Protectioncasestudies Protection case studies

s.k.mishra

ChallengesofElectricalProtections Challenges of Electrical Protections

ChallengesofElectricalProtection Challenges of Electrical Protection

ChallengesofElectricalProtection Challenges of Electrical Protection

MajorGridincidentslast5year Major Grid incidents last 5 year

Month/Year 2nd jan 2010 7th &9Th Jan 2008 12October2007 12 October 2007 27th Jan2007 1st May2006 6th July2005 Time 03:01Hrs 03:01 Hrs 7to8AM 12:51 08:12Hr 18:11to 19:00 19 00 1:23 LinetrippingduetoFog Linetrippingdue toFog Line tripping due to Fog 53Linetripped 315MVAICTfailure samaypur Incident GenerationAffected Punjab,NorthHaryana, Punjab North Haryana J&K,Himachal Delhi/UP Delhi/UP Delhi /UP Delhi/UP Delhi/UP/Haryana

MuradnagarAgraLineYph Delhi/UP/Haryana conductorfailure WholeNorthernGrid

2nd Jan2001 1st Jan1997 Morning ICTFailureat Dadri

WholeNorthernGrid

ProtectionCaseStudies Protection Case Studies

Lineprotection(GridIncidents) Line protection ( Grid Incidents) GeneratorStatorEarthFaults GeneratorDifferentialProtectionOperation Generator Differential Protection Operation GeneratorRotorEarthFault GeneratorTransformerBuchholzProtection G t T f B hh l P t ti LBBProtection UnderVoltageprotection LowForwardPowerprotection

ProtectionCaseStudies Protection Case Studies Line protection ( Grid Incidents) Lineprotection(GridIncidents)

GeneratorStatorEarthFaults GeneratorDifferentialProtectionOperation G t Diff ti l P t ti O ti GeneratorRotorEarthFault GeneratorTransformerBuchholzProtection Generator Transformer Buchholz Protection LBBProtection UnderVoltageprotection g p LowForwardPowerprotection

UnderstandingGridProtection Understanding Grid Protection

NortherngridPowerMap Northern grid Power Map

Dadri Ballabhgarh, Mandula, Mandula, Muradnagar

Rihand, Singaruli , Vindhyachal

PowerSystemDelhi Power System Delhi

Malerkotla punjab Mandula Delhi Panipat Haryana y

AGRA Muradnagar

400KV 400 KV 220kv Coal 220kv Gas Railway

Rishikesh

Sequenceofevents Sequence of events

01 01 0 02 T=0 T=0 T=12ms s YphaseofMuradnagarAgrasnappedat Fault 23kmfromAgra g 400/220 240MVAICT3Trippedat Muradnagar 400/220 240MVAICT1Trippedat 00/ 0 0 C pped at Muradnagar 400KVMoradabadLineatMuradnagar Tripped 400kv BuscoupleratMuradnagar tripped 400/220 240MVAICT2Trippedat Muradnagar TrippedonOver currentasICT1&3 had trippedand220kv systemwascoupled system was coupled LBBOperationof 400kvMuradnagar Agra Lineisolating BusB

03 04 05

T=36ms T=51ms 5sec 247ms

Sequenceofevents Sequence of events

01 01 T=0 T= 12sec 135ms T=12 sec 362ms T= 14sec 488ms T= 31sec9 ms T= 31sec9 ms T= 31sec9 ms T= 31sec9 ms YphaseofMuradnagarAgrasnappedat Fault 23kmfromAgra g 400kv/220KVICT#3 atDadri GasTripped DirectionalEarthFault 400kv side AllbreakersofBus1tripped LBBprotection

02 03 04 05 06 07

400kv/220KVICT#4atDadri GasTripped DirectionalEarthfault 400kV k Dadri GT2 Tripped Dadri GT4Tripped Dadri GT1 Tripped Dadri GT1 Tripped GTbackUpEarthfault GTbackUpEarthfault GTbackUpEarthfault GTbackUpEarthfault

Sequenceofevents Sequence of events

01 01 T=0 1:23:31:436 42sec632 ms 44sec632 ms 44sec632 ms 02:30:50: 864 YphaseofMuradnagarAgrasnappedat Fault 23kmfromAgra g 400kv Dadri ballbggarh1trippedfrom Ballb end 400kv Dadri ballbggarh2trippedfrom Ballb end Main#1RALZBrelay operation Main#1RALZBrelay operation

02

03

Rihand Dadri HVDCBipole trippeddueto Unbalance h d d l dd b l DCharmonicprotectionExcessive unbalance Dadri Muradnagar Dadri end tripped MuradnagarDadri endtripped clearingthefault Dadri Panipt LineTrippedwhichwason thesamediameter. Z1& Z2diatance Z1 & Z2 diatance protection

04

PowerSystemDelhi Power System Delhi

Malerkotla punjab Mandula Delhi Panipat Haryana y

AGRA BusBMuradnagar

ICT ICT BusAMuradnagar 400KV 400 KV Rishikesh 220kv Coal 220kv Gas Railway

Rishikesh

ProtectionIssues Protection Issues

Sr no Location 01 01 Muradnagar ProtectionOperation LBB protection protection Nooperationofcarrieraided protection. ICTTripping400kv Directional ICT Tripping 400 kv Directional earthFault No operationofdistance protectionZ#3 Nooperationofcarrieraided protection LBBprotectionofBus#1 GTbackupearthfault protection&Negativephase seq protection protection Unbalanceprotection Issues BreakerLock out Breaker Lock out NoIssueoftripcommand toDadri endBreaker Forfaultinreversezone For fault in reverse zone SettingPhilosophy

