets con-
and Oikawa Detachments? cerned, then the divi-
c. If they are retreating, in which direction? sional intelligence offi-
d. Do they make use of motor vehicles for cer.
transporting troops and supplies?
"5. Reconnoiter enemy situation at Lungehow, Inform the Det concerned.
Kweihsien, and Peihai.
a. Find out from the above three areas if Inform the Det concerned.
there are enemy troops (Chinese) ad-
vancing toward the Division (the 5th
Japanese Division). If there are, what
kind of troops, strength, and route of
march?
"2d Period: (The preparatory period for the attack
of N is roughly November 16-18)
"1. Enemy situation on the route of advance of Inform the Det concerned.
the Nakamura and the Oikawa Detach-
ments, and the location of these detach-
ments.
a. Where is the main strength of the enemy? Inform the two Dets con-
cerned and the Cav Det.
b. Are the small streams fordable?
c. The location of the advance parties of the
two detachments?
"2. Enemy situation at N and on the right bank Inform the two Dets con-
to the south thereof. Any obstacles? cerned and the Cav Det.
a. Are the enemy troops near N offering
resistance?

15
 b. The front of their positions, especially
locations of the two wings.
"3. Condition of Yung River. Inform the two Dets con-
a. Any civilian boats in anchorage? cerned and the Cav Det.
b. Any defensive works on the northern
bank facing our troops?
"4. Enemy situation at Kueihsien, Pinyang, Inform the two Dets con-
Wuming, and especially Lungchow. cerned and the Cav Det.
a. Strength of enemy troops and the manner
in which they are moving about.
b. About their main body.
"5. The Shioda Army Group. Inform Nakamura Det.
a. Toward which line are they moving?
b. Enemy situation near the Division's
battle area.
"6. Activity of enemy planes.
"3d Period: (After November 19)
"1. Enemy's defensive works in the neighbor- Inform the two Dets con-
hood of N and his strength. cerned and the Cav Det.
a. The fortifications onl the high ground
north of the city wall.
b. The defensive works at the airdrome,
and arsenal.
"2. The condition of enemy's retreat. Inform the two Dets con-
a. Direction and strength. cerned and the Cav Det.
b. How they are retreating, by water?
"3. Troop movements in the interior.
a. Location and the strength of the ma;n
body of enemy troops, especially
whether they are offering counrterat-
tacks from the northeast or from the
high ground in the north.
"4. Condition of Yung River and the main roads
leading to N.
a. Condition of boats and fording points of
the river.
b. Any damage to roads and bridges?
"5. When the Oikawa Detachment is advancing Inform Oikawa Det.
toward Lungchow, how about the roads?
Are they good enough? Any hostile op-
position on the route of advance?
a. Any defensive works in the vicinity of
Lungchow?
b. Condition of the border (with French
Indo-China)."

16
 SECTION II

JAPANESE ARMY TROOP TRANSPORTS*

1. Tonnage Calculations and Probable Troop-Carrying Capacities

The tonnage allowance for troops varies according to the length of the voyage.
the route taken, and the season of the year. The following data will provide.
however, a useful guide to the tonnage required (in each case a margin is allowed
for a certain quantity of stores, coal, ammunition, and vehicles):
a. Personnel and Horses.
Short sea voyages
Long sea voyages (3 days)
For each manll ..................... 5 tons 3 tons
For each horse .. .. __.
. . . .........10 tons 9 tonls

b. Materiel.-For every 1,000 tons of shipping, various vehicles (loaded),

tanks, and other equipment can be shipped as shown in the table below:
Trucks (3-ton) ...----- --- -- -- 12
Trucks (30-cwt-approximately 11/3 tons) . . . 23
Trucks (1-ton) . ....................-- --- -------------- 40
Tractors (field artillery) .. .. ..--- _________ __. _--_--_____ 50
C ars . .. ...--
- -- - - -- - - - - - -- - -- - - -- - -- --. 40
Ambulances .-------------------- - ---------------------- 30
Howitzers (105-mm) ...- ____ _____-_-________-----. ----- --_ 50
Field guns (aS -mm) .... ... -
_ __.._.__-_____----- _-_--___.... 100
Tankettes --- .. - ---..------.---------.- ------------------- 30
Light tanks . ..........-------------. 25
NMedium tanks . .-. .15

*This information was taken from an Australian intelligence summary received recently.

- -
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FxGuiE 2.-Map of Nanning area.

