2013-02-25 AM Transcript

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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IN RE: OIL SPILL BY THE OIL


RIG DEEPWATER HORIZON IN THE
GULF OF MEXICO ON APRIL 20,
2010

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-MD-2179 "J"


NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2013

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THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:


CASE NO. 2:10-CV-02771,
IN RE: THE COMPLAINT AND
PETITION OF TRITON ASSET
LEASING GmbH, ET AL
CASE NO. 2:10-CV-4536,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V.
BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
INC., ET AL
***************************************************************

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DAY 1

MORNING SESSION

TRANSCRIPT OF NONJURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS


HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

APPEARANCES:

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FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

DOMENGEAUX WRIGHT ROY & EDWARDS


BY: JAMES P. ROY, ESQ.
556 JEFFERSON STREET, SUITE 500
POST OFFICE BOX 3668
LAFAYETTE, LA 70502

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HERMAN HERMAN & KATZ


BY: STEPHEN J. HERMAN, ESQ.
820 O'KEEFE AVENUE
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70113

CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS
BY: ROBERT T. CUNNINGHAM, ESQ.
1601 DAUPHIN STREET
MOBILE, AL 36604

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LEWIS, KULLMAN, STERBCOW & ABRAMSON


BY: PAUL M. STERBCOW, ESQ.
PAN AMERICAN LIFE BUILDING
601 POYDRAS STREET, SUITE 2615
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

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BREIT DRESCHER IMPREVENTO & WALKER


BY: JEFFREY A. BREIT, ESQ.
600 22ND STREET, SUITE 402
VIRGINIA BEACH, VA 23451

LEGER & SHAW


BY: WALTER J. LEGER, JR., ESQ.
600 CARONDELET STREET, 9TH FLOOR
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

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WATTS, GUERRA, CRAFT


BY: MIKAL C. WATTS, ESQ.
4 DOMINION DRIVE
BUILDING 3, SUITE 100
SAN ANTONIO, TX 78257

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WILLIAMS LAW GROUP


BY: CONRAD S. P. WILLIAMS, ESQ.
435 CORPORATE DRIVE, SUITE 101
HOUMA, LA 70360

THORNHILL LAW FIRM


BY: THOMAS THORNHILL, ESQ.
1308 NINTH STREET
SLIDELL, LA 70458

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DEGRAVELLES PALMINTIER HOLTHAUS & FRUGE


BY: JOHN W. DEGRAVELLES, ESQ.
618 MAIN STREET
BATON ROUGE, LA 70801

WILLIAMSON & RUSNAK


BY: JIMMY WILLIAMSON, ESQ.
4310 YOAKUM BOULEVARD
HOUSTON, TX 77006

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IRPINO LAW FIRM


BY: ANTHONY IRPINO, ESQ.
2216 MAGAZINE STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

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FOR THE UNITED STATES


OF AMERICA:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TORTS BRANCH, CIVIL DIVISION
BY: R. MICHAEL UNDERHILL, ESQ.
450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE
7TH FLOOR, ROOM 5395
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT SECTION
BY: STEVEN O'ROURKE, ESQ.
SCOTT CERNICH, ESQ.
DEANNA CHANG, ESQ.
RACHEL HANKEY, ESQ.
A. NATHANIEL CHAKERES, ESQ.
P.O. BOX 7611
WASHINGTON, DC 20044

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


TORTS BRANCH, CIVIL DIVISION
BY: JESSICA McCLELLAN, ESQ.
MICHELLE DELEMARRE, ESQ.
JESSICA SULLIVAN, ESQ.
SHARON SHUTLER, ESQ.
MALINDA LAWRENCE, ESQ.
POST OFFICE BOX 14271
WASHINGTON, DC 20044

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


FRAUD SECTION
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION BRANCH
BY: DANIEL SPIRO, ESQ.
KELLEY HAUSER, ESQ.
ELIZABETH YOUNG, ESQ.
BEN FRANKLIN STATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20044
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

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FOR THE STATE OF


ALABAMA:

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ALABAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE


BY: LUTHER STRANGE, ATTORNEY GENERAL
COREY L. MAZE, ESQ.
WINFIELD J. SINCLAIR, ESQ.
500 DEXTER AVENUE
MONTGOMERY, AL 36130

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FOR THE STATE OF


LOUISIANA OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL:

STATE OF LOUISIANA
BY: JAMES D. CALDWELL,
ATTORNEY GENERAL
1885 NORTH THIRD STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 94005
BATON ROUGE, LA 70804

KANNER & WHITELEY


BY: ALLAN KANNER, ESQ.
DOUGLAS R. KRAUS, ESQ.
701 CAMP STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

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FOR BP EXPLORATION &


PRODUCTION INC.,
BP AMERICA PRODUCTION
COMPANY, BP PLC:
LISKOW & LEWIS
BY: DON K. HAYCRAFT, ESQ.
ONE SHELL SQUARE
701 POYDRAS STREET
SUITE 5000
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70139

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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

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COVINGTON & BURLING


BY: ROBERT C. MIKE BROCK, ESQ.
1201 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20004

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KIRKLAND & ELLIS


BY: J. ANDREW LANGAN, ESQ.
HARIKLIA "CARRIE" KARIS, ESQ.
MATTHEW T. REGAN, ESQ.
300 N. LASALLE
CHICAGO, IL 60654

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FOR TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS


LLC, TRANSOCEAN
OFFSHORE DEEPWATER
DRILLING INC., AND
TRANSOCEAN DEEPWATER
INC.:
FRILOT
BY: KERRY J. MILLER, ESQ.
ENERGY CENTRE
1100 POYDRAS STREET, SUITE 3700
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70163

SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN


BY: STEVEN L. ROBERTS, ESQ.
RACHEL G. CLINGMAN, ESQ.
1001 FANNIN STREET, SUITE 3700
HOUSTON, TX 77002

MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON


BY: MICHAEL R. DOYEN, ESQ.
BRAD D. BRIAN, ESQ.
LUIS LI, ESQ.
335 SOUTH GRAND AVENUE, 35TH FLOOR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90071
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

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MAHTOOK & LAFLEUR


BY: RICHARD J. HYMEL, ESQ.
1000 CHASE TOWER
600 JEFFERSON STREET
LAFAYETTE, LA 70502

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HUGHES ARRELL KINCHEN


BY: JOHN KINCHEN, ESQ.
2211 NORFOLK, SUITE 1110
HOUSTON, TX 77098

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FOR CAMERON INTERNATIONAL


CORPORATION:
STONE PIGMAN WALTHER WITTMANN
BY: PHILLIP A. WITTMANN, ESQ.
546 CARONDELET STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

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BECK REDDEN & SECREST


BY: DAVID J. BECK, ESQ.
DAVID W. JONES, ESQ.
GEOFFREY GANNAWAY, ESQ.
ALEX B. ROBERTS, ESQ.
ONE HOUSTON CENTER
1221 MCKINNEY STREET, SUITE 4500
HOUSTON, TX 77010

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FOR HALLIBURTON
ENERGY SERVICES,
INC.:

GODWIN LEWIS
BY: DONALD E. GODWIN, ESQ.
BRUCE W. BOWMAN, JR., ESQ.
FLOYD R. HARTLEY, JR., ESQ.
GAVIN HILL, ESQ.
RENAISSANCE TOWER
1201 ELM STREET, SUITE 1700
DALLAS, TX 75270
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

GODWIN LEWIS
BY: JERRY C. VON STERNBERG, ESQ.
1331 LAMAR, SUITE 1665
HOUSTON, TX 77010

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FOR M-I L.L.C.:

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS


BY: HUGH E. TANNER, ESQ.
DENISE SCOFIELD, ESQ.
JOHN C. FUNDERBURK, ESQ.
1000 LOUISIANA STREET, SUITE 4000
HOUSTON, TX 77002

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OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER:

CATHY PEPPER, CRR, RMR, CCR


CERTIFIED REALTIME REPORTER
REGISTERED MERIT REPORTER
500 POYDRAS STREET, ROOM HB406
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
504) 589-7779
[email protected]

PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY.


PRODUCED BY COMPUTER.

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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

TRANSCRIPT

I N D E X

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PAGE

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OPENING STATEMENTS BY MR. ROY........................

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OPENING STATEMENTS BY MR. UNDERHILL..................

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OPENING STATEMENTS BY MR. STRANGE.................... 100

OPENING STATEMENTS BY MR. CALDWELL................... 103

OPENING STATEMENTS BY MR. BRIAN...................... 111

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LUNCHEON RECESS...................................... 142

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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2013

M O R N I N G

S E S S I O N

(COURT CALLED TO ORDER)

07:22AM

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08:02AM

THE DEPUTY CLERK:

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THE COURT:

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VOICES:

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re:

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Mexico on April 20, 2010; Civil Action 10-2771, In re:

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Complaint and Petition of Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, et al.;

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Civil Action 10-4536, United States of America versus

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BP Exploration and Production, Incorporated, et al.

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those counsel who will be appearing during the trial to make an

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appearance on the record right now, please.

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MR. CUNNINGHAM:

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MR. WILLIAMS:

All rise.

All right.

Good morning, everyone.

Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Be seated.

All right, Stephanie, you may call the case,


please.
THE DEPUTY CLERK:

Multidistrict Litigation 10-2179, In

Oil spill by the oil rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of

THE COURT:

MR. ROY:

All right.

The

Counsel, I would like to have

Your Honor, Jim Roy, good morning, PSC

coliaison.
Your Honor, Robert Cunningham, PSC.

Good morning, Your Honor.


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

Duke

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08:03AM

Williams, PSC.

08:03AM

MR. IRPINO:

08:03AM

MR. DEGRAVELLES:

08:04AM

MR. STERBCOW:

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MR. HERMAN:

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for the plaintiff.

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MR. LEGER:

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MR. WILLIAMSON:

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MR. WATTS:

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MR. CERNICH:

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MR. CALDWELL:

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MR. O'ROURKE:

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MR. UNDERHILL:

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MR. KANNER:

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MR. MAZE:

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THE COURT:

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Anthony Irpino on behalf of the PSC.


John DeGravelles, PSC.

Paul Sterbcow, Your Honor, PSC.

Good morning, Your Honor.

Steve Herman

Walter Leger, Counsel for the PSC.


Jimmy Williamson, PSC.

Mikal Watts, PSC.

MR. THORNHILL:

Good morning, Your Honor.

Tom.

Thornhill, PSC.
Scott Cernich, the United States.
Buddy Caldwell, Attorney General for the

State of Louisiana.
MR. STRANGE:

Luther Strange, Attorney General, State

of Alabama.
Steve O'Rourke for the United States.
Good morning, Your Honor.

Mike Underhill on behalf of the United States of America.


MR. BREIT:

Jeffrey Breit on behalf of the PSC,

Your Honor.
Allan Kanner for the State of Louisiana.

Corey Maze for the State of Alabama.


Anyone else on the plaintiffs' side?

Let's move to the defendants.


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

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08:04AM

MR. BROCK:

Mike Brock for BP.

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MR. REGAN:

Matthew Regan for BP, Your Honor.

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MS KARIS:

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MR. LANGAN:

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MR. HAYCRAFT:

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MR. BECK:

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MR. ROBERTS:

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MR. MILLER:

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MR. BRIAN:

Brad Brian, Transocean.

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MR. DOYEN:

Michael Doyen, Transocean.

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MR. Li:

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MS. CLINGMAN:

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MR. HYMEL:

Richard Hymel, Transocean.

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MR. GODWIN:

Don Godwin, Halliburton.

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MR. YORK:

Alan York, also for Halliburton.

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MR. HILL:

Gavin Hill, also form Halliburton.

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MR.:

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MR. VON STERNBERG:

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MR. TANNER:

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MS. SCOFIELD:

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MR. FUNDERBURK:

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THE COURT:

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MR. FUNDERBURK:

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THE COURT:

Hariklia Karis on behalf of BP.


Andy Langan for BP.
Don Haycraft, BP.

David Beck for Cameron.


Steve Roberts, Transocean.
Kerry Miller, Transocean.

Luis Lee, Transocean.


Rachel Clingman, Transocean.

Floyd Hartley for Halliburton.


Jerry Von Sternberg, Halliburton.

Hugh Tanner for M-I.


Denise Scofield for M-I.
John Funderburk, for M-I.

I'm sorry, what's your name, sir?

have you on my list.

What's your name?


John Funderburk.

Funderburk?
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

I don't

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MR. FUNDERBURK:

Yes, sir.

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THE COURT:

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MR. WITTMANN:

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MR. JONES:

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MR. GANNAWAY:

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MR. ROBERTS:

Alan Roberts for Cameron.

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MR. KINCHEN:

John Kinchen for Transocean.

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THE COURT:

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are called opening statements by counsel for the parties.

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anticipated that these opening statements will take up the rest

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of today.

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These statements, of course, are not part of the

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evidence in this trial, but are an opportunity for counsel for

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each party to give us an overview or a preview of what they

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believe the evidence will show.

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today, we will recess the trial and resume in the morning with

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the first live witness.

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Before counsel begin their opening statements,

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however, I want to address a few matters regarding courtroom

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conduct and, also, explain some other things about the trial

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itself.

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Okay, thank you.


Phil Wittmann, Cameron.

David Jones for Cameron.


Geoff Gannaway for Cameron.

All right.

All right.

Does that cover everyone?

In a few moments, we will begin what


It's

At the conclusion of the opening statements

This is the first phase of what is expected to be


a multiphase trial.

The parties have estimated that this first


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phase will take approximately three months to complete.

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Thursday beginning at 8:00 a.m. and recessing not later than

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6:00 p.m.

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have no jury, which is customary in admiralty cases such as

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this.

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electronic devices are either turned off or placed on silent

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mode.

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and away from the courtroom doors to do so.

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maintained at all times during this lengthy trial.

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course, cannot have any sorts of verbal commenting or outbursts

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during the trial or during a witness's testimony, so please

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heed this caution.

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An exception is that counsel for the parties may have water at

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their tables.

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type of photographs or video anywhere in the federal courthouse

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complex is strictly prohibited.

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transmitting any part of a trial in a federal courthouse is

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prohibited.

Ordinarily, we will hold trial Monday through

This is a bench trial.

As everyone can see, we

At this time, I ask everyone to make sure that


your cell phones, laptops, iPads, tablets or any other

If you need to use your phone, please step into the hall

I also expect that proper decorum will be


We, of

No food or drinks are allowed in the courtroom.

I also remind everyone that the taking of any

Any recording, broadcasting or

These are not simply my rules.


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

It is the policy

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of the judicial conference of the United States.

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Anyone who violates these rules may be subjected

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to sanctions, including fines, seizure of the camera, phone or

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other device, and possible ejection from the courtroom and

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courthouse.

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access to the trial are set forth in the Court's Order of

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January 18, 2013, which is Record Document 8291.

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posted on the Court's public website on that date, and I

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there are audio feeds and evidence presentation screens.

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those of you who cannot get into the courtroom will nonetheless

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be able to hear the live testimony, what is occurring in this

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courtroom, and you'll be able to see whatever is on the

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evidence presentation screens at the same time.

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courthouse and in the courtroom apply to these overflow

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courtrooms as well.

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Now, I would like to give some brief context to

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this trial, primarily to help the press and public understand

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the nature of the current proceedings.

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background and do not constitute rulings or findings by the

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Court.

These rules and other matters regarding public

It's also

strongly encourage everyone to read this article.


Also, we have several overflow courtrooms where
So

The same rules about what is prohibited in the

These comments are provided merely to establish

So, for example, if my description of a particular


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

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08:10AM

party's role is not entirely accurate or complete, that

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statement is not binding.

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concerns the April 20, 2010 blowout, explosion and fire on the

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mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon as it was

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preparing to temporarily abandon the Macondo well, an

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exploratory well drilled in Block 252, Mississippi Canyon, on

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the Outer Continental Shelf, approximately 50 miles south of

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Louisiana.

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sank into the Gulf of Mexico.

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months, oil continuously discharged into the Gulf before the

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well could be capped.

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via a relief well.

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this Phase One of the trial.

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claimants, include, among others, the United States of America,

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the States of Louisiana and Alabama, and numerous private

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individuals, businesses or other entities who have filed claims

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in Transocean's limitation action.

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There are also multiple defendants.

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operator and leased the Macondo prospect site from the federal

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government.

As you are all probably aware, this trial

That catastrophe took the lives of eleven men and


injured many others.
On April 22, after burning for two days, the rig
For roughly the next three

Later, the well was permanently sealed

There are a number of parties participating in


For example, the plaintiffs, or

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

BP was the

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Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon and was

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Deepwater Horizon's BOP, or blowout preventer, which was

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installed near the wellhead.

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stemming from these events were consolidated before this Court

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in what is called a multidistrict litigation, or commonly

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called an MDL.

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within this MDL:

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entities limitation action, under what is known as the

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Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act, which I will further

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discuss in a moment; also, Case Number 10-4536, the

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United States' action for certain damages under the

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Oil Pollution Act of 1990, or also called OPA, and for civil

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penalties under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act.

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purposes including trial, as opposed to some of the other cases

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that were transferred here for pretrial purposes only under the

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MDL statute.

contracted by BP to drill the Macondo well.


Halliburton was contracted by BP to provide
cement and related services for the Macondo well.
Cameron manufactured and sold to Transocean the

M-I was contracted by BP to provide certain


drilling fluids, among other services and materials.
In August of 2010, numerous individual lawsuits

This Phase One trial concerns two of the cases


Case number 10-2771, which is the Transocean

Both of these cases are before the Court for all

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The Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act is an

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1851 federal statute which permits a vessel owner to file a

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complaint in federal court seeking exoneration from liability

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or, alternatively, limitation of liability equal to the

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post-casualty value of the vessel, plus any pending freight.

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requirements, claims against the vessel owner pending in other

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courts are stayed, and the claims instead must be brought in

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the limitation proceeding.

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in what is called a concursus.

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third parties it believes are liable to the plaintiffs, who may

08:13AM

13

likewise crossclaim against one another and/or counterclaim

08:13AM

14

against the vessel owner.

08:13AM

15

08:13AM

16

limitation complaint.

08:13AM

17

proceeding.

08:13AM

18

Halliburton, Cameron, M-I and others, who then cross-claimed

08:13AM

19

against one another and counterclaimed against Transocean.

08:13AM

20

08:13AM

21

shows that the fault causing the loss occurred without its

08:14AM

22

privity or knowledge.

08:14AM

23

of negligence or unseaworthiness caused the casualty and

08:14AM

24

whether the vessel owner had knowledge or privity of these

08:14AM

25

acts.

If the vessel owner complies with certain

In this manner, all claims are marshaled together


The vessel owner may also join

This is what happened here.

Transocean filed a

Claims were filed in the limitation

Transocean brought third-party claims against BP,

A vessel owner may limit its liability only if it

Thus, the Court must determine what acts

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

19

08:14AM

The burden of proving negligence or

08:14AM

unseaworthiness is on the claimants.

08:14AM

shift to the vessel owner to prove lack of privity or

08:14AM

knowledge.

08:14AM

08:14AM

entitled to limit its liability, there would be unresolved

08:14AM

questions about what claims are subject to the limitation,

08:14AM

particularly with respect to claims under OPA.

08:14AM

08:14AM

10

in the limitation action, to simplify matters during this

08:14AM

11

trial, I will typically refer to the United States, the States

08:14AM

12

and the private plaintiffs as the plaintiffs, and I will refer

08:14AM

13

to Transocean and BP, Halliburton, Cameron and M-I as the

08:14AM

14

defendants.

08:14AM

15

08:14AM

16

claims under OPA and the Clean Water Act.

08:15AM

17

tried with Transocean's limitation action because there are

08:15AM

18

some overlapping issues, particularly whether BP or Transocean

08:15AM

19

acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct.

08:15AM

20

08:15AM

21

civil penalty for harmful discharge of oil, the maximum value

08:15AM

22

of which is determined primarily by two factors, how much oil

08:15AM

23

was discharged, and whether or not the discharger acted with

08:15AM

24

gross negligence or willful misconduct.

08:15AM

25

The burden will then

It should be noted that even if Transocean is

Although Transocean is technically the plaintiff

As mentioned, the United States' action brings


This action is being

This is because the Clean Water Act imposes a

Phase One of this trial will address fault


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

20

08:15AM

determination and allocation relating to the loss of well

08:15AM

control or blowout, the ensuing fire and explosion, capsizing

08:15AM

and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, and the initiation of the

08:15AM

release of oil from the well.

08:15AM

08:15AM

Transocean's exoneration, limitation and liability defenses, as

08:15AM

well as the issues relating to various crossclaims,

08:16AM

counterclaims, etcetera, between the various defendants.

08:16AM

08:16AM

10

losses or damages suffered by any one plaintiff will not be

08:16AM

11

determined in this phase, nor will the Court determine the

08:16AM

12

amount of any civil fines or penalties in this phase of the

08:16AM

13

trial.

08:16AM

14

08:16AM

15

to or decide in this phase issues regarding the response

08:16AM

16

efforts following the spill or the quantity of oil that escaped

08:16AM

17

before the well was capped.

08:16AM

18

later Phase Two trial.

08:16AM

19

08:16AM

20

opening statements and assigned the order in which they will

08:16AM

21

occur.

08:16AM

22

08:16AM

23

the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee will have 75 minutes of

08:16AM

24

opening statements.

08:16AM

25

45 minutes.

Phase One will also include issues related to

It is important to understand that the particular

Also, the Court will not hear evidence relating

Those issues will be subjects of a

Now, the Court has previously allocated time for

The private claimants represented here today by

The United States will then follow for

The States of Louisiana and Alabama have a total


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

21

08:16AM

of 20 minutes.

Transocean then has 60 minutes, Halliburton

08:17AM

60 minutes, BP 90 minutes, Cameron 10 minutes, and M-I

08:17AM

10 minutes.

08:17AM

370 minutes, or a little over six hours.

08:17AM

08:17AM

will generally go as follows:

08:17AM

United States and the States will present evidence in support

08:17AM

of their claims against all defendants.

08:17AM

08:17AM

10

exoneration, limitation and liability defenses, as well as any

08:17AM

11

counter, cross or third-party claims against other defendants.

08:17AM

12

08:17AM

13

their evidence in support of their defenses in counter, cross

08:17AM

14

and third-party claims.

08:17AM

15

08:17AM

16

08:17AM

17

08:17AM

18

presentation.

08:18AM

19

to trial.

08:18AM

20

outside of court under oath, and those examinations were

08:18AM

21

recorded.

08:18AM

22

to the Court in advance of trial.

08:18AM

23

08:18AM

24

transcript may be introduced into evidence in lieu of having

08:18AM

25

that witness appear in person to testify live.

If my math is correct, that's a total of

During the trial, the order of proof, the order


First, the PSC, the

Second, Transocean will present evidence on its

Third, the remaining defendants shall present

And fourth, the PSC, USA and States shall present


any rebuttal evidence.
Finally, a few notes regarding evidence
The parties deposed many, many witnesses prior

This means that witnesses were questioned by counsel

Transcripts of these depositions have been submitted

During the trial, a witness's deposition

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

22

08:18AM

In addition, the parties may at times play

08:18AM

08:18AM

08:18AM

08:18AM

The plan is to have Magistrate

08:18AM

Judge Sally Shushan assist the Court and the parties each

08:18AM

Thursday afternoon in marshalling the materials which were used

08:18AM

or introduced during that week.

08:18AM

08:18AM

10

electronic format and will be made available for the press and

08:18AM

11

public as follows.

08:18AM

12

During each week of the trial, the report and

08:18AM

13

rsum of each expert who testifies will be introduced into

08:19AM

14

evidence.

08:19AM

15

testimony on direct examination.

08:19AM

16

08:19AM

17

tender for filing into the record fact witness deposition

08:19AM

18

transcripts and exhibits.

08:19AM

19

objections which have been lodged by various parties.

08:19AM

20

procedure will continue through the course of the trial.

08:19AM

21

08:19AM

22

particularly, a caveat here about this.

08:19AM

23

volume of evidence that the Court has already seen and will see

08:19AM

24

during the course of this trial, some of the testimony and

08:19AM

25

exhibits that will be admitted during the trial will be

shorter video clips from certain depositions.


The parties have also prepared numerous exhibits
that will be submitted as the trial progresses.

All of the depositions and exhibits are in

The report will be a part of the expert's trial

At the first marshalling conference, the PSC will

Those will be proffered subject to


That

Let me provide the press and the public,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

Because of the sheer

23

08:19AM

admitted subject to certain objections.

That means that the

08:19AM

Court may later exclude some of this evidence and not take it

08:19AM

into consideration in reaching its decisions in this case.

08:20AM

08:20AM

just because something is mentioned in testimony or an exhibit

08:20AM

is introduced at trial, if it is subject to an objection, that

08:20AM

does not preclude the possibility of it being excluded at a

08:20AM

later date.

08:20AM

This is being done as an accommodation, again,

08:20AM

10

because of the sheer volume of evidence that the parties and

08:20AM

11

the Court are working with in this case.

08:20AM

12

08:20AM

13

deposition transcripts, related exhibits, expert reports and

08:20AM

14

rsums, and the exhibits that are marshalled each week will be

08:20AM

15

made available and posted each week on a public FTP Internet

08:20AM

16

website, which is www.MDL2179trialdocs.com.

08:21AM

17

will be posted on the Court's public website.

08:21AM

18

08:21AM

19

but it is a website where all of this information will be

08:21AM

20

posted weekly and will be available to the public or press.

08:21AM

21

08:21AM

22

public access to trial materials, you should refer to the

08:21AM

23

recent Order of the Court issued February 22nd, 2013, which

08:21AM

24

will be available on the Court's public website.

08:21AM

25

website, by the way, for the benefit of those who do not know,

So I would just caution the press and public that

All right.

Again, the plan is that all

The link to that

That is not a court-maintained website, however,

So if anyone has any further questions about

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

The Court's

24

08:21AM

is www.laed.uscourts.gov.

08:21AM

08:21AM

08:21AM

08:21AM

the Court staff about this.

08:21AM

posted at the Court's website.

08:21AM

can tell you, so please do not call or contact the Court staff

08:22AM

with these questions.

08:22AM

08:22AM

10

available to the Court and to the court reporters a glossary of

08:22AM

11

certain terms and acronyms that may be used from time to time

08:22AM

12

during the trial.

08:22AM

13

08:22AM

14

highly technical industry, and there are a lot of acronyms that

08:22AM

15

will be used.

08:22AM

16

to try to avoid using acronyms as much as they can during the

08:22AM

17

trial; but, so that the press and the public can understand

08:22AM

18

what's going on, we do have a glossary that can be made

08:22AM

19

available that would be helpful.

08:22AM

20

08:22AM

21

that we have two benches in the courtroom reserved for members

08:22AM

22

of the credentialed media.

08:22AM

23

08:22AM

24

have arranged, in addition to the three normal overflow

08:22AM

25

courtrooms which we should have for the length of the trial,

If you go there, that's the Court's home page,


there is a link to MDL 2179.
Please do not, do not call the Court or contact
All information you should have is
There's really nothing else we

I should also note that the parties have made

The oil and gas industry is a specialized and

I'm going to ask the parties and the attorneys

With regard to the press corps, you will note

In addition, at least for this first week, we

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

25

08:23AM

just for the week only, we've arranged for the use of Courtroom

08:23AM

C-224, which is Judge Milazzo's courtroom directly across the

08:23AM

hall from my courtroom.

08:23AM

proceeding that she had scheduled this week to another

08:23AM

courtroom to allow us to use that courtroom.

08:23AM

08:23AM

there are courtrooms available, I'll try to make another

08:23AM

district court courtroom available.

08:23AM

08:23AM

10

figured out or counted that the lawyers have enough room

08:23AM

11

between taking up most of this courtroom and three other

08:23AM

12

courtrooms that we needed space reserved for the press and

08:23AM

13

public.

08:23AM

14

08:23AM

15

could not get in this courtroom and/or would just like a more

08:23AM

16

convenient place to work, we have five tables reserved for use

08:23AM

17

by the press across the hall.

08:24AM

18

is for the public.

08:24AM

19

08:24AM

20

other overflow rooms, will have a live audio feed and evidence

08:24AM

21

screens for you to follow what's going on in this courtroom.

08:24AM

22

08:24AM

23

statements.

08:24AM

24

else that I've looked at the calendar.

08:24AM

25

announced that we would not work -- this trial, as I said, is

She's been kind enough to move one

This is going to be a week-to-week thing.

In that courtroom, it's a no lawyer zone.

If

We

So if there are any members of the press who

All right.

The rest of the seating in there

And again, that courtroom, like the

One more thing before we begin opening


I want to announce to the lawyers and to everyone
We had already

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

26

08:24AM

expected to last three months.

We've already announced that we

08:24AM

would not work or hold court on the Thursday and Friday

08:24AM

immediately preceding Easter weekend.

08:24AM

08:25AM

calendar, since a lot of the attorneys and parties in this case

08:25AM

are from out of town, to accommodate them, I've decided that we

08:25AM

would also not work on the Monday right after Easter, which I

08:25AM

think is April 1, so that way you all can make travel plans so

08:25AM

you don't have to travel back -- so those of you out of town

08:25AM

10

don't have to travel back on Sunday, if you care to stay home

08:25AM

11

for that weekend.

08:25AM

12

08:25AM

13

08:25AM

14

08:25AM

15

08:25AM

16

08:25AM

17

08:25AM

18

08:25AM

19

08:25AM

20

08:25AM

21

we're gathered.

08:25AM

22

operator of the Deepwater Horizon.

08:25AM

23

their liability.

08:25AM

24

failed to discover a major gas kick and shut in the well on

08:25AM

25

April 20, 2010.

And in thinking about it and looking at the

Okay.

Does anybody have any other preliminary

matters before we begin opening statements?


All right.
statements?

Who is going to make opening

Mr. Roy?
OPENING STATEMENTS

BY MR. ROY:
Good morning, Your Honor.

I'm Jim Roy for the

Plaintiffs' Steering Committee.


Why did this terrible tragedy happen?

That's why

Let's begin with Transocean, the owner and the


They seek limitation of

The evidence is going to show Transocean

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

27

08:25AM

A critical part of the temporary abandonment

08:26AM

procedure from Macondo was a negative pressure test.

08:26AM

a shared responsibility between BP and Transocean.

08:26AM

was misinterpreted.

08:26AM

well was secure and that it was safe to go forward with

08:26AM

displacement of the heavy drill mud with much lighter seawater.

08:26AM

08:26AM

will describe the failure to interpret this test correctly as a

08:26AM

gross and extreme departure from the standards of good oilfield

08:26AM

10

08:26AM

11

08:26AM

12

is over 20 barrels is code red and critical.

08:26AM

13

is described as off the chart and unprecedented, exceeding not

08:26AM

14

20 barrels, but exceeding 700 barrels, and consuming 50 minutes

08:27AM

15

of time before the kick was detected and unsuccessful efforts

08:27AM

16

made to shut it in.

08:27AM

17

08:27AM

18

discover this giant gas kick and to shut in the well was a

08:27AM

19

result of the willful failure of Transocean management to give

08:27AM

20

its Deepwater Horizon crew, and other crews on other rigs,

08:27AM

21

adequate training.

08:27AM

22

08:27AM

23

information showing that this well was flowing, this Transocean

08:27AM

24

crew, BP and Halliburton Sperry logger totally missed the kick

08:27AM

25

on April 20, 2010, that according to BP's own expert,

This was

The test

This led to the mistaken belief that the

Richard Heenan, an expert petroleum engineer,

practice.
Transocean's own standards state that a kick that
The Macondo kick

The evidence will show Transocean's failure to

The evidence shows that despite a wealth of

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

28

08:27AM

Robert Grace, my dad would have caught.

08:27AM

08:27AM

responsibility at Transocean for this gross and extreme

08:27AM

departure from good oilfield practically rests with the

08:28AM

management of Transocean.

08:28AM

08:28AM

of the drill crew, including the offshore installation manager,

08:28AM

the driller, the assistant driller or the toolpusher on how to

08:28AM

interpret a negative pressure test.

08:28AM

10

Transocean's formal training, its training materials, nor its

08:28AM

11

well control handbook cover or even discuss negative pressure

08:28AM

12

tests.

08:28AM

13

08:28AM

14

crew and BP and Halliburton on April 20, 2010, to catch the

08:28AM

15

riser unloading, the kick, was no isolated event.

08:28AM

16

will show that Transocean had known for years that its rig

08:28AM

17

personnel were not adequately trained to recognize and shut in

08:28AM

18

gas kicks, especially riser unloading events like that involved

08:29AM

19

on the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

08:29AM

20

08:29AM

21

back as 2004 on another semisubmersible concluded procedures

08:29AM

22

were not set up to effectively detect kicks.

08:29AM

23

heed warnings in the drill program.

08:29AM

24

disciplined, coordinated procedures to monitor for well

08:29AM

25

influxes, and prophetically, alarms were turned off.

The evidence will show the ultimate

Transocean never specifically trained any member

Amazingly neither

The catastrophic failure of the Deepwater Horizon

The evidence

Transocean's investigation of an incident as far

The team did not

The team did not use

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

29

08:29AM

By March of 2008, the situation had deteriorated

08:29AM

such that Larry McMahon, Transocean's vice-president of

08:29AM

performance, wrote an e-mail to management teams about a series

08:29AM

of recent loss-of-control-type events, including, as an

08:29AM

example, loss of well control.

08:29AM

08:30AM

cannot ignore what has happened in the area of loss of control.

08:30AM

This is very concerning to me.

08:30AM

having events at a rate that is overwhelming.

08:30AM

10

better off investing that time in the prevention side and more

08:30AM

11

effective risk assessment, as well as adherents to proceed."

08:30AM

12

08:30AM

13

do not change the way we operate, we will continue to have

08:30AM

14

these train wrecks."

08:30AM

15

08:30AM

16

following yet another riser unloading incident in February

08:30AM

17

of '09, on a Transocean rig, Transocean determined, there was

08:30AM

18

no task risk assessment performed; that Management of Change

08:31AM

19

was not adequately addressed; well control training and the

08:31AM

20

well control manual does not adequately cover the procedures

08:31AM

21

for closing in a well during a blowout situation; also, the use

08:31AM

22

of the diverter is not adequately covered.

08:31AM

23

08:31AM

24

specific training given for handling a kick in the riser and a

08:31AM

25

lack of explanation about the proper use of the diverter.

This is what he said, among other things, "We

The problem is that we are


We would be

And then McMahon prophetically concluded, "If we

That's in 2008.

A year later, in March of 2009,

The report also found that there had been no

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

It

30

08:31AM

also recommended well control reference material and training

08:31AM

should adequately cover the use of the diverter and what to do

08:31AM

in the case of the riser unloading.

08:31AM

use Management of Change procedures to ensure adequate risk

08:31AM

assessments are performed.

08:32AM

08:32AM

08:32AM

08:32AM

08:32AM

10

inadequacy of crew training problems to management.

08:32AM

11

involved multiple failures to shut in the well when influxes

08:32AM

12

were clearly detected, and not shutting in the well during an

08:32AM

13

influx.

08:32AM

14

08:32AM

15

incident occurred aboard the Transocean Sedco 711, involving an

08:32AM

16

uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons on the drill floor due to

08:32AM

17

Transocean crews failure to notice kick indicators.

08:32AM

18

08:33AM

19

prophetically revealed that Transocean's mind-set is certainly

08:33AM

20

less vigilant regarding well control preparedness during the

08:33AM

21

completion phase as compared to the drilling phase.

08:33AM

22

08:33AM

23

recommendation that Transocean's well control handbook add a

08:33AM

24

section on performing fluid displacements, this was not done

08:33AM

25

until after the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe.

And rig management should

Transocean management refused to act on these


recommendations until the April 20th catastrophe.
Again, in late July of 2009, another well control
event on another Transocean rig, once again, demonstrated the
It

Just five months before this disaster.


In December of 2009, another well control

The Transocean investigation of this incident

Although the investigation again made the

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

31

08:33AM

Randy Ezell, Transocean's senior toolpusher

08:33AM

aboard the Deepwater Horizon, will recall several declared well

08:33AM

control events on the Deepwater Horizon before this one where

08:33AM

hydrocarbons made it past the blowout preventer and to the

08:33AM

bottom of the rotary table thousands of feet up above on the

08:33AM

drill floor, and had the potential to endanger life in the

08:33AM

environment.

08:34AM

08:34AM

08:34AM

10

Deepwater Horizon failed to catch a gas kick for some 35 to

08:34AM

11

40 minutes.

08:34AM

12

reflected itself over years, that lack of training in kick

08:34AM

13

detection and well control was no isolated incident with

08:34AM

14

Transocean rigs, but rather was a chronic problem, allowed by

08:34AM

15

Transocean management to go uncorrected.

08:34AM

16

08:34AM

17

2010, in fact, commented, Transocean's drill crew had screwed

08:34AM

18

up by not catching it.

08:34AM

19

08:34AM

20

Transocean management itself recognized the following:

08:35AM

21

increasing trend seen in 2009 of drilling risers being either

08:35AM

22

partially or completely evacuated or unloaded."

08:35AM

23

08:35AM

24

this type of event, that's riser unloading, occurred six times

08:35AM

25

on Transocean rigs.

In fact, on March 8th of 2010, just a month


before this disaster, the Transocean crew on the

Once again, demonstrating a pattern that had

The BP well team leader at the time, in March of

In its annual well control report for 2009,


"The

Again, from December of 2008 until year end 2009,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

32

08:35AM

"It is particularly hazard," it went on, "due to

08:35AM

the uncontrolled release of mud and gas through the rotary

08:35AM

table and the potential for ignition.

08:35AM

can be avoided through the application of fundamental well

08:35AM

control practices, such as treating every positive indicator as

08:35AM

a kick, shutting in quickly, and taking returns through the

08:35AM

choke whenever in any doubt, any doubt whatsoever."

08:35AM

08:36AM

08:36AM

10

08:36AM

11

08:36AM

12

follow basic well monitoring kick detection and shut-in

08:36AM

13

procedures was well known to upper level management at

08:36AM

14

Transocean and continued unabated and uncorrected, despite

08:36AM

15

their knowledge, up to and including this tragedy.

08:36AM

16

08:36AM

17

at least the seventh that a Transocean rig had experienced in

08:36AM

18

just the previous 17 months.

08:36AM

19

led to the disaster of April 20th, 2010, which Larry McMahon,

08:36AM

20

Transocean's own vice-president operations and performance,

08:36AM

21

agreed was a train wreck of the largest magnitude.

08:37AM

22

08:37AM

23

Transocean willfully failed to adequately train its crew in

08:37AM

24

other safety critical functions.

08:37AM

25

assurance system in place aboard the Deepwater Horizon.

Riser unloading events

Transocean management knew about the widespread


nature of well control problems on its vessels, and that the
time spent on well control events had increased in 2009.
The failure of Transocean drill crews to know and

The fateful April 20th, 2010, riser unloading was

This chronic problem ultimately

The evidence is also going to show that

There was no competence

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

33

08:37AM

In fact, Lloyd's Register, an entity trusted by

08:37AM

drillers across the world to tell them what their problems are,

08:37AM

Lloyd's Register issued a report covering an assessment from

08:37AM

March 9th to 26th of 2010, just weeks before this catastrophe,

08:37AM

in which it discussed Transocean's safety management and safety

08:37AM

culture.

08:37AM

08:37AM

report were the following ominous indications of training

08:37AM

failures:

08:38AM

10

they were exposed to, relating to both their job and to other

08:38AM

11

jobs in the same/adjoining work areas."

08:38AM

12

08:38AM

13

fully understood, and the subsequent control measures were not

08:38AM

14

always appropriate.

08:38AM

15

08:38AM

16

comment, "This clearly demands attention, as frontline crews

08:38AM

17

are potentially working with a mind-set that they are fully

08:38AM

18

aware of all the hazards when it's highly likely that they are

08:38AM

19

not."

08:38AM

20

08:38AM

21

short, required Transocean to appoint a designated person

08:39AM

22

ashore who has responsibility for safety on a given rig, and

08:39AM

23

has access to the highest levels of management.

08:39AM

24

08:39AM

25

Among the supervisors' comments recounted in the

"The workforce was not always aware of the hazards

"The risk posed by identified hazards were not

They don't know what they don't know."

The report concluded this section with the

The International Safety Management Code, ISM for

Gerald Canducci was Transocean's designated


person ashore for the Deepwater Horizon.
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

34

08:39AM

Jeff Webster, a marine expert testifying on

08:39AM

behalf of the PSC, will testify that Mr. Canducci was not even

08:39AM

minimally competent for this job.

08:39AM

three-day course.

08:39AM

board the Deepwater Horizon.

08:39AM

responsibility for safety that management had entrusted to that

08:39AM

job.

08:39AM

08:39AM

08:40AM

10

guy, good captain, but under trained in the safety management

08:40AM

11

system of the vessel, despite the ISM requirement that he, no

08:40AM

12

one else, he be in charge of implementing it, and he had never

08:40AM

13

been trained in it adequately.

08:40AM

14

the operation of the vessel's emergency disconnect system

08:40AM

15

either.

08:40AM

16

Compounding this problem was the

08:40AM

17

Deepwater Horizon's dual command structure, which prevented

08:40AM

18

Captain Kutcha, the captain of the vessel, from activating the

08:40AM

19

emergency disconnect system until Jimmy Harold, the offshore

08:40AM

20

installation manager arrived.

08:40AM

21

08:40AM

22

been given the requisite training and authority by Transocean

08:40AM

23

management, earlier activation of this emergency disconnect

08:40AM

24

system could have averted much of the catastrophe, either

08:41AM

25

altogether or at the very least mitigating it by reducing loss

His training consisted of a

Amazingly Mr. Canducci had never been on


And this is the man with the

The captain of the Deepwater Horizon,


Carl [verbatim] Kutcha, was also woefully under trained.

Good

He had never been trained in

The evidence will show that if Captain Kutcha had

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

35

08:41AM

of life, injuries, the vessel, and pollution.

08:41AM

08:41AM

Jimmy Harold's certificate did not allow him to be the OIM and

08:41AM

the person in charge on this vessel.

08:41AM

08:41AM

Yancy Keplinger had no training on the safety equipment on the

08:41AM

bridge of the vessel where he acted as senior watch keeping

08:41AM

officer and held no proper license for the job he was

08:41AM

performing.

08:41AM

10

Andrea Fleytas had ever received training on a scenario like

08:41AM

11

the one which occurred on the day of this fateful disaster

08:41AM

12

where there was a contemporaneous activation of numerous gas

08:42AM

13

detection alarms.

08:42AM

14

08:42AM

15

Transocean management failure to adequately train this crew

08:42AM

16

directly contributed to the events leading to the blowout

08:42AM

17

explosion, deaths, the loss of Deepwater Horizon, and the

08:42AM

18

ensuing pollution.

08:42AM

19

08:42AM

20

crew recklessly misused equipment by diverting the blowout

08:42AM

21

through the mud-gas separator, instead of the rig's diverter

08:42AM

22

system.

08:42AM

23

The mud-gas separator is a low-pressure system,

08:42AM

24

Judge, used to separate small amounts of gas coming up in the

08:42AM

25

mud returns and taking them out.

Amazingly, the offshore installation manager,

Senior dynamic positioning officer, DPO,

Neither he nor dynamic positioning officer

The evidence will establish that this overarching

The evidence will also show that Transocean's

It's not designed or intended

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

36

08:42AM

to handle large amounts of gas or gas under high pressure in an

08:42AM

emergency.

08:42AM

Transocean's policy on this thing did dictate

08:42AM

that the gas diverter system, not the mud-gas separator, be

08:43AM

used in the event of a well control event requiring diversion

08:43AM

of large amounts of gas.

08:43AM

08:43AM

trained crew of the Deepwater Horizon failed to divert the kick

08:43AM

through the emergency diverter system, the mud-gas separator

08:43AM

10

was quickly overwhelmed by the high volume of gas and pressure

08:43AM

11

and the entire vessel was engulfed in flammable gas.

08:43AM

12

08:43AM

13

system be used instead of the mud-gas separator, the

08:43AM

14

Deepwater Horizon crew would likely have survived without

08:43AM

15

casualty and the vessel not been destroyed.

08:43AM

16

08:43AM

17

of the diverter system was once again evidence of a chronic

08:43AM

18

problem known to senior management in failure to train but

08:43AM

19

which remained uncorrected for years.

08:43AM

20

08:44AM

21

overrode several automatic functions of the integrated alarm

08:44AM

22

and control system.

08:44AM

23

may have people refer to that as the I-A-C-S or IACS or the

08:44AM

24

Kongsberg system.

08:44AM

25

The evidence will show that when the poorly

The evidence will show had the emergency diverter

This lack of adequate training in the proper use

The evidence will also show Transocean willfully

In the course of this trial, Judge, you

It's one in the same.

By overriding the automatic functions, it


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

37

08:44AM

required human intervention to activate the shutdown system.

08:44AM

Specifically, the integrated alarm and control system was

08:44AM

designed to control a number of safety critical functions

08:44AM

automatically upon the detection of combustible gas, including

08:44AM

the sounding of a general alarm, and the activation of an

08:44AM

emergency shutdown system, and activation of a fire and gas

08:44AM

safety system.

08:44AM

08:44AM

08:45AM

10

which was the major potential source of gas ignition on this

08:45AM

11

rig, by closing dampers that allowed -- stopped air from

08:45AM

12

entering the room itself where the engines were, sounding

08:45AM

13

audible alarms and actually shutting down the over-speeding

08:45AM

14

engines to deny an ignition source to all the natural gas that

08:45AM

15

had set the alarms off to begin with.

08:45AM

16

08:45AM

17

alarm and control system and requiring human intervention to

08:45AM

18

activate the shutdown system, while the alarm signalling the

08:45AM

19

influx of gas would be reported to the bridge, it would no

08:45AM

20

longer automatically activate these other safety critical

08:45AM

21

functions.

08:45AM

22

on the fateful day of April 20th of 2010.

08:45AM

23

08:46AM

24

the origination point for signalling an influx of gas amazingly

08:46AM

25

had either been set into passive mode or otherwise had their

The emergency shutdown system, or ESD, as some


call it, would in turn stop gas from entering the engine room,

By Transocean's inhibiting these alarms in this

And this meant a lot when time was of the essence

In addition, many of the centers which served as

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

38

08:46AM

sensors set basically into what is functionally a passive mode

08:46AM

and removed from service.

08:46AM

08:46AM

control system was Transocean company policy.

08:46AM

chief electronics technician, Mike Williams, will testify in

08:46AM

this courtroom that inhibiting the alarms was done to avoid

08:46AM

waking people up at night.

08:46AM

08:46AM

08:46AM

10

Even with the automatic function inhibited, the crew could have

08:47AM

11

activated the emergency shutdown system, but why didn't they?

08:47AM

12

08:47AM

13

mayhem on the bridge, shouts, directions being yelled that

08:47AM

14

weren't being enacted.

08:47AM

15

deer-in-the-headlights look, was overwhelmed, dazed and

08:47AM

16

confused.

08:47AM

17

08:47AM

18

requests from Chris Pleasant, another crewmember, to the

08:47AM

19

captain to allow him to activate the emergency disconnect

08:47AM

20

system before the captain finally authorized him to do it.

08:47AM

21

08:47AM

22

have activated the emergency disconnect system, but under the

08:47AM

23

then existing dual command structure, he was prevented from

08:47AM

24

doing so until the offshore installation manager, Jimmy Harold,

08:48AM

25

arrived and gave his approval.

This inhibition of the integrated alarm and


Why?

Transocean

Transocean personnel failed to activate the


emergency shutdown system fast enough to do any good.

Why?

Because after the blowout there was chaos and

Captain Kutcha had a

Even after the second explosion, it took three

During this critical time when the captain could

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

39

08:48AM

Had this been done promptly, the vessel probably

08:48AM

would have been saved and pollution minimized.

08:48AM

the dysfunctional dual command structure and lack of adequate

08:48AM

training, the emergency disconnect system was not even

08:48AM

activated manually.

08:48AM

08:48AM

Deepwater Horizon, in other words, did not have overriding

08:48AM

authority and responsibility from Transocean management to take

08:48AM

the decisive action he needed to take to protect the crew, the

08:48AM

10

vessel, and the environment.

08:48AM

11

nonconformity with the ISM code and contributed significantly

08:48AM

12

to the magnitude of the disaster.

08:48AM

13

08:48AM

14

about this problem.

08:49AM

15

first days of the Deepwater Horizon's operation nine years

08:49AM

16

earlier.

08:49AM

17

08:49AM

18

organization called Det Norske Veritas or DNV, an international

08:49AM

19

respected organization that does inspections for vessel and

08:49AM

20

owners, for compliance.

08:49AM

21

responsibilities of the master and OIM were in conflict.

08:49AM

22

08:49AM

23

requiring action to be taken by August of 2002.

08:49AM

24

later, in 2009, DNV again cautioned Transocean management about

08:49AM

25

this problem.

But because of

Certainly not timely.

The evidence will show the master of the

This constituted a major

Transocean executive management had been warned


They had been warned about this since the

In the initial ISM certification by an

They identified that the authority and

DNV raised this ISM code nonconformity issue,


Seven years

The company was requested to address it.


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

40

08:50AM

For seven years before this tragedy, this

08:50AM

critical problem had been known to Transocean executive

08:50AM

management but Transocean still had not corrected the situation

08:50AM

as of April 20th, 2010.

08:50AM

08:50AM

were poorly trained and failed to act in a timely manner.

08:50AM

the cascading alarms did sound, in fact, dynamic positioning

08:50AM

officer Andrea Fleytas failed to announce, "This is not a

08:50AM

drill," because she was too nervous.

08:50AM

10

08:50AM

11

positioning officer, Yancy Keplinger failed to intervene and

08:50AM

12

allowed this to happen.

08:50AM

13

never received training for a scenario where there was a

08:50AM

14

contemporaneous activation of numerous detections and alarms

08:51AM

15

going off.

08:51AM

16

08:51AM

17

refusal to upgrade and maintain the Deepwater Horizon blowout

08:51AM

18

preventer was also a major cause of this disaster.

08:51AM

19

preventer or BOP, is a safety critical piece of

08:51AM

20

Deepwater Horizon vessel equipment, owned by Transocean.

08:51AM

21

08:51AM

22

the main barrier protecting human life, equipment and the

08:51AM

23

environment, it must function without fail.

08:51AM

24

the field as the last line of defense to a blowout.

08:51AM

25

Other key members of the Transocean bridge team


When

Even worse, the more senior DPO, dynamic

Indeed, Keplinger agrees that he had

Transocean's design involvement and willful

The blowout

And the evidence will establish that because it's

BOPs are viewed in

Transocean participated with BP and Cameron in


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

41

08:51AM

the original design of the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer

08:51AM

and the selection and configuration of the component parts.

08:51AM

Under the drilling contract, Transocean was to furnish the

08:52AM

blowout preventer and ensure that it was adequately maintained

08:52AM

in such a condition as to permit its continuous and efficient

08:52AM

operation.

08:52AM

08:52AM

BOP on the Deepwater Horizon is a piece of Transocean

08:52AM

equipment, and we are responsible for the maintenance of that

08:52AM

10

08:52AM

11

08:52AM

12

BOP was out of certification and in violation of industry

08:52AM

13

standards.

08:52AM

14

Transocean's well control handbook required the

08:52AM

15

BOP to be able to handle the maximum pressure and temperature

08:52AM

16

conditions for any well where it was to be used.

08:52AM

17

evidence will show that this BOP could not.

08:52AM

18

08:53AM

19

for a particular well, it, Transocean, was obligated to either

08:53AM

20

change the BOP or not drill the well.

08:53AM

21

08:53AM

22

evidence will also show that if BP realized that the equipment

08:53AM

23

of the rig was not fit for the well it wanted the rig to drill,

08:53AM

24

then BP, too, had the obligation not to take that rig but to

08:53AM

25

get another or make them change it.

As stated by Transocean's CEO, Steve Newman, "The

piece of equipment."
Multiple audits warned BP and Transocean that the

Yet the

If Transocean concluded that the BOP was unfit

Now, the converse is true, too, Your Honor.

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

The

42

08:53AM

Transocean knew that drilling crews frequently

08:53AM

confronted situations where the blind shear rams on the BOP

08:53AM

would encounter off-center piping.

08:53AM

upgrade the blind shear rams with better cutting blades even

08:53AM

those they were cheap, easily available and easily installed.

08:53AM

Transocean knew as early as 2001, that a single

08:53AM

blind shear ram represented a single point of failure, and knew

08:54AM

that double-blind shear rams were available and becoming more

08:54AM

common in 2009 and 2010, yet Transocean chose to continue with

08:54AM

10

08:54AM

11

08:54AM

12

failure under dynamic flow conditions.

08:54AM

13

conditions, oil, gas, high-pressure liquids or distillate

08:54AM

14

actually flowing rapidly through it and you try to close it.

08:54AM

15

That's a dynamic condition versus a static condition, it's

08:54AM

16

already closed and it's just holding the pressure back.

08:54AM

17

08:54AM

18

under these dynamic flow conditions and knew that blind shear

08:54AM

19

rams had not been tested under dynamic flow conditions, and

08:54AM

20

willfully chose not to do that testing itself to see if they

08:54AM

21

would work and under what dynamic flow conditions.

08:54AM

22

matter, there was no BOP shear testing at all.

08:55AM

23

Transocean management knew that the batteries on

08:55AM

24

the pods of the BOP could not be monitored, checked or charged

08:55AM

25

while the BOP was 5000 feet underwater on the sea floor, and

Yet Transocean chose not to

the single ram.


Transocean knew of the potential for the BOP
Dynamic flow

Transocean knew of the potential for BOP failure

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

For that

43

08:55AM

knew that its maintenance and recordkeeping system regarding

08:55AM

the batteries was seriously flawed such that one could not tell

08:55AM

when the batteries had been changed.

08:55AM

change its recordkeeping system.

08:55AM

08:55AM

the cables, they are called MUX cables, that powered and

08:55AM

controlled it and give feedback to the surface and vice versa,

08:55AM

Transocean knew that by running the MUX cable through the

08:55AM

Moonpool, the hole in the rig, that it created a single failure

08:55AM

10

point if there was an explosion that could knock out both

08:55AM

11

redundant cables from the same explosion.

08:56AM

12

steps to correct that.

08:56AM

13

trigger system to the blowout preventer activation, which

08:56AM

14

Transocean, in fact, utilized on other rigs in other places in

08:56AM

15

the world.

08:56AM

16

In violation of the ISM code, the

08:56AM

17

Deepwater Horizon had not been in for drydocking inspections

08:56AM

18

and repair during its entire nine years of existence.

08:56AM

19

expert Geoff Webster says that was reckless and inexcusable.

08:56AM

20

Furthermore, Transocean had a reactive, rather

08:56AM

21

than a proactive, condition-based maintenance system, which,

08:56AM

22

from the view of Transocean Chief Mechanic Doug Brown,

08:56AM

23

translated to a run it till it breaks philosophy.

