pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics

pragmatic conditionals conditional pragmatics

jean-franois bonnefon
cnrs and universit de toulouse

guy politzer
cnrs and institut jean nicod
august , nd london reasoning workshop

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics overview

the paradox of the pragmatic component

Whatever the future grand theory of conditional reasoning will be, it will require a pragmatic component. content and context eects on interpretation and inference are consensually important, and are expected to explain an awful lot. . . and yet the pragmatic component is often the least developed in current theories. Maybe because pragmatics is all too often used to explain stuff away. Maybe because we cast too wide a net.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics overview

the boundaries of the pragmatic component

suggestion (constrain the explananda)
That the component must explain the pragmatic dimension of conditional reasoning does not mean it has to explain everything pragmatic that can happen when reasoning conditionally.

We oer a rule of thumb to determine what the component should explain and what is o its explanatory limits. Should handle broad sets of results:
inferences from exotic pragmatic conditionals inferences derived from classic conditional pragmatics.

Should certainly handle the intersection of these sets. Might safely ignore (for now) the exclusion of these sets.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics pragmatic conditionals

preliminary characterization

What is the purpose of an if p then q conditional? Often to inform of a (causal, temporal. . . ) relation between p and q: (1)
a. b. If Elizabeth dies then Charles will become King; If thats the Brussels plane the next one is to Berlin.

Some conditionals have another illocutionary force; Often involve considerations of decision-theoretic utility; Invite conclusions without a minor premise.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics pragmatic conditionals consequential conditionals

consequential conditionals
Illocutionary force is still to inform (suggest?), but goes beyond the causal relation. a definitional framework for other utility conditionals.

definition (consequential conditionals)

p is an action under the control of an agent who is neither the speaker nor the listener. q is a valued (desirable or undesirable) consequence of taking action p; q is known by the agent to be a consequence of p.

(2)

a. b.

If the ceo admits the fraud, hell serve time in jail; If Sophie takes this drug, shell make a good recovery.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics pragmatic conditionals conditional inducements

conditional inducements
Intention not merely to inform, but to induce or discourage a behavior through commitment to some consequences.

definition (promises/threats)
p q q p is an action under the control of the listener. is an action under the control of the speaker. is either desirable or undesirable to the listener. has same valence to speaker as q to listener.
If you buy this computer, Ill throw in a box of free CDs; If you throw a tantrum, Ill ground you.

(3)

a. b.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics pragmatic conditionals other utility conditionals

other utility conditionals

tips/warnings are very similar to promises/threats, but speaker neither controls q nor has stake in p. (4)
If you throw a tantrum, your mom will ground you.

persuasion conditionals implicate that their speaker believes their antecedent should (not) be undertaken. (5)
If the Kyoto accord is ratied, greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced.

directives and more generally deontics give indication about the preferences of individuals who established or accepted them. (6)
If I clean the house then I may have a drink.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics pragmatic conditionals non-utility pragmatic conditionals

non-utility pragmatic conditionals

biscuit conditionals do not conditionalize their consequent on their antecedent, but rather the conversational relevance of asserting their consequent. Their obverse is an endless source of fun. (7)
a. b. If you need help, my name is Pam; and whats your name when I dont need help?

preconditionals aka anankastic conditionals use a necessary condition as the antecedent, and suggest that this antecedent is far from being guaranteed. (8)
If I have some money left on Monday Ill invite you to lunch.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics conditional pragmatics the invited inferences

the invited inferences

Conditionals routinely invite their obverse: (9)
a. b. If Guy gets a raise then hell buy a car; If Guy doesnt get a raise then he wont buy a car.

Linguists approach this phenomenon within the framework of conditional perfection. Psychologists mostly want to explain the fallacies. Recent psychological accounts depart from conditional perfection in several critical assumptions:
Invited inferences can occur outside conditional perfection; Conditionals may also invite their converse ; The two invitations need not occur together.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics conditional pragmatics the conditional field

the conditional field

There is much more to a conditional than just two propositions. Statement If A, then really refers to: (AA1 A )(BB1 B ) (N N1 N ) where each of A, B, . . . , N would warrant the inference to , as long as complementary necessary conditions Ai s, Bj s, etc. are satised. All disjuncts other than As are ruled out by the invited inference to the obverse; The a-conjuncts are implicitly true as per expectations of cooperativeness and relevance.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics intersection obversion of pragmatic conditionals

obversion of pragmatic conditionals

Geis & Zwicky actually made their point using a promise: (10)
a. b. If you mow the lawn, Ill give you dollars; If you dont mow the lawn, I wont give you dollars.

We dont infer (10b) for scalar reasons, but rather not to defeat the whole illocutionary point of (10a). Threats also invite their obverse, for slightly more complicated reasons: (11)
a. b. If youre home later than , Ill take away your car; If youre home before , I wont take away your car.

Not meaning (11b) would again make (11a) inefficient. In addition, the parent asserting (11a) has a moral obligation to mean (11b).

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics intersection suppression effects

suppression effects
Conditionals come with the assumption that their cncs are satised; Pragmatic conditionals invite inferences of their ownpossibly about the cncs of other conditionals. Thus the well-known suppression effects (12)
a. b. c. a. b. c. If we go to room , well have free wine; If Mike got funding, well have free wine; We go to room . If Emma goes to the party then she buys a new dress; If Emma buys a new dress, she cant pay the rent; Emma goes to the party.

(13)

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics exclusion

exclusion
Say a research appeals to pragmatic notions and predicts conditional reasoning phenomena. . . . . . whilst not dealing with either pragmatic conditional nor conditional pragmatics.

modus tollens, modus shmollens

(14) Carol and Didier are eating a soup; a. b. c. If it tastes like garlic, there is garlic in the soup; Carol tells Didier: there is no garlic in this soup; Therefore, the soup tastes like garlic.

This result constrains theories of reasoning, but not necessarily the pragmatic component of conditional reasoning.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics conclusion

conclusion

To accelerate theoretical development, we need to be clear about the role we give to the pragmatic component. We suggest that the prime explanatory targets are two broad sets of results, pragmatic conditionals and conditional pragmatics. The intersection of the sets is especially relevant (obversion of pragmatic conditionals, suppression eects). We suggest to ignore for now the exclusion of these sets.

pragmatic conditionals/conditional pragmatics question time

pragmatic conditionals conditional pragmatics

jean-franois bonnefon
cnrs and universit de toulouse

guy politzer
cnrs and institut jean nicod
august , nd london reasoning workshop