18 19
 c. Infantry D)ivision.*---On the above basis, one infantry division would require
transports totaling app)roximately 122,000 tons, divided as follows:
Tons
15,000 troops (approximately) 75, 000
39 tanks (light and mediumr) .-. 2, 000
72 75-mlmn gunlls .-. ___ 750
16 105-mil howitzers . . ...... 330
2,000 horses (estimated) .................. 20, 000

98, 080
Add 4 percent of gross tonnage for carrying stores, heavy artillery,
etc. (approximately) .. _24, 000

Total tonnage required for one infantry division 122, 080

d. Ship I)imensions in Relation to Tonnage.-The length, breadth, and draft
of vessels in relation to tonnage is given in the following table:

Draft Length Breadth Approximate

(feet) (feet) (feet) tonnage
15 230 33 1, 000
19 280 39 2, 000
21 330 44 3, 000
23 360 48 4, 000
25 390 51 5, 000
26 420 53 6, 000
27 440 55 7, 000
28 450 57 8, 000
28 460 58 9, 000
29 470 59 10, 000
'The strengths of various Japanese units are approximately as follows:
Infantry division .. . ..-.. 15,000 men.
Infantry brigade ... . .. --- .- 10,000 men.
Infantry regiment . 3,400 men.
Mobile mixed brigade ... ........ 8,000 men.
Mechanized mixed brigade 8,000 men.
Independent mixed brigade 12,000 men

20
 SECTION III

SPECIAL NOTES ON THE USE OF FIELD ARTILLERY

1. On Bataan Peninsula
a. General.-The use of field artillery, particularly 155-mm howitzers, was a
vital factor in the 3-month defense of Bataan Peninsula. Large-scale Japanese
attacks were broken up several times by concentrated and well-directed artillery
fire. United States firing techniques have proved their worth conclusively and
have led United States artillery officers on Bataan to report that they could
"make no suggestions for the improvement of the methods taught at Fort Sill."
b. Observer's Report.-On Bataan, massed artillery fire, controlled by a fire-
direction center connected with all observation posts available, has been proved
highly effective. The enemy has been very sensitive to heavy artillery concen-
trations, particularly when they came as a surprise. On every occasion when
artillery was used with audacity, the Japanese were checked and seemed com-
pletely bewildered. In many situations that seemed desperate the artillery
has been a most vital factor, and 155-mm howitzers have proved the most effective
pieces.
2. In the Malayan Campaign*
a. General.-A comparatively small amount of field artillery was used in the
Malayan Campaign, because most of the country is marshy and has very few
roads. The British employed some artillery effectively in defense of beaches.
The Japanese did not use artillery, however, until about 6 weeks after they started
the campaign, and even then most of their pieces are believed to have been
captured from the British. Singapore was the first Malayan city extensively
shelled by field artillery.**
b. Problems Confronting the British.-(1) Communication.--(a) Wire was cut in
forward zones by infiltrating Japanese or native partisans almost as soon as it
was laid. After cutting the wire the enemy often hid nearby and fired on the line
guards when they approached.
(b) A considerable amount of wire was lost in rapidly moving withdrawals.
(c) As a result of (a) and (b) above, the British relied more and more on radio
communication*** during the latter phases of the campaign.

'As reported by a United States field artillery observer.

**A Japanese document captured recently in Burma reveals that batteries of the 55th Mountain Artillery-
part of the newly organized Japanese 55th Division-have only three sections, whereas usually the Japanese
use four sections to the battery.
**'For details on Japanese radio communications, see MID Information Bulletin No. S,Notes on Japanese
Warfare, February 7, 1942.

21
 (d) British division artillery commanders had no communications of their
own and were forced to use divisional nets.
(2) Japanese Infiltrations.-Infiltrationtactics used by the Japanese were a
constant menace to artillery, particularly against columns on the roads. Japanese
parties infiltrated between the elements of the columns, thus preventing them from
advancing or retreating. Personnel were forced to abandon guns and make way
to the rear through the jungle. Whole regiments of guns were captured or
destroyed in this manner. To guard against these tactics, all artillery personnel
have been instructed to carry rifles. Division of batteries into sections or platoons
with infantry in the front and in the rear has been found to be desirable.
c. Targets.-The principal use of British artillery in Malaya was against targets
of opportunity, and practically all effective fire was by direct laying. To secure
targets of opportunity, the artillery was placed among the forward elements.
The targets included roadblocks, tanks, and motor vehicles. Speed in opening
fire was very important and use of fewer motor transports on roads was very
helpful. These advantageswere secured-at least in a large measure-by using
self-propelled mounts for the pieces.
d. Beach Defenses.-Use of field artillery in defense of beaches was a tactical
success in Malaya. Its fire alone drove away one Japanese landing force, sinking
three transports. On this occasion-contrary to their usual practice--the Jap-
anese attempted to land at a point where they were expected. To provide
against Japanese landings in unexpected places, highly mobile reserves of field
artillery located centrally to the entire waterfront have proved effective.
e. "37's"'.-Used as field artillery most of the time, 37-mm antitank guns were
valuable against all types of targets'in Malaya.
f. Formations.-The field artillery formation generally used in Malaya was the
British 2-gun "section"-equivalent to two United States sections.