08:56AM

24

08:56AM

25

Yet Transocean did not

Transocean knew the potential danger of running

It chose not to take

It also failed to add an acoustic

PSC

Yet, barely six months before this disaster,


Paul Johnson, the Transocean Rig Manager - Performance, when
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

44

08:57AM

asked about one of the Deepwater Horizon's -- when asked about

08:57AM

its readiness to commence operations, he told BP, Transocean is

08:57AM

satisfied we can start up operations safely.

08:57AM

08:57AM

up representation to BP, he was telling his own team that he

08:57AM

understood why the Deepwater Horizon was in its current bad

08:57AM

condition, a condition that Steve Bertone, the

08:57AM

Deepwater Horizon Maintenance Supervisor, had just told the

08:57AM

same Mr. Johnson the day before.

08:57AM

10

Deepwater Horizon is currently experiencing, in my opinion, is

08:57AM

11

a lack of proper maintenance on the equipment for many years

08:57AM

12

check.

08:57AM

13

induced standpoint."

08:57AM

14

08:58AM

15

time is generally taken up by repairing the equipment that was

08:58AM

16

broke."

08:58AM

17

08:58AM

18

08:58AM

19

08:58AM

20

need of repairs or maintenance performed and not enough

08:58AM

21

personnel or time to do it" -- "to throw at it."

08:58AM

22

08:58AM

23

could not be completed even by doubling the amount of workers

08:58AM

24

on the rig."

08:58AM

25

Less than a month after making that safe to start

"The issue that the

The drive behind this has been from a performance

"When the rig does receive maintenance time, that

"Once again, limping along with equipment


failures."
He goes on, "There is just too much equipment in

"The rig has an overloaded amount of work that

"The engineering department has been going down


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

45

08:58AM

for some time now due to lack of knowledge, motivation and

08:58AM

supervision."

08:58AM

08:58AM

08:58AM

08:58AM

had been audited on multiple occasions and found to be

08:58AM

seriously deficient, yet Transocean never corrected the

08:59AM

deficiencies, at least not many of the substantial ones.

08:59AM

08:59AM

10

of its broken maintenance system was the blowout preventer.

08:59AM

11

Inspections following the disaster found that it had multiple

08:59AM

12

deficiencies which contributed to the blowout preventer not

08:59AM

13

properly functioning on the day of the explosion and in the

08:59AM

14

days that followed.

08:59AM

15

these deficiencies before April 20 and did not act on them.

08:59AM

16

08:59AM

17

available and safest technology.

08:59AM

18

knew this.

08:59AM

19

08:59AM

20

Inspections in 2008, '9 and spring of 2010 clearly made

08:59AM

21

Transocean and BP aware of this.

08:59AM

22

09:00AM

23

Deepwater Horizon, making over a half million dollars a day,

09:00AM

24

instead of bringing the vessel into a shipyard for repairs of

09:00AM

25

the BOP and other critical equipment.

Yet, Transocean said it was safe to start up


operations in the fall of 2009.
Transocean's condition-based maintenance system

The evidence will show one significant casualty

Both Transocean and BP knew of many of

The Deepwater Horizon BOP was not the best


Transocean, BP, and Cameron

In fact, the BOP was out of certification.

Transocean willfully continued to lease the

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

46

09:00AM

No one disputes that the blowout preventer was

09:00AM

ship's equipment on the Deepwater Horizon essential to fulfill

09:00AM

its mission, and that Transocean had a responsibility to have

09:00AM

it working properly at all times in order the maintain a

09:00AM

seaworthy vessel.

09:00AM

09:00AM

maintenance problems of the Deepwater Horizon, and especially

09:00AM

the BOP.

09:00AM

chartered the Deepwater Horizon to finish the Macondo well.

09:00AM

10

09:00AM

11

drill a well, the evidence will show BP had the primary duty to

09:00AM

12

determine whether that vessel was adequate to drill that well,

09:01AM

13

including the adequacy of the operational -- or, rather, the

09:01AM

14

operational requirements of the BOP for a particular well,

09:01AM

15

pressure, temperature, the competence of the crews and

09:01AM

16

management systems such as safety management.

09:01AM

17

09:01AM

18

09:01AM

19

09:01AM

20

safety culture at Transocean was a substantial cause of this

09:01AM

21

disaster.

09:01AM

22

09:01AM

23

Transocean rigs, on October 21 of 2009, Transocean's top

09:01AM

24

executives, CEO Steve Newman and Bob Long, sent a news bulletin

09:01AM

25

out to employees of Transocean.

It did not.

By the way, BP knew about the design and

BP knew all of this and still, in late 2009,

Every time BP chartered the Deepwater Horizon to

BP alone knew what unique risks awaited in terms


of pore pressures, fracture gradients and temperatures.
The evidence will show that a longstanding failed

Following four fatalities of four different

This is what they said, among

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

47

09:01AM

other things:

"Something's not right.

We're clearly not

09:01AM

executing our safety processes as well as we once thought --

09:02AM

and we need to find out why."

09:02AM

09:02AM

09:02AM

09:02AM

09:02AM

09:02AM

09:02AM

10

09:02AM

11

"There is no quick fix; we have to rebuild it."

09:02AM

12

Transocean's maintenance system had been audited

09:02AM

13

on multiple occasions and found to be woefully deficient.

09:02AM

14

evidence will show that the maintenance processes and systems

09:02AM

15

within Transocean were by no means the best in the class, yet

09:02AM

16

Transocean never corrected the major deficiencies.

09:03AM

17

09:03AM

18

brutally candid.

09:03AM

19

"We often have such a focus on saving money in the short term

09:03AM

20

that it affects the philosophy of looking after our equipment

09:03AM

21

and following our policies."

09:03AM

22

09:03AM

23

not a recent thing.

09:03AM

24

Group summed it up well in 2009, when he recognized the

09:03AM

25

difficulties Transocean had experienced with task planning and

"It is vital that we learn from these recent


experiences so that no one else is injured or killed."
"We must learn why we cannot seem to operate
without serious incidents and injury to our people."
A couple of months later, a December 2009
Transocean Engineering PowerPoint put it even more bluntly.
"We have lost our safety culture."

The

Their May 1, 2009 Asset Reliability Project was


Personnel at a division level stated that:

The lost safety culture of Transocean was clearly


Transocean's Director of the Performance

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

48

09:03AM

risk management in 2004, and observed that the 2009

09:03AM

company-wide Offshore Installation Manager's survey on the same

09:03AM

subjects resonated to be many of the same results noted in

09:03AM

2005.

09:03AM

09:04AM

doing the same things over and over and expecting a different

09:04AM

result."

09:04AM

09:04AM

09:04AM

10

so poor that Transocean was only conditionally approved to work

09:04AM

11

for BP's Gulf of Mexico Strategic Performance Unit.

09:04AM

12

09:04AM

13

Deepwater Horizon was first put into service in 2001, the

09:04AM

14

evidence is going to show it had never, ever been to port for

09:04AM

15

maintenance, repairs, refitting.

09:04AM

16

years.

09:04AM

17

09:04AM

18

evidence will show that management's willful refusal to fix it

09:04AM

19

led directly to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

09:04AM

20

09:05AM

21

09:05AM

22

09:05AM

23

09:05AM

24

09:05AM

25

His conclusion:

"The definition of insanity,

In August of 2009, a BP audit of Transocean's


Health Safety, Security and Environment management systems was

The unfortunate reality is that since the

Not one single time; nine

Transocean's safety culture was broken, and the

The Deepwater Horizon kept drilling, and BP kept


hiring.
Now, let's turn to Cameron and its blowout
preventer.
In 2007, Melvin Whitby, as Cameron's Director of
Engineering, drilling, said:

"In all cases, however, when the

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

49

09:05AM

BOP is called on to function in an emergency situation, it is

09:05AM

the main barrier protecting human life, capital equipment and

09:05AM

the environment.

09:05AM

The evidence will show this blowout preventer

09:05AM

failed partly due to the serious neglect of Transocean with

09:05AM

knowledge of BP, but also due to willful decisions of Cameron.

09:05AM

09:05AM

died for not trying close the BOP shear rams fast enough

09:05AM

because they will say the blowout preventer rams were not

09:06AM

10

designed to close after the flow begins to go up into the

09:06AM

11

riser.

09:06AM

12

09:06AM

13

09:06AM

14

The evidence will show that BP, Transocean and

09:06AM

15

Halliburton personnel clearly missed the fact that a blowout

09:06AM

16

was beginning, but the evidence will also show that Transocean

09:06AM

17

personnel ultimately did try to use the blowout preventer

09:06AM

18

shear rams -- to no avail in either saving their lives or

09:06AM

19

stopping millions of gallons of oil from entering the Gulf.

09:06AM

20

09:06AM

21

09:06AM

22

09:06AM

23

09:07AM

24

09:07AM

25

Therefore, it must function without fail."

Cameron will blame the men on the drill floor who

Well, in any of the BOP materials of Cameron,


that admonition is not given.

The BOP, in other words, did not function without


fail as Cameron's Director of Engineering said it must.
There are four primary problems with Cameron's
BOP other than Transocean's neglect of it.
First, the blind shear ram cutting blades did not
cover the entire wellbore.

Cameron knew that its BOP would

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

50

09:07AM

likely not be able to shear and seal drill pipe if it was off

09:07AM

center in the wellbore, a common occurrence and completely

09:07AM

foreseeable situation.

09:07AM

09:07AM

whether the blind shear rams it sold would seal under dynamic

09:07AM

flow conditions, yet Cameron sold it as a preventer.

09:07AM

09:07AM

out whether its blowout preventer blind shear rams would

09:07AM

successfully shear pipe and fully seal a well against -- and

09:07AM

10

this is the key phrase, Your Honor -- against a high pressure

09:07AM

11

dynamic flow plus an off center pipe, neither one, even though

09:07AM

12

both were known foreseeable environment conditions the BOP

09:08AM

13

could be called upon to function in.

09:08AM

14

09:08AM

15

could not monitor the batteries to see if they were charged or

09:08AM

16

dead.

09:08AM

17

09:08AM

18

the surface, 5000 feet above it.

09:08AM

19

controls that indicated to the operators on the drill floor

09:08AM

20

that the automatic emergency BOP functions were armed and

09:08AM

21

therefore available; but, if that power was on all the time, it

09:08AM

22

wouldn't tell whether or not the batteries were dead, and it

09:08AM

23

couldn't function.

09:08AM

24

09:08AM

25

The evidence will show Cameron had no idea

Cameron did not know and never even tried to find

The third problem, Cameron knew rig personnel

Cameron's signal light system was powered from


That's the power that ran the

In other words, the driller could be getting a


green, everything is okay light, and yet his batteries be
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

51

09:08AM

totally dead, that he's showing it's armed.

09:08AM

09:08AM

09:09AM

09:09AM

systems were not separate emergency systems because all of them

09:09AM

would fail if a single component, the blind shear rams, failed.

09:09AM

Cameron knew of this single point failure hazard,

09:09AM

09:09AM

09:09AM

10

design, and Cameron cooperated.

09:09AM

11

shouldn't have is going to be up to Your Honor.

09:09AM

12

Now, what about Halliburton's conduct?

09:09AM

13

As the self-described world leader in cementing

09:09AM

14

09:09AM

15

09:09AM

16

contractually responsible to BP for the design, testing, and

09:09AM

17

execution of cementing the production casing, and to provide

09:10AM

18

mud pit monitoring through its Sperry division for signs of a

09:10AM

19

kick or blowout.

09:10AM

20

09:10AM

21

used for each casing string and the volumes and spacers to be

09:10AM

22

used.

09:10AM

23

BP did not tell Halliburton which cement to use.

09:10AM

24

Halliburton's contractual obligations included

09:10AM

25

The result on April 20 was the battery in the


Blue Pod was dead, and nobody knew it was dead.
The fourth issue, the multiple BOP emergency

yet willfully chose to ignore it in design and instructions.


Now, in fairness, Transocean requested that
Whether they should or

services, what were Halliburton's obligations?


The evidence will show that Halliburton was

Halliburton recommended the type of cement to be

sole responsibility for pressure testing and pumping the cement


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

52

09:10AM

as well as a safety leadership role.

The contract between BP

09:10AM

and Halliburton required Halliburton to create a lightweight

09:10AM

slurry mixture with very specific characteristics.

09:10AM

09:10AM

Halliburton management the final cement slurry details at least

09:10AM

24 hours prior to BP running the production casing.

09:10AM

not.

09:10AM

09:11AM

09:11AM

10

09:11AM

11

09:11AM

12

prematurely at Macondo due to a failure of the Halliburton

09:11AM

13

cement.

09:11AM

14

09:11AM

15

Halliburton assigned cement engineer Jesse Gagliano to be

09:11AM

16

embedded in BP's Houston offices as BP's what will be described

09:11AM

17

as in-house cementing expert.

09:11AM

18

09:11AM

19

2010, both Halliburton and Gagliano had histories of problems

09:11AM

20

with BP as far as modeling inputs and timeliness were

09:11AM

21

concerned.

09:11AM

22

09:11AM

23

BP engineers voiced serious concerns -- questions about his

09:11AM

24

competency as it affected the timeliness and quality of his

09:11AM

25

reports to BP.

Halliburton was required to provide BP and

It did

Indeed, Halliburton's Jesse Gagliano never even


checked the cement test results before the blowout, despite
being notified they were ready the day before.
The evidence will show that the gas flowed

In connection with its obligations to BP,

The evidence will show that prior to April 20 of

Indeed, in the weeks leading up to the blowout,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

53

09:11AM

In fact, BP Drilling Engineer Team Leader Greg

09:12AM

Walz believed that the decision had already been made to fire

09:12AM

Gagliano from his embedded position with BP in its Houston

09:12AM

office.

09:12AM

09:12AM

provide technical supervision of Gagliano, thus leaving the

09:12AM

inadequacies of his work undetected.

09:12AM

Yet, Mr. Gagliano, in Houston, was virtually the

09:12AM

final word on what Halliburton did or did not do regarding the

09:12AM

10

09:12AM

11

09:12AM

12

supervisor, did not even know what Mr. Gagliano was doing, much

09:12AM

13

less that there was a critical cementing job about to take

09:12AM

14

place in Macondo.

09:12AM

15

The evidence will show that Halliburton created

09:12AM

16

cement that was poorly designed, not properly tested, and was

09:13AM

17

unstable.

09:13AM

18

09:13AM

19

provided a barrier to hydrocarbon flow that was high pressure,

09:13AM

20

high temperature.

09:13AM

21

09:13AM

22

which is known to present risks and potential complications not

09:13AM

23

found with conventional cement, thus requiring additional

09:13AM

24

expertise and care.

09:13AM

25

Halliburton compounded the problem by refusing to

Macondo cement job; yet he had no supervision.


In fact, Ronnie Faul, Gagliano's immediate

Cement in a well like Macondo should have

Halliburton did not provide that barrier.

The cement used at Macondo was a foam cement

The evidence will show that every investigation


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

54

09:13AM

which has considered the question, except Halliburton's, and

09:13AM

every expert, except Halliburton's, who has opined about it,

09:13AM

has concluded that the Halliburton cement was poorly designed

09:13AM

and did not seal the well.

09:13AM

09:13AM

used the cement from another well, Judge, the Kodiak well.

09:13AM

That blend had been on the Deepwater Horizon since November of

09:14AM

2009, and had aged at least five months since the

09:14AM

Deepwater Horizon had left the Kodiak and come and been working

09:14AM

10

09:14AM

11

09:14AM

12

Halliburton proprietary additive called D-Air 3000, a defoamer,

09:14AM

13

emphasis, defoamer that destabilizes and is incompatible with

09:14AM

14

foam cement.

09:14AM

15

09:14AM

16

will admit that the slurry Halliburton used at Macondo would

09:14AM

17

not have included a defoamer agent, as the Kodiak did, if

09:14AM

18

Halliburton had designed the cement from scratch.

09:14AM

19

09:14AM

20

Kodiak cement on Macondo well and try to convert it to a foam

09:15AM

21

cement when it had defoamer in it?

09:15AM

22

Halliburton was able to save time and save money by doing so.

09:15AM

23

09:15AM

24

09:15AM

25

In designing the cement for Macondo, Halliburton

on the Macondo.
More significantly, Kodiak cement contained a

Halliburton's own expert, David Bolado, in fact,

So why would Halliburton risk using this leftover

The evidence will show

BP was not charged for extra testing, regardless


of the amount of testing.
Halliburton also had already given BP about
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

55

09:15AM

$100,000, in fact, $139,000 credit, for that Kodiak cement that

09:15AM

went unused at the Kodiak well that was still sitting on the

09:15AM

Deepwater Horizon, so Halliburton had a monetary incentive to

09:15AM

use that stuff, to then charge BP and get paid some of what it

09:15AM

already on hand without incurring the cost of shipping new

09:15AM

stuff out there, mixing new stuff and so forth, much less

09:15AM

hauling off the leftover Kodiak.

09:15AM

09:15AM

09:15AM

10

required tests and did not have a single successful stability

09:16AM

11

test on the actual slurry pumped down the Macondo before it was

09:16AM

12

pumped.

09:16AM

13

undersupervised.

09:16AM

14

09:16AM

15

by Halliburton was essentially useless because all those tests

09:16AM

16

failed except one that was manipulated to not mimic Macondo's

09:16AM

17

downhole condition.

09:16AM

18

09:16AM

19

of tests required by the American Petroleum Institute, BP,

09:16AM

20

Halliburton itself, and the BP-Halliburton contract, and failed

09:16AM

21

to utilize standard testing protocols.

09:16AM

22

09:16AM

23

will admit the fluid loss and static gel strength development

09:16AM

24

tests were indeed important for this job, and Halliburton

09:16AM

25

failed to perform either test.

The evidence will show that Halliburton's


employees also admit that Halliburton failed to run many

Their lab was overworked, understaffed and

The evidence will also show the testing performed

Halliburton performed fewer than the full suite

In fact, Halliburton's own expert, Dr. Sam Louis,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

56

09:17AM

The evidence will show Halliburton's Sperry Sun

09:17AM

division mudloggers were not adequately trained and missed the

09:17AM

kick that blew up the Deepwater Horizon.

09:17AM

09:17AM

vessel had started on the Macondo, BP told Halliburton that one

09:17AM

of its mudloggers was not getting the job done and was not

09:17AM

getting the basics right.

09:17AM

09:17AM

09:17AM

10

09:17AM

11

09:17AM

12

undetected for 33 minutes by the Halliburton Sperry mudlogger

09:17AM

13

on duty.

09:17AM

14

Following that go kick, Halliburton-Sperry did no

09:18AM

15

lesson learned investigation and did not provide its mudloggers

09:18AM

16

with any additional training.

09:18AM

17

09:18AM

18

the Halliburton Sperry mudlogger ignored signs the well was

09:18AM

19

flowing.

09:18AM

20

09:18AM

21

that the first time he realized there was a kick was when mud

09:18AM

22

started raining down on the mudlogger's shack.

09:18AM

23

09:18AM

24

Sperry mudlogger, Joe Keith, left his mudlogger's monitoring

09:18AM

25

pit unmanned while he took a 30-minute smoke break just as the

In October of 2009, while the Marianas drilling

Halliburton pulled him from the job.

Prior to the Macondo, because BP felt


Halliburton's Sperry Sun's performance was so poor, the
evidence will show BP was considering pulling its business.
The March 8, 2010, kick on this well went

The evidence will show that on April 20 of 2010,

The Halliburton Sperry-Sun mudlogger testified

Why?

The evidence will show that the Halliburton

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

57

09:18AM

well began to give clear signs that it was flowing, signs he

09:18AM

would have seen if he had been paying attention and not

09:18AM

recklessly abandoned his post.

09:18AM

Halliburton had a contractual obligation under

09:19AM

its 2009 contract with BP to provide, in connection with its

09:19AM

cement work, a complete safety analysis in writing called a

09:19AM

Basis of Design.

09:19AM

09:19AM

09:19AM

10

continuously reassess and update these risk assessments on an

09:19AM

11

ongoing basis.

09:19AM

12

09:19AM

13

President, signed that contract on April 16 of 2009, the

09:19AM

14

evidence will show that Halliburton knew it had no way of

09:19AM

15

complying with this contract provision because no such process

09:19AM

16

safety system was in place that would have been required to

09:19AM

17

fulfill this ongoing contractual requirement.

09:19AM

18

09:19AM

19

and April 20 of 2010, Halliburton did not have a formal Basis

09:20AM

20

of Design standard, nor did it have a formal Management of

09:20AM

21

Change standard, both of which are essential to timely

09:20AM

22

identification of process safety risk effectively required to

09:20AM

23

be recognized on an ongoing basis under the contract.

09:20AM

24

09:20AM

25

The April 2009 BP/Halliburton contract required


Halliburton to, among other things, continuously, emphasis,

They didn't do it.

When David King, Halliburton's Division

The evidence will show that between April of 2009

The evidence will establish that at the time of


the Macondo well blowout, Halliburton had failed to comply with
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

58

09:20AM

this express contractual requirement to have in place and

09:20AM

provide complete continuing process risk analysis to BP.

09:20AM

09:20AM

updated the Basis of Design as required by its contract, it

09:20AM

would, of necessity, have identified the catastrophic risk of

09:20AM

using Kodiak blend.

09:21AM

Let's now turn our attention to BP.

09:21AM

Financial pressure drove BP to rush the

09:21AM

09:21AM

10

09:21AM

11

not have the cash to fund its commitment to pay dividends to

09:21AM

12

its shareholders.

09:21AM

13

Exploration and Production Division portion of the amount

09:21AM

14

needed to pay the dividend to be about $7 billion.

09:21AM

15

09:21AM

16

to 5 percent profit growth commitment to shareholders, BP

09:21AM

17

Exploration and Production was under pressure to raise these

09:21AM

18

dollars by driving efficiency in a year where production was

09:21AM

19

lower.

09:21AM

20

09:21AM

21

09:22AM

22

09:22AM

23

2010 was expected to be "a year where every barrel counts and

09:22AM

24

every dollars counts."

09:22AM

25

The evidence will show that if Halliburton had

completion of the Macondo well.


Because BP's production was down in 2010, BP did

The evidence will show BP calculated

In order to raise this $7 billion and meet its 4

It chose to do so by spending fewer days in the


drilling of its wells.
According to BP, without major project startups,

Macondo was more than $50 million over budget and


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

59

09:22AM

behind schedule.

The Deepwater Horizon was committed to drill

09:22AM

two more wells for BP within a short time, and it had to get

09:22AM

one right away started or BP risked losing an expensive Gulf

09:22AM

lease.

09:22AM

09:22AM

placed huge financial pressure on BP rig management to cut

09:22AM

costs by cutting corners and to rush the job.

09:22AM

09:22AM

09:23AM

10

total of around 18,000 feet, in a formation known to BP for

09:23AM

11

being high pressure, high temperature, and, most importantly,

09:23AM

12

an unstable, no-salt formation.

09:23AM

13

09:23AM

14

Deepwater Exploration at BP, confirms, wells without a thick

09:23AM

15

sequence of salt require more casing for a given depth than

09:23AM

16

those that do penetrate salt.

09:23AM

17

09:23AM

18

the frac gradient is generally narrower in no-salt wells which

09:23AM

19

requires more casing.

09:23AM

20

09:23AM

21

before Macondo, but, as he says, "it had just been a few

09:24AM

22

wells."

09:24AM

23

So, with the rush of financial urgency combined

09:24AM

24

with BP concerns about the Macondo well situation, how did BP

09:24AM

25

proceed with its Macondo well?

The evidence will show BP executive management

The Macondo well bottom was under 5000 feet of


water and then another about 13,000 feet of earth below that,

As Jonathan Bellow, a BP Operations Geologist for

The drilling window between the pore pressure and

BP had drilled wells with no salt previously

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

60

09:24AM

Petroleum engineering expert David Pritchard

09:24AM

09:24AM

09:24AM

Macondo kick, BP Tiger Team member Kate Paine says:

09:24AM

sure it was a lack of communication nor awareness as much as a

09:24AM

'we can get away with this' attitude."

09:24AM

09:24AM

that BP failed to disclose information to MMS that it was

09:25AM

required to disclose on an ongoing basis.

09:25AM

10

show that on multiple occasions BP falsely reported its

09:25AM

11

fracture gradients and pressure integrity test results to the

09:25AM

12

MMS by drilling ahead without a safe drilling margin and

09:25AM

13

without seeking prior MMS approval.

09:25AM

14

09:25AM

15

as the "well from hell," a "nightmare" well, and a "crazy"

09:25AM

16

well.

09:25AM

17

kicks and ten incidents of lost returns resulting in the loss

09:25AM

18

of 668,000 gallons of mud.

09:25AM

19

09:25AM

20

so many last-minute changes to the temporary abandonment

09:26AM

21

procedure plan that BP's John Guide told David Sims just

09:26AM

22

three days before the disaster, "David, over the past

09:26AM

23

four days, there has been so many last-minute changes to the

09:26AM

24

operation, that the well site leaders have finally come to

09:26AM

25

their wits' end."

says:

"BP repeatedly chose speed over safety."


When asked for feedback following the March 8th
"I'm not

Dr. Allen Huffman, a geophysicist, will testify

The evidence will

Macondo was described variously by BP personnel

In the months preceding the disaster, there were four

The push to complete the "nightmare" well caused

The quote is, "Flying by the seat of our


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

61

09:26AM

pants."

09:26AM

09:26AM

huge level of paranoia from engineering leadership is driving

09:26AM

chaos.

09:26AM

me numerous times trying to make sense of all the insanity."

09:26AM

And then later he concludes, "The operation is not going to

09:26AM

succeed if we continue in this manner."

09:26AM

09:27AM

09:27AM

10

the BP operations geologist -- March 27th, Robert Bodek, a BP

09:27AM

11

operations geologist told his boss that, "If BP continued to

09:27AM

12

total depth on Macondo, it will all be in God's hands."

09:27AM

13

09:27AM

14

disaster, Bodek again told his boss that, "If they really

09:27AM

15

believe that the poor pressure can be as high as projected, we

09:27AM

16

need to start having some serious discussions about pulling the

09:27AM

17

plug early."

09:28AM

18

09:28AM

19

temporarily abandon this well, BP made a series of decisions to

09:28AM

20

save time and money but substantially increased risk and

09:28AM

21

reduced safety.

09:28AM

22

09:28AM

23

with a tieback, which it was originally designed to be until

09:28AM

24

about a month before the disaster, to save time and at least

09:28AM

25

seven to $10 million and seven to ten days in time.

"Everybody wants to do the right thing, but this

This operation is not Thunder Horse.

Brian has called

Now, put that into context, March 29th -- excuse


me -- just 22 days before the Macondo disaster Robert Bodek,

Two days later, just 22 days before the Macondo

The evidence will show that during BP's rush to

Here are some examples:

BP used a long string casing rather than a liner

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

62

09:28AM

BP failed to perform a bottoms up circulation

09:28AM

09:28AM

09:28AM

originally planned -- and originally planned 21 centralizers,

09:28AM

ended up using many less.

09:28AM

09:29AM

stability test before pouring -- or allowing to pour the

09:29AM

cement.

09:29AM

09:29AM

10

12 hours after the cementing operation and refused to wait for

09:29AM

11

the cement to fully cure.

09:29AM

12

09:29AM

13

09:29AM

14

09:29AM

15

09:29AM

16

09:29AM

17

09:29AM

18

09:29AM

19

without a written procedure and with personnel who had never

09:29AM

20

been given formal training in how to perform the test.

09:29AM

21

09:30AM

22

confirm the success or failure of the cement job despite the

09:30AM

23

presence of a Schlumberger crew they had on the rig ready to

09:30AM

24

run it.

09:30AM

25

test prior to allowing Halliburton to pump its cement.


Third, BP refused to use the recommended and

BP failed to wait for the completion of the foam

Fifth, BP began its positive pressure test just

Six, BP displaced the riser before setting a real


barrier, the cement plug.
Seventh, BP displaced the riser over 3,000 feet
below the surface.
BP used a untried experimental spacer from
leftover lost circulation materials.
BP ran the safety critical negative pressure test

Tenth, BP refused to run a cement bond log to

Once again, BP did this to save time and money.


Finally, BP conducted simultaneous operations
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

63

09:30AM

during the displacement without doing the required risk

09:30AM

assessment, which significantly impaired the ability to

09:30AM

recognize that a kick, a serious kick was happening.

09:30AM

09:30AM

executive management were a substantial cause of the disaster.

09:30AM

BP will place great reliance on its Bly Report to try to

09:30AM

diminish its culpability.

09:30AM

Bly Report was not as thorough as represented by BP to be.

09:30AM

09:31AM

10

open, complete and transparent investigation that would cover

09:31AM

11

everything.

09:31AM

12

investigating serious accidents, and certainly no one will

09:31AM

13

contest that this wasn't a serious accident, BP's investigation

09:31AM

14

of the Macondo disaster, the Bly Report failed to investigate

09:31AM

15

systemic management causes.

09:31AM

16

09:31AM

17

directly controlled BP's Worldwide Risk Management and

09:31AM

18

encouraged a culture which placed profit and production over

09:31AM

19

safety and protection.

09:31AM

20

09:31AM

21

Professor Bob Bea will make it clear, starting tomorrow when he

09:31AM

22

takes the stand, that effective process safety only happens if

09:31AM

23

a company creates a safety culture that reflects the

09:31AM

24

seriousness with which that company attempts to manage risks.

09:32AM

25

Effective process safety is reflected by what a

The evidence will show the actions of BP

Yet the evidence will show that the

BP's CEO Tony Hayward claimed BP conducted an

Rather, contrary to BP's standard protocol for

The evidence will show BP's executive management

Process safety and risk engineering expert

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

64

09:32AM

company actually does, not what it says.

It's also reflected

09:32AM

by its commitment to learn lessons from past events.

09:32AM

commitment is critical, because in the words of Dr. Bea, "It

09:32AM

has a major effect on how the company balances between

09:32AM

production and protection."

09:32AM

09:32AM

disasters to place relatively high emphasis on short-term

09:32AM

benefits of cost and speed could cause major loss of life and

09:32AM

property.

09:32AM

10

production pressures from BP executive managers, impairs

09:32AM

11

process safety performance.

09:32AM

12

09:32AM

13

for Macondo, BP was still putting production over protection,

09:33AM

14

profits over safety.

09:33AM

15

09:33AM

16

he had two years to turn the company's financial performance

09:33AM

17

around.

09:33AM

18

issued directives to cut billions and billions of dollars from

09:33AM

19

the costs of BP operations.

09:33AM

20

09:33AM

21

$4 billion, with plans for another 1.4 billion in 2010.

09:33AM

22

resulted in massive layoffs, 20 percent of BP's entire

09:33AM

23

worldwide force.

09:33AM

24

09:33AM

25

That

Dr. Bea will explain how BP knew from previous

And that cost cutting, failure to invest, and

Nonetheless, the evidence will show that in 2010

In 2007, BP's CEO Tony Hayward acknowledged that

The evidence will show BP's executive management

From 2008 to 2009, BP management slashed costs by


This

Former BP vice-president of drilling and


completions Kevin Lacy, will describe for the Gulf of Mexico
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

65

09:33AM

operating unit, incredibly pressured with respect to cost

09:33AM

production during 2008 and 2009.

09:34AM

Beginning in 2008, Lacy received directives from

09:34AM

BP's senior vice-president global projects, Neil Shaw, and CEO

09:34AM

of BP Exploration and Production, Andy Inglis, to cut the

09:34AM

costs.

09:34AM

09:34AM

the safety and technical director, 290 BP personnel, 93

09:34AM

contractors.

09:34AM

10

director, there was no one person in the Gulf of Mexico unit

09:34AM

11

whose sole job was administer or oversee process safety.

09:34AM

12

09:34AM

13

the Gulf of Mexico Drilling & Completion organization with

09:34AM

14

further cost cutting directed for 2010.

09:34AM

15

personnel lost their jobs -- or rather, saw their jobs

09:35AM

16

eliminated.

09:35AM

17

09:35AM

18

include incentives for effective measurable process safety.

09:35AM

19

BP's safety culture will be shown by the evidence, according to

09:35AM

20

BP's Kate Payne, to be a "we can get away with this" attitude.

09:35AM

21

According to Dr. Bea, a culture of entrepreneurial risk taking

09:35AM

22

and a culture of production over protection.

09:35AM

23

09:35AM

24

Patrick Hudson will testify that BP was a highly risk tolerant

09:35AM

25

culture and an opportunistic and speed-driven culture and a

One of Shaw's first decisions was to eliminate

After eliminating the safety and technical

In 2009, BP cut between 250 and 350 million from

Many key safety

Cost cutting was further incentivized but did not

Even Halliburton process safety expert

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

66

09:35AM

culture of being loss averse rather than risk averse.

09:35AM

09:35AM

management incentivized a culture of cost cutting, profits over

09:36AM

safety, and taking high risk with a conscious disregard for

09:36AM

dire potential risks.

09:36AM

09:36AM

intentionally refused to change its past behavior and instead

09:36AM

willfully exclude its process safety requirements, its OMS

09:36AM

program, from leased vessels like the Deepwater Horizon.

09:36AM

10

09:36AM

11

this.

09:36AM

12

engineering expert, Dr. Bob Bea himself, was retained directly

09:36AM

13

and advised BP on three separate occasions, in 2001, 2002, and

09:36AM

14

2005, what it was doing wrong with process safety and what

09:36AM

15

needed to be done to correct it.

09:37AM

16

did not listen and how that was a substantial cause of the

09:37AM

17

Macondo disaster.

09:37AM

18

09:37AM

19

and systemic causes of previous disasters, major accidents, are

09:37AM

20

virtually identical to the systemic and organizational causes

09:37AM

21

of the Macondo blowout.

09:37AM

22

09:37AM

23

in 2006, that if BP did not improve its process safety, it was

09:37AM

24

going to have another disaster every 10 to 15 years.

09:37AM

25

it only took four.

In other words, the evidence will show that BP

The evidence will show BP executive management

At BP's invitation -- let's give some context to


At BP's own invitation, renowned process safety and risk

Dr. Bea will explain how BP

Dr. Bea will also explain how the organizational

BP's then head of safety, John Mogford, predicted

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

In fact,

67

09:37AM

Long before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP

09:37AM

was aware of specific recommendations of how it could fix its

09:37AM

process safety problem in order to avoid future disasters.

09:37AM

09:38AM

executive management in London implemented the operations

09:38AM

management system, or OMS, which was indeed a comprehensive

09:38AM

management system that integrates and improves existing

09:38AM

management systems and provides the framework to achieve safe

09:38AM

and reliable operations across its worldwide operations.

09:38AM

10

09:38AM

11

failing to extend its OMS program to its leased drilling

09:38AM

12

vessels, like the Deepwater Horizon, BP failed to keep the

09:38AM

13

following factors present in previous disasters from playing a

09:38AM

14

role in Macondo:

09:38AM

15

perform effective audits, engaging in mindless, pointless and

09:38AM

16

counterproductive organizational restructuring, and failing to

09:38AM

17

maintain safety critical equipment.

09:38AM

18

09:39AM

19

management promised to change, to learn lessons.

09:39AM

20

will show that for BP's leased vessels in the Gulf of Mexico,

09:39AM

21

like the Deepwater Horizon, BP's culture regarding safety

09:39AM

22

remained the same.

09:39AM

23

09:39AM

24

Mexico drilling engineering manager, Jonathan Sprague, in fact,

09:39AM

25

received an e-mail from a lower level BP employee regarding

In an effort to improve its process safety, BP

But the evidence will show that in willfully

Ignoring process safety risks, failing to

Prior to the Macondo disaster, BP executive


The evidence

The evidence will show that when BP's Gulf of

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

68

09:39AM

process safety, lessons learned, he passed it off as clutter.

09:39AM

09:39AM

the Deepwater Horizon and discovered an astounding 390

09:39AM

outstanding maintenance issues requiring 3,545 man-hours to

09:39AM

repair, some of which had been outstanding since another 2008

09:40AM

audit by BP.

09:40AM

09:40AM

chartering and using the Deepwater Horizon year in and year out

09:40AM

despite actual knowledge of many problems with the vessel,

09:40AM

10

keeping it at sea, driving it hard, when BP knew it should have

09:40AM

11

been taken to a shipyard for repairs.

09:40AM

12

09:40AM

13

requested to participate in a "lessons learned" inquiry in a

09:40AM

14

March 8th kick, 2010, said, "I don't think this is going to be

09:40AM

15

a lesson learned.

09:40AM

16

learned.

09:40AM

17

it look like we won't do this again.

09:40AM

18

learning."

09:40AM

19

09:40AM

20

repair cost concerns, in September 2009, BP Houston operations

09:41AM

21

engineer, Brett Cocales responded internally, "Don't worry

09:41AM

22

about this small stuff.

09:41AM

23

apart unless absolutely necessary and we are ready to kick some

09:41AM

24

serious ass.

09:41AM

25

In late 2009, BP conducted a rig safety audit of

But the evidence will show that BP kept

BP Tiger Team member Kate Payne, who being

I'm sorry to push back on the lessoned

I know you've got to get something out there to make


I don't see us really

Commenting on apartments, Deepwater Horizon

We're not going to tear anything else

Don't worry, be happy."


BP Drilling Engineer, Nicholas Lirette replied
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

69

09:41AM

saying, prophetically, "This rig is not in appropriate

09:41AM

condition to start a well."

09:41AM

09:41AM

engineer, Brett Cocales, sent 15 extra centralizers to the

09:41AM

Deepwater Horizon in addition to the six already on board.

09:41AM

the extra centralizers were intended to reduce cement

09:41AM

channeling and thus reduce the risk of a blowout.

09:41AM

09:42AM

the extra centralizers not be used.

09:42AM

10

show to save time and money for BP.

09:42AM

11

09:42AM

12

another BP Houston engineer, "But who cares, it's done.

09:42AM

13

story.

09:42AM

14

09:42AM

15

implement OMS on its riskiest enterprise, deepwater drilling in

09:42AM

16

the Gulf of Mexico, played a substantial role in the disaster

09:42AM

17

at Macondo.

09:42AM

18

09:42AM

19

was lost.

09:42AM

20

in charge of process safety of the Macondo well.

09:42AM

21

09:43AM

22

09:43AM

23

MR. ROY:

09:43AM

24

THE COURT:

09:43AM

25

MR. ROY:

But of course, it did.

Just five days before the blowout, BP Houston

And

The next day BP's John Guide's boss demanded that


Why?

The evidence will

Cocales succumbed to Guide's demand and e-mailed


End of

We'll probably be fine."


Dr. Bea will explain how the failure of BP to

Whatever benefit the system might have brought


At the time of the blowout there was no individual

THE COURT:

Mr. Roy, you need to bring it to a close.

Your time is about up.


I have one-and-a-half pages, Your Honor.
Go ahead.

Dr. Bea will explain that the Macondo


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

70

09:43AM

Drilling Team was blind to major process safety risks because

09:43AM

of the lack of OMS.

09:43AM

09:43AM

denies knowing the high risk of drilling in the Gulf of Mexico

09:43AM

prior to the Macondo disaster.

09:43AM

known the risk in the Gulf of Mexico, we would have never

09:43AM

drilled that well in the Gulf of Mexico."

09:43AM

Kevin Lacy, the former vice-president of Drilling

09:43AM

& Completions summed up the Macondo disaster best when he said,

09:43AM

10

09:43AM

11

09:44AM

12

suggest that the evidence will prove the Deepwater Horizon was

09:44AM

13

unseaworthy on April 20th of 2010, and had been for many

09:44AM

14

months, if not years, before.

09:44AM

15

it.

09:44AM

16

09:44AM

17

will also prove the negligence of BP, Transocean, Halliburton

09:44AM

18

and Cameron.

09:44AM

19

09:44AM

20

09:44AM

21

09:44AM

22

this trial will demonstrate to Your Honor why this tragedy

09:44AM

23

occurred and who is responsible.

09:44AM

24

09:44AM

25

Ironically, BP board member Sir William Castell

But he testifies, "If I had

"It was entirely preventable."


In conclusion, Your Honor, we respectfully

And Transocean and BP both knew

It will also prove the negligence -- the evidence

And finally, the evidence will prove the


defendants' gross negligence and willful and reckless conduct.
The limitation should be denied.

The evidence in

Thank you.
THE COURT:

All right.

I was planning on taking a

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

71

09:44AM

break after the United States' presentation, but we are going

09:44AM

to do it right now because we have a technical problem, I

09:44AM

understand.

09:44AM

09:44AM

THE DEPUTY CLERK:

09:44AM

THE COURT:

09:44AM

a problem with the sound, and someone needs to come here and

09:45AM

fix something.

09:45AM

09:45AM

10

09:45AM

11

THE DEPUTY CLERK:

09:45AM

12

(WHEREUPON, at 9:45 a.m. the Court took a recess.)

10:03AM

13

THE COURT:

10:03AM

14

our technical problem in one of the other courtrooms repaired,

10:03AM

15

so we're ready to proceed.

10:03AM

16

10:03AM

17

10:03AM

18

10:03AM

19

Thank you, Your Honor.

10:03AM

20

Your Honor, before I start, my good friend,

10:03AM

21

Mr. Roy, asked me to say that he made a mistake that he would

10:03AM

22

like me to correct, and I certainly agree to do that.

10:03AM

23

10:03AM

24

mudlogger took a 30-minute smoke break or whatever kind of

10:03AM

25

break, and Mr. Roy indicated it should have been 10 minutes.

They still have that going on, Stephanie?


Yes, sir.

In one of the overflow courtrooms, there is

So we're going to take about a 15-minute recess


right now.
All rise.

All right.

I think they tell me we have

Mr. Underhill.
OPENING STATEMENTS
BY MR. UNDERHILL:
Good morning.

He indicated that Mr. Keith, the Sperry-Sun

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

72

10:03AM

He didn't want to mislead the Court or any of the parties.

10:03AM

10:03AM

THE COURT:

10:03AM

MR. UNDERHILL:

10:03AM

10:03AM

days after the Macondo well blew out.

10:03AM

in this courtroom today, myself, my colleagues from both the

10:04AM

plaintiff and defense side, is to try to give the evidence to

10:04AM

the Court so you can decide how this tragedy happened, why it

10:04AM

10

10:04AM

11

10:04AM

12

despite BP's attempts to shift blame to other parties in this

10:04AM

13

lawsuit, by far and away, the primary fault for this disaster

10:04AM

14

lies with BP.

10:04AM

15

10:04AM

16

designed the Macondo well.

10:04AM

17

Macondo well.

10:04AM

18

10:04AM

19

that caused the blowout and disaster up on that screen,

10:04AM

20

decisions about narrow and dangerous drilling margins, about

10:04AM

21

cement design and placement, the all critical negative pressure

10:04AM

22

test you'll hear a great deal about in this case, about well

10:05AM

23

monitoring and well control, about the BOP, those decisions,

10:05AM

24

Your Honor, were made by BP.

10:05AM

25

So is that good, Jim?

Thank you.

Okay.
Your Honor, good morning.

This was the Deepwater Horizon on April 22, two


The job of the parties

happened, and who caused it to happen.


The evidence in this trial will show that,

BP was the owner of the Macondo well.

It

It was the operator of the

The evidence will show that critical decisions

We will show that a long series of missteps and


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

73

10:05AM

reckless decisions made by BP taken together demonstrate

10:05AM

willful misconduct.

10:05AM

10:05AM

happen to the sound?

10:05AM

everyone else can.

10:05AM

10:05AM

10:05AM

MR. GODWIN:

10:05AM

MR. UNDERHILL:

10:05AM

10

10:05AM

11

THE COURT:

10:05AM

12

MR. UNDERHILL:

10:05AM

13

THE COURT:

10:05AM

14

10:06AM

15

10:06AM

16

MR. UNDERHILL:

10:06AM

17

THE COURT:

10:06AM

18

MR. UNDERHILL:

10:06AM

19

THE COURT:

10:06AM

20

MR. UNDERHILL:

10:06AM

21

missteps and reckless decisions by BP taken together

10:06AM

22

demonstrate willful misconduct.

10:06AM

23

decisions made by BP standing alone constitute gross

10:07AM

24

negligence.

10:07AM

25

THE COURT:

Stop, I'm sorry, one second.

I can still hear you, but I'm not sure

Excuse me.

Is your Lavalier mic not working?


it is?

Did something

Is that what

Is that not working?

next to you.

It's your battery.


There might be another one right there

There is a backup.
See if the other one works.
Certainly, Your Honor.

Isn't technology wonderful, as long as it

works.
That sounds like it's working.
How are we doing?

That's better.
Thank you very much, Your Honor.

Thank you.
We will show that a long series of

We will show that individual

Especially among those individual decisions was


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

74

10:07AM

the incomprehensible decision to declare the negative pressure

10:07AM

test a success only two hours before the first of the

10:07AM

explosions that wracked the rig.

10:07AM

10:07AM

April 20, less than an hour before oil and gas exploded in a

10:07AM

fireball aboard that rig that was up on the screen a moment

10:07AM

ago, BP Senior Drilling Engineer in Houston, Mark Hafle, and

10:07AM

its Senior Well Site Leader on the rig, Don Vidrine, had a

10:07AM

telephone conversation.

10:07AM

10

Amendment in this case.

10:07AM

11

10:07AM

12

prevented the tragedy, the need for any of us to be in this

10:07AM

13

courtroom today and for the next three months.

10:08AM

14

10:08AM

15

eleven lives, saved the Gulf, saved the people of the Gulf from

10:08AM

16

a catastrophe, despite all of the BP failures that had happened

10:08AM

17

before that day on API 20 and in the days before.

10:08AM

18

10:08AM

19

hung up the phone at 9:02 p.m., eleven men, eleven souls, had

10:08AM

20

47 minutes to live the rest of their lives, 47 minutes in which

10:08AM

21

BP failed to take any action that could have prevented that

10:08AM

22

tragedy that's on the screen and our need to be here today.

10:08AM

23

10:08AM

24

little as a ten-second phone call from Mr. Vidrine to the

10:08AM

25

toolpusher or the driller, as little as a 30=second walk down

The evidence will show that at 8:52 p.m., on

Both men subsequently took the Fifth

That conversation, we will show, should have

They had a conversation that could have saved

The evidence will show that when those two men

The evidence and testimony will show that with as

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

75

10:08AM

to the rig floor to those two men, the toolpusher, the driller,

10:09AM

we could have avoided all of this, all of this.

10:09AM

10:09AM

failure to take that action, that simple action, that act alone

10:09AM

constituted willful misconduct.

10:09AM

10:09AM

the record that we have, Your Honor, the best we can do as

10:09AM

attorneys is present a snapshot of the evidence to the Court;

10:09AM

but, if we're looking for a snapshot that shows how and why BP

10:09AM

10

is the primary cause for this disaster, we point to evidence of

10:09AM

11

a corporate culture of disregard for safety that laid the

10:09AM

12

foundation for all that happened on April 20 on that rig.

10:09AM

13

10:10AM

14

the well team leader for the Macondo well.

10:10AM

15

the well site leaders, Mr. Vidrine and Mr. Kaluza, reported

10:10AM

16

directly to Mr. Guide in Houston.

10:10AM

17

10:10AM

18

Guide, reported to David Sims, his boss at BP headquarters in

10:10AM

19

Houston.

10:10AM

20

10:10AM

21

days before the blowout, Guide sent Sims an extraordinary

10:10AM

22

document that explains as much as any single piece of evidence

10:10AM

23

in this entire case that Your Honor will hear why eleven men

10:10AM

24

needlessly lost their lives and why this catastrophe of an oil

10:10AM

25

spill began.

The evidence will show, Your Honor, that BP's

In an opening like this, and with the volume of

The evidence will show that BP made John Guide


It will show that

The evidence will show that the well team leader,

It will show that on April 17, 2010, only three

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

76

10:10AM

Mr. Roy mentioned this e-mail.

I'll very briefly

10:10AM

going through it.

10:10AM

well site leaders had finally come to their wits end, that BP

10:11AM

well site leaders were flying by the seat of their pants.

10:11AM

10:11AM

driving chaos.

10:11AM

trying to make sense of all the insanity.

10:11AM

within three days became literal prophecy, Guide finished, "the

10:11AM

operation is not going to succeed if we continue in this

10:11AM

10

10:11AM

11

10:11AM

12

Guide's boss, responded to Guide by telling him that he had to

10:11AM

13

go to dance practice in a few minutes.

10:11AM

14

told him that the engineer who used the word "insanity" to

10:11AM

15

describe this operation needed to be reminded that, quote, it

10:11AM

16

was a great learning opportunity.

10:12AM

17

the same issues or worse exist anywhere else.

10:12AM

18

10:12AM

19

10:12AM

20

10:12AM

21

didn't succeed.

10:12AM

22

testimony of BP's own witnesses that BP should have shut down

10:12AM

23

the Macondo operation at the moment, that moment, when Guide

10:12AM

24

sent the e-mail to Sims.

10:12AM

25

On April 17, Guide told Sims that the BP

Guide described a huge level of paranoia that was


He talked about another BP Macondo engineer
In a sentence that

manner."
The evidence will show that the same day, Sims,

It will show that Sims

It will be over soon.

That

He finished by telling Guide, I'll be back soon,


and we can talk.

We are dancing to the Village People.

Well, the operation, as we know, Your Honor,


The evidence will show through the sworn

The evidence will show in Sims's own testimony


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

77

10:12AM

that he didn't shut down the operation either after dance

10:12AM

practice or before the well blew out, even in response to words

10:12AM

like paranoia, chaos and insanity.

10:12AM

10:12AM

refused to give a straight answer in deposition to the simple

10:12AM

question of whether he and Guide, the Macondo well team leader,

10:13AM

had more responsibility for safety aboard the Deepwater Horizon

10:13AM

than the rig's cook or its bed maker.

10:13AM

10:13AM

10

that was, to use their words, flying by the seat of the pants,

10:13AM

11

had far deeper problems, that stopping the operation was not

10:13AM

12

the BP way.

10:13AM

13

10:13AM

14

people, profits before safety, and profits before the

10:13AM

15

environment.

10:13AM

16

drove its people, was, as Mr. Roy mentioned, time is money, and

10:13AM

17

every dollars counts.

10:13AM

18

10:13AM

19

be that time is money, and every dollars counts were the

10:13AM

20

bludgeons that sacrificed safety, the weapons that drove people

10:14AM

21

to save money at the cost of people's lives.

10:14AM

22

10:14AM

23

safety and what drove people to use words like "chaos" and

10:14AM

24

"insanity" to describe this high hazard, high risk BP

10:14AM

25

operation, the easiest example is the Macondo well itself.

In fact, Sims's testimony will show that he

But the evidence will show that a BP operation

The evidence will show that BP put profits before

It will show that the BP way, the way that BP

The story that will be told by this evidence will

If we want to grasp this culture of profit over

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

78

10:14AM

The evidence will show that BP was tens of

10:14AM

millions, 50 million according to Mr. Roy, over its budget of

10:14AM

one hundred million dollars to drill the Macondo well, and that

10:14AM

it was spending nearly a million dollars a day for every day

10:14AM

the rig stayed onsite.

10:14AM

10:14AM

dollars saved for BP.

10:14AM

million.

10:14AM

10:14AM

10

have made during the last days of the rig, such as those

10:14AM

11

dealing with the cement job, with the float collar, with the

10:15AM

12

negative pressure test, with the Guide/Sims e-mail, the

10:15AM

13

evidence will show that those decisions were not made because

10:15AM

14

they would have caused delayed and, most importantly to BP,

10:15AM

15

money.

10:15AM

16

10:15AM

17

this trial make the point about profit over safety better than

10:15AM

18

anyone in this courtroom ever can or ever could."

10:15AM

19

10:15AM

20

example, one example of the culture that pervaded BP's

10:15AM

21

operation of the Macondo, the evidence will show that Mark

10:15AM

22

Hafle, the same BP engineer in Houston who talked to the rig in

10:15AM

23

its last and final hour, Hafle knew before the disaster, quote,

10:15AM

24

the cement design was on the ragged edge, closed quote -- and

10:15AM

25

pardon the language, Your Honor -- that he knew that, quote, we

So a safety corner cut, a day saved was a million


10 days, 10 million.

20 days, 20

Decisions that any safety minded company would

BP's own words:

"The evidence that we'll see in

As an example, and I stress this is only an

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

79

10:15AM

are going to get a shitty cement job, closed quote.

That's

10:16AM

Mr. Hafle.

10:16AM

10:16AM

alarm ringing down the halls of BP headquarters, not even

10:16AM

close.

10:16AM

10:16AM

redoing it with a new cement job could have cost delays worth

10:16AM

millions of dollars to BP.

10:16AM

Instead, the evidence will show that only days

10:16AM

10

before the blowout and eleven deaths, another BP engineer in

10:16AM

11

Houston, Brett Cocales -- e-mail is up on the screen -- made

10:16AM

12

the infamous, unforgiveable statement that by the end of this

10:16AM

13

trial will stand as the summation of BP's safety culture at

10:16AM

14

Macondo:

10:16AM

15

probably be fine, and we'll get a good cement job."

10:16AM

16

10:16AM

17

was concerned about.

10:16AM

18

testimony of Dr. Allen Huffman, that BP violated mandatory

10:17AM

19

federal regulations and critical safety practices over the

10:17AM

20

course of drilling the Macondo well, regulations and safety

10:17AM

21

procedures that require operators to maintain what is called a

10:17AM

22

safe drilling margin.

10:17AM

23

10:17AM

24

means in terms of fundamental drilling and safety issues; but

10:17AM

25

what will become apparent through the evidence is that BP

The evidence will show that to BP that wasn't an

The evidence will show that doing it right and

"But who cares, it's done, end of story, will

But it wasn't only millions of dollars that BP


The evidence will also show, through the

Dr. Huffman will explain what drilling margin

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

80

10:17AM

drilled and pushed this well beyond safe drilling margin

10:17AM

limits, in violation of law, all because it feared that if it

10:17AM

told the MMS what it was doing on this well, MMS could shut

10:17AM

down the operation, and BP would stand to lose not only the one

10:17AM

hundred million or whatever the amount is plus that it had

10:17AM

already spent drilling Macondo, but it could loose the

10:17AM

potential of billions, that's billions with a B, billions of

10:18AM

dollars of profit from the production well they hoped to get.

10:18AM

10:18AM

10

ever begrudge BP or anyone from wanting to make a profit.

10:18AM

11

That's not an issue in the case, not even remotely.

10:18AM

12

Instead, what the evidence and the testimony will

10:18AM

13

show is that reckless actions amounting to gross negligence and

10:18AM

14

the willful misconduct were tolerated by BP, sometimes

10:18AM

15

encouraged by BP to squeeze extra profit out of every decision,

10:18AM

16

out of every well, including this well.

10:18AM

17

10:18AM

18

this well, and especially in the final days and hours of the

10:18AM

19

Deepwater Horizon, the evidence will show that at every fork in

10:18AM

20

the road, BP chose time and money over safety in the operation

10:18AM

21

of what the rig crew called this "well from hell."

