PEOPLE VS.

MARIANOGR L-40527 JUNE 30, 1976 Facts: Hermogenes Mariano, the appointed liaison officer of a municipality inthe Province of Bulacan was charged with estafa of goods amountingto no more than 6,000 pesos. Mariano then filed with the court amotion to quash all information. The respondent judge then grantedthe motion on the basis that the court indeed had no jurisdiction overthe case, citing that a military commission had already ruled on amalversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the sameproperties questioned at bar. The respondent judge noted that casehaving been heard and decided by a competent tribunal gives no jurisdiction to his court to pass anew judgment on the same subjectmatter. The PEOPLE then appealed and the Supreme Court havingciting the Judicial Act of 1948 and the fact that Estafa and Malversationare 2 different and distinct offense and that the military commissionhas no authority over the charges placed on Mariano, decided thatlower court committed a grave error in saying that they had no jurisdiction over the matter. As so ordered by the Supreme Court therespondent judge was to continue the criminal case against Mariano. The issues presented: Does the civil court & military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the case of the estafa of goods amounting to notmore than 6,000 Pesos. The Ruling: Military commissions have no authority over estafa cases and the courtof first instance has original jurisdiction as so implied by the JudicialAct of 1948. Ratio: The Judicial act of 1948 sec. 44 states that the Court of First Instanceshall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penaltyprovided by the law is imprisonment for more than six months or afine of over 200 pesos. Estafa more than meets with requirementsneeded for the Court of First Instance to acquire original jurisdiction PEOPLE VS LORETA GOZO Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country. ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base? HELD: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. SUZETTE NICOLAS VS. ALBERTO ROMULO On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith is a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty b/n the US and RP, the US embassy was granted custody of Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA. ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial. The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA are not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

Bayan Muna Vs. Romulo Facts: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to thiscase. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statuteestablishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the mostserious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions . Theserious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes againsthumanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instantpetition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrenceprocess. The Philippines is not among the 92. Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are eitherimmoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law. Held: No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/orbeing at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceedsfrom the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility forunimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering anAmerican criminal to the [ICC] x x x. The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner s earlier position, which, asalready discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.The Court isnot persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the SolicitorGeneral, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x . Theagreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country s judiciary to try

offenses under its nationalcriminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americanscommitting high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestlyincorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished inthe Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all theformalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, whatthe Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like theICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With theview we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by bothPhilippine laws and the Rome Statute. CASE DIGEST ON LIANG v. PEOPLE [323 SCRA 652 (2000)] Facts: Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged by the Metropolitan TC of Mandaluyong City for allegedly uttering defamatory words against her fellow worker w/ 2 counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC judge then received an office of protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs, stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the agreement bet ADB & the govt. MeTC judge, w/o notice, dismissed the two criminal cases. Prosecution filed writ of mandamus & certiorari and ordered the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest. Issues: WON the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court. Ratio: He is not covered by immunity because the commission of a crime is part of the performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that a certain person is covered by immunity. That a person is covered by immunity is preliminary. Due process is right of the accused as much as the prosecution. Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of official duty. Under Vienna convention on Diplomatic Relations, commission of a crime is not part of official duty. On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation isnt a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear than no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling w/in the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation doesnt affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.

NAVALES V.ABAYA FACTS Petitioners consisting of more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men, mostly fromthe elite units of the AFP who all took part in a failed coup attempt in Oakwood Suites, Makati, filed awrit of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court questioning the jurisdiction of the Judge AdvocateGeneral in filing charges against them for violations of the Articles of War Sections 67, 96, and 97. TheRegional Trial Court acquitted 290 of the original 331 soldiers who participated in the mutiny.Petitioners contend that the Judge Advocate General due to the fact that their participation in themutiny was not service connected. The present petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus werethen filed with the Supreme Court. Acting on the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining orderin the petition for prohibition, the Supreme Court directed the parties to observe the status quoprevailing before the filing of the petition.: ISSUE