22
 SECTION IV

JAPANESE TACTICS IN MALAYA*

1. General
There is a dangerous tendency among some persons to attribute Japanese war
successes to surprise and plentiful supplies. Although these have been helpful,
their success has been due primarily to training, previous war experience, and good
discipline and morale. The necessity for aggressive offensive fighting is stressed
in all Japanese training manuals. The Japanese are not merely imitators, as
some are inclined to think. They have led the world in development of landing
operations and in the design of special landing-craft carriers and assault landing
craft. The Japanese Army always has used to the fullest extent the fundamental
infantry virtue of marching and fighting, while placing minimum reliance on motor
transport. This, coupled with the exploitation of captured enemy motor trans-
port and locally-obtained vehicles-especially bicycles-has given the Japanese
a battle technique peculiarly well adapted to the theaters of war in which they
have fought. They are quick to adopt foreign techniques to fit their own require-
ments. That they have studied closely recent German war experiences and have
given much thought and preparation to their own peculiar situations has been
shown in Malaya in the following ways:
a. Close coordination between infantry, supporting ground arms, and avia-
tion-all using radio.
b. Quick and effective air support, including reconnaissance.
c. Use of noise as weapons of war. Firecrackers and loud mortar bombs were
especially effective in jungle country where visibility was poor.
d. Use of trees as fire positions, thereby gaining an advantage over ground-
bound opponents. Each light machine gun appears to be fitted with a spike or
similar means of rapidly attaching it to a tree, behind which the Japanese stands
and fires the weapon. This method overcomes the screening effect of under-
growth in the prone position.
e. Exploitation of the tendency of troops to be road-bound, by carrying out
encircling movements around them and establishing road blocks in their rear-a
technique which often resulted in British loss of guns and transport.
f. The skill shown in repairing demolished bridges by use of local materials, and
in the removal of obstacles by engineer units.

*Thissection is a summary of Japanese tactics used during the Malayan campaign and the lessons learned
therefrom. All of the information came from Australia. The information dealing with ground tactics is
based on a training memorandum issued by headquarters of the U. S. Army forces in Australia. That
dealing with air tactics is based on Australian intelligence summaries received recently.

23
 2. Fifth Column
Operations of Fifth Columnists in Malaya included the following:
a. A Malay overseer arrested at Alor Star Aerodrome had in his possession
airdrome plans, Japanese propaganda, and signaling apparatus.
b. Two coolies walking alone, one wearing a red shirt and the other a white
shirt, indicated the proximity of British troops.
c. Vendors of drinks on bicycles, after supplying free refreshments to British
troops, signaled to the Japanese by means of a flag, waving it twice and pointing
to the troops. This signal immediately brought down accurate mortar fire.
d. Enemy patrols have on at least one occasion been preceded at a distance of
about 50 yards by a German dressed in civilian clothes who engaged troops in
conversation while enemy patrols came into firing position.
e. Motor transport was on one occasion delayed by a nude local inhabitant
who leaped about the road.
f. Telephone operators in the Kedah area were reported to have been the chief
Fifth Column agents.
g. It has been reported that rice, salt, and white paper were used on roads to
denote the proximity of troops.
h. Enemy landing parties employed Malay guides.
i. Scarecrows, with arms outstretched and covered with red material, pointed
to troop positions.
j. Banana leaves laid on roads indicated motor transport parks.
k. Wooden planks laid out as arrowheads pointed to military headquarters.
1. Rice or grass trodden down or cut into the shape of arrows pointed to head-
quarters.
3. Camouflage
a. Personnel.-Japanesemilitary personnel in the theater of operations disguised
themselves extensively. Individual camouflage equipment included a body net
and a head net, either or both of which could be worn according to circumstances.
The body net was 1 by 112 yards in size. It was made of a greenish-colored straw
fiber cord or ordinary twine with a square mesh less than 2 inches in size. The
head net was made of the same material and had the same mesh and color as the
body net. It was constructed so as to fit snugly over a cap or metal helmnet.
b. Horses.-A net used to camouflage horses was large enough to hang over the
back of the animal from head to tail and down to a point slightly below the girth.
It was similar in color and construction to the personnel net.
c. Machine Guns.-The machine-gun net was more than 2 yards square. It was
the same color as the other nets but was made of heavier material and had a
slightly larger mesh.
d. Artillery.-A net designed for the artillery gun position was large enough to
cover a gun and its detachment. It was attached to the ends of poles or other
convenient supports at a height sufficient to enable the gun to be operated
unhindered.
e. Vehicles.-Paint and local vegetation--with or without nets--were the usual
means of camouflaging vehicles. Armored force vehicles normally were irregularly
painted in indeterminate shades of khaki, yellow, brown, and green. Motor