10:19AM

22

10:19AM

23

needed to do have the integrity and the responsibility to own

10:19AM

24

up to the ongoing dangers and its own mistakes, just like Hafle

10:19AM

25

and Vidrine needed to do in the last hour of the rig.

Now, no plaintiff here in this courtroom will

That repeated multiple times in the operation of

Witnesses will testify in this courtroom that BP

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

81

10:19AM

But it will show that BP, from company men in the

10:19AM

well to senior managers ashore, refused to deviate from a

10:19AM

course of a corporate culture of recklessness that was

10:19AM

chartered in board rooms in Houston and London.

10:19AM

10:19AM

evidence will show that their actions spoke louder than words

10:19AM

and demonstrated the same reckless behavior that's shown in the

10:19AM

words, "who cares, it's done, probably be fine," written on

10:19AM

that screen and the Guide/Sims e-mails and in Hafle's and

10:19AM

10

10:19AM

11

10:20AM

12

find that BP put people in charge of the Macondo well that

10:20AM

13

weren't functionaries.

10:20AM

14

changing oil at the BP corner service station.

10:20AM

15

BP operation, deepwater drilling of a well like Macondo that

10:20AM

16

had the destructive power to do exactly what we've seen in this

10:20AM

17

case, deaths, injuries, a rig at the bottom of the Gulf of

10:20AM

18

Mexico, economic and environmental devastation, along the swath

10:20AM

19

of Gulf Coast states and communities, and the power to cause an

10:20AM

20

oil spill that even has its own name.

10:20AM

21

10:20AM

22

tragedy of this case, and as the evidence will show, is that

10:20AM

23

the explosions, the death, everything that followed, could be

10:20AM

24

explained as being caused by some of the simple, easiest to

10:20AM

25

understand things imaginable that we'll understand in this

As people BP's men continued on that course, the

Vidrine's abdication of responsibility in the last hour.


During the course of this trial, Your Honor will

They weren't guys pumping gas and


They headed the

But the tragedy of this case, Your Honor, the

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

82

10:20AM

court by the end of trial, failures that should not have

10:21AM

happened, that with even a simple amount of care should never

10:21AM

have happened.

10:21AM

10:21AM

of money saved to execute so many of the cost cutters, the cost

10:21AM

savings, the short cuts, didn't even amount to pocket change in

10:21AM

the operation of this magnitude with this many millions of

10:21AM

dollars.

10:21AM

10:21AM

10

put out its story of why this strategy happened.

10:21AM

11

Report, as Mr. Roy pointed out, that will be Exhibit 1 in this

10:21AM

12

trial.

10:21AM

13

appendices.

10:21AM

14

10:21AM

15

exhibit, all 769 of them, all the footnotes and all the fine

10:21AM

16

print, you won't find a mention, not a whisper, not a hint, of

10:21AM

17

the deeper systemic and corporate management causes, BP culture

10:22AM

18

of corporate recklessness like we see in the Guide/Sims

10:22AM

19

e-mails, the Cocales e-mail and the ones like it.

10:22AM

20

10:22AM

21

events that happened on the rig during its last few days and

10:22AM

22

hours.

10:22AM

23

will show that when BP declared the negative pressure test a

10:22AM

24

success, it was wrong, recklessly and grossly wrong.

10:22AM

25

one failed test isn't even close to being the only cause of the

At worst, the evidence will show that the amount

Now, BP published its internal investigation and


The Bly

It consists of 190 pages and another 569 pages of

But, Your Honor, if you read every page of that

Much of this trial, the evidence will look at

As for the immediate rig-based causes, the evidence

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

But that

83

10:22AM

Deepwater Horizon tragedy.

10:22AM

10:22AM

taken from BP's own internal investigation, the Bly Report,

10:22AM

which claimed to trace the causes of the Deepwater Horizon

10:22AM

tragedy to a series of interrelated causes, when taken

10:22AM

together, caused the accident.

10:22AM

10:23AM

coming up, but it's the far left slice; the failure of the

10:23AM

float collar, the second from the left; the failed negative

10:23AM

10

test; the failure to monitor and control the well; all the way

10:23AM

11

to the far right, the failure of the BOP to close in the well.

10:23AM

12

Now, according to BP's own accident model, which

10:23AM

13

you see on the screen, each causation slice lined up in an

10:23AM

14

unbroken sequence and created a chain of causation, a direct

10:23AM

15

line through all of these holes that led to the disaster.

10:23AM

16

According to BP's own model, this evidence on the

10:23AM

17

screen, and according to the testimony you'll hear from the Bly

10:23AM

18

Report's namesake, if even one of the causation holes hadn't --

10:23AM

19

or slices hadn't lined up, then the Gulf oil spill never would

10:23AM

20

have happened.

10:23AM

21

10:24AM

22

been interpreted correctly by BP and it was discovered the

10:24AM

23

cement job had failed, BP's own highly respected drilling

10:24AM

24

expert, Dr. Azar, and BP's own cement expert, Mr. Calvert, will

10:24AM

25

testify that this blowout and all that followed never would

This evidence up on the screen, Your Honor, is

For example, the failure of cement, which isn't

For example, if the negative pressure test had

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

84

10:24AM

have happened.

Your Honor, this is what BP's expert witnesses

10:24AM

will say.

10:24AM

10:24AM

because it, more than any one single reason, was the immediate

10:24AM

rig-based cause of this tragedy.

10:24AM

10:24AM

systemic corporate and management causes that allowed the

10:24AM

separate mechanical failures to happen, the evidence will also

10:24AM

prove BP's liability for willful misconduct.

10:24AM

10

10:24AM

11

sued BP for simple penalties under the Clean Water Act, which

10:24AM

12

is consequences for willful misconduct as well as gross

10:25AM

13

negligence.

10:25AM

14

10:25AM

15

standards as two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, the evidence that

10:25AM

16

we'll present at trial and BP's own accident model, this model,

10:25AM

17

fit the law of willful misconduct under the Clean Water Act is

10:25AM

18

perfectly matched pieces.

10:25AM

19

10:25AM

20

Your Honor, we ask that the Court examine each piece of

10:25AM

21

evidence against the Clean Water Act's legal standard of

10:25AM

22

willful misconduct, which says that an accumulation of acts, a

10:25AM

23

chain of circumstances that were contributing causes, like

10:25AM

24

those we see in BP's own Bly Report and this model, this

10:25AM

25

accumulation of acts constitute willful misconduct even if no

We'll come back to the negative pressure test

Leaving aside the model's emission of the

United States, as Your Honor has pointed out, has

If we think of the factual evidence and the legal

When we present this evidence during the trial,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

85

10:25AM

single one of those causes was the immediate cause, and even if

10:25AM

no single one of them standing alone would rise to the level of

10:26AM

willful misconduct.

10:26AM

This legal standard of the chain of causation and

10:26AM

willful misconduct under the Clean Water Act is describing BP's

10:26AM

own accident model.

10:26AM

10:26AM

only skim the surface of the evidence that will establish BP's

10:26AM

ownership of each of these interrelated pieces of the willful

10:26AM

10

10:26AM

11

I don't think my arrow is working.

10:26AM

12

The first, on the left, Your Honor, is BP's

10:26AM

13

representation of the first causal chain in their model, which

10:26AM

14

is cement.

10:26AM

15

10:26AM

16

the well until a production rig would later come and start

10:26AM

17

pumping oil.

10:26AM

18

during trial, is to prevent oil and gas from pressuring into

10:26AM

19

the casing and causing a blowout during the temporary

10:27AM

20

abandonment.

10:27AM

21

10:27AM

22

focusing on the cement job.

10:27AM

23

disingenuous, at best.

10:27AM

24

10:27AM

25

Now, in the limited time for this opening, we can

misconduct chain of liability.


There we go.

BP was in the process of temporarily abandoning

The purpose of the cement job, as we'll hear

Now, BP will attempt to shift blame to others by


I'll suggest that that attempt is

The evidence will show that it's simply a fact


that cement jobs sometimes are unsuccessful, but a bad cement
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

86

10:27AM

job doesn't equal a blowout.

10:27AM

10:27AM

provide a barrier to hydrocarbons, they test it.

10:27AM

with a negative pressure test.

10:27AM

with a negative pressure test and botched the test.

10:27AM

10:27AM

risks that compromised the cement job and that it ignored

10:27AM

warnings from Halliburton and its own in-house BP cement

10:27AM

expert.

10:28AM

10

cares, it's done, probably be fine" e-mail.

10:28AM

11

the risk as running fewer centralizers that had been

10:28AM

12

recommended by Halliburton.

10:28AM

13

10:28AM

14

that point, particularly on the cement job, witnesses will

10:28AM

15

testify that BP should have put the rig crew on heightened

10:28AM

16

alert before the negative pressure test; that BP should have

10:28AM

17

warned them, had the duty, the obligation, the responsibility

10:28AM

18

to warn them before the negative pressure test of BP's own

10:28AM

19

concerns about the cement job.

10:28AM

20

not do that.

10:28AM

21

10:28AM

22

Again, my pointer doesn't work.

10:28AM

23

the left is the flow collar, Your Honor.

10:28AM

24

10:28AM

25

Before safe operators rely upon a cement job to


They test it

BP tested the Macondo cement

The evidence will show that BP took multiple

BP's attitude was epitomized in the callous "who


It acknowledged

Considering the risks that BP had undertaken to

The evidence will show they did

BP also bears responsibility for the flow collar.


It's this second slice from

The flow collar was supposed to keep the cement


in place and prevent it from flowing back into the casing while
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

87

10:29AM

the cement set up and formed a barrier to hydrocarbons.

10:29AM

10:29AM

problems in what is called converting the flow collar and

10:29AM

making it work.

10:29AM

the device.

10:29AM

increasing amounts of pressure to the flow collar.

10:29AM

10:29AM

equipment was that a critical component could fail at

10:29AM

1,300 pounds per square inch.

10:29AM

10

go to the service station, fill the tires in our car, call it

10:29AM

11

32, 40 pounds.

10:29AM

12

10:29AM

13

1,800 pounds of pressure above the 1,300-pound design

10:29AM

14

limitation.

10:29AM

15

10:30AM

16

BP's well site leaders, Mr. Kaluza, told people aboard the rig,

10:30AM

17

quote, I was afraid something had blown, close quote.

10:30AM

18

words.

10:30AM

19

10:30AM

20

engineer, Brian Morel, who was also on the rig and who has also

10:30AM

21

taken the Fifth Amendment, stated, as we see, quote, Yeah, we

10:30AM

22

blew it at 3,140.

10:30AM

23

quote.

10:30AM

24

10:30AM

25

As the witnesses will explain, BP had severe

Nine different attempts were made to convert

Each of those attempts involved applying

But one of the design limitations of the

As a point of reference, when we

1,300 pounds was the design limitation.

BP applied 3,142 pounds of pressure.

Over

Testimony will show that at that point, one of

His

The evidence will show that yet another BP

Still not sure what we blew yet, close

That's Mr. Morel.


The evidence will show that despite BP's own

concerns, as we've just seen, about having blown something, to


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

88

10:30AM

use their words, BP did not standdown the operation and take

10:30AM

the time to see what they had blown.

10:30AM

10:30AM

will testify about BP's responsibility for the negative

10:30AM

pressure test, well monitoring and well response; third, fourth

10:30AM

and fifth slices of the causal chain until BP's accident model.

10:31AM

10:31AM

the central and obvious evidence.

10:31AM

three nautical miles, from the bottom of the well up to the

10:31AM

10

rig, 18,000 feet.

10:31AM

11

from here to City Park in New Orleans.

10:31AM

12

casing through 5,000 feet of ocean and marine riser, and

10:31AM

13

finally blew out on to the Deepwater Horizon before either of

10:31AM

14

BP's well site leaders were aware of the blowout.

10:31AM

15

10:31AM

16

regulation 30 C.F.R. 250.401, which required BP, required BP to

10:31AM

17

take all necessary precautions to keep the well under control

10:31AM

18

at all times.

10:31AM

19

10:31AM

20

40 barrels of oil is considered a major kick that must be

10:32AM

21

discovered in time to take action to prevent an uncontrolled

10:32AM

22

blowout.

10:32AM

23

10:32AM

24

by the moment the rig exploded a kick had become a blowout of

10:32AM

25

approximately 2,000 barrels, 84,000 gallons, 50 times more than

Dick Heenan, the United States' drilling expert,

For now it's enough to come back and point out


Oil and gas traveled

Point of reference, roughly the distance


Up 13,000 feet of well

Despite, despite the mandate of a federal

The evidence will show that a kick less than

The evidence will show that BP has admitted that

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

89

10:32AM

a 40-barrel kick they considered to be a major well control

10:32AM

event.

10:32AM

10:32AM

responsibility for other causation slices, including the BOP's

10:32AM

failure to shut in the well.

10:32AM

10:32AM

Your Honor.

10:32AM

final slice.

10:32AM

10:32AM

10

already, the BOP is the last barrier to protect human life in

10:32AM

11

the environment.

10:32AM

12

without fail.

10:33AM

13

federal regulation as the operator of the Macondo well to,

10:33AM

14

quote, Maintain your BOP system to ensure that the equipment

10:33AM

15

function properly, close quote.

10:33AM

16

10:33AM

17

Transocean for the BOP, but the evidence will establish that

10:33AM

18

for five years, stemming from rig audits in 2005, 2008, and

10:33AM

19

2009, BP believed and understood that it had significant

10:33AM

20

maintenance problems with the BOP.

10:33AM

21

drilling the "well from hell," in an area with no kick

10:33AM

22

tolerance and little to no room for mistakes, BP barreled ahead

10:33AM

23

and gambled with a piece of major equipment that was the last

10:33AM

24

line of defense to protect against an uncontrolled blowout.

10:33AM

25

We'll hear other evidence concerning BP's

Since my pointer isn't working, I'll use this,


The BOP on BP's accident model is that last and

In an emergency, as Mr. Roy has pointed out

So it has to function, has to function

Precisely for that reason, BP was required by

Now, BOP -- pardon me, BP will attempt to blame

Yet, despite knowing it was

But of all the evidence the Court will hear, and


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

90

10:34AM

all the different slices of the causal chain of failures in

10:34AM

BP's own accident model, the evidence will show that none was

10:34AM

so critical and none was so thoroughly and grossly botched as

10:34AM

the negative pressure test.

10:34AM

10:34AM

one test had been the done right, this one simple test, it

10:34AM

would have prevented the blowout, the deaths, and everything

10:34AM

else that followed, despite the things that had already gone

10:34AM

wrong, like the cement job.

10:34AM

10

The evidence will show that shortly before

10:34AM

11

8:00 p.m. on April 20th, BP and Transocean completed the

10:34AM

12

negative pressure test of the Macondo well's casing.

10:34AM

13

negative pressure test was a safety critical test.

10:34AM

14

safety critical test to determine whether the cement pumped

10:35AM

15

into the bottom of the hole less than 18 hours before would

10:35AM

16

stop oil and gas from pressuring into the casing, and if

10:35AM

17

unchecked, create an uncontrolled blowout.

10:35AM

18

10:35AM

19

negative pressure test, and there is simply not enough time now

10:35AM

20

to describe the different tests and all that occurred.

10:35AM

21

purposes now, the evidence will show that all BP needed to know

10:35AM

22

is what's on the right-hand side of this slide.

10:35AM

23

10:35AM

24

One, no flow out of the well when it was opened up during the

10:35AM

25

test; or, two, no pressure buildup when the well was closed in.

As even BP's own witnesses will testify, if this

The

The last

The Court will hear a great deal about the

For our

Once the test was set up, there should have been:

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

91

10:35AM

As witnesses will explain, this test is

10:35AM

exceedingly simple and is pass/fail.

10:35AM

It's not an essay exam.

10:36AM

present, flow or pressure buildup, the test is a failure.

10:36AM

10:36AM

pressure test monitored pressures on two pipes:

10:36AM

and the kill line.

10:36AM

10:36AM

10:36AM

10

right-hand slide has an pressure reading of zero.

10:36AM

11

other lines here that we aren't going to be going through for

10:36AM

12

the negative test.

10:36AM

13

The kill line, which they are also monitoring,

10:36AM

14

finally, is this other one here on the very right-hand side,

10:36AM

15

that on the right-hand side of the slide also has a zero

10:36AM

16

pressure reading.

10:36AM

17

To have a successful test when it was lined up

10:36AM

18

like this, the evidence will show that all BP needed to know

10:36AM

19

was that the pressure on both pipes had to be zero; repeat,

10:36AM

20

zero.

10:36AM

21

10:37AM

22

and the other pipe had pressure, like the graphic on the

10:37AM

23

left-hand side of the slide, then the test was a failure.

10:37AM

24

Because pressure potentially meant that oil and gas were

10:37AM

25

pressuring into the well and threatening to blow it out, which

It's not multiple choice.

If either of those elements are

The evidence will show that the final negative


The drill pipe

Using the example here, Your Honor, the drill


pipe is the center of the casing going up, and on this
There are

The evidence will show that if one pipe read zero

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

92

10:37AM

is exactly what happened.

10:37AM

10:37AM

courtroom, Your Honor, every expert witness who will testify in

10:37AM

this courtroom, every investigative report that is admitted

10:37AM

into evidence by Your Honor in this trial, and every witness

10:37AM

who was asked the question in deposition, testified that you

10:37AM

can't have a successful negative pressure test if both

10:37AM

pressures aren't zero.

10:37AM

10:37AM

10

that this is something he would expect his first-year students

10:37AM

11

to understand.

10:38AM

12

lines, as in the graphic on the right, the evidence will show

10:38AM

13

that BP saw 1,400 pounds of pressure on the drill pipe and zero

10:38AM

14

on the kill line, what's up there on the left-hand side of the

10:38AM

15

slide.

10:38AM

16

be considered a success and that the well could be flowing.

10:38AM

17

Instead, the evidence will be undisputed that

10:38AM

18

BP's two company men, well site leaders Kaluza and Vidrine,

10:38AM

19

disregarded the differential pressure and approved the test

10:38AM

20

based upon a nonexistent theory called the bladder effect.

10:38AM

21

10:38AM

22

proposed by Transocean crewmen.

10:38AM

23

this nonexistence phenomenon, BP's two well site leaders bought

10:38AM

24

into it lock, stock and barrel.

10:38AM

25

Every fact witness who will testify in this

BP's own drilling expert, Dr. Azar, testified

But instead of pressure, zero pressure on both

That meant, without any doubt, that the test could not

Now, we expect BP to claim that the theory was


But whatever the source of

As the experts and the percipient witnesses will


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

93

10:39AM

testify, without any exception, the theory is incomprehensible

10:39AM

and makes absolutely no sense from engineering, drilling or

10:39AM

even common sense perspectives.

10:39AM

10:39AM

equivocation, that no such phenomenon could be discovered.

10:39AM

fact, Mr. Bly himself is expected to testify that his

10:39AM

investigation spent approximately $10 million and used

10:39AM

approximately 50 people, yet still could find no evidence, no

10:39AM

evidence whatsoever, of the bladder effect, and that BP's well

10:39AM

10

site leaders, what they had used to justify to turn out, turned

10:39AM

11

out to be a deadly decision.

10:39AM

12

10:39AM

13

team could find no evidence this phenomenon is possible,

10:39AM

14

leaving the 1,400 psi unexplained unless it was caused by

10:39AM

15

pressure from the reservoir.

10:40AM

16

10:40AM

17

this case, looked at well site leader Kaluza's attempt to

10:40AM

18

explain the nonexistent bladder effect and summed it up here,

10:40AM

19

eloquently, with nothing but question marks, 560 of them.

10:40AM

20

10:40AM

21

leaders, who had the final authority to approve the test or

10:40AM

22

reject it, called it successful.

10:40AM

23

success despite the 1,400 on the drill pipe.

10:40AM

24

10:40AM

25

As we'll show, BP's Bly Report admits, without


In

As BP's own report explained, the investigation

One BP executive, who is expected to testify in

The evidence will show that BP's well site

They declared the test a

And the evidence will then show that BP proceeded


with its next decision, which displaced mud in the riser to
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

94

10:40AM

lighter seawater and severely underbalanced the well and

10:40AM

allowed it to flow.

10:40AM

and explosions and set the rig afire like a Roman candle.

10:40AM

10:40AM

BP of the negative pressure test under these circumstances was

10:41AM

so far outside the bounds of any reasonable judgment to be

10:41AM

constituted gross negligence, but the evidence against BP will,

10:41AM

in fact, show far, far more.

10:41AM

10:41AM

10

8:52 p.m., less than an hour after the approval of the negative

10:41AM

11

pressure test, and less than an hour before the first explosion

10:41AM

12

on the rig, Hafle and Vidrine had a telephone conversation that

10:41AM

13

should have stopped the chain of events, prevented the need for

10:41AM

14

this trial.

10:41AM

15

save 11 lives and prevent the Gulf oil spill, did absolutely

10:41AM

16

nothing.

10:41AM

17

10:41AM

18

men began their call, the evidence will show and BP's Bly

10:41AM

19

Report admits, that high pressure oil began flowing into the

10:42AM

20

well approximately three miles below the rig floor on the

10:42AM

21

Deepwater Horizon.

10:42AM

22

At that same moment, according to what BP's own

10:42AM

23

documents will show, the BP man in Houston, Hafle, called the

10:42AM

24

well site leader on the rig, Vidrine, and the two men talked

10:42AM

25

for ten full minutes.

The action that set in motion the blowout

The evidence will establish that this approval by

Documents and testimony will show that at

Instead, both men, armed with knowledge that could

At 8:52, at almost the exact same moment the two

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

95

10:42AM

The evidence will show that Vidrine talked to

10:42AM

Hafle about the negative pressure tests; that Vidrine told

10:42AM

Hafle that the crew had zero pressure on the kill line, but

10:42AM

that they still had pressure on the drill pipe.

10:42AM

Vidrine that he couldn't have pressure on the drill pipe and

10:42AM

zero pressure on the kill line in a test that's properly lined

10:42AM

up.

10:42AM

10:42AM

evidence concerning the actions and inactions of BP's well site

10:43AM

10

leaders, the senior drilling engineer in Houston, in that final

10:43AM

11

hour of the rig, will be among the clearest, most irrefutable

10:43AM

12

pieces of evidence in this trial that show BP's primary

10:43AM

13

responsibility for the blowout and everything that followed.

10:43AM

14

The evidence will show that BP's man in Houston,

10:43AM

15

Hafle, understood the obvious and correctly told the well site

10:43AM

16

leader on the rig that the negative pressure test that BP had

10:43AM

17

approved only an hour before couldn't be considered a success.

10:43AM

18

10:43AM

19

absolutely nothing to countermand the well site leader's

10:43AM

20

disastrous conclusion that, quote, He was fully satisfied that

10:43AM

21

the rig crew had performed a successful negative test.

10:43AM

22

10:43AM

23

believed that the cement design was on the ragged edge and had

10:43AM

24

used a swear word to describe the cement job that the negative

10:44AM

25

pressure test was supposed to be testing.

Hafle told

This exchange between these two BP men and other

But the evidence will show that Hafle did

The evidence will show that Hafle, who already

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

It will show that

96

10:44AM

Hafle didn't tell Vidrine the obvious:

Full stop.

Shut it in.

10:44AM

Do it again.

10:44AM

10:44AM

10:44AM

10:44AM

evidence will show that he already knew that the final negative

10:44AM

pressure test had 1,400 on the drill pipe and zero on the kill

10:44AM

line, and he had just been told by one of BP's senior men in

10:44AM

Houston that that can't be.

10:44AM

10

10:44AM

11

BP's well site leader flunked the all-critical safety test when

10:44AM

12

he approved it shortly before 8:00 p.m.; but, worse, he was

10:44AM

13

given the right answer, the right answer by Hafle an hour

10:44AM

14

later, and he was given a chance to undo the previous

10:44AM

15

disastrous mistake he had already made.

10:44AM

16

10:45AM

17

and immediately order the test be rerun?

10:45AM

18

show that he didn't.

10:45AM

19

ordering the well shut in while he investigated what it was

10:45AM

20

doing?

10:45AM

21

10:45AM

22

toolpusher?

10:45AM

23

the rig anywhere?

10:45AM

24

10:45AM

25

The evidence will show that Hafle did nothing


like that.
Now, what about well site leader Vidrine?

The

In other words, the evidence will establish that

So did BP's well site leader get off the phone


The evidence will

Did he protect the rig and the crew by

The evidence, Your Honor, will be that he didn't.


Did he warn the driller?

Did he warn the

Did he warn anybody on the rig floor?

Anybody on

The evidence will show that he didn't.

In fact, there won't be a scrap of evidence, no


testimony, any document at all to show that Vidrine did
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

97

10:45AM

anything at all in that last hour after hanging up the phone

10:45AM

with Vidrine -- with Hafle, to take any action to reverse the

10:45AM

deadly blowout that was already underway miles below the floor

10:45AM

of the rig.

10:45AM

10:46AM

the evidence will show that the greatest tragedy, the saddest

10:46AM

tragedy and the tragic irony is the fact that if Hafle had

10:46AM

ordered Vidrine immediately to find the reason for the failed

10:46AM

negative test, or if Vidrine had done it on his own as he was

10:46AM

10

supposed to, the very actions that would have been taken would

10:46AM

11

have saved the rig, the men's lives and the oil spill,

10:46AM

12

prevented the oil spill.

10:46AM

13

10:46AM

14

show, that in order to re-perform the negative pressure test,

10:46AM

15

the BOP would have been shut in, just as it had been during the

10:46AM

16

earlier negative pressure test.

10:46AM

17

well before oil and gas passed above the BOP stack and barreled

10:46AM

18

up the riser like an explosive time bomb counting down to zero,

10:46AM

19

which is exactly what the well had become.

10:46AM

20

10:46AM

21

BP's two men, or either one of them had done their jobs, simple

10:47AM

22

jobs, jobs that were their responsibility, Deepwater Horizon

10:47AM

23

tragedy and an environmental disaster we call the Gulf Oil

10:47AM

24

Spill would never have happened.

10:47AM

25

In a case that is already filled with tragedy,

And the reason for that is, the evidence will

That would have shut in the

Make no mistake, the evidence will show that if

The blowout would have stopped right here at the


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

98

10:47AM

end of the negative pressure test, on this slice of BP's own

10:47AM

accident model.

10:47AM

10:47AM

ended their call at 9:02 p.m., ten minutes after the well began

10:47AM

to flow.

10:47AM

the explosive mass of oil and gas didn't pass the BOP and enter

10:47AM

the riser until approximately 9:38 p.m.

10:47AM

10:47AM

10:48AM

10

conclusion of the phone call between BP Houston and its well

10:48AM

11

site leader to close in the well through normal operation of

10:48AM

12

the BOP.

10:48AM

13

10:48AM

14

hung up the phone at 9:02 p.m., the people on the rig, the rig

10:48AM

15

itself, and the Gulf and its people had 47 minutes before oil

10:48AM

16

and gas exploded out of the riser and changed, in some cases

10:48AM

17

ended, lives.

10:48AM

18

10:48AM

19

just described weren't the result of an accident, or mere

10:48AM

20

negligence or even gross negligence, which it was, but it was

10:48AM

21

the result of willful misconduct, for not only was it within

10:48AM

22

BP's power to prevent the tragedy, it was its responsibility.

10:48AM

23

Now, to be sure, BP will argue that the blowout

10:48AM

24

was the fault of the Transocean crewmen, who worked under BP's

10:48AM

25

well site leaders and followed their orders during the negative

Instead BP did nothing.

The evidence will show that Hafle and Vidrine

The evidence, such as BP's Bly Report, will show that

Witnesses will testify that that means both BP


and the rig crew would have had over a full half hour after the

The evidence will show that when BP's two men

The evidence will show that those actions we've

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

99

10:49AM

pressure test that went so horribly wrong.

But the evidence

10:49AM

will show, it will be proved that if even some of those

10:49AM

Transocean crewmen bore responsibility for what happened, they

10:49AM

paid for those mistakes with their lives.

10:49AM

employed by Transocean, some not, had nothing to do with the

10:49AM

negative pressure test and made no mistakes for which they

10:49AM

could ever be held to pay.

10:49AM

10:49AM

10:49AM

10

lives when the evidence will show, without a sliver or a shadow

10:49AM

11

of a doubt, that BP could have saved them, could have saved

10:49AM

12

every plaintiff in this courtroom, every defendant in this

10:49AM

13

courtroom, the Gulf from this disaster, with something as short

10:49AM

14

as a ten-second phone call to the rig floor, to the driller,

10:50AM

15

Dewey Rivette; the toolpusher, Jason Anderson, saying something

10:50AM

16

as simple as:

10:50AM

17

10:50AM

18

willful misconduct lightly, Your Honor.

10:50AM

19

seriousness of those allegations.

10:50AM

20

11 people died as a result of multiple interconnected faults of

10:50AM

21

BP and others.

10:50AM

22

10:50AM

23

of people across the Gulf States suffered injuries to their

10:50AM

24

livelihood.

10:50AM

25

millions of people depend, directly and indirectly, for their

And other men, some

But the point is that none of them, not a single


one of those men should have paid for any mistake with their

Shut it in.

We're doing the test again.

We don't use words like gross negligence and


We understand the

But the fact that remains is

As a further consequence, many tens of thousands

The Gulf and the environment upon which tens of

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

100

10:50AM

food, their livelihoods, and their recreation, as well as the

10:50AM

birds, the fish, the marine and shoreline organisms, which

10:50AM

sustains the Gulf's complex ecosystem, sustain damage and

10:51AM

injuries which are still being measured, and will be tried in

10:51AM

later phases of this trial.

10:51AM

10:51AM

people aboard the Deepwater Horizon, were caused by actions on

10:51AM

and prior to April 20th, that cannot be seen as anything but

10:51AM

utterly inexcusable behavior.

10:51AM

10

10:51AM

11

Honor.

10:51AM

12

for the benefit of the families of the men who were killed,

10:51AM

13

justice for the people of the Gulf and for the money to help

10:51AM

14

heal and restore the precious environment that sustains this

10:51AM

15

Crescent City and the states, the cities, and the communities

10:51AM

16

all across the Gulf of Mexico.

10:51AM

17

10:51AM

18

10:51AM

19

10:51AM

20

10:51AM

21

10:52AM

22

10:52AM

23

Luther Strange, the Attorney General of the State of Alabama

10:52AM

24

and the liaison counsel for the Gulf States in this historic

10:52AM

25

litigation.

These damages, and not least the deaths to the

We look forward to putting on this evidence, Your


And by the end of the phases of trial, securing answers

Thank you very much.


THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Alabama.
OPENING STATEMENTS
BY MR. STRANGE:
May it please the Court, Your Honor.

I'm

It's my privilege to stand before you today on


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

101

10:52AM

behalf of Alabama and its nearly five million citizens.

10:52AM

10:52AM

detail the lingering economic and environmental devastation the

10:52AM

defendants inflicted on Alabama.

10:53AM

about those damages at the appropriate time, for they are

10:53AM

indeed great.

10:53AM

10:53AM

just one issue, who was at fault for the explosion and spill

10:53AM

that caused such unprecedented and catastrophic damages to the

10:53AM

10

10:53AM

11

10:53AM

12

the interest of the United States and the private plaintiffs.

10:53AM

13

Alabama, therefore, supports and affirms the descriptions of

10:53AM

14

facts and laws so well outlined by Mr. Roy and Mr. Underhill,

10:53AM

15

and I don't plan to duplicate their efforts this morning.

10:53AM

16

10:53AM

17

case against BP:

10:53AM

18

preventable.

10:53AM

19

towards the Gulf caused the spill.

10:54AM

20

10:54AM

21

that the risks of a deep-water blowout in the Gulf of Mexico

10:54AM

22

was great.

10:54AM

23

North Sea.

10:54AM

24

10:54AM

25

In due course, Your Honor, I'll have the opportunity to

But today I'll be brief.

I'll have a great deal to say

In this phase one we address

Gulf Coast?
On this issue, Alabama's interests align perfectly with

Instead, I offer two points that summarize our collective


One, the spill was both predictable and

Two, BP's culture of corporate callousness

On this first point, the evidence will show that BP knew

In fact, it was nine times greater than in the

BP also knew, and certainly should have known before the


blowout, that the centralizers would not centralize, the cement
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

102

10:54AM

will not cement, the controllers will not control, and the

10:54AM

blowout preventer would not prevent.

10:54AM

all of this, but BP was blinded by their bottom line.

10:54AM

10:54AM

10:54AM

10:54AM

Money mattered more than the environment.

10:54AM

than the thousands of jobs and businesses that were destroyed

10:55AM

all along the Gulf Coast.

10:55AM

10

lives of the 11 workers who lost their lives on the Horizon

10:55AM

11

rig.

10:55AM

12

10:55AM

13

10:55AM

14

10:55AM

15

coming weeks we will prove that BP acted with gross negligence

10:55AM

16

and willful misconduct, and that we'll prove the same level of

10:55AM

17

fault against two of BP's partners, Transocean and Halliburton.

10:55AM

18

10:55AM

19

trial to rule that all three, BP, Transocean, and Halliburton

10:55AM

20

are liable for punitive damages to the State of Alabama.

10:55AM

21

10:55AM

22

behalf of the victims of the Gulf disaster as this historic

10:56AM

23

case gets underway.

10:56AM

24

10:56AM

25

We'll show that BP knew

Which leads me, Judge, to my second point, the spill was


tragically inevitable due to BP's corporate culture.
The evidence will show that at BP money mattered most.
Money mattered more

Money even mattered more than the

Money mattered more to BP than the Gulf, much more.


Your Honor, the evidence will be clear and unmistakable,

greed devastated the Gulf.


Finally, Your Honor, I agree with Mr. Roy, that in the

For that reason, we'll ask the Court at the end of this

Again, Your Honor, it's a privilege to stand here on

Thank you.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Strange.

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

103

10:56AM

Mr. Caldwell.

Louisiana.

10:56AM

10:56AM

10:56AM

10:56AM

Court, I want to thank you and Magistrate Shushan and your

10:56AM

staff for consuming and exhaustive efforts in bringing this

10:56AM

landmark case to trial.

10:56AM

and those involved are all part of an effort for your entire

10:57AM

hard-working team.

10:57AM

10

10:57AM

11

McGovern and the parties for handling their clients' interests

10:57AM

12

in a professional manner, but after all, none of the lawyers so

10:57AM

13

far, as I know, were witnesses to this event.

10:57AM

14

here has a job to do.

10:57AM

15

own counsel and staff.

10:57AM

16

10:57AM

17

the benefit of the press and those who are watching, that we're

10:57AM

18

having a trial and it's important for the general public to

10:57AM

19

understand what we're doing.

10:57AM

20

10:57AM

21

as far as we're concerned, that our oil companies -- and

10:58AM

22

Louisiana is an oil and gas state -- that our companies are

10:58AM

23

conducting business in the safest possible manner.

10:58AM

24

don't do that, then it's our job as Attorney General

10:58AM

25

Luther Strange, myself, and the other lawyers, too, do what

OPENING STATEMENTS
BY MR. CALDWELL:
Your Honor, Judge Barbier, if it please the

The courtroom staff, the law clerks,

But I would also like to thank Special Master

And everybody

And having said that, I want to thank my


And we're here to do justice.

Trials are important.

This court has stated for

All citizens and workers should feel confident,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

When they

104

10:58AM

we're supposed to do so that they have to answer.

10:58AM

I have personally been executing my

10:58AM

responsibility as Attorney General from a couple of days out

10:58AM

when this rig happened, along with the other Attorney Generals

10:58AM

from the Gulf States; and with the help, I should say, of BP.

10:58AM

Mr. Jack Lynch is in the courtroom today from Texas.

10:58AM

10:58AM

knows, and in retrospect and in hindsight, is a tragic,

10:58AM

horrible event.

10:59AM

10

10:59AM

11

business, not just in the Gulf of Mexico, but in the world.

10:59AM

12

The second thing about this case is the gross

10:59AM

13

10:59AM

14

10:59AM

15

Louisiana, this was a no risk proposition for any oil to reach

10:59AM

16

Louisiana shores 48 miles away.

10:59AM

17

10:59AM

18

economy, and its ecology.

10:59AM

19

importantly, this disaster continues in various forms,

10:59AM

20

including continued pollution, higher unemployment, and the

10:59AM

21

need for increased social service.

10:59AM

22

30 miles from the door of this courthouse, Your Honor, over

11:00AM

23

212 miles of Louisiana coast are being polluted and continue to

11:00AM

24

be oiled, and in Gulf waters, especially Barataria Bay and

11:00AM

25

Breton Sound.

We worked together to try to solve what everybody

But this case is really about the cost of doing

underestimating the cost of doing that business.


For example, on the application to drill, BP told

The disaster has damaged Louisiana's people, its


I think that's clear.

But most

And today, less than

We continue to be adversely affected.


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

105

11:00AM

Our culture, of course, we know is unique in our

11:00AM

reliance on the Gulf; but, the other states, to a certain

11:00AM

extent, as well, our natural resources, our livelihood and

11:00AM

recreation.

11:00AM

11:00AM

it can't restore the ecosystem; but this trial can and will

11:00AM

show that BP and its contractors, all of them, all of the

11:00AM

contractors bear some responsibility.

11:00AM

negligent manner.

11:01AM

10

11:01AM

11

11:01AM

12

11:01AM

13

culture, but the law doesn't penalize culture, it penalizes

11:01AM

14

gross negligence.

11:01AM

15

of negligence.

11:01AM

16

11:01AM

17

11:01AM

18

11:01AM

19

OPA's limitation of liability, and certainly we appreciate

11:01AM

20

that.

11:01AM

21

the willful and wanton misconduct, and that this imposition of

11:01AM

22

punitive damages should be in the highest amount allowed by

11:01AM

23

law.

11:01AM

24

11:02AM

25

This trial can't bring back the 11 workers, and

They acted in a grossly

This disaster was totally and wholly avoidable,


as we heard Mr. Roy, Mr. Underhill state.
We've heard a lot about the problem of BP's

The culture, of course, causes an atmosphere

It recognizes that elevated risks warrant


elevated care.
BP has admitted liability under OPA and waived

Nevertheless, the evidence in this case is going to show

We want the Court to focus on, and we know it


will, the chaos that was BP's planning process and operations,
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

106

11:02AM

and including the botched negative pressure test that we know

11:02AM

is central, a central feature, the cement job disaster, and the

11:02AM

failed control and the well response.

11:02AM

11:02AM

about that, especially in detail from Mr. Roy.

11:02AM

that much, just that show that Transocean is liable under OPA

11:02AM

jointly and severally.

11:02AM

11:02AM

11:02AM

10

11:02AM

11

11:02AM

12

Louisiana.

11:02AM

13

burned off, and no attempt was made to capture this oil.

11:03AM

14

11:03AM

15

failure to monitor the well, to control the well, and for its

11:03AM

16

conduct, along with BP's, in the negative pressure test.

11:03AM

17

11:03AM

18

negative pressure test.

11:03AM

19

September 2009 rig audit, which documented 390 jobs of overdue

11:03AM

20

and inadequate maintenance equaling 3,545 overdue hours of

11:03AM

21

maintenance that Mr. Roy referred to.

11:03AM

22

not even seaworthy.

11:03AM

23

11:03AM

24

deposition, Transocean asked its witnesses if its employees

11:03AM

25

would really act so as to endanger themselves.

What about Transocean?

Well, you've heard a lot


I won't go into

Transocean, the owner of the Deepwater Horizon,


failed to operate the vessel safely and to protect personnel
onboard and the marine environment.
Transocean oil was the first oil to reach
The first oil may be the worst oil.

It wasn't

Transocean must also be held accountable for its

BP and Transocean worked together to botch the


Prior to that, they botched the

Deepwater Horizon was

A final word about Transocean, almost every

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

Well, that's

107

11:04AM

the wrong question.

The right question is did the employees do

11:04AM

the best with what Transocean made available to them, and was

11:04AM

what Transocean made available enough?

11:04AM

11:04AM

and ecological disaster could have been avoided as well by

11:04AM

Transocean.

11:04AM

11:04AM

them, if anything at all.

11:04AM

strictly, jointly and severally liable under OPA.

11:04AM

10

11:04AM

11

11:04AM

12

party to this phase of the trial, so you might want to talk

11:04AM

13

about another party, okay.

11:04AM

14

11:04AM

15

11:05AM

16

as we've seen and has been referred to, using leftover rig

11:05AM

17

blend from a prior job that contained a defoaming agent

11:05AM

18

incompatible with the slurry.

11:05AM

19

It failed to run critical safety tests to confirm

11:05AM

20

the cement stability, and without the results of that test that

11:05AM

21

showed that the slurry was also unstable.

11:05AM

22

11:05AM

23

perform the production casing cement job in accordance with the

11:05AM

24

industry accepted recommendations was another but for cause.

11:05AM

25

Each one of these things on their own could be deemed to have

The evidence will show these deaths and economic

So we've got BP and Transocean.


What about Anadarko?

Nobody said much about

Evidence will show that they're


Anadarko is

a 25 percent owner of the -THE COURT:

Mr. Caldwell, excuse me, Anadarko is not a

MR. CALDWELL:

All right, Your Honor.

Halliburton.

Halliburton was grossly negligent,

The evidence will show Halliburton failed to

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

108

11:05AM

caused this disaster.

11:05AM

11:05AM

negligent.

11:05AM

it designed that for them, but did not install rechargeable

11:06AM

batteries.

11:06AM

More troubling is Cameron's system erroneously

11:06AM

led the operator to believe that the automatic emergency BOP

11:06AM

function was armed, even when the batteries were dead, and

11:06AM

could not function.

11:06AM

10

11:06AM

11

displacement procedure that was improper.

11:06AM

12

normal spacer procedure.

11:06AM

13

BP and each of every one of its contractors

11:06AM

14

violated their duties, as Mr. Underhill has stated, under

11:06AM

15

30 CFR 250.401 to take all necessary precautions to keep the

11:06AM

16

well under control at all times.

11:06AM

17

11:06AM

18

the critical warning signs and failed to take precautions that

11:07AM

19

would have delayed the completion of the well, but also would

11:07AM

20

have averted this entire environmental disaster.

11:07AM

21

11:07AM

22

with the consequences.

11:07AM

23

$50 million over budget.

11:07AM

24

ignored.

11:07AM

25

Cameron redesigned the BOP, and it was grossly


The emergency battery system for Transocean and BP,

M-I Swaco was also grossly negligent.

It had a

It did not use

Management for each of these defendants ignored

BP's team goal was to save money, and to heck


Macondo was behind schedule and some
Corners were not cut, they were

Your Honor, finally, I would like to say that


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

109

11:07AM

Louisiana has been ground zero for this disaster.

11:07AM

11:07AM

shoreline -- BP refused to inspect the other half -- we've got

11:07AM

660 miles of marsh and shoreline oiled in Louisiana.

11:07AM

million barrels of oil are unaccounted for.

11:07AM

have been discovered and removed in 2012 from Louisiana's

11:08AM

shore.

11:08AM

2012 was from Louisiana's shores.

11:08AM

11:08AM

10

State of Louisiana, in our waters.

11:08AM

11

nearly one hundred percent, when you look at heavy and moderate

11:08AM

12

oiling.

11:08AM

13

11:08AM

14

weekly from Louisiana's shores and beaches in the form of oil

11:08AM

15

balls and oil mats.

11:08AM

16

11:08AM

17

million pounds of oily material from subsurface mats on Elmer's

11:08AM

18

Island.

11:09AM

19

Louisiana since 2012; but, over 9 million pounds of oil and

11:09AM

20

material collected have been removed since June of 2011 through

11:09AM

21

December 2012.

11:09AM

22

November 21st of 2012, 1,720,000 pounds have been recovered.

11:09AM

23

11:09AM

24

11:09AM

25

Based on an inspection of one-half of Louisiana

One

28 new oil mats

Since January 1, 2013, 93 percent of all oil removed in

60 percent of all Gulf oiling occurred in the


The number is even higher,

To date, retrievable, visible oil is recovered

In 2011, operations crews removed over one

2.1 million pounds of oil material has been removed in

Post-Hurricane Isaac, between September 7th and

58 percent of all wildlife injured and collected


in state identifiable waters were recovered in Louisiana.
Your Honor, finally, I know the Court has lived
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

110

11:09AM

and breathed this case.

I would like to say that if we could

11:09AM

take every lawyer in this courtroom and every person that

11:09AM

wanted to out to Louisiana oil and drop them off, we'd see what

11:10AM

a 10W90 smog would look like.

11:10AM

tragedy to this very day and tomorrow.

11:10AM

11:10AM

and to judge the case on live witness testimony, not just

11:10AM

wholesale reference as well to depositions and documents.

11:10AM

sure the lawyers are going to produce that for the Court; but,

11:10AM

10

the direct and cross-examination has got to be critically

11:10AM

11

assessed by the Court in the event that there is some change in

11:10AM

12

what the Court expects.

11:10AM

13

11:10AM

14

determine the real truth in this case, that is, what happened,

11:10AM

15

why, who is responsible, and to what degree and who is still

11:10AM

16

responsible for the continuous oiling.

11:11AM

17

the one to separate the chaff from the grain and apply the law

11:11AM

18

accordingly.

11:11AM

19

11:11AM

20

11:11AM

21

11:11AM

22

11:11AM

23

11:11AM

24

11:11AM

25

The point is this a continuing

It's crucial for this Court to keep an open mind

I'm

Because it's the Court's responsibility to

In short, this Court is

We need to get to the proof, Your Honor.

The

whole world is watching what we're doing.


Again, I want to thank Your Honor for the
opportunity to address the Court.
THE COURT:

All right.

All right.
MR. BRIAN:

Thank you, Mr. Caldwell.

Transocean.

Your Honor, I'm going to put up an exhibit


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

111

11:11AM

later.

May Mr. Miller approach and readjust the easel?

11:11AM

11:12AM

11:12AM

you're going to use a pad, low tech.

11:12AM

in a while in court, but that's okay.

11:12AM

11:12AM

him I could out low tech him, Your Honor.

11:12AM

OPENING STATEMENTS

11:12AM

11:12AM

10

11:12AM

11

11:12AM

12

took place on the Deepwater Horizon that explains virtually

11:12AM

13

everything you need to know about what happened on the rig that

11:12AM

14

night.

11:12AM

15

There was a conversation between Don Vidrine,

11:12AM

16

BP's onsite well site leader, and Mark Hafle, their onshore

11:12AM

17

engineer.

11:12AM

18

11:12AM

19

test.

11:12AM

20

but he thought the results were squirrelly.

11:12AM

21

Mr. Hafle, who called him back at 8:52 p.m., before the gas had

11:12AM

22

gotten above the BOP, and early enough that if they had shut

11:13AM

23

down the job then, none of us would be here today.

11:13AM

24

11:13AM

25

THE COURT:

Sure.

With all the technology we have here, Mr. Brian,

MR. BRIAN:

Okay.

Haven't seen this

Mr. Roy told me he was low tech, and I told

BY MR. BRIAN:
Your Honor, Brad Brian for Transocean.
At 8:52 p.m. on April 20, 2010, a conversation

Mr. Vidrine had supervised the negative pressure


He had declared the negative pressure test a success,

Who was Mr. Hafle?

So he called

Mr. Hafle was one of three

onshore engineers, part of the BP team.


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

Mr. Hafle knew better

112

11:13AM

than anybody how problematic this well had been and the risks

11:13AM

that BP had taken.

11:13AM

11:13AM

negative pressure test is and what it should show.

11:13AM

to Mr. Vidrine, and he knew immediately that there was a

11:13AM

problem.

11:13AM

11:13AM

test results that Mr. Vidrine had explained if the test had

11:13AM

been done right.

11:13AM

10

Mark Hafle told Don Vidrine that you can't have

11:14AM

11

pressure on the drill pipe and zero pressure on the kill line

11:14AM

12

in a test that's properly lined up.

11:14AM

13

11:14AM

14

expert, the DOJ's expert, just about everybody's expert

11:14AM

15

believes that that should have shut in the well, then, shut

11:14AM

16

down the job.

11:14AM

17

11:14AM

18

did what he and the other engineers at BP had been doing for

11:14AM

19

two months in the face of risk; he did nothing.

11:14AM

20

Mr. Vidrine did worse.

11:14AM

21

phone and walked to the drill floor.

11:14AM

22

shack, and he talked to the three men on Transocean's crew.

11:14AM

23

told them to proceed with the displacement, to remove from the

11:15AM

24

well the drilling mud, the only thing that was at that point

11:15AM

25

standing in the way between those men and a blowout.

Mr. Hafle understood better than anybody what a


He listened

He told Mr. Vidrine that you could not have the

So what did they do?

Your Honor, the PSC's

If they had done that, we wouldn't be here.


But Hafle did not do that.

Instead, Mark Hafle

Mr. Vidrine got off the


He walked into the drill

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

He

113

11:15AM

He left them alone in the drill shack to face

11:15AM

11:15AM

11:15AM

instructions.

11:15AM

complacent.

11:15AM

the pumps when they saw abnormalities.

11:15AM

11:15AM

what Mr. Hafle already knew, that you can't have pressure on

11:15AM

the drill pipe and zero pressure on the kill line in a test

11:15AM

10

11:15AM

11

11:15AM

12

putting too much trust in BP, and they paid for that trust with

11:16AM

13

their lives.

11:16AM

14

11:16AM

15

effort to shift the blame to the Transocean drill crew and to

11:16AM

16

avoid its indemnity obligation is shameful.

11:16AM

17

11:16AM

18

entered guilty pleas as a result of some of the conduct on

11:16AM

19

April 20, 2010, but that's where the comparison ends.

11:16AM

20

11:16AM

21

manslaughter for not only causing the largest oil spill in

11:16AM

22

history, but for causing the deaths of eleven people, including

11:16AM

23

nine of our crewmen.

11:16AM

24

11:16AM

25

those risks.

He never saw them alive again.


Transocean's drill crew followed those
They did it attentively.

They were not

Twice during the next 30 minutes they shut down

They spent crucial minutes trying to figure out

that's properly lined up.


These men on the drill crew made the mistake of

Under these facts, Your Honor, BP's continuing

Your Honor knows that both BP and Transocean have

BP pled guilty to eleven counts of seamen's

Transocean Deepwater, Inc., the employer of the


men offshore, pled guilty to one ordinary negligence
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

114

11:16AM

misdemeanor count for discharging oil into the Gulf.

11:17AM

11:17AM

should have investigated more in response to Mr. Vidrine's

11:17AM

instruction, and we pled guilty for that; but they put their

11:17AM

trust into BP, and they were betrayed.

11:17AM

11:17AM

Transocean defendants in this case.

11:17AM

be working alongside some of the best lawyers I've ever had the

11:17AM

privilege to work with, Kerry Miller, Steve Roberts,

11:17AM

10

Rachel Clingman, Richard Hymel; my own colleagues, Mike Doyen

11:17AM

11

and Luis LI and, back in the courtroom somewhere, John Kinchen.

11:17AM

12

11:17AM

13

the two questions Your Honor will have to decide with respect

11:17AM

14

to Transocean in, I think, Phase One of the trial:

11:17AM

15

drill crew or the company that employed them so consciously

11:18AM

16

indifferent to danger that their conduct can be deemed to be

11:18AM

17

grossly negligent; and, was the conduct of those men or the

11:18AM

18

company so deliberately deviant such that Transocean is deemed

11:18AM

19

to have committed a core breach of conduct that might

11:18AM

20

conceivably void BP's unambiguous indemnity obligation?

11:18AM

21

11:18AM

22

11:18AM

23

11:18AM

24

crew and Transocean were not consciously indifferent to danger.

11:18AM

25

Their conduct does not come close to the sort of deliberate

We have admitted, Your Honor, that our crew

Your Honor, it's my privilege to represent the


I'm honored and humbled to

I've tried to organize my opening remarks around

Was the

I would submit that the answer to both of those


questions is no.
The evidence will show at this trial that the

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

115

11:18AM

misconduct that has to be shown to establish a core breach of

11:18AM

contract.

11:18AM

11:18AM

the heart of the facts that Your Honor must wrestle with in

11:18AM

answering both of those questions.

11:19AM

microcosm of what BP did wrong on this well and why we believe

11:19AM

that Transocean and our crewmen truly are victims of that

11:19AM

misconduct.

11:19AM

11:19AM

10

leader had that conversation, and they realized that the test

11:19AM

11

was no good, their instructing the crew to proceed with

11:19AM

12

displacement of the well was in utter disregard to the facts.

11:19AM

13

Nothing remotely similar was done by Transocean.

11:19AM

14

11:19AM

15

was good and relying on Mr. Vidrine?

11:19AM

16

that.

11:19AM

17

11:19AM

18

11:19AM

19

11:20AM

20

Mr. Vidrine, immediately saw a problem, and then stayed safely

11:20AM

21

onshore.

11:20AM

22

several hours for the sole purpose of getting that negative

11:20AM

23

pressure test right.

11:20AM

24

for lack of trying, and it was not for indifference.

11:20AM

25

I would submit that that 8:52 p.m. call lies at

In many ways, it's a

When the BP onshore engineer and the BP well site

Did the crew make a mistake in thinking the test


Yes.

We've admitted

In hindsight, everybody knows they made a mistake.


But did they know the test was wrong, as

Mr. Hafle indicated in those notes of his interview?

No.

Mr. Hafle had an eight-minute conversation with

The Transocean crew, by contrast, worked hard for

They didn't get it right, but it wasn't

We don't know, and we'll never know, Your Honor,


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

116

11:20AM

precisely what that crew was thinking because they are not here

11:20AM

to tell us.

11:20AM

putting themselves and their crew mates at risk.

11:20AM

11:20AM

fact and law, as Mr. Caldwell just tried to do, to equate the

11:20AM

conduct of the Transocean crew to the conduct of Mark Hafle,

11:20AM

who knew it was wrong and did nothing, or the conduct of

11:21AM

Don Vidrine, who was told by Mark Hafle it was wrong, and yet

11:21AM

told the crew to proceed.

11:21AM

10

11:21AM

11

Your Honor.

11:21AM

12

duty.

11:21AM

13

well.

11:21AM

14

11:21AM

15

end, the Transocean drill crew, Revette, Stephen Curtis, and

11:21AM

16

Jason Anderson, were in the drill shack.

11:21AM

17

11:21AM

18

universally admired by everyone.

11:21AM

19

shows that Transocean worked long and hard to provide this

11:21AM

20

drill crew with the training and the equipment that they needed

11:21AM

21

to do their job safely and return home.

11:21AM

22

they weren't trained properly; they died because critical

11:22AM

23

information was withheld from them.

11:22AM

24

11:22AM

25

But what we do know is they had no interest in

I would submit that it's wrong as a matter of

The Transocean crew did not go home to safety,


They did not ignore their duty.

They died doing their duty.

They did their

They died fighting the

From 6:00 p.m. that night on April 20 until the

This was a great crew, experienced, well trained,


The overwhelming evidence

Who were these three men?

They died not because

Jason Anderson had

been on the Deepwater Horizon almost 10 years, since its maiden


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

117

11:22AM

voyage.