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can divest the military courts of jurisdiction.: RA 7055 provides that "Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject tomilitary law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offensespenalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons,shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civilcourt, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by courtmartial: Provided, That the Presidentof the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any suchcrimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts." As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offensesshall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth ActNo. 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take intoconsideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local governmentordinances. HELD: The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are considered service-connectedcrimes or offenses under Commonwealth Act 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the Articles of War.Section 1 of RA 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. In view of the clearmandate of RA 7055, the Regional Trial Court cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over thosecharged with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97 of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included asservice-connected offenses or crimes under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, themilitary courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. There was no factual and legal basis for the RegionalTrial Court to rule that violations of said articles of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coupdetat and, as such, absorbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup detat against Navales, et al., and recommended the dismissal of thecase against them. The trial court approved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against Navales et al.There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the Navale et al., committed the violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup detat. In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that thesecharges were not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, the RTC(Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal contemplation, necessarily nulland void and does not exist.

Miranda vs Tuliao GR No. 158763March 31, 2006On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao. Twoinformations of murder were filed against police officers, one of which remained atlarge during the trial. The RTC convicted said accused personnel and sentenced reclusion pertua. TheSupreme Court, on automatic review, reversed the decision and acquitted the policeofficers based on reasonable doubts.Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, heexecuted a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 RomeoB. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe,as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and ElizerTuliao.Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder againstpetitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confessionof SPO2Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issuedwarrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminaryinvestigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. The petition was denied by Judge Tumaliuan on the ground of the absence of petitioners, thus, the court did not acquired jurisdiction over them. Judge Anghad took over the case and ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent file a petition praying that a temporary restraining order beissued to enjoin Judge Anghad to form proceeding with the case. Two days after theResolution of the Court granting the prayer of respondent, Judge Anghad dismissedthe two Informations for murder agaist petitioner. Issues:1.Whether of not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners ontheir petition to cancel the warrant of arrest.2.Whether of not the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of the cases.3.Whether or not double jeopardy would attach

Held:1. Yes. As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemedto have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the pastdecisions of the Supreme Court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,constitutes voluntary appearance.

After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitionerMiranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretaryof Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrantof arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad,x x x prudence dictates and because of comity, a deferment of theproceedings is but proper.Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable tocharge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity whenhe issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because thepetitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolutionto the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed beforethe issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground toquash the warrants of arrest.2.No. Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings shouldbe deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by thenullified proceedings. JudgeAnghads order quashing the warrants of arresthad been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforthdeemed unquashed.3.No. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed beforearraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot beinvoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon hisexpress motion that the case was dismissed Miranda vs. TuliaoG.R. # 158763, March 31, 2006 Facts: On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodiesof Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tulio who is now under the witnessprotection program.2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and sentencedthem 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being atlarge. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the herein petitionerMiranda and 4 others responsible for the death of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaintfor murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitionersand SPO2 Maderal.Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall orquash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumalian noted the absence of petitionersand issued a Joint order denying the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners appealed theresolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ.The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing theJoint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia filed apetition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad fromfurther proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolutiongranting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing theinformation against the petition.Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion tothe CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminalcases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdictionof the court Held: Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners.It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such aswarrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the court. It isonly when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek judicialrelief

