Alzate v. Aldana
Alzate v. Aldana
Alzate v. Aldana
Alzate (Principal of the South Provincial High School, La Union) v. Aldana (Director of Public Schools) (1960) Barrera, J. Dec 20, 1957: Alzate, Principal of the High School, wrote to the Director of Public Schools saying that taking into account his 24 years of service in the Bureau of Public Schools, he was entitled (under RA 842 The Public School Salary Act) to an automatic salary increase of 4 rates (1 rate for every 5 years of service). o These 24 yrs of service was actually in various positions, the last position being a secondary school principal. He claims that he is also entitled to an additional automatic salary increase of 1 rate for passing the exam for Superintendent of Private Schools given by the Civil Service Commission. Mar 10, 1958: The Director denied this saying that in the adjustment of salary of secondary principals, only the actual number of years of service as such only been in that position for 9 years, he would be entitled only to 1 rate of salary increase. Also, since the exam taken and passed by Alzate (the principal) was only for the Bureau of Private Schools, he was not entitled to the benefit of the Public School Salary Act. May 17, 1958: Alzate (the principal) requested for a reconsideration of the ruling, citing an opinion of the Secretary of Justice that in the adjustment of salaries, the length of service in the educational branch of the government and not merely in the position occupied at the time of the adjustment, should be considered. This reconsideration was received by the Bureau of Public Schools and it has been processed by a certain Mr. Samson of the Bureau of Public Schools. June 11, 1958: Alzate (the principal) not having received any ruling and believing that his salary, if not disbursed before the expiration of the fiscal year would be reverted to the Government, filed a mandamus proceeding in the CFI. June 27, 1958, after due hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction, CFI said that it has been agreed (by both parties) that the Director of Public Schools shall recommend to the proper officials not later than June 30, 1958 and before the close of office hours on that date the sum of P840.00 to accounts receivable the amount being claimed by the herein petitioner After this CFI decision, the Director filed an MTD on grounds that he did not exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court CFI granted the MTD.
Issue/Held: Whether the petition filed while the Director of Public Schools was still considering his request for reconsideration of the previous ruling stated no cause of action in view of the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- NO Ratio:
It appears from the petition that the reason for its filing without awaiting the final action of the Director of Public Schools was the urgency of preventing the automatic reversion as of July 1, 1958, after the expiration of the then current fiscal year, of the sum appropriated in Republic Act No. 2042 for the adjustment of salary of public school officials and teachers pursuant to Republic Act No. 842. Alzate (the principal) contends that if he waited for the final decision on his petition for reconsideration which was not forthcoming, and in fact did not come, before June 30, 1958, whatever action may thereafter be taken, even if favorable, would be of no avail after the reversion of the funds. Hence, to require him to exhaust the administrative remedies would, in the circumstances of the case, in effect amount to a nullification of his claim. SC agrees with his argument. The fact that the parties had to agree and the court had to approve the agreement that the Director of Public Schools shall recommend to the proper official not later than June 30, 1958 and before the closing of office hours on that date the commitment of the sum of P840.00 claimed, to accounts payable in order to prevent its reversion, is a recognition by the parties as well as the court of the validity and urgency of the action taken by the principal. In these particular circumstances, he had sufficient cause of action at the time of the filing of his petition on June 11, 1958, and a resort to the court without awaiting for the final decision of the administrative officers is not, in view of the special situation, premature.