Shortly before April 20, he was offered a promotion

11:22AM

precisely because he was one of the best toolpushers in the

11:22AM

company.

11:22AM

11:22AM

experience with the company.

11:22AM

Horizon almost as long as Mr. Anderson.

11:22AM

11:22AM

for Transocean for almost nine years, all but a few months of

11:22AM

which were on the Deepwater Horizon.

11:22AM

10

11:22AM

11

depositions in this case, Your Honor, we asked virtually

11:22AM

12

everyone what they thought of these men.

11:23AM

13

safety conscious people, the kinds of men you would gladly

11:23AM

14

entrust yourself, your lives to.

11:23AM

15

11:23AM

16

11:23AM

17

11:23AM

18

video clip was played.)

11:23AM

19

Q.

11:23AM

20

individuals we just talked about in terms of their safety

11:23AM

21

consciousness while you work as a well site leader on the

11:23AM

22

Deepwater Horizon?

11:23AM

23

A.

"Never had it.

11:23AM

24

Q.

"If you could turn back the clock, and if you could work

11:23AM

25

on a rig with these guys again, would you have any problem

Dewey Revette, the driller, had 23 years of


He had been on the Deepwater

Stephen Curtis, the assistant driller, had worked

These men were universally respected.

At

The answer, they were

Here is what Murray Sepulvado, one of the highest


ranked BP well site leaders, said in his deposition:
(WHEREUPON, at this point in the proceedings, a

"Did you ever have any problems with any of these

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

118

11:23AM

working on a rig with these guys?

11:23AM

A.

11:23AM

11:23AM

video clip ended.)

11:23AM

MR. BRIAN:

11:23AM

of the best rigs in the world.

11:23AM

challenging wells in the world.

11:23AM

11:23AM

11:23AM

10

11:23AM

11

government agencies and neutral third parties.

11:24AM

12

officials at the government, the MMS, testified that from his

11:24AM

13

experience, they're one of the best.

11:24AM

14

11:24AM

15

they said they found the rig, the overall rig in excellent

11:24AM

16

condition.

11:24AM

17

11:24AM

18

worked exclusively for BP.

11:24AM

19

best rigs in the fleet.

11:24AM

20

11:24AM

21

a tour on April 20 of the Deepwater Horizon by some senior BP

11:24AM

22

people, including a man named Pat O'Bryan.

11:24AM

23

to say about it.

11:24AM

24

11:24AM

25

"It would be my pleasure."


(WHEREUPON, at this point in the proceedings, the

The Deepwater Horizon, Your Honor, was one


It drilled some of the most

In 2009, it dug a well over 35000 feet, a record


in the world at its time, twice what the Macondo well was.
The rig was inspected hundreds of times by
One of the

When the Coast Guard inspected the rig in 2009,

BP agreed.
The Deepwater Horizon had been built for BP and
It was regarded by BP as one of the

You're going to hear testimony at the trial about

Here is what he had

At his deposition, he said, "It was the best


performing rig from a safety and a drilling performance
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

119

11:24AM

standpoint."

11:24AM

11:24AM

11:24AM

11:25AM

11:25AM

11:25AM

the MMS, the Coast Guard.

11:25AM

or the crew.

11:25AM

or mismanaged it.

11:25AM

10

11:25AM

11

best rig and a fine, well-trained crew on the Macondo well,

11:25AM

12

Your Honor.

11:25AM

13

equipment.

11:25AM

14

people or our equipment on the hope that we'll make zillions of

11:25AM

15

dollars by striking oil.

11:25AM

16

we want them to come back to their homes and their families.

11:25AM

17

11:26AM

18

training.

11:26AM

19

Jason Anderson, Dewey Revette and Stephen Curtis, were up to

11:26AM

20

date on their well control training courses.

11:26AM

21

11:26AM

22

IADC, which sets standards and has certified well control

11:26AM

23

training programs in companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Noble

11:26AM

24

Drilling and others.

11:26AM

25

He went out on the tour because he wanted to see


what good looks like.
This crew didn't just meet industry standard.
This rig, Your Honor, was what the industry standard should be.
As of April 20, 2010, that was the view of BP,
The problem here wasn't with the rig

The problem was the well and the way BP managed

It was not an accident that Transocean had its

Transocean has only two assets, its people and its


We don't own oil and gas leases.

We don't risk our

When we send our people out to a rig,

Transocean gave its people state of the art


All three of the men in the drill shack that night,

Those courses were audited and certified by the

Many, many experts have reviewed our training


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

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11:26AM

programs.

The bottom line is our training was top notch,

11:26AM

Your Honor.

11:26AM

11:26AM

saying that our training was below the standard of care in the

11:26AM

industry at that time.

11:26AM

11:26AM

to ask whether we could have done something different and

11:26AM

better?

11:26AM

when it had accidents and incidents in the past.

11:26AM

10

studied them.

11:27AM

11

new procedures.

11:27AM

12

11:27AM

13

Macondo.

11:27AM

14

the evidence in this case will show that Transocean's training

11:27AM

15

was far above the standard of care in the industry.

11:27AM

16

11:27AM

17

11:27AM

18

11:27AM

19

April 18, 2010, on the Deepwater Horizon, just two days before

11:27AM

20

the incident.

11:27AM

21

responsibilities of the crew, and they discussed the

11:27AM

22

possibility of kicks during cement jobs.

11:27AM

23

that wells have been lost due to improperly designed cement

11:27AM

24

slurries and spacers.

11:28AM

25

You're not going to find a single expert report

Now, it is, of course, proper after an accident

We've all done that.

Transocean has always done that

They have reported on them.

They've

They've instituted

They've updated their training control manual.

We all hope that lessons will be learned from


But in the world before Macondo, I would submit that

Our training programs were reinforced constantly


by drills on the rig.

Some of them weekly, others ad hoc.

For example, this is the drill report from

In this drill, they discussed the roles and

The crew was reminded

You heard Mr. Roy talk about the Sedco 711


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

121

11:28AM

incident that took place in the North Sea in late 2009.

He

11:28AM

suggested, and I expect to hear argument at trial, that

11:28AM

somehow, because of that incident, and because a written

11:28AM

advisory somehow didn't get to the Deepwater Horizon because

11:28AM

somebody was on vacation, that the crew somehow was complacent

11:28AM

to the fact that barriers like cement can fail.

11:28AM

11:28AM

11:28AM

11:28AM

10

Dewey Revette, Don Vidrine.

11:28AM

11

perished on April 20 were there.

11:28AM

12

11:28AM

13

example of how training at Transocean works.

11:29AM

14

the Transocean crewmen must attend well control school, get

11:29AM

15

classroom training and receive on-the-job training that is

11:29AM

16

tailored to their specific job responsibilities.

11:29AM

17

11:29AM

18

training.

11:29AM

19

years.

11:29AM

20

most of all, by drilling.

11:29AM

21

11:29AM

22

their jobs.

11:29AM

23

looking for the right stuff on April 20.

11:29AM

24

11:29AM

25

Your Honor, that is precisely what the crew was


told on April 18, 2010, two days before the incident.
Who was present?

Jason Anderson, Stephen Curtis,

In fact, nine of the 11 men who

That drill on April 18, Your Honor, is just an


To join a crew,

Once they make it to a crew, they keep on


They go back to the well control school every two

They learn on the job by teaching others and, probably

Your Honor, these men know and knew how to do


They knew what to look for, and they weren't

They knew the fundamentals.

They were preached

into them when they took the job, and that became their trade,
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

122

11:29AM

and they relived them and relearned them repeatedly.

11:29AM

Now, Mr. Roy talked about some other well control

11:29AM

events and suggested that that somehow shows that Transocean as

11:29AM

a company was grossly negligent, that somehow we had -- our

11:30AM

safety culture was deficient.

11:30AM

Mr. Roy, they show nothing of the sort, Your Honor.

11:30AM

11:30AM

11:30AM

11:30AM

10

Transocean worked on almost 7,000 wells worldwide.

11:30AM

11

kicks are a part of the business, Your Honor, and our goal is

11:30AM

12

to keep the kicks under 20 barrels.

11:30AM

13

11:30AM

14

control events report, and you'll see what it tracks.

11:30AM

15

tracks how the company or how the rig crews do in detecting

11:30AM

16

kicks.

11:30AM

17

11:30AM

18

corner is that the majority of the kicks are detected within

11:31AM

19

10 barrels, the vast majority within 20, and only a small

11:31AM

20

sliver exceed 30 barrels.

11:31AM

21

The plaintiffs' efforts to use a handful, I think

11:31AM

22

Mr. Roy referred to six, of well control events to suggest that

11:31AM

23

somehow the company was grossly negligent or the crew was

11:31AM

24

grossly negligent on April 20 is unfair to the evidence, it's

11:31AM

25

unfair to the company, and it's unfair to the crew.

With respect to my friend

Transocean is justifiably proud of its record on


well control.

Kicks are part of the business.


From 2005 through 2009, that five-year period,
Our goal --

This is a report that came out in 2009, well


It

What you see clustered in the lower left-hand

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

123

11:31AM

Now, when a drill crew does not meet that goal,

11:31AM

which happens, the company goes out, and it investigates it, it

11:31AM

reports on it, and it takes corrective action.

11:31AM

11:31AM

the Cunningham that Mr. Roy referred to.

11:31AM

took place nine years ago, in 2004, six years before the

11:32AM

Macondo event.

11:32AM

entirely different division of the company.

11:32AM

11:32AM

10

that Mr. Roy is able to stand up and talk about these events is

11:32AM

11

because the company doesn't sweep them under the rug.

11:32AM

12

company investigations them and creates written reports and

11:32AM

13

takes action.

11:32AM

14

11:32AM

15

11:32AM

16

11:32AM

17

toolpusher, that's the -- a letter that says his conduct --

11:32AM

18

that he was complacent, and his conduct was grossly negligent.

11:32AM

19

It was recommended that he will be terminated from the company

11:32AM

20

immediately.

11:32AM

21

In every single one of the incidents that Mr. Roy

11:32AM

22

will talk about at trial, the company investigated those events

11:33AM

23

and took action.

11:33AM

24

11:33AM

25

For an example, let's look at this 2004 event on


First of all, that

It took place off the coast of Egypt, in an

But, more fundamentally, Your Honor, the reason

The

Here is the action that took place as a result


of -- oops, I went the wrong way.
This is a letter that was written to the night

That's what a safety process system is.

Now, Mr. Roy referred an e-mail by Larry McMahan,


in which he said -- talked about train wrecks.
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

You'll seal

124

11:33AM

that document.

He's talking almost entirely, by the way -- he

11:33AM

uses the phrase "loss of control," and Mr. McMahan will tell

11:33AM

you that virtually all of those are loss of control of objects,

11:33AM

things falling, heavy equipment falling.

11:33AM

or two well control events that are referred to in there.

11:33AM

11:33AM

some whistleblower who feels like he's not being heard by his

11:33AM

superiors at the company.

11:33AM

the company's most senior executive in charge of training

11:33AM

10

11:33AM

11

11:33AM

12

When he felt that people were not living up to that -- to the

11:33AM

13

high standards that the company set, he took action.

11:34AM

14

with the kind of language that Mr. Roy indicated.

11:34AM

15

Transocean, that is encouraged.

11:34AM

16

11:34AM

17

Mr. McMahan, will testify at this trial, totally supported

11:34AM

18

Mr. McMahan's effort.

11:34AM

19

Mr. Newman personally got involved in connection

11:34AM

20

with some problems you'll hear about involving a rig that they

11:34AM

21

call the Arctic I with Shell.

11:34AM

22

11:34AM

23

or four people had actually been killed, not in well control

11:34AM

24

events, but on accidents on the rigs, he commissioned a

11:34AM

25

worldwide survey of the company.

I think there are one

But the point is that these are not e-mails from

This is a document by Larry McMahan,

worldwide.
His responsibility was to point out problems.

He did it

At

Steven Newman, the company's CEO, who, like

Before that, in the Fall of 2009, because three

Because that was going to

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

125

11:34AM

take a while, he actually ordered an immediate worldwide

11:34AM

shutdown of the fleet to reemphasize the basics of safety.

11:34AM

Transocean does not put profit over safety.

11:34AM

Now, Mr. Roy mentioned a March 8th kick, 2010, on

11:34AM

the Deepwater Horizon.

11:35AM

detected that kick late, and that it was criticized by

11:35AM

John Guide.

11:35AM

11:35AM

11:35AM

10

evidence will be that the kick was detected within 10 to

11:35AM

11

12 barrels.

11:35AM

12

30 barrels because the crew was investigating whether the

11:35AM

13

movement of a crane on the rig could affect the pit volumes,

11:35AM

14

which it can do.

11:35AM

15

11:35AM

16

BP well site leader at the time, what he thought about the

11:35AM

17

crew's performance on March 8th.

11:35AM

18

11:35AM

19

video clip was played.)

11:35AM

20

Q.

11:35AM

21

and the driller saw something that he had concerns about and

11:35AM

22

took the time to shut the crane down and then look to see if

11:36AM

23

there was really the crane or something else going on --

11:36AM

24

A.

"Right.

11:36AM

25

Q.

" -- did you consider his response to what he was seeing

He said that the Transocean drill crew

John Guide has said that.

His testimony on that

is contradicted by every other piece of evidence.

In fact, the

It was not shut in until slightly more than

So we asked Murray Sepulvado, again, who was the

This is what he said.

(WHEREUPON, at this point in the proceedings, a

"Because of the circumstances where the crane was in use

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

126

11:36AM

appropriate?

11:36AM

A.

"Yes.

11:36AM

Q.

"Do you believe that anybody there on the rig screwed up,

11:36AM

as Mr. John Guide is quoted as having said here in this

11:36AM

interview, in terms of the March 8 kick?

11:36AM

A.

11:36AM

job myself.

11:36AM

Q.

"They being the TO folks?

11:36AM

A.

"The TO folks and Halliburton."

11:36AM

10

11:36AM

11

video clip ended.)

11:36AM

12

MR. BRIAN:

11:36AM

13

audit that took place also in 2010, and said there were some

11:36AM

14

problems.

11:36AM

15

mention it, so I didn't have it to put it up.

11:36AM

16

you a few of the findings by Lloyd's audit.

11:36AM

17

11:36AM

18

Deepwater Horizon crew members surveyed believed that line

11:36AM

19

managers listened and acted on the crew's safety concern.

11:36AM

20

11:36AM

21

Deepwater Horizon crew members surveyed felt they understand

11:37AM

22

the safety procedures and hazards associated with their jobs

11:37AM

23

because of the degree of training and support they have

11:37AM

24

received, and they found the Deepwater rig safety culture to be

11:37AM

25

robust.

"Well, I was there, and I thought they done a pretty good

(WHEREUPON, at this point in the proceedings, the

Mr. Roy also talked about this Lloyd's

Well, I actually didn't think he was going to


So I'll read to

They found that 97.6 percent of the

They believe that 100 percent of the

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

127

11:37AM

So, Your Honor, if we had this great rig and this

11:37AM

well-trained crew, why did the blowout take place?

11:37AM

in the end, only two reasons for that.

11:37AM

11:37AM

11:37AM

11:37AM

cement likely would fail and that the test, the negative

11:37AM

pressure test, to determine whether the cement job was good

11:37AM

had, in fact, failed, they did not give those warnings.

11:37AM

10

11:37AM

11

that BP took with the not doing the bottoms-up circulation,

11:37AM

12

using the long string instead of a liner, using the lower

11:38AM

13

number of centralizers.

11:38AM

14

the context of a well they described as one of the wells from

11:38AM

15

hell, or a "nightmare" well.

11:38AM

16

11:38AM

17

bottom hole cement critical.

11:38AM

18

show that BP did not comply with its own requirements to make

11:38AM

19

sure they had a good cement job.

11:38AM

20

11:38AM

21

cement than I will, Your Honor, but one of the critical

11:38AM

22

variables in cement is how long it takes to set, to harden.

11:38AM

23

11:38AM

24

strength tests were performed at the wrong temperature,

11:38AM

25

contrary to BP and industry standards.

There are,

First, BP took a series of unconscionable risks


with an exceptionally difficult well.
Second, instead of warning the crew that the

Now, Mr. Underhill described some of the risks

All of these decisions were made in

The risk that they took made the integrity of the


Nevertheless, the evidence will

Others in this trial will spend more time on

The evidence here will show that compressive

Other tests showed that

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

128

11:38AM

the cement would not set in 24 hours.

11:38AM

11:38AM

pouring of the cement and the time that displacement was

11:39AM

started.

11:39AM

ordered the crew to proceed with displacement within 16 hours

11:39AM

of the pouring of the cement.

11:39AM

11:39AM

Halliburton; but, one thing is absolutely clear, that by

11:39AM

April 20, BP had lost faith in the Halliburton cement team.

11:39AM

10

11:39AM

11

Jesse Gagliano, who was their interface at Halliburton.

11:39AM

12

said that Jessie isn't cutting it anymore.

11:39AM

13

for this.

11:39AM

14

11:39AM

15

they said he showed a lack of understanding of the modeling.

11:39AM

16

The lab results came in at the last minute.

11:39AM

17

11:40AM

18

job, whether it's Halliburton, BP, or both, some facts are

11:40AM

19

absolutely clear:

11:40AM

20

forward with the cement job without accurate test results;

11:40AM

21

three, they went forward without waiting for the test to

11:40AM

22

harden.

11:40AM

23

11:40AM

24

11:40AM

25

Despite that, BP shortened the time between the

Rather than waiting, let's say, 24 to 48 hours, they

Now, I expect that BP's lawyer will blame this on

They referred in these documents to


They

There is no excuse

Jesse still waited until the last minute.


In another document, in their handwritten notes,

They had to QC.

Whoever is to blame, Your Honor, for the cement

One, the cement job failed; two, they went

To make matters worse, they decided not to do a


cement bond log.

Why?

Because it would cost more money.

The men who made these decisions had days to


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

129

11:40AM

think about what they were doing.

This is very different from

11:40AM

the Transocean rig crew whose conduct over the course of

11:40AM

minutes is at issue in this case.

11:40AM

11:40AM

the number of centralizers, even though they'd received a

11:40AM

report from Halliburton on April 18 warning them of a severe

11:40AM

gas flow problem if they didn't use the number of centralizers

11:41AM

that BP wanted.

11:41AM

admitted that he had a conversation with Mr. Gagliano on April

11:41AM

10

19, in which Mr. Gagliano told him about this document, and yet

11:41AM

11

they did nothing.

11:41AM

12

11:41AM

13

in the case, Brett Cocales' e-mail where he says, who cares,

11:41AM

14

it's done, end of story, it will probably be fine.

11:41AM

15

11:41AM

16

I think the second, the next sentence, Your Honor, is in some

11:41AM

17

ways more telling.

11:41AM

18

stuck above the wellhead."

11:41AM

19

What he's saying is, I would rather take the risk

11:41AM

20

of getting it wrong and then having just to fix it, than taking

11:41AM

21

the additional time to get it right in the first place.

11:41AM

22

11:42AM

23

whatever you think of its merit, that risky approach that BP

11:42AM

24

took, if you're going to take those risks, you have to tell the

11:42AM

25

people sitting on top of the well, the guys who are going to

You've already heard about BP flip-flopping on

The head of BP's onshore team, Greg Walz,

That takes us to one of the most famous e-mails

There is an lot of arrogance in that e-mail; but,

"I would rather have to squeeze than get

That attitude has been widely condemned; but,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

130

11:42AM

have to deal with it in the event of a failure.

11:42AM

11:42AM

this is a risky business, and since the drill crew knew that

11:42AM

cement can fail, there is no need to tell them about the

11:42AM

extraordinary risks they were taking.

11:42AM

11:42AM

this, Your Honor.

11:42AM

report says, and I quote, BP's onshore well team refused to

11:42AM

communicate key risks of the operation to Transocean.

11:42AM

10

11:42AM

11

Transocean were grossly negligent on a negative pressure test.

11:43AM

12

Your Honor, I just would point out, you certainly can't prove

11:43AM

13

that from our guilty plea because in our guilty plea, while

11:43AM

14

we've admitted ordinary negligence, we have not admitted gross

11:43AM

15

negligence.

11:43AM

16

11:43AM

17

from the beginning to end, and they botched it up.

11:43AM

18

botched it in the planning, in the design, in interrupting the

11:43AM

19

crew, and interpreting its results.

11:43AM

20

11:43AM

21

BP changed its mind five or six times about how to do a

11:43AM

22

negative pressure test, how many to do, when to do them.

11:43AM

23

First, they were going to do one.

11:43AM

24

two.

11:43AM

25

BP's view at the time seemed to be that since

Now, this is not -- I'm not the only one saying


The PSC's expert, Professor Bea, in his

The PSC now stands up and says that both BP and

There is nothing in there that establishes.


The truth is that BP was responsible for the test
They

In the weeks leading up to April 20, Your Honor,

Then they were going to do

Then they were going to do one.


By the way, in the middle, and you'll see that
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

131

11:43AM

the yellow says -- the one that's below says, monitor for

11:43AM

30 minutes.

11:44AM

to do two tests; but, in fact, their own documents make clear

11:44AM

that that was in reference to a second negative pressure test,

11:44AM

because this an e-mail from Brian Morel, April 18, where he

11:44AM

says, the plan is to do a negative test with base oil on the

11:44AM

bottom plug.

11:44AM

will be done.

11:44AM

11:44AM

10

monkeyed with the test.

11:44AM

11

unused lost circulation materials on the rig.

11:44AM

12

they were going to have to ship that back to shore and dispose

11:44AM

13

of it as hazardous waste.

11:44AM

14

11:44AM

15

money.

11:44AM

16

pumped it through the BOP in the system, they could refer to it

11:44AM

17

as circulation material, call it spacer, and then they could

11:44AM

18

just dump it overboard into the Gulf of Mexico.

11:45AM

19

11:45AM

20

the formation.

11:45AM

21

displace a well.

11:45AM

22

11:45AM

23

effect of that was, and there's all these theories about

11:45AM

24

whether it clogged the kill line and stopped the flow; but, at

11:45AM

25

a minimum, it confused the negative pressure test.

I suspect BP might argue that they never planned

Then we will displace, and a second negative test

In addition to all this confusion, they then


You see, they had 400 barrels of
Under the law,

They didn't want to do that because it would cost


So somebody at BP had this bright idea that if they

Well, this stuff had been used to patch cracks in


As far as we know, it had never been used to

You know, people have been studying what the

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

132

11:45AM

All of these last minute changes by the

11:45AM

engineering people at BP had the operations people at wits end.

11:45AM

This is the e-mail you saw earlier from John Guide, where he

11:45AM

says there is so many last minute changes that they had finally

11:45AM

come to their wits end.

11:45AM

our pants."

11:45AM

operation is not going to succeed.

11:45AM

11:45AM

David Sims do about it?

Nothing.

11:45AM

10

didn't call a time-out.

He didn't say, let's talk about it.

11:45AM

11

Instead, he sent back this e-mail in which he said, if we had

11:45AM

12

more time to plan this casing job, I think all of this would

11:46AM

13

have been worked out before it got to the rig.

11:46AM

14

They actually considered an alternative, plug the

11:46AM

15

well and abandon it, but that would have cost over $10 million.

11:46AM

16

11:46AM

17

11:46AM

18

11:46AM

19

drill pipe, as was their practice when Murray Sepulvado had

11:46AM

20

been the well site leader, and they detected the abnormal

11:46AM

21

pressure on the drill pipe.

11:46AM

22

11:46AM

23

analyzing what that pressure meant when there was a change in

11:46AM

24

shifts of the two well site leaders at BP.

11:46AM

25

replaced Bob Kaluza.

The quote is, "flying by the seat of

Then he made his prophetic prediction, the

He sent that to his boss, David Sims.

What did

He didn't do anything.

He

Your Honor, they had the time, they just didn't


want to spend the money.
The crew set up the negative pressure test on the

They were in the middle of investigating and

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

Don Vidrine

133

11:46AM

Don Vidrine insisted that they start the test

11:46AM

over and do it down the kill line because that's what their

11:47AM

permit had said, and instructed the crew to do it down the kill

11:47AM

line and to check for flow.

11:47AM

11:47AM

11:47AM

11:47AM

test monitored on the kill line, as reflected in a document he

11:47AM

and Mr. Kaluza signed shortly after the incident.

11:47AM

10

11:47AM

11

simple, that it's like two straws going down a glass.

11:47AM

12

see a different pressure, automatically it's a failure.

11:47AM

13

11:47AM

14

one killed the kill line, went down 5,000 feet, the drill pipe

11:47AM

15

went down 3,000 more feet, and they are in different fluids

11:47AM

16

with different pressures.

11:47AM

17

11:47AM

18

the kill line and the drill pipe.

11:47AM

19

have that different pressure?

11:48AM

20

what the -- the crew didn't miss the fact that they had

11:48AM

21

different pressure.

11:48AM

22

Mr. Vidrine told them to look for flow on the kill line, and

11:48AM

23

that was the mistake the crew made.

11:48AM

24

listened to that instruction.

11:48AM

25

The crew followed that instruction, and they


watched it for 30 minutes.

There was no flow.

Mr. Vidrine declared it a successful negative

Now, some people have said, well, this is very


If you

It's not so simple because the two straws here,

So it's not unusual to have different pressure on


The question is why do you

That's the issue.

And that's

They were trying to analyze that, but

They should not have

After Vidrine finished his call at 8:52 p.m. with


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

134

11:48AM

Mr. Hafle and came to the drill pipe -- to the drill shack,

11:48AM

there were subtle signs that, with hindsight, experts now say

11:48AM

indicated a kick around 9 o'clock, slightly after 9 o'clock.

11:48AM

11:48AM

the screens that were available to Transocean, BP and

11:48AM

Halliburton; but, one thing we know for sure is that those

11:48AM

subtle signs of a kick were missed by a number of people

11:48AM

between around 9:08 and 9:14, 9:15.

11:49AM

11:49AM

10

11:49AM

11

who did take a break, a 10-minute break that Mr. Roy indicated,

11:49AM

12

and then came back to the drill shack and checked the screen

11:49AM

13

and didn't notice that.

11:49AM

14

11:49AM

15

drill floor during this time period to look at a sheen test and

11:49AM

16

check the screens.

11:49AM

17

11:49AM

18

who said in his interview that he had the screens up during his

11:49AM

19

conversation with Mr. Hafle between 8:52 and about 9 o'clock.

11:49AM

20

11:49AM

21

11:49AM

22

11:49AM

23

what they were thinking and exactly why they did what they did

11:49AM

24

because they are not here to tell us.

11:49AM

25

Your Honor, the Sperry-Sun data.

No one knows exactly how those signs appeared on

They were missed by the driller at Transocean.


They were missed by the mudlogger, Joseph Keith,

They were missed by Don Vidrine, who visited the

They were missed by Mark Hafle, who testified --

After Mr. Vidrine left the drill shack between


9:15, the crew then monitored the well.
As I said earlier, we will never know exactly

But we do have the data,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

135

11:50AM

The right four-fifths of that is the actual

11:50AM

actually Sperry-Sun data.

11:50AM

make it easier.

11:50AM

11:50AM

they are watching between 9:14 and 9:49.

11:50AM

the crew was far from being complacent.

11:50AM

11:50AM

noticed that, and they shut down three pumps to investigate.

11:50AM

They determined the problem was a popped pressure valve, so

11:50AM

10

11:50AM

11

11:50AM

12

11:50AM

13

11:50AM

14

before 9:30, they see that the kill line and the drill pipe are

11:50AM

15

acting different, that the kill line goes up and then starts to

11:50AM

16

go down, and the drill pipe is doing something different.

11:50AM

17

11:51AM

18

11:51AM

19

11:51AM

20

actually released the pressure on the drill pipe.

11:51AM

21

it dip down as a result of that.

11:51AM

22

monitoring what was going on.

11:51AM

23

Then right around 9:40, before, about 9:39, you

11:51AM

24

see the pressure on the drill pipe goes up, and then it turns

11:51AM

25

back down.

We changed the column on the left to

This is what shows you what's happening, what


What you see is that

At about 9:18, you see that blue spike.

The crew

they turned the pumps back on and the pressure rose.


The drill pipe is the red at the bottom, and the
kill line is the blue, Your Honor.
They continued to monitor.

Then, about shortly

So they shut off the pumps again.

You see that

at the top, when it goes down to the bottom.


They continued to monitor.

At about 9:36, they


You can see

That's because they were

That's an indication of a kick.


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

136

11:51AM

The crew noticed that, and they did a flow check.

11:51AM

They saw that the well was flowing, so they closed the annular.

11:51AM

The flow was too strong, so closing the annular did not seal

11:51AM

the well.

11:51AM

11:51AM

11:51AM

Now, consistent with BP and Transocean policy at

11:51AM

that time, the diverter system was set by default to divert to

11:51AM

the mud-gas separator.

11:52AM

10

You don't want to just automatically divert hazardous stuff

11:52AM

11

into the sea.

11:52AM

12

11:52AM

13

separator became overwhelmed.

11:52AM

14

this case, we don't know exactly when, but there will be

11:52AM

15

evidence in this case that the crude did, in fact, then begin

11:52AM

16

to divert overboard; but, of course, by then, it was too late.

11:52AM

17

11:52AM

18

bore ram.

11:52AM

19

the force was just too great.

11:52AM

20

11:52AM

21

issue is were they consciously indifferent, were they grossly

11:52AM

22

negligent, this crew was attentive in taking responsive actions

11:52AM

23

at every step of the way in response to the indications that

11:52AM

24

they saw.

11:52AM

25

As they were trained to do, they diverted the


flow into the diverter system.

The reason for that is environmental.

Ultimately, as Mr. Roy indicated, the mud-gas


There is going to be evidence in

At about 9:46 or 9:47, they closed the variable


For a moment, the well was successfully shut in, but

My point, Your Honor, is in a case where the

In addition to activating the BOP, closing the


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

137

11:52AM

annular, activating the variable bore rams, the crew did their

11:53AM

duty to alert others.

11:53AM

Mr. Vidrine, and they called the senior toolpusher, Randy

11:53AM

Ezell.

11:53AM

11:53AM

conversation with Steve Curtis:

11:53AM

in.

11:53AM

my God, and I asked did they have it shut in.

11:53AM

that Jason -- that's Jason Anderson -- was shutting it in.

11:53AM

10

said, Jason is shutting it in now.

11:53AM

11

that, we can't see out of our windows.

11:53AM

12

help.

11:53AM

13

11:53AM

14

and to help them, but he was blown back by the tremendous

11:53AM

15

explosion that then happened.

11:53AM

16

11:53AM

17

happened because BP was behind schedule and was rushing to get

11:53AM

18

this well done.

11:53AM

19

11:54AM

20

going to hear evidence in the trial, of accusations that the

11:54AM

21

crew did not act quickly or decisively enough.

11:54AM

22

Your Honor, that that's unfair.

11:54AM

23

attentive, but they were missing critical information.

11:54AM

24

11:54AM

25

They called the bridge, they called

This is Randy Ezell's testimony about his


Steve said the well is coming

We got mud blowing to the crown.

I remember thinking, oh,


Curtis told me
He

Then he made the remark


Randy, we need your

Ezell ran to put on his coveralls and his boots

None of this had to happen, Your Honor.

It

Some people have accused Transocean, and you're

I would submit,

They took action, they were

They should have been told that there was a


severe gas flow potential.

They should have been told that

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

138

11:54AM

there was a grave risk that the cement may not have hardened by

11:54AM

then.

11:54AM

stable.

11:54AM

between Mr. Vidrine and Mr. Hafle at 8:52 p.m.

11:54AM

BP has tried to shift the blame by focusing now

11:54AM

on the BOP and claiming that -- by distorting facts about the

11:54AM

BOP and by distorting what happened on the rig that night.

11:54AM

PSC has sort of jumped on that bandwagon.

11:54AM

the few minutes I have left about the BOP and what happened on

11:54AM

10

11:54AM

11

11:55AM

12

details about the BOP.

I am not going to go through those

11:55AM

13

technical details now.

They are going to be presented by the

11:55AM

14

experts.

11:55AM

15

the forensic evidence found by DNV.

11:55AM

16

11:55AM

17

preventer.

11:55AM

18

just simply a copy of that, was because I'm going to show you

11:55AM

19

that the things function, and I realize that it's helpful to

11:55AM

20

have that up and in place.

11:55AM

21

11:55AM

22

it was closed by the crew that evening.

11:55AM

23

annular that you see on the chart over there that, in fact, did

11:55AM

24

close.

11:55AM

25

They should have been told that the cement might not be
They should have been told about the conversation

The

So let me talk for

the bridge crew.


The Court is going to hear a lot of technical

Most of them are, we think, undisputed and based on

Your Honor, that's the graphic of the blowout


The reason I prepared the board over here, which is

The evidence shows that annular functioned when


This is the upper

The variable bore rams also functioned.


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

139

11:55AM

But two minutes later, at about 9:47, there was

11:55AM

the powerful explosion, and that caused the rig to lose power

11:56AM

and to drift off station with pulled pipe.

11:56AM

11:56AM

blind shear rams had functioned.

11:56AM

we'll talk about it at the trial, as to when.

11:56AM

functioned as they should have functioned; but, unfortunately,

11:56AM

the extreme flow up the well had moved the pipe off center.

11:56AM

DNV found, because it moved off center, when it cut it was not

11:56AM

10

11:56AM

11

You see where the pipe is off center.

11:56AM

12

what caused it not to stop the blowout, Your Honor.

11:56AM

13

11:56AM

14

that it, in fact, functioned.

11:56AM

15

nothing to do with maintenance.

11:56AM

16

hear about batteries, it's all a red herring.

11:56AM

17

BOP functioned.

11:56AM

18

11:57AM

19

maintenance system the company used.

11:57AM

20

maintenance is used by the United States Department of Defense,

11:57AM

21

the Coast Guard, and the aircraft industry.

11:57AM

22

running your tires on your car until the treads are bare and

11:57AM

23

your tire blows out.

11:57AM

24

fixing them before they fix [verbatim].

11:57AM

25

After the explosion, it was determined that the


There is some dispute, and
We believe they

As

able to actually stop the flow of the well.


That's

The fact is that the men operated the BOP and


The piping off the side had
The evidence you're going to
The fact is the

Mr. Roy had mentioned the condition based


Well, condition based

It doesn't mean

It means keeping track of things and

The Court will hear evidence that the BOP


OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

140

11:57AM

received extensive and regular maintenance, including hundreds

11:57AM

of hours in January and February of 2010, before it was put

11:57AM

back in operation on the Macondo.

11:57AM

11:57AM

and maintained.

11:57AM

shear rams were tested on the morning of April 20, 2010, the

11:57AM

very day of the incident.

11:57AM

test, and they functioned during the incident.

11:57AM

11:58AM

10

happened on the bridge crew because there has been an argument

11:58AM

11

raised that somehow the crew and the captain panicked and that

11:58AM

12

they failed to disconnect immediately from the well.

11:58AM

13

11:58AM

14

of the men and the heroic actions of the men and women on the

11:58AM

15

crew that night.

11:58AM

16

Some people seem to think that the EDS button is

11:58AM

17

some sort of ejector button like you see on an Air Force F-16.

11:58AM

18

It's not.

11:58AM

19

used after you communicate with the drill crew.

11:58AM

20

11:58AM

21

the well, and they have to take actions.

11:58AM

22

before you're supposed to or without checking with them, or

11:58AM

23

when it cuts the joints and it can't cut through the joints,

11:58AM

24

you may have a rig drifting out in the Gulf of Mexico with a

11:58AM

25

wide open wellbore.

All of the major components had been inspected


The BOP was tested constantly.

The blind

They functioned then during the

So let me talk for the last few minutes on what

Your Honor, that argument disrespects the memory

It's a piece of equipment that's only designed to be

Why?

Because the drill crew is trying to control

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

If you just EDS

141

11:59AM

Panicking and pushing the EDS button is not what

11:59AM

is recommended.

11:59AM

button on an F-16 before you realize that you're upside down a

11:59AM

hundred feet above ground.

11:59AM

11:59AM

there was confusion because of the dual command, is not

11:59AM

accurate.

11:59AM

Captain Kuchta was in charge.

11:59AM

members knew it.

11:59AM

10

11:59AM

11

questions of some people before deciding to EDS.

11:59AM

12

entirely appropriate in an emergency.

11:59AM

13

Captain Kuchta, and he adhered to the right procedures on the

11:59AM

14

bridge crew -- on the bridge that night, Your Honor.

11:59AM

15

12:00PM

16

well trained and that they acted properly in response to this

12:00PM

17

disaster is that every single man and woman who could have

12:00PM

18

survived did.

12:00PM

19

explosion, burning oil, the men and women on that rig sprung

12:00PM

20

into action.

12:00PM

21

12:00PM

22

literally death-defying acts of heroism.

12:00PM

23

walking, climbing, crawling on the rig to save their shipmates.

12:00PM

24

In the end, every single crew member who was not killed in the

12:00PM

25

initial explosion survived.

It's almost like if you hit the ejector seat

You have to think before you do it.

The next claim that Mr. Roy made, that somehow

Everybody knew that in case of an emergency,


He knew it, and the other crew

It was totally proper for Captain Kuchta to ask


That was

There was no panic in

Perhaps the clearest indication that the crew was

In the midst of a literal apocalypse of fire,

You will hear testimony at this trial about

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

Men and women

142

12:00PM

12:01PM

deposition, Your Honor, when he was asked, "What is your

12:01PM

opinion on the performance of the Transocean crew on April 20?"

12:01PM

Answer, "I think they were heroic."

12:01PM

I think so too, Your Honor.

12:01PM

12:01PM

12:01PM

take a lunch recess before we continue with the remainder of

12:01PM

the statements.

12:01PM

10

opening statements, I calculate.

12:01PM

11

Recess until then.

12:01PM

12

THE DEPUTY CLERK:

12:01PM

13

(WHEREUPON, at 12:01 p.m. the Court was in luncheon

14
15

I think Professor Bea may have put it best at his

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Thank you.

Thank you.
It's noontime.

We're going to now

I think we have about three hours left of


So let's come back at 1:30.

All rise.

recess.)
*

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

143

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2
3

I, Cathy Pepper, Certified Realtime Reporter, Registered

Merit Reporter, Certified Court Reporter of the State of

Louisiana, Official Court Reporter for the United States

District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, do hereby

certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript to

the best of my ability and understanding from the record of the

proceedings in the above-entitled and numbered matter.

10
11
12

s/Cathy Pepper

13

Cathy Pepper, CRR, RMR, CCR


Certified Realtime Reporter
Registered Merit Reporter
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
[email protected]

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

_____

$
$10 [3] - 62:2, 93:11,
132:23
$100,000 [1] - 55:3
$139,000 [1] - 55:3
$50 [2] - 59:2, 109:2

'
'09 [1] - 29:17
'we [1] - 60:8

1
1 [5] - 1:19, 26:8,
47:17, 82:14, 109:11
1,300 [2] - 87:12,
87:14
1,300-pound [1] 87:16
1,400 [4] - 92:17,
93:18, 94:2, 96:12
1,720,000 [1] - 110:1
1,800 [1] - 87:16
1.4 [1] - 64:23
10 [9] - 21:2, 21:3,
67:1, 72:2, 78:10,
117:4, 122:23,
125:17
10-2179 [1] - 10:13
10-2771 [2] - 10:15,
17:15
10-4536 [2] - 10:17,
17:18
10-MD-2179 [1] - 1:8
10-minute [1] - 134:20
100 [3] - 3:4, 9:7,
127:2
1000 [2] - 7:4, 8:5
1001 [1] - 6:20
101 [1] - 3:8
103 [1] - 9:8
10W90 [1] - 110:8
11 [5] - 94:20, 99:25,
102:14, 105:9,
121:14
1100 [1] - 6:16
111 [1] - 9:9
1110 [1] - 7:8
12 [2] - 62:12, 125:18
1201 [2] - 6:4, 7:21
1221 [1] - 7:14
12:01 [1] - 142:22
13,000 [2] - 59:11,
88:14
1308 [1] - 3:11

1331 [1] - 7:24


142 [1] - 9:10
14271 [1] - 4:18
15 [2] - 67:2, 69:6
15-minute [1] - 71:11
16 [2] - 57:15, 128:12
1601 [1] - 2:11
1665 [1] - 7:24
17 [3] - 32:18, 75:22,
76:4
1700 [1] - 7:21
18 [7] - 15:8, 90:18,
120:23, 121:12,
121:16, 129:13,
131:12
18,000 [2] - 59:12,
88:13
1851 [1] - 18:2
1885 [1] - 5:11
19 [1] - 129:17
190 [1] - 82:15
1990 [1] - 17:20
1:30 [1] - 142:19

2
2,000 [1] - 89:3
2.1 [1] - 109:22
20 [35] - 1:6, 10:15,
16:4, 21:1, 26:25,
27:12, 27:14, 27:25,
28:14, 45:15, 51:2,
52:19, 56:19, 57:21,
64:24, 74:7, 74:19,
75:14, 78:10, 78:11,
111:15, 113:23,
116:18, 117:5,
118:25, 119:10,
121:15, 122:2,
122:16, 122:23,
123:3, 128:16,
131:2, 140:15,
142:12
20004 [1] - 6:5
2001 [3] - 42:6, 48:13,
66:15
2002 [2] - 39:23, 66:15
2004 [4] - 28:21, 48:1,
123:9, 123:11
20044 [3] - 4:13, 4:19,
4:24
2005 [4] - 48:4, 66:16,
89:21, 122:13
2006 [1] - 66:25
2007 [2] - 48:24, 64:17
2008 [9] - 29:1, 29:15,
31:23, 45:20, 64:22,
65:4, 65:5, 68:7,
89:21

2009 [36] - 29:15, 30:8,


30:14, 31:19, 31:21,
31:24, 32:10, 39:24,
42:9, 45:4, 46:8,
46:23, 47:8, 47:17,
47:24, 48:1, 48:8,
54:9, 56:6, 57:7,
57:10, 57:15, 57:21,
64:22, 65:4, 65:14,
68:4, 68:22, 89:22,
106:23, 118:12,
118:18, 121:5,
122:13, 122:17,
125:4
2010 [37] - 1:6, 10:15,
16:4, 17:10, 26:25,
27:25, 28:15, 31:8,
31:17, 32:16, 32:19,
33:4, 37:22, 40:4,
42:9, 45:20, 52:20,
56:13, 56:19, 57:21,
58:12, 58:25, 64:14,
64:23, 65:16, 68:16,
70:15, 75:22,
111:15, 113:23,
119:10, 120:23,
121:12, 125:11,
126:20, 140:11,
140:15
2011 [2] - 109:20,
109:24
2012 [5] - 109:10,
109:12, 109:23,
109:25, 110:1
2013 [5] - 1:9, 10:2,
15:8, 23:23, 109:11
20th [8] - 30:7, 32:16,
32:19, 37:22, 40:4,
70:15, 90:14, 100:13
21 [2] - 46:23, 62:6
212 [1] - 105:2
2179 [1] - 24:3
21st [1] - 110:1
22 [4] - 16:12, 61:11,
61:15, 72:7
2211 [1] - 7:8
2216 [1] - 3:22
22ND [1] - 2:19
22nd [1] - 23:23
23 [1] - 117:8
23451 [1] - 2:19
24 [3] - 52:7, 128:8,
128:11
25 [3] - 1:9, 10:2,
107:14
250 [1] - 65:14
250.401 [2] - 88:19,
108:19
252 [1] - 16:7
26 [1] - 9:5

2615 [1] - 2:15


26th [1] - 33:4
27th [1] - 61:12
28 [1] - 109:9
290 [1] - 65:10
29th [1] - 61:10
2:10-CV-02771 [1] 1:11
2:10-CV-4536 [1] 1:14

3
3 [1] - 3:4
3,000 [2] - 62:16,
133:23
3,140 [1] - 87:25
3,142 [1] - 87:15
3,545 [2] - 68:6,
106:24
30 [8] - 88:19, 105:1,
108:19, 113:9,
122:24, 125:19,
131:9, 133:14
30-minute [2] - 57:2,
72:1
300 [1] - 6:9
3000 [1] - 54:13
30=second [1] - 75:2
311 [1] - 17:21
32 [1] - 87:14
33 [1] - 56:14
335 [1] - 6:24
35 [1] - 31:10
350 [1] - 65:14
35000 [1] - 118:12
35TH [1] - 6:24
36130 [1] - 5:6
36604 [1] - 2:12
3668 [1] - 2:4
370 [1] - 21:4
3700 [2] - 6:16, 6:20
390 [2] - 68:5, 106:23

4
4 [3] - 3:4, 58:17,
64:23
40 [3] - 31:11, 87:14,
88:23
40-barrel [1] - 89:4
400 [1] - 131:17
4000 [1] - 8:5
402 [1] - 2:19
4310 [1] - 3:18
435 [1] - 3:8
45 [1] - 20:25
450 [1] - 4:5

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

4500 [1] - 7:14


47 [3] - 74:22, 98:20
48 [2] - 104:20, 128:11

5
5 [1] - 58:18
5,000 [2] - 88:15,
133:22
50 [5] - 16:8, 27:15,
78:5, 89:3, 93:12
500 [3] - 2:4, 5:5, 8:9
5000 [4] - 5:22, 42:25,
50:18, 59:10
504 [1] - 8:10
5395 [1] - 4:6
556 [1] - 2:4
560 [1] - 93:23
569 [1] - 82:15
58 [1] - 110:2
589-7779 [1] - 8:10

6
60 [3] - 21:1, 21:2,
109:13
600 [3] - 2:19, 2:22,
7:4
601 [1] - 2:15
60654 [1] - 6:9
618 [1] - 3:15
660 [1] - 109:8
668,000 [1] - 60:20
6:00 [2] - 14:4, 116:18

7
7 [2] - 58:16, 58:17
7,000 [1] - 122:14
700 [1] - 27:14
701 [2] - 5:16, 5:22
70113 [1] - 2:8
70130 [5] - 2:16, 2:23,
3:22, 5:16, 8:10
70139 [1] - 5:23
70163 [1] - 6:16
70360 [1] - 3:8
70458 [1] - 3:12
70502 [2] - 2:5, 7:5
70801 [1] - 3:15
70804 [1] - 5:12
71 [1] - 9:6
711 [2] - 30:15, 121:4
75 [1] - 20:23
75270 [1] - 7:21
7611 [1] - 4:12
769 [1] - 82:18

77002 [2] - 6:20, 8:5


77006 [1] - 3:19
77010 [2] - 7:15, 7:25
77098 [1] - 7:8
78257 [1] - 3:5
7th [1] - 109:25
7TH [1] - 4:6

8
8 [2] - 56:13, 126:12
820 [1] - 2:8
8291 [1] - 15:8
84,000 [1] - 89:3
8:00 [3] - 14:3, 90:14,
96:17
8:52 [9] - 74:6, 94:15,
94:22, 111:15,
111:25, 115:7,
134:8, 135:3, 138:13
8th [5] - 31:8, 60:5,
68:16, 125:11,
125:24

9
9 [5] - 45:20, 109:23,
134:11, 135:3
90 [1] - 21:2
90071 [1] - 6:25
93 [2] - 65:10, 109:11
94005 [1] - 5:12
94102 [1] - 4:6
97.6 [1] - 126:24
9:02 [3] - 74:21, 98:9,
98:19
9:08 [1] - 134:17
9:14 [2] - 134:17,
135:14
9:15 [2] - 134:17,
135:5
9:18 [1] - 135:16
9:30 [1] - 135:23
9:36 [1] - 136:3
9:38 [1] - 98:12
9:39 [1] - 136:7
9:40 [1] - 136:7
9:45 [1] - 71:14
9:46 [1] - 137:1
9:47 [2] - 137:1,
139:10
9:49 [1] - 135:14
9TH [1] - 2:22
9th [1] - 33:4

A
a.m [2] - 14:3, 71:14

abandon [3] - 16:6,


61:21, 132:22
abandoned [1] - 57:5
abandoning [1] 85:18
abandonment [3] 27:1, 60:22, 85:23
abdication [1] - 81:13
ability [2] - 63:4, 143:8
able [7] - 15:14, 15:15,
41:15, 50:1, 54:23,
123:15, 139:19
abnormal [1] - 133:3
abnormalities [1] 113:10
aboard [7] - 30:15,
31:2, 32:25, 74:8,
77:10, 87:19, 100:12
above-entitled [1] 143:9
ABRAMSON [1] - 2:14
absolutely [6] - 68:25,
93:6, 94:20, 95:24,
128:15, 129:1
accepted [1] - 108:3
access [3] - 15:7,
23:22, 33:23
accident [12] - 63:15,
83:9, 83:15, 84:19,
85:9, 88:9, 89:10,
90:5, 98:7, 98:24,
119:14, 120:10
accidents [4] - 63:14,
66:21, 120:13, 125:6
accommodate [1] 26:6
accommodation [1] 23:9
accordance [1] 108:2
according [9] - 27:25,
58:24, 65:21, 65:23,
78:5, 83:15, 83:19,
83:20, 95:2
accordingly [1] 110:22
accountable [1] 106:18
accumulation [2] 84:25, 85:3
accurate [3] - 16:1,
129:2, 141:16
accusations [1] 138:4
accused [1] - 138:3
achieve [1] - 67:10
acknowledged [2] 64:17, 86:13
acoustic [1] - 43:12
acronyms [3] - 24:11,

24:14, 24:16
Act [9] - 17:17, 17:20,
17:21, 18:1, 19:16,
19:20, 84:14, 84:21,
85:8
act [6] - 30:6, 40:6,
45:15, 75:6, 107:4,
138:5
Act's [1] - 84:24
acted [7] - 19:19,
19:23, 35:7, 102:19,
105:12, 127:1,
141:25
acting [1] - 135:24
action [22] - 16:22,
17:16, 17:19, 19:10,
19:15, 19:16, 19:17,
39:9, 39:23, 74:23,
75:6, 88:24, 94:6,
97:7, 123:8, 123:18,
123:19, 124:3,
124:20, 138:6, 142:4
Action [2] - 10:15,
10:17
ACTION [1] - 1:8
actions [10] - 63:6,
80:16, 81:9, 95:14,
97:15, 98:23,
100:12, 137:6,
140:23, 141:5
activate [5] - 37:1,
37:18, 37:20, 38:8,
38:19
activated [3] - 38:11,
38:22, 39:5
activating [3] - 34:18,
137:9, 137:10
activation [6] - 34:23,
35:12, 37:5, 37:6,
40:14, 43:13
acts [5] - 18:22, 18:25,
84:25, 85:3, 142:6
actual [3] - 55:13,
68:11, 135:10
ad [1] - 120:21
add [2] - 30:23, 43:12
addition [7] - 22:1,
24:23, 24:24, 37:23,
69:7, 131:16, 137:9
additional [3] - 53:24,
56:18, 130:3
additive [1] - 54:13
address [5] - 13:21,
19:25, 39:25,
101:12, 111:1
addressed [1] - 29:19
adequacy [1] - 46:13
adequate [5] - 27:21,
30:4, 36:16, 39:3,
46:12

adequately [10] 28:17, 29:19, 29:20,


29:22, 30:2, 32:23,
34:13, 35:15, 41:4,
56:4
adhered [1] - 141:22
adherents [1] - 29:11
administer [1] - 65:13
admiralty [1] - 14:6
admired [1] - 116:22
admit [3] - 54:17,
55:11, 55:25
admits [2] - 93:8,
94:24
admitted [10] - 22:25,
23:1, 89:1, 92:8,
105:22, 114:6,
115:19, 129:16,
130:21
admonition [1] - 49:13
advance [1] - 21:22
adversely [1] - 105:4
advised [1] - 66:15
advisory [1] - 121:8
affect [1] - 125:20
affected [2] - 52:25,
105:4
affects [1] - 47:20
affirms [1] - 101:17
afire [1] - 94:7
afraid [1] - 87:20
afternoon [1] - 22:7
aged [1] - 54:9
agencies [1] - 118:15
agent [2] - 54:18,
107:21
ago [2] - 74:9, 123:11
agree [2] - 71:24,
102:18
agreed [2] - 32:21,
118:20
agrees [1] - 40:12
ahead [3] - 60:14,
70:1, 89:25
Air [2] - 54:13, 141:1
air [1] - 37:11
aircraft [1] - 140:5
al [2] - 10:16, 10:18
AL [4] - 1:13, 1:15,
2:12, 5:6
Alabama [10] - 11:16,
11:23, 16:20, 20:25,
100:24, 101:3,
101:6, 101:9,
101:17, 102:24
ALABAMA [2] - 5:3
Alabama's [1] 101:15
Alan [2] - 12:15, 13:6
alarm [7] - 36:21,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