APARIS VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition For Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on August 31, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 24238 and its Resolution2[2] dated August 5, 2005. The challenged Decision of the CA affirmed with modification the March 31, 2000 Decision3[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 64 in Criminal Case No. 96-146, finding herein petitioner Francisco Aparis y Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 (RA 6425), otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; while its questioned Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The prosecution's version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows: On [January] 17, 1996 at about 2:30 o'clock in the morning, elements of the PNP Narcotics Command based at Camp Crame, Quezon City and headed by Police Inspector Randolfo Gozar, conducted a buy-bust operation at Dian Street, corner Zobel Street, Barangay Palanan, Makati City which resulted in the apprehension of accused Edilberto Campos y Ibalid and [herein petitioner] Francisco Aparis y Santos. Several Days prior to the actual buy-bust, PO3 Nelson Labrador and confidential informant had entered into a drug deal with a certain Boyet Aparis. The name Boyet Aparis is in the drug watchlist of the NARCOM. In the planned buy-bust operation the poseur buyer, PO3 Nelson Labrador, was to buy from the accused P100,000.00 worth of shabu which would be delivered at Dian Street, corner Zobel Street, Bgy. Palanan, Makati City. They reported the deal to their superior, Police Capt. David Noora who directed them to conduct the buy-bust operation. On the aforesaid date and time, from Camp Crame the team composed of Police Inspector Randolfo Gozar, SPO1 Edwin Anaviso, PO3 Nelson Labrador and the confidential informant went to Dian Street, corner Zobel Street, Palanan, Makati City on board three unmarked vehicles. PO3 Labrador and the confidential informant were together in one vehicle. Upon their arrival at the place the buybust team deployed themselves at strategic position[s] while they waited for their quarry. After sometime a white Lancer GLI with Conduction No. 97-AYZ arrived with two (2) male persons on board. A male person seated at the passenger side of the car alighted and approached the car of PO3 Nelson Labrador. PO3 Nelson Labrador and the confidential informant alighted from their car and proceeded to the car of accused and they went inside at the backseat of the car. They were accompanied by the man who earlier alighted from the white Lancer GLI and who was later on identified as Edilberto Campos. In a little while PO3 Labrador executed the pre-arranged signal signifying that the buy-bust operation had been accomplished. x x x Upon receiving the signal, P/Insp. Gozar and his other police teammates rushed to where PO3 Labrador and the confidential informant were and they gave their assistance to effect the arrest of the accused. x x x The police [were] able to confiscate the shabu subject of the buy-bust and the buy-bust money... x x x The man from whom PO3 Labrador bought shabu was identified as Francisco S. Aparis alias Boyet Aparis, and his companion who was seated at the front passenger seat of the white Lancer GLI, and who alighted from the car upon seeing PO3 Labrador and the confidential informant, and who accompanied the two to the Lancer GLI, was identified as the accused Edilberto Campos. The alleged shabu was examined at the PNP Crime

1[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Jose C. Mendoza concurring; CA rollo, pp. 238-245.

Laboratory and was found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug. x x x4[4]

In an Information dated January 18, 1996, petitioner and co-accused Edilberto Campos (Campos) were charged with violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. Pertinent portions of the Information filed against petitioner and Campos read as follows: That on or about the 17th day of January, 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver 101.11 gms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) which is a regulated drug. CONTRARY TO LAW.5[5]

Upon arraignment, petitioner and Campos both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.6[6] Thereafter, trial ensued.

In his defense, petitioner denied the occurrence of any buy-bust operation, which the prosecution claimed to have conducted, and which led to his and Campos' arrest. Petitioner alleged that he was billeted at the Manila Hotel as early as January 15, 1996. Campos, whom he claimed to be his driver, followed him to the hotel the following day. In the early morning of January 17, 1996, while he was driving his car along Roxas Boulevard, Manila, on his way to a casino in Silahis Hotel, his vehicle was suddenly blocked by two cars. Thereafter he was apprehended at gun point by persons unknown to him. They took over his car, blindfolded, handcuffed him and robbed him of his money and other valuables. They then proceeded to his room in the Manila Hotel, where he was further robbed of his previous winnings in the casino worth P1,000,000.00, as well as other personal records and documents. Petitioner also claims that Campos was arrested at the hotel. Petitioner alleged that he was simply framed up, and that he was a victim of a conspiracy designed by his former wife, or by a police colonel, both of whom had an ax to grind against him.

On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 96-146, the accused EDILBERTO CAMPOS y IBALID is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. 2. In Criminal Case No. 96-147, the accused FRANCISCO APARIS y SANTOS alias BOYET' is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) YEARS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum. SO ORDERED.7[7]

Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the trial court found that all the elements of the crime charged were present and were proven beyond reasonable doubt by the documentary and object evidence presented by the prosecution, as well as the testimonies of the witnesses, especially Police Officer 3 PO3 Labrador, who acted as the poseur-buyer; and Police Inspector Gozar, the team leader who led the buy-bust operation.

With respect to Campos, however, the RTC ruled that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he actually sold or delivered shabu to PO3 Labrador, or that he was in conspiracy with petitioner in selling the said drugs.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.

On August 31, 2004, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 64) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the sentence imposed on accused-appellant Francisco Aparis y Santos in that he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor, as maximum. SO ORDERED.8[8]

The CA ruled that the trial court committed no error in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as against those of petitioner. The CA also held that petitioner failed to substantiate his defense that he was framed up.

