Enhanced Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol (E-Gpsr)
Enhanced Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol (E-Gpsr)
Enhanced Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol (E-Gpsr)
M.Tech, Research Scholar Department of Co mputer Application Samrat Ashok Technological Institute Vid isha (M.P.)
1,
-------------------------------------------------Abstract-------------------------------------------------------------Wireless sensor networks are collections of large nu mber of sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are fea tured with limited energy, computation and transmission power. Each node in the network coordinates with every other node in forwarding their packets to reach the destination. Since these nodes operate in a physically insecure environment; they are vulnerable to different types of attacks such as selective forwarding and sybil. These attacks can inject malicious packets by compro mising the node. Geographical routing protocols of wireless sensor networks have been developed without considering the security aspects against these attacks. In this paper, a mo re efficient routing protocol named enhanced greedy perimeter stateless routing protocol (E-GPSR) is proposed for mobile sensor networks by incorporating the concept of observation time to the existing tru st based secured greedy perimeter stateless routing protocol (S-GPSR). Simu lation results proves that Enhanced greedy Perimeter stateless Routing outperforms the S-GPSR by reducing the over head and improving the delivery rat io of the network.
Keywords: Wireless sensor network, GPSR protocol, secured GPSR, Enhanced GPSR, co mpro mised nodes,
Sybil attack, selective fo rwarding attack. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Date of Submission: 1, December, 2012 Date of Publication: 15, December 2012 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Introduction
1.1 Wireless sensor Network Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are now used in many applications including military, environ mental, healthcare applications, home automation and traffic control. It consists of a large number of sensor n odes, densely deployed over an area. A wireless sensor network [1] typically consists of a very large number of small, inexpensive, disposable, robust, and low power sensor nodes working cooperatively. Wireless sensor network generally co mposed of a large number of distributed sensor nodes that organize themselves into a mult i-hop wireless network. Each network is equipped with more than one sensors, processing units, controlling units, transmitting units etc. Typically, the sensor nodes coordinate themselves to perform a common task. Sensor nodes are capable of collaborating with one another and measuring the condition of their surrounding environments. The sensed measurements are then transformed into [2] digital signals and processed to reveal some properties of the phenomena around sensors. Due to the fact that the sensor nodes in WSN have short radio transmission range, intermediate nodes act as relay nodes to transmit data towards the sink node using multipath. The deploy ment of sensor nodes based upo n the application types. Recently wireless sensor networks have drawn a lot of attention due to broad applications in military and civilian operations. Sensor nodes in the network are characterized by severely constrained, energy resources and communicational capabilities. Due to small size and inattention of the deployed nodes, attackers can easily capture and rework them as malicious nodes. Karloff and Wagner also have revealed that routing protocols of sensor networks are insecure and highly vulnerable to malicious nodes
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Figure 1: Basic structure of a Wireless sensor Network It can either join the network externally or may originate internally by compro mising an existing benevolent node . The attacks launched by internally generated compro mised nodes are the most dangerous type of attacks. These compro mised nodes can also carry out both passive and active attacks against the networks . In passive attack a malicious node only eavesdrops upon the packet contents, while in active attacks it may imit ate, drop or modify leg itimate packets . Sinkhole is one of the common type of active attack in which a node, can deceitfully modify the routing packets. So, it may lure other sensor nodes to route all traffic through it. The impact of sinkhole is to launch further active attacks on the traffic, wh ich is routed through it Due to limited capabilities of sensor nodes, providing security and privacy against these attacks is a challenging issue to sensor networks. In order to protect network against malicious attackers, numbers of routing protocols have been developed to improve network performance with the help of cryptographic techniques. Security mechanis ms used in these routing protocols of sensor networks detect the compro mised nod e and then revoke the cryptographic keys of the network. But, requirements of such secure routing protocols include configuration of the nodes with encryption keys and the creation of a centralized or distributed key repository to realize different security services in the network. This paper is organized as follow : Section 2 describes about the greedy perimeter stateless routing (GPSR). Section 3 deals with the Secured GPSR (S-GPSR). Sect ion 4 elaborates the proposed Enhanced Greedy Perimeter Stateless Ro uting (E-GPSR) for Wireless Sensor Network. Simu lation result are described in section 5. Section 6 defines the conclusion.