24
 transports usually were painted a sandy khaki color, although some were painted
like the armored force vehicles. Guns were painted either dark green or in shades
also like those of armored force vehicles.
f. Aircraft.-(1) Fighters.-A large number of the Japanese fighters were painted
jet black in order to absorb as many light rays as possible and thus make them
harder to see.
(2) Type "96" Heavy Bombers.-Many of these were camouflaged well and were
difficult to locate. They had irregular curling lines of light gray and light green
over most of the surface.
(3) Type "97" Reconnaissance Planes.-They were painted a dark gray all over.
4. Blitz Parties
The principal roles of Japanese blitz parties apparently were to clear the roads
of British forces and obstacles and to create confusion deep in their defense set-up.
The parties, usually consisting of three to five tanks or armored carrier vehicles,
came in waves, each of which generally was led by a medium tank. The leading
party moved over roads regardless of opposing forces on the flanks. It generally
fired at the opposition but did not stop. Its principal role was to engage vehicles
and personnel on the road. Subsequent blitz parties-sometimes as many as
four-halted when British troops were encountered and opened fire from the road.
Firing usually was high and only slight casualties resulted. The parties did not
pursue the attacks a great distance from the road. After brief engagements they
moved over the roads farther into British territory to engage other British units
in a similar way.
5. Air Tactics
a. Formations.-(1) Fighters.-The basic unit used by Japanese Army fighters
in Malaya was a diamond of four planes. Naval fighters used a basic unit which
consisted of a narrow-angled unsymmetrical V formation of three or five planes.
Normally the formation leader pulled out when encountering opposing aircraft
and took no part in the actual combat. Presumably he directed the other
fighters in the battle by radio-with which most recent Japanese planes are
equipped.
(2) Heavy Bombers.--In a raid on Singapore Island by heavy bombers, the
Japanese employed an unusual formation. The three leaders were in line astern
with two lines of six also in line astern on each quarter of the leading flight. Four
scattered weavers constituted the rear.
b. Attack Techniques.--() General Air Policy.-In air action as in ground tac-
tics, the Japanese stress the necessity of the sustained offensive. "By keeping
always on the offensive we force the enemy to divert part of his air force to the
defensive, thereby weakening him"--so states the preface in a captured Japanese
training manual.
(2) At Kota Bharu.-(a) In an attack on the Kota Bharu airdrome, four type
"O" fighters approached in echelon to port formation at 2,000 to 3,000 feet and
peeled off into a deep dive to make an organized front-gun attack. The front
guns fired from 1,500 feet down and the planes pulled out at low altitude until
sufficient height was gained to make another attack. After the initial dive
each plane appeared to act independently. The attack lasted only 5 minutes.

25
 (b) In another attack on the same airdrome, 15 to 20 naval type "96" Mit-
subishi sea-scouting fighters used one V of 7 planes with the rest of the planes
flying as stragglers. In peeling off, some of the planes carried out a maneuver
resembling a spin or aileron turn. They straightened out into a 700 dive with a
very sharp pull-out at 800 to 1,000 feet, and dived again after sufficient height
was gained. The attack lasted about 10 minutes.
(3) Maneuvering.-Japanese fighters in Malaya did not engage in extreme
aerobatics. They normally employed dive and zoom tactics in breaking away
and in regaining height.
(4) Deceptions.-(a) In several instances Japanese aircraft flew high over
airdromes to draw antiaircraft fire and searchlights, whereupon a single plane
came in at low altitude with navigation lights on and wheeled down to strafe the
airdrome. The strafing plane then climbed fast into the nearest cloud.
(b) Later in the Malayan campaign a Netherlands East Indies plane sighted
some Japanese launches on the northeast coast with natives towing them and
waving a white flag. When the plane went down to investigate, it was shot
down by light antiaircraft concealed under the awnings of some of the boats.
6. Lessons on Airdrome Defense
The following comments on airdrome defense were compiled in connection
with Japanese attacks on airdromes at Kota Bharu, Gong Kedah, and Machang:
a. Antiaircraft.-Light antiaircraft in sizable numbers are needed to protect
airdromes from low-flying attacks. Where possible, these guns should be on
twin mounts.
b. Personnel.-All airdrome personnel, regardless of duties, should be well
armed and trained in the use of tommy guns, rifles, and pistols.
c. Denmolitions.-These should be well planned. At the airdromes execution of
the necessary demolitions was extremely difficult because the armament personnel
who had been detailed for the tasks were occupied completely with rearming of
planes and other duties. In times of emergency this will usually be the case, and
a number of station personnel, detailed by name for the duty well in advance,
should be trained in executing the demolition. Wherever possible, electrical
circuits should be used to save time and personnel.
d. Slit trench.-The value of slit trenches was proved conclusively during the
bombing and strafing of these airdromes. No casualties occured to the men in
these trenches despite frequent and very low strafing.
e. Identification of Planes.-This was difficult because the Japanese used planes
similar to the Lockheeds operated at Kota Bharu by the Royal Australian Air
Force. In one instance, Japanese planes appeared over the Gong Kedah airdrome
at about the same time Royal Australian Air Force Lockheeds were due from
Kota Bharu. Not until the Japanese had blasted airdrome buildings were they
recognized.
7. Points to be Emphasized
a. Resisting Landings.-Landings must be destroyed or repelled at the water's
edge. If a beachhead is once established, Japanese excellence at infiltration makes
its rapid expansion very difficult to resist. British defenses commonly were in
depth from the beaches, and, as a result, practically no landings were repelled or