7[7] 8[8]

Id. at 439-456. Supra note 1.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution of August 5, 2005. Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds: I WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-BR. 64, MAKATI CITY AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE MATTER OF JURISDICTION. II WHETHER OR NOT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS ALLEGEDLY ARRESTED BY THE POLICE OFFICERS.9[9] Petitioner maintained his innocence and insisted that he was a victim of frame-up and robbery. He contends that the police officers who testified against him were paid to falsely charge him with a crime he did not commit. Petitioner also asserted that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other. In particular, he claimed that the first two witnesses testified that he (petitioner) was the target of the buy-bust operation, that his name was in the Drug Watch List of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), and that surveillance was conducted by PO3 Labrador, who acted as the poseur-buyer. However, petitioner averred that Labrador categorically denied knowing petitioner prior to his arrest, and he admitted that no surveillance was conducted. Petitioner further contends that the RTC of Makati had no jurisdiction over his case, as the place where the crime was supposedly committed is within Manila. Lastly, petitioner claims that he was not properly apprised of his fundamental rights when he was arrested. The Court is not persuaded. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.10[10] In prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.11[11] In the case before the Court, the prosecution was able to establish--through testimonial, documentary, and object evidence--the said elements. PO3 Labrador, who acted as the poseur-buyer, categorically testified about the buy-bust operation from the time he and the confidential informant waited for petitioner to arrive, to the time when petitioner met

9[9]

Supra note 1, at 18.

10[10] People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009. 11[11] People v. Sy, G.R. No. 185284, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 511, 524; People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 625, 635.

them and asked them if they had money, to the actual exchange of the marked money with the plastic bag containing a white substance, which was later proved to be shabu; until the apprehension of petitioner, to wit: PROS. BAGAOISAN Now, what time did you leave your office? WITNESS Almost 2:00 o'clock, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN And, where was your destination? WITNESS Dian Street corner Zobel, Barrio Palanan, Makati City, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN And, what means of transporation did you take in going to Dian corner Zobel Streets, Barrio Palanan, Makati City? WITNESS We were aboard three cars, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN Who was with you on that car that you were riding? WITNESS My informant, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN So, there were only two of you on that car? WITNESS Yes, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN What time did you arrive at Dian corner Zobel Streets, Barrio Palanan, Makati City? WITNESS In the morning, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN What did you do next upon arrival at Dian corner Zobel Streets? WITNESS We waited for the person to whom we had a deal, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN And, you were referring to Francisco Boyet Aparis? WITNESS Yes, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN Did Francisco Boyet Aparis arrive? WITNESS It was not long before the white lancer arrived, that don't (sic) have plate number but some sort of sticker, sir. xxx PROS. BAGAOISAN Now, what happened after this white lancer car arrived? WITNESS A man alighted from the car and he approached us and we came to know later on that the name of the man is Edilberto Campos, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN When you said lumapit sa amin whom you are referring? (sic)

WITNESS The informant and me, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN So, what did the man tell you, if he did tell you anything? WITNESS He told my informant that alias Boyet was there inside the car, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN So, what happened after you were informed by the man that Boyet Aparis was inside the car? WITNESS They asked us to transfer to their car, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN Who asked you to transfer to the car? WITNESS Edilberto Campos, sir. He was the one who gave us the signal to transfer to their car. PROS. BAGAOISAN Did you transfer to the white lancer car? WITNESS Yes, sir PROS. BAGAOISAN Now, in what portion of the car did you position yourself? WITNESS We got in the passenger's seat of the car, at the backseat of the car, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN Now, where was Boyet Aparis positioned? WITNESS At the driver's seat, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN How about Edilberto Campos, where was he? WITNESS They were side by side, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN How about you, where were you positioned? WITNESS I was at the back of Francisco Aparis, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN How about your informant, where was he positioned? WITNESS He was at the side, sir, at the back of Edilberto Campos. PROS. BAGAOISAN What happened next when you were positioned as such? WITNESS Aparis asked us if the money was with us, sir.