37:2, 37:5, 37:17,


37:18, 38:3, 79:7
alarms [8] - 28:25,
35:13, 37:13, 37:15,
37:16, 38:6, 40:7,
40:14
alert [2] - 86:19,
137:11
ALEX [1] - 7:13
align [1] - 101:15
alive [1] - 113:6
all-critical [1] - 96:16
ALLAN [1] - 5:15
Allan [1] - 11:22
allegations [1] - 99:24
Allen [2] - 60:9, 79:21
allocated [1] - 20:19
allocation [1] - 20:1
allow [3] - 25:5, 35:3,
38:19
allowed [7] - 14:18,
31:14, 37:11, 40:12,
84:10, 94:6, 106:1
allowing [2] - 62:4,
62:9
almost [8] - 94:22,
107:2, 117:4,
117:10, 117:12,
122:14, 124:7,
141:11
alone [5] - 46:17,
73:25, 75:6, 85:5,
113:5
alongside [1] - 114:12
alternative [1] 132:21
alternatively [1] - 18:4
altogether [1] - 34:25
amazingly [4] - 28:9,
34:4, 35:2, 37:24
Amendment [2] 74:12, 87:24
America [3] - 10:17,
11:19, 16:19
AMERICA [3] - 1:14,
4:4, 5:20
AMERICAN [1] - 2:15
American [1] - 55:21
amount [10] - 20:12,
44:22, 44:23, 55:1,
58:15, 80:8, 82:5,
82:7, 82:9, 106:1
amounting [1] - 80:16
amounts [4] - 35:24,
36:1, 36:6, 87:9
Anadarko [3] - 107:11,
107:13, 107:15
analysis [2] - 57:8,
58:4
analyze [1] - 134:4

analyzing [1] - 133:6


AND [2] - 1:12, 6:13
Anderson [7] - 99:20,
116:20, 117:3,
117:10, 119:23,
121:13, 137:18
Andrea [2] - 35:10,
40:8
ANDREW [1] - 6:7
Andy [2] - 12:4, 65:7
ANGELES [1] - 6:25
announce [2] - 25:23,
40:8
announced [2] 25:25, 26:1
annual [1] - 31:19
annular [5] - 136:12,
137:10, 139:5, 139:7
Answer [1] - 142:13
answer [6] - 77:8,
96:18, 104:5,
114:25, 117:16
answering [1] - 115:9
answers [1] - 100:17
Anthony [1] - 11:2
ANTHONY [1] - 3:21
anticipated [1] - 13:11
ANTONIO [1] - 3:5
apart [1] - 68:25
apartments [1] - 68:21
API [1] - 74:19
apocalypse [1] - 142:2
apparent [1] - 80:3
appear [1] - 21:25
appearance [1] 10:21
APPEARANCES [7] 2:1, 3:1, 4:1, 5:1,
6:1, 7:1, 8:1
appeared [1] - 134:13
appearing [1] - 10:20
appendices [1] 82:16
application [2] - 32:4,
104:18
applied [1] - 87:15
apply [2] - 15:18,
110:21
applying [1] - 87:8
appoint [1] - 33:21
appreciate [1] 105:23
approach [2] - 111:5,
130:5
appropriate [5] 33:14, 69:3, 101:10,
126:8, 141:21
approval [4] - 38:25,
60:15, 94:9, 94:15
approve [1] - 93:25

approved [4] - 48:10,


92:23, 95:22, 96:17
APRIL [1] - 1:6
April [47] - 10:15,
16:4, 16:12, 26:8,
26:25, 27:25, 28:14,
30:7, 32:16, 32:19,
37:22, 40:4, 45:15,
51:2, 52:19, 56:19,
57:10, 57:15, 57:20,
57:21, 70:15, 72:7,
74:7, 75:14, 75:22,
76:4, 90:14, 100:13,
111:15, 113:23,
116:18, 117:5,
118:25, 119:10,
120:23, 121:12,
121:15, 121:16,
122:2, 123:3,
128:16, 129:13,
129:16, 131:2,
131:12, 140:15,
142:12
Arctic [1] - 125:3
area [2] - 29:7, 89:24
areas [1] - 33:11
argue [2] - 99:3, 131:9
argument [3] - 121:6,
140:19, 140:22
armed [4] - 50:20,
51:1, 94:19, 108:12
arranged [2] - 24:24,
25:1
ARRELL [1] - 7:7
arrived [2] - 34:20,
38:25
arrogance [1] - 129:22
arrow [1] - 85:14
art [1] - 119:21
article [1] - 15:10
ASBILL [1] - 6:18
ashore [3] - 33:22,
33:25, 81:5
aside [1] - 84:9
ass [1] - 69:1
assessed [1] - 110:15
assessment [4] 29:11, 29:18, 33:3,
63:4
assessments [2] 30:5, 57:12
ASSET [1] - 1:12
Asset [2] - 10:16,
47:17
assets [1] - 119:16
assigned [2] - 20:20,
52:16
assist [1] - 22:6
assistant [2] - 28:8,
117:11

associated [1] - 127:4


assurance [1] - 32:25
astounding [1] - 68:5
atmosphere [1] 105:18
attempt [5] - 85:24,
85:25, 89:19, 93:21,
106:17
attempts [4] - 64:1,
72:14, 87:7, 87:8
attend [1] - 121:18
attention [3] - 33:16,
57:4, 58:9
attentive [2] - 137:6,
138:7
attentively [1] - 113:8
attitude [4] - 60:8,
65:22, 86:12, 130:4
ATTORNEY [4] - 5:3,
5:4, 5:9, 5:11
Attorney [6] - 11:13,
11:15, 101:3, 104:3,
104:7, 104:8
attorneys [3] - 24:15,
26:5, 75:10
audible [1] - 37:13
audio [2] - 15:12,
25:20
audit [6] - 48:8, 68:4,
68:8, 106:23,
126:20, 126:23
audited [3] - 45:6,
47:12, 119:25
audits [3] - 41:11,
67:17, 89:21
August [3] - 17:10,
39:23, 48:8
authority [4] - 34:22,
39:8, 39:20, 93:25
authorized [1] - 38:20
automatic [5] - 36:21,
36:25, 38:10, 50:20,
108:11
automatically [4] 37:4, 37:20, 133:20,
136:19
avail [1] - 49:18
available [15] - 22:10,
23:15, 23:20, 23:24,
24:10, 24:19, 25:7,
25:8, 42:5, 42:8,
45:17, 50:21, 107:6,
107:7, 134:14
AVENUE [5] - 2:8, 4:5,
5:5, 6:4, 6:24
averse [2] - 66:3
averted [2] - 34:24,
108:24
avoid [4] - 24:16, 38:6,
67:5, 113:20

avoidable [1] - 105:14


avoided [3] - 32:4,
75:4, 107:9
awaited [1] - 46:17
aware [6] - 16:3, 33:9,
33:18, 45:21, 67:4,
88:17
awareness [1] - 60:7
Azar [2] - 84:2, 92:13

B
background [1] 15:24
backup [1] - 73:12
bad [2] - 44:6, 86:3
balances [1] - 64:6
balls [1] - 109:19
bandwagon [1] 138:17
Barataria [1] - 105:3
BARBIER [1] - 1:21
Barbier [1] - 103:8
bare [1] - 140:6
barely [1] - 43:24
barrel [2] - 58:25, 93:3
barreled [2] - 89:25,
97:22
barrels [12] - 27:12,
27:14, 88:23, 89:3,
109:9, 122:16,
122:23, 122:24,
125:18, 125:19,
131:17
barrier [8] - 40:22,
49:2, 53:20, 53:21,
62:15, 86:6, 87:4,
89:13
barriers [1] - 121:10
base [1] - 131:13
based [9] - 43:21,
45:5, 82:25, 84:8,
92:24, 109:6,
138:23, 140:2, 140:3
basic [1] - 32:12
basics [2] - 56:9,
125:9
Basis [3] - 57:9,
57:22, 58:6
basis [3] - 57:13,
57:25, 60:11
BATON [2] - 3:15,
5:12
batteries [9] - 42:23,
43:2, 43:3, 50:15,
50:22, 50:25, 108:9,
108:12, 139:25
battery [3] - 51:2,
73:10, 108:7

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

Bay [1] - 105:3


Bea [11] - 63:23, 64:5,
64:8, 65:23, 66:14,
66:17, 66:20, 69:16,
70:2, 130:14, 142:10
BEACH [1] - 2:19
beaches [1] - 109:18
bear [1] - 105:12
bears [1] - 86:24
became [3] - 76:11,
122:4, 136:22
Beck [1] - 12:6
BECK [3] - 7:11, 7:12,
12:6
become [3] - 80:3,
89:2, 97:24
becoming [1] - 42:8
bed [1] - 77:11
BEFORE [1] - 1:21
began [6] - 57:3,
62:11, 76:2, 94:23,
94:24, 98:9
begin [7] - 13:9,
13:20, 25:22, 26:13,
26:21, 37:15, 136:24
beginning [4] - 14:3,
49:16, 65:5, 130:24
begins [1] - 49:10
begrudge [1] - 80:13
behalf [7] - 11:2,
11:19, 11:20, 12:3,
34:2, 101:6, 102:25
behavior [3] - 66:9,
81:10, 100:14
behind [4] - 44:12,
59:3, 109:1, 138:1
belief [1] - 27:4
believes [2] - 18:12,
112:19
Bellow [1] - 59:15
below [6] - 59:11,
62:17, 94:25, 97:8,
120:8, 131:8
BEN [1] - 4:24
bench [1] - 14:5
benches [1] - 24:21
benefit [4] - 23:25,
69:20, 100:17,
103:21
benefits [1] - 64:10
Bertone [1] - 44:7
best [15] - 45:16,
47:15, 70:11, 75:9,
86:1, 107:6, 114:12,
117:6, 118:10,
118:17, 118:23,
119:3, 119:15,
142:10, 143:8
betrayed [1] - 114:9
better [7] - 29:10,

42:4, 73:19, 78:20,


112:4, 112:7, 120:12
between [19] - 20:8,
25:11, 27:3, 52:2,
57:20, 59:19, 64:6,
65:14, 95:13, 98:15,
109:25, 111:19,
113:4, 128:9,
134:17, 135:3,
135:4, 135:14,
138:13
beyond [1] - 80:4
billion [4] - 58:16,
58:17, 64:23
billions [5] - 64:20,
80:10
binding [1] - 16:2
birds [1] - 100:7
bladder [3] - 92:24,
93:13, 93:22
blades [2] - 42:4,
49:24
blame [8] - 49:7,
72:14, 85:24, 89:19,
113:19, 128:14,
128:24, 138:14
blend [3] - 54:8, 58:8,
107:21
blew [6] - 56:5, 72:8,
77:5, 87:25, 88:16
blind [12] - 42:2, 42:4,
42:7, 42:8, 42:18,
49:24, 50:5, 50:8,
51:6, 70:3, 139:14,
140:14
blinded [1] - 102:7
Block [1] - 16:7
blow [1] - 92:4
blowing [1] - 137:16
blown [4] - 87:20,
88:3, 88:5, 137:23
blowout [55] - 16:4,
17:6, 20:2, 29:21,
31:4, 35:17, 35:20,
38:12, 40:17, 40:18,
40:24, 41:1, 41:4,
43:13, 45:10, 45:12,
46:1, 48:22, 49:4,
49:9, 49:15, 49:17,
50:8, 51:20, 52:10,
52:23, 58:2, 66:23,
69:5, 69:9, 69:21,
72:21, 75:23, 79:13,
84:3, 85:22, 86:4,
88:17, 88:25, 89:2,
90:2, 90:10, 90:20,
94:7, 95:18, 97:8,
98:5, 99:3, 101:25,
102:4, 102:6, 113:4,
127:9, 138:25,

139:21
blows [1] - 140:7
bludgeons [1] - 77:23
Blue [1] - 51:3
blue [2] - 135:16,
135:21
bluntly [1] - 47:9
Bly [11] - 63:8, 63:10,
63:16, 82:13, 83:6,
83:21, 85:2, 93:8,
93:10, 94:23, 98:10
board [5] - 34:5, 69:7,
70:5, 81:7, 139:1
Bob [4] - 46:24, 63:23,
66:14, 133:8
BOCKIUS [1] - 8:3
Bodek [3] - 61:11,
61:12, 61:16
Bolado [1] - 54:16
bomb [1] - 97:23
bond [2] - 62:23,
129:6
boots [1] - 137:22
BOP [53] - 17:6, 40:19,
41:8, 41:12, 41:15,
41:17, 41:18, 41:20,
42:2, 42:11, 42:17,
42:22, 42:24, 42:25,
45:16, 45:19, 45:25,
46:8, 46:14, 49:1,
49:8, 49:12, 49:20,
49:23, 49:25, 50:12,
50:20, 51:4, 72:25,
83:14, 89:10, 89:13,
89:17, 89:19, 89:20,
89:23, 97:20, 97:22,
98:11, 98:17, 108:6,
108:11, 112:1,
131:23, 137:9,
138:15, 138:16,
138:18, 138:21,
139:22, 140:1,
140:9, 140:14
BOP's [1] - 89:7
BOPs [1] - 40:23
bore [4] - 99:8, 137:2,
137:10, 139:9
boss [6] - 61:13,
61:16, 69:10, 75:20,
76:15, 132:15
botch [1] - 106:21
botched [6] - 86:8,
90:6, 106:5, 106:22,
130:24, 130:25
bottom [11] - 31:5,
59:10, 81:20, 88:12,
90:18, 102:7, 120:5,
127:24, 131:14,
135:20, 136:2
bottoms [2] - 62:3,

127:18
bottoms-up [1] 127:18
bought [1] - 93:2
BOULEVARD [1] 3:18
BOUNDS [1] - 2:10
bounds [1] - 94:11
BOWMAN [1] - 7:19
BOX [4] - 2:4, 4:12,
4:18, 5:12
BP [280] - 1:15, 5:19,
5:20, 5:20, 10:18,
12:1, 12:2, 12:3,
12:4, 12:5, 16:23,
17:2, 17:3, 17:8,
18:17, 19:13, 19:18,
21:2, 27:3, 27:24,
28:14, 31:16, 40:25,
41:11, 41:22, 41:24,
44:2, 44:5, 45:14,
45:17, 45:21, 46:6,
46:8, 46:10, 46:11,
46:17, 48:8, 48:20,
49:6, 49:14, 51:17,
51:24, 52:2, 52:5,
52:7, 52:15, 52:21,
52:24, 53:1, 53:2,
53:4, 54:25, 55:2,
55:6, 55:21, 55:22,
56:7, 56:10, 56:12,
57:7, 58:4, 58:9,
58:10, 58:12, 58:14,
58:18, 58:24, 59:4,
59:5, 59:7, 59:8,
59:12, 59:15, 59:16,
59:22, 60:1, 60:4,
60:6, 60:10, 60:12,
60:16, 61:12, 61:13,
61:21, 61:24, 62:3,
62:5, 62:8, 62:11,
62:14, 62:16, 62:18,
62:20, 62:23, 63:1,
63:2, 63:6, 63:8,
63:10, 63:11, 64:8,
64:12, 64:15, 64:21,
64:22, 65:1, 65:7,
65:10, 65:14, 66:1,
66:4, 66:8, 66:15,
66:17, 66:25, 67:3,
67:6, 67:14, 67:20,
68:2, 68:4, 68:8,
68:9, 68:12, 68:14,
68:22, 69:2, 69:5,
69:12, 69:14, 69:16,
70:5, 70:16, 70:19,
72:16, 72:17, 73:1,
73:3, 73:23, 73:25,
74:9, 74:18, 74:23,
75:11, 75:15, 75:20,

76:5, 76:6, 76:9,


76:25, 77:12, 77:15,
77:16, 77:18, 78:2,
78:4, 78:10, 78:17,
78:25, 79:6, 79:7,
79:11, 79:13, 79:19,
79:21, 80:3, 80:7,
80:13, 80:17, 80:18,
80:23, 80:25, 81:4,
81:15, 81:17, 81:18,
82:12, 82:20, 83:1,
83:25, 84:14, 85:18,
85:24, 86:7, 86:9,
86:11, 86:16, 86:18,
86:19, 86:24, 87:5,
87:15, 87:22, 88:4,
88:19, 89:1, 89:15,
89:19, 89:22, 89:25,
90:14, 90:24, 91:22,
92:17, 92:25, 93:20,
94:3, 94:10, 94:12,
95:3, 95:13, 95:21,
98:7, 98:13, 98:15,
99:3, 99:16, 100:1,
101:21, 101:24,
102:3, 102:6, 102:7,
102:10, 102:15,
102:19, 102:23,
104:9, 104:18,
105:11, 105:22,
106:21, 107:10,
108:7, 108:17,
109:7, 112:4, 112:6,
112:22, 113:16,
113:21, 113:24,
114:9, 115:10,
115:13, 117:20,
118:20, 118:21,
118:22, 119:1,
119:10, 119:12,
125:23, 127:11,
127:18, 127:25,
128:7, 128:9,
128:16, 128:25,
129:11, 129:15,
130:5, 130:17,
130:23, 131:3,
131:9, 131:22,
132:9, 133:7,
134:14, 136:16,
138:1, 138:14
BP's [90] - 27:25,
48:11, 52:17, 58:12,
60:23, 61:20, 63:11,
63:13, 63:15, 63:18,
63:19, 64:17, 64:19,
64:24, 65:6, 65:21,
65:22, 66:12, 66:13,
66:24, 67:22, 67:23,
67:25, 69:10, 72:14,
75:5, 76:25, 78:19,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

78:23, 79:16, 81:8,


83:6, 83:15, 83:19,
84:1, 84:2, 84:4,
84:12, 84:19, 85:2,
85:9, 85:12, 85:15,
86:12, 86:21, 87:19,
88:2, 88:7, 88:9,
88:17, 89:6, 89:10,
90:5, 90:8, 92:13,
92:22, 93:2, 93:8,
93:13, 93:16, 93:24,
94:23, 95:2, 95:14,
95:17, 95:19, 96:13,
96:16, 96:21, 98:1,
98:6, 98:10, 98:18,
99:2, 99:4, 101:22,
102:9, 102:21,
105:16, 106:4,
106:20, 108:25,
111:20, 113:18,
114:24, 128:14,
129:15, 130:9,
130:15
BP-Halliburton [1] 55:22
BP/Halliburton [1] 57:10
BRAD [1] - 6:23
Brad [2] - 12:9, 111:14
BRANCH [3] - 4:4,
4:15, 4:22
breach [2] - 114:23,
115:5
break [6] - 57:2, 71:3,
72:1, 72:2, 134:20
breaks [1] - 43:23
breathed [1] - 110:5
BREIT [3] - 2:18, 2:18,
11:20
Breit [1] - 11:20
BRENNAN [1] - 6:18
Breton [1] - 105:4
Brett [4] - 68:23, 69:6,
79:14, 129:20
Brian [6] - 12:9, 61:6,
87:23, 111:7,
111:14, 131:12
BRIAN [7] - 6:23, 12:9,
111:4, 111:10,
111:13, 118:9,
126:19
BRIAN.....................
[1] - 9:9
bridge [9] - 35:7,
37:19, 38:13, 40:5,
137:11, 138:19,
140:19, 141:23
brief [2] - 15:20,
101:12
briefly [1] - 76:4

bright [1] - 131:22


bring [2] - 69:23,
105:9
bringing [2] - 45:24,
103:10
brings [1] - 19:15
broadcasting [1] 14:23
Brock [1] - 12:1
BROCK [2] - 6:4, 12:1
broke [1] - 44:16
broken [2] - 45:10,
48:17
brought [3] - 18:8,
18:17, 69:20
Brown [1] - 43:22
BRUCE [1] - 7:19
brutally [1] - 47:18
Buddy [1] - 11:13
budget [3] - 59:2,
78:5, 109:2
BUILDING [2] - 2:15,
3:4
buildup [2] - 91:3,
91:8
built [1] - 118:21
bulletin [1] - 46:24
burden [2] - 19:1, 19:2
BURLING [1] - 6:3
burned [1] - 106:17
burning [2] - 16:12,
142:3
business [7] - 56:12,
104:2, 104:15,
104:17, 122:12,
122:15, 130:10
businesses [2] 16:21, 102:12
button [4] - 140:25,
141:1, 141:10,
141:12
BY [44] - 1:5, 2:3, 2:7,
2:11, 2:14, 2:18,
2:22, 3:3, 3:7, 3:11,
3:14, 3:18, 3:21, 4:5,
4:10, 4:16, 4:22, 5:4,
5:10, 5:15, 5:21, 6:4,
6:7, 6:15, 6:19, 6:23,
7:3, 7:7, 7:12, 7:18,
7:24, 8:3, 8:12, 8:13,
9:5, 9:6, 9:7, 9:8,
9:9, 26:17, 71:20,
101:1, 103:7, 111:13

C
C-224 [1] - 25:2
C.F.R [1] - 88:19
CA [2] - 4:6, 6:25

cable [1] - 43:8


cables [3] - 43:6,
43:11
calculate [1] - 142:19
calculated [1] - 58:14
Caldwell [5] - 11:13,
103:5, 107:15,
111:2, 116:9
CALDWELL [4] - 5:10,
11:13, 103:7, 107:18
CALDWELL...............
... [1] - 9:8
calendar [2] - 25:24,
26:5
CALLED [1] - 10:4
callous [1] - 86:12
callousness [1] 101:22
Calvert [1] - 84:2
camera [1] - 15:3
Cameron [24] - 12:6,
13:3, 13:4, 13:5,
13:6, 17:5, 18:18,
19:13, 21:2, 40:25,
45:17, 48:22, 49:6,
49:7, 49:12, 49:25,
50:4, 50:6, 50:7,
50:14, 51:7, 51:11,
70:20, 108:6
CAMERON [1] - 7:11
Cameron's [5] - 48:24,
49:21, 49:22, 50:17,
108:10
CAMP [1] - 5:16
candid [1] - 47:18
candle [1] - 94:8
Canducci [3] - 33:24,
34:2, 34:4
cannot [5] - 14:15,
15:13, 29:7, 47:6,
100:13
Canyon [1] - 16:7
capital [1] - 49:2
capped [2] - 16:15,
20:17
capsizing [1] - 20:2
captain [7] - 34:8,
34:10, 34:18, 38:19,
38:20, 38:21, 140:20
Captain [6] - 34:18,
34:21, 38:14,
141:17, 141:19,
141:22
capture [1] - 106:17
car [2] - 87:13, 140:6
care [6] - 26:10, 53:25,
82:5, 105:21, 120:8,
120:19
cares [5] - 69:14,
79:17, 81:11, 86:13,

129:20
Carl [1] - 34:9
CARL [1] - 1:21
CARONDELET [1] 2:22
CARRIE [1] - 6:8
cascading [1] - 40:7
Case [1] - 17:18
CASE [2] - 1:11, 1:14
case [33] - 10:11,
17:15, 23:3, 23:11,
26:5, 30:3, 72:24,
74:12, 75:25, 80:14,
81:20, 81:24, 81:25,
93:21, 97:10,
101:20, 103:1,
103:11, 104:14,
104:16, 105:24,
110:5, 110:11,
110:18, 114:11,
117:15, 120:18,
129:10, 129:20,
136:23, 136:24,
137:4, 141:16
cases [6] - 14:6,
17:14, 17:22, 17:23,
48:25, 98:21
cash [1] - 58:13
casing [14] - 51:18,
51:22, 52:7, 59:17,
59:21, 61:24, 85:22,
87:3, 88:15, 90:15,
90:19, 91:13, 108:2,
132:19
Castell [1] - 70:5
casualty [4] - 18:5,
18:23, 36:15, 45:9
catastrophe [7] 16:10, 30:7, 30:25,
33:4, 34:24, 74:18,
76:1
catastrophic [3] 28:13, 58:7, 101:14
catch [2] - 28:15,
31:10
catching [1] - 31:18
Cathy [2] - 143:3,
143:13
CATHY [1] - 8:8
Cathy_Pepper@laed
.uscourts.gov [1] 143:15
cathy_Pepper@laed.
uscourts.gov [1] 8:11
caught [1] - 28:1
causal [3] - 85:16,
88:9, 90:4
causation [5] - 83:16,
83:17, 83:21, 85:7,

89:7
caused [14] - 18:23,
60:21, 72:12, 72:21,
78:17, 82:2, 83:9,
93:18, 100:12,
101:13, 101:23,
108:5, 139:11,
139:21
causes [11] - 63:17,
66:21, 66:22, 82:20,
82:25, 83:7, 83:8,
84:10, 85:1, 85:4,
105:18
causing [4] - 18:21,
85:22, 113:25, 114:1
caution [2] - 14:17,
23:4
cautioned [1] - 39:24
caveat [1] - 22:22
CCR [2] - 8:8, 143:13
cell [1] - 14:9
cement [82] - 17:4,
51:21, 51:24, 52:1,
52:6, 52:10, 52:14,
52:16, 53:11, 53:17,
53:19, 53:22, 53:24,
54:4, 54:6, 54:7,
54:12, 54:15, 54:19,
54:21, 54:22, 55:3,
57:8, 62:4, 62:10,
62:13, 62:15, 62:23,
62:24, 69:8, 72:23,
78:14, 79:2, 79:4,
79:10, 79:18, 83:10,
84:1, 84:2, 85:17,
85:20, 85:25, 86:3,
86:5, 86:7, 86:10,
86:11, 86:17, 86:22,
87:2, 87:4, 90:12,
90:17, 96:3, 96:4,
102:4, 102:5, 106:6,
107:24, 108:2,
121:1, 121:2,
121:10, 127:14,
127:15, 127:24,
128:1, 128:3, 128:4,
128:8, 128:10,
128:13, 128:16,
128:24, 129:1,
129:2, 129:6,
130:11, 138:10,
138:11
cementing [5] - 51:14,
51:18, 52:18, 53:14,
62:12
center [7] - 42:3, 50:2,
50:11, 91:13,
139:17, 139:18,
139:20
CENTER [1] - 7:14

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

centers [1] - 37:23


central [3] - 88:11,
106:6
centralize [1] - 102:4
centralizers [9] - 62:6,
69:6, 69:8, 69:11,
86:14, 102:4,
127:20, 129:12,
129:14
CENTRE [1] - 6:15
CEO [6] - 41:7, 46:24,
63:11, 64:17, 65:6,
124:23
Cernich [1] - 11:12
CERNICH [2] - 4:10,
11:12
certain [7] - 17:8,
17:19, 18:6, 22:2,
23:1, 24:11, 105:6
certainly [8] - 30:19,
39:5, 63:14, 71:24,
73:14, 102:3,
105:23, 130:19
certificate [1] - 35:3
CERTIFICATE [1] 143:1
certification [3] 39:17, 41:12, 45:19
CERTIFIED [1] - 8:8
certified [2] - 119:25,
120:1
Certified [3] - 143:3,
143:4, 143:13
certify [1] - 143:7
CFR [1] - 108:19
chaff [1] - 110:21
chain [8] - 83:17, 85:1,
85:7, 85:13, 85:16,
88:9, 90:4, 94:18
CHAKERES [1] - 4:12
challenging [1] 118:11
chance [1] - 96:19
CHANG [1] - 4:11
change [9] - 29:13,
41:20, 41:25, 43:4,
66:9, 67:21, 82:9,
110:15, 133:6
Change [3] - 29:18,
30:4, 57:23
changed [4] - 43:3,
98:21, 131:3, 135:11
changes [4] - 60:22,
60:25, 132:8, 132:11
changing [1] - 81:17
channeling [1] - 69:9
chaos [6] - 38:12,
61:6, 76:9, 77:6,
78:1, 106:4
characteristics [1] -

52:4
charge [7] - 34:12,
35:4, 55:6, 69:22,
81:15, 124:16,
141:17
charged [3] - 42:24,
50:15, 54:25
chart [2] - 27:13,
139:7
chartered [3] - 46:9,
46:10, 81:7
chartering [1] - 68:10
CHASE [1] - 7:4
cheap [1] - 42:5
check [4] - 44:12,
133:12, 134:25,
136:11
checked [3] - 42:24,
52:10, 134:21
checking [1] - 141:6
Chevron [1] - 120:2
CHICAGO [1] - 6:9
chief [1] - 38:5
Chief [1] - 43:22
choice [1] - 91:6
choke [1] - 32:7
chose [8] - 42:3, 42:9,
42:20, 43:11, 51:8,
58:22, 60:4, 80:23
Chris [1] - 38:18
chronic [3] - 31:14,
32:18, 36:17
circulation [5] - 62:3,
62:19, 127:18,
131:18, 131:24
circumstances [3] 85:1, 94:10, 126:2
cities [1] - 100:20
citizens [2] - 101:6,
103:24
City [2] - 88:14,
100:20
civil [3] - 17:20, 19:21,
20:12
Civil [2] - 10:15, 10:17
CIVIL [3] - 1:8, 4:4,
4:15
claim [2] - 92:25,
141:14
claimants [3] - 16:19,
19:2, 20:22
claimed [3] - 18:18,
63:11, 83:7
claiming [1] - 138:15
claims [12] - 16:21,
18:7, 18:8, 18:10,
18:16, 18:17, 19:7,
19:8, 19:16, 21:8,
21:11, 21:14
class [1] - 47:15

classroom [1] 121:19


Clean [7] - 17:21,
19:16, 19:20, 84:14,
84:21, 84:24, 85:8
clear [7] - 57:3, 63:23,
102:16, 104:22,
128:15, 129:1,
131:10
clearest [2] - 95:16,
141:24
clearly [6] - 30:12,
33:16, 45:20, 47:1,
47:23, 49:15
CLERK [5] - 10:7,
10:13, 71:7, 71:13,
142:21
clerks [1] - 103:11
clients' [1] - 103:15
climbing [1] - 142:7
CLINGMAN [2] - 6:19,
12:12
Clingman [2] - 12:12,
114:14
clip [4] - 117:22,
118:8, 126:1, 126:18
clips [1] - 22:2
clock [1] - 118:3
clogged [1] - 132:6
close [13] - 42:14,
49:8, 49:10, 69:23,
79:8, 83:3, 83:14,
87:20, 87:25, 89:18,
98:16, 115:4, 139:8
closed [7] - 42:16,
79:2, 79:4, 91:4,
136:11, 137:1, 139:6
closing [4] - 29:21,
37:11, 136:12, 137:9
clustered [1] - 122:21
clutter [1] - 68:3
Coast [6] - 81:22,
101:14, 102:13,
118:18, 119:11,
140:5
coast [2] - 105:2,
123:12
Cocales [5] - 68:23,
69:6, 69:13, 79:14,
82:22
Cocales' [1] - 129:20
Code [1] - 33:20
code [4] - 27:12,
39:11, 39:22, 43:16
coliaison [1] - 10:23
collar [7] - 78:14,
83:12, 86:25, 87:1,
87:2, 87:6, 87:9
colleagues [2] - 72:9,
114:14

collected [2] - 109:24,


110:2
collective [1] - 101:20
column [1] - 135:11
combined [1] - 59:25
combustible [1] - 37:4
coming [4] - 35:24,
83:11, 102:18,
137:15
command [4] - 34:17,
38:23, 39:3, 141:15
commence [1] - 44:2
comment [1] - 33:16
commented [1] 31:17
commenting [2] 14:15, 68:21
comments [2] - 15:23,
33:7
COMMERCIAL [1] 4:22
commissioned [1] 125:6
commitment [4] 58:13, 58:18, 64:4,
64:5
committed [2] - 59:3,
114:23
Committee [2] 20:23, 26:19
common [3] - 42:9,
50:2, 93:7
commonly [1] - 17:12
communicate [2] 130:16, 141:3
communication [1] 60:7
communities [2] 81:22, 100:21
companies [3] 103:25, 104:1, 120:2
company [28] - 38:4,
39:25, 48:2, 63:25,
64:1, 64:3, 64:6,
78:12, 81:4, 92:22,
114:19, 114:22,
117:7, 117:9, 122:8,
122:19, 123:2,
123:4, 123:7,
123:13, 123:16,
123:17, 123:24,
124:2, 124:15,
124:20, 125:7, 140:3
COMPANY [1] - 5:20
company's [3] 64:18, 124:16,
124:23
company-wide [1] 48:2
compared [1] - 30:21

comparison [1] 113:23


competence [2] 32:24, 46:15
competency [1] 52:25
competent [1] - 34:3
complacent [4] 113:9, 121:9,
123:23, 135:15
complaint [2] - 18:3,
18:16
COMPLAINT [1] - 1:12
Complaint [1] - 10:16
complete [6] - 14:1,
16:1, 57:8, 58:4,
60:21, 63:12
completed [2] - 44:23,
90:14
completely [2] 31:22, 50:2
Completion [1] 65:15
completion [4] 30:21, 58:11, 62:8,
108:23
Completions [1] 70:11
completions [1] - 65:2
complex [2] - 14:23,
100:8
compliance [1] 39:20
complications [1] 53:23
complies [1] - 18:6
comply [2] - 58:2,
127:25
complying [1] - 57:17
component [3] - 41:2,
51:6, 87:11
components [1] 140:13
compounded [1] 53:6
compounding [1] 34:16
comprehensive [1] 67:8
compressive [1] 128:5
compromised [1] 86:10
COMPUTER [1] - 8:13
conceivably [1] 114:24
concern [1] - 127:1
concerned [3] - 52:22,
79:20, 103:25
concerning [3] - 29:8,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

89:6, 95:14
concerns [8] - 16:4,
17:14, 52:24, 60:1,
68:22, 86:22, 88:3,
126:3
concluded [5] - 28:21,
29:12, 33:15, 41:18,
54:4
concludes [1] - 61:8
conclusion [5] 13:17, 48:5, 70:13,
95:25, 98:15
concursus [1] - 18:11
condemned [1] 130:4
condition [12] - 41:5,
42:15, 43:21, 44:7,
45:5, 55:19, 69:4,
118:20, 140:2, 140:3
condition-based [2] 43:21, 45:5
conditionally [1] 48:10
conditions [8] - 41:16,
42:12, 42:13, 42:18,
42:19, 42:21, 50:6,
50:12
conduct [15] - 13:22,
51:13, 70:22,
106:20, 113:22,
114:20, 114:21,
114:23, 115:4,
116:10, 116:11,
123:22, 123:23,
129:9
conducted [3] - 63:2,
63:11, 68:4
conducting [1] - 104:2
conference [2] - 15:1,
22:16
confident [1] - 103:24
configuration [1] 41:2
confirm [2] - 62:24,
107:24
confirms [1] - 59:16
conflict [1] - 39:21
confronted [1] - 42:2
confused [2] - 38:16,
132:7
confusion [2] 131:16, 141:15
connection [3] 52:15, 57:7, 125:1
CONRAD [1] - 3:7
conscious [2] - 66:6,
117:17
consciously [3] 114:19, 115:3, 137:5
consciousness [1] -

117:25
consequence [1] 100:2
consequences [2] 84:15, 109:1
consider [1] - 126:7
consideration [1] 23:3
considered [6] - 54:2,
88:23, 89:4, 92:20,
95:22, 132:21
considering [2] 56:12, 86:16
consisted [1] - 34:3
consistent [1] 136:16
consists [1] - 82:15
consolidated [1] 17:11
constantly [2] 120:20, 140:14
constitute [3] - 15:24,
73:25, 85:3
constituted [3] 39:10, 75:7, 94:12
consuming [2] 27:14, 103:10
contact [2] - 24:4,
24:7
contained [2] - 54:12,
107:21
contemporaneous [2]
- 35:12, 40:14
contest [1] - 63:15
context [4] - 15:20,
61:10, 66:12, 127:21
Continental [1] - 16:8
continue [8] - 22:20,
29:13, 42:9, 61:9,
76:12, 105:2, 105:4,
142:17
CONTINUED [6] - 3:1,
4:1, 5:1, 6:1, 7:1, 8:1
continued [7] - 32:14,
45:22, 61:13, 81:8,
104:24, 135:22,
136:3
continues [1] - 104:23
continuing [3] - 58:4,
110:8, 113:18
continuous [2] - 41:5,
110:20
continuously [3] 16:14, 57:11, 57:12
contract [10] - 41:3,
52:2, 55:22, 57:7,
57:10, 57:15, 57:17,
57:25, 58:6, 115:6
contracted [3] - 17:2,
17:3, 17:8

contractors [4] 65:11, 105:11,


105:12, 108:17
contractual [4] 51:25, 57:6, 57:19,
58:3
contractually [1] 51:17
contradicted [1] 125:16
contrary [2] - 63:13,
128:7
contrast [1] - 115:25
contributed [3] 35:16, 39:11, 45:12
contributing [1] - 85:1
control [48] - 20:2,
28:11, 29:4, 29:5,
29:7, 29:19, 29:20,
30:1, 30:9, 30:14,
30:20, 30:23, 31:3,
31:13, 31:19, 32:5,
32:9, 32:10, 33:13,
36:5, 36:22, 37:2,
37:3, 37:17, 38:4,
41:14, 72:25, 83:13,
88:20, 89:4, 102:5,
106:7, 106:19,
108:20, 119:24,
120:1, 120:15,
121:18, 121:22,
122:7, 122:12,
122:18, 123:1,
124:8, 124:9,
124:11, 125:5, 141:5
controlled [2] - 43:7,
63:19
controllers [1] - 102:5
controls [1] - 50:19
convenient [1] - 25:16
conventional [1] 53:24
conversation [12] 74:11, 74:13, 74:16,
94:17, 111:15,
111:19, 115:14,
115:23, 129:16,
135:3, 137:15,
138:12
converse [1] - 41:21
convert [2] - 54:21,
87:7
converting [1] - 87:6
cook [1] - 77:11
cooperated [1] - 51:11
coordinated [1] 28:24
copy [1] - 139:2
core [2] - 114:23,
115:5

COREY [1] - 5:4


Corey [1] - 11:23
corner [3] - 78:9,
81:17, 122:22
corners [2] - 59:9,
109:2
corporate [7] - 75:13,
81:6, 82:20, 82:21,
84:10, 101:22, 102:9
CORPORATE [1] - 3:8
CORPORATION [1] 7:11
corps [1] - 24:20
correct [5] - 21:3,
43:12, 66:17, 71:24,
143:7
corrected [3] - 40:3,
45:7, 47:16
corrective [1] - 123:8
correctly [3] - 27:8,
83:25, 95:20
cost [17] - 55:7, 64:10,
64:11, 65:3, 65:16,
65:19, 66:5, 68:22,
77:24, 79:10, 82:8,
104:14, 104:17,
129:6, 131:22,
132:22
costs [4] - 59:9, 64:21,
64:22, 65:8
counsel [9] - 10:19,
10:20, 13:10, 13:14,
13:20, 14:19, 21:19,
101:4, 103:19
Counsel [1] - 11:7
count [1] - 114:5
counted [1] - 25:10
counter [2] - 21:11,
21:13
counterclaim [1] 18:14
counterclaimed [1] 18:19
counterclaims [1] 20:8
countermand [1] 95:24
counterproductive [1]
- 67:18
counting [1] - 97:23
counts [5] - 58:25,
59:1, 77:20, 77:22,
113:24
couple [2] - 47:8,
104:7
course [17] - 13:13,
14:15, 22:20, 22:24,
34:4, 36:22, 69:4,
79:23, 81:6, 81:8,
81:14, 101:7, 105:5,

105:18, 120:10,
129:9, 136:25
courses [2] - 119:24,
119:25
Court [43] - 15:25,
17:11, 17:22, 18:22,
20:11, 20:14, 20:19,
21:22, 22:6, 22:23,
23:2, 23:11, 23:23,
24:4, 24:5, 24:7,
24:10, 71:14, 72:3,
72:11, 75:10, 84:23,
90:3, 90:21, 101:2,
102:22, 103:9,
106:3, 110:4,
110:10, 110:13,
110:15, 110:16,
110:20, 111:1,
138:20, 140:9,
142:22, 143:4,
143:5, 143:6,
143:14, 143:15
COURT [28] - 1:1, 8:8,
10:4, 10:8, 10:10,
10:19, 11:24, 12:22,
12:25, 13:2, 13:8,
69:23, 70:1, 71:2,
71:8, 71:15, 72:5,
73:5, 73:13, 73:15,
73:19, 73:21,
100:23, 103:4,
107:15, 111:2,
111:6, 142:15
court [9] - 18:3, 21:20,
23:18, 24:10, 25:8,
26:2, 82:4, 103:20,
111:9
Court's [8] - 15:7,
15:9, 23:17, 23:24,
24:2, 24:6, 110:17
court-maintained [1] 23:18
courthouse [5] 14:22, 14:24, 15:5,
15:18, 105:1
courtroom [32] 13:21, 14:12, 14:18,
15:4, 15:13, 15:15,
15:18, 24:21, 25:2,
25:3, 25:5, 25:8,
25:9, 25:11, 25:15,
25:19, 25:21, 38:6,
72:9, 74:15, 78:21,
80:12, 80:25, 92:7,
92:8, 99:17, 99:18,
103:11, 104:10,
110:6, 114:15
Courtroom [1] - 25:1
courtrooms [7] 15:11, 15:19, 24:25,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

25:7, 25:12, 71:8,


71:16
courts [1] - 18:8
cover [6] - 13:8, 28:11,
29:20, 30:2, 49:25,
63:12
coveralls [1] - 137:22
covered [1] - 29:22
covering [1] - 33:3
COVINGTON [1] - 6:3
cracks [1] - 132:1
CRAFT [1] - 3:3
crane [4] - 125:20,
126:2, 126:4, 126:5
crawling [1] - 142:7
crazy [1] - 60:17
create [2] - 52:3, 90:20
created [3] - 43:9,
53:16, 83:17
creates [2] - 63:25,
123:17
credentialed [1] 24:22
credit [1] - 55:3
Crescent [1] - 100:20
crew [85] - 27:20,
27:24, 28:7, 28:14,
30:10, 31:9, 31:17,
32:23, 35:16, 35:20,
36:8, 36:14, 38:10,
39:9, 62:25, 80:24,
86:18, 95:8, 96:1,
96:23, 98:14, 113:1,
113:7, 113:15,
113:19, 114:6,
114:19, 115:3,
115:15, 115:18,
115:25, 116:5,
116:7, 116:10,
116:13, 116:14,
116:19, 116:21,
116:24, 119:8,
119:12, 119:15,
120:25, 121:1,
121:9, 121:11,
121:17, 121:21,
123:3, 123:5, 123:6,
125:13, 125:19,
126:25, 127:3,
127:9, 127:13,
128:12, 129:9,
130:10, 131:1,
133:1, 133:11,
133:13, 134:3,
134:6, 135:5,
135:15, 135:17,
136:10, 137:6,
137:10, 138:5,
138:19, 139:6,
140:19, 140:20,

140:24, 141:3,
141:4, 141:17,
141:23, 141:24,
142:8, 142:12
crew's [2] - 125:24,
127:1
crewmember [1] 38:18
crewmen [6] - 93:1,
99:4, 99:8, 114:2,
115:11, 121:18
crews [8] - 27:20,
30:17, 32:11, 33:16,
42:1, 46:15, 109:20,
122:19
critical [27] - 27:1,
27:12, 32:24, 37:3,
37:20, 38:21, 40:2,
40:19, 45:25, 53:14,
62:20, 64:5, 67:19,
72:20, 72:23, 79:22,
87:11, 90:6, 90:16,
90:17, 96:16,
107:23, 108:22,
117:2, 127:24,
128:3, 138:7
critically [1] - 110:14
criticized [1] - 125:13
cross [4] - 18:18,
21:11, 21:13, 110:14
cross-claimed [1] 18:18
cross-examination [1]
- 110:14
crossclaim [1] - 18:13
crossclaims [1] - 20:7
crown [1] - 137:16
CRR [2] - 8:8, 143:13
crucial [2] - 110:10,
113:11
crude [1] - 136:24
culpability [1] - 63:9
culture [29] - 33:6,
46:20, 47:10, 47:22,
48:17, 63:20, 63:25,
65:21, 65:23, 65:24,
66:2, 66:3, 66:5,
67:23, 75:13, 77:25,
78:23, 79:16, 81:6,
82:20, 101:22,
102:9, 105:5,
105:17, 105:18,
122:9, 127:6
Cunningham [2] 10:24, 123:10
CUNNINGHAM [3] 2:10, 2:11, 10:24
cure [1] - 62:13
current [2] - 15:22,
44:6

Curtis [6] - 116:19,


117:11, 119:23,
121:14, 137:15,
137:17
customary [1] - 14:6
cut [8] - 59:8, 64:20,
65:7, 65:14, 78:9,
109:2, 139:18, 141:7
cuts [2] - 82:9, 141:7
cutters [1] - 82:8
cutting [8] - 42:4,
49:24, 59:9, 64:11,
65:16, 65:19, 66:5,
128:19

D
D-Air [1] - 54:13
dad [1] - 28:1
DALLAS [1] - 7:21
damage [1] - 100:8
damaged [1] - 104:21
damages [7] - 17:19,
20:10, 100:11,
101:10, 101:14,
102:24, 106:1
dampers [1] - 37:11
dance [2] - 76:16, 77:4
dancing [1] - 76:22
danger [3] - 43:5,
114:20, 115:3
dangerous [1] - 72:22
dangers [1] - 81:2
DANIEL [1] - 4:22
data [3] - 135:8, 135:9,
135:11
date [4] - 15:9, 23:8,
109:17, 119:24
DAUPHIN [1] - 2:11
David [10] - 12:6, 13:4,
54:16, 57:14, 60:3,
60:23, 60:24, 75:20,
132:15, 132:16
DAVID [2] - 7:12, 7:12
DAY [1] - 1:19
days [25] - 16:12,
39:15, 45:14, 58:22,
60:24, 60:25, 61:11,
61:15, 62:2, 69:5,
72:8, 74:19, 75:23,
76:11, 78:10, 78:13,
79:12, 80:21, 82:24,
104:7, 120:23,
121:12, 129:7
dazed [1] - 38:15
DC [4] - 4:13, 4:19,
4:24, 6:5
dead [6] - 50:16,
50:22, 51:1, 51:3,

108:12
deadly [2] - 93:15,
97:8
deal [4] - 72:24, 90:21,
101:9, 130:8
dealing [1] - 78:14
DEANNA [1] - 4:11
death [2] - 82:1, 142:6
death-defying [1] 142:6
deaths [7] - 35:17,
79:13, 81:20, 90:10,
100:11, 107:8, 114:1
December [4] - 30:14,
31:23, 47:8, 109:25
decide [3] - 20:15,
72:11, 114:17
decided [2] - 26:6,
129:5
deciding [1] - 141:20
decision [5] - 53:3,
74:3, 80:19, 93:15,
94:4
decisions [15] - 23:3,
49:6, 61:21, 65:9,
72:20, 72:22, 72:25,
73:3, 73:23, 73:25,
74:2, 78:12, 78:16,
127:20, 129:7
decisive [1] - 39:9
decisively [1] - 138:5
declare [1] - 74:3
declared [5] - 31:2,
83:1, 94:1, 111:23,
133:15
decorum [1] - 14:13
deemed [3] - 108:4,
114:20, 114:22
deep [1] - 101:25
deep-water [1] 101:25
deeper [2] - 77:14,
82:20
deepwater [2] - 69:17,
81:18
DEEPWATER [3] 1:5, 6:13, 6:14
Deepwater [82] 10:14, 16:5, 17:1,
17:6, 20:3, 26:22,
27:20, 28:14, 28:19,
30:25, 31:2, 31:3,
31:10, 32:25, 33:25,
34:5, 34:8, 34:17,
35:17, 36:8, 36:14,
39:7, 39:15, 40:17,
40:20, 41:1, 41:8,
43:17, 44:1, 44:6,
44:8, 44:10, 45:16,
45:23, 46:2, 46:7,

46:9, 46:10, 48:13,


48:19, 48:20, 54:8,
54:10, 55:5, 56:5,
59:3, 59:16, 66:11,
67:3, 67:14, 67:23,
68:5, 68:10, 68:21,
69:7, 70:14, 72:7,
77:10, 80:22, 83:4,
83:7, 88:16, 95:1,
98:2, 100:12,
106:12, 106:25,
111:16, 114:3,
117:4, 117:9,
117:13, 118:1,
118:9, 118:21,
118:25, 120:23,
121:8, 125:12,
126:25, 127:3, 127:6
deer [1] - 38:15
deer-in-theheadlights [1] 38:15
default [1] - 136:17
defendant [1] - 99:17
defendants [10] 11:25, 16:23, 19:14,
20:8, 21:8, 21:11,
21:12, 101:9,
108:21, 114:11
defendants' [1] 70:22
Defense [1] - 140:4
defense [3] - 40:24,
72:10, 90:2
defenses [3] - 20:6,
21:10, 21:13
deficiencies [4] 45:8, 45:12, 45:15,
47:16
deficient [3] - 45:7,
47:13, 122:9
definition [1] - 48:5
defoamer [4] - 54:13,
54:14, 54:18, 54:22
defoaming [1] 107:21
defying [1] - 142:6
DeGravelles [1] - 11:3
DEGRAVELLES [3] 3:14, 3:14, 11:3
degree [2] - 110:19,
127:5
delayed [2] - 78:17,
108:23
delays [1] - 79:10
DELEMARRE [1] 4:16
deliberate [1] - 115:4
deliberately [1] 114:22

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

demand [1] - 69:13


demanded [1] - 69:10
demands [1] - 33:16
demonstrate [3] 70:24, 73:3, 73:24
demonstrated [2] 30:10, 81:10
demonstrating [1] 31:11
denied [1] - 70:23
denies [1] - 70:6
DENISE [1] - 8:4
Denise [1] - 12:20
deny [1] - 37:14
Department [1] 140:4
DEPARTMENT [4] 4:4, 4:8, 4:15, 4:21
department [1] - 44:25
departure [2] - 27:9,
28:4
deposed [1] - 21:18
deposition [9] - 21:23,
22:17, 23:13, 77:8,
92:10, 107:3,
117:20, 119:3,
142:11
depositions [5] 21:21, 22:2, 22:9,
110:12, 117:15
depth [2] - 59:17,
61:14
DEPUTY [5] - 10:7,
10:13, 71:7, 71:13,
142:21
describe [6] - 27:8,
65:2, 76:18, 78:2,
90:23, 96:4
described [8] - 27:13,
51:14, 52:17, 60:16,
76:8, 98:24, 127:17,
127:21
describing [1] - 85:8
description [1] - 15:25
descriptions [1] 101:17
Design [3] - 57:9,
57:22, 58:6
design [13] - 40:16,
41:1, 46:6, 51:8,
51:11, 51:17, 72:23,
79:2, 87:10, 87:14,
87:16, 96:3, 130:25
designated [2] 33:21, 33:24
designed [11] - 35:25,
37:3, 49:10, 53:17,
54:4, 54:19, 61:25,
72:18, 108:8, 121:2,
141:2

designing [1] - 54:6


despite [15] - 27:22,
32:14, 34:11, 52:10,
62:24, 68:11, 72:14,
74:18, 88:2, 88:18,
89:23, 90:11, 94:2,
128:9
destabilizes [1] 54:14
destroyed [2] - 36:15,
102:12
destructive [1] - 81:19
Det [1] - 39:18
detail [2] - 101:7,
106:9
details [3] - 52:6,
138:21, 138:22
detect [1] - 28:22
detected [6] - 27:15,
30:12, 122:22,
125:13, 125:17,
133:3
detecting [1] - 122:19
detection [4] - 31:13,
32:12, 35:13, 37:4
detections [1] - 40:14
deteriorated [1] - 29:1
determination [1] 20:1
determine [6] - 18:22,
20:11, 46:12, 90:17,
110:18, 127:15
determined [5] 19:22, 20:11, 29:17,
135:18, 139:13
devastated [1] 102:17
devastation [2] 81:21, 101:8
development [1] 56:1
deviant [1] - 114:22
deviate [1] - 81:5
device [2] - 15:4, 87:8
devices [1] - 14:10
Dewey [4] - 99:20,
117:8, 119:23,
121:14
DEXTER [1] - 5:5
Dick [1] - 88:6
dictate [1] - 36:3
died [6] - 49:8, 99:25,
116:16, 116:25,
117:1
different [16] - 46:22,
48:6, 87:7, 90:4,
90:23, 120:11,
123:13, 129:8,
133:20, 133:23,
133:24, 133:25,

134:2, 134:4,
135:24, 135:25
differential [1] - 92:23
difficult [1] - 127:12
difficulties [1] - 47:25
diminish [1] - 63:9
dip [1] - 136:5
dire [1] - 66:7
direct [3] - 22:15,
83:17, 110:14
directed [1] - 65:16
directions [1] - 38:13
directives [2] - 64:20,
65:5
directly [7] - 25:2,
35:16, 48:19, 63:19,
66:14, 75:18, 100:5
director [2] - 65:10,
65:12
Director [3] - 47:23,
48:24, 49:21
disaster [42] - 28:19,
30:13, 31:9, 32:19,
35:11, 39:12, 40:18,
43:24, 45:11, 46:21,
48:19, 60:18, 60:24,
61:11, 61:16, 62:1,
63:7, 63:16, 66:19,
67:1, 67:3, 67:20,
69:18, 70:7, 70:11,
72:15, 72:21, 75:12,
79:1, 83:18, 98:3,
99:18, 103:1,
104:21, 104:23,
105:14, 106:6,
107:9, 108:5,
108:24, 109:5, 142:1
disasters [4] - 64:9,
66:21, 67:5, 67:15
disastrous [2] - 95:25,
96:20
discharge [1] - 19:21
discharged [2] 16:14, 19:23
discharger [1] - 19:23
discharging [1] 114:5
disciplined [1] - 28:24
disclose [2] - 60:10,
60:11
disconnect [7] 34:14, 34:19, 34:24,
38:19, 38:22, 39:4,
140:21
discover [2] - 26:24,
27:18
discovered [5] - 68:5,
83:25, 88:24, 93:9,
109:10
discuss [2] - 17:18,

28:11
discussed [3] - 33:5,
120:24, 120:25
discussions [1] 61:18
disingenuous [1] 86:1
displace [2] - 131:14,
132:3
displaced [3] - 62:14,
62:16, 94:4
displacement [7] 27:6, 63:3, 108:15,
113:2, 115:16,
128:10, 128:12
displacements [1] 30:24
dispose [1] - 131:19
dispute [1] - 139:14
disputes [1] - 46:1
disregard [3] - 66:6,
75:13, 115:16
disregarded [1] 92:23
disrespects [1] 140:22
distance [1] - 88:13
distillate [1] - 42:13
distorting [2] 138:15, 138:16
District [3] - 143:6,
143:15
DISTRICT [3] - 1:1,
1:2, 1:22
district [1] - 25:8
diversion [1] - 36:5
divert [4] - 36:8,
136:17, 136:19,
136:25
diverted [1] - 136:14
diverter [10] - 29:22,
29:25, 30:2, 35:21,
36:4, 36:9, 36:13,
36:17, 136:15,
136:17
diverting [1] - 35:20
dividend [1] - 58:16
dividends [1] - 58:13
DIVISION [3] - 4:4,
4:9, 4:15
division [4] - 47:18,
51:19, 56:4, 123:13
Division [2] - 57:14,
58:15
DNV [5] - 39:18,
39:22, 39:24,
138:24, 139:18
Document [1] - 15:8
document [7] - 75:24,
97:5, 124:7, 124:15,

128:21, 129:17,
133:16
DOCUMENT [1] - 1:10
documented [1] 106:23
documents [5] 94:14, 95:3, 110:12,
128:17, 131:10
DOJ's [1] - 112:18
dollars [14] - 45:23,
58:20, 59:1, 64:20,
77:20, 77:22, 78:6,
78:7, 78:10, 79:11,
79:19, 80:11, 82:11,
119:19
DOMENGEAUX [1] 2:3
DOMINION [1] - 3:4
DON [1] - 5:21
Don [10] - 12:5, 12:14,
74:10, 111:19,
112:14, 116:12,
121:14, 133:7,
133:9, 134:23
DONALD [1] - 7:18
done [23] - 23:9,
30:24, 38:6, 39:1,
56:8, 66:17, 69:14,
79:17, 81:11, 86:13,
90:9, 97:14, 98:1,
112:13, 112:20,
115:17, 120:11,
120:12, 126:13,
129:21, 131:15,
138:2
door [1] - 105:1
doors [1] - 14:12
double [1] - 42:8
double-blind [1] 42:8
doubling [1] - 44:23
doubt [4] - 32:7,
92:19, 99:16
Doug [1] - 43:22
DOUGLAS [1] - 5:15
down [26] - 37:13,
44:25, 55:13, 56:24,
58:12, 75:2, 76:25,
77:4, 79:7, 80:7,
97:23, 112:2,
112:20, 113:9,
126:4, 133:10,
133:11, 133:19,
133:22, 133:23,
135:17, 135:25,
136:2, 136:5, 136:9,
141:12
downhole [1] - 55:19
Doyen [2] - 12:10,
114:14