02 03

Dadri Dadri

04 05

Dadri Dadri

Operation afterclearing thefault h f l Operation philosophy

06

Dadri HVDC

ProtectionPhilosophy

EnergyconsumedDuringFault Energy consumed During Fault

Total energy consumed : 118 MWh is Totalenergyconsumed:118MWh is consumedin63minute FaultsarecharacterizedbyheavyMVAR andnegligibleMWflow. Accuracyofactiveenergymeterwhenpf isclosetozero? is close to zero ?

OtherComponentsofProtection Other Components of Protection

Timesynchronization Time synchronization EventLogger DisturbanceRecorder i b d PLCCcarrier Communicationnetwork

Pointsofconcern Points of concern

Operationalfailureoftwo400Kv CircuitBreaker p NonavailabilityofPLCCforlastseveralmonth Failureof400Kv LBBprotectionsystemattwo substation(MuradnagarandDadri) ( ) Revisitingbackupprotectionphilosophyforline distanceprotection distance protection Inabilityofoperatortofullycomprehendthe situation Lackofaproperverbalcommunicationbetween substationandloaddispatchcentre

RisktoGridStability Risk to Grid Stability

RisktoGridStability Risk to Grid Stability

InsulatorPollution:AdoptionSilicon ProfileInsulator fl l

LineMaintenance:Needforadoption ofModernMaintenancePractices f d

ProtectionCaseStudies Protection Case Studies

Lineprotection(GridIncidents) p ( ) GeneratorStatorEarthFaults GeneratorDifferentialProtectionOperation GeneratorRotorEarthFault GeneratorTransformerBuchholzProtection

LBBProtection
UnderVoltageprotection LowForwardPowerprotection

LBBFailureCases LBB Failure Cases

SINGRAULI TRIPPED AS 400 KV BUS 2 TRIPPED ON 05 09 09 AT 14:30 HRS 05.09.09 HRS. ALLAHABAD LINE 1 TRIPPED DUE TO EARTH FAULT. 400 KV BUS 2 TRIPPED DUE TO LBB OPERATION. UNIT 4 SYNCHRONISED ON 05.09.09 AT 16:45 HRS

LBB of Buscoupler-1 Operated due to scheme problem while loading BusVINDHYACHAL 2 through V-J-3 line VJ3 LBB of Buscoupler-1 Operated due to scheme problem while loading BusVINDHYACHAL 2 through V-J-3 line LBB of B f Buscoupler-1 O l 1 Operated d t scheme problem while l di B t d due to h bl hil loading BusVINDHYACHAL 2 through V-J-3 line LBB of Buscoupler-1 Operated due to scheme problem while loading BusVINDHYACHAL 2 through V-J-3 line

LBBFailureCases LBB Failure Cases

TALCHER KANIHA TRIPPED AS 400 KV BUS BAR TRIPPED ON LBB OPERATION ON 26/10/2009 AT 12:55 HRS, U-3 CONTINUING . TRIPPED AS 400 KV BUS BAR TRIPPED ON LBB OPERATION ON 26/10/2009 AT 12:55 HRS, U-4 SYNCHRONISED ON 26.10.09 AT 01:25 TRIPPED AS 400 KV BUS BAR TRIPPED ON LBB OPERATION ON 26/10/2009 AT 12:55 HRS, U-5 SYNCHRONISED ON 26.10.09 AT 17:45 HRS. TRIPPED AS 400 KV BUS BAR TRIPPED ON LBB OPERATION ON 26/10/2009 AT 12:55 HRS, U-6 SYNCHRONISED ON 27.10.09 AT 15:56 HRS.

TALCHER KANIHA

TALCHER KANIHA

TALCHER KANIHA

NeedforLBBProtection Need for LBB Protection

Failuretotrip: Breaker Contact do not open BreakerContactdonotopen FaultyTripCoil FaultyTripCircuit MechanicalproblemIn Breaker B k Failuretoclear: BreakeropenbutArcisnot p extinguishedandcurrent continuetoflow MechanicalFailure Incompleteopening Incomplete opening Dielectricproblem PreInsertionresisters

LBBProtection:IEEEGuideline LBB Protection : IEEE Guideline

LBB:Withoutresettime LBB: With out reset time

SometypicalUnwantedoperations Some typical Unwanted operations

Unwanted operation related ; Unwantedoperationrelated;
Defectivetimer(Wrongsetting,defectivetimer element,driftintimeetc) DefectiveFlagoperationrestrictingresettingof relay. DefectiveBusselectionrelay/Humanerror / Duringtesting(Wrongcurrentinjection) D bl DoubleearthingacrossCurrenttransformer hi C f Wrongselectionofrelay(Thresholdpickup,relay resetetc) reset etc)