PROS. BAGAOISAN What was your reply if there was any? WITNESS We asked if they have the stuff, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN

To whom did you address that question? WITNESS Aparis sir, because he was the one who talked. PROS. BAGAOISAN What happened after that? WITNESS Sir, he took the stuff from the bag which was inside the car and gave to me the stuff, then after that, I gave him the buy bust money, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN Now, will you please describe to us this stuff that you have just mentioned? WITNESS It was inside the improvised plastic bag, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN How big is this plastic bag? WITNESS About this size, sir. (Witness indicating the size of about 3 x 2 inches) PROS. BAGAOISAN Does it have any color? WITNESS Whitees (sic), sir. xxx PROS. BAGAOISAN So, what happened after the accused Aparis handed to you this stuff and you also handed to him the buy bust money? WITNESS When I realized that the sale was already consummated, I pressed the voyager beeper, and that's the signal to our companion to give assistance to us and effect the arrest of the accused. xxx PROS. BAGAOISAN What happened after you pressed that voyager beeper? WITNESS When I saw that my companions were already approaching, I put my left arm around Aparis' neck and I introduced myself as Narcom agent and informed them that they were under arrest, sir.

PROS. BAGAOISAN What happened next after that? WITNESS After that, they were already arrested and we were able to recover the buy bust money and the stuff. And, when we conducted the search, we found some paraphernalias (sic), sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN What are these paraphernalias (sic)? WITNESS The improvised toother (sic), burner, and the alcohol they used for the burner, sir. xxx PROS. BAGAOISAN

Now, what did you do next after you were able to arrest the two accused? WITNESS We went to our office in Camp Crame to turn over the evidence to the police investigator for proper investigation and disposition, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN Were you able to turn over the evidence and the persons of the accused to the investigator? WITNESS Yes, sir. xxx PROS. BAGAOISAN Did you come to know what happened to the stuff that was sold by the accused? WITNESS After it was have been marked (sic), I know that it could be submitted for examination to verify whether it is really shabu, sir. PROS. BAGAOISAN And, did you come to know the result of the examination conducted? WITNESS I learned that it was positive, sir...12[12] Upon examination, the white crystalline substance, bought by PO3 Labrador for P100,000.00 from petitioner during the buy-bust operation, later yielded a positive result for shabu per Physical Sciences Report No. D-64-96 issued by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory on January 17, 1996.13[13] As to the question of credibility of the police officers who served as principal witnesses for the prosecution, settled is the rule that prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.14[14] It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.15[15] The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of

testifying during the trial.16[16] The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals, as in the present case.17[17]

Moreover, in the process of converting into written form the statements of living human beings, not only fine nuances but a world of meaning apparent to the judge present, watching and listening, may escape the reader of the translated words. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during trial.18[18] Hence, their factual findings are accorded great weight, absent any showing that certain facts of relevance and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.19[19] No cogent reason exists for the Court to deviate from this rule. The inaccuracies in the testimonies of the arresting officers alluded to by petitioner are inconsequential and minor to adversely affect their credibility. Moreover the alleged inconsistencies pointed to by petitioner, namely: (a) the target of the buy-bust operation; (b) the presence or absence of a prior surveillance; and (c) the identity of the team leader, were not necessary to establish the elements of the crime committed. The RTC, as upheld by the CA, found that the testimonies of PO3 Labrador, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gozar, and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Edwin Anaviso were unequivocal, definite and straightforward. More importantly, their testimonies were consistent in material respects with each other and with other testimonies and physical evidence. Time and again, the Court has ruled that the testimonies of witnesses need only to corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime.20[20] In the present case, what is essential is that the prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the one who sold and delivered the shabu to PO3 Labrador. There is nothing on record that sufficiently casts doubt on the credibility of the police operatives.

20[20] People v. Razul, G.R. No. 146470, November 22, 2002, 392 SCRA 553, 570; People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 143805, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 689, 698.