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

DOYEN [2] - 6:23,


12:10
DPO [2] - 35:5, 40:10
Dr [14] - 55:24, 60:9,
64:5, 64:8, 65:23,
66:14, 66:17, 66:20,
69:16, 70:2, 79:21,
80:1, 84:2, 92:13
DRESCHER [1] - 2:18
drift [1] - 139:12
drifting [1] - 141:8
drill [61] - 17:2, 27:6,
28:7, 28:23, 30:16,
31:6, 31:17, 32:11,
40:9, 41:20, 41:23,
46:11, 46:12, 49:7,
50:1, 50:19, 59:4,
78:6, 91:10, 91:12,
92:17, 94:2, 95:9,
95:10, 96:12,
104:18, 112:15,
112:25, 113:5,
113:7, 113:13,
113:15, 113:19,
114:19, 116:19,
116:20, 116:24,
119:22, 120:22,
120:24, 121:16,
123:6, 125:12,
130:10, 133:2,
133:4, 133:22,
134:1, 134:9,
134:21, 134:24,
135:4, 135:20,
135:23, 135:25,
136:4, 136:8, 141:3,
141:4
drilled [5] - 16:7,
59:22, 70:9, 80:4,
118:10
driller [11] - 28:8,
50:24, 75:2, 75:3,
97:1, 99:19, 117:8,
117:11, 126:3,
134:18
drillers [1] - 33:2
Drilling [7] - 53:2,
65:15, 69:2, 70:3,
70:11, 74:9, 120:3
DRILLING [1] - 6:13
drilling [35] - 16:5,
17:9, 30:21, 31:21,
41:3, 42:1, 48:20,
48:25, 56:6, 58:23,
59:19, 60:14, 65:1,
67:13, 68:1, 69:17,
70:6, 72:22, 79:23,
79:25, 80:1, 80:2,
80:4, 80:9, 81:18,
84:1, 88:6, 89:24,

10

92:13, 93:6, 95:15,


113:3, 119:4, 121:24
drills [1] - 120:21
drinks [1] - 14:18
DRIVE [2] - 3:4, 3:8
drive [1] - 44:12
driven [1] - 66:2
driving [4] - 58:20,
61:5, 68:12, 76:9
drop [1] - 110:7
drove [4] - 58:10,
77:19, 77:23, 78:1
drydocking [1] - 43:17
dual [4] - 34:17, 38:23,
39:3, 141:15
due [9] - 30:16, 32:1,
45:1, 49:5, 49:6,
52:13, 101:7, 102:9,
121:2
dug [1] - 118:12
Duke [1] - 10:25
dump [1] - 131:25
duplicate [1] - 101:19
during [36] - 10:20,
14:14, 14:16, 19:10,
21:5, 21:23, 22:8,
22:12, 22:24, 22:25,
24:12, 24:16, 29:21,
30:13, 30:20, 38:21,
43:18, 61:20, 63:3,
65:4, 78:13, 81:14,
82:24, 84:22, 85:21,
85:22, 91:3, 97:20,
99:5, 113:9, 121:1,
134:24, 135:2,
140:16, 140:17
duties [1] - 108:18
duty [7] - 46:11, 56:15,
86:20, 116:15,
116:16, 137:11
dynamic [12] - 35:5,
35:9, 40:7, 40:10,
42:12, 42:15, 42:18,
42:19, 42:21, 50:5,
50:11
dysfunctional [1] 39:3

E
e-mail [14] - 29:3,
68:2, 76:3, 77:2,
78:15, 79:14, 82:22,
86:13, 124:5,
129:20, 129:22,
131:12, 132:10,
132:18
e-mailed [1] - 69:13
e-mails [4] - 81:12,

82:22, 124:13,
129:19
early [3] - 42:6, 61:19,
112:1
earth [1] - 59:11
easel [1] - 111:5
easier [1] - 135:12
easiest [2] - 78:3, 82:2
easily [2] - 42:5
Easter [2] - 26:3, 26:7
EASTERN [1] - 1:2
Eastern [1] - 143:6
ecological [1] - 107:9
ecology [1] - 104:22
economic [3] - 81:21,
101:8, 107:8
economy [1] - 104:22
ecosystem [2] - 100:8,
105:10
edge [2] - 79:2, 96:3
EDS [4] - 140:25,
141:6, 141:10,
141:20
EDWARDS [1] - 2:3
effect [5] - 64:6,
92:24, 93:13, 93:22,
132:5
effective [5] - 29:11,
63:24, 64:2, 65:20,
67:17
effectively [2] - 28:22,
57:24
efficiency [1] - 58:20
efficient [1] - 41:5
effort [4] - 67:6,
103:12, 113:19,
124:25
efforts [5] - 20:16,
27:16, 101:19,
103:10, 122:25
Egypt [1] - 123:12
eight [1] - 115:23
eight-minute [1] 115:23
either [12] - 14:10,
31:21, 34:15, 34:25,
37:25, 41:19, 49:18,
56:2, 77:4, 88:16,
91:7, 98:1
ejection [1] - 15:4
ejector [2] - 141:1,
141:11
electronic [2] - 14:10,
22:10
electronics [1] - 38:5
elements [1] - 91:7
elevated [2] - 105:20,
105:21
eleven [8] - 16:10,
74:17, 74:21, 75:25,

79:13, 113:24, 114:1


eliminate [1] - 65:9
eliminated [1] - 65:18
eliminating [1] - 65:11
ELIZABETH [1] - 4:23
ELLIS [1] - 6:7
ELM [1] - 7:21
Elmer's [1] - 109:21
eloquently [1] - 93:23
embedded [2] - 52:17,
53:4
emergency [22] 34:14, 34:19, 34:23,
36:2, 36:9, 36:12,
37:6, 37:8, 38:9,
38:11, 38:19, 38:22,
39:4, 49:1, 50:20,
51:4, 51:5, 89:12,
108:7, 108:11,
141:16, 141:21
emission [1] - 84:9
emphasis [3] - 54:14,
57:11, 64:9
employed [2] - 99:10,
114:19
employee [1] - 68:2
employees [4] - 46:25,
55:11, 107:3, 107:5
employer [1] - 114:3
enacted [1] - 38:14
encounter [1] - 42:3
encourage [1] - 15:10
encouraged [3] 63:20, 80:18, 124:22
end [17] - 31:23, 61:2,
69:14, 76:5, 79:15,
79:17, 82:4, 98:6,
100:16, 102:22,
116:19, 127:10,
129:21, 130:24,
132:9, 132:12, 142:8
endanger [2] - 31:6,
107:4
ended [5] - 62:7, 98:9,
98:22, 118:8, 126:18
ends [1] - 113:23
ENERGY [2] - 6:15,
7:17
ENFORCEMENT [1] 4:9
engaging [1] - 67:17
engine [1] - 37:9
engineer [13] - 27:7,
52:16, 68:23, 69:6,
69:14, 76:9, 76:17,
78:25, 79:13, 87:23,
95:15, 111:21,
115:13
Engineer [3] - 53:2,
69:2, 74:9

Engineering [3] 47:9, 48:25, 49:21


engineering [8] 44:25, 60:3, 61:5,
63:22, 66:14, 68:1,
93:6, 132:9
engineers [3] - 52:24,
112:4, 112:22
engines [2] - 37:12,
37:14
engulfed [1] - 36:11
ensuing [2] - 20:2,
35:18
ensure [3] - 30:4,
41:4, 89:17
enter [1] - 98:11
entered [1] - 113:22
entering [3] - 37:9,
37:12, 49:19
enterprise [1] - 69:17
entire [7] - 36:11,
43:18, 49:25, 64:24,
75:25, 103:12,
108:24
entirely [5] - 16:1,
70:12, 123:13,
124:7, 141:21
entities [2] - 16:21,
17:16
entitled [2] - 19:6,
143:9
entity [1] - 33:1
entrepreneurial [1] 65:23
entrust [1] - 117:18
entrusted [1] - 34:6
ENVIRONMENT [1] 4:9
Environment [1] 48:9
environment [11] 31:7, 39:10, 40:23,
49:3, 50:12, 77:18,
89:14, 100:4,
100:19, 102:11,
106:14
ENVIRONMENTAL [1]
- 4:9
environmental [5] 81:21, 98:3, 101:8,
108:24, 136:18
epitomized [1] - 86:12
equal [2] - 18:4, 86:4
equaling [1] - 106:24
equate [1] - 116:9
equipment [24] - 35:6,
35:20, 40:20, 40:22,
41:9, 41:10, 41:22,
44:11, 44:15, 44:17,
44:19, 45:25, 46:2,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

47:20, 49:2, 67:19,


87:11, 89:17, 90:1,
116:24, 119:17,
119:18, 124:10,
141:2
equivocation [1] 93:9
erroneously [1] 108:10
escaped [1] - 20:16
ESD [1] - 37:8
especially [6] - 28:18,
46:7, 74:2, 80:21,
105:3, 106:9
ESQ [55] - 2:3, 2:7,
2:11, 2:14, 2:18,
2:22, 3:3, 3:7, 3:11,
3:14, 3:18, 3:21, 4:5,
4:10, 4:10, 4:11,
4:11, 4:12, 4:16,
4:16, 4:17, 4:17,
4:18, 4:22, 4:23,
4:23, 5:4, 5:5, 5:15,
5:15, 5:21, 6:4, 6:7,
6:8, 6:8, 6:15, 6:19,
6:19, 6:23, 6:23,
6:24, 7:3, 7:7, 7:12,
7:12, 7:13, 7:13,
7:18, 7:19, 7:19,
7:20, 7:24, 8:3, 8:4,
8:4
essay [1] - 91:7
essence [1] - 37:21
essential [2] - 46:2,
57:23
essentially [1] - 55:17
establish [9] - 15:23,
35:14, 40:21, 58:1,
85:11, 89:20, 94:9,
96:15, 115:5
establishes [1] 130:22
estimated [1] - 13:25
et [2] - 10:16, 10:18
ET [2] - 1:13, 1:15
etcetera [1] - 20:8
evacuated [1] - 31:22
evening [1] - 139:6
event [12] - 28:16,
30:9, 31:24, 36:5,
89:5, 103:17,
104:13, 110:15,
123:9, 123:12, 130:8
events [18] - 17:11,
28:19, 29:4, 29:9,
31:3, 32:3, 32:10,
35:16, 64:4, 82:24,
94:18, 122:7,
122:18, 123:1,
123:15, 124:3,

11

124:11, 125:6
evidence [195] - 13:14,
13:16, 15:12, 15:16,
20:14, 21:7, 21:9,
21:13, 21:16, 21:17,
21:24, 22:14, 22:23,
23:2, 23:10, 25:20,
26:23, 27:17, 27:22,
28:2, 28:16, 32:22,
34:21, 35:14, 35:19,
36:7, 36:12, 36:17,
36:20, 39:6, 40:21,
41:17, 41:22, 45:9,
46:11, 46:19, 47:14,
48:14, 48:18, 49:4,
49:14, 49:16, 50:4,
51:16, 52:12, 52:19,
53:16, 54:1, 54:22,
55:10, 55:16, 56:3,
56:12, 56:19, 56:25,
57:16, 57:20, 58:1,
58:5, 58:14, 59:7,
60:11, 61:20, 63:6,
63:9, 63:18, 64:14,
64:19, 65:21, 66:4,
66:8, 67:12, 67:21,
67:25, 68:9, 69:11,
70:14, 70:19, 70:21,
70:23, 72:10, 72:13,
72:20, 74:6, 74:20,
74:25, 75:5, 75:10,
75:12, 75:15, 75:19,
75:24, 76:14, 76:24,
77:3, 77:12, 77:16,
77:21, 78:4, 78:16,
78:19, 78:24, 79:6,
79:9, 79:12, 79:20,
80:3, 80:15, 80:22,
81:9, 81:25, 82:7,
82:23, 82:25, 83:5,
83:19, 84:11, 84:17,
84:18, 84:22, 84:24,
85:11, 86:2, 86:9,
86:22, 87:22, 88:2,
88:11, 88:22, 89:1,
89:6, 89:20, 90:3,
90:5, 90:13, 90:24,
91:9, 91:22, 91:25,
92:9, 92:16, 92:21,
93:12, 93:13, 93:17,
93:24, 94:3, 94:9,
94:12, 94:23, 95:6,
95:14, 95:17, 95:19,
95:23, 96:2, 96:8,
96:11, 96:15, 96:22,
96:25, 97:3, 97:4,
97:11, 97:18, 97:25,
98:8, 98:10, 98:18,
98:23, 99:6, 99:15,
100:15, 101:24,
102:10, 102:16,

105:24, 107:8,
107:12, 108:1,
115:2, 116:23,
120:18, 123:4,
125:16, 125:17,
127:24, 128:5,
136:22, 136:24,
138:4, 138:24,
139:5, 139:24, 140:9
exact [1] - 94:22
exactly [7] - 81:19,
92:5, 97:24, 134:13,
135:6, 135:7, 136:23
exam [1] - 91:7
examination [2] 22:15, 110:14
examinations [1] 21:20
examine [1] - 84:23
example [14] - 15:25,
16:18, 29:5, 78:3,
78:22, 78:23, 83:10,
83:24, 91:12,
104:18, 120:22,
121:17, 123:9
examples [1] - 61:23
exceed [1] - 122:24
exceeding [2] - 27:13,
27:14
exceedingly [1] - 91:6
excellent [1] - 118:19
except [3] - 54:2, 54:3,
55:18
exception [2] - 14:19,
93:5
exceptionally [1] 127:12
exchange [1] - 95:13
exclude [2] - 23:2,
66:10
excluded [1] - 23:8
exclusively [1] 118:22
excuse [4] - 61:10,
73:7, 107:15, 128:19
execute [1] - 82:8
executing [2] - 47:2,
104:6
execution [1] - 51:18
executive [12] - 39:13,
40:2, 59:7, 63:7,
63:18, 64:12, 64:19,
66:8, 67:7, 67:20,
93:20, 124:16
executives [1] - 46:24
exhaustive [1] 103:10
Exhibit [1] - 82:14
exhibit [3] - 23:6,
82:18, 111:5

exhibits [6] - 22:3,


22:9, 22:18, 22:25,
23:13, 23:14
exist [1] - 76:20
existence [1] - 43:18
existing [2] - 38:23,
67:9
exoneration [3] - 18:3,
20:6, 21:10
expect [5] - 14:13,
92:14, 92:25, 121:6,
128:14
expected [5] - 13:24,
26:1, 58:25, 93:10,
93:20
expecting [1] - 48:6
expects [1] - 110:16
expensive [1] - 59:5
experience [2] 117:9, 118:17
experienced [3] 32:17, 47:25, 116:21
experiences [1] - 47:5
experiencing [1] 44:10
experimental [1] 62:18
expert [26] - 22:13,
23:13, 27:7, 27:25,
34:1, 43:19, 52:18,
54:3, 54:16, 55:24,
60:3, 63:22, 65:25,
66:14, 84:2, 84:4,
86:12, 88:6, 92:7,
92:13, 112:18,
120:7, 130:14
expert's [1] - 22:14
expertise [1] - 53:25
experts [4] - 93:4,
120:4, 134:10,
138:23
explain [10] - 13:22,
64:8, 66:17, 66:20,
69:16, 70:2, 80:1,
87:5, 91:5, 93:22
explained [3] - 82:2,
93:16, 112:12
explains [2] - 75:24,
111:16
explanation [1] 29:25
exploded [3] - 74:7,
89:2, 98:21
EXPLORATION [2] 1:15, 5:19
Exploration [5] 10:18, 58:15, 58:19,
59:16, 65:7
exploratory [1] - 16:7
explosion [14] - 16:4,

20:2, 35:17, 38:17,


43:10, 43:11, 45:13,
94:16, 101:13,
137:24, 139:11,
139:13, 142:3, 142:9
explosions [3] - 74:5,
82:1, 94:7
explosive [2] - 97:23,
98:11
exposed [1] - 33:10
express [1] - 58:3
extend [1] - 67:13
extensive [1] - 140:10
extent [1] - 105:7
extra [5] - 54:25, 69:6,
69:8, 69:11, 80:18
extraordinary [2] 75:23, 130:12
extreme [3] - 27:9,
28:3, 139:17
Exxon [1] - 120:2
Ezell [3] - 31:1,
137:13, 137:22
Ezell's [1] - 137:14

F
F-16 [2] - 141:1,
141:12
face [2] - 112:23,
113:5
fact [36] - 22:17, 31:8,
31:17, 33:1, 40:7,
43:14, 45:19, 49:15,
53:2, 53:12, 54:16,
55:3, 55:24, 67:2,
68:1, 77:7, 86:2,
92:6, 93:10, 94:13,
97:4, 97:12, 99:24,
102:1, 116:9,
121:10, 121:14,
125:16, 127:16,
131:10, 134:3,
136:24, 139:7,
139:22, 139:23,
139:25
factors [2] - 19:22,
67:15
facts [6] - 101:18,
113:18, 115:8,
115:16, 128:25,
138:15
factual [1] - 84:17
fail [9] - 40:23, 49:3,
49:21, 51:6, 87:11,
89:15, 121:10,
127:14, 130:11
failed [35] - 26:24,
31:10, 32:23, 36:8,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

38:8, 40:6, 40:8,


40:11, 43:12, 46:20,
49:5, 51:6, 55:11,
55:18, 55:22, 56:2,
58:2, 60:10, 62:3,
62:8, 63:16, 67:14,
74:23, 83:3, 83:12,
84:1, 97:13, 106:7,
106:13, 107:23,
108:1, 108:22,
127:16, 129:1,
140:21
failing [3] - 67:13,
67:16, 67:18
failure [28] - 27:8,
27:17, 27:19, 28:13,
30:17, 32:11, 35:15,
36:18, 42:7, 42:12,
42:17, 43:9, 51:7,
52:13, 62:24, 64:11,
69:16, 75:6, 83:10,
83:11, 83:13, 83:14,
89:8, 91:8, 92:2,
106:19, 130:8,
133:20
failures [7] - 30:11,
33:9, 44:18, 74:18,
82:4, 84:11, 90:4
fairness [1] - 51:10
faith [1] - 128:16
fall [1] - 45:4
Fall [1] - 125:4
falling [2] - 124:10
falsely [1] - 60:12
families [2] - 100:17,
119:20
famous [1] - 129:19
FANNIN [1] - 6:20
far [14] - 28:20, 52:21,
72:15, 77:14, 83:11,
83:14, 94:11, 94:13,
103:17, 103:25,
120:19, 132:2,
135:15
fast [2] - 38:9, 49:8
fatalities [1] - 46:22
fateful [3] - 32:16,
35:11, 37:22
Faul [1] - 53:12
fault [6] - 18:21,
19:25, 72:15, 99:4,
101:13, 102:21
faults [1] - 99:25
feared [1] - 80:5
feature [1] - 106:6
February [3] - 23:23,
29:16, 140:11
FEBRUARY [2] - 1:9,
10:2
federal [8] - 14:22,

12

14:24, 16:24, 18:2,


18:3, 79:22, 88:18,
89:16
feed [1] - 25:20
feedback [2] - 43:7,
60:5
feeds [1] - 15:12
feet [14] - 31:5, 42:25,
50:18, 59:10, 59:11,
59:12, 62:16, 88:13,
88:14, 88:15,
118:12, 133:22,
133:23, 141:13
felt [3] - 56:10, 124:19,
127:3
few [10] - 13:9, 13:21,
21:17, 59:23, 76:16,
82:24, 117:12,
126:23, 138:18,
140:18
fewer [3] - 55:20,
58:22, 86:14
field [1] - 40:24
fifth [1] - 88:9
Fifth [3] - 62:11,
74:11, 87:24
fifths [1] - 135:10
fighting [1] - 116:16
figure [1] - 113:11
figured [1] - 25:10
file [1] - 18:2
filed [3] - 16:21, 18:15,
18:16
filing [1] - 22:17
fill [1] - 87:13
filled [1] - 97:10
final [10] - 52:6, 53:10,
79:1, 80:21, 89:11,
91:9, 93:25, 95:15,
96:11, 107:2
finally [12] - 21:17,
38:20, 61:1, 63:2,
70:21, 76:5, 88:16,
91:18, 102:18,
109:4, 110:4, 132:11
financial [4] - 58:10,
59:8, 59:25, 64:18
findings [2] - 15:24,
126:23
fine [7] - 69:15, 79:18,
81:11, 82:18, 86:13,
119:15, 129:21
fines [2] - 15:3, 20:12
finish [1] - 46:9
finished [3] - 76:11,
76:21, 134:8
fire [5] - 16:4, 20:2,
37:6, 53:3, 142:2
fireball [1] - 74:8
FIRM [2] - 3:10, 3:21

first [23] - 13:19,


13:24, 14:1, 21:6,
22:16, 24:23, 39:15,
48:13, 49:24, 56:23,
65:9, 74:4, 85:15,
85:16, 92:14, 94:16,
101:24, 106:15,
106:16, 123:10,
127:11, 130:3, 131:5
first-year [1] - 92:14
fish [1] - 100:7
fit [2] - 41:23, 84:20
five [8] - 25:16, 30:13,
54:9, 69:5, 89:21,
101:6, 122:13, 131:3
five-year [1] - 122:13
fix [6] - 47:11, 48:18,
67:4, 71:10, 130:2,
140:8
fixing [1] - 140:8
flammable [1] - 36:11
flawed [1] - 43:2
fleet [2] - 118:23,
125:9
Fleytas [2] - 35:10,
40:8
flip [1] - 129:11
flip-flopping [1] 129:11
float [2] - 78:14, 83:12
floor [12] - 30:16, 31:6,
42:25, 49:7, 50:19,
75:3, 94:25, 97:2,
97:8, 99:19, 112:25,
134:24
FLOOR [3] - 2:22, 4:6,
6:24
flopping [1] - 129:11
flow [29] - 42:12,
42:18, 42:19, 42:21,
49:10, 50:6, 50:11,
53:20, 86:24, 87:1,
87:2, 87:6, 87:9,
91:2, 91:8, 94:6,
98:10, 129:14,
132:6, 133:12,
133:14, 134:5,
136:10, 136:12,
136:15, 138:9,
139:17, 139:19
flowed [1] - 52:12
flowing [8] - 27:23,
42:14, 56:21, 57:3,
87:3, 92:20, 94:24,
136:11
Floyd [1] - 12:17
FLOYD [1] - 7:19
fluid [2] - 30:24, 55:25
fluids [2] - 17:9,
133:23

flunked [1] - 96:16


flying [3] - 76:6,
77:13, 132:12
Flying [1] - 61:2
foam [4] - 53:22,
54:15, 54:22, 62:8
focus [2] - 47:19,
106:3
focusing [2] - 85:25,
138:14
folks [2] - 126:15,
126:16
follow [3] - 20:24,
25:21, 32:12
followed [8] - 45:14,
82:1, 84:3, 90:11,
95:18, 99:5, 113:7,
133:13
following [10] - 20:16,
29:16, 31:20, 33:8,
45:11, 46:22, 47:21,
56:16, 60:5, 67:15
follows [2] - 21:6,
22:11
food [2] - 14:18, 100:6
footnotes [1] - 82:18
FOR [9] - 2:3, 4:3, 5:3,
5:8, 5:19, 6:12, 7:11,
7:17, 8:3
force [2] - 64:25,
137:3
Force [1] - 141:1
foregoing [1] - 143:7
forensic [1] - 138:24
foreseeable [2] - 50:3,
50:12
fork [1] - 80:22
form [2] - 12:16,
109:18
formal [4] - 28:10,
57:21, 57:22, 62:22
format [1] - 22:10
formation [3] - 59:12,
59:14, 132:2
formed [1] - 87:4
former [2] - 65:1,
70:10
forms [1] - 104:23
forth [2] - 15:7, 55:8
forward [4] - 27:5,
100:15, 129:2, 129:3
foundation [1] - 75:14
four [8] - 46:22, 49:22,
60:18, 60:25, 67:2,
125:5, 135:10
four-fifths [1] - 135:10
fourth [3] - 21:15,
51:4, 88:8
frac [1] - 59:20
fracture [2] - 46:18,

60:13
framework [1] - 67:10
FRANCISCO [1] - 4:6
FRANKLIN [1] - 4:24
FRAUD [1] - 4:21
freight [1] - 18:5
frequently [1] - 42:1
Friday [1] - 26:2
friend [2] - 71:22,
122:10
FRILOT [1] - 6:14
frontline [1] - 33:16
FRUGE [1] - 3:14
FTP [1] - 23:15
fulfill [2] - 46:2, 57:19
full [4] - 55:20, 95:5,
96:6, 98:14
fully [5] - 33:13, 33:17,
50:9, 62:13, 95:25
function [13] - 38:10,
40:23, 49:1, 49:3,
49:20, 50:13, 50:23,
89:14, 89:18,
108:12, 108:13,
139:3
functionally [1] - 38:1
functionaries [1] 81:16
functioned [9] - 139:5,
139:9, 139:14,
139:16, 139:23,
140:1, 140:16,
140:17
functioning [1] 45:13
functions [6] - 32:24,
36:21, 36:25, 37:3,
37:21, 50:20
fund [1] - 58:13
fundamental [2] 32:4, 80:2
fundamentally [1] 123:14
fundamentals [1] 122:3
FUNDERBURK [4] 8:4, 12:21, 12:24,
13:1
Funderburk [3] 12:21, 12:24, 12:25
furnish [1] - 41:3
furthermore [1] 43:20
future [1] - 67:5

G
Gagliano [10] - 52:9,
52:16, 52:20, 53:4,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

53:7, 53:9, 53:13,


128:18, 129:16,
129:17
Gagliano's [1] - 53:12
gallons [3] - 49:19,
60:20, 89:3
gambled [1] - 90:1
GANNAWAY [2] 7:13, 13:5
Gannaway [1] - 13:5
gas [44] - 24:13,
26:24, 27:18, 28:18,
31:10, 32:2, 35:12,
35:21, 35:23, 35:24,
36:1, 36:4, 36:6,
36:9, 36:10, 36:11,
36:13, 37:4, 37:6,
37:9, 37:10, 37:14,
37:19, 37:24, 42:13,
52:12, 74:7, 81:16,
85:21, 88:11, 90:19,
92:3, 97:22, 98:11,
98:21, 104:1,
111:25, 119:17,
129:14, 136:18,
136:21, 138:9
GATE [1] - 4:5
gathered [1] - 26:21
Gavin [1] - 12:16
GAVIN [1] - 7:20
gel [1] - 55:25
general [2] - 37:5,
103:22
GENERAL [3] - 5:4,
5:9, 5:11
General [5] - 11:13,
11:15, 101:3, 104:3,
104:7
GENERAL'S [1] - 5:3
generally [3] - 21:6,
44:15, 59:20
Generals [1] - 104:8
Geoff [2] - 13:5, 43:19
GEOFFREY [1] - 7:13
Geologist [1] - 59:15
geologist [2] - 61:12,
61:13
geophysicist [1] 60:9
Gerald [1] - 33:24
giant [1] - 27:18
given [9] - 29:24,
33:22, 34:22, 49:13,
55:2, 59:17, 62:22,
96:18, 96:19
gladly [1] - 117:17
glass [1] - 133:19
global [1] - 65:6
glossary [2] - 24:10,
24:18

13

GmbH [2] - 1:13,


10:16
goal [4] - 108:25,
122:14, 122:15,
123:6
God [1] - 137:17
God's [1] - 61:14
GODWIN [5] - 7:18,
7:18, 7:23, 12:14,
73:10
Godwin [1] - 12:14
GOLDEN [1] - 4:5
government [3] 16:25, 118:15,
118:16
Grace [1] - 28:1
gradient [1] - 59:20
gradients [2] - 46:18,
60:13
grain [1] - 110:21
GRAND [1] - 6:24
graphic [3] - 92:1,
92:16, 138:25
grasp [1] - 77:25
grave [1] - 138:10
great [10] - 63:8,
72:24, 76:19, 90:21,
101:9, 101:11,
102:1, 116:21,
127:8, 137:3
greater [1] - 102:1
greatest [1] - 97:11
greed [1] - 102:16
green [1] - 50:25
Greg [2] - 53:2, 129:15
gross [15] - 19:19,
19:24, 27:9, 28:3,
70:22, 73:25, 80:16,
84:15, 94:12, 98:25,
99:22, 102:19,
104:16, 105:18,
130:21
grossly [13] - 83:2,
90:6, 105:12,
107:19, 108:6,
108:14, 114:21,
122:8, 123:2, 123:3,
123:23, 130:18,
137:5
ground [2] - 109:5,
141:13
GROUP [1] - 3:7
Group [1] - 47:24
growth [1] - 58:18
Guard [3] - 118:18,
119:11, 140:5
GUERRA [1] - 3:3
Guide [16] - 60:23,
75:15, 75:18, 75:20,
75:23, 76:4, 76:8,

76:11, 76:15, 76:21,


77:1, 77:9, 125:14,
125:15, 126:11,
132:10
Guide's [3] - 69:10,
69:13, 76:15
Guide/Sims [3] 78:15, 81:12, 82:21
guilty [6] - 113:22,
113:24, 114:4,
114:8, 130:20
GULF [1] - 1:6
Gulf [44] - 10:14,
16:13, 16:14, 48:11,
49:19, 59:6, 65:2,
65:12, 65:15, 67:22,
67:25, 69:18, 70:6,
70:8, 70:9, 74:17,
81:20, 81:22, 83:22,
94:20, 98:3, 98:20,
99:18, 100:3, 100:4,
100:18, 100:21,
101:4, 101:14,
101:23, 101:25,
102:13, 102:15,
102:17, 103:1,
104:9, 104:15,
105:3, 105:6,
109:13, 114:5,
131:25, 141:8
Gulf's [1] - 100:8
guy [1] - 34:10
guys [4] - 81:16,
118:4, 118:5, 130:7

H
Hafle [37] - 74:9,
78:25, 79:1, 79:5,
81:2, 94:17, 95:3,
95:7, 95:8, 95:9,
95:20, 95:23, 96:2,
96:6, 96:8, 96:18,
97:7, 97:12, 98:8,
111:20, 111:25,
112:3, 112:4, 112:7,
112:14, 112:21,
113:12, 115:22,
115:23, 116:10,
116:12, 134:9,
135:1, 135:3, 138:13
Hafle's [1] - 81:12
half [5] - 45:23, 69:25,
98:14, 109:6, 109:7
hall [3] - 14:11, 25:3,
25:17
HALLIBURTON [1] 7:17
Halliburton [71] 12:14, 12:15, 12:16,

12:17, 12:18, 17:3,


18:18, 19:13, 21:1,
27:24, 28:14, 49:15,
51:16, 51:21, 51:24,
52:3, 52:5, 52:6,
52:13, 52:16, 52:20,
53:6, 53:10, 53:16,
53:21, 54:4, 54:6,
54:13, 54:17, 54:19,
54:20, 54:23, 55:2,
55:5, 55:11, 55:17,
55:20, 55:22, 56:2,
56:7, 56:9, 56:14,
56:16, 56:20, 56:22,
57:1, 57:6, 57:11,
57:16, 57:21, 58:2,
58:5, 62:4, 65:25,
70:20, 86:11, 86:15,
102:21, 102:23,
107:19, 108:1,
126:16, 128:15,
128:16, 128:18,
128:25, 129:13,
134:15
Halliburton's [12] 51:13, 51:15, 51:25,
52:9, 54:2, 54:3,
54:16, 55:10, 55:24,
56:3, 56:11, 57:14
Halliburton-Sperry [1]
- 56:16
halls [1] - 79:7
hand [8] - 55:7, 90:25,
91:14, 91:18, 91:19,
92:2, 92:18, 122:21
handbook [3] - 28:11,
30:23, 41:14
handful [1] - 122:25
handle [2] - 36:1,
41:15
handling [2] - 29:24,
103:15
hands [1] - 61:14
handwritten [1] 128:21
hanging [1] - 97:6
HANKEY [1] - 4:11
happy [1] - 69:1
hard [4] - 68:12,
103:13, 115:25,
116:23
hard-working [1] 103:13
harden [2] - 128:4,
129:4
hardened [1] - 138:10
HARIKLIA [1] - 6:8
Hariklia [1] - 12:3
harmful [1] - 19:21
Harold [2] - 34:19,

38:24
Harold's [1] - 35:3
HARTLEY [1] - 7:19
Hartley [1] - 12:17
hauling [1] - 55:9
HAUSER [1] - 4:23
HAYCRAFT [2] - 5:21,
12:5
Haycraft [1] - 12:5
Hayward [2] - 63:11,
64:17
hazard [3] - 32:1,
51:8, 78:2
hazardous [2] 131:20, 136:19
hazards [4] - 33:9,
33:12, 33:18, 127:4
HB406 [1] - 8:9
head [2] - 66:24,
129:15
headed [1] - 81:17
headlights [1] - 38:15
headquarters [2] 75:21, 79:7
heal [1] - 100:19
Health [1] - 48:9
hear [18] - 15:14,
20:14, 72:24, 73:6,
75:25, 83:20, 85:20,
89:6, 90:3, 90:21,
118:24, 121:6,
125:2, 138:4,
138:20, 139:25,
140:9, 142:5
heard [6] - 105:15,
105:16, 106:8,
121:4, 124:14,
129:11
HEARD [1] - 1:21
heart [1] - 115:8
heavy [3] - 27:6,
109:15, 124:10
heck [1] - 108:25
heed [2] - 14:17, 28:23
Heenan [2] - 27:7,
88:6
heightened [1] - 86:18
held [3] - 35:8, 99:12,
106:18
hell [4] - 60:17, 80:24,
89:24, 127:22
help [5] - 15:21,
100:19, 104:9,
137:21, 137:23
helpful [2] - 24:19,
139:3
hereby [1] - 143:6
Herman [1] - 11:5
HERMAN [4] - 2:7,
2:7, 11:5

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

heroic [2] - 140:23,


142:13
heroism [1] - 142:6
herring [1] - 139:25
high [16] - 36:1, 36:10,
42:13, 50:10, 53:20,
53:21, 59:13, 61:17,
64:9, 66:6, 70:6,
78:2, 94:24, 124:20
high-pressure [1] 42:13
higher [2] - 104:24,
109:14
highest [3] - 33:23,
106:1, 117:20
highly [4] - 24:14,
33:18, 66:1, 84:1
Hill [1] - 12:16
HILL [2] - 7:20, 12:16
himself [2] - 66:14,
93:10
hindsight [3] - 104:12,
115:20, 134:10
hint [1] - 82:19
hiring [1] - 48:21
historic [2] - 101:4,
103:1
histories [1] - 52:20
history [1] - 114:1
hit [1] - 141:11
hoc [1] - 120:21
hold [2] - 14:2, 26:2
holding [1] - 42:16
HOLDINGS [1] - 6:12
hole [3] - 43:9, 90:18,
127:24
holes [2] - 83:18,
83:21
HOLTHAUS [1] - 3:14
home [4] - 24:2,
26:10, 116:14,
116:25
homes [1] - 119:20
Honor [98] - 10:9,
10:22, 10:24, 10:25,
11:4, 11:5, 11:10,
11:18, 11:21, 12:2,
26:18, 41:21, 50:10,
51:12, 69:25, 70:13,
70:24, 71:21, 71:22,
72:6, 73:1, 73:14,
73:20, 75:5, 75:9,
75:25, 76:23, 79:3,
81:14, 81:24, 82:17,
83:5, 84:4, 84:13,
84:23, 85:15, 87:1,
89:10, 91:12, 92:7,
92:9, 96:25, 99:23,
100:16, 101:2,
101:7, 102:16,

14

102:18, 102:25,
103:8, 105:1,
107:18, 109:4,
110:4, 110:23,
110:25, 111:4,
111:11, 111:14,
112:17, 113:18,
113:21, 114:6,
114:10, 114:17,
115:8, 116:4,
116:15, 117:15,
118:9, 119:9,
119:16, 120:6,
121:11, 121:16,
121:25, 122:10,
122:15, 123:14,
127:8, 128:3,
128:24, 129:23,
130:14, 130:19,
131:2, 132:24,
135:9, 135:21,
137:4, 137:25,
138:6, 138:25,
139:21, 140:22,
141:23, 142:11,
142:14
HONORABLE [1] 1:21
honored [1] - 114:11
hope [2] - 119:18,
120:16
hoped [1] - 80:11
Horizon [76] - 10:14,
16:5, 17:1, 20:3,
26:22, 27:20, 28:14,
28:19, 30:25, 31:2,
31:3, 31:10, 32:25,
33:25, 34:5, 34:8,
35:17, 36:8, 36:14,
39:7, 40:17, 40:20,
41:1, 41:8, 43:17,
44:6, 44:8, 44:10,
45:16, 45:23, 46:2,
46:7, 46:9, 46:10,
48:13, 48:19, 48:20,
54:8, 54:10, 55:5,
56:5, 59:3, 66:11,
67:3, 67:14, 67:23,
68:5, 68:10, 68:21,
69:7, 70:14, 72:7,
77:10, 80:22, 83:4,
83:7, 88:16, 95:1,
98:2, 100:12,
102:14, 106:12,
106:25, 111:16,
117:4, 117:10,
117:13, 118:1,
118:9, 118:21,
118:25, 120:23,
121:8, 125:12,

126:25, 127:3
HORIZON [1] - 1:5
Horizon's [4] - 17:6,
34:17, 39:15, 44:1
horrible [1] - 104:13
horribly [1] - 99:6
Horse [1] - 61:6
HOUMA [1] - 3:8
hour [11] - 74:7, 79:1,
81:3, 81:13, 94:15,
94:16, 95:16, 95:22,
96:18, 97:6, 98:14
hours [15] - 21:4, 52:7,
62:12, 68:6, 74:4,
80:21, 82:25, 90:18,
106:24, 116:1,
128:8, 128:11,
128:12, 140:11,
142:18
house [2] - 52:18,
86:11
HOUSTON [7] - 3:19,
6:20, 7:8, 7:14, 7:15,
7:25, 8:5
Houston [17] - 52:17,
53:4, 53:9, 68:22,
69:5, 69:14, 74:9,
75:18, 75:21, 78:25,
79:14, 81:7, 95:3,
95:15, 95:19, 96:14,
98:15
Hudson [1] - 66:1
Huffman [3] - 60:9,
79:21, 80:1
huge [3] - 59:8, 61:5,
76:8
HUGH [1] - 8:3
Hugh [1] - 12:19
HUGHES [1] - 7:7
human [5] - 37:1,
37:17, 40:22, 49:2,
89:13
humbled [1] - 114:11
hundred [4] - 78:6,
80:8, 109:15, 141:13
hundreds [2] - 118:14,
140:10
hung [2] - 74:21,
98:19
Hurricane [1] - 109:25
hydrocarbon [1] 53:20
hydrocarbons [4] 30:16, 31:4, 86:6,
87:4
HYMEL [2] - 7:3, 12:13
Hymel [2] - 12:13,
114:14

I
IACS [2] - 36:23
IADC [1] - 120:1
idea [2] - 50:4, 131:22
identical [1] - 66:22
identifiable [1] - 110:3
identification [1] 57:24
identified [3] - 33:12,
39:20, 58:7
ignition [3] - 32:3,
37:10, 37:14
ignore [3] - 29:7, 51:8,
116:15
ignored [4] - 56:20,
86:10, 108:21, 109:3
ignoring [1] - 67:16
IL [1] - 6:9
imaginable [1] - 82:3
immediate [5] - 53:12,
82:25, 84:7, 85:4,
125:8
immediately [7] 26:3, 96:22, 97:13,
112:9, 115:24,
123:25, 140:21
impaired [1] - 63:4
impairs [1] - 64:12
implement [1] - 69:17
implemented [1] 67:7
implementing [1] 34:12
important [4] - 20:9,
56:1, 103:20, 103:22
importantly [3] 59:13, 78:17, 104:23
imposes [1] - 19:20
imposition [1] 105:25
IMPREVENTO [1] 2:18
improper [1] - 108:15
improperly [1] - 121:2
improve [2] - 66:25,
67:6
improves [1] - 67:9
IN [3] - 1:5, 1:5, 1:12
in-house [2] - 52:18,
86:11
inactions [1] - 95:14
inadequacies [1] 53:8
inadequacy [1] 30:10
inadequate [1] 106:24
INC [5] - 1:15, 5:19,

6:13, 6:14, 7:18


Inc [1] - 114:3
incentive [1] - 55:5
incentives [1] - 65:20
incentivized [2] 65:19, 66:5
inch [1] - 87:12
incident [12] - 28:20,
29:16, 30:15, 30:18,
31:13, 120:24,
121:5, 121:7,
121:12, 133:17,
140:16, 140:17
incidents [4] - 47:7,
60:19, 120:13, 124:1
include [3] - 16:19,
20:5, 65:20
included [2] - 51:25,
54:18
including [14] - 15:3,
17:23, 28:7, 29:4,
32:15, 37:4, 46:13,
80:19, 89:7, 104:24,
106:5, 114:1, 119:1,
140:10
incompatible [2] 54:14, 107:22
incomprehensible [2]
- 74:3, 93:5
Incorporated [1] 10:18
increased [3] - 32:10,
61:22, 104:25
increasing [2] - 31:21,
87:9
incredibly [1] - 65:3
incurring [1] - 55:7
indeed [6] - 40:12,
52:9, 52:23, 56:1,
67:8, 101:11
indemnity [2] 113:20, 114:24
indicated [8] - 50:19,
71:25, 72:2, 115:22,
124:21, 134:11,
134:20, 136:21
indication [2] - 136:9,
141:24
indications [2] - 33:8,
137:7
indicator [1] - 32:5
indicators [1] - 30:17
indifference [1] 116:3
indifferent [3] 114:20, 115:3, 137:5
indirectly [1] - 100:5
individual [4] - 17:10,
69:21, 73:24, 74:2
individuals [2] -

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

16:21, 117:24
induced [1] - 44:13
industry [10] - 24:13,
24:14, 41:12, 108:3,
119:8, 119:9, 120:9,
120:19, 128:7, 140:5
inevitable [1] - 102:9
inexcusable [2] 43:19, 100:14
infamous [1] - 79:15
inflicted [1] - 101:9
influx [3] - 30:13,
37:19, 37:24
influxes [2] - 28:25,
30:12
information [6] 23:19, 24:5, 27:23,
60:10, 117:2, 138:7
Inglis [1] - 65:7
inhibited [1] - 38:10
inhibiting [2] - 37:16,
38:6
inhibition [1] - 38:3
initial [2] - 39:17,
142:9
initiation [1] - 20:3
injured [3] - 16:11,
47:5, 110:2
injuries [4] - 35:1,
81:20, 100:3, 100:9
injury [1] - 47:7
inputs [1] - 52:21
inquiry [1] - 68:15
insanity [6] - 48:5,
61:7, 76:10, 76:17,
77:6, 78:2
insisted [1] - 133:9
inspect [1] - 109:7
inspected [3] 118:14, 118:18,
140:13
inspection [1] - 109:6
inspections [4] 39:19, 43:17, 45:11,
45:20
install [1] - 108:8
installation [4] - 28:7,
34:20, 35:2, 38:24
Installation [1] - 48:2
installed [2] - 17:7,
42:5
instead [16] - 18:8,
35:21, 36:13, 45:24,
66:9, 79:12, 80:15,
92:15, 92:21, 94:19,
98:7, 101:20,
112:21, 127:13,
127:19, 132:18
Institute [1] - 55:21
instituted [1] - 120:14

15

instructed [1] - 133:11


instructing [1] 115:15
instruction [3] 114:8, 133:13, 134:7
instructions [2] 51:9, 113:8
integrated [3] - 36:21,
37:2, 38:3
integrates [1] - 67:9
integrity [3] - 60:13,
81:1, 127:23
intended [2] - 35:25,
69:8
intentionally [1] - 66:9
interconnected [1] 99:25
interest [2] - 101:16,
116:6
interests [2] - 101:15,
103:15
interface [1] - 128:18
internal [2] - 82:12,
83:6
internally [1] - 68:23
international [1] 39:18
International [1] 33:20
INTERNATIONAL [1] 7:11
Internet [1] - 23:15
interpret [2] - 27:8,
28:9
interpreted [1] - 83:25
interpreting [1] 131:1
interrelated [2] - 83:8,
85:12
interrupting [1] 130:25
intervene [1] - 40:11
intervention [2] 37:1, 37:17
interview [3] - 115:22,
126:12, 135:2
introduced [4] 21:24, 22:8, 22:13,
23:6
invest [1] - 64:11
investigate [2] 63:16, 135:18
investigated [3] 96:24, 114:7, 124:2
investigates [1] 123:7
investigating [3] 63:14, 125:19, 133:5
investigation [11] 28:20, 30:18, 30:22,

54:1, 56:17, 63:12,


63:15, 82:12, 83:6,
93:11, 93:16
investigations [1] 123:17
investigative [1] 92:8
investing [1] - 29:10
invitation [2] - 66:12,
66:13
involved [5] - 28:19,
30:11, 87:8, 103:12,
125:1
involvement [1] 40:16
involving [2] - 30:15,
125:2
iPads [1] - 14:9
ironically [1] - 70:5
irony [1] - 97:12
Irpino [1] - 11:2
IRPINO [3] - 3:21,
3:21, 11:2
irrefutable [1] - 95:16
Isaac [1] - 109:25
Island [1] - 109:22
ISM [6] - 33:20, 34:11,
39:11, 39:17, 39:22,
43:16
isolated [2] - 28:15,
31:13
issue [9] - 39:22, 44:9,
51:4, 80:14, 101:13,
101:15, 129:10,
134:2, 137:5
issued [3] - 23:23,
33:3, 64:20
issues [8] - 19:18,
20:5, 20:7, 20:15,
20:17, 68:6, 76:20,
80:2
itself [8] - 13:23,
31:12, 31:20, 37:12,
42:20, 55:22, 78:3,
98:20

J
Jack [1] - 104:10
JAMES [2] - 2:3, 5:10
January [3] - 15:8,
109:11, 140:11
Jason [8] - 99:20,
116:20, 117:3,
119:23, 121:13,
137:18, 137:19
Jeff [1] - 34:1
JEFFERSON [2] - 2:4,
7:4

Jeffrey [1] - 11:20


JEFFREY [1] - 2:18
JERRY [1] - 7:24
Jerry [1] - 12:18
Jesse [4] - 52:9,
52:16, 128:18,
128:20
JESSICA [2] - 4:16,
4:17
Jessie [1] - 128:19
jigsaw [1] - 84:18
Jim [3] - 10:22, 26:18,
72:4
JIMMY [1] - 3:18
Jimmy [4] - 11:8,
34:19, 35:3, 38:24
job [46] - 33:10, 34:3,
34:7, 35:8, 53:11,
53:14, 56:1, 56:8,
56:9, 59:9, 62:24,
65:13, 72:8, 78:14,
79:4, 79:10, 79:18,
84:1, 85:20, 85:25,
86:4, 86:5, 86:10,
86:17, 86:22, 90:12,
96:4, 103:18, 104:3,
106:6, 107:21,
108:2, 112:2,
112:20, 116:25,
121:19, 121:20,
121:23, 122:4,
126:14, 127:15,
128:1, 128:25,
129:1, 129:2, 132:19
jobs [12] - 33:11,
65:17, 86:3, 98:1,
98:2, 102:12,
106:23, 121:1,
122:1, 127:4
Joe [1] - 57:1
JOHN [3] - 3:14, 7:7,
8:4
John [13] - 11:3,
12:21, 12:24, 13:7,
60:23, 66:24, 69:10,
75:15, 114:15,
125:14, 125:15,
126:11, 132:10
Johnson [2] - 43:25,
44:9
join [2] - 18:12, 121:17
jointly [2] - 106:11,
107:13
joints [2] - 141:7
Jonathan [2] - 59:15,
68:1
JONES [2] - 7:12, 13:4
Jones [1] - 13:4
Joseph [1] - 134:19
JR [3] - 2:22, 7:19,

7:19
Judge [7] - 22:6, 25:2,
35:24, 36:22, 54:7,
102:8, 103:8
judge [1] - 110:11
JUDGE [1] - 1:22
judgment [1] - 94:11
judicial [1] - 15:1
July [1] - 30:8
jumped [1] - 138:17
June [1] - 109:24
jury [1] - 14:6
JUSTICE [4] - 4:4, 4:8,
4:15, 4:21
justice [2] - 100:18,
103:19
justifiably [1] - 122:11
justify [1] - 93:14

K
Kaluza [5] - 75:17,
87:19, 92:22, 133:8,
133:17
Kaluza's [1] - 93:21
KANNER [3] - 5:14,
5:15, 11:22
Kanner [1] - 11:22
KARIS [2] - 6:8, 12:3
Karis [1] - 12:3
Kate [3] - 60:6, 65:22,
68:14
KATZ [1] - 2:7
keep [7] - 67:14, 87:2,
88:20, 108:19,
110:10, 121:21,
122:16
keeping [3] - 35:7,
68:12, 140:7
Keith [3] - 57:1, 71:25,
134:19
KELLEY [1] - 4:23
Keplinger [3] - 35:6,
40:11, 40:12
kept [3] - 48:20, 68:9
Kerry [2] - 12:8,
114:13
KERRY [1] - 6:15
Kevin [2] - 65:2, 70:10
key [4] - 40:5, 50:10,
65:16, 130:16
kick [36] - 26:24,
27:11, 27:13, 27:15,
27:18, 27:24, 28:15,
29:24, 30:17, 31:10,
31:12, 32:6, 32:12,
36:8, 51:20, 56:5,
56:13, 56:16, 56:23,
60:6, 63:5, 68:16,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

68:25, 88:22, 88:23,


89:2, 89:4, 89:24,
125:11, 125:13,
125:17, 126:12,
134:11, 134:16,
136:9
kicks [9] - 28:18,
28:22, 60:19, 121:1,
122:12, 122:15,
122:16, 122:20,
122:22
kill [18] - 91:11, 91:17,
92:18, 95:8, 95:11,
96:12, 112:15,
113:13, 132:6,
133:10, 133:11,
133:16, 133:22,
134:1, 134:5,
135:21, 135:23,
135:24
killed [5] - 47:5,
100:18, 125:5,
133:22, 142:8
Kinchen [2] - 13:7,
114:15
KINCHEN [3] - 7:7,
7:7, 13:7
kind [3] - 25:3, 72:1,
124:21
kinds [1] - 117:17
King [1] - 57:14
KIRKLAND [1] - 6:7
knock [1] - 43:10
knowing [2] - 70:6,
89:23
knowledge [8] 18:22, 18:24, 19:4,
32:15, 45:1, 49:6,
68:11, 94:19
known [10] - 17:16,
28:16, 32:13, 36:18,
40:2, 50:12, 53:23,
59:12, 70:8, 102:3
knows [4] - 104:12,
113:21, 115:20,
134:13
Kodiak [9] - 54:7,
54:10, 54:12, 54:18,
54:21, 55:3, 55:4,
55:9, 58:8
Kongsberg [1] - 36:24
KRAUS [1] - 5:15
Kuchta [3] - 141:17,
141:19, 141:22
KULLMAN [1] - 2:14
Kutcha [4] - 34:9,
34:18, 34:21, 38:14

16

L
L.L.C [1] - 8:3
LA [14] - 2:5, 2:8, 2:16,
2:23, 3:8, 3:12, 3:15,
3:22, 5:12, 5:16,
5:23, 6:16, 7:5, 8:10
lab [2] - 55:14, 128:23
lack [11] - 19:3, 29:25,
31:12, 36:16, 39:3,
44:11, 45:1, 60:7,
70:4, 116:3, 128:22
Lacy [3] - 65:2, 65:5,
70:10
LAFAYETTE [2] - 2:5,
7:5
LAFLEUR [1] - 7:3
laid [1] - 75:13
LAMAR [1] - 7:24
landmark [1] - 103:11
LANGAN [2] - 6:7,
12:4
Langan [1] - 12:4
language [2] - 79:3,
124:21
laptops [1] - 14:9
large [2] - 36:1, 36:6
largest [2] - 32:21,
113:25
Larry [4] - 29:2, 32:19,
124:5, 124:15
LASALLE [1] - 6:9
last [19] - 26:1, 40:24,
60:22, 60:25, 78:13,
79:1, 81:3, 81:13,
82:24, 89:10, 89:13,
90:1, 90:16, 97:6,
128:20, 128:23,
132:8, 132:11,
140:18
last-minute [2] 60:22, 60:25
late [6] - 30:8, 46:8,
68:4, 121:5, 125:13,
136:25
Lavalier [1] - 73:8
law [8] - 80:5, 84:20,
103:11, 105:17,
106:2, 110:21,
116:9, 131:18
LAW [3] - 3:7, 3:10,
3:21
LAWRENCE [1] - 4:18
laws [1] - 101:18
lawsuit [1] - 72:15
lawsuits [1] - 17:10
lawyer [3] - 25:9,
110:6, 128:14
lawyers [6] - 25:10,

25:23, 103:16,
104:4, 110:13,
114:12
layoffs [1] - 64:24
Leader [2] - 53:2,
74:10
leader [17] - 31:16,
51:14, 75:16, 75:20,
77:9, 93:21, 95:4,
95:21, 96:10, 96:16,
96:21, 98:16,
111:20, 115:14,
117:25, 125:23,
133:3
leader's [1] - 95:24
leaders [14] - 61:1,
75:17, 76:5, 76:6,
87:19, 88:17, 92:22,
93:2, 93:14, 93:25,
95:15, 99:5, 117:20,
133:7
leadership [2] - 52:2,
61:5
leading [3] - 35:16,
52:23, 131:2
leads [1] - 102:8
learn [5] - 47:4, 47:6,
64:4, 67:21, 121:23
learned [6] - 56:17,
68:3, 68:15, 68:17,
68:18, 120:16
learning [2] - 68:20,
76:19
lease [2] - 45:22, 59:6
leased [4] - 16:24,
66:11, 67:13, 67:22
leases [1] - 119:17
LEASING [1] - 1:13
Leasing [1] - 10:16
least [8] - 24:23,
32:17, 34:25, 45:8,
52:6, 54:9, 62:1,
100:11
leaving [3] - 53:7,
84:9, 93:18
led [5] - 27:4, 32:19,
48:19, 83:18, 108:11
Lee [1] - 12:11
left [14] - 54:10, 57:1,
83:11, 83:12, 85:15,
87:1, 92:2, 92:18,
113:5, 122:21,
135:4, 135:11,
138:18, 142:18
left-hand [3] - 92:2,
92:18, 122:21
leftover [4] - 54:21,
55:9, 62:19, 107:20
legal [3] - 84:18,
84:24, 85:7