26
 expelled. The proper method is to attack landing parties with everything avail-
able at the time landings are made.
b. Knowledge of Area.-Both officers and men should know the country in
which they operate. The strength of units operating in close country is reduced
rapidly by detached parties becoming lost and being unable to rejoin commands.
Every unit down to platoons should have rear rendezvous points familiar to all
members where lost individuals may be assembled. Commanding officers must
impress local guides, forcibly if necessary.
c. Liaison Officers.-The British found that the use of liaison officers from lower
to higher units was absolutely indispensable. Each battalion should have a
liaison officer with regimental headquarters. Orders should be submitted by
liaison officers rather than by message. They must have the confidence of the
higher commanding officer, and be kept informed of the complete picture at all
times.
d. Resisting Infiltration.-Troops must be trained to deal properly with in-
filtration. Japanese infiltration generally was done by small parties, platoons,
or companies with trench mortars and machine guns. The Japanese inserted
themselves between elements of British columns. Road blocks of trees or over-
turned cars were hurriedly constructed and the Japanese covered these road
blocks from the roadsides with mortar, machine-gun, and rifle fire. British
elements in advance of the road blocks commonly regarded themselves as "cut
off" and tried to retreat, whereas advancing elements in the rear of the road
blocks fired upon their own troops. The proper method is to train troops in
column to disregard infiltration in their rear and to have enemy parties dealt
with by elements in the rear of infiltrations.
e. General Qualifications.--For success, the United Nations' forces should be
trained to a high standard of toughness, fighting efficiency, adaptability, discipline,
and morale. This type of training is particularly important for modern jungle
warfare.

27
 SECTION V

JAPANESE "FLYING COLUMNS"

1. Introduction
The information contained in this section was taken from an Australian intelli-
gence summary which was issued on December 12, 1941. The summary itself
was based on a Chinese-prepared booklet compiled from captured Japanese docu-
ments. The "Flying Columns" were used extensively by the Japanese against
the Chinese.
2. Missions
The principal functions of the "Flying Columns" were listed by the Chinese as
follows:
"a. To threaten our flank;
"b. To harass and disrupt our rear communications and to interrupt road
communications in other areas;
"c. To threaten our rear;
"d. To act as advance guard for the main body by occupying important points
ahead of the main body;
"e. To carry out surprise attacks in localities where the enemy is not expected;
"f. To harass our larger formations, and to facilitate attacks by the enemy's
main body;
"g. To protect the enemy flank and rear;
"h. To assist the enemy's main body when it is in a dangerous situation;
"i. To carry out reconnaissance and other duties."
3. Composite Elements
The "Flying Columns" were composed of light and fast combat vehicles and
selected personnel, including expert-riding cavalrymen, in order to present a
hard-hitting, swiftly-moving assault force. They had signal and medical units
attached. Although the strength of the "Flying Columns" varied according to
the tasks performed, their composition generally was as follows:
a. 1 section of armored cars:
1 lieutenant in command.
25 enlisted men (approximately) including 1 sergeant as car commander
and 1 corporal.
4 light armored cars, each carrying 2 light machine guns.
4 trailers.
1 motorcycle, with attached side car.
b. 1 section of tanks (light or medium) :*
1 lieutenant in command.
*"Flying Columns" do not necessarily have tanks attached.