Case A:OperationofLBB CaseA: Operation of LBB

400KVBus#1trippedonoperationofLBBrelayofUnit3 Observations: Unit#wasoperatingonratedload.Itsuddenlytrippedwith followingrelaysoperatedinGRP following relays operated in GRP GToveralldifferentialrelay87GT. OverheadLinedifferentialrelay87LRphase. Triprelays86G,286G,386Gand486G. Feedersconnectedto400KVbustripped

Case A:OperationofLBB CaseA: Operation of LBB

CauseofUnit3tripping: pp g ItwasfoundthatUnit#3Mulsifirehadoperated duetoairleakagefromoneofthejointflange gaskets.Dropinairpressurecausedoperationof k d f delugevalvewhichisfedfromRawwaterheader. Onlinesprinklingofmuddywatercausedarc Online sprinkling of muddy water caused arc trackingfromRphasebushingtobushingflangeof thegeneratortransformercausingtheRphto groundfaultresultinginoperationofalltheabove d f lt lti i ti f ll th b relaysinUnit3.

Case A:OperationofLBBatKorba CaseA: Operation of LBB at Korba

CauseofLBBoperation: p AsthefaultwasbetweenGTandyarditwasfedfor sometimeduetogeneratorresidualmagnetism seenonlybybushingCT. l b b h Th CT TheCTsecondarycurrentofbushingCTfacedtwo d t f b hi CT f d t parallelhighimpedanceckttoflow(87L&LBBckt withCT)andthesmallportionofthecurrentpassed ) p p throLBBcurrentelementwassufficienttocausethe operationofLBB.

Case C:UnwarrantedOperationofLBB CaseC: Unwarranted Operation of LBB

Case1:TalcherKaniha Observations:

250306

LBBprotectionwasfoundoperatedforthecircuit BreakersofthefollowingSt IIGenerator Breakers of the following StII Generator Transformers: Generator#3 : None Generator#4 : BothBus#3(2952)& Bus#4(2752) Generator#5 : BothBus#5(3852)& Bus#6(3652) Generator#6 Generator # 6 : OnlyBus#5(4152) Only Bus#5 (4152)

86relayof Unit Protection

LBB protectionof CB (+) ()

NOcontactof Triprelay86

LBBstart BinaryI/O

Case C:UnwarrantedOperationofLBB CaseC: Unwarranted Operation of LBB Case1:TalcherKaniha 250306

Cause: PickupvoltageoftheBinaryinputrelayof theLBBprotectionwascheckedandtothe surpriseofthestationengineersitwasfound tobe15VDCand16VAC. AnynearbyEHVinductionhavecausedthe operationofLBB p

Case C:UnwarrantedOperationofLBB CaseC: Unwarranted Operation of LBB Case1:TalcherKaniha 250306 Solution: S l i Relay7SV600ofSiemens makehasabinary inputrelayratedfor17 300V d h i l d f 17 300Vandhasa operatingthresholdsettingoptionof17Vor 74V.Thesettingselectionisbylinksatthe 74V The setting selection is by links at the cardleveloftherelay(notontherelayfront panel). Thresholdincreasedto74Vbyadoptingnew linkposition. link position.

Case C:UnwarrantedOperationofLBB CaseC: Unwarranted Operation of LBB

Case1:Unchahar 180107 Observations: Unit5trippedonLBBprotection. Cause: Lowpickupvoltage(1213V)ofbinaryinputchannel relay.RelayusedisMiComP122ofAreva. Remedy: Relaystobereplacedashighersettingofthresholdis notpossibleinMiComP122.

ProtectionCaseStudies Protection Case Studies

Lineprotection(GridIncidents) p ( ) GeneratorStatorEarthFaults

GeneratorDifferentialProtectionOperation p
GeneratorRotorEarthFault GeneratorTransformerBuchholzProtection LBBProtection

UnderVoltageprotection LowForwardPowerprotection

DifferentialProtectionOperationOn Throughfault:7No h hf l
Recommendation sent to site for replacement of existing f Tripped on Gen differential protection f during through fault at 400KV Panki relay. Stability of existing Gen diff relay is not adequate due end. CT got burst. to increase in fault level level. Recommendation sent to site for replacement of existing Tripped on generator protection relay. relay Stability of existing Gen during tripping of 220KV line diff relay is not adequate due to increase in grid fault level. TRIPPED ON GT DIFF PROTECTION. DTH relay maloperated

Case B:Operationof87Gwithlinefault CaseB: Operation of 87G with line fault Case1:Dadri Gas: 261106 Observations: Allthe4GTGgeneratorsofDadri Gastripped onGenDiffProtn (87G)duringfaultat400KV on Gen Diff Protn (87G) during fault at 400KV Dadri Ballabhgarhline1 Siemens make 7UD21relay is in service in all Siemensmake7UD21relayisinserviceinall theGTGs&STGs.ButrelaysofGTGsonly operatedduringtheincident. operated during the incident Linefaultclearedwithadelayof145ms.