LEGER [3] - 2:21,


2:22, 11:7
Leger [1] - 11:7
length [1] - 24:25
lengthy [1] - 14:14
less [11] - 30:20, 44:4,
53:14, 55:8, 62:7,
74:7, 88:22, 90:18,
94:15, 94:16, 104:25
lesson [2] - 56:17,
68:17
lessoned [1] - 68:17
lessons [5] - 64:4,
67:21, 68:3, 68:15,
120:16
letter [2] - 123:21,
123:22
level [7] - 32:13,
47:18, 61:5, 68:2,
76:8, 85:5, 102:20
levels [1] - 33:23
LEWIS [5] - 2:14, 5:20,
7:18, 7:23, 8:3
LI [2] - 6:24, 114:15
Li [1] - 12:11
Liability [2] - 17:17,
18:1
liability [11] - 18:3,
18:4, 18:20, 19:6,
20:6, 21:10, 26:23,
84:12, 85:13,
105:22, 105:23
liable [4] - 18:12,
102:24, 106:10,
107:13
liaison [1] - 101:4
license [1] - 35:8
lies [2] - 72:16, 115:7
lieu [1] - 21:24
LIFE [1] - 2:15
life [6] - 31:6, 35:1,
40:22, 49:2, 64:10,
89:13
light [2] - 50:17, 50:25
lighter [2] - 27:6, 94:5
lightly [1] - 99:23
lightweight [1] - 52:3
likely [4] - 33:18,
36:14, 50:1, 127:14
likewise [1] - 18:13
limit [2] - 18:20, 19:6
limitation [16] - 16:22,
17:16, 18:4, 18:9,
18:16, 19:7, 19:10,
19:17, 20:6, 21:10,
26:22, 70:23, 87:14,
87:17, 105:23
Limitation [2] - 17:17,
18:1
limitations [1] - 87:10

limited [1] - 85:10


limits [1] - 80:5
limping [1] - 44:17
line [24] - 40:24,
83:18, 90:2, 91:11,
91:17, 92:18, 95:8,
95:11, 96:13, 102:7,
112:15, 113:13,
120:5, 126:25,
132:6, 133:10,
133:12, 133:16,
133:22, 134:1,
134:5, 135:21,
135:23, 135:24
lined [6] - 83:16,
83:22, 91:21, 95:11,
112:16, 113:14
liner [2] - 61:24,
127:19
lines [2] - 91:15, 92:16
lingering [1] - 101:8
link [2] - 23:16, 24:3
liquids [1] - 42:13
Lirette [1] - 69:2
LISKOW [1] - 5:20
list [1] - 12:23
listen [1] - 66:18
listened [3] - 112:8,
127:1, 134:7
literal [2] - 76:11,
142:2
literally [1] - 142:6
Litigation [1] - 10:13
LITIGATION [1] - 4:22
litigation [2] - 17:12,
101:5
live [6] - 13:19, 15:14,
21:25, 25:20, 74:22,
110:11
lived [1] - 110:4
livelihood [2] - 100:4,
105:7
livelihoods [1] - 100:6
lives [15] - 16:10,
49:18, 74:17, 74:22,
76:1, 77:24, 94:20,
97:16, 98:22, 99:9,
99:15, 102:13,
102:14, 113:17,
117:18
living [1] - 124:19
LLC [1] - 6:12
Lloyd's [4] - 33:1,
33:3, 126:19, 126:23
lock [1] - 93:3
lodged [1] - 22:19
log [2] - 62:23, 129:6
logger [1] - 27:24
London [2] - 67:7,
81:7

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

longstanding [1] 46:19


look [11] - 38:15,
68:19, 82:23,
100:15, 109:15,
110:8, 122:1, 123:9,
126:4, 134:5, 134:24
looked [2] - 25:24,
93:21
looking [4] - 26:4,
47:20, 75:11, 122:2
looks [1] - 119:7
loose [1] - 80:9
LOS [1] - 6:25
lose [2] - 80:7, 139:11
losing [1] - 59:5
loss [13] - 18:21, 20:1,
29:4, 29:5, 29:7,
35:1, 35:17, 55:25,
60:19, 64:10, 66:3,
124:8, 124:9
loss-of-control-type
[1] - 29:4
losses [1] - 20:10
lost [11] - 47:10,
47:22, 60:19, 62:19,
65:17, 69:21, 76:1,
102:14, 121:2,
128:16, 131:18
louder [1] - 81:9
Louis [1] - 55:25
LOUISIANA [5] - 1:2,
1:8, 5:8, 5:10, 8:5
Louisiana [20] - 11:14,
11:22, 16:9, 16:20,
20:25, 103:5, 104:1,
104:19, 104:20,
105:2, 106:16,
109:5, 109:6, 109:8,
109:14, 109:23,
110:3, 110:7, 143:5,
143:6
Louisiana's [4] 104:21, 109:10,
109:12, 109:18
low [4] - 35:23, 111:8,
111:10, 111:11
low-pressure [1] 35:23
lower [4] - 58:21, 68:2,
122:21, 127:19
Luis [2] - 12:11,
114:15
LUIS [1] - 6:24
lunch [1] - 142:17
LUNCHEON [1] - 9:10
luncheon [1] - 142:22
LUTHER [1] - 5:4
Luther [3] - 11:15,
101:2, 104:4

17

Lynch [1] - 104:10

M
M-I [3] - 12:19, 12:20,
12:21
Macondo [68] - 16:6,
16:24, 17:2, 17:4,
27:2, 27:12, 46:9,
52:13, 53:11, 53:15,
53:19, 53:22, 54:6,
54:11, 54:17, 54:21,
55:13, 56:7, 56:10,
58:2, 58:11, 59:2,
59:10, 59:23, 60:1,
60:2, 60:6, 60:16,
61:11, 61:14, 61:15,
63:16, 64:15, 66:19,
66:23, 67:16, 67:20,
69:19, 69:22, 70:2,
70:7, 70:11, 72:8,
72:17, 72:18, 72:19,
75:16, 76:9, 77:1,
77:9, 78:3, 78:6,
78:24, 79:17, 79:23,
80:9, 81:15, 81:18,
86:7, 89:16, 90:15,
109:1, 118:13,
119:15, 120:17,
123:12, 140:12
Macondo's [1] - 55:19
MAGAZINE [1] - 3:22
Magistrate [2] - 22:5,
103:9
magnitude [3] - 32:21,
39:12, 82:10
MAHTOOK [1] - 7:3
maiden [1] - 117:4
mail [14] - 29:3, 68:2,
76:3, 77:2, 78:15,
79:14, 82:22, 86:13,
124:5, 129:20,
129:22, 131:12,
132:10, 132:18
mailed [1] - 69:13
mails [4] - 81:12,
82:22, 124:13,
129:19
MAIN [1] - 3:15
main [2] - 40:22, 49:2
Maintain [1] - 89:17
maintain [4] - 40:17,
46:4, 67:19, 79:24
maintained [4] 14:14, 23:18, 41:4,
140:14
Maintenance [1] 44:8
maintenance [20] -

41:9, 43:1, 43:21,


44:11, 44:14, 44:20,
45:5, 45:10, 46:7,
47:12, 47:14, 48:15,
68:6, 89:23, 106:24,
106:25, 139:24,
140:3, 140:4, 140:10
major [14] - 26:24,
37:10, 39:10, 40:18,
47:16, 58:24, 64:6,
64:10, 66:21, 70:3,
88:23, 89:4, 90:1,
140:13
majority [2] - 122:22,
122:23
maker [1] - 77:11
MALINDA [1] - 4:18
man [6] - 34:5, 68:6,
95:3, 95:19, 119:1,
142:1
man-hours [1] - 68:6
manage [1] - 64:1
managed [1] - 119:12
Management [5] 29:18, 30:4, 33:20,
57:22, 63:19
management [44] 27:19, 28:5, 29:3,
30:3, 30:6, 30:11,
31:15, 31:20, 32:8,
32:13, 33:5, 33:23,
34:6, 34:10, 34:23,
35:15, 36:18, 39:8,
39:13, 39:24, 40:3,
42:23, 46:16, 48:1,
48:9, 52:6, 59:7,
59:8, 63:7, 63:17,
63:18, 64:19, 64:22,
66:5, 66:8, 67:7,
67:8, 67:9, 67:10,
67:21, 82:20, 84:10,
108:21
management's [1] 48:18
manager [5] - 28:7,
34:20, 35:2, 38:24,
68:1
Manager [1] - 43:25
Manager's [1] - 48:2
managers [3] - 64:12,
81:5, 127:1
mandate [1] - 88:18
mandatory [1] - 79:21
manipulated [1] 55:18
manner [7] - 18:10,
40:6, 61:9, 76:13,
103:16, 104:2,
105:13
manslaughter [1] -

113:25
manual [2] - 29:20,
120:15
manually [1] - 39:5
manufactured [1] 17:5
March [13] - 29:1,
29:15, 31:8, 31:16,
33:4, 56:13, 60:5,
61:10, 61:12, 68:16,
125:11, 125:24,
126:12
margin [4] - 60:14,
79:25, 80:1, 80:4
margins [1] - 72:22
Marianas [1] - 56:6
marine [4] - 34:1,
88:15, 100:7, 106:14
Mark [8] - 74:9, 78:24,
111:20, 112:14,
112:21, 116:10,
116:12, 135:1
marks [1] - 93:23
marsh [1] - 109:8
marshaled [1] - 18:10
marshalled [1] - 23:14
marshalling [2] - 22:7,
22:16
mass [1] - 98:11
massive [1] - 64:24
master [2] - 39:6,
39:21
Master [1] - 103:14
matched [1] - 84:21
material [5] - 30:1,
109:21, 109:22,
109:24, 131:24
materials [7] - 17:9,
22:7, 23:22, 28:10,
49:12, 62:19, 131:18
mates [1] - 116:7
math [1] - 21:3
mats [3] - 109:9,
109:19, 109:21
matter [3] - 42:22,
116:8, 143:9
mattered [5] - 102:10,
102:11, 102:13,
102:15
matters [5] - 13:21,
15:6, 19:10, 26:13,
129:5
Matthew [1] - 12:2
MATTHEW [1] - 6:8
maximum [2] - 19:21,
41:15
mayhem [1] - 38:13
MAZE [2] - 5:4, 11:23
Maze [1] - 11:23
McCLELLAN [1] -

4:16
McGovern [1] - 103:15
MCKINNEY [1] - 7:14
McMahan [4] - 124:6,
124:8, 124:15,
124:24
McMahan's [1] 124:25
McMahon [3] - 29:2,
29:12, 32:20
MDL [4] - 17:13,
17:15, 17:25, 24:3
mean [1] - 140:5
means [6] - 21:19,
23:1, 47:15, 80:2,
98:13, 140:7
meant [4] - 37:21,
92:3, 92:19, 133:6
measurable [1] 65:20
measured [1] - 100:9
measures [1] - 33:13
Mechanic [1] - 43:22
MECHANICAL [1] 8:12
mechanical [1] 84:11
media [1] - 24:22
meet [3] - 58:17,
119:8, 123:6
Melvin [1] - 48:24
member [5] - 28:6,
60:6, 68:14, 70:5,
142:8
members [6] - 24:21,
25:14, 40:5, 126:25,
127:3, 141:18
memory [1] - 140:22
men [38] - 16:10, 49:7,
74:11, 74:20, 74:21,
75:3, 75:25, 81:4,
81:8, 92:22, 94:19,
94:23, 95:4, 95:13,
96:13, 98:1, 98:18,
99:9, 99:14, 100:17,
113:1, 113:4,
113:15, 114:4,
114:21, 117:3,
117:14, 117:16,
117:17, 119:22,
121:15, 121:25,
129:7, 139:22,
140:23, 142:3, 142:6
men's [1] - 97:16
mention [2] - 82:19,
126:22
mentioned [6] - 19:15,
23:5, 76:3, 77:19,
125:11, 140:2
mere [1] - 98:24

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

merely [1] - 15:23


Merit [2] - 143:4,
143:14
merit [1] - 130:5
MERIT [1] - 8:9
Mexico [18] - 10:15,
16:13, 48:11, 65:2,
65:12, 65:15, 67:22,
68:1, 69:18, 70:6,
70:8, 70:9, 81:21,
100:21, 101:25,
104:15, 131:25,
141:8
MEXICO [1] - 1:6
MI [6] - 8:3, 17:8,
18:18, 19:13, 21:2,
108:14
mic [1] - 73:8
MICHAEL [2] - 4:5,
6:23
Michael [1] - 12:10
MICHELLE [1] - 4:16
microcosm [1] 115:10
middle [2] - 131:7,
133:5
midst [1] - 142:2
might [6] - 69:20,
73:11, 107:16,
114:23, 131:9,
138:11
MIKAL [1] - 3:3
Mikal [1] - 11:9
Mike [4] - 11:19, 12:1,
38:5, 114:14
Milazzo's [1] - 25:2
miles [8] - 16:8, 88:12,
94:25, 97:8, 104:20,
105:1, 105:2, 109:8
Miller [3] - 12:8, 111:5,
114:13
MILLER [2] - 6:15,
12:8
million [19] - 45:23,
59:2, 62:2, 65:14,
78:5, 78:6, 78:7,
78:10, 78:11, 80:8,
93:11, 101:6, 109:2,
109:9, 109:21,
109:22, 109:23,
132:23
millions [6] - 49:19,
78:5, 79:11, 79:19,
82:10, 100:5
mimic [1] - 55:18
mind [4] - 30:19,
33:17, 110:10, 131:3
mind-set [2] - 30:19,
33:17
minded [1] - 78:12

18

mindless [1] - 67:17


minimally [1] - 34:3
minimized [1] - 39:2
minimum [1] - 132:7
minute [7] - 60:22,
60:25, 115:23,
128:20, 128:23,
132:8, 132:11
minutes [27] - 20:23,
20:25, 21:1, 21:2,
21:3, 21:4, 27:15,
31:11, 56:14, 72:2,
74:22, 76:16, 95:5,
98:9, 98:20, 113:9,
113:11, 129:10,
131:9, 133:14,
138:18, 139:10,
140:18
misconduct [20] 19:19, 19:24, 73:4,
73:24, 75:7, 80:17,
84:12, 84:15, 84:20,
84:25, 85:3, 85:6,
85:8, 85:13, 99:1,
99:23, 102:20,
105:25, 115:5,
115:12
misdemeanor [1] 114:5
misinterpreted [1] 27:4
mislead [1] - 72:3
mismanaged [1] 119:13
miss [1] - 134:3
missed [8] - 27:24,
49:15, 56:4, 134:16,
134:18, 134:19,
134:23, 135:1
missing [1] - 138:7
mission [1] - 46:3
Mississippi [1] - 16:7
missteps [2] - 73:2,
73:23
mistake [8] - 71:23,
96:20, 97:25, 99:14,
113:15, 115:18,
115:20, 134:6
mistaken [1] - 27:4
mistakes [4] - 81:2,
89:25, 99:9, 99:11
misused [1] - 35:20
mitigating [1] - 34:25
mixing [1] - 55:8
mixture [1] - 52:4
MMS [7] - 60:10,
60:14, 60:15, 80:6,
118:16, 119:11
Mobil [1] - 120:2
MOBILE [1] - 2:12

mobile [1] - 16:5


mode [3] - 14:11,
37:25, 38:1
model [11] - 83:15,
83:19, 84:19, 84:20,
85:2, 85:9, 85:16,
88:9, 89:10, 90:5,
98:7
model's [1] - 84:9
modeling [2] - 52:21,
128:22
moderate [1] - 109:15
Mogford [1] - 66:24
moment [8] - 17:18,
74:8, 77:1, 89:2,
94:22, 95:2, 137:2
moments [1] - 13:9
MONDAY [2] - 1:9,
10:2
Monday [2] - 14:2,
26:7
monetary [1] - 55:5
money [21] - 47:19,
54:23, 61:22, 63:1,
69:12, 77:19, 77:22,
77:24, 78:18, 80:23,
82:8, 100:18,
102:10, 102:11,
102:13, 102:15,
108:25, 129:6,
131:22, 132:25
monitor [7] - 28:24,
50:15, 83:13,
106:19, 131:8,
135:22, 136:3
monitored [4] - 42:24,
91:10, 133:16, 135:5
monitoring [7] 32:12, 51:19, 57:2,
72:25, 88:8, 91:17,
136:6
monkeyed [1] 131:17
MONTGOMERY [1] 5:6
month [3] - 31:8, 44:4,
62:1
months [13] - 14:1,
16:14, 26:1, 30:13,
32:18, 43:24, 47:8,
54:9, 60:18, 70:16,
74:15, 112:23,
117:13
Moonpool [1] - 43:9
Morel [3] - 87:23,
88:1, 131:12
MORGAN [1] - 8:3
MORNING [1] - 1:19
morning [13] - 10:8,
10:9, 10:22, 10:25,

11:5, 11:10, 11:18,


13:18, 26:18, 71:21,
72:6, 101:19, 140:15
most [11] - 25:11,
59:13, 78:17, 95:16,
102:10, 104:22,
118:10, 121:24,
124:16, 129:19,
138:23
motion [1] - 94:6
motivation [1] - 45:1
move [2] - 11:25, 25:3
moved [2] - 139:17,
139:18
movement [1] 125:20
MR [68] - 9:5, 9:6, 9:7,
9:8, 9:9, 10:22,
10:24, 10:25, 11:2,
11:3, 11:4, 11:5,
11:7, 11:8, 11:9,
11:10, 11:12, 11:13,
11:15, 11:17, 11:18,
11:20, 11:22, 11:23,
12:1, 12:2, 12:4,
12:5, 12:6, 12:7,
12:8, 12:9, 12:10,
12:11, 12:13, 12:14,
12:15, 12:16, 12:17,
12:18, 12:19, 12:21,
12:24, 13:1, 13:3,
13:4, 13:5, 13:6,
13:7, 26:17, 69:25,
70:2, 71:20, 72:6,
73:10, 73:11, 73:14,
73:18, 73:20, 73:22,
101:1, 103:7,
107:18, 111:4,
111:10, 111:13,
118:9, 126:19
MS [3] - 12:3, 12:12,
12:20
mud [16] - 27:6, 32:2,
35:21, 35:23, 35:25,
36:4, 36:9, 36:13,
51:19, 56:23, 60:20,
94:4, 113:3, 136:18,
136:21, 137:16
mud-gas [7] - 35:21,
35:23, 36:4, 36:9,
36:13, 136:18,
136:21
mudlogger [6] 56:14, 56:20, 56:22,
57:1, 72:1, 134:19
mudlogger's [2] 56:24, 57:1
mudloggers [3] 56:4, 56:8, 56:18
multidistrict [2] -

10:13, 17:12
multiphase [1] - 13:25
multiple [12] - 16:23,
30:11, 41:11, 45:6,
45:11, 47:13, 51:4,
60:12, 80:20, 86:9,
91:6, 99:25
MUNGER [1] - 6:22
Murray [3] - 117:19,
125:22, 133:2
must [10] - 18:8,
18:22, 40:23, 47:6,
49:3, 49:21, 88:23,
106:18, 115:8,
121:18
MUX [2] - 43:6, 43:8

N
name [3] - 12:22,
12:23, 81:23
named [1] - 119:1
namesake [1] - 83:21
narrow [1] - 72:22
narrower [1] - 59:20
NATHANIEL [1] - 4:12
natural [2] - 37:14,
105:7
NATURAL [1] - 4:9
nature [2] - 15:22,
32:9
nautical [1] - 88:12
near [1] - 17:7
nearly [3] - 78:7,
101:6, 109:15
necessary [3] - 68:25,
88:20, 108:19
necessity [1] - 58:7
need [13] - 14:11,
44:20, 47:3, 61:18,
69:23, 74:14, 74:24,
94:18, 104:25,
110:23, 111:17,
130:11, 137:20
needed [10] - 25:12,
39:9, 58:16, 66:17,
76:18, 81:1, 81:3,
90:24, 91:22, 116:25
needlessly [1] - 76:1
needs [1] - 71:9
negative [52] - 27:2,
28:9, 28:11, 62:20,
72:23, 74:3, 78:15,
83:1, 83:12, 83:24,
84:6, 86:7, 86:8,
86:19, 86:21, 88:7,
90:7, 90:15, 90:16,
90:22, 91:9, 91:16,
92:11, 94:10, 94:15,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

95:7, 95:21, 96:1,


96:4, 96:11, 97:14,
97:19, 97:21, 98:6,
99:5, 99:11, 106:5,
106:20, 106:22,
111:22, 111:23,
112:8, 116:1,
127:14, 130:18,
131:4, 131:11,
131:13, 131:14,
132:7, 133:1, 133:15
neglect [2] - 49:5,
49:23
negligence [20] 18:23, 19:1, 19:19,
19:24, 70:18, 70:19,
70:22, 74:1, 80:17,
84:16, 94:12, 98:25,
99:22, 102:19,
105:18, 105:19,
114:4, 130:21,
130:22
negligent [11] 105:13, 107:19,
108:7, 108:14,
114:21, 122:8,
123:2, 123:3,
123:23, 130:18,
137:6
Neil [1] - 65:6
nervous [1] - 40:9
neutral [1] - 118:15
never [22] - 28:6, 34:4,
34:12, 34:13, 40:13,
45:7, 47:16, 48:14,
50:7, 52:9, 62:22,
70:8, 82:5, 83:23,
84:3, 98:4, 113:6,
116:4, 118:2, 131:9,
132:2, 135:6
nevertheless [2] 105:24, 127:24
new [5] - 55:7, 55:8,
79:10, 109:9, 120:15
New [1] - 88:14
NEW [9] - 1:8, 2:8,
2:16, 2:23, 3:22,
5:16, 5:23, 6:16,
8:10
Newman [4] - 41:7,
46:24, 124:23, 125:1
news [1] - 46:24
next [8] - 16:13, 69:10,
73:12, 74:15, 94:4,
113:9, 129:23,
141:14
Nicholas [1] - 69:2
night [8] - 38:7,
111:18, 116:18,
119:22, 123:21,

19

138:16, 140:24,
141:23
nightmare [3] - 60:17,
60:21, 127:22
nine [9] - 39:15, 43:18,
48:15, 87:7, 102:1,
114:2, 117:12,
121:14, 123:11
NINTH [1] - 3:11
NO [3] - 1:8, 1:11, 1:14
no-salt [2] - 59:14,
59:20
Noble [1] - 120:2
nobody [2] - 51:3,
107:11
nonconformity [2] 39:11, 39:22
none [6] - 90:5, 90:6,
99:13, 103:16,
112:2, 137:25
nonetheless [2] 15:13, 64:14
nonexistence [1] 93:2
nonexistent [2] 92:24, 93:22
NONJURY [1] - 1:20
noontime [1] - 142:16
NORFOLK [1] - 7:8
normal [3] - 24:24,
98:16, 108:16
Norske [1] - 39:18
North [2] - 102:1,
121:5
NORTH [1] - 5:11
notch [1] - 120:5
note [2] - 24:9, 24:20
noted [2] - 19:5, 48:3
notes [3] - 21:17,
115:22, 128:21
nothing [15] - 24:6,
93:23, 94:21, 95:24,
96:8, 98:7, 99:10,
112:23, 115:17,
116:11, 122:10,
129:18, 130:22,
132:16, 139:24
notice [2] - 30:17,
134:22
noticed [2] - 135:17,
136:10
notified [1] - 52:11
November [2] - 54:8,
110:1
Number [1] - 17:18
number [8] - 16:17,
17:15, 37:3, 109:14,
127:20, 129:12,
129:14, 134:16
numbered [1] - 143:9

numerous [6] - 16:20,


17:10, 22:3, 35:12,
40:14, 61:7
NW [1] - 6:4

O
O'Bryan [1] - 119:1
o'clock [3] - 134:11,
134:12, 135:3
O'KEEFE [1] - 2:8
O'ROURKE [2] - 4:10,
11:17
O'Rourke [1] - 11:17
oath [1] - 21:20
objection [1] - 23:7
objections [2] - 22:19,
23:1
objects [1] - 124:10
obligated [1] - 41:19
obligation [5] - 41:24,
57:6, 86:20, 113:20,
114:24
obligations [3] 51:15, 51:25, 52:15
observed [1] - 48:1
obvious [3] - 88:11,
95:20, 96:6
occasions [4] - 45:6,
47:13, 60:12, 66:15
occur [1] - 20:21
occurred [7] - 18:21,
30:15, 31:24, 35:11,
70:25, 90:23, 109:13
occurrence [1] - 50:2
occurring [1] - 15:14
ocean [1] - 88:15
October [2] - 46:23,
56:6
OF [14] - 1:2, 1:6,
1:12, 1:14, 1:20, 4:4,
4:8, 4:15, 4:21, 5:3,
5:8, 5:9, 5:10
off-center [1] - 42:3
offer [1] - 101:20
offered [1] - 117:5
office [1] - 53:5
OFFICE [5] - 2:4, 4:18,
5:3, 5:8, 5:12
officer [5] - 35:5, 35:8,
35:9, 40:8, 40:11
offices [1] - 52:17
OFFICIAL [1] - 8:8
Official [2] - 143:5,
143:14
officials [1] - 118:16
offshore [6] - 16:5,
28:7, 34:19, 35:2,
38:24, 114:4

OFFSHORE [1] - 6:13


Offshore [1] - 48:2
often [1] - 47:19
Oil [2] - 17:20, 98:3
OIL [2] - 1:5
oil [51] - 10:14, 16:14,
19:21, 19:22, 20:4,
20:16, 24:13, 42:13,
49:19, 74:7, 76:1,
81:17, 81:23, 83:22,
85:20, 85:21, 88:11,
88:23, 90:19, 92:3,
94:20, 94:24, 97:16,
97:17, 97:22, 98:11,
98:20, 103:25,
104:1, 104:19,
106:15, 106:16,
106:17, 109:9,
109:11, 109:17,
109:18, 109:19,
109:22, 109:23,
110:7, 113:25,
114:5, 119:17,
119:19, 131:13,
142:3
oiled [2] - 105:3, 109:8
oilfield [2] - 27:9, 28:4
oiling [3] - 109:13,
109:16, 110:20
oily [1] - 109:21
OIM [2] - 35:3, 39:21
OLSON [1] - 6:22
ominous [1] - 33:8
OMS [5] - 66:10, 67:8,
67:13, 69:17, 70:4
ON [1] - 1:6
on-the-job [1] 121:19
onboard [1] - 106:14
once [8] - 30:9, 31:11,
36:17, 44:17, 47:2,
63:1, 91:1, 121:21
One [5] - 16:18, 17:14,
19:25, 20:5, 114:18
one [79] - 18:13,
18:19, 20:10, 25:3,
25:22, 31:3, 34:12,
35:11, 36:24, 43:2,
44:1, 45:9, 46:1,
47:5, 48:15, 50:11,
55:18, 56:7, 59:5,
63:14, 65:9, 65:12,
69:25, 71:8, 71:16,
73:5, 73:11, 73:13,
78:6, 78:23, 80:7,
83:3, 83:21, 84:7,
85:4, 85:5, 87:10,
87:18, 90:9, 91:2,
91:18, 91:25, 93:20,
96:13, 98:1, 99:14,

101:12, 101:21,
108:4, 108:17,
109:6, 109:8,
109:15, 109:20,
110:21, 112:3,
114:4, 117:6,
117:19, 118:10,
118:15, 118:17,
118:22, 124:1,
124:11, 127:21,
128:3, 128:15,
129:1, 129:19,
130:13, 131:5,
131:6, 131:8,
133:22, 134:13,
134:15
ONE [2] - 5:21, 7:14
one-and-a-half [1] 69:25
one-half [1] - 109:6
ones [2] - 45:8, 82:22
ongoing [5] - 57:13,
57:19, 57:25, 60:11,
81:2
onshore [6] - 111:20,
112:4, 115:13,
115:25, 129:15,
130:15
onsite [2] - 78:8,
111:20
oops [1] - 123:20
OPA [6] - 17:20, 19:8,
19:16, 105:22,
106:10, 107:13
OPA's [1] - 105:23
open [3] - 63:12,
110:10, 141:9
opened [1] - 91:2
opening [13] - 13:10,
13:11, 13:17, 13:20,
20:20, 20:24, 25:22,
26:13, 26:14, 75:8,
85:10, 114:16,
142:19
OPENING [10] - 9:5,
9:6, 9:7, 9:8, 9:9,
26:16, 71:19,
100:25, 103:6,
111:12
operate [3] - 29:13,
47:6, 106:13
operated [1] - 139:22
operating [1] - 65:3
operation [26] - 34:14,
39:15, 41:6, 61:1,
61:6, 61:8, 62:12,
76:12, 76:18, 76:23,
77:1, 77:4, 77:12,
77:14, 78:3, 78:24,
80:7, 80:20, 80:23,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

81:18, 82:10, 88:4,


98:16, 130:16,
132:14, 140:12
operational [2] 46:13, 46:14
Operations [1] - 59:15
operations [15] 32:20, 44:2, 44:3,
45:4, 61:12, 61:13,
63:2, 64:21, 67:7,
67:11, 68:22, 106:4,
109:20, 132:9
operator [5] - 16:24,
26:22, 72:18, 89:16,
108:11
operators [3] - 50:19,
79:24, 86:5
opined [1] - 54:3
opinion [2] - 44:10,
142:12
opportunistic [1] 66:2
opportunity [4] 13:14, 76:19, 101:7,
111:1
opposed [1] - 17:23
order [8] - 20:20, 21:5,
46:4, 58:17, 67:5,
96:22, 97:19
Order [2] - 15:7, 23:23
ORDER [1] - 10:4
ordered [3] - 97:13,
125:8, 128:12
ordering [1] - 96:24
orders [1] - 99:5
ordinarily [1] - 14:2
ordinary [2] - 114:4,
130:21
organisms [1] - 100:7
organization [3] 39:18, 39:19, 65:15
organizational [3] 66:20, 66:22, 67:18
organize [1] - 114:16
original [1] - 41:1
originally [3] - 61:25,
62:6
origination [1] - 37:24
ORLEANS [9] - 1:8,
2:8, 2:16, 2:23, 3:22,
5:16, 5:23, 6:16,
8:10
Orleans [1] - 88:14
otherwise [1] - 37:25
outbursts [1] - 14:15
Outer [1] - 16:8
outlined [1] - 101:18
outside [2] - 21:20,
94:11
outstanding [2] -

20

68:6, 68:7
over-speeding [1] 37:13
overall [1] - 118:19
overarching [1] 35:15
overboard [2] 131:25, 136:25
overdue [2] - 106:23,
106:24
overflow [5] - 15:11,
15:18, 24:24, 25:20,
71:8
overlapping [1] 19:18
overloaded [1] - 44:22
overriding [2] - 36:25,
39:7
overrode [1] - 36:21
oversee [1] - 65:13
overview [1] - 13:15
overwhelmed [3] 36:10, 38:15, 136:22
overwhelming [2] 29:9, 116:22
overworked [1] 55:14
own [37] - 27:11,
27:25, 32:20, 44:5,
54:16, 55:24, 66:13,
76:25, 77:3, 78:19,
81:1, 81:2, 81:23,
83:6, 83:15, 83:19,
84:1, 84:2, 84:19,
85:2, 85:9, 86:11,
86:21, 88:2, 90:5,
90:8, 92:13, 93:16,
95:2, 97:14, 98:6,
103:19, 108:4,
114:14, 119:17,
127:25, 131:10
owned [2] - 17:1,
40:20
owner [12] - 18:2,
18:6, 18:7, 18:11,
18:14, 18:20, 18:24,
19:3, 26:21, 72:17,
106:12, 107:14
owners [1] - 39:20
ownership [1] - 85:12

P
p.m [16] - 14:4, 74:6,
74:21, 90:14, 94:15,
96:17, 98:9, 98:12,
98:19, 111:15,
111:25, 115:7,
116:18, 134:8,

138:13, 142:22
P.O [1] - 4:12
pad [1] - 111:8
page [2] - 24:2, 82:17
PAGE [1] - 9:3
pages [3] - 69:25,
82:15
paid [4] - 55:6, 99:9,
99:14, 113:16
Paine [1] - 60:6
PALMINTIER [1] 3:14
PAN [1] - 2:15
panic [1] - 141:21
panicked [1] - 140:20
panicking [1] - 141:10
pants [4] - 61:3, 76:7,
77:13, 132:13
paranoia [3] - 61:5,
76:8, 77:6
pardon [2] - 79:3,
89:19
Park [1] - 88:14
part [8] - 13:13, 14:24,
22:14, 27:1, 103:12,
112:4, 122:12,
122:15
partially [1] - 31:22
participate [1] - 68:15
participated [1] 40:25
participating [1] 16:17
particular [4] - 15:25,
20:10, 41:19, 46:14
particularly [5] - 19:8,
19:18, 22:22, 32:1,
86:17
parties [19] - 13:10,
13:25, 14:19, 16:17,
18:12, 21:18, 22:1,
22:3, 22:6, 22:19,
23:10, 24:9, 24:15,
26:5, 72:3, 72:8,
72:14, 103:15,
118:15
partly [1] - 49:5
partners [1] - 102:21
parts [1] - 41:2
party [6] - 13:15,
18:17, 21:11, 21:14,
107:16, 107:17
party's [1] - 16:1
pass [1] - 98:11
pass/fail [1] - 91:6
passed [2] - 68:3,
97:22
passive [2] - 37:25,
38:1
past [5] - 31:4, 60:24,

64:4, 66:9, 120:13


Pat [1] - 119:1
patch [1] - 132:1
Patrick [1] - 66:1
pattern [1] - 31:11
paul [1] - 11:4
PAUL [1] - 2:14
Paul [1] - 43:25
pay [3] - 58:13, 58:16,
99:12
paying [1] - 57:4
Payne [2] - 65:22,
68:14
penalize [1] - 105:17
penalizes [1] - 105:17
penalties [3] - 17:21,
20:12, 84:14
penalty [1] - 19:21
pending [2] - 18:5,
18:7
penetrate [1] - 59:18
PENNSYLVANIA [1] 6:4
People [1] - 76:22
people [38] - 36:23,
38:7, 47:7, 74:17,
77:17, 77:19, 77:23,
78:1, 81:8, 81:15,
87:19, 93:12, 98:19,
98:20, 99:25, 100:3,
100:5, 100:12,
100:18, 104:21,
114:1, 117:17,
119:1, 119:16,
119:18, 119:19,
119:21, 124:19,
125:5, 130:7, 132:4,
132:9, 133:18,
134:16, 138:3,
140:25, 141:20
people's [1] - 77:24
PEPPER [1] - 8:8
Pepper [3] - 143:3,
143:12, 143:13
per [1] - 87:12
percent [9] - 58:18,
64:24, 107:14,
109:11, 109:13,
109:15, 110:2,
126:24, 127:2
percipient [1] - 93:4
perfectly [2] - 84:21,
101:15
perform [6] - 56:2,
62:3, 62:22, 67:17,
97:19, 108:2
performance [9] 29:3, 32:21, 44:12,
56:11, 64:13, 64:18,
119:4, 125:24,

142:12
Performance [3] 43:25, 47:24, 48:11
performed [7] - 29:18,
30:5, 44:20, 55:17,
55:20, 96:1, 128:6
performing [3] 30:24, 35:9, 119:4
perhaps [1] - 141:24
period [2] - 122:13,
134:24
perished [1] - 121:15
permanently [1] 16:15
permit [2] - 41:5,
133:11
permits [1] - 18:2
person [6] - 21:25,
33:21, 33:25, 35:4,
65:12, 110:6
personally [2] - 104:6,
125:1
personnel [12] 28:17, 38:8, 44:21,
47:18, 49:15, 49:17,
50:14, 60:16, 62:21,
65:10, 65:17, 106:13
perspectives [1] 93:7
pervaded [1] - 78:23
Petition [1] - 10:16
PETITION [1] - 1:12
petroleum [2] - 27:7,
60:3
Petroleum [1] - 55:21
Phase [6] - 16:18,
17:14, 19:25, 20:5,
20:18, 114:18
phase [9] - 13:24,
14:1, 20:11, 20:12,
20:15, 30:21,
101:12, 107:16
phases [2] - 100:10,
100:16
phenomenon [3] 93:2, 93:9, 93:17
Phil [1] - 13:3
philosophy [2] 43:23, 47:20
phone [10] - 14:11,
15:3, 74:21, 75:1,
96:21, 97:6, 98:15,
98:19, 99:19, 112:25
phones [1] - 14:9
photographs [1] 14:22
phrase [2] - 50:10,
124:8
piece [8] - 40:19, 41:8,
41:10, 75:24, 84:23,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

90:1, 125:16, 141:2


pieces [4] - 84:18,
84:21, 85:12, 95:17
pipe [27] - 50:1, 50:9,
50:11, 91:10, 91:13,
91:25, 92:1, 92:17,
94:2, 95:9, 95:10,
96:12, 112:15,
113:13, 133:2,
133:4, 133:22,
134:1, 134:9,
135:20, 135:23,
135:25, 136:4,
136:8, 139:12,
139:17, 139:20
pipes [2] - 91:10,
91:23
piping [2] - 42:3,
139:23
pit [3] - 51:19, 57:2,
125:20
place [17] - 25:16,
32:25, 53:15, 57:18,
58:3, 63:8, 64:9,
87:3, 111:16, 121:5,
123:11, 123:12,
123:19, 126:20,
127:9, 130:3, 139:4
placed [3] - 14:10,
59:8, 63:20
placement [1] - 72:23
places [1] - 43:14
plaintiff [6] - 11:6,
19:9, 20:10, 72:10,
80:12, 99:17
PLAINTIFFS [1] - 2:3
plaintiffs [5] - 16:18,
18:13, 19:12, 101:16
plaintiffs' [2] - 11:24,
122:25
Plaintiffs' [2] - 20:23,
26:19
plan [6] - 22:5, 23:12,
60:23, 101:19,
131:13, 132:19
planned [3] - 62:6,
131:9
planning [4] - 47:25,
71:2, 106:4, 130:25
plans [2] - 26:8, 64:23
play [1] - 22:1
played [3] - 69:18,
117:22, 126:1
playing [1] - 67:15
PLC [1] - 5:20
plea [2] - 130:20
pleas [1] - 113:22
Pleasant [1] - 38:18
pleasure [1] - 118:6
pled [3] - 113:24,

21

114:4, 114:8
plug [4] - 61:19,
62:15, 131:14,
132:21
plus [3] - 18:5, 50:11,
80:8
pocket [1] - 82:9
Pod [1] - 51:3
pods [1] - 42:24
point [24] - 37:24,
42:7, 43:10, 51:7,
75:12, 78:20, 86:17,
87:12, 87:18, 88:10,
88:13, 99:13,
101:24, 102:8,
110:8, 113:3,
117:21, 118:7,
124:13, 124:18,
125:25, 126:17,
130:19, 137:4
pointed [3] - 82:14,
84:13, 89:12
pointer [2] - 86:25,
89:9
pointless [1] - 67:17
points [1] - 101:20
policies [1] - 47:21
policy [4] - 14:25,
36:3, 38:4, 136:16
polluted [1] - 105:2
Pollution [1] - 17:20
pollution [4] - 35:1,
35:18, 39:2, 104:24
poor [3] - 48:10,
56:11, 61:17
poorly [4] - 36:7, 40:6,
53:17, 54:4
popped [1] - 135:18
pore [2] - 46:18, 59:19
port [1] - 48:14
portion [1] - 58:15
posed [1] - 33:12
position [1] - 53:4
positioning [4] - 35:5,
35:9, 40:7, 40:11
positive [2] - 32:5,
62:11
possibility [2] - 23:7,
121:1
possible [3] - 15:4,
93:17, 104:2
post [3] - 18:5, 57:5,
109:25
POST [3] - 2:4, 4:18,
5:12
post-casualty [1] 18:5
post-Hurricane [1] 109:25
posted [5] - 15:9,

23:15, 23:17, 23:20,


24:6
potential [10] - 31:6,
32:3, 37:10, 42:11,
42:17, 43:5, 53:23,
66:7, 80:10, 138:9
potentially [2] - 33:17,
92:3
pounds [10] - 87:12,
87:14, 87:15, 87:16,
92:17, 109:21,
109:22, 109:23,
110:1
pour [1] - 62:9
pouring [3] - 62:9,
128:10, 128:13
power [6] - 50:18,
50:21, 81:19, 81:22,
99:2, 139:11
powered [2] - 43:6,
50:17
powerful [1] - 139:11
PowerPoint [1] - 47:9
POYDRAS [4] - 2:15,
5:22, 6:16, 8:9
practically [1] - 28:4
practice [4] - 27:10,
76:16, 77:5, 133:2
practices [2] - 32:5,
79:22
preached [1] - 122:3
precautions [3] 88:20, 108:19,
108:22
preceding [2] - 26:3,
60:18
precious [1] - 100:19
precisely [4] - 89:15,
116:5, 117:6, 121:11
preclude [1] - 23:7
predictable [1] 101:21
predicted [1] - 66:25
prediction [1] - 132:13
preliminary [1] - 26:12
prematurely [1] 52:13
prepared [2] - 22:3,
139:1
preparedness [1] 30:20
preparing [1] - 16:6
presence [1] - 62:25
present [11] - 21:7,
21:9, 21:12, 21:16,
53:23, 67:15, 75:10,
84:19, 84:22, 91:8,
121:13
presentation [4] 15:12, 15:16, 21:18,

71:3
presented [1] - 138:22
president [5] - 29:2,
32:20, 65:1, 65:6,
70:10
President [1] - 57:15
press [11] - 15:21,
22:10, 22:21, 23:4,
23:20, 24:17, 24:20,
25:12, 25:14, 25:17,
103:21
pressure [97] - 27:2,
28:9, 28:11, 35:23,
36:1, 36:10, 41:15,
42:13, 42:16, 46:15,
50:10, 52:1, 53:20,
58:10, 58:19, 59:8,
59:13, 59:19, 60:13,
61:17, 62:11, 62:20,
72:23, 74:3, 78:15,
83:1, 83:24, 84:6,
86:7, 86:8, 86:19,
86:21, 87:9, 87:15,
87:16, 88:8, 90:7,
90:15, 90:16, 90:22,
91:3, 91:8, 91:10,
91:14, 91:20, 91:23,
92:1, 92:3, 92:11,
92:15, 92:17, 92:23,
93:19, 94:10, 94:16,
94:24, 95:7, 95:8,
95:9, 95:10, 95:11,
95:21, 96:5, 96:12,
97:19, 97:21, 98:6,
99:6, 99:11, 106:5,
106:20, 106:22,
111:22, 111:23,
112:8, 112:15,
113:12, 113:13,
116:2, 127:15,
130:18, 131:4,
131:11, 132:7,
133:1, 133:4, 133:6,
133:20, 133:25,
134:2, 134:4,
135:18, 135:19,
136:4, 136:8
pressured [1] - 65:3
pressures [5] - 46:18,
64:12, 91:10, 92:12,
133:24
pressuring [3] 85:21, 90:19, 92:4
pretrial [1] - 17:24
pretty [1] - 126:13
prevent [6] - 85:21,
87:3, 88:24, 94:20,
99:2, 102:6
preventable [2] 70:12, 101:22

prevented [7] - 34:17,


38:23, 74:14, 74:23,
90:10, 94:18, 97:17
preventer [18] - 17:6,
31:4, 40:18, 40:19,
41:1, 41:4, 43:13,
45:10, 45:12, 46:1,
48:23, 49:4, 49:9,
49:17, 50:6, 50:8,
102:6, 139:1
prevention [1] - 29:10
preview [1] - 13:15
previous [5] - 32:18,
64:8, 66:21, 67:15,
96:19
previously [2] - 20:19,
59:22
primarily [2] - 15:21,
19:22
primary [5] - 46:11,
49:22, 72:15, 75:12,
95:17
print [1] - 82:19
Pritchard [1] - 60:3
private [4] - 16:20,
19:12, 20:22, 101:16
privilege [4] - 101:5,
102:25, 114:10,
114:13
privity [3] - 18:22,
18:24, 19:3
proactive [1] - 43:21
problem [22] - 29:8,
31:14, 32:18, 34:16,
36:18, 39:14, 39:25,
40:2, 50:14, 53:6,
67:5, 71:4, 71:9,
71:16, 105:16,
112:10, 115:24,
118:4, 119:11,
119:12, 129:14,
135:18
problematic [1] 112:5
problems [14] - 30:10,
32:9, 33:2, 46:7,
49:22, 52:20, 68:11,
77:14, 87:6, 89:23,
117:23, 124:18,
125:2, 126:21
procedure [6] - 22:20,
27:2, 60:23, 62:21,
108:15, 108:16
procedures [9] 28:21, 28:24, 29:20,
30:4, 32:13, 79:24,
120:15, 127:4,
141:22
proceed [7] - 29:11,
60:2, 71:17, 113:2,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

115:15, 116:13,
128:12
proceeded [1] - 94:4
proceeding [3] - 18:9,
18:17, 25:4
proceedings [6] 15:22, 117:21,
118:7, 125:25,
126:17, 143:9
PROCEEDINGS [3] 1:20, 8:12, 10:1
process [23] - 57:17,
57:24, 58:4, 63:22,
63:24, 64:2, 64:13,
65:13, 65:20, 65:25,
66:10, 66:13, 66:16,
66:25, 67:5, 67:6,
67:16, 68:3, 69:22,
70:3, 85:18, 106:4,
124:3
processes [2] - 47:2,
47:14
produce [1] - 110:13
PRODUCED [1] - 8:13
production [13] 51:18, 52:7, 58:12,
58:20, 63:20, 64:7,
64:12, 64:15, 65:4,
65:24, 80:11, 85:19,
108:2
Production [4] 10:18, 58:15, 58:19,
65:7
PRODUCTION [3] 1:15, 5:19, 5:20
professional [1] 103:16
Professor [3] - 63:23,
130:14, 142:10
proffered [1] - 22:18
profit [8] - 58:18,
63:20, 77:25, 78:20,
80:11, 80:13, 80:18,
125:10
profits [5] - 64:16,
66:5, 77:16, 77:17
program [3] - 28:23,
66:11, 67:13
programs [3] - 120:2,
120:5, 120:20
progresses [1] - 22:4
prohibited [3] - 14:23,
14:25, 15:17
Project [1] - 47:17
project [1] - 58:24
projected [1] - 61:17
projects [1] - 65:6
promised [1] - 67:21
promotion [1] - 117:5
promptly [1] - 39:1

22

proof [2] - 21:5,


110:23
proper [7] - 14:13,
29:25, 35:8, 36:16,
44:11, 120:10,
141:19
properly [9] - 45:13,
46:4, 53:17, 89:18,
95:11, 112:16,
113:14, 117:1,
141:25
property [1] - 64:11
prophecy [1] - 76:11
prophetic [1] - 132:13
prophetically [4] 28:25, 29:12, 30:19,
69:3
proposed [1] - 93:1
proposition [1] 104:19
proprietary [1] - 54:13
prospect [1] - 16:24
protect [5] - 39:9,
89:13, 90:2, 96:23,
106:13
protecting [2] - 40:22,
49:2
protection [4] - 63:21,
64:7, 64:15, 65:24
protocol [1] - 63:13
protocols [1] - 55:23
proud [1] - 122:11
prove [9] - 19:3,
70:14, 70:18, 70:19,
70:21, 84:12,
102:19, 102:20,
130:19
proved [1] - 99:7
provide [12] - 17:3,
17:8, 22:21, 51:18,
52:5, 53:7, 53:21,
56:17, 57:7, 58:4,
86:6, 116:23
provided [2] - 15:23,
53:20
provides [1] - 67:10
proving [1] - 19:1
provision [1] - 57:17
PSC [18] - 10:22,
10:24, 11:1, 11:2,
11:3, 11:4, 11:7,
11:8, 11:9, 11:11,
11:20, 21:6, 21:15,
22:16, 34:2, 43:18,
130:17, 138:17
PSC's [2] - 112:17,
130:14
psi [1] - 93:18
public [15] - 15:6,
15:9, 15:21, 22:11,

22:21, 23:4, 23:15,


23:17, 23:20, 23:22,
23:24, 24:17, 25:13,
25:18, 103:22
published [1] - 82:12
pulled [2] - 56:9,
139:12
pulling [2] - 56:12,
61:18
pump [1] - 62:4
pumped [4] - 55:13,
55:14, 90:17, 131:23
pumping [3] - 52:1,
81:16, 85:20
pumps [4] - 113:10,
135:17, 135:19,
136:1
punitive [2] - 102:24,
106:1
purpose [2] - 85:20,
116:1
purposes [3] - 17:23,
17:24, 90:24
push [2] - 60:21,
68:17
pushed [1] - 80:4
pushing [1] - 141:10
put [14] - 47:9, 48:13,
61:10, 77:16, 81:15,
82:13, 86:18, 111:4,
114:8, 125:10,
126:22, 137:22,
140:11, 142:10
putting [4] - 64:15,
100:15, 113:16,
116:7
puzzle [1] - 84:18

Q
QC [1] - 128:23
quality [1] - 52:25
quantity [1] - 20:16
questioned [1] - 21:19
questions [8] - 19:7,
23:21, 24:8, 52:24,
114:17, 115:1,
115:9, 141:20
quick [1] - 47:11
quickly [3] - 32:6,
36:10, 138:5
quote [15] - 61:2,
76:18, 79:1, 79:2,
79:3, 79:4, 87:20,
87:24, 88:1, 89:17,
89:18, 95:25,
130:15, 132:12
quoted [1] - 126:11

R
RACHEL [2] - 4:11,
6:19
Rachel [2] - 12:12,
114:14
ragged [2] - 79:2, 96:3
raining [1] - 56:24
raise [2] - 58:17, 58:19
raised [2] - 39:22,
140:20
ram [4] - 42:7, 42:10,
49:24, 137:2
rams [14] - 42:2, 42:4,
42:8, 42:19, 49:8,
49:9, 49:18, 50:5,
50:8, 51:6, 137:10,
139:9, 139:14,
140:15
ran [3] - 50:18, 62:20,
137:22
Randy [4] - 31:1,
137:12, 137:14,
137:20
ranked [1] - 117:20
rapidly [1] - 42:14
rate [1] - 29:9
rather [10] - 31:14,
43:20, 46:13, 61:24,
63:13, 65:17, 66:3,
128:11, 129:24,
130:1
re [3] - 10:14, 10:15,
97:19
RE [2] - 1:5, 1:12
re-perform [1] - 97:19
reach [2] - 104:20,
106:15
reaching [1] - 23:3
reactive [1] - 43:20
read [4] - 15:10,
82:17, 91:25, 126:22
readiness [1] - 44:2
reading [2] - 91:14,
91:20
readjust [1] - 111:5
ready [4] - 52:11,
62:25, 68:25, 71:17
real [2] - 62:15, 110:18
reality [1] - 48:12
realize [2] - 139:3,
141:12
realized [3] - 41:22,
56:23, 115:14
really [6] - 24:6, 61:16,
68:19, 104:14,
107:4, 126:5
REALTIME [1] - 8:8
Realtime [2] - 143:3,

143:13
reason [8] - 84:7,
89:15, 97:13, 97:18,
102:22, 123:14,
136:18, 139:1
reasonable [1] - 94:11
reasons [1] - 127:10
reassess [1] - 57:12
rebuild [1] - 47:11
rebuttal [1] - 21:16
receive [2] - 44:14,
121:19
received [7] - 35:10,
40:13, 65:5, 68:2,
127:6, 129:12,
140:10
recent [4] - 23:23,
29:4, 47:4, 47:23
recess [6] - 13:18,
71:11, 71:14,
142:17, 142:20,
142:23
RECESS....................
................. [1] - 9:10
recessing [1] - 14:3
rechargeable [1] 108:8
reckless [6] - 43:19,
70:22, 73:3, 73:23,
80:16, 81:10
recklessly [3] - 35:20,
57:5, 83:2
recklessness [2] 81:6, 82:21
recognize [2] - 28:18,
63:5
recognized [3] 31:20, 47:24, 57:25
recognizes [1] 105:20
recommendation [1] 30:23
recommendations [3]
- 30:7, 67:4, 108:3
recommended [6] 30:1, 51:21, 62:5,
86:15, 123:24,
141:11
Record [1] - 15:8
record [6] - 10:21,
22:17, 75:9, 118:12,
122:11, 143:8
RECORDED [1] - 8:12
recorded [1] - 21:21
recording [1] - 14:23
recordkeeping [2] 43:1, 43:4
recounted [1] - 33:7
recovered [3] 109:17, 110:1, 110:3

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

recreation [2] - 100:6,


105:8
red [3] - 27:12,
135:20, 139:25
REDDEN [1] - 7:11
redesigned [1] - 108:6
redoing [1] - 79:10
reduce [2] - 69:8, 69:9
reduced [1] - 61:23
reducing [1] - 35:1
redundant [1] - 43:11
reemphasize [1] 125:9
refer [5] - 19:11,
19:12, 23:22, 36:23,
131:23
reference [5] - 30:1,
87:12, 88:13,
110:12, 131:11
referred [7] - 106:25,
107:20, 123:1,
123:10, 124:5,
124:11, 128:17
refitting [1] - 48:15
reflected [4] - 31:12,
64:2, 64:3, 133:16
reflects [1] - 63:25
refusal [2] - 40:17,
48:18
refused [9] - 30:6,
62:5, 62:12, 62:23,
66:9, 77:8, 81:5,
109:7, 130:15
refusing [1] - 53:6
Regan [1] - 12:2
REGAN [2] - 6:8, 12:2
regard [1] - 24:20
regarded [1] - 118:22
regarding [9] - 13:21,
15:6, 20:15, 21:17,
30:20, 43:1, 53:10,
67:23, 68:2
regardless [1] - 54:25
Register [2] - 33:1,
33:3
REGISTERED [1] - 8:9
Registered [1] - 143:3
registered [1] - 143:14
regular [1] - 140:10
regulation [2] - 88:19,
89:16
regulations [2] 79:22, 79:23
reinforced [1] - 120:20
reject [1] - 94:1
related [3] - 17:4,
20:5, 23:13
RELATES [1] - 1:10
relating [4] - 20:1,
20:7, 20:14, 33:10

23

relatively [1] - 64:9


relearned [1] - 122:5
release [3] - 20:4,
30:16, 32:2
released [1] - 136:4
Reliability [1] - 47:17
reliable [1] - 67:11
reliance [2] - 63:8,
105:6
relief [1] - 16:16
relived [1] - 122:5
rely [1] - 86:5
relying [1] - 115:19
remainder [1] - 142:17
remained [2] - 36:19,
67:24
remaining [1] - 21:12
remains [1] - 99:24
remark [1] - 137:19
remarks [1] - 114:16
remember [1] - 137:16
remind [1] - 14:21
reminded [2] - 76:18,
121:1
remotely [2] - 80:14,
115:17
remove [1] - 113:2
removed [6] - 38:2,
109:10, 109:11,
109:20, 109:22,
109:24
RENAISSANCE [1] 7:20
renowned [1] - 66:13
repair [3] - 43:18,
68:7, 68:22
repaired [1] - 71:16
repairing [1] - 44:15
repairs [4] - 44:20,
45:24, 48:15, 68:13
repeat [1] - 91:23
repeated [1] - 80:20
repeatedly [2] - 60:4,
122:5
replaced [1] - 133:8
replied [1] - 69:2
Report [9] - 63:8,
63:10, 63:16, 82:14,
83:6, 85:2, 93:8,
94:24, 98:10
report [15] - 22:12,
22:14, 29:23, 31:19,
33:3, 33:8, 33:15,
92:8, 93:16, 120:7,
120:22, 122:17,
122:18, 129:13,
130:15
Report's [1] - 83:21
reported [5] - 37:19,
60:12, 75:17, 75:20,