28
 30 enlisted men (approximately).
3 tanks.
1 motorcycle, with attached side car.
c. 1 squadron of cavalry (4 troops):
Officers (number unknown but believed to be 5).
165 enlisted men, including 2 sergeant majors, 1 noncommissioned gas
officer, 1 noncommissioned veterinary officer, 1 noncommissioned
supply officer, two buglers, and 1 medical orderly.
155 horses (approximately).
4 light machine guns.
d. 1 company of infantry (3 platoons, with 1 platoon, or more, of heavy ma-
chine guns attached):
5 officers.
189 enlisted men.
12 light machine guns.
129 rifles.
194 bayonets.
18 short rifles.
Grenade dischargers (number unknown)
e. 1 car section:
i lieutenant in command.
15 drivers.
15 assistant drivers.
2 light machine-gunners.
1 mortar gunner.
1 ammunition carrier.
15 cars.
1 machine gun.
1 mortar.
f. 1 section of engineers:
Includes 5 noncommissioned officers.

4. Long-Distance Reconnaissance Columns

The "Flying Columns" frequently sent temporary reconnaissance columns
from their own organizations to make long-distance reconnaissances. The
composition of these branch columns was as follows:
Commander --- --- Captain.
Infantry .- 2 platoons (each platoon, 4 light machine
guns).
Machine gun --------- 1 section (5 noncommissioned officers).
Infantry gunls .--------- 1 battery (each battery, 2 sections).
Tanks 1 section.
Cars ---------------------- 1 section.
Engineers ------------------ 1 section (5 privates).
Wireless 1 section.
Medical section 1 unit (3 privates).

29
5. Resisting "Flying Columns"
a. As a Whole.-The Chinese have made the following suggestions for counter-
ing Japanese "Flying Columns":
(1) Determine composition and objectives in order to arrange an adequate
defense.
(2) Ascertain position of the Japanese main body of troops and their total
strength.
(3) Be sure adequate means of communication are set up.
(4) Ascertain the farthest point reachable by the "Flying Column," calculate
distances and times between points likely to be traversed, and determine the
capability of the enemy to reach certain points at certain times.
(5) Maintain constant and thorough reconnaissance.
(6) Provide thorough protection.
(7) Place obstructions in strategic roads and mine roads which the enemy's
vehicles are most likely to pass.
(8) Try to pick battleground disadvantageous to the enemy-such as wet
places, woods, plowed fields, high hills, and deep ravines if the enemy's forces
are mechanized.
(9) Avoid a frontal attack if possible.
b. As Individual Units.-(1) When opposing a cavalry force have all infantry
weapons fire heavily upon the enemy, in cooperation with artillery fire.
(2) In countering armored cars or tanks, use all available mechanized units
and infantry machine guns with special armor-piercing ammunition. If a short-
age of armored vehicles and antitank guns exist, use field guns, mortars, machine
guns, and hand grenades. If possible employ machine guns in pairs, and open
fire at about 500 yards, at a time when the enemy vehicles are traversing uneven
ground and rearing up so that the fire may strike underneath. When at close
range, direct the fire at the observation slit.
(3) In attacking the enemy's infantry following its armored vehicles, have
friendly infantry and attached troops open a very heavy fire.

30
 SECTION VI

JAPANESE EQUIPMENT AND TACTICS

1. Equipment
a. Two-way Radio.-An inspection of a Japanese two-way aircraft radio set
removed from a crashed plane showed that it was designed and constructed to
perform very efficiently. Good materials and components were used throughout.
Most of the parts appeared to be of Japanese manufacture and were apparently
copies of United States components. The construction showed both United
States and German influence. The set has a positive radius of communication of
about 450 miles. The reception and transmission range is 300 to 500 kilocycles
and 5,000 to 10,000 kilocycles, respectively. The set was detached when found
and it is not known from what type of plane it came. However, previous infor-
mation indicated that the set was designed for use in light bombers and long-
range fighters
(1) Receiver.-The receiver is a superheterodyne and has-
(a) One radio-frequency stage, first detector; one intermediate frequency
stage, second detector; power output.
(b) Plug-in coils for various bands of frequencies.
(c) Beat-frequency oscillator for continuous-wave telegraphy.
(2) Transmitter.-The transmitter, which could not be removed from the
mounting chassis, has the following characteristics:
(a) Plug-in coils for various bands of frequencies.
(b) Crystal-controlled (6,200 kilocycles).
(c) Continuous-wave telegraphy and voice transmission. The voice can be
transmitted straight or "scrambled."
(3) Generator.-No clue could be obtained as to whether the generator was run
by a windmill or a battery, but the voltage regulator (bottom right-hand corner
of transmitter panel) was fitted in the very best technical manner. The supply
of the fitting indicates that the generator may be battery-driven.
b. Bombs.--(1) Parachute Bombs.-The British Navy reports that the Japa-
nese are dropping delayed-action incendiary bombs by parachute. The bombs
have a delayed action up to 12 hours. Painted black with a small red band
6 inches from the nose, they are 6 inches in diameter and 3½ feet long.
(2) Flame Bombs.-The Japanese recently began using over Corregidor a new
type of bomb, which burst with a huge flame. Two of the bombs dropped on
April 3 exploded about 500 feet above the ground.
c. Artillery.-(1) 240-mm Guns.-Huge 240-mm guns were introduced into
the Far East conflict recently by the Japanese, who fired them at island fortifica-
tions held by the United States at the entrance to Manila Bay. The guns were