Case B:Operationof87Gwithlinefault CaseB: Operation of 87G with line fault Case1:#Gas: Cause of operation: Causeofoperation: a)CTsusedare5P10classandofdifferentsize &shapeforphase&neutralside(forGTG & shape for phase & neutral side (for GTG Generators). b) Relay restraint function starts at 3 times In b)Relayrestraintfunctionstartsat3timesIn. FaultsharedbytheGTGgeneratorswereless andrelayfailedtoproviderestrainingaction. and relay failed to provide restraining action

Z1Timedelayis100ms

Case B:Operationof87Gwithlinefault CaseB: Operation of 87G with line fault Case1:#Gas: Remedial action: Remedialaction: a)Relaytobereplacedwithasuitableonefor suchapplication. such application b)DelayinreceiptofcarrierfromBallabhgarh endtobeinvestigatedandresolved end to be investigated and resolved c)Asanimmediatesolution,settingof87G increasedfrom20%to30%. increased from 20% to 30%

Case B:Operationof87Gwithlinefault CaseB: Operation of 87G with line fault

Case2: 2x500MWCoalStation Both500MWgeneratorsat#trippedonGenDiff g pp Protn (87G)duringcloseinfaultat400KVline. A Areva makeCAG34relayisinservice. k CAG34 l i i i Temporarilysettinghasbeenincreased. Temporarily setting has been increased Suggestedsolution:ReplacewithsuitableNumerical relayhavingbiaseddifferential protection.

Case B:Operationof87Gwithlinefault CaseB: Operation of 87G with line fault

Case3:#GasStation ST1C:GeneratortrippedonGenDifferential pp Protectionduringlinefault&withmultipleline tripping. Actionstaken: CTssaturationcheckedandfoundinorder. Relaysettingfoundverysensitive.Suggestedto revisethethresholdsettingto0.1A(10%In)from i h h h ld i 0 1A (10% I ) f 0.025A(2.5%In)andslopesettingto20%from10%.

CT

DifferentialRelay RR I2 O Io I1

BiasedDifferentialRelay

I I I

I I I

I I1+I2 2

I=

I=I1 I2

Case B:Operationof87Gwithlinefault CaseB: Operation of 87G with line fault

Case4:GasStation AllGTGeneratortrippedonGenDifferential pp Protectionduringlinefault. Actionstaken: A ti t k CTssaturationcheckedandfoundinorder. RatioDifferentialRelayhavingfixeddifferentialand slopesetting. SuggestedtoreplacerelaywitheitherCAG34or numericalrelay.

CaseE:TrippingofmultipleGeneratorsdueto unclearedsystemfault f
Case1:FGPS Observations: 271007
GTG1atFGPSwasrunningon130MWloadwith220KVPalla 1andSamaypur1linesconnectedtoBus1&STGwas yp generating67MWwith220KVPalla2,Samaypur2linesand GTG2HVCBconnectedtoBus2atFGPS.220KVBuscoupler breakerwasclosedandGTG2wasoutofbarduetolow schedule.Totalpowerfailuretookplaceat07:22hrs. h d l T t l f il t k l t 07 22 h Theincidentwasinitiatedfromanunclearedfaultin16MVA, 66KV/11KVTransformer3feederatPallasubstationofHVPNL andfaultwasfedfromFGPSthrough220KVPalla1&2lines. d f lt f df FGPS th h 220KV P ll 1 & 2 li

FaridabadGPS

220KVPallaS/S

220KVPalla1&2 GTG1
2x100MVA, 2x100MVA, 230/66KV, Z%=11.5

3x16MVA, 66/11KV, 66/11KV Z%=7

GTG2 220KVSamaypur1&2 STG

Faultat Fault at 11KV side cable ofTr3

CaseE:TrippingofmultipleGeneratorsdueto unclearedsystemfault l d f l
S.N . 1 07h:22m:03s:375STG tripped on GT Standby Earth fault (51NGT) protection. a) Uncleared Fault in 16MVA, 66KV/11KV Transformer-3 feeder at Palla substation. b) Neutral current was just above relay setting of 250A and relay correctly operated after 1.5sec delay. BusBar differential relay rightly operated due to snapping of conductor from Bus-2 PG clamp on the 489B isolator at FGPS connected to Palla-2 line Palla 2 and within the zone of Busbar differential protection of Bus-2. The fault should have been cleared in back up by tripping of Palla-1 line instead of GTG-1 tripping. Protection relay settings need review. Event Observation / cause Remedial measure

Incorporation of DEF in line protection and co-ordination with 51NGT.

07h:22m:12s:62507h:22m:12s:625 BusBar differential protection of Bus-2 operated and 220KV breakers of Palla-2, B/C, GTG2 HVCB, and Samaypur-2 opened. Bus-2 became dead. Bus 2 GTG-1 was running connected to Bus-1 with Palla-1 & Samaypur-1 lines. 07h:22m:15s:875GTG-1 tripped on Overcurrent & Back up impedance protection.

The switchyard at FGPS has been recently taken over from PGCIL and hence monthly Thermovision scanning and attending of hot spots is suggested.

Relay setting reviewed and proper co-ordination provided.

CaseE:TrippingofmultipleGeneratorsdueto unclearedsystemfault f

Case2:Farakka Observations:

310308

Unit # 2 4 & 5 tripped on generator back up Unit#2,4&5trippedongeneratorbackup E/Fprotection(51NGT)asMaldaFarakkaline trippedduringtestchargingofMalda Purnia tripped during test charging of MaldaPurnia line(byPowerGrid). Remedy: IncorporationofDEFinlineprotectionandco ordinationwith51NGT.