Neither does the Court give credit to petitioners contention that the conduct of the buy-bust operation was highly irregular, as there was no surveillance made before the operation. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The court has held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.21[21] Moreover, prior surveillance is not necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.22[22] In the instant case, the entrapment or buy-bust operation was conducted without the necessity of any prior surveillance because the informant, who was previously tasked by PO3 Labrador to deal with petitioner's assistant, accompanied the team and PO3 Labrador himself when the latter bought shabu from petitioner. To be sure, there is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. Thus, the Court has refused to establish on a priori basis what detailed acts the police authorities might credibly undertake in their entrapment operations.23[23]

For his part, petitioner could not offer any viable defense except to deny that there was a buy-bust operation and to claim that he was, instead, a victim of frame-up and extortion by the police officers. However, like alibi, the defenses of denial and frame-up are viewed by the Court with disfavor, as these can easily be concocted and are commonly used as standard lines of defense in most prosecutions arising from illegal sale of drugs.24[24] Moreover, for the claim of frame-up to prosper, the defense must present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the arresting policemen performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.25[25] This, petitioner failed to do.

Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was an unfortunate prey to a supposed ploy concocted by the police. By all indications and, in fact, by his own admission, he did not know anyone of the members of the buy-bust team which apprehended him. There was, therefore, no motive for them to trump up any charge against him. Neither was petitioner able to substantiate his allegation that the police officers who arrested him were paid to frame him up. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse him of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over petitioners bare allegation that he was framed up.26[26] In other words, the categorical and convincing testimonies of the policemen, backed up by physical evidence, overcome the unsubstantiated claim of ill motive by petitioner.

21[21] Id. 22[22] Quinicot v. People, G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 458, 470 citing People v. Gonzales, supra. 23[23] Id. 24[24] Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009; People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 551. 25[25] People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 185164, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 494, 508; People v. Cabugatan, supra. 26[26] Id.

With respect to petitioner's contention that the RTC of Makati had no jurisdiction over the case, it is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.27[27] Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.28[28] The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.29[29] Once these are shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.30[30] In the instant case, the Information clearly alleged that the the crime was committed in Makati. The allegation in the Information was sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA and the RTC that the defense failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate its allegation that the place where the buy-bust operation took place was within the territorial jurisdiction of Manila and not of Makati. The trial court was correct in holding that the testimony of the defense witness, who was an engineering assistant at the Office of the City Engineer of Manila, cannot be given credence, considering that his claims were not backed up by any supporting evidence. While the defense referred to a certification issued by a certain Magdiwang Recato from the Office of the City Engineer of Manila, to the effect that the place where the buy-bust operation was conducted was within the territorial jurisdiction of the city of Manila, the same was not offered in evidence and, hence, cannot be given evidentiary value.

Lastly, petitioner claims in the present petition that he and Campos were presented for inquest proceedings only after a week of being incarcerated. However, his claim was contradicted by his own admission during his direct examination that the inquest proceedings were conducted within two days after their arrest.31[31] This was consistent with his admission in his brief filed with the CA that the day following their arrest, they were brought to Makati for inquest and, a day thereafter, an Information was already filed against them.

With respect to petitioners claim that he was not informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest, the same cannot prevail over the testimonies of P/Insp. Gozar and SPO1 Anaviso, who were members of the apprehending team, attesting to the fact that petitioner was sufficiently apprised of his rights during his arrest.32[32] As earlier discussed, in the

27[27] Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009 citing Macasaet v. People, G.R. No. 156747, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 255, 271. 28[28] Id. 29[29] Id. 30[30] Id. 31[31] See TSN, August 19, 1999, p. 14.

absence of clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation were given full faith and credit.

In sum, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the CA and the RTC in the present case. The positive identification made by the poseur-buyer and the arresting officers and the laboratory report, not to mention the dubious defenses of denial and frame-up which petitioner has resorted to, sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24238, which affirmed, with modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, finding petitioner Francisco Aparis y Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals,et. al., respondents Facts: The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with thecrime of estafa though falsification of publicdocuments before the RTC of Manila. Allegedly, Cruzexecuted an Affidavit of Self-adjucation of a parcel of land when she knew that there were other survivingheirs. The offended party did not reserve the right tofile a separate civil action. Hence, it was triedtogether with the criminal case. The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the courtordered the return of the parcel of land to thesurviving heirs.Cruz filed by registered mail a motion forreconsideration. This was denied by the trial court. Apetition for certiorari and mandamus was filed withthe CA. This was also dismissed by the appellatecourt. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issues:Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manilahad jurisdiction to render judgment on the civilaspect of the criminal case, involving a property inBulacan. Decision:Case Remanded. There are 3 important requisites which must bepresent before the court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdiction before the subject matter,the territory where the offense was committed, and over theperson of the accused. In this case, the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferredon the court the power to hear and decide cases involvingestafa though falsification of public document. The courtalso had jurisdiction over the offense charged since thecrime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Thecourt also has acquire jurisdiction over the accused becausewhe voluntarily submitted to the courts authority.Art. 100 of the RPC provides that every personcriminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Art. 104 of the same Code provides that civil liability xxx includesrestitution. In this case, the civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal action since the offended partydid not reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was acquitted,this did not dissolve the civil aspect of the case.