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stationed at points on the south side of the bay. It was known previously that
the Japanese possessed a relatively small number of 240-mm guns for railway and
general-siege purposes. The railway guns are capable of being transported on
either standard or narrow gage. The road and railroad net in the Philippines
is such that either the railroad type or the general-siege type could have been used.
(2) 24O-mm Shell.-A Japanese 240-mm shell recovered in the Philippines has
the following characteristics:
Weight -------- _----- about 440 pounds.
Fuze.---------- _---- base type, made of brass.
Filling ------------ TNT.
Projectile casing ------ Manufactured in 1941, base not streamlined,
with narrow rotating band near base.
d. Tanks.-A light, 7-ton tank being used by the Japanese in Burma was errone-
ously labeled as tankette M2595 in TM 30-480 (Handbook on Japanese Military
Forces). The tank is operated by a crew of three and is armed with a 37-mm gun
and two machine guns. It has four bogie-wheel suspensions on two bogie-wheel
tracks, and gets its drive off the front sprocket wheel. Radio control is believed
to be limited to commanders' tanks. It is known that each individual tank is not
radio-controlled. The armor of the tank is Y4 to Y inch thick.* Other specifica-
tions are listed in TM 30-480 and are approximately correct except for the weight
and crew.
e. Motor Torpedo Boats.-The Japanese were reported several months ago to
be building 70 motor torpedo boats. Some of them probably have been completed.
Characteristics of the boats are as follows:
(1) Length: 32 feet 6 inches to 49 feet.
(2) Beam: 6 feet 6 inches to 9 feet 9 inches.
(3) Body: Flat bottom, steel frame, and wood planking.
(4) Motor: Radial-cooled aircraft engine with reduction gear and angle drive
up to 400 ground-maximum horsepower.
(5) Armament: 2 torpedo tubes mounted on each side, 4 depth charges, and
1 machine gun.
(6) Crew: 3 or 4.
(7) Speed: 52 miles per hour or over.
(8) Endurance: 10 hours at full speed if about 1,150 gallons of gasoline are
carried.
f. Disposable Fuel Tank.-An auxiliary fuel tank dropped by a Japanese
fighter plane at Port Moresby had a capacity of 70 gallons.
2. Tactics
a. Bombing Attacks.-Japanese type "96" twin-engine heavy bombers used
500- to 1,000-pound bombs in high-level attacks on United States ships in the
Netherlands East Indies area. Each plane dropped one and frequently two bombs
on each run-apparently every bomber carried four 500-pound bombs or two
2,000-pound bombs, or a combination of the two. One ship suffered a direct hit
by a high-explosive bomb believed to weigh 500 pounds. The effective blast of
*British 37-mm fire proved highly effective against the tank.

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 the hit was 50 feet. The bomb was fuzed to produce a delay of about 15 feet:
exploding at the third deck level. It made a hole 10 inches in diameter when it
hit the deck. An armor-piercing bomb, of a much heavier type and believed
similar to some used at Pearl Harbor, struck another United States ship. Fuzed
for delay, it was so thick-walled as to suggest a converted-gun projectile. The
shell first struck the mast and then exploded on the main deck. Downward
damage was confined to one deck height and the blast effect was not great. Had
the fuze not been actuated when the shell struck the mast, the projectile would
have penetrated the ship's after magazine and caused much greater damage.
The holes showed it to be 14 inches in diameter. The fragments included large
pieces which caused great damage and heavy casualties.
b. Torpedo Planes.-Torpedo-bombing aircraft approached in formation at
about 6,000 feet, gradually losing height in a gentle dive and simultaneously
forming into a ragged line astern. Torpedoes were dropped at from 1,000 to
2,000 yards from the target and at heights up to 250 feet. After the torpedoes
were released, the attacking aircraft flew straight ahead across the bows of the ship
in a gentle climb.
c. Bomber Flights.-Accurate antiaircraft fire at Corregidor forced the planes
to bomb from altitudes over 27,000 feet. In a recent air raid two bombers flew
over and were shot down almost simultaneously by antiaircraft fire.
d. Artillery on Barges.-In an attempt to land on the east coast of Bataan,
the Japanese mounted 75-mm guns and smaller weapons on barges. Effective
artillery fire from United States and Filipino troops sank several of the barges
and forced others to withdraw without making any landings. Japanese losses
were believed to have been severe.
e. Smoke Screens.-After landing operations the Japanese on several occasions
have used smoke screens to facilitate their fast infiltrations into conquered
territories.
f. Destruction of Planes.-In New Guinea the Japanese are believed to have
adopted a plan to destroy completely on the ground any of their planes which
have been shot down. Australian pilots at Port Moresby report that in each
raiding formation the Japanese apparently detail one plane to dive-bomb and
destroy any crashed Japanese plane to prevent the United Nations from securing
construction details. One Australian pilot reported seeing one fallen Japanese
plane blasted thoroughly with incendiary bombs.