CaseF:TrippingofGeneratoronGTfield protectionsalongwithlinefault f
Case:Farakka on27th &30th April2007 Observations:
GT/UATBuchholz1/PRV/OSRrelaysofU2andsome offsiteHTTransfomersgotenergizedalongwithdisturbance offsite HT Transfomers got energized along with disturbance in400KVFkkDurgapur/Maldalines. Cause: EHVinterferencesinagedcables. Remedy: Replacementofoldcontrolcablesandlayingofcontroland powercablesinseparatetrays.ProperArmour/shield earthingatoneend&glanding. earthing at one end & glanding

CaseG:TrippingofGeneratorsubsequentto retrofittingofGRPwithnumericalrelays. f f Case:DadriGT2 Observations:

GT 2 tripped 5 times after retrofitting & GT2tripped5timesafterretrofitting& commissioningREG670&RET670numerical p otect o protection. i)On141207duetooperationofNPS ii)On15 12 07duetooperationofDeadM/c ii) On 151207 due to operation of Dead M/c protection. Iii) On 050208 due to operation of Gen Diff MainII Iii)On05 02 08duetooperationofGenDiffMain II

CaseG:TrippingofGeneratorsubsequentto retrofittingofGRPwithnumericalrelays. f f Case:DadriGT2 Observations:

iv)On030408duetooperationofGeneratorover ) p Excitationprotection. v)On090408duetooperationof95%StatorE/F protection. L Learning: i Parameterization,settings,measurementmode (RMS/DFT)etctobesetandstoredcarefullyinthe (RMS / DFT) etc to be set and stored carefully in the softwarealongwithdownloadingintherelay.

CaseH:Stationblackoutduetononoperation ofBusbardifferentialprotection. f ff Case:Vindhyachal y Observations:

400KVRphasebreakerofVindhyachalJabalpur4 p y p feederburst.BustdifferentialprotectionofBus1to whichfeederwasconnectedfailedtoclearthefault, causingstationblackout. causing station blackout Learning: Timely opening of bus section breakers & isolation of Timelyopeningofbussectionbreakers&isolationof faultwouldhaveavertedsuchincident.

CaseI:PTfailureleadingtoGenstatorearth fault.

Case:TalcherKaniha&Vindhyachal y Observations: Units tripped sometimes on SEF or on UnitstrippedsometimesonSEForon Excitationsystemtrouble(duetoUg failure) f il )

Learning: ReplacementofaparticularmakePTsand agedPTs.

IncidentsofGenerator95%StatorEarth ProtectionOperation P t ti O ti
TALCHER KANIHA 2 1 12 Aug 08 12-Aug-08 10-Nov-08 Tripped on stator earthfault protection due to problem of PT Unit w as running at 378 MW w ith mills BCDE in service. At 00:01hrs, unit tripped on Generator stator standby earth fault protection 64G2. In GRP, 95% Earth Fault Relay of Generator found in operated condition. All 12 PTs ( R, Y, B of PT A, B & C ) w ere

P T T

T e s T & re p

TALCHER KANIHA

FARAKKA

11-Feb-09 11 F b 09

Tripped on stator earthfault p pp protection. NaOH dosing carried out w hen Mixed g Bed Ion Exchanger resin w as exhausted.

L a c e.

Caution:ProperMonitoringofPWsystem

CaseJ:RotorearthFaulttripping
CaseI:TakcherKaniha Observations: On080808U#5trippedonRotorearthfault.Unit d hf l justcamebackaftergeneratorOH. Cause: cable from Exciter to GRP insulation damage cablefromExcitertoGRPinsulationdamage. Learning: Duecaretobetakenwhilehandlingcontrolcables Due care to be taken while handling control cables duringOHjobsofExciter. p CaseII:Sipat 6timesunitstrippedonREF DeficiencyofRelay CaseIII:VindhyachalExciterfailureatU#10

TypicalcasesK:SingrauliBustripping
19-Aug-08 SINGRAULI 2 19-Aug-08 SINGRAULI 4 Allahabad line 1 tripped due to line fault. LBB of bus 2 operated due to relay problem and bus became dead. Unit2 2 & 4 along w ith lLucknow line g sw itched to bus 2 got dead. Allahabad line 1 tripped due to line fault. LBB of bus 2 operated due to relay problem and bus became dead. Unit2 2 & 4 along w ith lLucknow line sw itched to bus 2 got dead.

Remedy: Remedy: PhaseSegregatedLBBprotectionforlineFeeders.