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Figure 1. Greedy forwarding mechanism 2.2. Perimeter Forwardi ng To overcome routing problems in such scenarios, GPSR engages perimeter forwarding mode. In perimeter mode, the data packet is marked as being in perimeter mode along with the location where greedy forwarding failed. These perimeter mode packets are forwarded using simple planar grap h traversal. Each node receiving a data packet marked as in perimeter mode uses the right-hand rule to forward packets to nodes, which are located counterclockwise to the line joining forwarding node and the destination. The perimeter fo rwarding mechanis m is shown in Figure 2. Each node, while forwarding perimeter mode packets, compares its present distance to the destination from the point where greedy forwarding has failed. If the current distance is less, packet is routed through greedy forwarding repeatedly from that point onwards. The protocol has been designed and developed based on the assumption that all nodes in the network would execute the protocol in a sincere manner. Ho wever, due to number of reasons including malice, inco mpetence and selfishnes s, nodes frequently deviate fro m defined standards leading to routing predicaments.
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Enhanced Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol (E-GPSR) 3. SECURED GREEDY PERIMETER STATELESS ROUTING (S-GPSR)
GPSR scans its neighborhood table to retrieve the next hop which is optimal and leads to the destination, during packet transmission to a known host. As there may be more than one such hop available, GPSR selects an adjacent neighbor that has the least distance to a p articular destination. In S-GPSR, the trust levels used in conjunction with the geographical distances are incorporated in the neighborhood table to create the most trusted distance route rather than the default min imal distance To compute direct trust in a node, an effort-return based trust model is used . The accuracy and sincerity of immediate neighboring nodes is ensured by observing their contribution to packet forwarding mechanis m. To imp lement the trust derivation mechanism, Trust Update Interval (TUI) of each forwarded packet is buffered in the node as (GPSR Agent::buffer packet). The TUI is a very critical co mponent of such a trust model. It determines the time a node should wait before assigning a trust or distrust level to a node based upon the results of a particular event. After transmission, each node promiscuously listens for the neighboring node to forward the packet. If neighbor forwards the packet in proper manner within the TUI, its corresponding trust level is incremented. However, if the neighboring node modifies the packet in an unexpected manner or does not forward the packet at all, its trust level is decremented. Every time a node transmits a data or control packet, it immediately brings its receiver into pro miscuous mode (GPSR Agent::tap), so as to overhear its immediate neighbor forwarding the packet . The sending node verifies the different fields in the forwarded IP packet for requisite modifications through a sequence of integrity checks (GPSR Agent::verify packet integrity). If the integrity checks succeed, it confirms that the node has acted in a benevolent manner and so its direct trust counter is incremented. On the other hand, if the integrity checkfails or the forward ing node does not transmit the packet at all, then its corre sponding direct trust measure is decremented so that the node is treated as malicious node. The S-GPSR is explained by using flow chart which is illustrated through Figure 3.
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4.1 GEN EARTION OF OBS ERVATION TIME FOR EACH NODE: Since the trust level count (TLC) , fo r each node that forwards a packet is initialized ,at the same t ime the Observation Time of each node is maintained ,wh ich is calcu lated on the acc ount of the buffered forwarded data packets in the node ( GPSR Agent :: buffer packet
). The Observation Time is very critical and impo rtant measure for efficient routing. It determines the time that a node takes to decide a most trusted and minimal route rather than a default minimal distance. The Observation time counter (OTC) is maintained by the observation of the neighboring nodes. The Observation Time Counter (OTC) field is updated by the monitoring of the average packet fo rwarding delay. Each t ime, if the packet is forwarded within the Observation Time the POSITIVE TRUST is generated for the particular node, else the NEGATIVE TRUST is generated for the Forwarding node 4.2 .TRUS TED ROUTE S EL ECTION Whenever a packet is to be forwarded a best and optimal node is to be selected. The selection of the trusted node is done on the basis of the TRUST COUNT for each nodes. A node with best TRUST COUNT is selected as the next node to be forward the packet along with the optimal minimu m distance. Every t ime a node transmits a data packet within an OBSERVATION TIM E , its neighbors overhears it immediately (forwarding packet) . The sending node verifies the different field in the forwarded IP packets and check for integrity. If the integrity check succeeds, it confirms that the node has acted in a benevolent manner.
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Fig : Total traffic sent in case of selecti ve forwarding and E-GPRS method and S-GPRS
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