3. Fifth Column Activities

a. Burma.-Certain elements of the civilian population in Burma and even
soldiers in the Burmese Division of the British Army have turned out to be
Fifth Columnists or traitors. A "Free Burmese Army" has been organized with
the aid of the Japanese and plans are being made to establish a "Free Burmese
Government."
(1) "Free Burmese Army."-The Army is organized in small groups, as a rule,
and confines its efforts to guerrilla warfare. It is armed with old model Japanese
rifles and light machine guns and is led by Japanese-occasionally by officers
and noncommissioned officers of Thailand. The Army also has been strengthened
with some soldiers who have deserted from the British Burmese Division. The

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 Army already has done considerable sabotaging, ambushing, and looting. Its
flag consists of yellow, green, and red horizontal stripes with a peacock in the
center.
(2) Burmese Buddhist Priests.-As was the case during the Malayan campaign,
Burmese Buddhist priests in many instances have acted as Fifth Columnists in
Burma. Also, many natives have cloaked themselves as priests or monks for
the specific purpose of doing Fifth Column work. To do this they joined the
priesthood order of poongees,* composed of monks and priests. Unlike most
other priesthoods, the poongees require no special training or lifelong vows. So
anyone-religious or otherwise-may become a poongee for any period desired
by simply shaving his head, putting on a saffron robe, formally renouncing all
things wordly before a temple, and thereafter living solely by begging. Publicly,
the poongees are regarded as holy men who can do no wrong and police generally
do not molest them. Under these conditions the British find it very difficult to
track down Fifth Columnists or prevent their activities.
(3) Thakins Party.-The Japanese also have been supported by several thou-
sand armed and organized Thakins, a native Burmese antiforeign political organ-
ization. One Thakin who fled Rangoon while it was still under British control
has been taken to Tokyo, where nearly every night he appeals by radio to the
Burmese for aid to the Japanese.
b. New Guinea.-German missionaries in New Guinea turned out to be Fifth
Columnists. They helped the Japanese through the jungles to contact defending
Australian forces. Also, some of the natives were believed to have cooperated
with the invaders.

4. Countering Japanese Night Operations

The Japanese have shown themselves to be exceedingly well trained in night
operations. British commanders have been instructed to develop original
methods to combat enemy action at night. The following countermeasures
have been adopted for their general guidance:
a. Changing dispositions after dark to include the use of false fronts to deceive
enemy day reconnaissance, and the pushing forward of false flanks at night or
establishing these false flanks in echelon behind the flanks held by day.
b. Establishment at dusk of standing patrols close to the enemy flanks or routes
which he may use for outflanking movements by night.
c. Watching all routes well beyond the British flank, and using trip wires and
other alarm signals.
d. Pushing out offensive detachments well beyond the British flanks to strike
enemy flanking forces in the rear.
e. Bold offensive action against the enemy's flank and rear at all times.
f. Showing the enemy that he cannot expect to make definite plans for attack
against a fixed and well reconnoitered position, but must himself be constantly
on the lookout against surprise and attack. Experience has shown that the
Japanese are peculiarly helpless against unforeseen action by an enemy force.

* Spelled also "poonghees" or "poonghies."

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5. Effect of Concentrated Fire on the Japanese
The reaction of Japanese soldiers when massed and well-directed fire is placed
upon them is illustrated by the following report from the Philippines:
"Our forces north of Davao in Mindanao recently staged a coordinated and
successful attack on the Japanese. The attack was preceded by intensive recon-
naissance of the Japanese rear and flanks. Hand grenades and automatic fire
from rifles caused the enemy troops to break formation, throw their rifles aside,
and flee. In the confusion, the Japanese fired mortars at their own troops. No
artillery or aircraft supported the attack."

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