TypicalcasesL:DadriStationBlackout
22 Sep 08 22-Sep-08 DADRI COAL 1 22-Sep-08 DADRI COAL 3 22-Sep-08 DADRI COAL DADRI GAS DADRI GAS DADRI GAS DADRI GAS DADRI GAS 4 GT-1 GT-2 GT-3 ST-1 ST-2 ST 2 22-Sep-08 22-Sep-08 22-Sep-08 22-Sep-08 22-Sep-08 22 Sep 08 Dadri Panipat line 1 tripped due to fault in panipat end line isolator fail Severe fail. dip in B phase voltage w as observed. All air preheaters of unit tripped causing boiler trip. Dadri Panipat line 1 tripped due to fault in panipat end line isolator fail. Severe dip in B phase voltage w as observed. All air preheaters of unit tripped causing boiler trip. Dadri Panipat line 1 tripped due to fault in panipat end line isolator fail. Severe dip in B phase voltage w as observed. All air preheaters of unit tripped causing boiler trip. Unit tripped on Under Voltage Unit tripped on Under Voltage Unit tripped on Under Voltage Unit tripped on Under Voltage Unit tripped on Under Voltage

Remedy: R d 1) VTStimedelaysettingtobesetright.5sec. 2) PUTTlogicstobeimplemented

CaseM:OtherElectricalIssues
12-Aug-08 UNCHAHAR 4 9-Sep-08

One of the ID Fan 4a channel developed earthfault causing tripping of 6.6KV bus A. All the drives in that bus tripped(FD, PA fans, Mills). Unit tripped as PA p Header pressure w ent low Unit#4 w as running at 504 MW w ith seven milling system & w ith TDBFP-A & B .Sipat -Seoni 765 KV LINE-1 out going feeder Breaker Y phase pole got opened . Generator Transformer Back up earth fault protection 51NGT opened.Unit tripped on this electrical clas

SIPAT

PROTECTIONCoordinationissues

RAMAGUNDAM

1-Nov-08

2-Nov-08

After isolation of Tie Transformer-4, Sec-F supply w as being extended through tie betw een Sec-A and Sec-F. For normalising 6.6KV station bus (7S1), (7S1) incomer breaker from Station Transformer 7 w as closed and tie breaker tripped on interlock. Immediately i Unit w as running at 70 MW w ith mill B and C and three oil guns in service after synchronization at 15:55 hrs. At 16:35 Hrs Unit Bus A supply w as change from reserve source to main source from UAT-A.UAT-B breaker w as also tried but it did not close .So U

UNCHAHAR

DDCMIS:Slowscanningtimeproblem& DDCMIS: Slow scanning time problem & logicproblem

Case N:Bus IItrippingduetolinefault. CaseN: BusII tripping due to line fault . Case:Badarpuron100509at13:11hrs p Observations: 220KV BusII became dead due to operation of 220KVBus IIbecamedeadduetooperationof BusbarDifferentialprotection(CAG34)atthe timeofZone1faultin220KVNoidaline.Unit #4&2tripped
Learning: Reviewofrelaysettingisrequiredtobecarriedout periodicallywiththechangeinfaultleveland network/systemconfiguration. network / system configuration

CasestudyBFPtripping Case study BFP tripping

STAGE2SATBWASINSERVICEANDSATAWASUNDER R&M.WHILESTARTINGUNIT6BFP,SATATRIPPEDdue tooperationof220KVO/CrelayANDTHECOOLING to operation of 220KV O/C relay AND THE COOLING WATERPUMPSALSOTRIPPEDCAUSINGTRIPPINGOF COMPRESSORE.INSTRUMENTAIRTOBOTHSTAGES WERECHARGEDFROMSTAGE2,ANSASARESULTALL THEUNITSOFSTAGE1TRIPPEDONDRUMLEVEL PROTECTIONASINSTRUMENTAIRPRESSUREWENT LOW.
PE revised setting (I>0.4A) was not implemented in Areva P122 relay. Setting was I>0.2A

Unit tripped as UAT tripped on over current while starting BFP.

UAT capacity low, it may happen with existing setting. PE to suggest renedial action action.

CasestudyBFPtripping 8UnitTrippings AT inayear TRIPPED ON DRUM LEVEL LOW ON 29.08.09

00:30 HRS. BFP 6A TRIPPED ON SUCTION FOW HIGH. HIGH WHILE STARTING STAND BY BFP UAT TRIPPED ON OVERCURRENT PROTECTION. SYNCHRONISED ON 29.08.09 AT 04:10 HRS Unit was running at 220 MW BFP B & C were in MW. service with BFP-C on unit bus-2A. When BFP A start command was given, Unit bus-2A tripped, leading to tripping of all the auxiliaries of this bus including BFP-C Changeover of the supply from BFP C. station transformer did not take place. Unit tripped on drum level very low'. Incomer breaker of Unit Bus 2A from UAT-2A tripped on earth fault protection. As lockout relay had operated, supply changeover did not occur. Root Cause: As per logic, this earth fault protection should have been in disabled condition. It was enabled in the last OH while doing major R & M work on breaker. HE, HE DDCMIS mistake

Theearthfaultdetectionissues The earth fault detection issues

Detection scheme : Detectionscheme:
CBCT Residualcurrent

CurrentTransformer:
Type of core Typeofcore Ratio Kneepointvoltage p g Screenearthing

Setting g

BuchholzProtection 08UnitTraipping inayear

Tripped due to operation of pp p buchholtz relay. Work was in progress in one of the GT cooling pump. While charging the GT cooler it is suspected that air ingress occurred. 6.6KV BA bus was kept charged from station supply. Station transformer OLTC buchholtz protection operated due cable f lt t ti t dd bl fault. One set of ID/FD/BFP tripped. Unit tripped on drum level low protection. Human error, online replacement of GT cooler pump is not recommended as there will be air ingress into the transformer. Old cables to be replaced as per revised OIN-32 Sl no-11.2 g) 11 2 )

BuchholzProtection Buchholz Protection

HE, Buchholtz line isolating valve was closed & Oil leakage was there from sampling line as there was no blank in the line and sampling valve was passing. Draining of oil caused g opeartion of Buchholz relay.