120:14
REPORTER [3] - 8:8,
8:8, 8:9
Reporter [7] - 143:3,
143:4, 143:5,
143:13, 143:14,
143:14
REPORTER'S [1] 143:1
reporters [1] - 24:10
reports [4] - 23:13,
53:1, 123:8, 123:17
represent [1] - 114:10
representation [2] 44:5, 85:16
represented [3] 20:22, 42:7, 63:10
requested [3] - 39:25,
51:10, 68:15
requests [1] - 38:18
require [2] - 59:17,
79:24
required [16] - 33:21,
37:1, 41:14, 52:3,
52:5, 55:12, 55:21,
57:10, 57:18, 57:24,
58:6, 60:11, 63:3,
88:19, 89:15
requirement [3] 34:11, 57:19, 58:3
requirements [4] 18:7, 46:14, 66:10,
127:25
requires [1] - 59:21
requiring [5] - 36:5,
37:17, 39:23, 53:24,
68:6
requisite [1] - 34:22
rerun [1] - 96:22
reserved [3] - 24:21,
25:12, 25:16
reservoir [1] - 93:19
resonated [1] - 48:3
resources [1] - 105:7
RESOURCES [1] - 4:9
respect [4] - 19:8,
65:3, 114:17, 122:9
respected [3] - 39:19,
84:1, 117:14
respectfully [1] 70:13
responded [2] - 68:23,
76:15
response [8] - 20:15,
77:5, 88:8, 106:7,
114:7, 126:7, 137:7,
141:25
responsibilities [3] 39:21, 120:25,
121:20

responsibility [22] 27:3, 28:3, 33:22,


34:6, 39:8, 46:3,
52:1, 77:10, 81:1,
81:13, 86:20, 86:24,
88:7, 89:7, 95:18,
98:2, 99:2, 99:8,
104:7, 105:12,
110:17, 124:18
responsible [6] - 41:9,
51:17, 70:25,
110:19, 110:20,
130:23
responsive [1] - 137:6
rest [3] - 13:11, 25:17,
74:22
restore [2] - 100:19,
105:10
restructuring [1] 67:18
rests [1] - 28:4
result [9] - 27:19,
48:7, 51:2, 98:24,
99:1, 99:25, 113:22,
123:19, 136:5
resulted [1] - 64:24
resulting [1] - 60:19
results [9] - 48:3,
52:10, 60:13,
107:24, 111:24,
112:12, 128:23,
129:2, 131:1
resume [1] - 13:18
retained [1] - 66:14
retrievable [1] 109:17
retrospect [1] - 104:12
return [1] - 116:25
returns [3] - 32:6,
35:25, 60:19
revealed [1] - 30:19
reverse [1] - 97:7
Revette [4] - 116:19,
117:8, 119:23,
121:14
reviewed [1] - 120:4
RICHARD [1] - 7:3
Richard [3] - 12:13,
27:7, 114:14
rig [89] - 10:14, 16:12,
28:17, 29:17, 30:3,
30:9, 32:17, 33:22,
37:11, 41:23, 41:24,
43:9, 44:14, 44:22,
44:24, 50:14, 59:8,
62:25, 68:4, 69:3,
74:5, 74:8, 74:10,
75:3, 75:14, 78:8,
78:13, 78:25, 80:24,
81:3, 81:20, 82:24,

82:25, 84:8, 85:19,


86:18, 87:19, 87:23,
88:13, 89:2, 89:21,
94:7, 94:17, 94:25,
95:4, 95:16, 95:21,
96:1, 96:23, 97:2,
97:3, 97:9, 97:16,
98:14, 98:19, 99:19,
102:14, 104:8,
106:23, 107:20,
111:17, 118:4,
118:5, 118:14,
118:18, 118:19,
119:4, 119:9,
119:11, 119:15,
119:19, 120:21,
122:19, 125:2,
125:20, 126:10,
127:6, 127:8, 129:9,
131:18, 132:20,
138:16, 139:11,
141:8, 142:3, 142:7
Rig [1] - 43:25
RIG [1] - 1:5
rig's [2] - 35:21, 77:11
rig-based [2] - 82:25,
84:8
right-hand [4] - 90:25,
91:14, 91:18, 91:19
rigs [8] - 27:20, 31:14,
31:25, 43:14, 46:23,
118:10, 118:23,
125:6
ringing [1] - 79:7
rise [4] - 10:7, 71:13,
85:5, 142:21
riser [16] - 28:15,
28:18, 29:16, 29:24,
30:3, 31:24, 32:3,
32:16, 49:11, 62:14,
62:16, 88:15, 94:5,
97:23, 98:12, 98:21
risers [1] - 31:21
Risk [1] - 63:19
risk [30] - 29:11,
29:18, 30:4, 33:12,
48:1, 54:20, 57:12,
57:24, 58:4, 58:7,
61:22, 63:3, 63:22,
65:23, 66:1, 66:3,
66:6, 66:13, 69:9,
70:6, 70:8, 78:2,
86:14, 104:19,
112:23, 116:7,
119:17, 127:23,
130:2, 138:10
risked [1] - 59:5
riskiest [1] - 69:17
risks [17] - 46:17,
53:23, 64:1, 66:7,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

67:16, 70:3, 86:10,


86:16, 101:25,
105:20, 112:5,
113:6, 127:11,
127:17, 130:6,
130:12, 130:16
risky [2] - 130:5,
130:10
Rivette [1] - 99:20
RMR [2] - 8:8, 143:13
road [1] - 80:23
ROBERT [2] - 2:11,
6:4
Robert [4] - 10:24,
28:1, 61:11, 61:12
Roberts [3] - 12:7,
13:6, 114:13
ROBERTS [4] - 6:19,
7:13, 12:7, 13:6
robust [1] - 127:7
role [4] - 16:1, 52:2,
67:16, 69:18
roles [1] - 120:24
Roman [1] - 94:7
Ronnie [1] - 53:12
room [4] - 25:10, 37:9,
37:12, 89:25
ROOM [2] - 4:6, 8:9
rooms [2] - 25:20,
81:7
rose [1] - 135:19
rotary [2] - 31:5, 32:2
ROUGE [2] - 3:15,
5:12
roughly [2] - 16:13,
88:13
Roy [32] - 10:22,
26:15, 26:18, 69:23,
71:23, 72:2, 76:3,
77:19, 78:5, 82:14,
89:12, 101:18,
102:18, 105:15,
106:9, 106:25,
111:10, 121:4,
122:6, 122:10,
123:1, 123:10,
123:15, 124:2,
124:5, 124:21,
125:11, 126:19,
134:20, 136:21,
140:2, 141:14
ROY [6] - 2:3, 2:3,
10:22, 26:17, 69:25,
70:2
ROY....................... [1]
- 9:5
rug [1] - 123:16
rule [1] - 102:23
rules [4] - 14:25, 15:2,
15:6, 15:17

24

rulings [1] - 15:24


run [5] - 43:23, 55:11,
62:23, 63:1, 107:23
running [5] - 43:5,
43:8, 52:7, 86:14,
140:6
rush [4] - 58:10, 59:9,
59:25, 61:20
rushing [1] - 138:1
RUSNAK [1] - 3:17
rsum [1] - 22:13
rsums [1] - 23:14

S
s/Cathy [1] - 143:12
sacrificed [1] - 77:23
saddest [1] - 97:11
safe [8] - 27:5, 44:4,
45:3, 60:14, 67:10,
79:25, 80:4, 86:5
safely [4] - 44:3,
106:13, 115:24,
116:25
safest [2] - 45:17,
104:2
safety [81] - 32:24,
33:5, 33:22, 34:6,
34:10, 35:6, 37:3,
37:7, 37:20, 40:19,
46:16, 46:20, 47:2,
47:10, 47:22, 48:17,
52:2, 57:8, 57:18,
57:24, 60:4, 61:23,
62:20, 63:21, 63:22,
63:24, 63:25, 64:2,
64:13, 64:16, 65:10,
65:11, 65:13, 65:16,
65:20, 65:21, 65:25,
66:6, 66:10, 66:13,
66:16, 66:24, 67:1,
67:5, 67:6, 67:16,
67:19, 67:23, 68:3,
68:4, 69:22, 70:3,
75:13, 77:10, 77:17,
77:23, 78:1, 78:9,
78:12, 78:20, 79:16,
79:22, 79:23, 80:2,
80:23, 90:16, 90:17,
96:16, 107:23,
116:14, 117:17,
117:24, 119:4,
122:9, 124:3, 125:9,
125:10, 127:1,
127:4, 127:6
Safety [2] - 33:20,
48:9
Sally [1] - 22:6
salt [5] - 59:14, 59:17,

59:18, 59:20, 59:22


Sam [1] - 55:24
same/adjoining [1] 33:11
SAN [2] - 3:5, 4:6
sanctions [1] - 15:3
sank [1] - 16:13
satisfied [2] - 44:3,
95:25
save [10] - 54:23,
61:22, 62:1, 63:1,
69:12, 77:24, 94:20,
108:25, 142:7
saved [10] - 39:2,
74:16, 74:17, 78:9,
78:10, 82:8, 97:16,
99:16
saving [2] - 47:19,
49:18
savings [1] - 82:9
saw [9] - 65:17, 92:17,
113:6, 113:10,
115:24, 126:3,
132:10, 136:11,
137:8
scenario [2] - 35:10,
40:13
schedule [3] - 59:3,
109:1, 138:1
scheduled [1] - 25:4
Schlumberger [1] 62:25
school [2] - 121:18,
121:22
Scofield [1] - 12:20
SCOFIELD [2] - 8:4,
12:20
SCOTT [1] - 4:10
Scott [1] - 11:12
scrap [1] - 97:4
scratch [1] - 54:19
screen [9] - 72:21,
74:8, 74:24, 79:14,
81:12, 83:5, 83:16,
83:20, 134:21
screens [6] - 15:12,
15:16, 25:21,
134:14, 134:25,
135:2
screwed [2] - 31:17,
126:10
Sea [2] - 102:2, 121:5
sea [3] - 42:25, 68:12,
136:20
seal [6] - 50:1, 50:5,
50:9, 54:5, 124:7,
136:13
sealed [1] - 16:15
seamen's [1] - 113:24
seat [5] - 61:2, 76:6,

77:13, 132:12,
141:11
seated [1] - 10:10
seating [1] - 25:17
seawater [2] - 27:6,
94:5
seaworthy [2] - 46:5,
107:1
second [13] - 21:9,
38:17, 73:5, 75:1,
83:12, 86:25, 99:19,
102:8, 104:16,
127:13, 129:23,
131:11, 131:14
SECREST [1] - 7:11
Section [1] - 17:21
section [2] - 30:24,
33:15
SECTION [2] - 4:9,
4:21
secure [1] - 27:5
securing [1] - 100:16
Security [1] - 48:9
Sedco [2] - 30:15,
121:4
see [31] - 14:5, 15:15,
22:23, 42:20, 50:15,
68:19, 73:13, 78:19,
82:21, 83:16, 85:2,
87:24, 88:5, 110:7,
119:6, 122:18,
122:21, 126:4,
131:7, 131:17,
133:20, 135:14,
135:16, 135:23,
136:1, 136:4, 136:8,
137:20, 139:7,
139:20, 141:1
seeing [1] - 126:7
seek [1] - 26:22
seeking [2] - 18:3,
60:15
seem [2] - 47:6,
140:25
seizure [1] - 15:3
selection [1] - 41:2
self [1] - 51:14
self-described [1] 51:14
semisubmersible [1] 28:21
send [1] - 119:19
Senior [2] - 74:9,
74:10
senior [12] - 31:1,
35:5, 35:7, 36:18,
40:10, 65:6, 81:5,
95:15, 96:13, 119:1,
124:16, 137:12
sense [4] - 61:7,

76:10, 93:6, 93:7


sensors [1] - 38:1
sent [6] - 46:24, 69:6,
75:23, 77:2, 132:15,
132:18
sentence [2] - 76:10,
129:23
separate [5] - 35:24,
51:5, 66:15, 84:11,
110:21
separator [7] - 35:21,
35:23, 36:4, 36:9,
36:13, 136:18,
136:22
September [3] - 68:22,
106:23, 109:25
Sepulvado [3] 117:19, 125:22,
133:2
sequence [2] - 59:17,
83:17
series [6] - 29:3,
61:21, 73:2, 73:22,
83:8, 127:11
serious [8] - 47:7,
49:5, 52:24, 61:18,
63:5, 63:14, 63:15,
69:1
seriously [2] - 43:2,
45:7
seriousness [2] 64:1, 99:24
served [1] - 37:23
service [5] - 38:2,
48:13, 81:17, 87:13,
104:25
services [3] - 17:4,
17:9, 51:15
SERVICES [1] - 7:17
SESSION [1] - 1:19
set [16] - 15:7, 28:22,
30:19, 33:17, 37:15,
37:25, 38:1, 87:4,
91:1, 94:6, 94:7,
124:20, 128:4,
128:8, 133:1, 136:17
sets [1] - 120:1
setting [1] - 62:14
seven [4] - 39:23,
40:1, 62:2
seventh [2] - 32:17,
62:16
several [4] - 15:11,
31:2, 36:21, 116:1
severally [2] - 106:11,
107:13
severe [3] - 87:5,
129:13, 138:9
severely [1] - 94:5
shack [8] - 56:24,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

113:1, 113:5,
116:20, 119:22,
134:10, 134:21,
135:4
shadow [1] - 99:15
shall [2] - 21:12, 21:15
shameful [1] - 113:20
shared [1] - 27:3
shareholders [2] 58:14, 58:18
SHARON [1] - 4:17
Shaw [1] - 65:6
SHAW [1] - 2:21
Shaw's [1] - 65:9
shear [16] - 42:2, 42:4,
42:7, 42:8, 42:18,
42:22, 49:8, 49:18,
49:24, 50:1, 50:5,
50:8, 50:9, 51:6,
139:14, 140:15
sheen [1] - 134:24
sheer [2] - 22:22,
23:10
Shelf [1] - 16:8
SHELL [1] - 5:21
Shell [1] - 125:3
shift [5] - 19:3, 72:14,
85:24, 113:19,
138:14
shifts [1] - 133:7
ship [1] - 131:19
ship's [1] - 46:2
shipmates [1] - 142:7
Shipowners' [2] 17:17, 18:1
shipping [1] - 55:7
shipyard [2] - 45:24,
68:13
shitty [1] - 79:4
shore [2] - 109:11,
131:19
shoreline [3] - 100:7,
109:7, 109:8
shores [3] - 104:20,
109:12, 109:18
short [7] - 33:21,
47:19, 59:4, 64:9,
82:9, 99:18, 110:20
short-term [1] - 64:9
shortened [1] - 128:9
shorter [1] - 22:2
shortly [5] - 90:13,
96:17, 117:5,
133:17, 135:22
shouts [1] - 38:13
show [149] - 13:16,
26:23, 27:17, 28:2,
28:16, 32:22, 34:21,
35:19, 36:7, 36:12,
36:20, 39:6, 41:17,

25

41:22, 45:9, 46:11,


46:19, 47:14, 48:14,
48:18, 49:4, 49:14,
49:16, 50:4, 51:16,
52:12, 52:19, 53:16,
54:1, 54:23, 55:10,
55:16, 56:3, 56:12,
56:19, 56:25, 57:16,
57:20, 58:5, 58:14,
59:7, 60:12, 61:20,
63:6, 63:9, 63:18,
64:14, 64:19, 66:4,
66:8, 67:12, 67:22,
67:25, 68:9, 69:12,
72:13, 72:20, 73:2,
73:22, 73:24, 74:6,
74:13, 74:20, 74:25,
75:5, 75:15, 75:16,
75:19, 75:22, 76:14,
76:16, 76:24, 77:3,
77:7, 77:12, 77:16,
77:18, 78:4, 78:16,
78:24, 79:6, 79:9,
79:12, 79:20, 80:16,
80:22, 81:4, 81:9,
81:25, 82:7, 83:1,
86:2, 86:9, 86:22,
87:18, 87:22, 88:2,
88:22, 89:1, 90:5,
90:13, 90:24, 91:9,
91:22, 91:25, 92:16,
93:8, 93:24, 94:3,
94:13, 94:14, 94:23,
95:3, 95:6, 95:17,
95:19, 95:23, 96:2,
96:5, 96:8, 96:11,
96:23, 97:3, 97:5,
97:11, 97:19, 97:25,
98:8, 98:10, 98:18,
98:23, 99:7, 99:15,
101:24, 102:6,
102:10, 105:11,
105:24, 106:10,
107:8, 107:12,
108:1, 112:8, 115:2,
120:18, 122:10,
127:25, 128:5, 139:2
showed [3] - 107:25,
128:7, 128:22
showing [2] - 27:23,
51:1
shown [3] - 65:21,
81:10, 115:5
shows [7] - 18:21,
27:22, 75:11,
116:23, 122:7,
135:13, 139:5
Shushan [2] - 22:6,
103:9
Shut [1] - 99:21

shut [24] - 26:24,


27:16, 27:18, 28:18,
30:11, 32:12, 76:25,
77:4, 80:6, 89:8,
96:6, 96:24, 97:20,
97:21, 112:1,
112:19, 113:9,
125:18, 126:4,
135:17, 136:1,
137:2, 137:17
shut-in [1] - 32:12
shutdown [7] - 37:1,
37:6, 37:8, 37:18,
38:9, 38:11, 125:9
SHUTLER [1] - 4:17
shutting [5] - 30:12,
32:6, 37:13, 137:18,
137:19
side [9] - 11:24, 29:10,
72:10, 90:25, 91:18,
91:19, 92:2, 92:18,
139:23
signal [1] - 50:17
signalling [2] - 37:18,
37:24
signed [2] - 57:15,
133:17
significant [2] - 45:9,
89:22
significantly [3] 39:11, 54:12, 63:4
signs [8] - 51:19,
56:20, 57:3, 57:4,
108:22, 134:10,
134:13, 134:16
silent [1] - 14:10
similar [1] - 115:17
simple [11] - 75:6,
77:8, 82:2, 82:5,
84:14, 90:9, 91:6,
98:1, 99:21, 133:19,
133:21
simplify [1] - 19:10
simply [4] - 14:25,
86:2, 90:22, 139:2
Sims [9] - 60:23,
75:20, 75:23, 76:4,
76:14, 76:16, 77:2,
132:15, 132:16
Sims's [2] - 77:3, 77:7
simultaneous [1] 63:2
SINCLAIR [1] - 5:5
single [17] - 42:6,
42:7, 42:10, 43:9,
48:15, 51:6, 51:7,
55:12, 75:24, 84:7,
85:4, 85:5, 99:13,
120:7, 124:1, 142:1,
142:8

sinking [1] - 20:3


Site [1] - 74:10
site [28] - 16:24, 61:1,
75:17, 76:5, 76:6,
87:19, 88:17, 92:22,
93:2, 93:14, 93:21,
93:24, 95:4, 95:14,
95:20, 95:24, 96:10,
96:16, 96:21, 98:16,
99:5, 111:20,
115:14, 117:20,
117:25, 125:23,
133:3, 133:7
sitting [2] - 55:4,
130:7
situation [6] - 29:1,
29:21, 40:3, 49:1,
50:3, 60:1
situations [1] - 42:2
six [8] - 21:4, 31:24,
43:24, 62:14, 69:7,
123:1, 123:11, 131:3
skim [1] - 85:11
slashed [1] - 64:22
slice [5] - 83:11,
83:16, 87:1, 89:11,
98:6
slices [4] - 83:22,
88:9, 89:7, 90:4
slide [5] - 90:25,
91:14, 91:19, 92:2,
92:19
SLIDELL [1] - 3:12
slightly [2] - 125:18,
134:11
sliver [2] - 99:15,
122:24
slurries [1] - 121:3
slurry [6] - 52:4, 52:6,
54:17, 55:13,
107:22, 107:25
small [3] - 35:24,
68:24, 122:23
smog [1] - 110:8
smoke [2] - 57:2, 72:1
snapshot [2] - 75:10,
75:11
social [1] - 104:25
sold [3] - 17:5, 50:5,
50:6
sole [3] - 52:1, 65:13,
116:1
solve [1] - 104:11
someone [1] - 71:9
something's [1] - 47:1
sometimes [2] 80:18, 86:3
somewhere [1] 114:15
soon [2] - 76:19,

76:21
sorry [3] - 12:22,
68:17, 73:5
sort [4] - 115:4,
122:10, 138:17,
141:1
sorts [1] - 14:15
souls [1] - 74:21
sound [3] - 40:7, 71:9,
73:6
Sound [1] - 105:4
sounding [2] - 37:5,
37:12
sounds [1] - 73:17
source [3] - 37:10,
37:14, 93:1
SOUTH [1] - 6:24
south [1] - 16:8
space [1] - 25:12
spacer [3] - 62:18,
108:16, 131:24
spacers [2] - 51:22,
121:3
Special [1] - 103:14
specialized [1] - 24:13
specific [4] - 29:24,
52:4, 67:4, 121:20
specifically [2] - 28:6,
37:2
speed [3] - 60:4,
64:10, 66:2
speed-driven [1] 66:2
speeding [1] - 37:13
spend [2] - 128:2,
132:25
spending [2] - 58:22,
78:7
spent [4] - 32:10,
80:9, 93:11, 113:11
Sperry [12] - 27:24,
51:19, 56:3, 56:11,
56:14, 56:16, 56:20,
56:22, 57:1, 71:25,
135:9, 135:11
Sperry-Sun [4] 56:22, 71:25, 135:9,
135:11
spike [1] - 135:16
spill [13] - 10:14,
20:16, 76:2, 81:23,
83:22, 94:20, 97:16,
97:17, 101:13,
101:21, 101:23,
102:8, 113:25
SPILL [1] - 1:5
Spill [1] - 98:4
SPIRO [1] - 4:22
Sprague [1] - 68:1
spring [1] - 45:20

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

sprung [1] - 142:3


SQUARE [1] - 5:21
square [1] - 87:12
squeeze [2] - 80:18,
129:24
squirrelly [1] - 111:24
stability [3] - 55:12,
62:9, 107:24
stable [1] - 138:12
stack [1] - 97:22
staff [5] - 24:5, 24:7,
103:10, 103:11,
103:19
stand [6] - 63:24,
79:16, 80:7, 101:5,
102:25, 123:15
standard [10] - 55:23,
57:22, 57:23, 63:13,
84:24, 85:7, 119:8,
119:9, 120:8, 120:19
standards [7] - 27:9,
27:11, 41:13, 84:18,
120:1, 124:20, 128:7
standdown [1] - 88:4
standing [3] - 73:25,
85:5, 113:4
standpoint [2] - 44:13,
119:5
stands [1] - 130:17
start [8] - 44:3, 44:5,
45:3, 61:18, 69:4,
71:22, 85:19, 133:9
started [4] - 56:7,
56:24, 59:5, 128:11
starting [1] - 63:23
starts [1] - 135:24
startups [1] - 58:24
STATE [3] - 5:3, 5:8,
5:10
State [8] - 11:14,
11:15, 11:22, 11:23,
101:3, 102:24,
109:14, 143:4
state [5] - 27:11,
104:1, 105:15,
110:3, 119:21
statement [2] - 16:2,
79:15
statements [12] 13:10, 13:11, 13:13,
13:17, 13:20, 20:20,
20:24, 25:23, 26:13,
26:15, 142:18,
142:19
STATEMENTS [10] 9:5, 9:6, 9:7, 9:8,
9:9, 26:16, 71:19,
100:25, 103:6,
111:12
states [3] - 81:22,

26

100:20, 105:6
STATES [4] - 1:1,
1:14, 1:22, 4:3
States [22] - 10:17,
11:12, 11:17, 11:19,
15:1, 16:19, 16:20,
19:11, 20:24, 20:25,
21:7, 21:15, 84:13,
100:3, 101:4,
101:16, 104:9,
140:4, 143:5, 143:15
States' [4] - 17:19,
19:15, 71:3, 88:6
static [2] - 42:15,
55:25
STATION [1] - 4:24
station [3] - 81:17,
87:13, 139:12
statute [2] - 17:25,
18:2
stay [1] - 26:10
stayed [3] - 18:8, 78:8,
115:24
Steering [2] - 20:23,
26:19
stemming [2] - 17:11,
89:21
STENOGRAPHY [1] 8:12
step [2] - 14:11, 137:7
Stephanie [2] - 10:11,
71:6
Stephen [4] - 116:19,
117:11, 119:23,
121:13
STEPHEN [1] - 2:7
steps [1] - 43:12
Sterbcow [1] - 11:4
STERBCOW [3] 2:14, 2:14, 11:4
STERNBERG [2] 7:24, 12:18
Sternberg [1] - 12:18
Steve [9] - 11:5, 11:17,
12:7, 41:7, 44:7,
46:24, 114:13,
137:15
Steven [1] - 124:23
STEVEN [2] - 4:10,
6:19
still [12] - 40:3, 46:8,
55:4, 64:15, 71:6,
73:6, 87:25, 93:12,
95:9, 100:9, 110:19,
128:20
stock [1] - 93:3
stop [6] - 37:9, 73:5,
90:19, 96:6, 139:19,
139:21
stopped [4] - 37:11,

94:18, 98:5, 132:6


stopping [2] - 49:19,
77:14
story [5] - 69:15,
77:21, 79:17, 82:13,
129:21
straight [1] - 77:8
STRANGE [3] - 5:4,
11:15, 101:1
Strange [4] - 11:15,
101:3, 103:4, 104:4
STRANGE.................
.. [1] - 9:7
Strategic [1] - 48:11
strategy [1] - 82:13
straws [2] - 133:19,
133:21
STREET [18] - 2:4,
2:11, 2:15, 2:19,
2:22, 3:11, 3:15,
3:22, 5:11, 5:16,
5:22, 6:16, 6:20, 7:4,
7:14, 7:21, 8:5, 8:9
strength [2] - 55:25,
128:6
stress [1] - 78:22
strictly [2] - 14:23,
107:13
striking [1] - 119:19
string [3] - 51:22,
61:24, 127:19
strong [1] - 136:12
strongly [1] - 15:10
structure [3] - 34:17,
38:23, 39:3
stuck [1] - 129:25
students [1] - 92:14
studied [1] - 120:14
studying [1] - 132:4
stuff [7] - 55:6, 55:8,
68:24, 122:2, 132:1,
136:19
subject [4] - 19:7,
22:18, 23:1, 23:6
subjected [1] - 15:2
subjects [2] - 20:17,
48:3
submit [5] - 114:25,
115:7, 116:8,
120:17, 138:5
submitted [2] - 21:21,
22:4
subsequent [1] 33:13
subsequently [1] 74:11
substantial [5] - 45:8,
46:20, 63:7, 66:18,
69:18
substantially [1] -

61:22
subsurface [1] 109:21
subtle [2] - 134:10,
134:16
succeed [4] - 61:9,
76:12, 76:24, 132:14
success [7] - 62:24,
74:4, 83:2, 92:20,
94:2, 95:22, 111:23
successful [6] 55:12, 91:21, 92:11,
94:1, 96:1, 133:15
successfully [2] 50:9, 137:2
succumbed [1] 69:13
sued [1] - 84:14
suffered [2] - 20:10,
100:3
suggest [3] - 70:14,
85:25, 123:2
suggested [2] - 121:6,
122:7
suite [1] - 55:20
SUITE [13] - 2:4, 2:15,
2:19, 3:4, 3:8, 5:22,
6:16, 6:20, 7:8, 7:14,
7:21, 7:24, 8:5
SULLIVAN [1] - 4:17
summarize [1] 101:20
summation [1] - 79:16
summed [3] - 47:24,
70:11, 93:22
Sun [5] - 56:3, 56:22,
71:25, 135:9, 135:11
Sun's [1] - 56:11
Sunday [1] - 26:10
superiors [1] - 124:15
supervised [1] 111:22
supervision [3] - 45:2,
53:7, 53:11
supervisor [1] - 53:13
Supervisor [1] - 44:8
supervisors' [1] - 33:7
support [3] - 21:7,
21:13, 127:5
supported [1] 124:24
supports [1] - 101:17
supposed [5] - 87:2,
96:5, 97:15, 104:5,
141:6
surface [4] - 43:7,
50:18, 62:17, 85:11
survey [2] - 48:2,
125:7
surveyed [2] - 126:25,

127:3
survived [3] - 36:14,
142:2, 142:9
suspect [1] - 131:9
sustain [1] - 100:8
sustains [2] - 100:8,
100:19
SUTHERLAND [1] 6:18
Swaco [1] - 108:14
swath [1] - 81:21
swear [1] - 96:4
sweep [1] - 123:16
sworn [1] - 76:24
system [46] - 32:25,
34:11, 34:14, 34:19,
34:24, 35:22, 35:23,
36:4, 36:9, 36:13,
36:17, 36:22, 36:24,
37:1, 37:2, 37:6,
37:7, 37:8, 37:17,
37:18, 38:4, 38:9,
38:11, 38:20, 38:22,
39:4, 43:1, 43:4,
43:13, 43:21, 45:5,
45:10, 47:12, 50:17,
57:18, 67:8, 67:9,
69:20, 89:17, 108:7,
108:10, 124:4,
131:23, 136:15,
136:17, 140:3
systemic [5] - 63:17,
66:21, 66:22, 82:20,
84:10
systems [6] - 46:16,
47:14, 48:9, 51:5,
67:10

T
table [2] - 31:5, 32:3
tables [2] - 14:20,
25:16
tablets [1] - 14:9
tailored [1] - 121:20
TANNER [2] - 8:3,
12:19
Tanner [1] - 12:19
task [2] - 29:18, 47:25
teaching [1] - 121:23
Team [4] - 53:2, 60:6,
68:14, 70:3
team [15] - 28:22,
28:23, 31:16, 40:5,
44:5, 75:16, 75:19,
77:9, 93:17, 103:13,
108:25, 112:4,
128:16, 129:15,
130:15

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

teams [1] - 29:3


tear [1] - 68:24
tech [3] - 111:8,
111:10, 111:11
technical [8] - 24:14,
53:7, 65:10, 65:11,
71:4, 71:16, 138:20,
138:22
technically [1] - 19:9
technician [1] - 38:5
technology [3] 45:17, 73:15, 111:7
telephone [2] - 74:11,
94:17
temperature [5] 41:15, 46:15, 53:21,
59:13, 128:6
temperatures [1] 46:18
temporarily [3] - 16:6,
61:21, 85:18
temporary [3] - 27:1,
60:22, 85:22
ten [6] - 60:19, 62:2,
75:1, 95:5, 98:9,
99:19
ten-second [2] - 75:1,
99:19
tender [1] - 22:17
tens [3] - 78:4, 100:2,
100:4
tenth [1] - 62:23
term [2] - 47:19, 64:9
terminated [1] 123:24
terms [5] - 24:11,
46:17, 80:2, 117:24,
126:12
terrible [1] - 26:20
test [98] - 27:2, 27:3,
27:8, 28:9, 52:10,
55:13, 56:2, 60:13,
62:4, 62:9, 62:11,
62:21, 62:22, 72:24,
74:4, 78:15, 83:1,
83:3, 83:13, 83:24,
84:6, 86:6, 86:7,
86:8, 86:19, 86:21,
88:8, 90:7, 90:9,
90:15, 90:16, 90:17,
90:22, 91:1, 91:3,
91:5, 91:8, 91:10,
91:16, 91:21, 92:2,
92:11, 92:19, 92:23,
93:25, 94:1, 94:10,
94:16, 95:11, 95:21,
96:1, 96:5, 96:12,
96:16, 96:22, 97:14,
97:19, 97:21, 98:6,
99:6, 99:11, 99:21,

27

106:5, 106:20,
106:22, 107:25,
111:23, 112:8,
112:12, 112:16,
113:13, 115:15,
115:18, 115:21,
116:2, 127:14,
127:15, 129:2,
129:3, 130:18,
130:24, 131:4,
131:11, 131:13,
131:14, 131:17,
132:7, 133:1, 133:9,
133:16, 134:24,
140:17
tested [5] - 42:19,
53:17, 86:7, 140:14,
140:15
testified [5] - 56:22,
92:10, 92:13,
118:16, 135:1
testifies [2] - 22:13,
70:7
testify [17] - 21:25,
34:2, 38:5, 60:9,
66:1, 80:25, 84:3,
86:18, 88:7, 90:8,
92:6, 92:7, 93:5,
93:10, 93:20, 98:13,
124:24
testifying [1] - 34:1
testimony [20] - 14:16,
15:14, 22:15, 22:24,
23:5, 74:25, 76:25,
77:3, 77:7, 79:21,
80:15, 83:20, 87:18,
94:14, 97:5, 110:11,
118:24, 125:15,
137:14, 142:5
testing [9] - 42:20,
42:22, 51:17, 52:1,
54:25, 55:1, 55:16,
55:23, 96:5
tests [11] - 28:12,
55:12, 55:18, 55:21,
56:1, 90:23, 95:7,
107:23, 128:6,
128:7, 131:10
Texas [1] - 104:10
THE [39] - 1:5, 1:5,
1:12, 1:21, 2:3, 4:3,
5:3, 5:8, 5:9, 10:7,
10:8, 10:10, 10:13,
10:19, 11:24, 12:22,
12:25, 13:2, 13:8,
69:23, 70:1, 71:2,
71:7, 71:8, 71:13,
71:15, 72:5, 73:5,
73:13, 73:15, 73:19,
73:21, 100:23,

103:4, 107:15,
111:2, 111:6,
142:15, 142:21
themselves [2] 107:4, 116:7
theories [1] - 132:5
theory [3] - 92:24,
92:25, 93:5
therefore [3] - 49:3,
50:21, 101:17
they've [2] - 120:13,
120:14
They've [1] - 120:15
thick [1] - 59:17
thinking [5] - 26:4,
115:18, 116:5,
135:7, 137:16
THIRD [1] - 5:11
third [9] - 18:12,
18:17, 21:11, 21:12,
21:14, 50:14, 62:5,
88:8, 118:15
third-party [3] - 18:17,
21:11, 21:14
THIS [1] - 1:10
this' [1] - 60:8
THOMAS [1] - 3:11
Thornhill [1] - 11:11
THORNHILL [3] 3:10, 3:11, 11:10
thorough [1] - 63:10
thoroughly [1] - 90:6
thousands [3] - 31:5,
100:2, 102:12
threatening [1] - 92:4
three [23] - 14:1,
16:13, 24:24, 25:11,
26:1, 34:4, 38:17,
60:24, 66:15, 74:15,
75:22, 76:11, 88:12,
94:25, 102:23,
112:3, 113:1, 117:3,
119:22, 125:4,
129:3, 135:17,
142:18
three-day [1] - 34:4
throw [1] - 44:21
Thunder [1] - 61:6
Thursday [3] - 14:3,
22:7, 26:2
tieback [1] - 61:25
Tiger [2] - 60:6, 68:14
time-out [1] - 132:17
timeliness [2] - 52:21,
52:25
timely [3] - 39:5, 40:6,
57:23
tire [1] - 140:7
tires [2] - 87:13, 140:6
TO [4] - 1:10, 10:4,

126:15, 126:16
today [11] - 13:12,
13:18, 20:22, 72:9,
74:15, 74:24, 101:5,
101:12, 104:10,
104:25, 112:2
together [6] - 18:11,
73:3, 73:23, 83:9,
104:11, 106:21
tolerance [1] - 89:25
tolerant [1] - 66:1
tolerated [1] - 80:17
TOLLES [1] - 6:22
Tom [1] - 11:10
tomorrow [2] - 63:23,
110:9
Tony [2] - 63:11, 64:17
took [23] - 16:10,
38:17, 57:2, 67:2,
71:14, 72:1, 74:11,
86:9, 111:16, 121:5,
122:4, 123:11,
123:12, 123:19,
124:3, 124:20,
126:4, 126:20,
127:11, 127:18,
127:23, 130:6, 138:6
toolpusher [8] - 28:8,
31:1, 75:2, 75:3,
97:2, 99:20, 123:22,
137:12
toolpushers [1] 117:6
top [4] - 46:23, 120:5,
130:7, 136:2
TORTS [2] - 4:4, 4:15
total [4] - 20:25, 21:3,
59:12, 61:14
totally [5] - 27:24,
51:1, 105:14,
124:24, 141:19
tour [2] - 118:25,
119:6
towards [1] - 101:23
TOWER [2] - 7:4, 7:20
town [2] - 26:6, 26:9
trace [1] - 83:7
track [1] - 140:7
tracks [2] - 122:18,
122:19
trade [1] - 122:4
tragedy [18] - 26:20,
32:15, 40:1, 70:24,
72:11, 74:14, 74:24,
81:24, 81:25, 83:4,
83:8, 84:8, 97:10,
97:11, 97:12, 98:3,
99:2, 110:9
tragic [2] - 97:12,
104:13

tragically [1] - 102:9


train [6] - 29:14,
32:21, 32:23, 35:15,
36:18, 124:6
trained [15] - 28:6,
28:17, 34:9, 34:10,
34:13, 36:8, 40:6,
56:4, 116:22, 117:1,
119:15, 127:9,
136:14, 141:25
training [34] - 27:21,
28:10, 29:19, 29:24,
30:1, 30:10, 31:12,
33:8, 34:3, 34:22,
35:6, 35:10, 36:16,
39:4, 40:13, 56:18,
62:22, 116:24,
119:22, 119:24,
120:2, 120:4, 120:5,
120:8, 120:15,
120:18, 120:20,
121:17, 121:19,
121:22, 124:16,
127:5
TRANSCRIPT [2] 1:20, 8:12
transcript [2] - 21:24,
143:7
transcripts [3] - 21:21,
22:18, 23:13
transferred [1] - 17:24
translated [1] - 43:23
transmitting [1] 14:24
TRANSOCEAN [3] 6:12, 6:12, 6:14
Transocean [161] 12:7, 12:8, 12:9,
12:10, 12:11, 12:12,
12:13, 13:7, 17:1,
17:5, 17:15, 18:15,
18:17, 18:19, 19:5,
19:9, 19:13, 19:18,
21:1, 21:9, 26:21,
26:23, 27:3, 27:19,
27:23, 28:3, 28:5,
28:6, 28:16, 29:17,
30:6, 30:9, 30:15,
30:17, 30:18, 31:9,
31:14, 31:15, 31:20,
31:25, 32:8, 32:11,
32:14, 32:17, 32:23,
33:21, 34:23, 35:15,
36:20, 38:4, 38:8,
39:8, 39:13, 39:24,
40:2, 40:3, 40:5,
40:20, 40:25, 41:3,
41:8, 41:11, 41:18,
41:19, 42:1, 42:3,
42:6, 42:9, 42:11,

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

42:17, 42:23, 43:3,


43:5, 43:8, 43:14,
43:20, 43:22, 43:25,
44:2, 45:3, 45:7,
45:14, 45:17, 45:21,
45:22, 46:3, 46:20,
46:23, 46:25, 47:9,
47:15, 47:16, 47:22,
47:25, 48:10, 49:5,
49:14, 49:16, 51:10,
70:16, 70:19, 89:20,
90:14, 93:1, 99:4,
99:8, 99:10, 102:21,
102:23, 106:8,
106:10, 106:12,
106:15, 106:18,
106:21, 107:2,
107:3, 107:6, 107:7,
107:10, 108:7,
111:3, 111:14,
113:19, 113:21,
114:3, 114:11,
114:18, 114:22,
115:3, 115:11,
115:17, 115:25,
116:10, 116:14,
116:19, 116:23,
117:12, 119:14,
119:16, 119:21,
120:12, 121:17,
121:18, 122:8,
122:11, 122:14,
124:22, 125:10,
125:12, 129:9,
130:16, 130:18,
134:14, 134:18,
136:16, 138:3,
142:12
Transocean's [31] 16:22, 19:17, 20:6,
27:11, 27:17, 28:10,
28:20, 29:2, 30:19,
30:23, 31:1, 31:17,
32:20, 33:5, 33:24,
35:19, 36:3, 37:16,
40:16, 41:7, 41:14,
45:5, 46:23, 47:12,
47:23, 48:8, 48:17,
49:23, 113:1, 113:7,
120:18
transparent [1] 63:12
travel [3] - 26:8, 26:9,
26:10
traveled [1] - 88:11
treads [1] - 140:6
treating [1] - 32:5
tremendous [1] 137:23
trend [1] - 31:21

28

TRIAL [1] - 1:20


trial [69] - 10:20,
13:14, 13:18, 13:22,
13:25, 14:2, 14:5,
14:14, 14:16, 14:24,
15:7, 15:21, 16:3,
16:18, 17:14, 17:23,
19:11, 19:25, 20:13,
20:18, 21:5, 21:19,
21:22, 21:23, 22:4,
22:12, 22:14, 22:20,
22:24, 22:25, 23:6,
23:22, 24:12, 24:17,
24:25, 25:25, 36:22,
70:24, 72:13, 78:20,
79:16, 81:14, 82:4,
82:15, 82:23, 84:19,
84:22, 85:21, 92:9,
94:19, 95:17,
100:10, 100:16,
102:22, 103:11,
103:22, 105:9,
105:10, 107:16,
114:18, 115:2,
118:24, 121:6,
124:2, 124:24,
128:2, 138:4,
139:15, 142:5
trials [1] - 103:20
tried [6] - 19:17, 50:7,
100:9, 114:16,
116:9, 138:14
trigger [1] - 43:13
Triton [1] - 10:16
TRITON [1] - 1:12
troubling [1] - 108:10
true [2] - 41:21, 143:7
truly [1] - 115:11
trust [3] - 113:16,
114:9
trusted [1] - 33:1
truth [2] - 110:18,
130:23
try [8] - 24:16, 25:7,
42:14, 49:17, 54:21,
63:8, 72:10, 104:11
trying [7] - 49:8, 61:7,
76:10, 113:11,
116:3, 134:4, 141:4
turn [6] - 37:9, 48:22,
58:9, 64:18, 93:14,
118:3
turned [4] - 14:10,
28:25, 93:14, 135:19
turns [1] - 136:8
twice [2] - 113:9,
118:13
two [39] - 16:12,
17:14, 19:22, 24:21,
59:4, 61:15, 64:18,

72:7, 74:4, 74:20,


75:3, 84:18, 91:3,
91:10, 92:22, 93:2,
94:22, 95:4, 95:13,
98:1, 98:18, 101:20,
101:22, 102:21,
112:23, 114:17,
119:16, 120:23,
121:12, 121:22,
124:11, 127:10,
129:1, 131:6,
131:10, 133:7,
133:19, 133:21,
139:10
Two [1] - 20:18
TX [8] - 3:5, 3:19,
6:20, 7:8, 7:15, 7:21,
7:25, 8:5
type [4] - 14:22, 29:4,
31:24, 51:21
typically [1] - 19:11

U
U.S [4] - 4:4, 4:8, 4:15,
4:21
ultimate [1] - 28:2
ultimately [3] - 32:19,
49:17, 136:21
unabated [1] - 32:14
unaccounted [1] 109:9
unambiguous [1] 114:24
unbroken [1] - 83:17
unchecked [1] - 90:20
unconscionable [1] 127:11
uncontrolled [5] 30:16, 32:2, 88:24,
90:2, 90:20
uncorrected [3] 31:15, 32:14, 36:19
under [36] - 17:16,
17:19, 17:21, 17:24,
19:8, 19:16, 21:20,
34:9, 34:10, 36:1,
38:22, 41:3, 42:12,
42:18, 42:19, 42:21,
50:5, 57:6, 57:25,
58:19, 59:10, 84:14,
84:20, 85:8, 88:20,
94:10, 99:4, 105:22,
106:10, 107:13,
108:18, 108:20,
113:18, 122:16,
123:16, 131:18
underbalanced [1] 94:5

underestimating [1] 104:17


UNDERHILL [9] - 4:5,
11:18, 71:20, 72:6,
73:11, 73:14, 73:18,
73:20, 73:22
Underhill [6] - 11:19,
71:18, 101:18,
105:15, 108:18,
127:17
UNDERHILL..............
... [1] - 9:6
understaffed [1] 55:14
understood [5] 33:13, 44:6, 89:22,
95:20, 112:7
undersupervised [1] 55:15
undertaken [1] - 86:16
underwater [1] - 42:25
underway [2] - 97:8,
103:2
undetected [2] - 53:8,
56:14
undisputed [2] 92:21, 138:23
undo [1] - 96:19
unemployment [1] 104:24
unexplained [1] 93:18
unfair [4] - 123:3,
123:4, 138:6
unfit [1] - 41:18
unforgiveable [1] 79:15
unfortunate [1] 48:12
unfortunately [1] 139:16
unique [2] - 46:17,
105:5
unit [3] - 16:5, 65:3,
65:12
Unit [1] - 48:11
United [18] - 10:17,
11:12, 11:17, 11:19,
15:1, 16:19, 17:19,
19:11, 19:15, 20:24,
21:7, 71:3, 84:13,
88:6, 101:16, 140:4,
143:5, 143:15
UNITED [4] - 1:1, 1:14,
1:22, 4:3
universally [2] 116:22, 117:14
unless [2] - 68:25,
93:18
unloaded [1] - 31:22

unloading [7] - 28:15,


28:18, 29:16, 30:3,
31:24, 32:3, 32:16
unmanned [1] - 57:2
unmistakable [1] 102:16
unprecedented [2] 27:13, 101:14
unresolved [1] - 19:6
unseaworthiness [2] 18:23, 19:2
unseaworthy [1] 70:15
unstable [3] - 53:18,
59:14, 107:25
unsuccessful [2] 27:16, 86:3
untried [1] - 62:18
unused [2] - 55:4,
131:18
unusual [1] - 133:25
up [60] - 13:11, 25:11,
28:22, 31:5, 31:18,
32:15, 35:24, 38:7,
44:3, 44:5, 44:15,
45:3, 47:24, 49:10,
51:12, 52:23, 56:5,
62:3, 62:7, 69:24,
70:11, 72:21, 74:8,
74:21, 79:14, 81:2,
83:5, 83:11, 83:16,
83:22, 87:4, 88:12,
91:1, 91:2, 91:13,
91:21, 92:18, 93:22,
95:12, 97:6, 97:23,
98:19, 111:4,
112:16, 113:14,
119:23, 123:15,
124:19, 126:10,
126:22, 127:18,
130:17, 130:24,
131:2, 133:1, 135:2,
135:24, 136:8,
139:4, 139:17
Up [1] - 88:14
update [1] - 57:12
updated [2] - 58:6,
120:15
upgrade [2] - 40:17,
42:4
upper [2] - 32:13,
139:6
upside [1] - 141:12
urgency [1] - 59:25
USA [1] - 21:15
useless [1] - 55:17
uses [1] - 124:8
utilize [1] - 55:23
utilized [1] - 43:14
utter [1] - 115:16

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

utterly [1] - 100:14

V
VA [1] - 2:19
vacation [1] - 121:9
value [2] - 18:5, 19:21
valve [1] - 135:19
variable [3] - 137:1,
137:10, 139:9
variables [1] - 128:4
various [4] - 20:7,
20:8, 22:19, 104:23
variously [1] - 60:16
vast [1] - 122:23
verbal [1] - 14:15
verbatim [1] - 34:9
verbatim] [1] - 140:8
Veritas [1] - 39:18
versa [1] - 43:7
versus [2] - 10:17,
42:15
vessel [26] - 18:2,
18:5, 18:6, 18:7,
18:11, 18:14, 18:20,
18:24, 19:3, 34:11,
34:18, 35:1, 35:4,
35:7, 36:11, 36:15,
39:1, 39:10, 39:19,
40:20, 45:24, 46:5,
46:12, 56:7, 68:11,
106:13
vessel's [1] - 34:14
vessels [4] - 32:9,
66:11, 67:14, 67:22
via [1] - 16:16
vice [6] - 29:2, 32:20,
43:7, 65:1, 65:6,
70:10
vice-president [5] 29:2, 32:20, 65:1,
65:6, 70:10
victims [2] - 103:1,
115:11
video [6] - 14:22, 22:2,
117:22, 118:8,
126:1, 126:18
Vidrine [38] - 74:10,
75:1, 75:17, 81:3,
92:22, 94:17, 95:4,
95:6, 95:7, 95:10,
96:6, 96:10, 97:5,
97:7, 97:13, 97:14,
98:8, 111:19,
111:22, 112:9,
112:11, 112:12,
112:14, 112:24,
115:19, 115:24,
116:12, 121:14,

29

133:7, 133:9,
133:15, 134:5,
134:8, 134:23,
135:4, 137:12,
138:13
Vidrine's [2] - 81:13,
114:7
view [3] - 43:22,
119:10, 130:9
viewed [1] - 40:23
vigilant [1] - 30:20
Village [1] - 76:22
violated [2] - 79:21,
108:18
violates [1] - 15:2
violation [3] - 41:12,
43:16, 80:5
VIRGINIA [1] - 2:19
virtually [5] - 53:9,
66:22, 111:16,
117:15, 124:9
visible [1] - 109:17
visited [1] - 134:23
vital [1] - 47:4
voiced [1] - 52:24
VOICES [1] - 10:9
void [1] - 114:24
volume [4] - 22:23,
23:10, 36:10, 75:8
volumes [2] - 51:22,
125:20
Von [1] - 12:18
VON [2] - 7:24, 12:18
voyage [1] - 117:5

W
wait [2] - 62:8, 62:12
waited [1] - 128:20
waiting [2] - 128:11,
129:3
waived [1] - 105:22
waking [1] - 38:7
walk [1] - 75:2
walked [2] - 112:25
WALKER [1] - 2:18
walking [1] - 142:7
Walter [1] - 11:7
WALTER [1] - 2:22
Walz [2] - 53:3, 129:15
wanton [1] - 105:25
wants [1] - 61:4
warn [4] - 86:21, 97:1,
97:2
warned [4] - 39:13,
39:14, 41:11, 86:20
warning [3] - 108:22,
127:13, 129:13
warnings [3] - 28:23,

86:11, 127:16
warrant [1] - 105:20
WASHINGTON [4] 4:13, 4:19, 4:24, 6:5
waste [1] - 131:20
watch [1] - 35:7
watched [1] - 133:14
watching [3] - 103:21,
110:24, 135:14
Water [7] - 17:21,
19:16, 19:20, 84:14,
84:21, 84:24, 85:8
water [3] - 14:19,
59:11, 101:25
waters [3] - 105:3,
109:14, 110:3
Watts [1] - 11:9
WATTS [3] - 3:3, 3:3,
11:9
ways [2] - 115:9,
129:24
wealth [1] - 27:22
weapons [1] - 77:23
website [8] - 15:9,
23:16, 23:17, 23:18,
23:19, 23:24, 23:25,
24:6
Webster [2] - 34:1,
43:19
week [9] - 22:8, 22:12,
23:14, 23:15, 24:23,
25:1, 25:4, 25:6
week-to-week [1] 25:6
weekend [2] - 26:3,
26:11
weekly [3] - 23:20,
109:18, 120:21
weeks [4] - 33:4,
52:23, 102:19, 131:2
well's [1] - 90:15
well-trained [2] 119:15, 127:9
wellbore [3] - 49:25,
50:2, 141:9
wellhead [2] - 17:7,
129:25
wells [10] - 58:23,
59:4, 59:16, 59:20,
59:22, 59:24,
118:11, 121:2,
122:14, 127:21
whatsoever [2] - 32:7,
93:13
WHEREUPON [6] 71:14, 117:21,
118:7, 125:25,
126:17, 142:22
whisper [1] - 82:19
whistleblower [1] -

124:14
Whitby [1] - 48:24
WHITELEY [1] - 5:14
whole [1] - 110:24
wholesale [1] - 110:12
wholly [1] - 105:14
wide [2] - 48:2, 141:9
widely [1] - 130:4
widespread [1] - 32:8
wildlife [1] - 110:2
willful [23] - 19:19,
19:24, 27:19, 40:16,
48:18, 49:6, 70:22,
73:4, 73:24, 75:7,
80:17, 84:12, 84:15,
84:20, 84:25, 85:3,
85:6, 85:8, 85:13,
99:1, 99:23, 102:20,
105:25
willfully [7] - 32:23,
36:20, 42:20, 45:22,
51:8, 66:10, 67:12
William [1] - 70:5
WILLIAMS [3] - 3:7,
3:7, 10:25
Williams [2] - 11:1,
38:5
WILLIAMSON [3] 3:17, 3:18, 11:8
Williamson [1] - 11:8
window [1] - 59:19
windows [1] - 137:20
WINFIELD [1] - 5:5
withheld [1] - 117:2
witness [7] - 13:19,
21:25, 22:17, 92:6,
92:7, 92:9, 110:11
witness's [2] - 14:16,
21:23
witnesses [13] 21:18, 21:19, 76:25,
80:25, 84:4, 86:17,
87:5, 90:8, 91:5,
93:4, 98:13, 103:17,
107:3
wits [3] - 76:5, 132:9,
132:12
wits' [1] - 61:2
WITTMANN [1] - 13:3
Wittmann [1] - 13:3
woefully [2] - 34:9,
47:13
woman [1] - 142:1
women [3] - 140:23,
142:3, 142:6
wonderful [1] - 73:15
word [4] - 53:10,
76:17, 96:4, 107:2
words [15] - 39:7,
49:20, 50:24, 64:5,

66:4, 77:5, 77:13,


78:1, 78:19, 81:9,
81:11, 87:21, 88:4,
96:15, 99:22
workers [4] - 44:23,
102:14, 103:24,
105:9
workforce [1] - 33:9
works [3] - 73:13,
73:16, 121:17
world [9] - 33:2,
43:15, 51:14,
104:15, 110:24,
118:10, 118:11,
118:13, 120:17
worldwide [6] - 64:25,
67:11, 122:14,
124:17, 125:7, 125:8
Worldwide [1] - 63:19
worry [2] - 68:23, 69:1
worse [5] - 40:10,
76:20, 96:17,
112:24, 129:5
worst [2] - 82:7,
106:16
worth [1] - 79:10
wracked [1] - 74:5
wreck [1] - 32:21
wrecks [2] - 29:14,
124:6
wrestle [1] - 115:8
WRIGHT [1] - 2:3
writing [1] - 57:8
written [5] - 62:21,
81:11, 121:7,
123:17, 123:21
wrote [1] - 29:3
www.laed.uscourts.
gov [1] - 24:1
www.MDL2179
trialdocs.com [1] 23:16

Y
Yancy [2] - 35:6, 40:11
year [8] - 29:15, 31:23,
58:20, 58:25, 68:10,
92:14, 122:13
years [19] - 28:17,
31:12, 36:19, 39:15,
39:23, 40:1, 43:18,
44:11, 48:16, 64:18,
67:2, 70:16, 89:21,
117:4, 117:8,
117:12, 121:23,
123:11
yelled [1] - 38:13
yellow [1] - 131:8

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

YOAKUM [1] - 3:18


YORK [1] - 12:15
York [1] - 12:15
YOUNG [1] - 4:23
yourself [1] - 117:18

Z
zero [15] - 91:14,
91:19, 91:23, 91:24,
92:1, 92:12, 92:15,
92:17, 95:8, 95:11,
96:12, 97:23, 109:5,
112:15, 113:13
zillions [1] - 119:18
zone [1] - 25:9

MIKE [1] - 6:4

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