Antiporda jr vs. Garchitorena 321 SCRA 551Facts:

Accused Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Et. Al were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos in an Information filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan dated September 18, 1997. The handling prosecutor,Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili, sought for the amendment of the info filed onSeptember 18, 1997 because of some inadequacies in the allegations in thesaid Information. An Amended Information was admitted by theSandiganbayan in a resolution dated November 24, 1997. The originalinformation did not allege that one of the petitioners, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan to order thekidnapping of Elmer Ramos.Accused filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold inAbeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued, denied. Issues: a) CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSE CHARGED IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION, SUBSEQUENTLYACQUIRE SUCH JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF AMENDING THEINFORMATION TO SUPPLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, JURISDICTIONAL FACTS NOTPREVIOUSLY AVERRED IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION? andb) COROLLARILY, CAN THE AMENDED INFORMATION BE ALLOWED WITHOUTCONDUCTING ANEW A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FOR THE GRAVEROFFENSE CHARGED THEREIN? Held: jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites concur:(1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to takecognizance of, (2) the offense must have been committed within itsterritorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged with the offense musthave been brought in to its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest orupon his voluntary submission to the court. The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal jurisdiction. Itis undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over thecase. But the third requisite is lacking, the accused xxx have no right toinvoke the processes of the court since they have not been placed in thecustody of the law or otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason or as aconsequence of the filling of the information. For the same reason, the courthad no authority to act on the petition. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention thatthe offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after thesame was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments tomotion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997[20]filed with the same court, it was they who challenged the jurisdiction of theRegional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion forReconsideration that the said crime is work connected and thus cognizablewith Sandigan Bayan.the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and itwas thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of theInformation.Petitioner prayed that a reinvestigation be made in view of the AmendedInformation.We hold that the reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. Areinvestigation is proper only if the accuseds substantial rights would beimpaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be undulyprejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe thepublic positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victimwas brought when he was kidnapped. The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already andwe see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

Fukuzume vs People GR. No. 143647November 11, 2005 Facts: Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is arepresentative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires;that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subjectaluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amountof P50,000.00 of the total agreed price of P290,000.00. that as a result , Yusuffered damage. Subsequently, Yu filed a complaint with the NationalBureau of Investigation (NBI).In 1994, an information is filed with the RTC Makati, charged Fukuzume withEstafa. The trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged which was alsoaffirmed by the CA.Hence, this petition.Fukuzume contended that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged since contract of sale of

the aluminumscrap wires took place at appellants residence in Paraaque. Contrary tothe allegation in the information that crime was committed in Makati. Issues: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction.WON the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised for thefirst time in the CA SC Held: We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that theRTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove thatFukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of theessential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafashould be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, tothe filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raisedthe issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged.Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground thatthe court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised orconsidered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or onappeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal casecannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver orotherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authoritywhich organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and formprescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by thisCourt beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy , whereinthe defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered thequestioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that thefactual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified thedeparture from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.

FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESJULY 14, 2008NACHURA, J.SUBJECT AREA: Estoppel by laches NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. TheRTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questionedRTCs jurisdiction on the case.The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches hasalready precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absentherein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case,constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding thefact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the CA HELD:

No. RATIO: Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issueof jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost bywaiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases inwhich the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, that is,lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that theparty entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stagewhen the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional casebecause of the presence of laches.In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty.Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt,promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based onprocedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive toshow cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to thateffect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to takethe case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.

The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, consideringthat he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, noconsiderable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. DISPOSITIVE: Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.