GT-BUCHHOLTZ OPERATED

TRIPPED ON UAT B Korba Unit 6: BKorba Unit-6: repeated BUCHHOLTZ RELAY failure. Old cables to be PROTECTION ON 01.07.09 AT replaced as per revised 00:11 HRS. FAULTY CABLE OIN-32 Sl no-11.2 g) REPLACED. SYNCHRONISED ON 01.07.09 AT 05:14 HRS.

BuchholzProtection Buchholz Protection

TRIPPED ON UAT B OIL TEMP 3RD STG HIGH PROTECTION ON 01.07.09 AT 14:40. TEMPERATURE INDICATOR REPLACED. REPLACED UNIT SYNCHRONISED ON 01.07.09 AT 19:50 HRS. TRIPPED ON BUCHHOLTZ RELAY10 RELAY 10ms D b De-bounce ti timer OPERATION ON 15.08.09 AT 07:50 setting to be carried HRS. BUCHHOLTZ RELAY out in relay. OPERATED DUE TO STRAY VOLTAGE PICK UP. Tripped on operation of buchholtz relay. Air observed in the relay.

BuchholzIssues Buchholz Issues

Old cables dielectric problem due to oil Oldcablesdielectricproblemduetooil contamination. Buchholz relay mercury contact Buchholzrelaymercurycontact malfunctioning M i Maintenanceissues i AirsuckinduringstartingfanPumpordueto improperventingafterfiltration y g p p y p Strayvoltagepickupbynumericalprotection

CoordinationIssues 15UnitTrippinginayear
CW motor breaker failed to clear fault in motor TB and 6.6KV bus incomer tripped. 415 Volt supply to Turbine LOPs lost DC lost. LOP came in on lub oil pressure. Cause of CW breaker failure to be studied and healthiness of breakers to be ensured. During g testing, tripping of breaker from trip relay to be checked.

TRIPPED AS GT R PHASE OVERCURRENT RELAY OPERATED DURING DISTURBANCE AT KANPUR PANKI LINE ON 09.08.09 AT 12:45 HRS.

CoordinationIssues Coordination Issues

TRIPPED DURING PE to review the DISTURBANCE IN 220KV LINE cause of operation ON GENERATOR ROTOR E/F of MiCom P343 PROTECTION ON 27 08 09 AT 27.08.09 relay. relay 20:56 HRS. B PHASE CONDUTOR OF CHAINPAL LINE 2 SNAPPED CAUSING LINE FAULT. CHAINPAL LINE 1 & 2 TRIPPED. IN THE RESULTING VOLTAGE DIP, AUXLIARIES OF UNIT 1,2,3,4 TRIPPED. TRIPPED UNITS 1 2 3 TRIPPED 1,2,3 TRIPPED.

CoordinationIssues Coordination Issues

TRIPPED AS 400 KV BUS 2 TRIPPED ON 05 09 09 AT 14:30 HRS ALLAHABAD 05.09.09 HRS. LINE 1 TRIPPED DUE TO EARTH FAULT. 400 KV BUS 2 TRIPPED DUE TO LBB OPERATION. Unit-2 SYNCHRONISED ON 05.09.09 AT 18:55 HRS. Arc developed in HVDC 2 isolator due to fog(suspected). Bus 2 to which it was connected tripped on bus bar protection protection. Units 2&4 which was connected to bus 2 also tripped. Units 7&8 tripped on generator differential protection during the voltage dip.

CoordinationIssues Coordination Issues

Seal Air p/p motor winding burnt and caused tripping of USS-SecA. Control Fluid p/p changed over sucessfully but still tripped on trip oil press low. Unit was running at 515 MW C t l Fl id P i t MW. Control Fluid Pump-1 1 tripped and CFP-2 came on auto. Unit tripped on turbine trip oil pressure very low protection. USS-A tripped on earth p pp fault as Seal Air Fan A motor got burnt. CFP-1 tripped on under Voltage i.e 80% under voltage with 1sec time delay and CFP-2 CFP 2 took auto start In the mean time start. trip oil pressure dropped. Seal air fan-A Motor found to be burnt due to rubbing of stator winding with rotor due to the damage of DE side bearing.

CoordinationIssues Coordination Issues

Due to fault in 400KV Panipat 1 RPhase, 400 KV bus voltage dropped to 350KV causing voltage drop in 6.6 KV buses. Voltage drop persisted for about 2 minutes. minutes This caused tripping of CW pumps and HPBFPs on over current / overload protection causing tripping of WHRB 1&2 on all HP BFPs tripped protection. ST-1 tripped as both WHRBs tripped.

TRIPPED AS NGT RELAY OPERATED AS PALLA LINE 2 TRIPPED ON ZONE 3 PROTECTION

DCE/F DC E/F
Tripped due to operation of GTR relay. No other relays / protection operated which is leading to operation of GTR. IBT 2 TRIPPED ON POLE DISCREPENCY. DISCREPENCY CW PUMPS TRIPPED ON COOLING WATER FLOW LOW. UNITS 1&2 TRIPPED AS CWPUMPS TRIPPED No reasons found

Swyd DC Gr-A & B earth f lt and th fault d mixing found.

REFStabilityIssue REF Stability Issue

GT-4 was repalced during OH. HE, REF relay stability GT REF operated due to checking not done after wrong polarity of CT and unit work was carried out on l i f d i k i d tripped along with fault in the REF circuit. OIN-32 to Noida line. be followed and SCC / OCC test along with stability proving of all protection relays to be carried out as per standard practice after replacement of t f transformer. f

VerminIssues Vermin Issues

TRIPPED ON 9 11 09 AT 13 52 ON COND VAC LOW CW 9.11.09 13.52 LOW-CW PUMPS TRIPPED DUE TO RODENT ENTRY IN SWGR. SYNCHRONISED AT 19:00 HRS ON 9.11.09 TRIPPED AT 17:05 HRS ON 10.11.09 DUE TO STATOR WATER FLOW LOW AS THE STATOR WATER PUMPS TRIPPED FOLLOWING 6.6 KV BUS BS INCOMER TRIPPING(UNIT HAD BEEN SYNCHRONISED AT 12:16 HRS ON 10.11.09 AFTER O/H).SYNCHRONISED AT 01:15 HRS ON 11.11.09 UAT- B INCOMER BREAKER TRIPPED DUE TO RODENT ENTRY CAUSING UNIT TRIP ON 05.12.09 AT 04:54 HRS. SYNCRONISED ON 05.12.09 AT 12:08 HRS. Unit #4 was running at 180 MW load with mills A B C D E in service without A,B,C,D,E oil support. Unit tripped on UAT Differential protection. Smoke observed from UAT 4B incomer breaker. A mouse found entrapped between Y&B phases at primary side of the breaker. Breaker was replaced with new one.

WaterIngressIssue Water Ingress Issue

GT-1 tripped due to earth fault in UAT busduct near UAT bushing due to water ingress. Bus duct pressuering system is not maintaining pressure TRIPPED ON UT DIFF. PROTECTION ON 30.07.09 AT 06:15 HRS. WATER INGRESS IN GRP PANEL DUE TO FRS LEAKAGE LEAKAGE. SYNCHRONISED ON 30.07.09 AT 19:48 HRS TRIPPED ON STATOR EARTH FAULT PROTECTION ON 29.08.09 AT6 15:10 HRS. RAIN WATER INGRESS THROUGH DAMAGED UAT BELLOW. SYNCHRONISED ON 29 08 09 AT 19:20 HRS 29.08.09 HRS.

WheretoTarget Where to Target

Understanding some Key specification UnderstandingsomeKeyspecification
IEC335Class3 Dust and Vermin Proof : IP52 DustandVerminProof:IP52 Allcutout:SyntheticsRubberGasket All td AlloutdoorCabinets,Kiosks,Panels:IP55 C bi t Ki k P l IP55
Class0:NoprotectiveEarthConnection,singlelevelofinsulation,intendedforuseindry area. Class01:Class0buthaveanearthconnectionwhichisunused. ClassI:Musthavechassisconnectedtoelectricalearthbyanearthconductor green/yellow ClassII:DoubleInsulateddoesnotrequiresafetyconnectiontoelectricalearth. Class II : Double Insulated does not require safety connection to electrical earth Class III:DesignedtobesuppliedfromSELV(SeparatedorsafetyextraLowvoltage) powersupply

WhytheProblemPersists
IP
Internation al Protection

1st Character Against ingress of solid lid foreign objects j

1: 50mm dia 2:>2.5 mm dia 4:1 mm dia 5; Dust Protected 6: Dust protected Dust Tight

2nd Character Against ingress of water t

3rd Character

4th Character

Additional Additional requireme requireme nt t nt t

1: vertically Dripping 2: dripping 15 pp g angle 3: Spraying 4: Splashing 5: Jetting 7: Immersion

A: Back of Hand B: Finger g C:Tool D: Wire

H: High Voltage device M : Moving g during water test S : still during water test t t t W : weather condition

CaseD:GeneratorPTprimaryfusefailureat KorbaStII K b S II Observations: Primaryfuse(6.3Arating)failedin6occasions atKorbaStII,500MWunitsbutwithoutany at Korba St II 500MW units but without any primaryfault. U i Unitstrippedon3occasions.PTfusefailrelay i d 3 i PT f f il l couldnotoperatefastenoughtoblockthe voltagedependentrelays. l d d l

GeneratorPTMB

Protection

PrimaryFuses

SecondaryFuses

AVR

Metering

CaseD:GeneratorPTprimaryfusefailureat KorbaStII K b S II
Analysis: y MostlymechanicalfailuretookplaceinPTprimary fuses. Delayinoperationoffusefailblockingrelayisunder studyforsuitablesolution.

Action: StationproposalforremovingtheprimaryfusesofPT hasbeenvettedastemporarysolution. has been vetted as temporary solution.

Thankyou Thank you